ASRS Database Report Set

Pilot / Controller Communications

Report Set Description...........................................A sampling of reports which highlight issues involving communications between pilots and controllers.

Update Number....................................................33.0

Date of Update..................................................May 31, 2018

Number of Records in Report Set.........................50

Number of New Records in Report Set ...............50

Type of Records in Report Set.............................For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating these data of the following points.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to report. Thus, the data can reflect reporting biases. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.

One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concerning specific event types represents the lower measure of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that the real power of ASRS data is the qualitative information contained in report narratives. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, why it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.
Report Synopses
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACN: 1519535 (1 of 50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Synopsis** | A319 flight crew reported being low altitude alert on approach due to heavy workload on final.  
| ACN: 1518920 (2 of 50) |  
| **Synopsis** | A Tower Controller reported they issued a departure clearance to the wrong aircraft due to similar sounding call signs from the same company.  
| ACN: 1517325 (3 of 50) |  
| **Synopsis** | CRJ-200 flight crew reported incorrect clearance read back for crossing a fix on STAR, which had similar sounding fixes names.  
| ACN: 1517238 (4 of 50) |  
| **Synopsis** | Air carrier flight crew reported multiple conflicts with helicopters not in contact with Tower while on approach to ADQ.  
| ACN: 1516955 (5 of 50) |  
| **Synopsis** | B737 flight crew reported receiving a clearance that did not include a revised altitude assignment from the Center controller.  
| ACN: 1516513 (6 of 50) |  
| **Synopsis** | Beech 400 flight crew reported that a lack of runway condition reports from ATC contributed to an excursion from an icy runway into the EMAS overrun.  
| ACN: 1516423 (7 of 50) |  
| **Synopsis** | Air carrier flight crew reported continuing their takeoff after ATC issued a clearance to cancel their takeoff.  
| ACN: 1516152 (8 of 50) |  
| **Synopsis** |
Air carrier flight crew reported the loss of all communications shortly after takeoff likely due to water damage to the radios.

**ACN: 1516084 (9 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
CRJ-900 flight crew reported communication breakdown between flight crew and approach control resulting in confusion of assigned landing runway.

**ACN: 1515926 (10 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a RA while on an arrival procedure.

**ACN: 1515849 (11 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
B787 flight crew reported being assigned 270 kts below 10,000 ft by ATC. Initially they thought it was ok, then later realized their manual stated otherwise.

**ACN: 1515542 (12 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
ERJ-175 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert due to an incorrect altitude from ATC.

**ACN: 1514990 (13 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
HUF Tower Controllers reported while training on Local, traffic did not comply with reporting instructions, which caused a conflict on final.

**ACN: 1514621 (14 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
Corporate jet flight crew reported ATC issued land and hold short off clearance, at touchdown and rollout while at high speed. Crew reported they were not given an option to readback or comply.

**ACN: 1514103 (15 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
LAX Tower Controller reported instructing an aircraft to lineup and wait, while another aircraft was on final approach. After a query from the flight crew, the Tower Controller promptly issued go-around instructions.
ACN: 1513835 (16 of 50)

Synopsis
LGA Tower Controller and a CRJ-900 Captain reported a traffic alert and go-around during a visual approach at night.

ACN: 1513434 (17 of 50)

Synopsis
BE-400 flight crew reported they were given a low altitude alert by ATC on arrival into EKM when they apparently misunderstood a descent clearance.

ACN: 1512259 (18 of 50)

Synopsis
BE-400 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of an Airbus on the CHSLY3 Arrival into CLT.

ACN: 1512163 (19 of 50)

Synopsis
Two ZSE Controllers reported issuing a pilot the lowest MIA available, at pilot's request. The pilot later questioned assigned altitude while descending below the MIA, causing a lower altitude alert.

ACN: 1510703 (20 of 50)

Synopsis
B777 flight crew reported receiving a revised ATC flow clearance that was not in compliance with the Oceanic Clearance system.

ACN: 1510576 (21 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported being too low while flying an RNAV approach because of a rapidly decreasing atmospheric pressure in the area.

ACN: 1509930 (22 of 50)

Synopsis
ERJ-175 flight crew reported communication breakdown with Ground Control regarding Procedures & Airport charts.

ACN: 1509499 (23 of 50)

Synopsis
EMB-175 flight crew reported receiving contradictory expected runway information between Approach Control, and Tower Control. Flight crew found the late runway change confusing, and subsequently called the ATC facility for clarification.

ACN: 1508965 (24 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported confusion determining the correct EUG Tower frequency from the RNAV Y Runway 34L approach chart.

ACN: 1506054 (25 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported an issue with a late clearance to a visual approach resulting in a marginally stable approach.

ACN: 1504353 (26 of 50)

Synopsis
CRJ-200 flight crew reported departing with Comm 1 transmitter inoperative, but discovered after landing that Comm 1 was not deferrable.

ACN: 1503687 (27 of 50)

Synopsis
ERJ-175 flight crew reported not declaring "Minimum Fuel" during assigned go-around vectors for another approach due to congested landing traffic and high workload.

ACN: 1502869 (28 of 50)

Synopsis
C560XL air taxi flight crew reported a rejected takeoff when traffic was observed departing from the crossing runway.

ACN: 1502626 (29 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported that their Dispatcher was unable file the correct arrival for an international destination due to the difference in times when the FMS database and charting updates occur.

ACN: 1502266 (30 of 50)

Synopsis
Approach Controller and turboprop pilot reported a near miss with a helicopter during visual approach.
ACN: 1500179  (31 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported difficulty identifying the proper taxi exit entrance during roll out on the active runway due to insufficient markings.

ACN: 1500165  (32 of 50)

Synopsis
EMB-175 flight crew reported that while dealing with communication issues they neglected to complete the landing checklist and received an aural alert "TOO LOW, FLAPS".

ACN: 1499099  (33 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported being out of contact for ten minutes in Fukuoka airspace due to a late hand off from Manila ATC and an error in ATC frequency information in the Jepp-Pro application.

ACN: 1499011  (34 of 50)

Synopsis
PC 12 flight crew reported being unable to make the turnoff that ATC was planning, resulting in cancellation of takeoff clearance for a B737 in position on the crossing runway.

ACN: 1496013  (35 of 50)

Synopsis
B737-700 Captain reported missing a taxi clearance that was issued during a critical phase of flight during reverse thrust application on landing roll.

ACN: 1494652  (36 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported three aircraft on the same arrival with similar call signs caused confusion for pilots and controller.

ACN: 1493055  (37 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported neglecting to call the tower for landing clearance while distracted on final approach by a wing body overheat warning.

ACN: 1492422  (38 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported that they were unable to get the performance weight and balance landing data through ACARS.

**ACN: 1490741 (39 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
Air carrier flight crew reported a track deviation due to confusion with the departure clearance delivery format.

**ACN: 1489800 (40 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
B737 flight crew reported that as they started a descent, as per ATC instructions, then received a TCAS alert of traffic below.

**ACN: 1489773 (41 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
Airbus 320 flight crew reported a NMAC during descent, and descending to comply with an TCAS RA.

**ACN: 1489271 (42 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
B737-800 flight crew reported they did not comply with an ATC assigned speed.

**ACN: 1488926 (43 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
A pilot and Center Controller reported a communication problem with an altitude clearance and descended below the minimum IFR altitude.

**ACN: 1488544 (44 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
Flight crew reported receiving a low altitude warning while approaching the SAV area.

**ACN: 1488114 (45 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
Business jet flight crew reported difficulty catching altitude restriction departing HOU on the PDC print out.

**ACN: 1486038 (46 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
B737 flight crew reported ATC repeatedly assigned instructions to incorrect aircraft due to similar call signs.

ACN: 1485403 (47 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported an ATC low altitude alert due to an altitude deviation on arrival into ONT. Fatigue and workload were cited as contributing factors.

ACN: 1485384 (48 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported FMC route data was missing two fixes on their assigned departure SKYL8 from OAK.

ACN: 1482841 (49 of 50)

Synopsis
The flight crew of a Boeing 737 reported that ATC cleared them "Direct To" a way point without further instructions or clearances after they arrived at the way point.

ACN: 1482686 (50 of 50)

Synopsis
G550 flight crew reported they overshot the 5,000 restriction at STREL departing SNA citing confusion with the "climb via" clearance.
Report Narratives
ACN: 1519535 (1 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201802
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1300

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: A319
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1519535
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1519708
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events

Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Undershoot
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: CFTT / CFIT
Detector. Automation: Aircraft Terrain Warning
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather
Primary Problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

LDA approach. First Officer flying. Wound up rushed and high workload for no good reason. We were at 3000' at "ZZZZZ Intersection" per approach chart. Passed ZZZZZ Intersection, but descent was delayed, concerning/distracting the crew about being high on profile. Leveled off 1700' just prior to "ZZZZZ1 Intersection" (FAF). After ZZZZZ1 Intersection, initiated descent late.

Configuration and speed right on. Airport in sight approximately 1,300 FT. Continued to airport. "Low Altitude" alert from tower as descent was being shallowed. Alert was acknowledged to tower. Normal landing accomplished.

[Destination] weather was checked by crew several times encountered from [at this airport]. 5,000 Ovc 10 NM consistently. Approach was briefed flying "Visual [Approach]". We talked about issues to consider with this approach, as First Officer was fairly low time and with not a lot recently. Strong expectation of 5000/10...Visual Approach. Checked in with Potomac approach. Advised new ATIS. Pulled up new ATIS. Now shift to IFR approach procedure close in. Abbreviated, rushed brief. Distraction level, task load rising. "Low Altitude Alert"- I think First Officer had been task loaded during the approach and got slightly low but was correcting. [Early] wakeup and last day of 4 day trip. First day late dep.

Should have delayed approach until we had completely briefed new procedure and weather and were in the "Green". Also increased awareness with low time First Officer.

Narrative: 2

While flying the LDA, tower warned "low altitude"

ATIS reporting 5,000' ceiling and 10 miles vis. Crew briefed and expected a visual approach. Weather degraded rapidly due to fast moving snow storm. During the descent,
there was confusion among all aircraft on frequency as to the actual weather. Other flights were heard getting clearance for instrument approaches. Earlier in our descent, other flights were overheard asking approach which approach was in use. Approach controller pointedly answered the question with another question: "What did the ATIS say?" seemingly affirming the declaration of a visual approach. When we heard other aircraft getting clearance for instrument approaches, we clung to the idea that we would fly a visual approach.

News that we would fly the LDA came late. Setup and rebriefing the approach was rushed. Inside the FAF, I was task saturated and uncertain what vertical guidance to use on the approach.

I think I went below 1100' [when] I did not hear a low altitude alert from the tower but the Pilot Monitoring shared later that evening that he acknowledged it.

[Suggest] better communication from ATC during rapidly changing weather conditions. We should have delayed our approach to better prepare to fly the LDA. I am generally unfamiliar with LDA approaches and will review them.

**Synopsis**

A319 flight crew reported being low altitude alert on approach due to heavy workload on final.
ACN: 1518920 (2 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201802
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: BUR.Airport
State Reference: CA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: BUR
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Flight Phase: Taxi
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class C: BUR

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: BUR.TOWER
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1518920
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Facility: BUR.TOWER
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1518914
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

Air Carrier XYZ called for taxi instructions. I taxied the aircraft to the runway. When I passed the strip to Local Control, I passed Air Carrier AYZ. Air Carrier AYZ got released by TRACON. The Local Controller using the callsign Air Carrier AYZ put Air Carrier XYZ into position on the runway and then subsequently cleared Air Carrier XYZ for takeoff using the callsign Air Carrier AYZ. The Pilot of Air Carrier XYZ responded to Air Carrier AYZ each time and then began using that callsign as well. After the aircraft got airborne he tagged up as Air Carrier XYZ and then we realized what had happened.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis

A Tower Controller reported they issued a departure clearance to the wrong aircraft due to similar sounding call signs from the same company.
ACN: 1517325 (3 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201802
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: SCT.TRACON
State Reference: CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: SCT
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Vectors
Route In Use.STAR: RYDRR1
Airspace.Class B: LAX

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1517325
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Narrative: 1

We were descending on the RYDRR 1 RNAV arrival into KLAX when we were assigned an arrival clearance that included a crossing restriction of 8,000 feet at fix CLIFY. As pilot monitoring, I misheard the instructions and read back to ATC that we were to cross fix KEVVI at 8,000 feet.

The instructions as we misheard them were confirmed between myself and the Captain, and the inputs into the FMS were executed. We then hurried down to cross KEVVI at 8,000 feet, which we were able to accomplish. We were not corrected for the incorrect read-back to ATC of our instructions. The events eventually led to vectors assigned by ATC in order to steer the airplane away from traffic.

This was a miscommunication between ATC and the pilots. We had flown from the north into KLAX earlier the same day, and had received instructions to "descend via" with alterations to the published routing of the assigned arrival. We were not surprised by the alteration from the published altitude of the misinterpreted crossing restriction, and so we descended according to our read-back assignment.

Suggestions: First, two fixes in the same route, that phonetically sound as similar as CLIFY and KEVVI could be avoided in order to minimize miscommunications. Second, as pilots, we ought to brief the fact that phonetically similar fixes are a threat, in order to heighten our awareness of potential miscommunications.

Narrative: 2

As we were arriving to LAX on the RYDRR1 arrival, we were given "descend via except cross CLIFFY at 8000. However, We both heard "except cross KEVVI at 8000. My First Officer read back KEVVI and I did not question it because it is what I thought I heard and I verified it with the next fix coming up was KEVVI and I noticed that I needed to get down at 3000 feet per minute to make the crossing there at 8000. ATC did not catch our read back error either. After I leveled off, I started to wonder why he had us descended to 8000 when KEVVI is normally at or above 10000. I figured that he got us down early due to traffic. When ATC noticed our altitude deviation, he vectored us off the approach and a
climb instruction due to traffic nearby.

We flew this approach earlier in the day and [we] were also given a modified descent by ATC so we weren't surprised to hear another modification for this approach. The problem, however is that CLIFFY and KEVVI, sound so similar that neither of us or ATC caught the error. Also, CLIFFY was not on my MFD yet since it was outside of my selected range. I was not aware of that threat of the similar fix names. I was also more concerned of making the crossing restriction than I was to verify that ATC really meant CLIFFY. Since I did not see any other fix on my MFD that could have been similar, I had no reason to question the instruction.

Suggestions: Since this arrival has a known threat to ATC of similar sounding fixes, a clearer or more articulated instruction could be given, or better yet, have the fix names changed to avoid this problem in the future. As a crew, I believe that we could have found the threat had we noticed the similar phonetic on this approach. But due to our normal workflow at the time and expectations, we did not catch this.

Synopsis

CRJ-200 flight crew reported incorrect clearance read back for crossing a fix on STAR, which had similar sounding fixes names.
**ACN: 1517238 (4 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201802
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ADQ.Airport
- State Reference: AK

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft: 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ADQ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Airspace.Class D: ADQ

**Aircraft: 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ADQ
- Aircraft Operator: Military
- Make Model Name: Helicopter
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class D: ADQ

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1517238
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1517239
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

During a visual approach I was the pilot monitoring. The First Officer was pilot flying. The Center held us up at 6000 feet and 2 miles north of the VOR until clearing us for a Visual Approach upon passage of a [military] helicopter at 5000 feet at our 9 o’clock position travelling opposite direction. We were switched to Tower at that altitude and position noting 4 targets on TCAS at that time. The weather was clear daylight however lots of glare off water. I called the Tower. The Tower came back twice with very low unintelligible audio and I came back unreadable weak audio. At third time Tower said how do hear me now? I said loud and clear. He said report two mile right base. I replied unable we are at 6000 feet over VOR due to Center and must descend and turn away from airport for stable approach before coming in. We were past the VOR about one half mile.

At same time we got a TA alert on TCAS directly below us and started looking below. Off to our left below we saw another [military helicopter] 1500 feet below us matching our speed for the airport and not talking on Tower frequency. The aircraft was hard to see due to sun glare off the water but discerned it to be a second [military] Helicopter inbound for ADQ. I queried the Tower and told him we were on straight in final and queried Tower about status of 2nd [military helicopter] below us. Tower said that [military helicopter] was not a factor but I felt otherwise. Tower said to continue, landing clearance further in
as another aircraft was landing in front of us. I replied continuing. This was approximately at 2.5 mile final. Meanwhile three additional VFR aircraft called in to land. One was by Buckskin Lake northwest of the field and one behind us and at least 2 queried for takeoff. Once we completed final checks the First Officer and I both used good CRM to discuss escape maneuver/missed options if we did not receive a landing clearance in time based on aircraft threats in our area we had identified.

Finally the [military helicopter] below us matching our speed came on Tower frequency requesting to land and the Tower instructed the 2nd [military helicopter] to remain clear and called traffic landing (our plane). The 2nd [military helicopter] then said traffic in sight and complied with Tower and remained clear. There was a lot of radio chatter as a result. I also think Tower did not have our current position or have us in sight as he wanted to place another VFR airplane in front of us via right base. The traffic instructed for the base had us in sight and said he was in better position to land behind us. About 1 mile and 500 feet we finally could get out a 2nd request for landing and it was granted. We were told no delay on runway and exit and call the Tower. I thought the Tower had us in sight but I am not sure he did until we were on a mile final and I think this surprised his train of thought. I tried about 5 times to call Tower on telephone but believe he was too busy handling traffic to answer. I talked to him on departure and said there was no need to call now. To his credit I felt he did a remarkable job given the high workload in this scenario. I thanked him for doing the best job under all the workload he had at the time and all of us want to keep things safe. We departed without incident.

**Narrative: 2**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported multiple conflicts with helicopters not in contact with Tower while on approach to ADQ.
**Time / Day**

Date: 201802  
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: DCA.Airport  
State Reference: DC  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 9500

**Environment**

Light: Night

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZDC  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Descent  
Route In Use.STAR: TRUPS3  
Airspace.Class E: ZDC

**Person: 1**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying  
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer  
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 316  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1516955  
Human Factors: Confusion  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew  
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**

Reference: 2  
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew: Captain  
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying  
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
While on the descend via portion of the TRUPS3 landing North RWY 1 transition into DCA with a clearance limit to 6000 ft. ATC cleared us to KATRN. While initially not understanding the waypoint due to communication congestion and not recognizing the fix on the Legs portion of the arrival I promptly queried the Washington center controller. Direct to what fix I asked and the controller replied KATRN and gave the identifier for the waypoint. Promptly consulting the captain I asked if he understood the waypoint due to radio congestion and issues hearing the controller clearly. Still not confident with the waypoint I ask ATC a third time please verify the waypoint you would like us to proceed direct to. Washington sternly replies back with a DME mileage and repeats KATRN and informs us the fix is on the approach portion of the ILS to RWY 1. Promptly finding the fix we proceed direct to KATRN as directed by ATC. At this portion of the flight we are continuing to descend through 9500 ft when we hear Aircraft Y query ATC about a fix and an altitude of 11000ft. ATC responds saying no the 11000ft clearance was for [us]. This being the first time to my knowledge we were ever given an altitude limit of 11000 ft. I promptly ask ATC, you need Aircraft X to maintain 11000ft? ATC replies yes Aircraft X Maintain 11000 ft. After hearing the altitude limit I immediately notice that we are defending through 9500 ft and I question the Captain by asking him if he ever remembers a previous altitude clearance to maintain 11000 ft given. His reply is no, I never remember being given any other clearance given other than proceed direct to KATRN. After being given the altitude limit we begin a climb from 9500 ft to the altitude 11000 ft.

Now very close to the airport environment and also high the controller realizes that we need a turn to descend for landing. ATC then issues a vector by telling us to turn initially to a HDG 150 then immediately corrects that to 170 degrees. Once in the turn to 170 degrees the controller promptly hands us off to DCA approach. Once in contact we are cleared for the Mount Vernon visual for the RWY 1.
In this case clearer and precise communication between both us and the Controller would have greatly helped in alleviating the workload and initial confusion finding the KATRN waypoint. Clear communication also would have allowed and allotted the time wasted fixating on finding the waypoint. Also proper communication. We do not remember or were not aware of ever being given an altitude limit of 11,000. Either we missed the altitude limit or ATC never issued us the altitude limit but to the best of my knowledge I never remember being given an altitude limit once we were cleared to the KATRN waypoint nor did ATC query us for an acknowledgement of the altitude clearance.

**Narrative: 2**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

B737 flight crew reported receiving a clearance that did not include a revised altitude assignment from the Center controller.
ACN: 1516513 (6 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201802
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: Marginal
- Light: Dusk

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Taxi
- Make Model Name: Beechjet 400
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1516513
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1516514
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Excursion : Runway
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected.Other
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

Prior to departing we had acceptable time to plan and execute our preflight planning, evaluation and clearances. The planning included information on meteorological conditions at the time of arrival being marginal VFR, runway NOTAMs with a FICON (Field Condition) of 5/5/5, and the ILS approach would be our planned approach with runway analysis done to calculate the landing distance if wet and dry. Enroute there was no occurrences other than light chop. In the descent the PM received the weather and we determined we would do the ILS 24R to a full stop because the winds were straight down the runway with limited marginal cloud coverage. Around 4,000 ft ATC advises us that the winds have shifted and we will be circling north for the landing. We received the weather and there was a significant change to 340 at 10 kts with gusts. We concluded we would try the circling approach. We received very close vectors essentially directly onto the FAF 600 ft high, this is where we first encountered icing. At a safe airspeed, I the PF, descended until the airport became visible at 1800 ft MSL. Both the PM and I, PF, concluded we could circle by flying north of the airport and agreed if PF lost sight of the airport that PF would transfer controls to Capt., the PM.

At this time we had not received any runway braking or status reports from the Tower. We circled north and concluded we were too low and too close to the downtown area around the airport due to the northern winds and the snow and upon reaching our base to final turn concluded that we would be unable to maneuver onto the Final Approach Path safely and we executed a missed approach. Tower gave us a heading of 360 up to 3000 ft MSL and transferred control to Approach. Approach asked us our intentions and we requested the straight-in ILS to 24R due to the winds being a crosswind at both runways and the inability to safely circle to the non-approach equipped runway. Anticipating that we would once again receive vectors to the FAF rather closely and I was slowed to approach speed with 30 degrees flaps in prior to the FAF. The approach was accomplished with the autopilot to minimums, although the airport was in sight at 1700-1800 ft MSL.

During the approach Tower cleared us to land on runway 24R and gave sporadic wind check warnings throughout the descent, none of which included raining, icing reports, runway analysis or braking action. The autopilot was flown to minimums of 200 ft AGL. At that time I turned off the autopilot and yaw damp and started my final segment of the approach. Above the threshold the winds died down and I landed the aircraft on the centerline and in the touchdown zone. PF began applying breaks gradually then forcefully when PF noticed it wasn't sufficient enough and Capt., PM, assisted. The anti-skid
attempted to kick on but the aircraft simply wasn’t slowing down due to no traction from the layer of ice between the wheels and runway. Around the 1500 ft markers Captain, PM and I, PF, tried our best to stop the aircraft with what was left and began swerving moderately and slid into the EMAS. The aircraft rolled to a stop and settled. Captain took control and I began exiting the aircraft with the passengers.

**Narrative: 2**

Fire department upon arrival apologized for delay due to icy taxiways and the trucks inability to maintain safe control.

Upon exiting, the EMAS and runway were covered in ice causing the passengers, pilots, and authorities to almost fall several times. From observation the ice was smooth and approximately 1/8 inch thick.

**Synopsis**

Beech 400 flight crew reported that a lack of runway condition reports from ATC contributed to an excursion from an icy runway into the EMAS overrun.
**ACN: 1516423 (7 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201802
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: PBI.Airport
- State Reference: FL
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: PBI
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Takeoff

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1277
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1516423
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function: Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience: Flight Crew Type : 9372
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number : 1516432
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party 1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party 2 : Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector. Person : Flight Crew
Detector. Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Flight was the first leg of a 2 leg day, PBI to ZZZ. The weather was 2000 OVC, with light easterly winds. Pushback and taxi to RW 10L were uneventful. Tower cleared a 737 for takeoff ahead of us. Then we were instructed to line up and wait. Noticing convective activity and while holding in position on 10L, the Captain and FO called up the weather radar and noticed a few radar returns (threat). As I recall, these appeared predominantly to the left of centerline.

The jet, which was cleared for takeoff ahead of us, was given a left turn (north) into the returns. We communicated to each other that Tower should not have cleared the jet into the convective activity (verbalize, monitor). Our plan was avoidance, which meant that it was possible we might have to delay the turn to assure not flying through it (should the tower issue the same left turn clearance).

The flight was cleared for takeoff along with a left turn to north. The Captain pushed up the power and we began the takeoff roll. As we were rolling down the runway, FO recalls giving a courtesy advisory (heads up) to the tower that the flight may need to delay the turn. At some point after this, (I don't recall the speed, while crosschecking engine instruments and runway centerline, tower issued a cancel takeoff clearance. The captain, who was the PF, made the decision to continue. My gut feeling at the time was it was the right call and likely the safest course of action. The rest of the takeoff was uneventful and the flight complied with the assigned heading on departure (convective weather no factor).

The Captain and FO debriefed and both agreed it would have been better for the FO to
remain quiet (not make the advisory radio call) with ATC during the takeoff roll so as to completely eliminate the risk of confusing the tower controller (error management). I think it would have worked out better to state our intentions after becoming airborne.

Narrative: 2

While in position and holding, we had the radar up and scanning. It appeared to have some minor cells to the left of course. They gave the jet in front of us a clearance to takeoff and turn left on a heading of 050 and expect vectors on to the same departure we had. I stated to the FO, "Ha, the only cell with some yellow in it and they flew them right through it." Then again, the yellow could have been the return from the aircraft, which I did not state out loud. I also notice the jet was not complaining of any turbulence.

We were given the same clearance as the jet in front of us and I pushed the throttles up and we started rolling. FO read back the clearance as we were rolling. He then added a statement, "be advised we might be delaying our turn for weather." I didn't like the statement, but takeoff was underway. There was a pause and above 30 kts the Tower said, then take off clearance is canceled. I knew it was for the FO stating we were not going to comply with clearance, but we were. We were not even off the ground and I was not sure it was a real cell of weather and not a ground return, so I was not too concerned with the small cell of weather. I told the FO to tell the tower we were going to continue. He stated such. My intention was to comply with departure, which we did. If tower had repeated abort, we would have. They said nothing, and I was sure we were on the same page as the tower. 100 feet into the air, the so call cell was gone. It was ground clutter. We flew the departure as ATC originally cleared us.

When we got to altitude, I told the FO that his extra statement that we may not turn as requested was the catalyst to the issue. I explained that the cell was small and could have been ground return. Most of all I stated that if we got into the air and then saw it was an issue, we would have asked for relief from the heading. There was plenty of time to evaluate and there was no reason to add the extra statement. If he had concerns he should have addressed them to me. In the end the threat was not a true threat at all.

There was no intent to disregard the ATC takeoff clearance, but an intent to comply with the clearance as originally given to us. Looking back now it appears we may have disregarded a direct ATC clearance to abort the takeoff. I believe if the tower had other safety concerns or concerns we were not going to flying the original clearance, they would have restated the cancellation of the takeoff clearance and I would have complied. In fact, I was armed for the abort if they so stated. With no such second statement, I believed we were all on the same page.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported continuing their takeoff after ATC issued a clearance to cancel their takeoff.
Time / Day
Date : 201802
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : HSV.Tower
State Reference : AL

Environment
Light : Dawn

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : HSV
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class C : HSV

Person : 1
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1516152
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1516518
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

When I got to the aircraft my FO, told me that he saw little bit of water dripping from the escape hatch of the aircraft and was dripping on the center pedestal. While we conducted our preflight checks all radios were working and checks where completed. Taking off out of KHSV on runway 18R. After we take off on the runway climbing out on runway heading to 5000 feet, tower told us to contact departure and I responded by reading back the instruction and switch to departure frequency which is 118.05. I call departure and that's when we lost all communications with ATC, all radios was not working or transmitting at all. So I followed my clearance turn on course and then 10 minutes later we climb to our filed altitude which was FL340. Finally after we got up to our cruise altitude in VFR, conditions we were able to utilized ACARS, which was a huge asset of regaining some sort of communication which I was able to communicate with dispatcher let her know what the situation is. I had to utilize all my resources as a captain, which in result by breaking company SOP procedures because I could not communicate with our FAs so I had to instruct the FO to open the cockpit door so he could explain to the flight attendants on what is going on with us in the flight deck.

They could not understand his accent at all so I had to instruct him to get back to the flight deck so he could fly the aircraft while address the FAs and our passengers on the situation. I also violated SOPs by having one of our qualified FO that was in the cabin non rev, which I had flown quite few times since I have been a captain and he is very competent and more than capable to assist in the flight deck. We did not have sufficient oxygen for three crew requirement: However at the time I feel like he was best resources that I have at my disposal to assist my FO while is flying.

Anyways we continue to DFW, on our filed route talking to dispatcher and we received ACARS msg asking if we squawk 7600 and we responded saying yes and our dispatcher saying that ATC wants to squawk 7600 it seems like they were not picking us up I tried to identify ATC by pushing the button. Anyway we were finally able to re-establish communication on the jump seat or observer seat radio and that how we were able to complete the flight with communication with ATC and land. I greatly believed that we all did a great job as a team from SOC, Pilots, FAs, ATC, etc. We did the best we can as while we can. I greatly appreciated all the support with our dispatcher and ATC, they were tremendous with their procedures.

I believed we as a crew did a great job with our preflight procedures we had no signs or indication that our radios would have failed us on takeoff. I know when the FO called for our clearance, I know he had to repeat or read the clearance back twice I didn't feel it was a radio issues at all. I can only assume he may misunderstood the clearance or maybe not?
Narrative: 2

Early as soon as I walked into the cockpit I noticed water dripping from the escape hatch seal onto the RTU's. Because I had a radio issue with similar causes recently in the past I brought this issue to the attention of the Captain.

I noticed the communication with the Ground and tower stations wasn't the best but it was acceptable (3/5). We delayed a little bit the taxi out because the ACARS wasn't working and we had to do a manual weight and balance.

We taxied out and took of runway 18R and shortly after liftoff, like about 500 ft AGL or so the cockpit became very noisy. Like if all the radios, markers were on speaker in high volume. The noise was heard on both the speakers and the headphones. It was too loud that I wasn't even able to clearly hear what my captain was saying. I leveled off at 5,000 ft and kept runway heading at about 230 kts, while the captain was moving all the knobs and switches possible to try to get our radios back to work without any positive result.

After 10 minutes he instructed me to climb to our final altitude and continue on course as cleared originally. We weren't talking to any ATC facility at that point, we couldn't hear or be heard. We also lost all communications with the cabin crew and I eventually transferred the controls to the captain and left the cockpit to advise the lead FA of the situation since they had been trying to communicate with us several times by then. We were able to still transmit through text messages with Dispatch and that was our only contact available.

Captain squawked 7600 and brought in a first officer that was sitting in the back to help us deal with the situation due to his longer experience flying. He established clearly my pilot flying roll and asked me to concentrate exclusively on that while he tried to deal with the situation with the other FO.

We remained like that, switching to frequencies of Center along the route from Jepp FD and eventually, shortly before our top of descent we were able to get the standby (Jumpseater RTU) radio back and started complying with ATC instructions. Everything continued without further incidents, we were able to do a normal approach and landing and taxi into the gate and the Captain confirmed once again with ATC that no emergency had been declared in our behalf.

I think that even though the Company policies were violated by bringing another crew member into the cockpit in flight all of this was done in the best interest of safety in mind and best use of all the available resources. The crew as a team worked in perfect harmony each one focused on their role in the operation and the outcome was the best we could've hoped for in a situation like the one we experienced.

This is the second time that I experience a radio failure/loss of communication due to water leaking from the escape hatch into the RTU's in a little bit over a month. This is a situation that is a 100% preventable and that we shouldn't be exposed to. All leaking escape hatches should be written up if leaking, and either seals replaced or if it's a design problem, bring it up to the manufacturer's attention so situations like this don't happen in the future.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported the loss of all communications shortly after takeoff likely due to water damage to the radios.
**ACN: 1516084 (9 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201802
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: BNA.Airport
- State Reference: TN

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: BNA
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class B: BNA

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: BNA
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class B: BNA

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1516084
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
The Captain and I had loaded and briefed the arrival and Approach with the expectation of receiving the visual backed up by the ILS to runway 2R BNA. When we checked on with Approach the assigned us 2L. We were confused but complied. Reloaded the FMS, Re Briefed the new runway and ran the runway change items. We were given a descent to 2600 then a right base turn. and when runway 2R was abeam our right wing tip approach told us we were cleared for the visual 2R. The captain read it back. Neither one of us realized the approach controller had said 2R instead of 2L. Nor had we realized the captain read back 2R and didn’t double check that they in fact meant 2R and not 2L. While manually turning in to intercept the localizer for 2L we both heard the controller then tell ("Air Carrier X" similar sounding callsign to "Air Carrier Y") they were cleared for the visual 2L and not to worry about the [other traffic] that they were going to the right side. We both quickly realized what was going on. The captain keyed the mike and confirmed 2R we made a right turn to heading 050 intercepted the final for 2R. We agreed that because we had briefed 2R initially and had landing numbers for 2R we were both comfortable with continuing to a full stop landing on 2R and we would figure out what had happened on the ground. If you had asked me in flight what the controller said I would bet my life that we were cleared for the visual 2L... But after reviewing the tapes it was very clear we had made the mistake. Expectation Bias I guess... Late last minute change by approach with no heads up... Multiple factors played a key role in this Incident.

Initial contact with ATC we were told to expect 2L after briefing for the expected 2R before TOD. We re-briefed 2L and ran the runway change items checklists. Handed off to the next Approach frequency on a visual base we called the field and were cleared for the visual to 2R. I read back 2R and immediately confirmed with the First Officer (FO) -Pilot Flying the
clearance had been for 2R contrary to our earlier instructions to expect 2L. Approach then called another aircraft and them 'cleared for 2L, stating "the only traffic I have is an [other aircraft] for the Right". We called Approach and said we were cleared for the Left; Approach said 'Visual 2 Right and gave is a heading to intercept the 2R Final Approach Course. As the changes were above 1500' in VMC we accepted the heading and landed uneventfully.

At the gate we requested a phone number for the tower, and spoke initially to the tower controller who passed our concerns onto the TRACON. Approximately an hour later we received a voice mail from the TRACON recognizing the confusing and contradictory instructions.

AN ATC error compounded by my reading back the clearance for 2R other than immediately questioning it. [The destination] was using all three runways for arrivals & departure that obviously increases operational complexity and introduces unnecessary threats.

Synopsis

CRJ-900 flight crew reported communication breakdown between flight crew and approach control resulting in confusion of assigned landing runway.
**Time / Day**
Date: 201802
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ONT.Airport
State Reference: CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4300

**Aircraft : 1**
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZLA
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use.STAR: SCBBY2
Airspace.Class E: ZLA

**Aircraft : 2**
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZLA
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class E: ZLA

**Person : 1**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1515926
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

**Person : 2**
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Level at cruise altitude of 240. Directed to descend to FL220. Once in contact with LA Approach cleared to descend via the Scooby2 which has a bottom altitude of 4300 ft. After several altitude interventions by ATC we were finally cleared to descend via the Scooby2 out of 14000 ft. At 11000 ft a target appeared on our Navigation Display climbing at high rate in a direct vector to a collision. Out of 9000 ft a TCAS alert sounded with "Climb". We climbed rapidly and when we received the all clear statement we cleared the traffic by 400 ft. Now high on the arrival for Scooby2 Runway 26R due to the TCAS RA, informed Ontario Appr of the RA. Landed with no further issues. Controllers over-saturated. Do not have enough knowledge on ATC to offer any suggestions.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a RA while on an arrival procedure.
ACN: 1515849 (11 of 50)

**Time / Day**
Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: LAX.Airport
State Reference: CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3000

**Environment**
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: SCT
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 4
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class B: LAX

**Person: 1**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 13722
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1119
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1515849
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 7701
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 775
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1516109
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 7498
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1834
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1515999
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 4

Reference : 4
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 7267
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1627
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1515963
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Manuals
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I classified the error as procedural as we complied with an ATC instruction to climb at 270kts below 10,000 ft. I was the PM on this flight and the First Officer was the pilot flying. SoCal requested 270 kts below 10,000 ft, after takeoff from Runway 24L. We were at a very heavy weight as we were flying LAX to PVG, so clean maneuvering was above 250 kts. ATC specifically requested 270 kts, and then later "best rate". I replied that we could do 270 kts. He requested that once we were above 10,000 ft he wanted best rate climb speed, then we were given normal speed somewhere between 15,000 and 18,000 ft.

My experience was with previous departures from LAX, at max weight takeoff, or near max takeoff weight, our clean maneuvering speed was over 250 kts. After the flight blocked in at destination, during our post flight cockpit crew debrief, we discussed the FOM policy that we were not allowed to climb above clean maneuvering speed when below 10,000 ft. I as the Captain and the rest of the crew feel that the ATC controller led us into violating this regulation or policy.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Narrative: 3
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Narrative: 4
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
B787 flight crew reported being assigned 270 kts below 10,000 ft by ATC. Initially they thought it was ok, then later realized their manual stated otherwise.
Time / Day
Date: 201802
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.
ATC Facility: CMH.TRACON
State Reference: OH
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: CMH
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class C: CMH

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1515542
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 850
Events

Anomaly. ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector. Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result. Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Received multiple vectors from Approach in speed and altitude. Last instruction was verified by both pilots and read back as 2000 ft. Upon leveling off at assigned altitude, Approach advised us of low altitude alert. Altitude was immediately corrected to 2500 ft. Even when being vectored in VMC, always have the SA to verify that if issued a lower altitude than published, I should always inquire!

Narrative: 2

Was given multiple instructions for speed, heading and altitude. Last instructions given to us was descend to maintain 2000 Ft and confirmed by both pilots and read back as descend maintain 2000. Then Atc came back and said we are setting off ground proximity at his end and was instructed to climb to 2500. Complied with instructions and upon landing we were able to check the tapes and confirmed we were instructed to descend to 2000 not 2500.

Synopsis

ERJ-175 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert due to an incorrect altitude from ATC.
ACN: 1514990 (13 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201801
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: HUF.Tower
- State Reference: IN
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft: 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: HUF
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Airspace.Class D: HUF

**Aircraft: 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: HUF
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Airspace.Class D: HUF

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Facility: HUF.Tower
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
- Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Developmental
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1514990
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
**Person : 2**
- Reference : 2
- Location Of Person.Facility : HUF.Tower
- Reporter Organization : Government
- Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
- Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
- Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 6
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1515190
- Human Factors : Training / Qualification
- Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
- Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
- When Detected : In-flight
- Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
- Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
Aircraft X was told to "make straight in for Runway 14 and report a 3 mile final." There was an aircraft in left closed for 14 turning base when Aircraft X reported a 3 mile final. In reality, they were around a 1.5 mile final. I cleared Aircraft X for stop and go and then gave them a right 360 for spacing after realizing how close they were to the traffic on left base. Upon coming out of the right 360 they said "verify that Aircraft X is cleared to land." I went back and said "Aircraft X Runway 14, cleared to land." Once they were on the ground I gave them taxi instructions and they proceeded to say "Aircraft X is a stop and go." I then gave them a pattern entry. The pilot did not comply with the instruction that was given. Not sure what you can do to change that.

**Narrative: 2**
I was providing OJT on the Local position during TRACAB Operations. We had 4-6 aircraft on frequency and were working ground control and flight data. Aircraft X was joining the traffic pattern straight in. We observed Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were going to be a conflict due to compression on final, and my Developmental issued a right 360 to establish proper spacing. His sequence and plan should have worked. During the debrief we watched the falcon replay and saw that Aircraft X and Aircraft Y had an [approximately] 40 knot speed difference. We could not see this when it happened due to working TRACAB Operations. During discussion my Developmental knew how to handle this had we seen the speed difference. If the speeds were matched we would have had plenty of room and the sequence would have worked as planned. During TRACAB Operations we do not have access to the Center Radar. Approach Control is using it to work the airspace on a 60 mile range.
Open the TRACON before someone gets killed! It is less safe to work TRACAB Operations due to "staffing" than it is to have the TRACON open. It is not fair to expect our Developmentals to learn how to do this job with only half of their tools available. Our facility is sick. We have something worse than just a lack of safety culture. We willingly and knowingly schedule staffing so low that we cannot open the TRACON. We have Developmentals who have been in the building for over a year and have never seen the TRACON open. This is messed up.

Synopsis

HUF Tower Controllers reported while training on Local, traffic did not comply with reporting instructions, which caused a conflict on final.
Time / Day
Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: HPN.Airport
State Reference: NY

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: HPN
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Medium Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Visual Approach

Aircraft : 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower: HPN
Make Model Name: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Phase: Landing

Person : 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 6000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 25
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 800
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1514621
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Narrative: 1

When approaching HPN on left base vectors for the ILS 16, Westchester Tower asked us to square up our base and slow to minimum speed for a Cessna to land on Runway 11 prior to our arrival. We squared up our base and slowed to 130 knots before being cleared for the visual approach Runway 16. We intercepted the localizer to back up the visual at the CZIMR, the final approach fix, slowed to our final approach speed of 112kts and were subsequently cleared to land Runway 16. Upon touchdown and rollout, still at high speed, we were instructed "You don't need to read this back, but hold short of Runway 11 for landing traffic". As it wasn't given to us as an option but a clearance and we were not in a position to execute a go around, I maximized braking and was able to stop prior to and hold short of runway 11 for the crossing traffic. My concern was that a LAHSO clearance was given to us after touchdown without giving us the option, which could have led to a runway incursion or conflict with cross runway traffic.

Narrative: 2

After landing Runway 16, we were approaching the intersection of Runway 11 at about 20 KIAS, and noticed a small piston aircraft approaching the same intersection on Runway 11. About the time we saw him, we were told to hold short of 11, and were able to bring the aircraft to a stop with normal braking. The piston aircraft was told to, and did, exit Runway 11 on the taxiway just prior to the intersection with Runway 16.
The situation didn't seem right, so we reviewed the ATC transmissions.
-Prior to us being on frequency, the piston aircraft was cleared to land, and told traffic landing 16 would hold short of Runway 11. I assume the 16 traffic was us.
-We checked in with tower about 30 seconds later, and were told to slow down and widen our base.
-Less than 2 min later, we were cleared to land, #2 behind a Cessna short final on Runway 11. We were not advised to hold short of 11.

I believe the controller failed to ask us to hold short of 11. We were fortunate that we were light, and were slow enough by the time we got to the runway intersection to be able to stop. It could have been disastrous if both planes had required more runway.

There were two issues here.
First, the tower controller failing to request we hold short of 11.
Second, there were a few planes in the pattern, but heightened situational awareness on our part could have brought our attention to the potential conflict. It is a reminder to not be complacent at towered fields.

Synopsis
Corporate jet flight crew reported ATC issued land and hold short off clearance, at touchdown and rollout while at high speed. Crew reported they were not given an option to readback or comply.
ACN: 1514103 (15 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201801
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: LAX
  - State Reference: CA
  - Altitude: AGL. Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: LAX
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: A320
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Airspace: Class B: LAX

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: LAX
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi
- Route In Use: None

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Facility: LAX.TOWER
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function: Air Traffic Control: Local
- Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience: Air Traffic Control: Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 4
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1514103
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Workload
Narrative: 1

I was working local. On the other side of the airport, runway 25r was closed and they were using their one runway for both arrivals and departures. Multiple cross-overs had been happening, and I had most of the departures and arrivals on my side of the airport due to their runway closure.

Many aircraft were catching [up to] the ones in front on final and I was really keeping an eye on this. Aircraft X was number 2 on final for 24r when he checked in, and they were very fast and catching the aircraft in front of them. I knew based on experience that they would have to be sent around, so I offered for Aircraft X runway 24l instead. There was one aircraft in position on 24l, and Aircraft X was approaching 4-mile final when I offered them 24l. I told Aircraft X about the aircraft holding in position, and I told the aircraft in position about Aircraft X on final, then I cleared them for takeoff. I saw that the spacing was good between the departure and Aircraft X on 24l, so my focus went back to making a good departure sequence reference my traffic and traffic off the south complex.

I set the sequence for Aircraft Y to depart first from the full length, and I told the next aircraft to hold short of 24l at V (they would be number two for departure). Then I told Aircraft Y to line up and wait on 24l. Aircraft X was still on final, and was tagged up for 24r still, so my scan saw 24r and I my brain processed 24r while scanning Aircraft X on final.
Out the window, Aircraft X appeared to be in final for 24r. All of the visual signals and cues I was receiving confirmed that Aircraft X was landing on 24r. Aircraft Y had not lined up on 24l, and they asked me to verify that they were cleared to line up and wait. I scanned again told him yes, lineup and wait on 24l. Aircraft Y’s pilot asked what the aircraft on final was doing. Then I realized that I had switched Aircraft X to his runway, and I immediately sent Aircraft X around. Aircraft X went around, and then the ASDE-X (Airport Surface Detection Equipment) alarmed.

SOCAL had been running aircraft tight the entire time I was sitting on local controller (which they do very frequently). When the pilots are told to maintain visual separation from preceding traffic on final, there are a lot of squeeze plays and a lot of close calls with aircraft barely exiting the runway before the next arrival crosses the threshold. Something can be done about this, perhaps, SOCAL could take some of the responsibility for their final and make sure they are not consistently handing us close calls.

When I switch someone to the arrival runway, I need to do something that is a visual reminder for myself. Maybe turn over the next departure strip immediately so that this information stays in the forefront of my memory, and so that it will be a reminder that something out of the ordinary is happening on that runway. Or take my pad of paper that I’m using for my arrivals and set it on top of the departure strips. Aircraft on final that are switched to the inboard runway need to be tagged up for the correct runway to allow for this information to be accurately.

**Narrative: 2**

While taxing to runway 24L in LAX, we were issued a line up and wait clearance, the First Officer (FO) read back the clearance. Crossing the hold short bars I announce "clear left" and the FO said "clear right" and "runway 24L, heading 251". When he said clear right, it appeared to be right, as the runways are closely spaced and can be very difficult to judge if the plane is actually lined up with the usual runway for landing 24R. As we were passed the hold short bars and close to the centerline, I asked something like "does that airplane (on final) look clear to you?" The FO asked ATC to confirm our line up and wait clearance for 24L, and they confirmed it. Immediately after the confirmation the FO asked about the plane on final. ATC immediately issued a go around to the final traffic. At this point, the final traffic was probably about 2NM from the runway. We briefly held in position and then issued a takeoff clearance and accepted. On the hand off to departure, the tower thanked us for the catch. The flight continued without incident from there. I contacted the on call chief pilot after landing to touch base about the situation.

**Synopsis**

LAX Tower Controller reported instructing an aircraft to lineup and wait, while another aircraft was on final approach. After a query from the flight crew, the Tower Controller promptly issued go-around instructions.
**Time / Day**

Date: 201801  
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: LGA.Airport  
State Reference: NY  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 800

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC  
Light: Night

**Aircraft : 1**

Reference: X  
ATC / Advisory. Tower: LGA  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Final Approach  
Route In Use: Visual Approach  
Airspace.Class B: LGA

**Aircraft : 2**

Reference: Y  
ATC / Advisory. Tower: LGA  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Final Approach  
Route In Use: Visual Approach  
Airspace.Class B: LGA

**Person : 1**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person.Facility: LGA.Tower  
Reporter Organization: Government  
Function.Air Traffic Control: Local  
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified  
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 3  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1513835  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
LaGuardia was on the expressway visual to runway 31 approach. Departing runway 04. I was in the process of relieving a controller on the local control position. The previous controller needed space for a departure and told Aircraft X to join a two mile left base and square it off (this is a routine procedure to accommodate departures on this configuration). Aircraft X extended his downwind and had to be prompted by the previous controller to turn his base. Aircraft X wound up joining three mile left base. The previous controller told Aircraft Y that Aircraft X extended and suggested that he do the same.

I took the position at this time and told Aircraft Y where Aircraft X was and asked the pilot if he had him in sight. Aircraft Y confirmed that he had Aircraft X in sight and began a turn to fall in behind him. I observed both aircraft out the window and saw that Aircraft Y was in fact behind Aircraft X. Very soon after I noticed on radar that Aircraft Y continued a turn towards the runway cutting Aircraft X off. I questioned the pilot and he turned to the right. Due to the aircraft altitude and position. I felt that he would not be able to continue the approach. Because he was on a visual. I asked the pilot if he would be able to continue or if he would like to go around. The pilot chose to go around.
Because the aircraft was below the MVA and the pilot need a heading as to not leave my airspace. I instructed the pilot for fly a heading of 010 and climb to 2000 ft. This would have kept the aircraft clear of any terrain. I handed the aircraft back to approach control on a heading 040 climbing to 3000 ft. This was at TRACON's request.

Both aircraft landed without incident.

Due to LGAs configuration. The expressway visual to runway 31 can be very challenging. I suggest that we use the RNAV approach to this runway. Because each pilot flies the visual differently. We have to use several techniques to make it work and still accommodate departure. The RNAV approach would keep the aircraft more on a consistence path.

**Narrative: 2**

We were cleared for the expressway visual 31. Around 900 ft, tower advised us to square our final, and traffic was at our 11 o’clock in which I reported in sight; I did see a beacon. A few seconds later we began to turn in bound, and air traffic control confirmed if we’re turning in bound and I said yes. Tower then asked if we had enough separation, and at that point I saw traffic moving from our 1 o’clock and they were aligned with runway 31. I then said we are going around and ATC instructed us to fly heading 040 and to climb to 2,000 ft. We received a TA, not an RA.

I reported the wrong traffic in sight, and did not see the correct traffic until it was at our 12 o’clock. This was due to a high work load situation at night. Going forward I will verify the traffic with the controller, as well as verify it on TCAS.

**Synopsis**

LGA Tower Controller and a CRJ-900 Captain reported a traffic alert and go-around during a visual approach at night.
ACN: 1513434 (17 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: EKM.Airport
State Reference: IN
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: SBN
Aircraft Operator: Air Taxi
Make Model Name: Beechjet 400
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class E: SBN

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1513434
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party 2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1513715
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Flight was a reposition to EKM. While proceeding direct from ASHEN to EKM, we were issued a descent by Fort Wayne Approach to 2000. I distinctly remember the 2000 as I was planning my descent while keeping all the anti-ice equipment on and had to use speed brakes during the descent in order to keep the N2 at the required minimum of 70% for the wing anti-ice. We were handed off to South Bend Approach and were told to turn right to a heading of 320 (no altitude issued). Our next set of instructions were to turn left to 300 degrees, maintain 2,500 MSL until established, and cleared ILS 27. When we received those directions we were already at 2,300 MSL descending to 2,000 MSL. ATC issued us a low altitude warning and we mentioned were cleared to 2,000. ATC said negative, we were cleared to 2,500. I requested a review of the tapes while I corrected the altitude to 2,500. The remainder of the approach was uneventful.

I suspect there was misinterpretation of our cleared altitude in the hand off between Fort Wayne Approach and South Bend Approach. Although 2,500 is the minimum altitude for that leg, we were in VMC below the clouds. I did not double check the assigned altitude at 2,000 MSL as I have encountered approach facilities that would assign altitudes lower than on the approach plate as long as we were above the MVA. The situation could have been prevented had we mentioned we were cleared to 2,000 MSL when we read back the heading to 320.

Narrative: 2
On letdown into South Bend airspace arriving empty into EKM, we were given and read back a descent from 8000 feet to 2000 feet. Both pilots were clear and certain about this. South Bend approach gave us a vector to intercept the final approach course and to maintain 2500 feet until established. At that time we were passing through 2300 feet to level 2000 feet. I immediately told ATC we were given 2000 feet. Controller came back saying, no we were given 2500 feet. [Captain] jumped in and told the controller we were given and read back 2000 feet while initiating a climb back to 2500. We landed normally.

On departure, South Bend told us he had listened to the tapes and we had been told and read back 2500. Well, okay. Makes me think we were given the descent out of 8000 feet
by the previous Controller. Ft Wayne or Terre Haute, not certain which.

What would I do to prevent this in the future? No idea. We were just flying along as normal. The radio transmissions were clear. We heard the same thing. If we both are gaga, then maybe it is time for the booby hatch.

**Synopsis**

BE-400 flight crew reported they were given a low altitude alert by ATC on arrival into EKM when they apparently misunderstood a descent clearance.
**Time / Day**

Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: CLT.Airport
State Reference: NC
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

**Aircraft : 1**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: CLT
Aircraft Operator: Air Taxi
Make Model Name: Beechjet 400
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use.STAR: CHSLY3
Airspace.Class B: CLT

**Aircraft : 2**

Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: CLT
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use.STAR: CHSLY3
Airspace.Class B: CLT

**Person : 1**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1512259
While flying the assigned clearance, descending via the CHSLY3, we received a late wake turbulence advisory from Charlotte Approach (in trail of an Airbus). Our position on the arrival was between CAATT and EPAYE, descending below 8,000 ft to 6,000 ft. Less than two seconds after the advisory and before we had time to respond to the ATC advisory, the jet rolled abruptly and steeply to the left. I immediately disconnected the automation to take command of the aircraft. I stabilized the aircraft and advised ATC of the encounter and then offset the jet from the Airbus’ flight path (something I would have done earlier had we NOT been issued a late advisory). I instructed my First Officer to check on the passenger in the back. He was in his seat and appeared visibly shaken. No physical harm to any of the aircraft occupants. Seatbelt sign was on and illuminated at the time of this event. We landed without incident and after the aircraft was in the chocks, I went to the cabin to further check on the passenger (not physically hurt). I also explained to him why the aircraft turned suddenly and steeply to the left. The passenger acknowledged my quick and proper reaction to stabilize the jet. We discussed his return trip departing the same afternoon and he later canceled this trip.

Wake turbulence avoidance is something we learn and are trained on at the beginning of flight training. As professionals we continue to revisit this training and exercise these avoidance procedures. Based upon the circumstances of this wake turbulence event, we as
the crew did everything to ensure the safe operation of the aircraft. Had ATC issued a wake turbulence advisory sooner, I would have requested to offset our course to properly reduce the risk of encountering the Airbus' wake. I also had the TCAS displayed on the MFD with range set inner ring to 5 miles, outer 12.5 miles (traffic well outside of 5 mile ring).

**Narrative: 2**

During descent to 6000 ft we received an ATC alert of wake turbulence from an Airbus aircraft. Before I could acknowledge the alert the aircraft made an abrupt and significant bank to the left. After recovery the pilot flying informed ATC that we had encountered the turbulence. They issued a 10 degree turn to the left to avoid any other possibilities.

Possibly an earlier turn from ATC would have kept us out of the path of the Wake Turbulence.

**Synopsis**

BE-400 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of an Airbus on the CHSLY3 Arrival into CLT.
ACN: 1512163 (19 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZSE.ARTCC
State Reference: WA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6300

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZSE
Aircraft Operator: Air Taxi
Make Model Name: PC-12
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Ambulance
Flight Phase: Descent

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZSE.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1512163
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Facility: ZSE.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1512158
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Returned to Clearance
Result: Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

[Aircraft] requesting lowest available altitude. Cleared to MIA of 6600 msl. Aircraft read back 6600. Aircraft then asks if the altitude was 6300 or 6600. Clarified to aircraft that the clearance was to 6600. Aircraft descends below MIA to 6300 mode-c reported before correcting to 6600. The moment the altitude was questioned, a Low altitude alert should have been issued for safety.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis

Two ZSE Controllers reported issuing a pilot the lowest MIA available, at pilot's request. The pilot later questioned assigned altitude while descending below the MIA, causing a lower altitude alert.
ACN: 1510703 (20 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B777-200
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1510703
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1511013
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

A previous Center controller had approved our request to proceed direct to our filed Oceanic Entry Point. Next Center Controller informed us he had to revise our clearance for flow and to proceed direct ZZZ, which was not in our Flight plan and then XXXXX1. The Pilot Flying inserted ZZZ as the TO Waypoint and executed it to comply with the initial clearance. Remembering XXXXX1 was one of the filed waypoints the Pilot Flying then typed XXXXX1 into the scratchpad and entered it as the next waypoint but did not execute because he realized the XXXXX1 was the Oceanic Exit Point and this was not a valid clearance for Center to issue. The Pilot Flying then spoke to Center and advised him that we could not comply with XXXXX1 after ZZZ because this was our Oceanic Exit Point on the far side of the Atlantic Ocean. Center, basically, replied that this was the clearance passed along to him and we would need to work it out with Next Center Controller after our handoff shortly. While proceeding direct to ZZZ the Pilot Flying decided that proceeding to XXXXX1 after ZZZ while waiting for the handoff was not acceptable called Center back and informed the controller that we could not comply with XXXXX1 after ZZZ and would proceed to XXXXX2 after ZZZ instead. The Center Controller did not approve or disapprove XXXXX2 after ZZZ and reiterated that we work it out with Next Center Controller.

After contacting the next Center, a few minutes later and informing him of what we were doing, he stated that he was informed that there was a problem with our previous clearance, continue to XXXXX2, and give him a minute. Center came right back and asked us to verify what our filed route was between XXXXX2 and XXXXX1, which the Pilot Monitoring did and the Center Controller was happy with it. Unfortunately, after proceeding direct to ZZZ and subsequently entering XXXXX1 as the next waypoint in the FMS, all the original filed waypoints prior to XXXXX1 were deleted from the FMS route 1 legs, and [they] had to be reentered. This added some fuel to the invalid clearance problem temporarily, but all of the deleted waypoints were re-entered manually successfully and the crew was just beginning to verify the entries with the Flight plan when Center [us] asked to verify the filed routing.

There were several errors associated with this event:
1) Invalid Route Revision. The crew certainly have no idea what occurred within the ATC system to generate the invalid route revision "Direct ZZZ then XXXXX1" to be issued, but
it was obviously in error. The Center controller indicated it had been passed on to him from some other entity.

2) Deleted FMS Waypoints. The Pilot Monitoring while in the haste of complying with the clearance to proceed direct ZZZ, which wasn't very far away, and subsequently typing XXXXX1 into the FMS scratchpad for insertion as the Next Waypoint did not follow B777 FMS standard procedure which prescribes down selecting the desired waypoint from the Route 1 Legs into the scratchpad.

3) Potential for ATC Perception of our Failure to Comply with Revised Route Clearance. Neither of the two Centers voiced any concern over our flight track after flying to XXXXX2 after ZZZ in lieu of the issued XXXXX1, but technically neither did they approve our proposal to fly to XXXXX2 after ZZZ. The frequency was busy and the crew did not subsequently seek Center's clear approval to fly to XXXXX2 after ZZZ. Center's approval appeared to be tacit with his response but it was not clearly voiced.

Suggestions referencing the aforementioned errors; first, as far as I know, this was a breakdown within the ATC flow control system to a clearance to be issued to fly from ZZZ to a North Atlantic Track Oceanic Exit Point, 2400-plus miles away and totally circumventing the North Atlantic Track Oceanic Clearance system. Hopefully, there will be some follow up within ATC circles regarding this particular event. Had the Pilot Flying followed proper FMS procedure he would have realized that XXXXX1 was the Oceanic Exit Point before modifying the FMS routing. Although the entry of XXXXX1 as the next waypoint had not been executed, it still caused all the intervening waypoints to be deleted after XXXXX1 was inserted after ZZZ because as the active waypoint was not in the original Route 1 legs. Following proper procedure would have prevented deletion of Route 1 waypoints to include all Oceanic Waypoints, which in turn should have allowed the crew to better focus on coordination with Center to address the problem. As stated previously, had the Pilot Flying followed proper FMS procedure, his attention would not have been devoted to rebuilding deleted Route 1 waypoints and would have been better able to obtain the unequivocal approval from Center to proceed to XXXXX2, which he saw as the most logical plan of action.

**Narrative: 2**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

B777 flight crew reported receiving a revised ATC flow clearance that was not in compliance with the Oceanic Clearance system.
**Time / Day**
Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ALB.Airport
State Reference: NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 500

**Environment**
Flight Conditions: Mixed
Weather Elements / Visibility: Cloudy
Weather Elements / Visibility: Snow
Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ALB
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class C: ALB

**Person: 1**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 408
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1510576
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Aircraft: "Albany"

Weather in Albany was forecast to have light snow during the arrival timeframe. We (Captain and F/O) had continued to monitor the local ALB weather via ACARS and WSI throughout the flight. At the XA00 ATIS, the altimeter was 30.08 and the nearby snow was mostly west and north of the airport (WSI radar). At the XB00 Z ATIS, the altimeter was 30.01, and the snow was still staying off the airport in roughly the same areas. Our scheduled arrival was XB50 Z, but we were showing arriving about 15-20 early. We checked in with Albany Approach Control with the XB00 Z weather. I do not know if Approach provided the local altimeter, but I do know that we had 30.01 set, based on ATIS, and we did not change.

We descended below some clouds and could see the airport from more than 10 miles. We had originally planned to fly the ILS 19 and had briefed the approach in case the snow arrived and IMC conditions became a factor. Approach asked us if we wanted the RNAV Z Approach to Runway 19. We said that would be fine. We loaded the FMS with the RNAV Z 19 and briefed the points/altitudes, even though we had VMC. We were cleared to TUKUY (IF) and we flew the approach as published with the autopilot engaged. As we rounded the corner between CUGOP and WISIG, I commented that we were low (could see the PAPI; it showed 1 white/3 red).

At about WISIG, I commented to the other Pilot that the HUD was showing us low and touching down prior to the runway, but that I would not let that happen (we were in IMC mode on the HUD with a -3.00 glideslope angle and the TDZE set in the altitude). I left the
autopilot engaged to see if the automation was going to correct the low situation. I crosschecked the instruments and the lateral and vertical navigation pointers were centered in the middle. As the white PAPI started to change color to red, I disconnected the autopilot and corrected the aircraft flight path back to 2 white/2 red on the PAPI. The vertical guidance (GP) indicator for the RNAV on the instruments then showed us high when the PAPI showed us on the proper glide path.

I do not remember seeing the ILS indication during the event. I feel confident that we both had the ILS Localizer frequency and course set, but I did not look for the glideslope during the event. The landing was uneventful. After arrival at the gate, I asked Ground Control "what was the altimeter indicating", and they said "29.94 and falling rapidly." I estimate this altimeter was provided at XB35 Z.

**Narrative:** 2

Due to rapidly falling pressure atmospheric conditions the autopilot coupled flown visual approach began flying below the visual glide path when synced up to the RNAV RNP Z Runway 19 Approach. The arrival weather was VMC and ATC asked if we could accept the RNAV Approach for ease of sequencing. After confirming all points/altitudes, both the PF (Pilot Flying) and I verified the FMA illustrated it was in LNAV and VNAV PATH throughout the approach. While on final we discovered that the approach path was flying low in comparison to the PAPI located on the airfield.

The PF elected to turn off the autopilot and correct our position for a more accurate approach path with relation to the PAPI lights. Immediately after turning off the autopilot, we heard the glidepath annunciation very briefly as the PF corrected the situation. We touched down without incident and queried the Controller for the latest altimeter setting. It was at that point we were notified of the rapidly changing conditions. Had the airfield been under IMC conditions, we would have been forced to execute a go-around/missed approach.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported being too low while flying an RNAV approach because of a rapidly decreasing atmospheric pressure in the area.
ACN: 1509930 (22 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: LGA.Airport
State Reference: NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1509930
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1509935
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

**Events**

Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly. Ground Incursion: Taxiway
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: Taxi
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

We received clearance from ramp to push to spot "XY". Before pushing, we also contacted clearance delivery with our squawk code and departure instructions as requested in our PDC. Soon after being pushed to spot "XY", we contacted ground for taxi. While taxiing, ground control gave us a phone number and told us to call tower. Once on the phone, tower informed us that at the gate we pushed back from, we were "supposed to contact ground before pushing, because spot "XY" is on an active taxiway." The [person] on the phone then went on to say that he would not violate us and just give us a "warning".

After hanging up the phone, we reviewed the charts again and NOWHERE does it say to ever contact ground before push, nor does the taxi diagram show spot “XY” on an active taxiway.

The cause of this event was us (the pilots) simply not being aware that were supposed to contact ground before push. The main cause is the absence of this information in any of the charts for the airport.

Another contributing factor is that I have only been to this airport a handful of times and it was also the captains first time there.

The only suggestion I have to avoid this event from happening again is to have this information published in the charts for this airport.

**Narrative: 2**

At [the] gate, we received clearance from ramp control to push to spot "XY". Before pushing, we also contacted clearance with our squawk code and departure instructions as requested in our PDC. Soon after being pushed to spot "XY", we contacted ground for taxi. While taxiing, ground control gave us a phone number to call Tower. Once on the phone, tower informed us that at [the] gate we were "supposed to contact ground before pushing because spot XY is in taxiway A". He then went on to say that he wouldn't violate us and gave us a "warning". After hanging up the phone, we reviewed the charts and nowhere does is say to contact ground prior to push, nor does the taxi diagram show spot "XY" on
taxiway "A" Not familiar with push clearance procedures from [the] gate. Missing or inadequate information in Jeppesen charts regarding push requirements from [the] gate.

Contact ground control; not ramp, for push clearance from [the] gate.

Synopsis

ERJ-175 flight crew reported communication breakdown with Ground Control regarding Procedures & Airport charts.
Time / Day
Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ORD.Tower
State Reference: IL

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ORD
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: C90
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B: ORD

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1509499
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1509503
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On arrival into ORD, my First Officer and I received notification that the expected arrival runway was 27L. A visual approach clearance to runway 27L was then given by approach control. After being switched to ORD tower, there was possible confusion on which runway we were supposed to be assigned. Tower cleared us to land on runway 27L then informed us to change to runway 27R and provided the clearance to land on that runway. No other aircraft were assigned to that runway. Aircraft landed without incident or further issue. After landing, we queried the tower controller regarding the situation. The controller told us they were informed of a shift change on approach.

Confusion between our flight and the controllers as to what runway is being assigned was the causal factor. The ambiguity came just prior to the radio switch from approach to tower. Constant vigilance in assuring pilots and controllers are on the same page is crucial. Clarification should immediately be requested if the message received doesn't explicitly match the message sent - for both parties. This is accomplished successfully the vast majority of times but the general threat is all too high unless both parties are on the same page 100% of the time.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis

EMB-175 flight crew reported receiving contradictory expected runway information between Approach Control, and Tower Control. Flight crew found the late runway change confusing, and subsequently called the ATC facility for clarification.
ACN: 1508965 (24 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201801
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: EUG.Airport
State Reference: OR
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1000

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: EUG
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class D: EUG

Component
Aircraft Component: Aero Charts
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Design

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1508965
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
Analyst Callback: Attempted

Person: 2
Narrative: 1

On descent into EUG, abeam the field, downwind at 6000 ft we were cleared for the visual approach 34L. We had loaded the RNAV Y 34L. I instructed the FO to 'clean up the approach' and activate vectors to ZIMKE (FAF). I turned off the autopilot and autothrottles and I slowed and configured on schedule. When we were turning base to final, Cascade Approach told us to contact Tower. I called flaps five, set Vapp, landing check as we rolled out on a 4 nm final. The FO called the Tower on the frequency listed on the RNAV Y 34L Approach (124.15). Tower did not answer us. I called for the landing check again and we completed it and stated not cleared to land yet. FO immediately called Tower again, no response, FO said 'is that the right frequency?' Then answered himself while looking at the approach chart and said "yeah 124.15" I looked at my iPad and verified 124.15 but I didn't say anything. We are now right about 1000 ft still no answer from Tower. I tell the FO to try Comm 2. No answer. Now at about 500 ft I say put in ground frequency. Right at this moment we get a solid green light from Tower. The light gun was unmistakable, the visibility was good and we could clearly see that it was a steady green from the Tower. I said 'we're cleared to land by the green light gun signal' and we continued to land. On roll out the FO got ground frequency in COMM 2 and FO calls Ground as we roll out and they responded that they were transmitting in the blind. We responded that we were also transmitting in the blind and that we were now on Comm 2. We suspected the issue to be a Comm issue.

Once at the gate and on the debrief items we inspected the issue further and discovered that the frequency on the approach chart is not correct. EUG RNAV Y 34L (effective 07 Dec 17) page 7-90 Tower 124.15 (incorrect). It should read Tower 118.9 for 34L.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported confusion determining the correct EUG Tower frequency from the RNAV Y Runway 34L approach chart.
**Time / Day**
Date : 201712
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

**Place**
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : N90.TRACON
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

**Environment**
Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dusk

**Aircraft**
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : N90
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Airspace.Class B : EWR

**Person : 1**
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 6372
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 6372
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1506054
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

**Person : 2**
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1507920
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Beautiful evening, EWR approach to 22L. Level at 8000 over DYLIN on the PHLBO3. They gave us 4000. I verified because we normally get 6000 after DYLIN. ATC said 4000. We went down to 4000 and were on a heading for the RWY. Abeam the airport we were given a heading of 90 degrees and told to keep our speed up and to descend to 3000. Shortly after that we were told to descend to 2000 and keep our speed up till reaching 2000 then we could slow. We are about 6 miles from the RWY on a 90 heading and ATC asked if we had the RWY in sight. I was shocked because they cleared us for a visual. We were INSIDE the marker, BUZZED on a 90 heading, fast and close in. We did a steep turn, put the gear down, slowed as fast as we could, went through the LOC then under the glideslope. We were not even in a good position to do a go-around. It all happened so fast. We did land safely but I was pissed. There was no reason for ATC to vector us and give us such an unsafe approach.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported an issue with a late clearance to a visual approach resulting in a marginally stable approach.
ACN: 1504353 (26 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201712
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: Marginal
Light: Dawn

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ground: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Component
Aircraft Component: VHF
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1504353
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1504481
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Taxiing out we were to hold short of [taxiway] and contact ground. The FO (First Officer) transmitted but ATC did not hear him; we tried again and then I tried on my side to contact ground; they did not hear us. Ground control then called "who's at [taxiway]?" and we could not reply. I asked the FO to switch to comm 2 and try again, that was successful. We were given the runway assignment and taxi clearance. I started following the given route to the runway. While taxiing I tried to see if any button or knob was out of place so we could transmit, but to no success. As we got closer to the runway I determined that RTU 1 (Radio Tuning Unit) was not transmitting, but was receiving. I discussed the possibility of contacting Maintenance. I was trying to figure out what to do, and did not have a solid answer whether to go or not. After discussion with the FO about FAR's dealing with IFR flight on one radio, I came to the decision to go on the flight because we had Comm 3 available as a backup and I still could receive on Comm 1. That was a mistake. Enroute I ACARS Maintenance control and they advised to call when on the ground. I also notified Dispatch of the problem. As we flew I checked the QRH vol 1 to find any answers and read a Min. Equipment List that stated only 1 VHF is needed for flight, so I felt justified in departing, figuring we would be able to defer the radio. I talked with Maintenance control and we came to the conclusion that the Comm 1 was broken. I asked Maintenance to defer the radio and was told that Comm 1 is NOT deferrable because it's on the hot bus bar for emergency power loss. That's when I realized I made a mistake in departing.

Narrative: 2
Captain asked me how I felt about departing and I told him I was unsure. Captain felt pressured to stay on schedule and did not want to return to the gate. I need to be more assertive when unsure of a decision being made.

Synopsis
CRJ-200 flight crew reported departing with Comm 1 transmitter inoperative, but discovered after landing that Comm 1 was not deferrable.
ACN: 1503687 (27 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201712
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: DCA.Tower
State Reference: DC

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: Tower: DCA
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace: Class B: DCA

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: Captain
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1503687
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1503705
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Workload
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Fuel Issue
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
After lengthy vectors, and slowing to speeds requiring flap extension we had to perform a go around while on approach with the River Visual 19. Vectored back around for another river visual with same slow speeds at low altitude resulted in us hitting min-fuel numbers mid-approach. Due to the high workload we refrained from attempting to interject on a busy tower frequency to declare min fuel, as we were already well established on the approach.

In retrospect, I should have just delegated to have the First Officer declare min fuel in accordance with Company Policy.

Narrative: 2
After an extended period of vectors and speed changes for sequencing into DCA, we were forced to go-around from the river visual runway 19 at 300ft agl. While being vectored back into sequence and turning back towards the river visual inbound to Fergi, the amber caution for min fuel illuminated. A high workload caused by scanning for dense traffic and setting back up for another approach, as well as considering we were already in sequence, cleared for the approach and inbound to land lead to the decision to focus more on the task at hand rather than waiting and attempting to make a call on the congested frequency.

An attempt by me as pilot monitoring still should have been made to atc to advise them of our min fuel situation as soon as any opening came up after everything was set up for the approach to hopefully prevent yet another go-around.

Synopsis
ERJ-175 flight crew reported not declaring "Minimum Fuel" during assigned go-around vectors for another approach due to congested landing traffic and high workload.
**ACN: 1502869 (28 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201712
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: TEB.Airport
- State Reference: NJ
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling.Single Value: 10000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: TEB
- Aircraft Operator: Air Taxi
- Make Model Name: Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Takeoff
- Route In Use.SID: RUUDY6

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 12000
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 25
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1050
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1502869
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
Function, Flight Crew: First Officer
Function, Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification, Flight Crew: Flight Engineer
Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification, Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification, Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience, Flight Crew, Total: 30000
Experience, Flight Crew, Last 90 Days: 35
Experience, Flight Crew, Type: 600
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1502865
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown, Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown, Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly, ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly, Conflict: Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly, Deviation, Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly, Deviation, Procedural: Clearance
Detector, Person: Flight Crew
Miss Distance, Horizontal: 1000
Were Passengers Involved in Event: N
When Detected: In-flight
Result, Flight Crew: Rejected Takeoff
Result, Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action
Result, Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1

ATIS was reporting winds 290 at 13 gusting 22 and Runway 24 was being used for takeoff and landing. I was Pilot Flying and my Co-Captain was Pilot Not Flying and operating the radios. Delays during taxi were long, approximately 45 minutes to an hour. There were approximately 15 to 17 aircraft in front of us using both taxiways to Runway 24 for takeoff. Radio traffic was extremely busy. Taxi checks and pretakeoff checklists were accomplished during this period with adherence to sterile cockpit procedures. At no time did we hear or observe any traffic using Runway 19 as we were instructed to monitor the Tower frequency.

After a taxi time of approximately an hour we were given Tower instructions to taxi into position and hold on Runway 24. As we taxied into position we accomplished the final checks for takeoff, i.e. ignitions on, pitot heat on, lights on, etc. At no time were we made aware of departing traffic on the crossing runway before our departure. Anticipating a short wait as we thought we were the only aircraft on an active runway and no traffic inbound for landing we took this time to do a quick review of the RUUDY 6 and after
takeoff procedures. During this time we received what we heard as our takeoff clearance. The Non Flying Pilot read back the takeoff clearance with no response from the Tower as would be expected. I began to add power and started the takeoff roll but also felt that something was amiss. I quickly glanced up and to my right saw a twin Cessna departing on Runway 19. I immediately cut the throttles to idle and began braking calling abort. As it was the very beginning of the roll I had only reached approximately 1/3 or so of full takeoff power. I was able to slow and stop well before Runway 19 (1000 or so feet) and before the Tower instructed us to stop. The crossing traffic was well beyond the intersection by this time and at no time did I anticipate or fear a collision. We were then instructed to cross Runway 19 and contact Ground Control. This we did and ground directed back into the queue and we accomplished our checklists again. We departed 20 minutes later with no other issues.

Upon our arrival at our destination I called the Tower and explained the situation. I believe that a combination of factors contributed the this situation, number one being the very heavy radio traffic, with multiple communications being blocked by more than one aircraft attempting to transmit and blocking or garbling reception. Also, it would have been helpful as we taxied into position to have been given caution that another aircraft would be departing ahead of us on the crossing runway. In retrospect it seems that blocked radios may have interfered with us hearing of another aircraft readying to depart and identifying properly what we thought was our takeoff clearance. It also seems that our read back to the Tower that we were cleared for takeoff was blocked by the other aircraft reading back its clearance at the same time, hence no warning that there was a conflict.

I do acknowledge that I should have had the non-flying pilot verify the clearance but again we thought we were the only aircraft ready to go. Being unfamiliar with some Teterboro procedures such as allowing aircraft to depart when under these circumstances also may have contributed to this situation. Had I realized this I would have been more vigilant.

Narrative: 2

Ground and Tower frequency were extremely busy, and talk was fast. Once cleared to lineup and wait, we completed takeoff checks. We received our takeoff clearance, which was read back to Tower. We commenced our takeoff roll, and at approximately 50 kts, Captain aborted the takeoff because he saw an aircraft departing on Runway 19, a crossing runway. As we stopped we got a call from Tower to stop, but we had accomplished that. ATIS had said, landing and departing Runway 24. During our 50 minute taxi the only takeoffs were taking place on 24.

Synopsis

C560XL air taxi flight crew reported a rejected takeoff when traffic was observed departing from the crossing runway.
**ACN: 1502626 (29 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201712
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: OMDB.Airport
- State Reference: FO

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: IMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: OOMM
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Widebody Transport
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Cargo / Freight
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Descent

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1502626
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Dispatch
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1502630
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Dispatch  
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC  

Events  
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe  
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy  
Detector. Person : Flight Crew  
When Detected : In-flight  
Result. Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance  

Assessments  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Primary Problem : Procedure  

Narrative: 1  
I received a flight plan for [a flight to] OMDB filed to DESDI as the final fix. This has been the final filed fix for many years. I prepared using Jepp FDPRO and selected the new Dec load and it did not have any DESDI STARS. It doesn't have DESDI connecting to any STARS that I can find and all of the STARS have changed. Since I had a similar experience in RJAA years ago, I ask the Dispatcher to make sure we will have no issues. In other words, I am being proactive knowing I can't fly an arrival past DESDI, and I will arrive with none of the new STARS since I will be required to select the previous database based on a takeoff before XX01Z. I choose the FMS database ending XX Dec to comply with the FOM. I chose the previous database due to my takeoff time being prior to XX01Z of XX Dec and I carefully scrutinize the SID out of ZZZ based on the new XX Dec Jepp. The Dispatcher explains that our flight planning system will not allow a flight plan based on the new XX Dec load until after XX01Z. I arrive in OMDB and they acted very surprised and not happy that we could not fly the new STARS. We explained that we had called ahead and that fell on deaf ears. They asked if we could proceed direct to at least 4 different fixes and we had to say unable.  

I understand that we fully complied with the FOM and FARs as did the Dispatcher. This is about safety and a Flight Crew's expectations. I hate surprises in the air. In particular, after a 7 hour 2 man flight where we were vectored 90 degrees then back the other way 180 degrees and burned an extra 4,000 pounds of fuel. If the Dispatcher and Crew know they cannot fly any new arrivals, then the controlling agency should know upon arrival that radar vectors will be required, i.e. no surprises. The FMS database not coinciding with new IAPs works fine in the domestic system, however, not so great internationally. If we know we can't fly a STAR or approach, it is not the safest course of action to put the burden on the Crew to deal with it when they arrive.  

It would appear that airlines and ATC agencies from around the world have different interpretations/procedures of when to activate a new FMS database. Everyone should be doing the same thing so that crew and ATC expectations are the same. The safety implications of not knowing what to expect are tremendous. FAA, A4A and ICAO level discussions to standardize and enforce one policy worldwide.  

Narrative: 2  
Captain had consulted with Dispatch to ensure we were filed correctly, since we were airborne during database and charting changeover. He informed me [Dispatch] had told him we were filed the only way we could be and that he'd contacted UAE to confirm the DESDI arrival would be available at our planned arrival time. Upon entering UAE airspace
we were rerouted to B748. B416 airway was removed in the chart change. Since we were
operating on the "old" database we had to tell them we were unable and accepted radar
vectors. I believe we operated on the incorrect database for the flight.

Flight planning failure. UAE executed the database and charting change at XX30Z. We
should have been filed using the XX Dec data. We were informed the flight planning
software would not allow Dispatcher to file on the new route for our departure, based on
time.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported that their Dispatcher was unable file the correct arrival for
an international destination due to the difference in times when the FMS database and
charting updates occur.
**ACN: 1502266 (30 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201712
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling: Single Value: 12000

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Corporate
- Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Helicopter
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Corporate
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 8700
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 42
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2600
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1502266
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Person: 2

Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ. Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 4
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1502266
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: NMAC
Detector. Automation: Aircraft TA
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
Miss Distance. Horizontal: 100
Miss Distance. Vertical: 0
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was cleared for a visual approach to Runway 34. When I checked in on Tower they advised of helicopter traffic which was to my right. I reported traffic was not in sight. Tower advised helicopter of my position again. Helicopter reported he had me in sight. My situational awareness placed the helicopter below me and passing beneath me from right to left and it sounded like he would be using the parallel Runway 35.

I intentionally flew a significantly higher than normal visual approach to pass well above the Runway 35 final approach course. Upon joining the Runway 34 LOC I began a descent and got one TCAS "traffic" call and observed a target -300 below me. I pulled up again and the target disappeared about 10 seconds later and I began a descent to try to join the glideslope to stabilize my approach. After selecting full flaps I noticed out of my peripheral vision to the right a helicopter at my altitude less than 100 feet off my right wing. When I looked to the right the helicopter was veering away from me to the right and I initiated a slight turn to the left to make sure I missed him.

I asked the Tower if he had seen the helicopter I had missed by less than 100 feet on the final approach course and got no response. I made a normal landing and exited and asked what the call sign of the helicopter was so it would get on the tape for review. After
landing I called the Tower Chief and reported the incident so he could begin an immediate investigation into what caused the problem.

**Narrative: 2**

Aircraft Y on ILS approach for Runway 34, 7 MN south at 2,000. Aircraft X 10 MN southwest inbound. I noticed that there would be a possible conflict and Local was somewhat busy with other traffic. I asked if he saw the conflict and he acknowledged that he was going to sidestep Aircraft Y to Runway 35. I heard him give the instruction to continue and sidestep for Aircraft Y and gave traffic to Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. I assumed that the conflict was being handled appropriately and moved on to other tasks. The two aircraft got close, but I was under the impression that they had visual between them and were separating themselves. About ten minutes after Aircraft X landed he called the Tower and I transferred him to the facility manager. This is when I became aware that the pilot saw the situation as a NMAC.

The Local Controller simply made a bad plan and did not communicate the plan to the pilots in a way that his plan would have worked. He should have made Aircraft Y break into a right 360 turn to follow the fast Aircraft X.

**Synopsis**

Approach Controller and turboprop pilot reported a near miss with a helicopter during visual approach.
Time / Day
Date: 201711
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: EWR.Airport
State Reference: NJ
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: N90
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B: N90

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1500179
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1500181
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Airport

Narrative: 1

I was Captain and non-flying pilot during a night visual landing to Runway 11. ATIS called VMC with ILS 22L and ILS 11 in use. We were told by New York Approach to expect ILS 22L and were then given direct JARIT... when we queried the routing we were then notified to expect ILS 11. Neither ATIS nor ATC made notification of LAHSO in use or else we would not have accepted ILS 11. We were cleared to land 11 with no LAHSO clearance given. The landing was uneventful and as we rolled-out we were given instruction by Tower to turn left on taxiway P. We read back the instruction and at a slow taxi speed with all lights on, we could only make out one yellow lighted exit sign for P with an arrow pointing left. We were unable to determine the taxiway entrance as there was no lead-in line and the lighting was indistinguishable. As we taxied abeam the lighted exit sign it appeared that the taxiway was behind us and that the exit sign's location was nonstandard. I instructed the First Officer to notify Tower that we passed P and that we will need to take Z. Unable to make the radio call due to constant transmissions on frequency, we taxied up to and short of 22L when Tower called a go-around for traffic on final for 22L and gave us instructions to exit on EE. On taxi in we were given a phone number to call for possible pilot deviation. I talked with the ATC manager and explained what had happened and I was notified that a go-around warning indication was activated and necessitated the go-around call. An investigation into the event will be conducted in the morning and my name and certificate number was recorded.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported difficulty identifying the proper taxi exit entrance during roll out on the active runway due to insufficient markings.
ACN: **1500165** (32 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201711
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Air/Ground Communication
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1500165
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
I was the Pilot Flying (PF) and we had been cleared off the Arrival and direct to with a descent to 3000 feet. Everything had been normal until we were cleared for the approach. An issue affected our ability to communicate with ATC (transmitting) and each other (via the intercom). We were able to accept a visual approach clearance with the TRACON about 10 miles from the airport at an altitude of roughly 3000'. However, at this point, we lost the transmit function on both our COMs and it remained unclear whether ATC could hear us. When we both pressed the PTT, the radios went silent despite the "TX" being present on the radio page of the MCDU. We also could not hear each other over the intercom, but we could hear ATC without issue. The approach controller made several attempts to hand us off to tower, but apparently never heard us.

We slowed the aircraft for a visual approach to [the] runway as we continued to resolve the issue. As we configured for landing, we attempted to use the hand mics, as well as, all available PTTs and COM 2 to regain communication. We also reset our O2 mask mics, but the problem continued. The tower controller began calling us as we crossed over the FAF.

After establishing the approach, we continued our attempts to reach ATC and Fist Officer (FO) alertly began squawking 7600.

The tower made several attempts to clear us to land and we eventually acknowledged our landing clearance by flashing our landing lights and pressing IDENT.

Again, this all happened within 10 miles of the airport and left us little time to problem solve. Adding to the frustration, our inability to hear each other made it difficult to complete normal approach calls. We accomplished the Landing Checklist as I established the aircraft on a stabilized approach. However, in our attempts to troubleshoot the communication issue, I neglected to notice the flap handle sitting between 4 and 5. At roughly 700', we received an aural alert "TOO LOW, FLAPS".

Our FO quickly tapped the flap handle into the detent and the flaps traveled to the 5
position. After a brief discussion, I elected to continue the approach because we could not communicate a go around to ATC and I was unclear how we would explain our situation as we attempted to return to the field. Additionally, the aircraft was established on speed/profile for a night, visual approach to a long runway in VMC conditions and would ultimately land with the flaps at 5.

After a normal/routine landing, we cleared the runway and ATC could now make out some of our transmissions. I still had difficulty hearing via the intercom or when the mic was keyed, but we complied with our taxi instructions and canceled the 7600 squawk at the tower's request. After shutting down at the gate and completing the Parking Checklist, we made several radio checks on COM1 and COM2 using each of the available mics. At this point, the issue had completely disappeared and we were able to communicate clearly using each PTT and mic. I still entered the discrepancy in the aircraft logbook and contacted dispatch and maintenance control to make them aware of the problem.

As a side note, Tower informed us that we were the second [company] aircraft to arrive this evening with radio issues.

The best way to prevent these fixation issues would be to remain vigilant and follow SOP. I personally neglected the golden rule of aviating before communicating as I attempted to reestablish COMs during a critical stage of flight. Had I cross checked the flap indication with the handle position during the Landing Checklist we could have immediately remedied the situation.

**Narrative: 2**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

EMB-175 flight crew reported that while dealing with communication issues they neglected to complete the landing checklist and received an aural alert "TOO LOW, FLAPS".
ACN: 1499099 (33 of 50)

Time / Day

Date: 201711
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference. ATC Facility: RJJJ.ARTCC
State Reference: FO
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 32000

Environment

Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: RJJJ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Oceanic
Route In Use. Airway: L625

Person: 1

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 812
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1499099
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Person: 2

Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Narrative: 1

The flight was normal up until the point where we transitioned from Manila (RPHI) to Fukuoka (RJJJ - JAPAN OCEANIC AREA) at MEVIN intersection on airway L625. We had been in continuous contact with Manila control via CPDLC and Manila radio on HF (after receiving a good SELCAL check upon entering Manila airspace between ANOKI and ARESI). About 5 min before crossing the FIR at MEVIN we received a CPDLC disconnect message indicating the link with Manila RPHI was terminated. We immediately signed-on to RJJJ and sent them a position report after they accepted the CPDLC sign-on. We could not raise Tokyo Radio on HF and we asked RJJJ via CPDLC for an HF frequency for Tokyo Radio. We received the following cryptic message, "This is oceanic control. Contact control on VHF". We touched Ball note #8 on the Jepp-Pro application. The communication block that came-up in FD-Pro was WORTHLESS INFORMATION! We touched-on the communication box in the pull-out menu on FD-Pro and it showed FUKUOKA CONTROL 118.9 and 119.35(secondary) - we received no response on either. We finally received a SELCAL from the last Manila Radio frequency and was told to contact NAHA control on 123.9. We made contact with NAHA and were chastised twice by the controller and again by the controller supervisor for being in their airspace for 10 min without contacting them! The High IFR chart in JEPP-PRO indicates the airspace belongs to RJJJ FIR -This is absolutely NOT TRUE! It belongs to NAHA Control on Okinawa! The Jeppesen high chart and the pull-out information box need to be updated to reflect this REALITY. The whole incident could be avoided with proper charts and/or a CPDLC or HF handoff from Manila Control to NAHA control. Manila simply terminated the CPDLC connection without comment and Manila radio failed to SELCAL us with the hand-off to NAHA control until 10 minutes after we had passed the FIR boundary.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported being out of contact for ten minutes in Fukuoka airspace due to a late hand off from Manila ATC and an error in ATC frequency information in the Jepp-Pro application.
**Time / Day**
Date: 2017111
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: BUR.Airport
State Reference: CA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Night

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: BUR
Make Model Name: PC-12
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing

**Person : 1**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reportor Organization: Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 4970
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 155
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2100
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1499011
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reportor Organization: Air Taxi
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Commercial
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 550
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 227
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 207
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1497306
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Ground Incursion: Runway
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were cleared for the ILS approach [Runway] 08. During the landing roll out Tower Control cleared us to exit Bravo and contact Ground Control. Once we realized we could not make Bravo we continued to the next taxiway while crossing Runway 15. (LAHSO was not in effect nor are we permitted to accept the clearance per our SOPs.) We were instructed to exit D2 without delay due to a Gulfstream on short final. We contacted Ground Control and were instructed to proceed via Delta and hold short of taxiway Alpha and then to hold short Runway 15. We were then cleared to cross Runway 15 and asked to call Tower for a "possible pilot deviation." The First Officer [and I] were perplexed as to what this request was about.

After reaching the terminal I called the Tower. The Tower manager informed me that the Tower Controller had to cancel a takeoff clearance issued to a B737 on a line up and wait clearance on Runway 15 after it had powered up. I explained to the Tower manager that while I was on the landing rollout I was not able to respond quickly enough to inform the Controller I was unable to make Bravo, as my primary responsibility at the time was controlling the aircraft while on an active runway. He explained that I should not have accepted the clearance to make Bravo and I agreed. He also explained that another aircraft was on short final and that they (ATC) had separation criteria on aircraft speed over specific land marks on final approach which they based aircraft separation on. Further, he explained I should not have accepted the taxi clearance if I could not comply. I agreed. Finally, he explained that "we all learned from this scenario." The possible outcome could have been disastrous had the B737 not been able to stop in time as we crossed Runway 15 on the landing rollout.
In hindsight, this scenario highlights a very thin margin for error regarding separation of landing aircraft during a very busy time at this airport, and the possible error on the Controller's part. I agree with the Controller's instruction to not accept a clearance if unable to comply. Another contributing factor was my lack of situational awareness of the aircraft in position for takeoff and the aircraft cleared to land on short final. Lastly, I believe the Controller was rushed to keep things moving and subsequently should not have issued the takeoff clearance until our aircraft was clear of the intersecting runway and no conflict existed.

**Narrative: 2**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

PC 12 flight crew reported being unable to make the turnoff that ATC was planning, resulting in cancellation of takeoff clearance for a B737 in position on the crossing runway.
Time / Day
Date: 201711
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-700
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 671
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1496013
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1495996
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
During the landing rollout, the Tower Controller was asking what turnoff we could make. As the PF, I was zoned in on trying to get the aircraft stopped and wasn't hearing most of the Controller's communications with my F/O. With other aircraft inbound on the same runway, I chose to turn right at [a particular] Taxiway. After we cleared the runway, the Controller told us that Taxiway was closed there and that we were supposed to have turned left on [another taxiway] instead. With the aircraft in full reverse thrust and in critical phase of flight, confusion with Controller's communications took place. We taxied on into the gate.

Narrative: 2
While rolling out on landing, the runway was reported 5, 5, 5. We were still in reverse thrust and anti-skid cycling while Tower was telling us to exit [assigned] taxiway while we were still very busy in a critical phase of flight. I was responding back unable. We were stepping on each other and all I heard was [a different taxiway], as did the Captain, and he turned right on [the wrong taxiway]. After turning right, Tower told us to stop and do a 180 turn. We were unable at that point. Tower then said to continue and contact Ground and to comply with instructions next time.

Synopsis
B737-700 Captain reported missing a taxi clearance that was issued during a critical phase of flight during reverse thrust application on landing roll.
### ACN: 1494652 (36 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201711
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: IAH.Airport
- State Reference: TX
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 35700

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Medium Large Transport
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Airspace.Class A: ZHU

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1494652
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1494652
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1

On flight to IAH (which was severely delayed) we were close to our top of descent, but still at cruise, FL360, and originally filed on the DOOBI2 arrival into IAH. We were then given an arrival change, the new clearance was direct SWB for the ZEEKK1. I asked ATC for a descent since our top of descent was only about 15NM away. They gave us a frequency change and told us the next controller would have that for us. I then checked in with the next controller at FL360.

About a minute or two later, right as we were approaching our Vertex Time of Arrival (VTA), Center says "Aircraft Y (second digit of call sign different from Aircraft X), descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival landing west." Already with VNAV armed, my First Officer, thought he had heard ATC say "Aircraft X", he then dialed in the bottom altitude of the arrival in the altitude selector and the airplane began to capture the path. I caught that ATC said the wrong flight number, but I figured he meant to say Aircraft X and not Aircraft Y, but I wanted to verify anyway. So I said "I just want to confirm, Aircraft X cleared to descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival?" The Center Controller then came back on and said "uhhh Aircraft Z (first digit of call sign different from Aircraft X) descend via the ZEEKK1." Immediately I told my First Officer to go back up to FL360 until we get the confusion sorted out, but by that time we had already descended about 300 feet. I responded and said "okay sir, you're saying a bunch of different call signs here, who is cleared to descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival?" He then comes back and says a third call sign "Aircraft A (fourth digit of call sign different from Aircraft X), cleared to descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival". I then told ATC that we, Aircraft X, had started down since we thought he said Aircraft X originally. He then corrects himself and says "Aircraft B, Aircraft B (similar flight number, but different company), descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival landing west". About a minute goes by and then he gives us the proper clearance to descend via the ZEEKK1. Come to find out, Aircraft B and Aircraft A were both in front of us on the arrival and all 3 of our call signs were mixed up. After we received the proper clearance, we descended via without further incident.

I think that all of these similar sounding call signs that we are using is a hazard. It creates mass confusion for ATC and also for pilots. It happens very frequently where a pilot will take another's radio call by mistake and/or where ATC gives an airplane a clearance meant for another flight. I'm not sure of a solid solution other than extreme caution and diligence
for all pilots and ATC alike. But to truly eradicate these issues, it would take a complete change in logistics and planning. There are 9999 different flight number combinations that can be used, and we're only using a fraction of those combinations.

**Narrative: 2**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported three aircraft on the same arrival with similar call signs caused confusion for pilots and controller.
Time / Day
Date: 201711
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1800

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Component: 1
Aircraft Component: Pneumatic Ducting
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Component: 2
Aircraft Component: Air/Ground Communication
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 8079
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1406
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1493055
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

**Person : 2**

Reference : 2
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 444
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1493040
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

**Events**

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Primary Problem : Aircraft

**Narrative: 1**

On final 28R, First Officer called gear down, flaps 15, [and] landing check. Approach sent us over to tower. Wing body overheat light on left side illuminated. Completed normal landing procedures then got out QRH for wing body overheat. Accomplished QRH procedure by 500 feet. Landed 28R. After clearing the runway, we realized that we never switched over to tower frequency. [We] called tower, [and] they said they cleared us to land and gave us a green light.

**Narrative: 2**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

B737 flight crew reported neglecting to call the tower for landing clearance while distracted on final approach by a wing body overheat warning.
ACN: 1492422 (38 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201710
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude MSL Single Value: 18000

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC/Advisory Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-700
Crew Size Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Data Transmission and Automatic Calling
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number Accession Number: 1492422
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function Flight Crew: First Officer
Function Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1492438
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
Result. Flight Crew: FLC Overrode Automation
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
On the short flight we briefed in depth the approach page and the possibility of different taxi routes. This caused us to be late on getting the performance weight and balance landing performance. As we continued on the arrival, we decided to use the AeroData app to get the data. I transferred control to the First Officer (FO) to work on getting data. After not being able to get the data I notified ATC that we needed delayed vectors to contact our Dispatch to receive our data. ATC continued to push us into the approach not really caring that we asked for delayed vectors. I let them know again.

They slowed us to 180 knots and I noticed that we were still clean at 180 knots so we selected flaps 5. I monitored number 2 radio and finally got dispatch and landing on about a 15 mile final. After landing and exiting the runway the ACARS chimes and our landing data came through. We called Maintenance and they reset the ACARS to clear the memory of the system. This distraction caused us to be in the Yellow which caused us to be clean at 180 knots. I should have been more assertive with ATC and not let them push us into the approach.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported that they were unable to get the performance weight and balance landing data through ACARS.
ACN: 1490741  (39 of 50)

**Time / Day**

Date: 201710  
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference: ATC Facility: YMMM.ARTCC  
State Reference: FO  
Altitude: MSL: Single Value: 5000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
ATC / Advisory Center: YMMM  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Widebody Transport  
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 4  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC  
Flight Phase: Takeoff  
Flight Phase: Climb  
Route In Use: SID: BRYSON

**Person : 1**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer  
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying  
Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 11262  
Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 2095  
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1490741  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew  
Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**

Reference: 2  
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying  
Function: Flight Crew: Captain  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 17445
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 894
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1493064
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 3
Reference : 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 11526
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 988
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1490748
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 4
Reference : 4
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 796
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1490745
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
We were assigned, and wrote down Dosel departure [and] cleared to 5,000 feet. The other IRO also copied the same clearance. The Dosel and the Bryson departure have a similar turn and it wasn’t until passing ALBAK waypoint that the controller asked what departure we were on and issued a heading of 270. Communication at times can be an issue; PDC is an excellent way to close that weak link.

**Narrative: 2**

There is a problem with the way Melbourne delivers clearances and how pilots copy and interpret the clearance.

Here is a typical clearance: cleared to ZZZ via dosel maintain 5000 dosel 9 departure freq 118.9. Note how the dosel fix is mentioned first and then the departure sid later which is different from the United States. This clearance crews have no problem with.

Here is the clearance that gets crews in trouble departing runway 16: cleared to ZZZ via dosel maintain 5000 bison 5 departure frequency 118.9. Crews hear via dosel and assume that is the dosel 9 sid and it is not. Further for some reason the bison 5 never gets written down. Maybe because of the heavy accent and format are different. I have talked with three crews who have been charged with a pilot deviations coming out of Melbourne. All crews flew the dosel 9 and should have flown the bison 5!

**Narrative: 3**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Narrative: 4**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight Crew reported a track deviation due to confusion with the departure clearance delivery format.
ACN: 1489800 (40 of 50)

Time / Day
- Date: 201710
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
- Locale Reference. Airport: ORD.Airport
- State Reference: IL
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 9000

Environment
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: C90
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use.STAR: BENKY4
- Airspace.Class B: ORD

Aircraft: 2
- Reference: Y
- Make Model Name: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace.Class B: ORD

Person: 1
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 5093
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1489800
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 3988
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1489803
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Automation : Aircraft RA
Detector.Automation : Aircraft TA
Miss Distance.Vertical : 400
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On the BENKY4 Arrival at 9000 FT near TONIE intersection, ATC gave us a clearance to
descend to 8000 FT. We then received a TCAS TA "traffic" just before descending. The
TCAS traffic appeared to be on a track toward us and TCAS showed the traffic at 8500 FT.
ATC DID NOT advise us of the traffic at 8500 FT and we were cleared to descend to 8000
FT. We maintained 9000 FT due to the TCAS information and then acquired visual contact
with the traffic. As the traffic passed 500 FT directly below us, TCAS responded with a RA
"monitor vertical speed". After traffic passed, I advised ATC there was a single engine
Cessna that passed 500 FT below us. ATC replied something such as "roger" or "ok". We
then descended to 8000 FT. There were two or three other comments from other aircraft
in the vicinity regarding the 8500 FT traffic including a TCAS RA that was broadcast from
[another air carrier] flight. ATC then advised on frequency that there was a Station air
(Cessna) maneuvering in the area.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported that as they started a descent, as per ATC instructions, then
received a TCAS alert of traffic below.
**ACN: 1489773 (41 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201710
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Dusk

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: A320
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- Aircraft Operator.Other
- Make Model Name: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part.Other
- Mission.Other

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 14245
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 11081
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1489773
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
Narrative: 1

Inbound to [our destination] at 2000 MSL on a 050 heading and 210 KIAS assigned for radar vectors to the visual approach to runway 11. ATC called, "Traffic 10 o`clock at 1800, 2 to 3 miles" I looked for traffic. No Joy. Traffic on TCAS showed as an amber target. ATC called, "Traffic 12 o`clock less than a mile." I Pilot Flying (PF), said to First Officer, "I don`t have him." TCAS issued a Descent RA of 1600 FPM, the autopilot was disconnected, and the RA was followed.

I looked up in time to see a light brown and white C-172 at 12 o`clock pass approximately 300 feet above our airplane. ATC asked, "What are you doing?" Pilot Not Flying (PNF) responded, "Complying with TCAS RA." ATC responded, "Ok, continue." TCAS issued a reduce descent command. ATC said, "When able, turn to 060. I turned to 060. TCAS issued, "Clear of conflict." I leveled off at 1400 MSL.

We asked ATC what altitude he wanted us at, and we were told 1800 MSL. I climbed back to 1800 MSL. We were then turned inbound and cleared for a visual approach to runway 11 and completed a normal visual approach to and landing to that runway. CRM and cockpit communication worked very well in a busy cockpit, which contributed to a safe outcome to this event.

Narrative: 2

We were on a heading of 050 and an altitude of 2000 FT MSL being vectored by ATC for the ILS 11 approach when this incident occurred. ATC informed us about a traffic at 10
o'clock within 2 to 3 miles. I immediately started looking for the traffic and informed the captain that I did not see the traffic and he also stated not in sight. I told ATC traffic not in sight.

After that ATC stated traffic less than a mile 12 o'clock 1800 FT MSL. Without delay, I started looking for traffic, at that very moment the TCAS system instructed us to descend. The captain promptly turn off the automation system and executed the descend. While still looking outside, I saw a Cessna 172 with white and brown colors directly ahead of us and 300 FT above our altitude. The Captain descended to 1400 FT MSL. ATC asked what are you doing? I stated responding to a TCAS RA and the controller said continue. After we cleared the traffic, I queried about our altitude. ATC instructed us to climb to 1800 FT. MSL the minimum vectoring altitude and also stated when able turn to a heading of 060.

**Synopsis**

Airbus 320 flight crew reported a NMAC during descent, and descending to comply with an TCAS RA.
**Time / Day**

Date: 201710  
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**

Locale Reference: Airport: ATL.Airport  
State Reference: GA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 9000

**Environment**

Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
ATC / Advisory: TRACON: A80  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: B737-800  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Descent  
Route In Use: Vectors  
Airspace.Class B: ATL

**Person : 1**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew: Captain  
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying  
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 519  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1489271  
Human Factors: Distraction  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness  
Human Factors: Time Pressure  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew  
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**

Reference: 2  
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer  
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Type : 7000
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number : 1489273
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Speed : All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector. Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result. Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1
We were on downwind at an assigned speed of 210 knots while in the descent to 7,000 feet. Speed brake was already out. ATC asked for best rate of descent. We slowed to 200 knots and put out flaps 10. Speed fluctuation was too close to flaps 10 limit for me, so I slowed to 190 for flap 10 speed buffer. At the same time, we are hearing on the busy radios of Precision Runway Monitoring (PRM) Approaches being conducted. We hadn't previously briefed PRM Approaches and confirmed that wasn't on the ATIS, so we were working on that now as well. Passing somewhere around 5,000 feet, we were queried on what the airspeed was. We responded with speed of 185 and were subsequently scolded for slowing down without permission and given a phone number to call.

I think the combination of busy radios, probable PRM Approach clearance coming, slow to 210 knots, and go down faster resulted in non-compliance with speed clearance. Upon landing I called the company FAA representative who called ATL ATC and said he had talked to the Controller about the above situation who understood our concern.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
B737-800 flight crew reported they did not comply with an ATC assigned speed.
ACN: 1488926 (43 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201710
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: JAC.Airport
State Reference: WY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 13400

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZLC
Aircraft Operator: Air Taxi
Make Model Name: Light Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class E: ZLC

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZLC.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Developmental
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1488926
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 32000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 250
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1489229
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: CFTT / CFIT
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Primary Problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1
I was the Radar Controller of the combined sectors. Aircraft X was on a heading at 16,000 feet. I issued a descent to 14,000 feet, the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) in his area at the time was 13,700 feet. I thought the read back was correct, however after listening to it, it was very unclear. I noticed the pilot start to descend through 14,000 feet, to 13,700 feet where I asked, "say altitude". The pilot came back saying his altitude was 13,500 feet at the time, and descending to 11,000 feet. I issued a low altitude alert and a climb above the MIA.

I recommend new radios, or a new radio system.

Narrative: 2
I was given an initial descent from 16,000 feet inbound to the airport. I read back 11,000 feet twice and the controller had given me 14,000 feet. I looked at the terrain and thought it could be low, but failed to ask the controller if 11,000 feet was the correct altitude. I descended to 13,400 feet and the controller called. I immediately climbed to 14,000 feet.

Synopsis
A pilot and Center Controller reported a communication problem with an altitude clearance and descended below the minimum IFR altitude.
**ACN: 1488544 (44 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201710
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: SAV.TRACON
- State Reference: GA
- Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 2000

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: SAV
- Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace: Class C: SAV

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: SAV
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Airspace: Class C: SAV

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Fractional
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1488544
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Fractional
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1488545
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: CFTT / CFIT
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
About 20 DME southwest of SAV ATC told us to descend to 2000. About the same time we received an ATC caution terrain warning ATC told us to climb to 2500.

Narrative: 2
We were giving direct to the Outer Marker (OM) for a visual. At 5000 feet we received a TCAS warning from a [aircraft] doing aerobatics. ATC advised of traffic to our right and climbing fast. I saw him climb and do a snap roll then a couple of knife edges which is when I believe he saw us.

After that we were given a descent to 2000 feet. PIC started a descent to 2000 feet from 5000 feet. Although it was haze we began to see two antennas in front of us which seemed very high. At the same time we both saw them appear on the terrain avoidance map on the MFD. In the next couple of seconds we received a caution terrain message. A few second after that we got an ATC climb to 2500 feet. We climbed to 2500 feet to avoid the antennas. From this point we had the airport in sight and were cleared for a visual approach to 10. No other mention of this was made from ATC.

Synopsis
Flight crew reported receiving a low altitude warning while approaching the SAV area.
Time / Day
Date: 201710
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: HOU.Airport
State Reference: TX
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3800

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: I90
Aircraft Operator: Fractional
Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use.SID: WYLSN5
Airspace.Class B: HOU

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Fractional
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1488114
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Fractional
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1488676
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
After takeoff on the WYLSN5 out of HOU, we were switched to Houston departure. Checked in leaving 3800 feet for 16,000 feet. ATC queried us on the altitude cleared to, we said 16,000 feet. ATC returned and said we were only cleared to 5000 feet. After being told we were cleared to 5000 ft, I set 5000 ft in the alerter leaving approximately 4100 for 5000 feet. We leveled off at 5000 ft. ATC stated that direct to 16,000 feet clearances are never given, usually stop at five. He asked if 5000 was in our Clearance, we stated we received it PDC and only saw the 16,000 ft clearance limit of the departure. He said they have been having problems with PDC clearances out of Hobby with this same exact instance with pilots not seeing the 5000 ft limit. He said he would make note of this and review the PDC. We continued the flight and approximately 15 minutes later was asked to call an 800 number when we landed for a possible navigation deviation. We called after landing and explained the situation we were told that no deviation occurred, but the PDC was apparently incorrectly copied.

We were rushed and sidetracked as a crew in HOU with a passenger trip, and both apparently did not see the except maintain 5000 ft in the notes at the end of the PDC after both confirming 16000 ft. We only saw the 16000 ft altitude given as the top of the departure. As a crew we need to slow down and make sure every word has been read on the PDC and copied and entered correctly. It would also be beneficial if ATC reformatted the PDC clearances and standardized them including any changes to a departure altitude towards the top of the clearance where the departure is given so it can be understood easily.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
Business jet flight crew reported difficulty catching altitude restriction departing HOU on the PDC print out.
ACN: 1486038 (46 of 50)

Time / Day

Date: 201710
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: BUR.Airport
State Reference: CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 11000

Environment

Flight Conditions: Mixed
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 1400

Aircraft: 1

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: SCT
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-700
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Vectors
Route In Use.STAR: ROKKR1
Airspace. Class E: ZLA

Aircraft: 2

ATC / Advisory.TRACON: SCT
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace. Class E: ZLA

Person: 1

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 8900
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 456
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1486038
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Person: 2

Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 15000
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 200
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1486046
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Detector. Automation: Aircraft Other Automation
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

ATC repeatedly called us by wrong call sign. Company [flight] XXXX was in front of us. ATC kept calling us XXXX.

Narrative: 2

Descending on the ROKKR 1 we [flight XXYX] were given continued descent to 7000 FT. Flight XXXX was also on frequency, SoCal [Tracon] seemed to be mixing up the call signs or we may have misheard them. It is possible our clearance to 7000 FT was meant for XXXX. Several times it sounded like SoCal called us XXXX or called them XXYX. Somewhat urgently, we were directed to stop our descent immediately, which left us at 10,100 FT, which we reported. Then we were given vectors for traffic and then a second traffic. Normal vectors to final and continued descent followed.

Synopsis

B737 flight crew reported ATC repeatedly assigned instructions to incorrect aircraft due to similar call signs.
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Date : 201710</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800</td>
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<th><strong>Place</strong></th>
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<table>
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<tr>
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<td>Flight Plan : IFR</td>
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<td>Mission : Passenger</td>
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<td>Flight Phase : Descent</td>
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<td>Route In Use.STAR : EAGLZ1</td>
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<td>Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew</td>
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<td>Reporter Organization : Air Carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>Function.Flight Crew : First Officer</td>
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</table>
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1485382
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Fatigue
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown: Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter: CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result: Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

It was the fourth of five legs on the last day of our trip. We were both a little tired and looking forward to getting home as we descended via the EAGLZ 1 into ONT. The airspace was quiet and SoCal clearly wanted to help us expedite but ended up using far more words than were necessary as he mentioned a Visual Approach more than once. We were told to maintain 8000 ft and proceed direct to either TAKOE or PETIS to acquire the airport for the visual. We didn't have either point in our route and the FO (PF) selected the next point instead. Seeing the error, I went heads down to type in TAKOE. At the same time the FO thought we were cleared for the approach and changed the altitude in the AFCS and started a descent. I did not hear him announce this. ATC queried us as we passed 7300 ft and told us to climb to 7700 ft. We were subsequently cleared for the visual and landed uneventfully on 26R. We clearly had a breakdown in [altitude awareness] and it was completely our fault. Contributing factors were slight fatigue, expectation bias as ATC mentioned a visual approach multiple times and the feeling of being rushed because of our altitude and proximity to the runway.

Communication is the key. We both are very familiar with this airport but neither had flown the EAGLZ 1. A more thorough arrival briefing would have highlighted the fact the arrival does not connect to the runway points. When ATC mentioned the visual so many more times than normal we should have recognized and announced we were in the yellow as we continued to get closer to the airport and above all, we must always announce changes to the [autoflight system] and make sure both pilots are on the same page.

Narrative: 2
As the PF, I should have delayed any descent from our last assigned altitude until I could verify the clearance with my Captain. I allowed myself to feel I needed to rush into a steep descent while in proximity to terrain without allowing the Captain to finish programming our route so his attention could be fully on monitoring our flight path. I allowed an ATC routing instruction to distract me from properly verifying our vertical clearance. There did not seem to be hardly any other air traffic nearby, so a request for vectors to manage the descent would have been easy to get.

**Synopsis**

B737 flight crew reported an ATC low altitude alert due to an altitude deviation on arrival into ONT. Fatigue and workload were cited as contributing factors.
**Time / Day**

Date: 201709
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: OAK.Airport
State Reference: CA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**

Light: Night

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Route In Use.SID: SKYL8

**Person: 1**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1485384
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**

Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew: Type: 8000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1485406
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.Flight Crew : FLC Overrode Automation
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
We were cleared via SKYLINE 7 Departure. During LEGS review, we noticed that PORTE and OSI fixes didn’t populate on the LEGS page though they are on the chart. The textual description for Runway 30 departures no longer lists those fixes, but it does for 28L/R and other similar SIDS. We queried ATC on Clearance Delivery and they said that the PORTE and OSI fixes should be included in the SID from Runway 30. Either the database, Jeppesen Plate, or ATC is wrong. Please look into it. We manually entered the fixes and no issues ensued with ATC on departure as we were vectored to WAGES.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported FMC route data was missing two fixes on their assigned departure SKYL8 from OAK.
ACN: 1482841 (49 of 50)

Time / Day

Date: 201709
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference. ATC Facility: N90.TRACON
State Reference: NY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: N90
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B: N90

Person: 1

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1482841
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2

Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1483279
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

We were on radar vectors for the RNAV GPS RWY 31 Approach into LGA. We were communicating on frequency 134.9. On the downwind northeast of LGA, the controller cleared us "Direct To" CHALN IAP on the RNAV GPS RWY 31. We were not cleared to intercept the final, nor cleared for the visual, nor cleared for the approach. Approaching CHALN IAP myself and my FO (First Officer) noticed an aircraft approaching the final inside CHALN from the south side of the final approach course approximately 1.5 to 2 NM at our 2 O'clock position. Reaching CHALN at approximately 90 degree intercept to final my FO and I both concluded that the controller was taking us through the final for spacing on the preceeding Aircraft. Of note the frequency was congested and we could not get a word in to get clarification from the controller on what he wanted after passing CHALN IAP. We continued on the heading we were on after passing CHALN until it became apparent that we were approaching JFK airspace. I, at this point, was telling the FO that we needed to tell the controller we needed a right turn back towards LGA. Before the FO could do this the controller came up and gave us an immediate right turn to heading 360 with a climb to 3000 feet from 2000 feet. The controller then made a comment to the effect "I thought you were smart enough to intercept final". I then indicated we would call TRACON when on the ground. The controller then made a comment to the effect that "yes if we could figure out how to use the phone". Once on the ground I called NY TRACON and spoke with a controller. I asked for a supervisor and it was indicated to me that there was no supervisor present. I explained the situation my Flight was in while on Radar vectors. He indicated to me that it was EXPECTED of me to turn final after reaching the IAP. I told him that was not our clearance and he reiterated that this is what most pilots do operating in this airspace. I realize after reaching CHALN IAP I should have entered a standard holding pattern on the course that I was on inbound to CHALN IAP. This in my mind was a dangerous proposition because once back inbound to CHALN at 2000 feet I would have been nose to nose with the aircraft that was following me causing without a doubt an RA maneuver.

This event occurred because of an improper clearance in the terminal environment along with the fact the frequency was quite congested at the time. As a crew we were assuming what the controller was trying to do with us when we should have immediately upon
receiving the clearance direct to this waypoint questioned what was expected once arriving over the waypoint.

To prevent this from happening in the future it is my opinion that the controllers should comply with their handbook with regards to issuing ambiguous clearances and we as pilots should not assume what the controller may be wanting to do with us especially in a crowded frequency congested terminal environment.

**Narrative: 2**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

The flight crew of a Boeing 737 reported that ATC cleared them "Direct To" a way point without further instructions or clearances after they arrived at the way point.
**ACN: 1482686** (50 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201709
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: SNA.Airport
- State Reference: CA
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 5
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 8000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling.Single Value: 3000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: SCT
- Aircraft Operator: Corporate
- Make Model Name: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Route In Use.SID: FINNZ1
- Airspace.Class B: LAX

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Corporate
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 19800
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 60
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 600
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1482686
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 14000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 85
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2100
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1481857
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Noise abatement climb out of SNA. Clearance (CPDLC) FINZZ1 departure MISEN KEPEC arrival to LAS. Climb via SID except maintain 5000 ft. Passing through 4000 ft SoCal issued climb to 8000 ft climb via the SID. I read back the clearance and set the altitude alerter to 8000. I looked down at the SID and saw the crossing restriction at STREL at or below 5000 ft. Called out to PF the STREL restriction as we are passing 6500 ft. PF stated that we were cleared to 8000 ft. SOCAL called with a heading change and frequency change and [asked] were we aware of the 5000 ft crossing restriction. I called back that we believed we were cleared to 8000 ft. Controller then restated the frequency change.

I believe that there were two factors that applied here. First, the clearance to climb to 8000 ft before we reached the 5000 ft hold down as we were in a rapid climb for noise abatement. To be clearer, I think the call should have been 'After STREL climb to 8000 ft climb via the SID.' Second the crew should have been more familiar with the 5000 ft crossing restriction and made sure we are climbing in VNAV. Also we should have made sure as a crew what the clearance actually was.

Interesting side bar: Today we did the same SID with the same restriction of 5000 ft. SoCal cleared us to 8000 ft at exactly the same spot. I asked the Controller if we were cleared to climb to 8000 ft or were we to climb via the SID. He came back with we were
indeed cleared to climb to 8000 ft at this time. Sometimes these RNAV SIDS can be confusing when we are issued exceptions to what we see on the SID we are issued and then Controller changes things in a high workload environment.

**Narrative: 2**

Departing SNA on FINZZ1 departure. 5000 ft preselected in altitude window. This is the hold down at STREL. Prior to reaching STREL the Controller advised, cleared to 8000 ft. Climb via SID. The next fix at DOLLF has an 8000 foot restriction. Even by adding the phrase "climb via the SID" we were both under the impression that the 5000 foot restriction was deleted. The other issue here is the quiet flying sensors all around the airport and everyone believes climbing up and out is preferred. This is a setup that needs serious attention. This was a no harm no foul day, no conflicting traffic.

**Synopsis**

G550 flight crew reported they overshot the 5,000 restriction at STREL departing SNA citing confusion with the "climb via" clearance.