■ I departed my home base…for a short pleasure flight. Clear skies prevailed with visibility unlimited and winds out of the north at approximately 10 knots. I planned to fly over the lake. As I approached the north end of the lake, I saw a beach along the lake that was aligned with the wind and made the decision to -

■ Immediately after the “clear to pull chocks” from the ground crew, the Captain released the parking brakes, and we started rolling backward. I believe the ground crew said, “Wait I’m here connected.” As we continued to roll, the Captain and ground crew continued to communicate, and I heard the ground crew saying, “Wait, the headset’s hooked up to the plane.” I made direct eye contact with the Captain and told him we needed to stop several times. I could hear the ground crew saying something like, “Stop, I’m under here connected to the plane; you’re moving too fast.” I told the Captain it’s an emergency; we need to stop now. After no response…and hearing the ground personnel struggle,

■ During a single-engine taxi for departure, Engine One experienced an uncommanded rollback and shutdown, accompanied by an EGT rise. I was conducting OE (Operating Experience) with a new Captain on his second flight. As the Number Two Engine was stabilizing, the Flight Attendant contacted the flight deck regarding a possible medical situation in the cabin. While I was addressing the medical issue, the Captain in training observed an abnormal EGT rise on Engine One. He brought this to my attention, and I -

■ It was my first trip into Aspen, working for Company. The weather was CAVOK (Ceiling And Visibility OK). I had loaded the RNAV-F. The two remaining approaches in the FMC database were the localizer to 15 and another RNAV approach, which we did not have a plate for. The PM noticed the RNAV-F did not have a runway associated with it. It was decided that a RNWY EXT would be used in lieu of the localizer approach because it would provide vertical guidance using VNAV. Due to time pressure, being vectored for the approach, the PM neglected to change the glideslope angle from 3° to 3.5°. Though high on the…VNAV path, a soft terrain warning was followed by a hard terrain warning.

■ land there. I circled the area at about 500' AGL to make sure there were no people, vessels or structures anywhere near the area I planned to land. I set up for a half-mile final…dropped my flaps, and slowed to approach speed. I verified again the beach looked clear with no obstacles or people. I touched down on my main gear as slow as practical and immediately decelerated in soft mud. The aircraft slowly went over on its nose, but not all the way over - the tail did not strike.… I unbuckled and lowered myself against the windshield and roof. I turned off the mags and master switch. I waited for authorities to arrive. I had no injuries, and there was no damage to any property. In hindsight, it was a completely stupid decision…to land there.… I should know better than to do…this. There were no aircraft anomalies and no reason for me to land there. It took a brief moment of “aviation fun” to re-learn an important lesson.… I'm never too old to learn. I deeply regret this lapse in judgement.

■ I quickly applied the brakes to stop the aircraft. The stop was abrupt in order to prevent potential injury to ground crew and to prevent us from entering an active taxiway. Two Flight Attendants had fallen from the quick stop. We returned to the gate to get them cleared by Medical and to have the aircraft checked out for any maintenance irregularities to ensure safety. Both Flight Attendants were cleared by EMS, and the airplane was inspected by the Captain with no irregularities detected. No passenger injuries were reported.… Review and have detailed briefings on airport power-out notes. Follow ground communication procedures and ensure we understand instructions before taking actions.

■ re-engaged fully with the flight deck. We observed that Engine One had shut down by itself, with no visible signs of distress or damage. The ECAM displayed an "ENGINE 1 FAIL" message and suggested an engine restart if no damage was suspected. Given the simultaneous cabin and engine concerns, I coordinated with…Ground to taxi using only Engine Two to a safe area to address both issues. The Flight Attendant later confirmed that the cabin issue had resolved favorably, as the passenger was simply a nervous flyer. I then contacted Maintenance Control for guidance and diagnosis regarding the engine issue. Maintenance reviewed their data and indicated that the fault appeared to be related to the FADEC (Full Authority Digital Electronic Control). They advised that a reset would likely resolve the issue. I informed Maintenance Control that the Captain in training had observed a redline EGT rise during the event, however, Maintenance stated that no EGT exceedance was recorded in their data, and we did not have any exceedance indication in the flight deck.… Additionally, subsequent to our flight, Maintenance confirmed that our flight history showed no EGT exceedance. Following Maintenance's direction, we performed a FADEC reset. Before attempting an engine restart, I recommended conducting a dry motor to clear any residual fuel, which Maintenance agreed with. The subsequent engine start was normal with all engine parameters within limits. During takeoff, engine indications, including EGT and fuel flow, were normal and within 10 degrees of each other. Cruise checks also indicated normal operation. After departure, I noticed a red marking on the EGT gauge that had not been previously observed during ground operations, possibly due to expectation bias. Out of an abundance of caution, I notified Dispatch and Maintenance Control to meet the flight upon arrival. While further reviewing the situation, I retrieved a data printout left onboard from the previous flight.… Upon review, I noticed evidence suggesting similar engine issues had occurred twice on the inbound flight. Based on this information and the symptoms experienced, I elected to request a more thorough inspection by Maintenance before the aircraft was returned to service.

■ In good VMC conditions, the descent rate was shallow, and the terrain was visually cleared. The approach was continued to a landing. The GPWS provided appropriate terrain warnings. Terrain avoidance was done visually. During the course of the flight, I inquired as to what approach we may get into Aspen. It was my understanding that Company had a tailored approach to Runway 15. The database only had two approaches that the crew had plates for. The database was checked to be current prior to the 1st flight of the day. The crew was late doing the approach checklist due to a late start getting landing data. The descent rate was shallowed, but not enough to prevent the terrain warning. The approach was continued with the terrain in sight to a landing.… I should’ve gone around.