

ASRS Database Report Set

Controller Reports

Report Set Description.....A sampling of reports from Air Traffic Controllers.

Update Number32.0

Date of UpdateApril 30, 2019

Number of Records in Report Set.....50

Number of New Records in Report Set50

Type of Records in Report Set.....For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000



TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating these data of the following points.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "B Hooley".

Becky L. Hooley, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to report. Thus, the data can reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.

One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concerning specific event types represents the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that *at least* 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS data is the **qualitative information** contained in **report narratives**. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 1622395 *(1 of 50)*

Synopsis

Center Controller reported skydivers that were not supposed to be dropping out of the sky, close to an aircraft that reported the parachutes.

ACN: 1616471 *(2 of 50)*

Synopsis

Controller reported that a pilot reported encountering a drone while on a visual approach to New Orleans Lakefront airport.

ACN: 1614559 *(3 of 50)*

Synopsis

SLC Local Controller and B737 flight crew reported a runway incursion due to taxiway confusion.

ACN: 1614554 *(4 of 50)*

Synopsis

PSP Tower Controller reported issuing a Low Altitude Alert for an aircraft on a night time visual approach.

ACN: 1614326 *(5 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZHU Center Controller reported an unsafe situation when a military aircraft went No Radio and a carrier had to be vectored away from the No Radio aircraft.

ACN: 1614325 *(6 of 50)*

Synopsis

SDL Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation between two arrivals where both aircraft executed a different sequence.

ACN: 1613878 *(7 of 50)*

Synopsis

IAD Tower Controller and pilot reported a near collision on the runway between the aircraft and a snow removal vehicle.

ACN: 1613873 *(8 of 50)*

Synopsis

N90 TRACON controllers reported another Controller was descending aircraft through their airspace without coordination.

ACN: 1613488 *(9 of 50)*

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descended quicker than anticipated and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 1613487 *(10 of 50)*

Synopsis

Local Controller reported issuing a go around to an aircraft that appeared to be on short final to a closed runway.

ACN: 1612887 *(11 of 50)*

Synopsis

SBN TRACON Controller reported assisting an aircraft with an equipment problem to a safe landing.

ACN: 1612886 *(12 of 50)*

Synopsis

Seattle TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation due to a rule being misapplied as well as possible fatigue and distraction by the government furlough.

ACN: 1612878 *(13 of 50)*

Synopsis

DAB TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict was exacerbated by faulty voice communications equipment.

ACN: 1612876 *(14 of 50)*

Synopsis

Cleveland Center Controller reported an airspace deviation associated with a crossing restriction that the pilot busted.

ACN: 1612864 *(15 of 50)*

Synopsis

NorCal TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict with an arrival aircraft and a jet that departed an uncontrolled airport.

ACN: 1612862 *(16 of 50)*

Synopsis

SNA Local Controllers reported a NMAC due to a coordination/communication problem.

ACN: 1612860 *(17 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZLA Front Line Manager reported a UAV was scheduled into an Altitude Reservation but knowledge of it was not posted nor were the Controllers informed.

ACN: 1612859 *(18 of 50)*

Synopsis

Memphis Center Controller reported an aircraft that descended below the Minimum Safe Altitude due to icing.

ACN: 1612858 *(19 of 50)*

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation caused by distractions.

ACN: 1612853 *(20 of 50)*

Synopsis

Miami Center Controller reported a loss of separation due to different climb rates of two aircraft and failing to notice due to distractions.

ACN: 1612847 *(21 of 50)*

Synopsis

Denver Tower Controller reported various complaints due to staffing, weather and the traffic level.

ACN: 1612594 *(22 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZMP Controller reported not having current approach plates due to the government shutdown and improvising using an expired plate.

ACN: 1612592 *(23 of 50)*

Synopsis

Denver Center Controller reported observing an aircraft that received a Minimum IFR Altitude alert and climbed the aircraft but pilot was slow to respond.

ACN: 1612589 *(24 of 50)*

Synopsis

New York Center Controller reported an airspace violation which reporter attributed to distractions.

ACN: 1612587 *(25 of 50)*

Synopsis

New York TRACON Controller reported lack of communication from management about a RADAR site going out mid-shift causing confusion and panic.

ACN: 1612585 *(26 of 50)*

Synopsis

Ontario Tower Controllers reported an unsafe situation between a departure and an arrival due to distractions.

ACN: 1612577 *(27 of 50)*

Synopsis

Phoenix TRACON Controller reported an unsafe operation due to low morale and distractions.

ACN: 1612268 *(28 of 50)*

Synopsis

New York Center Controllers reported a loss of separation, possibly due to miscommunication, stress and distractions from the government shutdown.

ACN: 1612267 *(29 of 50)*

Synopsis

Maui Tower Controllers reported resolving a head-on conflict caused by untimely coordination from HCF.

ACN: 1612265 *(30 of 50)*

Synopsis

Houston TRACON Controller reported climbing an aircraft too close through a heavy jet's wake turbulence due to distractions.

ACN: 1612255 *(31 of 50)*

Synopsis

Potomac TRACON Instructor reported a loss of separation while training due in part to fatigue and distractions.

ACN: 1612250 *(32 of 50)*

Synopsis

Chicago TRACON Controller reported adverse weather and a malfunctioning glideslope caused aircraft to go around.

ACN: 1611947 *(33 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZMA ARTCC Controller reported assigning an aircraft a higher altitude even though there was converging traffic 1,000 feet above them.

ACN: 1611942 *(34 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Center Controller working a combined sector reported that they were distracted by a conversation with the Supervisor over pay issues and made a late point out to the adjacent facility.

ACN: 1611940 *(35 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported taking handoffs on two aircraft they did not recognize were converging at the same altitude due to stress from the government shutdown.

ACN: 1611932 *(36 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported an aircraft misunderstood their traffic information, possibly due to poor radio coverage, and climbed above their assigned altitude into conflict with converging traffic.

ACN: 1611931 *(37 of 50)*

Synopsis

MIA Approach Controller reported releasing departures from different airports on converging headings into a conflict due to fatigue and stress over a government shutdown.

ACN: 1611928 *(38 of 50)*

Synopsis

Tower Ground Controller reported incorrect coordination with Local Control that an aircraft on an IFR flight plan was a VFR flight due to being distracted by the government shutdown.

ACN: 1611925 *(39 of 50)*

Synopsis

Tower Controller reported Quality Assurance staff suggested a pilot initiated go-around due to preceding traffic was an ATC Operational Error.

ACN: 1611072 *(40 of 50)*

Synopsis

Traffic Management Coordinator reported that an unqualified Supervisor working several positions created significant traffic problems.

ACN: 1611071 *(41 of 50)*

Synopsis

SFO Ground Controller reported a pilot was confused by the departure clearance received via CPDLC.

ACN: 1611067 *(42 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller without an Assist reported an unidentified VFR aircraft climbed into traffic on a final approach course and another aircraft deviated from their course into a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude Area.

ACN: 1611052 *(43 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZNY Center Controller reported an airspace violation due to external distractions.

ACN: 1611048 *(44 of 50)*

Synopsis

Palm Springs Tower Controller reported an unsafe approach due to weather and possible piloting issues.

ACN: 1611038 *(45 of 50)*

Synopsis

RSW TRACON Controller reported NMAC with an airliner and a VFR aircraft due in part to being distracted.

ACN: 1610816 *(46 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZNY Controller reported an airborne conflict which was avoided by climbing an aircraft into another sectors airspace without a correct point-out. Reporter stated fatigue issues related to the government shutdown.

ACN: 1610813 *(47 of 50)*

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported no response from a military aircraft until using guard frequency. Flight was then switched to UHF and turned before entering a higher MVA.

ACN: 1610808 *(48 of 50)*

Synopsis

Tower Controller reported rushing to clear the runway of vehicles for landing traffic while training.

ACN: 1610372 *(49 of 50)*

Synopsis

SFO Tower Controller reported simultaneous go-arounds, one associated with a loss of communication.

ACN: 1610370 *(50 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZMP Center Controller reported an unsafe procedure that was resolved, but was not what the center controller wanted, which would have led to an operational error.

Report Narratives

Time / Day

Date : 201902
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
State Reference : NM
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAB
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use.Airway : V105

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAB
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : Military Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 4
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Mission : Skydiving

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1622395
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Object
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 0
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X reported there are parachutes off his left side less than half a mile at his altitude. He reported about a dozen parachutes. He adjusted his course to the right to miss them. He said that if he had stayed on V105 he would have hit them. We were not talking to any jump aircraft at AZ04 at the time. We then noticed a 1200 code maneuvering at 175. We tracked the aircraft and another IFR aircraft into TUS had to adjust his course to miss the aircraft and he reported that it was an [Aircraft Y]. I called the ZZZ jump school who told me that [Aircraft Y] had flown in yesterday. [Jump School] briefed them for operations at ZZZ and then the pilot told them that they would be dropping at AZ04. [Jump school] told them that they needed to contact ZAB for operations at AZ04. I asked him if he had a contact number for the pilot. He said that he would try to have them contact us. We were able to have the pilot call the Operations Manager. The pilot admitted to doing a HAHO [High Altitude High Opening] drop at AZ04 without talking to ZAB. This pilot violated several FAR's and created a near mid-air with a non-participating aircraft operating IFR in the NAS. The number, frequency, several locations and type of jump operations in Sector 46 is by far more than anywhere else in the world. The FAR's were never created for these types of operations. These operations, on an everyday basis, at several locations, create a very real hazard to the NAS. Every single controller that tries to maintain some sort of safety on that sector will tell you that the FAA will not take action to address the jump operations until someone dies. There will be a fatality in that sector due to jump operations in the very near future if these types of operations are allowed to continue. The FAR's need to be changed. There needs to be regulation in place that ensures that jump operations are contained in a TFR, warning area or restricted airspace. Aircraft should not be allowed to throw objects out the back of an airplane that will collide with other non-participating aircraft.

Synopsis

Center Controller reported skydivers that were not supposed to be dropping out of the sky, close to an aircraft that reported the parachutes.

Time / Day

Date : 201902
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : NEW.Airport
State Reference : LA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 500

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : NEW
Make Model Name : M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class D : NEW

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Flight Phase.Other
Airspace.Class D : NEW

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : NEW.Tower
Function.Air Traffic Control : Other / Unknown
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1616471

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft was on about a 1/2 mile right base for RWY 36R and cleared to land. As he was turning final, he reported a drone sighting about 400-500 ft. away from his aircraft. Do not allow any drone activity in any controlled airspace, regardless of altitude.

Synopsis

Controller reported that a pilot reported encountering a drone while on a visual approach to New Orleans Lakefront airport.

Time / Day

Date : 201902

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SLC.Airport

State Reference : UT

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : SLC

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-800

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Landing

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Plan : IFR

Route In Use : Vectors

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : SLC.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1614559

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1614801

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1614813
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Troubleshooting

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was cleared to land on runway 16L with Aircraft Y holding short of 16L waiting to depart. Another aircraft was crossing a 4.5NM final for 16L and Aircraft X was told to expedite to H4 (a high speed taxiway) to clear the runway and taxi to their gate. Aircraft Y was instructed to line up and wait on 16L. Aircraft X turned early at H5 but was observed clearing the runway; Aircraft X was then instructed to cross the hold-bar and contact Ground. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff and issued a departure heading of 160 and they began their takeoff roll. Aircraft X then turned back onto the runway to take the exit at H4. Aircraft Y's takeoff clearance was cancelled and they were instructed to exit at H11, which they did, and were given new taxi instructions to return to runway 16L full length (H13). Aircraft X was issued a brasher statement from the Ground Controller and instructed to contact the Tower by telephone. The aircraft on final landed and Aircraft Y [was] then able to depart with no further issues.

Narrative: 2

I flew the ILS 16L to SLC. On landing roll out, Tower said to exit at H4. I gave the controls of the aircraft to the Captain, answered Tower, and we began to exit the runway. In the process of exiting, we saw 3 taxiways immediately branch out in front of us. We quickly

assessed which branch was correct and turned left onto H4 as instructed. As we taxied onto H4, we heard Tower cancel an aircraft's takeoff clearance for Runway 16L. Once fully clear of the runway, we contacted ground and were instructed to call Tower to discuss a possible pilot deviation.

If possible, I suggest not clearing an aircraft for takeoff until after the landing aircraft is fully clear of the runway.

Narrative: 3

First Officer flew ILS to 16L at SLC. On rollout, Tower says expedite exit onto H4. While rolling out, I take the aircraft and see a sign for H4. I make a right off the runway and see 3 taxiways in front of me H4, H5 and H6. Now, the field diagram has popped up on my iPad so I look down and see that I am pointed more straight toward H5 and H4 is the high speed off to my left. There is a plane pointed at me on Spot 4 leaving the ramp taxiing out. My FO (First Officer) and I discuss that H4 is to our left. I am able to and do make a left turn onto taxiway H4 as instructed. I did not want to continue onto H5 as that was not my clearance and I did not want to come nose to nose with that aircraft. We are in the left turn on H4 when I hear Tower cancel a takeoff clearance for a plane on the runway. After exiting H4 once clear, Ground tells me to call Tower for a possible pilot deviation. I called the number and explained that it took some time while exiting to digest where we are, and where we are going. All of this happened in a very short time. From my vantage point, I was initially pointed more toward H5 but was still in the intersection Y of the 3 taxiways.

As pilots, we do our best to transition from flying an approach, rolling out and hearing and processing exiting taxi clearances. It takes a few seconds to figure out where you are, look at the diagram on the iPad and process it all. I perceived my plane to be in the Y intersection of all 3 taxiways the whole time. The runway clear/hold line for H4 is a distance. I have never landed on 16L. I usually land on the 34's so it does take a while to process information. There are a few signs at that intersection.

Better taxi diagram study probably, but many times at many airports, Tower gives multiple exit directions while we are still trying to roll out. I know they have closely spaced departures and arrivals but we are human and are multitasking at that very moment. It is hard to touchdown, slow down, hear clearances while you are still "flying" and digest them, get your bearings and process what it is that they want you to do. From our vantage point, my aircraft was never clear of the runway when the other plane was given a take-off clearance. We were in the intersection of H4, H5, and H6.

Synopsis

SLC Local Controller and B737 flight crew reported a runway incursion due to taxiway confusion.

Time / Day

Date : 201902

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : PSP.Tower

State Reference : CA

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 700

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Weather Elements / Visibility : Cloudy

Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : PSP

Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class D : PSP

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : PSP.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1614554

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

PSP is almost always visual approaches but all day we have been socked in with low ceilings. The only arrivals have been airliners equipped with RNAv RNP approach. The first aircraft to arrive on the VOR-B said they barely got the field in sight at 2300 (the decision height). Following that aircraft I was given [Aircraft X] on the VOR-B. I told SCT what the previous arrival said. [Aircraft X] called me and had the field in sight requesting 31R. I cleared him to land thinking he was on VOR-B. He later asked for 31L due to taxiway closures. I switched him back to 31L cleared to land. I noticed his altitude was low and the Low Altitude (LA) alert went off. I was looking for him with binoculars and gave him a LA alert and verified he had the field in sight still. He was at 600 ft at 4 miles. I was about to issue climb instructions as I looked with binos and pulled up the VOR-B chart. The pilot took a pause to reply and started climbing on his own saying he needed to go around. He was still 3+ miles out and I am CONVINCED he was attempting to land on perhaps a road he perceived to be the runway. It was raining, bases were low, and it was dark. I fully believe he was disoriented. I issued published missed approach (thinking he was VOR-B) and handed him off to SCT with proper coordination. [Aircraft X] then came back on my frequency and said he had the field "now" and wanted to land. I verified he had 31L in sight and he was issued a landing clearance and landed safely. I had him call me on the phone after he parked. He claimed he broke out of the clouds at 4000 ft and had the field in sight all the way down, he mentioned some kind of new equip in his plane that he was messing with and said he believes he got confused and was attempting to land on something he thought was the runway but 3 miles short. I am thankful he landed safely but I am convinced he would have landed/crashed elsewhere had I not called his LA. SCT verified he was in fact cleared visual, though his tag said VOR-B.

SCT change tag to reflect proper approach. Refresher on VOR-B minima (we rarely have days when this approach is used in actual IFR conditions). Refresher on Low Alt alert phraseology and surrounding MVAs.

Synopsis

PSP Tower Controller reported issuing a Low Altitude Alert for an aircraft on a night time visual approach.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZHU.ARTCC

State Reference : TX

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 24000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZHU

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A320

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Climb

Airspace.Class A : ZHU

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZHU

Aircraft Operator : Military

Make Model Name : Fighting Falcon F16

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Training

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class A : ZHU

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZHU.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1614326

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was training on 59/93 with multiple complex military operations including Crystal/Amraam and AR614. Aircraft Y flashed at me from 56. I took the handoff and Aircraft Y checked on requesting AR614. I told him to maintain block FL230-FL240 and I put in FL270 as a hard altitude and flashed him at Sector 76 because they clear participating aircraft into AR614. 76 took the handoff and I gave Aircraft Y [a] frequency. He requested UHF so I gave him UHF. 76 called on the landline and asked me to try Aircraft Y again because he did not check in. I tried Aircraft Y again and gave him a different UHF. 76 called back again requesting communications with Aircraft Y and Aircraft Y was no longer on my frequency. The AR614 block is FL250-FL270.

I took a handoff on Aircraft X from 56 going to Mexico requesting FL360 and climbed him to FL240. 76 called me and said he still has not had Aircraft Y check in on his frequency. I tried to contact Aircraft Y and did not get a reply. We tried him several times. Aircraft Y was orbiting south of AR614 at FL240. We had to give Aircraft X a 180 heading immediately and a descent to FL190. We had to contact Aircraft Y on guard frequency for him to come back up on 59 frequency.

The aircraft operating in AR614 should take VHF frequency change. Aircraft Y should have reported back [to] frequency if no response on 76 frequency.

AR614 has been a long standing issue in 59 airspace. It is located in a major corridor and 59 does not clear aircraft into the tract. The departure procedures from SAT approach should be through Rocksprings airspace since they are the ones to own AR614. Corpus acts as a middle man in the procedures outlined for AR614 which leaves room for error because if 76 doesn't take the handoff then we are stuck with a high performance jet orbiting in the corridor and we can only climb him to FL240 which is also the bottom of the high sectors airspace stratum.

The amount of military operations that we have to deal with on a day to day basis along with heavy commercial traffic can result in unsafe situations. The amount of military operations is a burden to the controllers that have to work it since we are required to bend over backwards for them and they keep requesting more and more. There needs to be better procedures, airspace design, and a limit to military operations in order to assure the safety of the NAS (National Airspace System).

Synopsis

ZHU Center Controller reported an unsafe situation when a military aircraft went No Radio and a carrier had to be vectored away from the No Radio aircraft.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SDL.Airport

State Reference : AZ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6000

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : P50

Make Model Name : Super King Air 300

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class D : SDL

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : SDL

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : BAe 125 Series 800

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class D : SDL

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : SDL.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 7

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1614325

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

P50 flashed 2 IFR inbound aircraft to me at SDL. Aircraft Y was inbound from the NW and Aircraft X was inbound from the North on a straight in. When Aircraft Y called me, he was on a 5 mile right base to Runway 21. Aircraft X was about an 8 mile final, but wasn't on my frequency. I told Aircraft Y to enter a right base and proceed direct to the airport. I call P50 to find out what their intentions were with Aircraft X but no-one answered the landline. I gave traffic to Aircraft Y and told him to continue turning toward the runway. Aircraft Y said he had Aircraft X insight. Aircraft X was still not on frequency and when P50 finally called us back, they said Aircraft X wasn't on their frequency either. I continued to reach out to Aircraft X, but he still wasn't on frequency and was descending on final. We also got out the light gun and flashed the red light to Aircraft X in case they were NORDO. Aircraft Y was Number 1 and the runway was clear but pilot sent self around because he was concerned about Aircraft X in trail. At the same time, P50 figured out that Aircraft X was on their frequency and also sent the Aircraft X around too. Aircraft Y was about 1/2 mile final and Aircraft X was about 2 mile final. P50 gave me a heading and altitude for Aircraft Y and I issued it and shipped him back to Approach to vector back to the approach.

Communication between the 2 facilities is at an all-time low. It's typical for P50 on not answer the shout line when we call to try and coordinate something. This needs to be address [at] this the facility.

Also, this whole situation could have been solved if the controller at P50 checked their frequency for the missing Aircraft X rather than just assuming Aircraft X switched.

P50 is required to provide a sequence for all IFR traffic and this was clearly not done in this situation. If both aircraft had actually checked in, I still didn't have any sequence. Both aircraft were a tie and I had to turn aircraft towards the runway and issue traffic.

P50 needs to ship aircraft in a timely manner. The LOA (Letter of Agreement) states that they need to be [switched] prior to enter the Delta and that clearly didn't happen.

I should have sent Aircraft Y around when P50 said Aircraft X wasn't on their frequency. That way we could have gotten him out of the way of a possible NORDO aircraft.

Synopsis

SDL Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation between two arrivals where both aircraft executed a different sequence.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : IAD.Airport

State Reference : DC

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Weather Elements / Visibility : Cloudy

Weather Elements / Visibility : Fog

Weather Elements / Visibility : Snow

Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : .75

Light : Daylight

RVR.Single Value : 4500

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : IAD

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Takeoff

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class B : IAD

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2.0

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1613878

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Confusion

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Personal

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 9200
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 85
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1614300
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was told twice by the Traffic Management Coordinator and the snow team coordinator that Runway 30 was open. Aircraft X was given instructions to line up and wait on Runway 30. I observed the ADSE-X and I did not see any targets on the runway. I was also in the middle of coordinating a closure for runway 1C due to snow removal. It was IFR and the visibility was heavily restricted. I could not see the entire runway. I could only see the first 2,000 feet of the runway at best. At no point did I observe a target or vehicle on the runway or ADSE-X. Aircraft X was given a departure clearance and a vector to the southwest. Aircraft Y was given instructions to line up and wait on Runway 30. As I was closing Runway 1C center on the ADSE-X, the ADSE-X alerted for Runway 30. I did not hear exactly what it said but I am quite sure that it did not say Runway 30 occupied. I thought I closed the wrong runway when I noticed an unidentified target moving towards Aircraft X. The targets were merging and at merging point. When Aircraft X's target moved passed the unidentified target I asked the pilot if he was still there. The pilot stated that it was close. After observing the aircraft airborne on radar and on the assigned heading, I believe I switched the aircraft to Potomac Approach.

I have not had a chance to review the tapes or ADSE-X playback. I will amend this report once I have a chance to review the incident. As mentioned earlier, I was in the middle of closing the runway when the ADSE-X alerted. My initial assumption was I closed the wrong runway. I am aware that my requirement is to issue a cancel takeoff clearance. By the time I noticed and assessed the situation, the targets were merging and merged. There was nothing I could do. I do not know what recommendations I can make on current procedures.

Narrative: 2

The flight departed the ramp after being deiced and anti-iced with Type I and Type IV fluid with an established holdover time of 20 minutes. We were then instructed by Ground Control to taxi to Runway 01 Center. After holding short of Taxiway F on Z while waiting for Runway 01 Center to open for departures, we were offered Runway 30 after the snow removal equipment finished their runway clearing. We were told it would be about 10 minutes until they were finished. The wait for Runway 01 Center would be a longer delay so we accepted the shorter wait for Runway 30 to accommodate our holdover time. As we looked over to Runway 30, about 20-30 vehicles were finishing the clearing and beginning to stage on Taxiway Q, adjacent to runway 30.

We were number 1 holding short of Runway 30 and instructed by the Tower controller to taxi into position and hold on Runway 30. After visually inspecting the wings for contamination and verifying that we had a clean wing and we were within our holdover time we conducted our lineup checks which were completed. The current special observation reported winds 0000 kt, 3/4 SM visibility, light snow and mist, scattered clouds at 500 feet, overcast at 2,300 feet, temperature 0, dew point -1, and altimeter 29.83. Approximately 30 seconds later, the Tower controller instructed us to turn left to a heading of 250 and cleared us for takeoff on Runway 30.

Our pulse lights were transitioned to their steady-on takeoff configuration, taxi light and strobe lights were on, power was advanced and autothrottles were engaged, giving us our desired takeoff power. I conducted my normal call outs during the takeoff roll. After my V1 call out, the pilot flying noticed what appeared to be headlights and amber strobe lights at his 1 o'clock position, on the right half of the runway. He then said something to the effect of "what is that?!" I then looked up and confirmed that indeed there was a truck coming at us. The Pilot Flying immediately looked at the airspeed indicator in the heads up display (HUD) and saw that we were passing through 4 knots above our decision speed (V1). He opted to pull back on the yoke in an attempt to fly over the truck. I believe the driver of the truck saw us at about the same time and made an evasive maneuver into the snow off the runway. I indicated that I saw him spin out and the last thing I witnessed was the truck "fish tailing" off the side of the runway, facing back toward us. The climb out was normal. Our climb checks were completed and we were handed over to Potomac departure. The remainder of the flight was completed without incident.

Synopsis

IAD Tower Controller and pilot reported a near collision on the runway between the aircraft and a snow removal vehicle.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : N90.TRACON

State Reference : NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : N90

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Descent

Airspace.Class E : N90

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : N90

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : N90

Aircraft : 3

Reference : Z

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : N90

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : N90

Aircraft : 4

Reference : A

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : N90

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Large Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Descent
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class E : N90

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : N90.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 6
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1613873
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Facility : N90
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 30
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1614090
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working the sequence position in the TRACON. I observed the Departure controller descend Aircraft X on V16, from 6,000 feet to 4,000 feet into the face of Feeder sector arrival traffic. The Feeder controller had to turn out two arrivals who were descending through 4,000 feet to maintain 3,000 feet. No pointout or coordination was made with either the Feeder controller who had aircraft there or the FINAL controller who owns the airspace there at 4,000 feet. Later during the same hour, again without coordination the same Departure controller, sent Aircraft Y on a vector right through Feeder's airspace. The Feeder controller had to stop multiple arrivals at 5,000 feet above Aircraft Y to maintain separation.

I recommend that when multiple controllers are voicing a safety concern with a certain controller it should be looked into and investigated before someone gets hurt. This controller has these kind of airspace deviations and loss of separation pretty much daily. The FAA is notified each time and yet nothing is being done to protect the flying public or the other controllers working near him.

Narrative: 2

Aircraft X is a through flight planned at 4,000 feet. Aircraft Z is a JFK arrival being descended to 3,000 feet for the approach. Aircraft X's tag was made yellow about 15 miles NE of JFK on my final vector scope without any verbal coordination. After several minutes I turned the tag green to un-highlight it. Normal procedure is to leave these through overflights at either 5,000 or 6,000 feet to allow the Feeder Sector to Final Sector a bit of room to descend to the approach. The Departure position was working Aircraft X initially and hands the aircraft off to the Feeder position. The Feeder position then descends the aircraft to 4,000 feet once the aircraft enters its airspace and avoids the Final's airspace. Final Sector owns 4,000 feet to the surface.

Without any verbal coordination JFK Departure Sector took Aircraft X through the JFK finals airspace without a pointout. The reason to leave the overflight traffic high is for safety.

Departure violated Finals airspace with Aircraft X by leaving that aircraft on V-16 at 4,000 feet without coordination or a pointout. This is very unsafe!! Aircraft Z was the first to cross paths with Aircraft X and also [another arrival] did as well. The controller on JFK departure should be de-certified and needs mandatory retraining on the position as I don't think he knows the airspace or procedures for pointouts or coordination.

Synopsis

N90 TRACON controllers reported another Controller was descending aircraft through their airspace without coordination.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4300

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A300
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Descent
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Heavy Transport
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1613488
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was training a developmental on his first sector in our area. Aircraft X was on a left downwind at 5100 feet. There was an aircraft on an RNAV Arrival that was going to be second. The developmental turned Aircraft X on a base and descended him to 3000 feet because he was anticipating that Aircraft X wasn't going to descend into the 4700 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA). Aircraft X descended quite rapidly and clipped the 4700 foot MVA at around 4400 feet. I didn't expect Aircraft X to descend so quickly. I will make sure the developmental uses the appropriate altitudes and not use anticipation.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descended quicker than anticipated and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.Tower

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 400

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Weather Elements / Visibility : Snow

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ

Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi

Make Model Name : Super King Air 200

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1613487

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was cleared for an ILS approach to Runway XXL. Runway XXR was closed for continuous snow removal and had snow removal vehicles operating on it. The weather was IMC with 1 mile visibility and snow. The approach end of both runways were not visible. I was the trainee in position in Local Control and cleared Aircraft X to land on Runway XXL which he read back. At about 1 mile final the AMASS (Airport Movement Area Safety System) issued a go-around instruction which I immediately relayed to the pilot. The aircraft was not visible yet on the ASDE (Airport Surface Detection Equipment)/AMASS display. The pilot immediately complied and executed a go around. After the pilot had begun his missed approach I informed him of the reason for the go-around, that it appeared he was aligned with the wrong runway, and I asked him to verify that he had been established on the Runway XXL localizer. He replied something to the effect of that he was "right of course", which to me would imply he had indeed established himself on the Runway XXR localizer.

During IFR weather and continuous snow removal, the approaches to XXL/XXR are frequently obscured. The radar display when zoomed out doesn't fully show whether the aircraft is aligned with the right runway, as the difference in position is only very subtle. Neither the Tower or TRACON observed the King Air lined up for the wrong runway. The AMASS essentially becomes the most useful layer of safety at that point. A recommendation that I have would be to give the Tower the ability to put an ILS system into standby/off when it is closed for snow removal. Currently we only have the ability to monitor the ILS, and can't change its functionality. If the ability to turn off the ILS to the occupied runway existed and was incorporated into the appropriate Runway close/open checklist, it would have prevented the King Air from picking up the wrong localizer. I would add that to the continuous snow removal Letter of Agreement as well. My other recommendation would be to require a closer distance setting on the radar display during IFR weather, which would help to more visibility indicate potential wrong runway alignments.

Synopsis

Local Controller reported issuing a go around to an aircraft that appeared to be on short final to a closed runway.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SBN.TRACON

State Reference : IN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : SBN

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : SBN

Component

Aircraft Component : AC Generator/Alternator

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Failed

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : SBN.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612887

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence

Detector.Person : Flight Crew

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X departed EKM airport heading towards ZZZ1 airport. About 9 minutes after departure, the pilot informed me that he was having an electrical issue and wanted to divert to ZZZ. I assigned a vector and descent for the ILS XX approach, the field at the time was IFR with an overcast ceiling of 1,400 feet and 1 1/2 SM visibility. I issued the pilot the approach clearance, but he was unable to fly the approach because he was running on battery only and had no idea where the localizer was. The pilot informed me that the heading indicator was not working, so I informed the pilot that the vectors will be no gyro. I instructed the pilot to start a right turn.

A few minutes later, he [requested priority handling]. The pilot had four souls on board and 3 hours of fuel remaining, he also advised he wanted vehicles standing by. For the next few minutes, the pilot struggled to maintain a steady heading, since he lost his instruments and was relying on a compass and myself. Once he was able to maintain a steady heading, I advised him to start a right turn, and successfully turned the pilot on to the localizer. Once he was established, I cleared him to land on XX and advised to contact tower once he was on the ground. The pilot did not start a descent and was a little high for the approach, and went around. I instructed him to climb and maintain 3,000 feet and to remain on his present heading. The pilot informed he was unable to climb and wanted to stay at 1,500 feet. I advised him I couldn't vector him for the approach at 1,500 feet because he was below the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). The pilot then told me his battery was running out and needed to land, so I approved for him to stay at 1,500 feet and instructed him to start a left turn. The pilot requested to stay close to the airport and set him up for a 2 mile final. I instructed the pilot to continue the left turn and then told him to stop turn once he was lined up for the runway. The pilot reported the runway insight, and I instructed him to continue a slow descent. Aircraft X landed safely. The pilot informed me he landed and explained that he had a dual alternator failure and was running on the battery only and a compass.

Synopsis

SBN TRACON Controller reported assisting an aircraft with an equipment problem to a safe landing.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SEA.Airport

State Reference : WA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : S46

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-800

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class B : SEA

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : S46

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Medium Large Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class B : SEA

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : S46.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 10

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612886

Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On final with strong northwest winds. Vectored Aircraft X from NW descended to 4000. I was vectoring Aircraft Y from east side to go behind to set up a stagger. When Aircraft X was at 5300 feet and Aircraft Y was at 064 feet. I gave Aircraft X 4000 again, then descended Aircraft Y to 5000. I thought I would have 1000 feet easily with the way aircraft were descending that day. Unfortunately, I had to give Aircraft X a speed reduction which I assume is why he leveled at 5000 and descended very slowly, while Aircraft Y descended quickly. I lost my 3 miles/1000feet. Then Aircraft X did not join the localizer as instructed. Aircraft X read the instruction to join back. I then broke out Aircraft Y and called traffic.

I would also like to mention that I got about 5 hours of sleep that night and the night before. The questionnaire asks how many hours I try to get, which is 8. But how much I actually get is usually between 5 and 6.

Also, before I took position, the supervisor handed me a paper with a name and number, my bank called about my mortgage. I was trying to figure out how to delay a payment because we had been furloughed and unpaid for 34 days or so, so I was distracted by that a little, because I was worried about what I was going to do since I was unpaid.

I misapplied the altitude leaving rule. I didn't visually observe Aircraft X leaving 5000 before I gave Aircraft Y lower. I pressured myself into descending Aircraft Y so he wouldn't be high on the approach, since it was IFR. I should have based Aircraft Y a little later, and held altitude longer to guarantee I could use altitude leaving.

Synopsis

Seattle TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation due to a rule being misapplied as well as possible fatigue and distraction by the government furlough.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : DAB.TRACON

State Reference : FL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : DAB

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : DAB

Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : VFR

Flight Phase : Cruise

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : DAB.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 9

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612878

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

I was working the combined high sectors during moderate traffic with a higher demand for services. Prior to taking the position, there was a VFR aircraft (Aircraft Y) doing survey work on east-west lines. For its mission, Aircraft Y insisted on being VFR at 5,000 feet (IFR altitude). Aircraft Y's route of flight took the aircraft in and out of DAB and F11 airspace. DAB was in communication with Aircraft Y, while F11 had taken a point out.

I noticed that Aircraft Y's route flew near CORLL, which is located on the CORLL1 STAR. This STAR uses 5,000 feet as the only available delivery altitude from DAB handing off to F11 per LOA. The CORLL1 is used by many aircraft inbound to SFB.

Several days prior, most of DAB communications systems went offline or experienced difficulties. Many of the RDVS (Rapid Deployment Voice Switch) units at several positions experienced malfunctions. These outages severely limited the RDVS in its ability to select frequencies and communicate via hot-line and shout-line. The issues were never resolved, I suspect the government shutdown played a role in the amount of time taken to address and correct the issue.

As I was working the needs of other aircraft around my airspace, I scanned to the southern portion and noticed that Aircraft Y was working west toward CORLL level at 5,000 feet. At the same time, Aircraft X was southbound on the CORLL1 arrival level at 5,000 feet. It appeared the aircraft were going to be in conflict at the same altitude and fix. I intended to resolve the issue by coordinating a different heading or altitude for Aircraft X. I tried to key up the F11 shout-line on the RDVS, but the equipment failed to function. I tried once more with the same result. At the time, the Aircraft X was near DIGGR, north of CORLL. I tried a third time to use the shout-line when it finally functioned. I was able to get a lower altitude for Aircraft X, and also issued a climb to Aircraft Y. I had called traffic to both aircraft, and they each got each other in sight.

Even though this event would not be considered significant, and did not result in any loss of separation, I find it to be very significant because of the equipment issue. I was in a situation where I needed my RDVS to be reliable because I wanted to coordinate with another facility quickly, and it failed me twice before finally working.

If the RDVS would have continued to fail, my only other options would have been to:

- 1) Issue a climb and turn to Aircraft Y. Being a C172, I feel the performance of the aircraft would not be an ideal solution.
- 2) Issue a descent and/or turn to Aircraft X. Again, without coordination, this is not an ideal solution as the aircraft would have been entering F11 airspace into traffic conditions unknown to myself.

I would recommend that any issues with communications equipment be given priority and be fixed immediately, as it is essential to our jobs as Air Traffic Controllers. I also feel that Aircraft Y should not have been allowed to work VFR at an IFR altitude, especially in close proximity to a busy arrival route. I am not sure of the circumstances of the approval, as it happened before I took the position. Another example, the emergency jack at our West Sector (W) has been broken for months now without being repaired.

Synopsis

DAB TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict was exacerbated by faulty voice communications equipment.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZOB.ARTCC
State Reference : OH
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 24000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZOB
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class A : ZOB

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZOB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612876
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Analyst Callback : Completed

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X checked on descending to FL240 from the high sector. I cleared him to descend via the TRYBE1 Arrival which has them crossing their next waypoint, UPPRR, at or above FL240 (keeping them above the adjacent low sector which owns up to FL230). The workload was low and I watched their descent rate. I remember thinking to myself as they approached leveling at FL240 that the last hit had too high of a descent rate for them to stop at FL240. So still several miles from UPPRR, they descended through FL240. At FL238 I inquired what they were doing and they said descending via. I stopped them at FL230 and PVD'd [Plan View Display] a datablock up on the airspace that was just violated to my east, Clarion Sector. After calling and explaining, I went back to Aircraft X and explained that they were to cross UPPRR at or above FL240. They apologized. I cleared them to cross UPPRR at FL230 then descend via. There were no other issues. I have seen several aircraft do this since Metroplex rolled out. Pilots just aren't paying attention. They are anticipating, displaying expectation bias and not listening/understanding the clearance. So far I haven't seen a loss of separation or NMAC, but it's only a matter of time. The issues I've seen are at the regional airline level.

Callback: 1

Reporter stated this is happening due to expectation bias. This intersection is right on the ZOB ARTCC and Cleveland TRACON Border. Pilots do not like having to slow at this point. Reporter stated this same problem happened to him about two weeks earlier.

Synopsis

Cleveland Center Controller reported an airspace deviation associated with a crossing restriction that the pilot busted.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SJC.Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : NCT

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Route In Use.STAR : SILCN FOUR

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : NCT

Make Model Name : Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : VFR

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : None

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : NCT.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612864

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working Licke/Hooks combined on my last radar session. Aircraft X checked in descending via the Silicon arrival into SJC, and I cleared the aircraft for the approach after an initial scan of the arrival corridor indicating no conflicting VFR targets. It had been an extremely busy day for me on these sectors with numerous unidentified targets in the South Bay Area, so I had been very vigilant in missing numerous targets throughout the day.

When I cleared Aircraft X, there was no traffic I saw to be a factor. At the same time, I was vectoring a B737 to final for a visual approach to avoid a C172 that I was vectoring across the SJC finals for a GPS approach at PAO, and I was vectoring a Gulfstream from OSI area north of his normal arrival route at 5000 ft. to miss an unidentified target at 4600 ft, which I missed with vectors by 2 miles. As I was watching this situation, Aircraft X keyed up and said "Approach Aircraft X", to which I replied "Go ahead", and as the collision alert on my scope was going off he indicated a TCAS RA (Resolution Advisory) (which blocked the frequency from me calling the traffic), and this was the first time I observed the unidentified target at somewhere around 9500 ft. beneath him as Aircraft X climbed out of 9800 to 10300 ft, and the aircraft crossed. I said roger and informed Aircraft X of the alert as well. I failed to give a traffic alert as Aircraft X was already in the climb and I observed they were passing. I felt completely helpless and in shock at the event because I never saw the target coming at Aircraft X. I advised Aircraft X to advise when finished and descended the aircraft to 6000 ft, and he was cleared for an ILS approach to SJC, landing without incident. I queried the pilot about the aircraft and he said he saw what he believed to be Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y later called the arrival sector that Aircraft X was in when the conflict happened and said he had departed Watsonville (WVI), an airport about 5-10 miles west of Aircraft X's STAR, and an uncontrolled field. I have not had an opportunity to review the Falcon replay of the event but plan to do so the first day I am back next week. My assumption at this point is he climbed rapidly and I simply missed it as I was working to miss other aircraft with vectors about 25 miles north of where this incident occurred. I pride myself on catching things out of the ordinary and my scan has protected numerous aircraft from unidentified targets and controlled aircraft regularly, especially today with an exorbitant number of aircraft just outside the Class Charlie not talking to controllers, and I am in utter shock that I did not see this one until the last minute. There is a slight possibility that because I have only been working one sector combination continuously and it was a very busy day, I could have been fatigued from the continuous scan for unidentified targets which I had been missing all day. Breaks were less frequent as a result of staffing being below numbers for the day, due to reduced staffing during the shutdown. I could have been affected by the stress of training being delayed or just complacency in working the same sectors continuously as well. I honestly don't know if these were subconscious factors or not, however, and I can say that I don't

feel them on conscious level. I strive to do my best every single day and am still massively shocked and disappointed in what occurred today. My reflections are ongoing from this event and it will only increase my vigilance in the future. I plan to watch the replay on my next working day and will amend this report with any information I find.

At the time of this event, I can say that the biggest factor that led to me not observing the other target was the need to miss unidentified targets close to the SFO BRAVO with an arrival at 5000 ft. This arrival route is standard from the Woodside Sector for arrivals to SJC. This arrival route has numerous issues that I have seen be at factor before today. First of all, if an aircraft comes in a 5000 ft. and requires the ILS, the aircraft must be climbed to 5100 ft. to meet MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitudes) requirements near KLIDE intersection, but Hooks does not have the ability to climb the aircraft for 10-15 miles and only about 10 miles from the MVA because of the conflict with Boulder's airspace at 6000 ft. without a point out. There are also PAO arrivals, SQL arrivals, and NUQ arrivals that can be pushed to descend from the south to 4700 ft. at a bare minimum until they are just east of OSI, putting them in opposite direction conflict with arrivals at 5000 ft. from Woodside. In this case, I did not need to climb the Gulfstream because the aircraft could get a visual approach, and was restricted from doing so by airspace, so I chose to vector the aircraft around an unidentified target because I could not guarantee altitude. The aircraft was close to the Bravo but could have gone up to 4900 ft. which would not have provided separation. This vector required concentration that distracted me from monitoring Aircraft X's descent from the south, as I was also missing other aircraft. Again, I pride myself on my scan and am disappointed and shocked that the target causing the RA was not observed climbing from sea level to 9500 ft. within 8-10 NM.

My only suggestion for arrivals from the northwest is the possibility of 6000 ft. and 7000 ft. instead of 5000 ft. and 7000 ft. to help protect the corridor and leave aircraft in the Bravo longer. An extension of the Bravo or Charlie to help protect aircraft in the Bay Area could help as well as numerous targets stay just on the fringes at bad altitudes, causing more harm than good. This is a hotspot almost daily and Optimized Descent Profiles need to be better protected with aircraft at such high speeds. From my understanding, when the ODP's were implemented they now put jets in areas they weren't before, and VFR pilots still have limited knowledge of the new routes. They stay in places that avoided the old routes, which now tend to put them in more conflict areas. Extension of Charlie or Bravo airspace to protect Bay Area arrivals would be ideal, but it seems that this is not a priority due to pushback from GA users. Again, it is my responsibility to separate from unidentified targets and I am disappointed that I was so focused on one that I missed the other. I personally will be even more aware of aircraft departing the WVI area in the future, as they have proven to be an immediate threat to the arrival corridor. The short distance with a high performance aircraft leaves minimal time to react. I pride myself on my scan and will be even more vigilant in the future to detect abnormalities.

Synopsis

NorCal TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict with an arrival aircraft and a jet that departed an uncontrolled airport.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : ZZZ

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SNA.Airport

State Reference : CA

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : SNA

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : M-20 R Ovation

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase : Takeoff

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class C : SNA

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : SNA

Make Model Name : Helicopter

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase : Takeoff

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class C : SNA

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : SNA.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612862

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : SNA.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612865

Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working the Local 2 position. The whole event was a combination of things that turned into this one mistake. The scenario starts off with me having 2 in the pattern, Aircraft X on the taxi back for takeoff to join the pattern and Ground Control needing to cross at Taxiway Juliet to bring a business jet to the west side of the tower. For reasons I do not know, the GC (Ground Controller) requested to cross at Juliet, I gave him the crossing. While this is going on, I put into position and hold Aircraft X.

Immediately after that, a helicopter had called me to depart Taxiway A to go west. I requested to the GC to depart Taxiway A, he advised to go after a business jet that was already taxiing. At this point, I knew I still had Aircraft X in position, but I didn't depart because my plan was to get the helicopter out first then launch Aircraft X. I couldn't depart the Aircraft X anyways because GC was in between the runways with the business jet. Although, GC was clear of my runway, I didn't want to jet blast the departure so I waited. I then coordinate with LC1 (Local Control) for a point out over the top west bound with my helicopter. Subsequently, LC1 (who is training) coordinates a point out with me to depart after my helicopter departs. After talking with the LC1 trainee, he said I approved the point out, which I'm not contesting nor am in agreement with. I advised him after the fact that I did not recall approving the point out. Nevertheless, after all this coordination went down, the business jet at Taxiway J was clear, I launch Aircraft X, not realizing Aircraft Y from LC1 is lifting as well to go over the top westbound behind my helicopter that departed approximately 20-30 beforehand. I look up to see Aircraft X airborne and at the same time, I see Aircraft Y just missing my departure and yelled WHOA off the frequency. I regain my composure after a few choice words to the trainee and the LC1 trainee advises me, "You approved the point out". I don't say anything. 15-20 mins later, I get relieved off position to go home. I find out shortly [that] the Aircraft Y pilot calls the tower and expresses his concerns with what happened.

Two things that come to mind right away from this scenario. Number one, I don't know the reason for GC deciding to cross a taxiway in the middle [of] a semi-busy session to bring a business jet to the other side of the airport. I'm not saying it doesn't happen but after looking at the departure strips the next day, saving 5-6 mins does not warrant a runway crossing in my opinion. This is especially true if both locals are busy.

Number two, for the life of me, I don't why the LC1 trainer allowed or even decided to let the trainee try to launch Aircraft Y via a point out with 3 pattern players in the traffic pattern. If I was the trainer, the automatic go to is "Contact tower 119.9" and I would advise my trainee to let LC2 handle his side of the airport at this point. Again, I'm not saying it doesn't happen, LC1 in extremely slow periods of traffic will request a point out in certain scenarios with LC2, but the traffic on LC2 side would have to be zero to one in the pattern to warrant that action. The normal reaction to a helicopter departing from the east side of the airport calling the west side for departure is to have LC2 work the traffic so they can meter around their own pattern traffic. I realize the LC1 trainee had good intentions of trying to alleviate my workload, but in this case the LC1 trainer should not have allowed that to happen. My immediate recommendation would be plain and simple, work the aircraft that are on your side of the airport to alleviate any coordination confusion.

Narrative: 2

I was training on Local 1. Aircraft Y called from the east side of the airport to depart west bound. My trainee decided to coordinate a point out with the Local 2 controller who [said] "point out approved". At this point, my trainee clears Aircraft Y for takeoff and gave him a left 270 departure over the control tower for a west bound departure.

At the same time, Local 2 controller clears Aircraft X for takeoff off Rwy 20L at Kilo for left closed traffic, not realizing that he had approved a point out for Aircraft Y departure with LC-1. Closest proximity was approximately 300 feet and by the time we realized the conflict and tried to issue traffic, it was too late to resolve the issue.

Aircraft Y said on frequency "Tower, that Aircraft X came close".

Synopsis

SNA Local Controllers reported a NMAC due to a coordination/communication problem.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZLA.ARTCC
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 43000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZLA
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class A : ZLA

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZLA.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Supervisor / CIC
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 15
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612860
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC
Analyst Callback : Attempted

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was a scheduled ALTRV [Altitude Reservation] scheduled with the MOS [Military Operations Specialist]. Airspace was not scheduled in the EDST [En-route Decision Support Tool] and the controller missed the ALTRV. The aircraft was a drone with his transponder

off. This was coordinated with the MOS and paperwork was distributed to the areas. Airspace should have been scheduled in the EDST and controllers and the FLM [Front Line Manager] should be verbally briefed.

Synopsis

ZLA Front Line Manager reported a UAV was scheduled into an Altitude Reservation but knowledge of it was not posted nor were the Controllers informed.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZME.ARTCC

State Reference : TN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Weather Elements / Visibility : Icing

Weather Elements / Visibility : Cloudy

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZME

Make Model Name : PA-34-200 Seneca I

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class E : ZME

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZME.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612859

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather

Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was IFR from ZZZ. The aircraft had just passed the ZZZ1 airport when I noticed that the aircraft had descended from its initial altitude of 4000 ft. to 3600 ft. and had continued to descend to 3400 ft. I issued a low altitude alert to the aircraft and advised that the aircraft climb to 4000 ft. The pilot then told me that he was heading back to ZZZ. I asked the pilot for the reason for the change in destination and he told me that he was icing up and he did not want to climb back into the clouds where he picked up ice. The aircraft continued to fluctuate in altitude. I advised him that my minimum safe altitude was 3700 ft. The aircraft eventually leveled off at 4000 ft. and went back to ZZZ.

Synopsis

Memphis Center Controller reported an aircraft that descended below the Minimum Safe Altitude due to icing.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : GSP.TRACON

State Reference : SC

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : GSP

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : VFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : GSP

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : GSP.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612858

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Distraction

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Had a VFR aircraft depart GMU, the tower had called down to coordinate a runway change at the next ATIS. I missed the next coordination, and the runway change was completed and I turned the aircraft on course toward the tower owned airspace. I was stressed about

the announcement with the government shutdown, and forgot to get a pointout with the tower. I was very concerned about how I was going to feed my three children and continue to be able to afford gas to get to work.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation caused by distractions.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZMA.ARTCC
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 32000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZMA
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class A : ZMA

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZMA
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class A : ZMA

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZMA.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 7
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612853
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working the R-side when this occurred. I had no D-Side. I climbed Aircraft Y to FL340, and he was climbing at 4000 feet per minute. As he was out of FL300 I assigned FL320 to Aircraft X, who was only out of FL240 and climbing at around 500 feet per minute. When Aircraft Y hit FL320 he reduced his rate of climb from around 4000 to 400. Aircraft X, conversely who was only doing around 500 increased it to 2000-3000 FPM. It was flashing when it was out of FL260 for 320 but I didn't really believe my conflict alert, because we get a ton of bad advisories and I had just checked the VRI (Velocity Reference Indicator). It flashed for around 2 minutes, and I went on for something else. When I went back to it, Aircraft X had climbed through FL315 and Aircraft Y was through FL325. I was thinking Aircraft Y was still climbing well, but he significantly shallowed his descent and I missed it.

Military airspace was hot to the east of both airlines, which had put them on the same route (different fixes but overlapping). This provided for further complications in routes that are normally separate.

Prior to plugging back into the position, my wife had called and texted me that she was crying about the shutdown, she was concerned with how long it was going to continue. I had tried to force this from my mind as I worked airplanes, but I believe it played a small part into what happened.

I should use positive separation and less interpolation of altitudes and assign what I have available, instead. It's completely my fault.

Synopsis

Miami Center Controller reported a loss of separation due to different climb rates of two aircraft and failing to notice due to distractions.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport

State Reference : CO

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Weather Elements / Visibility : Icing

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : DEN

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Landing

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class B : DEN

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : DEN.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Other / Unknown

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612847

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Ground 1 and 2 were combined to Local 2 due to the lack of staffing. Local 1 was staffed by a person that rarely works traffic and has no clue as to how to be helpful to the person with the most traffic. He could have ensured that they did not call me on ground until they were on [Taxiway] ED. He could even ask them their gate and enter that on the ASDE-X

and then ship them.

The lack of proper staffing of ground control is what led to the unsafe event of total frequency congestion and workload saturation. There were braking action reports, snow removal activity on the airport and coordinators in the tower, RVR's to issue and monitor controllers not doing their job. No airspace assigned to local 2.

Later this same day myself and others worked Ground 4 during heavy traffic with all departures on the west side of the airport. Ground 3 should have been open to relieve the frequency congestion. When multiple aircraft are calling ready to taxi out of all the deice pads and also at the ramp exit spots because some were not deicing, it is time to open Ground 3. Oh, but let me guess, we didn't have the staffing to do that either.

Reduce the arrival rate to one and a half runways so that snow equipment can keep up with cleaning runways and the controller that has to work combined positions with all kinds of distractions in the tower and on the airport can maintain the frequency.

The airport ops needs to allow us to get a detailed description of the braking action before flipping out and closing a runway and causing multiple aircraft to unnecessarily go around. Denver TRACON needs to retrain everyone down there on the correct procedures of breaking an aircraft off the approach.

Synopsis

Denver Tower Controller reported various complaints due to staffing, weather and the traffic level.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZMP.ARTCC

State Reference : MN

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZMP

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use.Other

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZMP.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 10

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612594

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

As Aircraft X was descending for the approach at CYAG (a Canadian airport controlled by the US) I was quickly reviewing the approach plate for the RNAV 12 and noticed it expired the end of Nov 2018. It has not been updated because those people are on furlough. This caused me to tell the Supervisor and he began trying to get a current copy from Canada and told me to use what I had at the moment. I felt uncomfortable with this so I verified the approach altitudes during each phase with the pilot so I knew what he would be flying and would not be surprised, even if he went missed. This took frequency time and time to check the chart I had, which was time not spent watching the scope. I didn't have much

traffic but I was steadily busy completing tasks so no-one would get delayed. I nearly missed a release for Aircraft Y because of the distraction.

What if I had missed the date was expired? What if there had been a change due to a tower or something? I could have caused an accident through no fault of my own. All because Support Staff are furloughed and I don't have the tools I need to do my job safely.

Put the Support Staff back to work. They are an integral part of the safety management system. There are only so many layers of safety, and we are eroding them away quickly.

Synopsis

ZMP Controller reported not having current approach plates due to the government shutdown and improvising using an expired plate.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZDV.ARTCC

State Reference : CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 9300

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZDV

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Airspace.Class E : ZDV

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZDV.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 8

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612592

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was flying level at 9000 ft. and I got an MIA [Minimum IFR Altitude] alert so I told the aircraft to climb to 10000 ft. to clear the MIA. I radioed him again right after to inform him I needed to vector him for some military airspace. He started to question it so I told him he would need a vector or he would need to be VFR and enter a military training complex at his own risk. I noticed that through this he was not climbing. I told him that I needed him to climb right now and that I would also need to vector him. He started to climb but had already entered the MIA box of 9300 ft. The pilot sounded as if to be a foreigner and did not take the appropriate action as directed. He was confused and his delayed response is the reason for the loss of separation. I also should have caught the MIA situation sooner.

Pilot needs to take action when given a clearance.

Synopsis

Denver Center Controller reported observing an aircraft that received a Minimum IFR Altitude alert and climbed the aircraft but pilot was slow to respond.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

State Reference : NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 9000

Environment

Weather Elements / Visibility : Icing

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ABE

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class E : ABE

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 7

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612589

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working Aircraft X at Sector 92 enroute to PNE. The aircraft was on route and I descended the aircraft to 9,000 MSL to hand off to Allentown Approach. Allentown took the

handoff and I switched communications. Allentown turned Aircraft X to the southeast, which they do have control for turns at 9,000 feet, however, they did not point this aircraft out to sector 74, and there was an airspace violation. This could have been bad since Sector 74 was just coming out of a hold for LGA, and this violation would have went close to the holding pattern. While typically we do not hold at 9,000 in that area, I know that there were icing conditions starting to affect that pattern and 9,000 feet could have very well been utilized. My guess is that the government shutdown must be hindering judgment of controllers and beginning to compromise safety.

Reopen the government so that we can focus more on our job rather than when we might get paid or what we are doing with finances. A lot of controllers are pre-occupied with how to make ends meet all across our country. This is already causing safety concerns. Air Traffic Control has its stress that comes along with it. Having this unnecessary stress of missed paychecks thrown on top of the already stressful job is not going to have a positive impact! This is an unnecessary safety risk!

Synopsis

New York Center Controller reported an airspace violation which reporter attributed to distractions.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : N90.TRACON

State Reference : NY

Aircraft

Reference : X

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : N90.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 5

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612587

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Human Factors : Troubleshooting

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Maintenance

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Positions were combined up to one position in the LGA area for the night shift operation. I went on break and was recalled into the area by the controller on within 5 minutes. The Controller on said his scope completely blanked out and was working at the adjacent scope that was not consolidated. At the time, there were about 15 aircraft on frequency with winds aloft very strong out of the South. I examined the screen and noticed the JFK sensor was not operational. Tech Ops was in our area when the incident occurred and notified us that the sensor was scheduled to go out at [this time] and that this was a prior coordinated event. The Operations Manager failed to notify our area of the outage thus

causing a brief, yet highly chaotic moment for the controller on duty. The JFK area was the only area notified of the outage.

All areas must be notified of a RADAR outage regardless of whether or not the area uses the sensor on a regular basis. Especially when positions are combined in the evening.

Synopsis

New York TRACON Controller reported lack of communication from management about a RADAR site going out mid-shift causing confusion and panic.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ONT.Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : ONT

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Takeoff

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class C : ONT

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : ONT

Make Model Name : Light Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class C : ONT

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ONT.TOWER

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Trainee

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612585

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : ONT.TOWER

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 8
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612591
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was training on the Local Control position at the time of the event. I had approved a pointout with Aircraft Y 8NM NE of ONT in-bound to POC on the ILS approach. I received release for Aircraft X while Aircraft Y was 5 NE (260 KIAS) of ONT and cleared Aircraft X for takeoff. The Aircraft X pilot did not take the runway as quickly as I anticipated and I attempted to get a vector for Aircraft X approved from SCT. SCT advised they were "Unable" to issue the vector. After quickly scanning to see Aircraft X's departure status, I noticed the aircraft had barely begun to move forward and cancelled their takeoff clearance. Due to the added stress of the government shutdown, and not knowing how I am going to keep myself and my family fed and housed, I may not have fully evaluated all of my options, and may have reacted to the situation more slowly or logically if I wasn't worried about when I would receive my next paycheck.

Allow ONT Tower to utilize DVA's [Diverse Vector Areas] without SCT approval while still in ATCT controlled airspace.

Narrative: 2

Aircraft Y automated IFR pointout 10 miles east ONT Aircraft X [given] a takeoff clearance. Aircraft X took an excessive amount of time I prompt the developmental to call for a heading and it was denied by overlaying facility. Developmental canceled take off clearance, Aircraft did not pass twy V less than 300 feet of departure roll. Looking out no traffic in line or crossing line 15 miles out of requested heading. Earlier the developmental was expressing concern over paying bills with the shutdown and loss of pay. I believe that this is the main reason it happened. The only reason I can see the vector was not approved would be the shutdown. There was no traffic evident.

I don't know how to prevent the effects of not getting paid for months, maybe years, will have on the work force.

Synopsis

Ontario Tower Controllers reported an unsafe situation between a departure and an arrival due to distractions.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : P50.TRACON

State Reference : AZ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : P50

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : P50

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : P50.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 6

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612577

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Release was requested by FFZ. I looked up at the IDS [Information Display System] and saw rwy 22. The aircraft was not assigned the ODP [Obstacle Departure Procedure]. So I pulled up the DVA [Diverse Vector Area] assigned a 190 heading and released the aircraft. I was being relieved as the aircraft departed. I observed the aircraft depart rwy 4. I took immediate action and assigned a 220 heading, same as the [ODP] and climbed to 5000 ft. I stopped my briefing and finished the event prior to releasing control of the sector to the

relieving controller.

The flight data controller knew that the aircraft was not on the [ODP]. When dropping the flight plan off, he said he doesn't give a [expletive] because he is [not] getting paid.

My mind is distracted thinking about how I will pay my mortgage in [the coming] days. We have worked thru the shutdown and have not been paid. Morale is awful at this facility. The controller relieving me was very disgruntled. This situation is very dangerous. We should not be used as political pawns. We are aviation safety and should be treated as such.

Tower should have questioned my heading when given their release. I should have observed Rwy 4 in use. We had just changed to west flow at Sky Harbor. All [satellite] airports should be required to change directions with PHX.

Also, open the government and pay employees. The FAA should not be subject to government shutdowns!

Synopsis

Phoenix TRACON Controller reported an unsafe operation due to low morale and distractions.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

State Reference : NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 23000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class A : ZNY

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Airspace.Class A : ZNY

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 14

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612268

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612258
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Was asked for a break. While I was starting to give a briefing, the controller relieving me was told someone else was going to relieve me. I had Aircraft X check in, climbed him to FL240. Aircraft X flashed to me at FL230. These aircraft were crossing traffic at CYN. I re-issued an amended ALT clearance to Aircraft X to stop at FL220. I put a Local INT alt of FL220 on Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was 8-10 MIT (Miles in Trail) with Aircraft X. I put INT of FL240 on Aircraft Y and Local INT of FL220 on the DB (data block) and climbed Aircraft Y to FL220. I then proceeded with the briefing.

As I was walking out, the relieving controller yelled over. I went to see what was going on, and Aircraft Y appeared to climb through Aircraft X. I am unaware if there was an RA or not, I was no longer listening to the frequency. I am certain I climbed Aircraft Y to FL220. With all of the distractions with the government shutdown, not getting paid yet again, and the horrible morale throughout this building, I could have been distracted. I have not been sleeping well, if at all some nights, to the distractions of this shutdown. I have added stress at home, so to deal with our financial situations caused by missing multiple paychecks. It's caused a strain on my marriage, and with the rest of my family. This added stress has multiplied, exponentially, the already stressful environment and job we engage in everyday. It's very difficult for any of us to not have these horrible goings-on in our thoughts distracting us, but I am positive I climbed the AC to FL220.

Having a distraction free environment.

Having the government not treat its employees' paychecks like bargaining tools in a hostage negotiation.

Narrative: 2

During briefing I was told Aircraft Y was climbing to FL220. At the time the data block reflected this information as well. Aircraft X was level at FL230. Both aircraft would cross paths by CYN. I issued a traffic call to Aircraft Y and pilot responded "Aircraft in sight". After the readback I noticed Aircraft Y altitude indicated FL223. I issued turns to both aircraft. Aircraft X responded to an RA and descended while Aircraft Y climbed. I asked Aircraft Y what altitude they were climbing to and the pilot said FL240. I do not know at this time if Aircraft Y responded to an RA or not.

Synopsis

New York Center Controllers reported a loss of separation, possibly due to miscommunication, stress and distractions from the government shutdown.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : OGG.Airport

State Reference : HI

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : OGG

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Widebody, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Takeoff

Airspace.Class C : OGG

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : OGG

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class C : OGG

Aircraft : 3

Reference : Z

ATC / Advisory.Tower : OGG

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Landing

Airspace.Class C : OGG

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : OGG.TOWER

Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612267
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Facility : OGG.TOWER
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Coordinator
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612259
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working LC (Local Control) during this event. RWY 20/23 were in use. Minutes prior to the event, Aircraft Z had twice attempted to land RWY 20, but had to go around due to a tailwind on final. However, our equipment indicated that the north and south field winds were consistently displaying winds that favored the current configuration. Aircraft X was holding short of RWY 20 with Aircraft Y (not on my frequency) on an 8 mile final. I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff and issued the traffic on final. My CC (Cab Coordinator) then received a call from HCF that Aircraft Y was on a visual approach and would be entering a right downwind for RWY 2. Our CC informed him that Aircraft X was passed the hold short bar and was taxiing onto the runway. While my CC was on the line with HCF, Aircraft Y checked in. Initially, I did not hear that he had been issued a right downwind for RWY 2. I

thought he had requested it. I told him unable, because Aircraft X was departing. I told him to "Say intentions." He responded with uncertainty about landing RWY 20, because of the previous pilot report from Aircraft Z. I gave him the current north and south field winds and asked if he could continue for RWY 20. He seemed hesitant, but agreed to give it a shot. Aircraft X made a slow turn onto the runway and proceeded to inform Aircraft Z of what information he had on the winds and nearby windsock. Aircraft Y was on a 3 mile final. Aircraft X departs without incident and is well off the departure end by the time Aircraft Y lands. Aircraft Y exited the runway and no separation was lost.

My concerns: RWY 20/23 operations are rare here at PHOG. There are a lot more traps on this configuration and it requires a lot more careful planning with departing aircraft. Part of the reason for this is because we have a very small range of headings we can issue due to the mountain ranges on either side of the airport.

The winds were swirling at the time and aircraft were having to go around or land long due to this. HCF never coordinated an opposite direction approach for Aircraft Y until they had already switched communications to us. They did not ask if we were about to depart anyone and then coordinate an opposite direction approach for Aircraft Y.

With Aircraft X, a heavy departing, wake turbulence would become an issue when trying to get Aircraft Y in for right traffic to RWY 2. Aircraft Y would have to extend their downwind at 1500 feet, while Aircraft X starts a climbing left turn above them at 2100 feet, unless taken off the SID (Sweep 2 Departure).

We did not have a lot of time to act and come up with a safe plan. I was unaware that Aircraft Y was on a right downwind for RWY 2 until he was 7 miles north of the airport and checked in with me. I tried to convince him to stick with RWY 20, because the winds displayed by my equipment favored that runway, and also because Aircraft X heavy was departing.

Had there been proper coordination by HCF, we could have held Aircraft X short of RWY 20 and accommodated Aircraft Y's request to land on RWY 2.

Aircraft X had a slow takeoff roll because they were trying to assist Aircraft Y's approach to RWY 20 by informing them of their experience of the field conditions. This caused a possible compression issue to exist. In the event Aircraft Y had to go around, there could be a loss of wake turbulence separation with a [smaller aircraft] following a heavy aircraft with limited vectors available to separate the two aircraft.

My recommendations: HCF should be familiar with the LOA (Letter of Agreement) concerning opposite direction operations. We rarely deal with such operations and things happen quickly in these instances. HCF should improve their coordination with our facility and seek the approval of doing something out of the ordinary, rather than issue the aircraft abnormal instructions, switch them to us, and then inform us what the aircraft will be doing, with little time for us to fix it. Overall, an imminent situation was created due to the lack of proper coordination, but luckily avoided due to the pilots being willing to accept RWY 20. When it comes to safety, we should be working hard for the pilots, and not the other way around.

Narrative: 2

RWY20/23 in use. Low level windshear advisories were in effect. We received multiple reports of aircraft experiencing tailwinds on final RWY20 but the surface wind showed 180/18 consistently. I was working Cab Coordinator (CC) and was having difficulty

coordinating effectively with HCF Approach for about an hour prior to the event due to the attitude of the controller. LC cleared Aircraft X for takeoff RWY20. Aircraft Y was on an 8nm final RWY20 with scratchpad coordination indicating he was on the RNAV GPS approach to RWY20. HCF Approach calls me for coordination just as I was about to call him for a rolling call for Aircraft X. He says "Aircraft Y is on a visual approach to RWY2, he is on the right downwind and will circle south of the airport and land on RWY2." This was not a request for an opposite direction operation, he was telling me that Aircraft Y was already given the instructions.

I informed him that Aircraft X was departing on the SWEEP2 departure, a SID that has the aircraft start a climbing left turn out of 2,100 and double back to the VORTAC located on the airport, which would put Aircraft X head on, opposite direction, with any aircraft on the right downwind to RWY2. The controller seemed surprised that Aircraft X was departing and asked several times about where exactly Aircraft X was. I told him multiple times that Aircraft X was on the runway and had begun the takeoff roll. I told him multiple times "Unable Aircraft Y opposite direction operation". He responded by saying, "Okay, then Aircraft X, hold for release". I responded with "Unable, he's already rolling". He then said "Aircraft X is in direct conflict with Aircraft Y". I agreed with him and again denied his request for the opposite direction operation. He ended the coordination by asking if we were talking to Aircraft Y. I responded in the negative since the last I knew, we did not have Aircraft Y on frequency. As the coordination was being terminated, I heard LC clear Aircraft Y to land RWY20. I keyed up the shout line to HCF and said "We have Aircraft Y". Aircraft X departed safely without incident and Aircraft Y landed RWY20 without incident.

While I was on the line attempting to coordinate, Aircraft Y checked in on our frequency without me knowing. Aircraft Y informed LC that he was on a visual approach to RWY2 and was entering the right downwind. LC issued the surface wind, which heavily favored RWY20 and asked him to say intentions. Aircraft Y expressed concern about landing RWY20 due to pilot reports of tailwinds on final approach. Aircraft X was on the runway beginning his takeoff roll and offered advice to Aircraft Y based off the windsocks and suggested RWY20 as the better option. Aircraft Y decided to make a straight in to RWY20 and landed without incident. HCF cleared Aircraft Y for a visual approach to RWY2 and enter the right downwind, switched the aircraft to our frequency, and then initiated the coordination for an opposite direction operation. The main problem at hand was that an opposite direction operation was initiated by approach without prior coordination with the tower.

This situation had the potential to be significant and extremely dangerous. The LOA (Letter of Agreement) between OGG TWR and HCF Approach states that an opposite direction operation arrival must be coordinated with the tower. An opposite direction arrival on RWY2 must be at least 25nm from the threshold by the time the departure off RWY20 is airborne and issued a turn to heading 185. This situation does not even fall into the scope of the LOA because the arrival was inbound from the north to land on RWY2, which put him head on with the departing Aircraft X, which would be making a climbing turn and reversing course. An opposite direction operation such as this would require clear coordination prior to any control instructions being given to a pilot, but that is not what happened.

I would recommend the controller working at HCF be reminded of the importance of properly coordinating opposite direction operations, especially being that it is a top 5 issue throughout the FAA. Furthermore, I would recommend HCF be reminded about the LOA between the tower and approach. A better understanding of the LOA could have avoided the development of this situation by coordinating in a timely fashion, before the control

instructions were given to Aircraft Y.

Additionally, I would recommend the HCF controller try to adopt a more positive attitude when coordinating with the tower. There have been many, many instances of unprofessional behavior on both the tower and approach's part throughout the years and there is definitely animosity between the two facilities. But when it comes to the safety of the flying public, we have to set our differences aside and work as a team. This is an example of what can happen when the relationship of the tower and approach control breaks down. We narrowly avoided a disastrous situation with two air carriers flying head on. This situation was easily avoidable with proper coordination.

Synopsis

Maui Tower Controllers reported resolving a head-on conflict caused by untimely coordination from HCF.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : IAH.Airport
State Reference : TX
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : I90
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Widebody, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B : IAH

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : I90
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Climb
Airspace.Class B : IAH

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : I90.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 12
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612265
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Wake Vortex Encounter

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

IAH departures off Rwy 15L/R
IAH arrivals to Rwy 27,26L, 26R

I was working the South Departure section. I climbed Aircraft Y too early through the wake turbulence of an arriving Heavy Aircraft X above me on the downwind. I was not aware of the event and uncharacteristically missed the Heavy completely. This triggered an electronic event and I was advised of my wake turbulence bust the following week.

I was delayed in writing this report because of the partial government shutdown.

It is inexplicable how I missed this. My focus was not there.

Stay focused all the time and realize your mind can wonder quickly when you are worried about things outside of your control.

Synopsis

Houston TRACON Controller reported climbing an aircraft too close through a heavy jet's wake turbulence due to distractions.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RIC.Airport
State Reference : VA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : PCT
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class C : RIC

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : PCT
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class C : RIC

Aircraft : 3

Reference : Z
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : PCT
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Airspace.Class C : RIC

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : PCT.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 11

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612255

Human Factors : Fatigue

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Two arrivals into RIC got very close to each other during the first couple minutes of training. There were very tough winds today. The first aircraft turned into the wind and immediately slowed down 100 knots. The second aircraft was turned on final behind him and separation was lost.

The trainee recognized it and turned the second aircraft out. However, when turning the aircraft back to final the aircraft took an extremely long turn and broke separation with Aircraft Z who was also inbound to RIC.

I am extremely stressed and tired today. I barely slept last night due to the government shutdown. But I am required to come to work because no leave is available. I tried to plug in to get my trainee some time on position training, but I should have refused to train him due to lack of sleep/stress.

Shut down all of the NAS or fund the government. I am not the only stressed and tired controller. Loss of sleep is impacting my reaction time.

Synopsis

Potomac TRACON Instructor reported a loss of separation while training due in part to fatigue and distractions.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ORD.Airport

State Reference : IL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2200

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : C90

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class B : ORD

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : C90

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Airspace.Class B : ORD

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : C90.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 9

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1612250

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

I was working West Arrival, vectoring aircraft for the ILS to RWY 28C at ORD. There was adverse winter weather in the area at this time, restricting ORD to a 2 runway arrival operation. Due to this, demand was high, and constant. All day, the RWY 28R glideslope had been out (presumed due to weather issues). During a busy period of traffic, the city wanted to have RWY28C groomed, cleaned and inspected due to the continuing ice conditions. At this point, 28R glideslope was returned to service. I was informed by the main arrival coordinator to begin vectoring arrivals to the new runway, and told the [glideslope] would be fully functional. I made the challenging switch to the new runway, and immediately had a full final to about 40 NM. I noticed the low altitude alert go off for Aircraft X, and issued the warning. Aircraft X arrested their descent, and noted they were having an issue with the glideslope.

At this point I noticed Aircraft Y that was also descending well below the glideslope. I immediately climbed them, and issued missed approach instructions. From this point, it was obvious there was still an issue with the glideslope, so I went ahead with the arduous task of reissuing every aircraft the localizer approach for runway 28R. This, along with what was already a busy airspace full of airplanes, Aircraft X and Aircraft Y both then needed to go around for unstable approaches. I was unable to make the coordination with the tower as I was too busy managing my aircraft. At this point the glideslope was taken out of service and deemed unreliable. This caused several ATIS changes, to reflect the equipment malfunction, and approach changes. Along with the rapidly changing weather, I again was oversaturated giving the new ATIS and weather conditions to pilots. It seems the appropriate work wasn't completed to remedy the problem on the glideslope, and nearly caused Aircraft X and Aircraft Y to descend below the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) as they crossed Downtown Chicago in IFR conditions. This seems like a serious safety issue.

Have some better form of verification equipment is working prior to resuming using that equipment.

Synopsis

Chicago TRACON Controller reported adverse weather and a malfunctioning glideslope caused aircraft to go around.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZMA.ARTCC
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 24000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZMA
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : Eagle (F-15)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Direct
Airspace.Class A : ZMA

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZMA
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class A : ZMA

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZMA.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 4
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611947
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I had a southbound F15 at 24,000 ft, which was at the floor of my sector. He was in a relatively unusual spot for us, as he crosses 4 departure streams. I put a 5 mile J-Ring on him to keep track of his position, and as the low altitude controller was climbing aircraft to 23,000 ft. and then handing them off to me, I leveled 3 aircraft and called traffic. As I had just taken a handoff on an unknown B737, my D-side asked me about how I was holding up with the lack of pay. We had a quick discussion about it, and how my wife was teaching music lessons in order to offset my salary, which was nowhere near the money we needed. The low altitude sector climbed the B737 to 23,000 ft, and handed him off to me as he was leveling. Distracted from my conversation about my lack of pay, as he checked on, I climbed him to 31,000 ft. The F15 was at his 1 o'clock and 3 miles and 1,000 ft. above him. I didn't get a response. My brain, still on the conversation, didn't recognize the conflict. I didn't get a response from the [B737] pilot. I radioed him again and told him to climb to 31,000 ft. He came back and said, "Uh, center, there's an airplane right above us."

Embarrassed, I quickly responded, "[Aircraft Y], maintain FL230! Sorry about that." I called the traffic, the traffic passed, and I climbed the [Aircraft Y]. This would never happen in normal circumstances. This HAS never happened to me under normal circumstances. I had already previously to this mentally told myself that I wasn't going to let the shutdown distract me, but apparently I'm more susceptible to it than I thought. It's absolutely 100% my fault, a distraction caused me to miss the traffic, that I normally would not have.

Synopsis

ZMA ARTCC Controller reported assigning an aircraft a higher altitude even though there was converging traffic 1,000 feet above them.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 34000

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-800

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 8

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611942

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was approaching the ZZZ1 boundary. I intended to point him out to ZZZ1, but was distracted by an aircraft with multiple requests in the area. I did not have a D-Side. Additionally, I was distracted by a discussion with my Supervisor about whether we would retain our health care coverage while not being paid. This was of great concern to me because I have multiple health conditions that would quickly deplete my savings if I were to lose my insurance. I realized Aircraft X was within 10 miles of ZZZ1 and attempted to call ZZZ1 with the point out but it took several attempts before they answered. Aircraft X was within 3 miles by the time they answered and took the point out. Have better staffing so that there is a D-side when [sectors] are combined. Start paying ATC their salaries.

Synopsis

A Center Controller working a combined sector reported that they were distracted by a conversation with the Supervisor over pay issues and made a late point out to the adjacent facility.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZDC.ARTCC

State Reference : VA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZDC

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class E : ZDC

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZDC

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : Direct

Airspace.Class E : ZDC

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZDC.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 15

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611940

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Fatigue

Human Factors : Physiological - Other

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was level at 11,000 ft. westbound. I took a handoff from TRACON of Aircraft Y out of 9,500 ft. climbing to 11,000 ft. obviously merging with Aircraft X but didn't realize it until too late. I first called TRACON to see if they were working Aircraft Y and if they were to stop their climb at 10,000 ft. They advised they weren't working Aircraft Y. I then called a different TRACON sector and told them to stop Aircraft Y at 10,000 ft, but they told me they switched the aircraft to another Center sector even though the aircraft would never enter their airspace. I called that sector and told them to descend Aircraft Y TO 10,000 ft. AND TURN 30 DEGREES RIGHT. They called me back and said they weren't talking to Aircraft Y. I then noticed Aircraft Y descending to 10,000 ft. and they checked on my frequency. At this point, I had separation between the 2 aircraft but then TRACON descended Aircraft X to 10,000 ft. thus losing separation as they were about 1 mile apart. I turned Aircraft Y 30 degrees right to avoid collision. They passed directly behind Aircraft X. I believe this is an event that happened because of the major added stress because of the government shutdown. My mind clearly wasn't working as fast as it needed to. There should never be an aircraft aloud northbound on V16 at 11,000 ft. due to the multiple metro arrivals we feed at 11,000 ft. to the TRACON.

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported taking handoffs on two aircraft they did not recognize were converging at the same altitude due to stress from the government shutdown.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 28000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Gulfstream G650

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : Direct

Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Direct

Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 26

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611932

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Distraction

Human Factors : Physiological - Other

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Aircraft RA
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was climbing. I had to stop the aircraft at 26,000 ft. for traffic at 27,000 ft. When cleared, I climbed Aircraft X to 28,000 ft. because of Aircraft Y at 29,000 ft. passing overhead. A few minutes later, Aircraft X reported an RA. I informed pilot that traffic was passing to the west 1,000 ft. above. Pilot responded "ROGER, leaving FL280 for FL380." I replied "Negative, maintain FL280. FL280 was your assigned altitude". At this time, Aircraft Y informed me that they were responding to an RA also. I never observed Aircraft Y change altitude nor Aircraft X above 28,100 ft. The aircraft passed 2 miles abreast. Listening to the tape later, my clearance could have been garbled but the pilot read back FL380.

In my opinion, fatigue and frequency issues could be a contributing factor. As far as fatigue, I have worked 28 days of overtime in the last 36 weeks, with 6 scheduled for the next 6 weeks. I am lower in hours than most on the overtime list and we are not even into the high leave part of the year. After 31 years of a 2-2-1 schedule, I can cope with the ups and downs of that, but throw in a random shift on my weekend, never knowing which day or which shift, it make rest hard. With our staffing levels it appears this will continue for the foreseeable future. Add in home life, and now the stress of having to work and not getting paid and my anxiety levels are at a peak. The burn-out factor and negativity is high, and I feel I speak for a lot of controllers here.

As far as frequencies, they have been problematic for quite some time. Not as clear as they used to be, static on both the pilots side and ours, over all weak, with no clear plan for a fix. The SOC will change TELCO paths and it may clear them up momentarily but it is no true fix. The feeling around the control room is that no feels frequencies are a priority. We can't do our job without them. They are as important as the RADAR. I can't say any of these thing were truly contributory to this incident, but I also can't say they weren't.

Need to listen more closely to read backs. Increase staffing. Clean up frequencies. Get the Government opened back up.

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported an aircraft misunderstood their traffic information, possibly due to poor radio coverage, and climbed above their assigned altitude into conflict with converging traffic.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : MIA.TRACON

State Reference : FL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : MIA

Make Model Name : SR22

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : Vectors

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : MIA

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Route In Use : Vectors

Person

Reference : 1

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611931

Human Factors : Distraction

Human Factors : Physiological - Other

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I released Aircraft X off of ZZZ and climbed him to 2,000 ft. on a 270 heading. At some point before or after, I'm unsure, I released Aircraft Y off of ZZZ1 on a standard heading of 300 climbing to 2,000 ft. All operations at MIA TRACON were west, which is the less common configuration. As soon as Aircraft Y checked in on my frequency, I turned him left to a 270 heading and turned Aircraft X to a 300 heading resulting in a slight loss of vertical separation. Since my first missed paycheck, I haven't been sleeping well, I'm coming to work angry and anxious. My patience with airplanes and my coworkers is deteriorating, my focus is off. I'm more concerned with how I'm going to provide for my two young daughters than I am concerned with this job.

Reopen the government and or pay the controllers who are being forced to come to work without pay. In an already stressful environment, the last thing that we need to be worrying about while trying to keep airplanes safe and separated is how to provide care for our children, feed our families, or what jobs we can apply for that will pay the bills. This shutdown is taking a toll on safety and moral. It's jeopardizing the integrity of the NAS.

Synopsis

MIA Approach Controller reported releasing departures from different airports on converging headings into a confliction due to fatigue and stress over a government shutdown.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Taxi

Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ

Make Model Name : Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Person

Reference : 1

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground

Function.Air Traffic Control : Flight Data / Clearance Delivery

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611928

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Confusion

Human Factors : Distraction

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X called for an IFR clearance. I issued the clearance and Aircraft X read back the clearance correctly, then taxied to the run-up area. After approximately 10 minutes, Aircraft Y called ready for taxi. I issued the taxi instructions and passed a VFR chip to the Local Controller. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff without receiving an IFR release because the Local Controller thought that he was VFR. After Aircraft Y tagged up on the radar, the Local Controller realized that Aircraft Y was on an IFR flight plan. The Local Controller then coordinated with TRACON and provided visual separation with the IFR arrival that was on a 3 mile final. I made a simple mistake that I normally would have caught because I was distracted. I was thinking about what I could cut out of my budget or possibly sell in order to make next month's mortgage payment. If it continues much longer, I might have to get a second job. Normally I am very focused at work, but the shutdown has caused me to be increasingly distracted over the past month.

Synopsis

Tower Ground Controller reported incorrect coordination with Local Control that an aircraft on an IFR flight plan was a VFR flight due to being distracted by the government shutdown.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Landing
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 6
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611925
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Other / Unknown
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Observer
When Detected : Routine Inspection
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

I told the first guy about the second guy. I told the second guy about his overtake with the first guy. As I started to issue instructions for the first guy to exit and taxi, I saw the second guy initiate his own go-around, as I issued instructions to the first guy. No reason to talk to him in a critical phase of flight, so I waited for him to report his go around. IF HE HAD KEPT HIS DESCENT AND APPROACH AND LANDED, RUNWAY SEPARATION WOULD HAVE BEEN MET; the pilot chose to go around even though it was going to work, that's his right.

Today I had a discussion with my supervisor. He showed me this pretty graphic showing a loss that came from ASDE data. Remember this is a Tower where we judge runway separation by looking out the windows. I explained to him "when" he went around, which was well before the threshold. So the graphic is meaningless because the aircraft sped up prior to the threshold. Even though I told him I saw him initiate the go-around as I started to talk to the first guy, I was informed that this will be investigated as a loss.

I find this insulting! It is being insinuated that I am lying or did not see what I saw. I was told that I could have used speed control. Wrong! I cannot use speed control inside the final approach fix. That's why I inform pilots about the overtake and leave it up to them to adjust their speed in a safe fashion. I asked if they wanted me to send aircraft around anytime its close and pilot might go around on his own, even though I think it'll work. They said no, don't do that. So here we are, I could have done nothing different. If I send them around because a pilot might go around, I'm wrong. If I let them land but they initiate their own go around, I'm wrong. And then later, when they talk to me, it doesn't matter at all when I tell them what I saw out the window. They only care about the data they can use to make graphics with.

The problem is not with Supervisors, but with the desk jockeys that make and investigate these events. It is a continuing problem we see over and over where someone who has never worked a Tower thinks they know how a Tower works. I understand needing to investigate to prevent future problems, but the problem here is they aren't listening to what I saw out the window. What is the point if you don't take ALL information into account? Insulting the controllers that work the airplanes will only add to distractions and reduce controller's abilities. It is time to take a look at this and stop this problem before it gets worse. Either tell controllers to send around airplanes whenever a pilot might go around or listen to your controllers and take what they say with the same weight as the data.

Synopsis

Tower Controller reported Quality Assurance staff suggested a pilot initiated go-around due to preceding traffic was an ATC Operational Error.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON

State Reference : US

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Traffic Management

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 16

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611072

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

The supervisor in charge of the Arrival line had the Arrival Coordinator position combined with himself. He was never trained on the [Arrival Coordinator] or Arrival positions so his knowledge is limited at best. He inundated the Arrival Controller with too many airplanes. The Arrival Controller was forced to vector airplanes outside of his airspace for an extended period of time. Aircraft were pulled off the final and several were sent around because the Supervisor/Arrival Coordinator did not take into account a scheduled runway inspection. The Supervisor failed to provide any guidance to the Arrival Controller possibly because he did not know what to do himself. This created a very chaotic and unsafe situation.

Do not combine positions with the Supervisor with any more than light traffic and don't combine positions with a Supervisor who has never been certified on those positions.

Mandate that Supervisors will be trained on the positions that they supervise so they can help and not hinder the operation.

Synopsis

Traffic Management Coordinator reported that an unqualified Supervisor working several positions created significant traffic problems.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SFO.Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : SFO

Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi

Make Model Name : Light Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Taxi

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : SFO.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 19

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611071

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Flight Crew

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working Ground Control when I heard Clearance Delivery call to Aircraft X, whose flight plan was in front of me. I handed it to Clearance Delivery and listened to their conversation with Aircraft X. There was clearly confusion about the CPDLC clearance upload. I listened to Clearance Delivery explain all details about the TRUKN2 SID with the SYRAH transition. I asked the Clearance Delivery person to have Aircraft X file an ASAP explaining their confusion. The Clearance Delivery Controller told me afterwards the flight was showing direct SYRAH off of the airport. I have seen this before and we have had multiple pilot deviations due to this exact confusion. Review/standardize CPDLC uploads so they work for the pilots.

Synopsis

SFO Ground Controller reported a pilot was confused by the departure clearance received via CPDLC.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Corporate
Make Model Name : Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Climb
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 8
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611067
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I had Aircraft X going into ZZZ and there was a VFR aircraft that turned and climbed into Aircraft X. I cancelled the approach clearance and climbed Aircraft X to 4,500 ft. Aircraft X advised climbing for an RA. I looked around to advise the person in charge of the area and could not see anyone. As I continued to work with aircraft not checking in or responding to correct call signs, I turned and asked for help and again did not see anyone in the area. I regained control but several aircraft were high on the approaches. I think everyone was separated by the standard separation but I honestly don't know. I had Aircraft Y going to ZZZ1 who said they wanted the GPS 12 Approach, so I cleared them direct ZZZZZ an IAF or IF for the approach and they turned south into a 5600 MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). I issued a Low Altitude Alert and Climb to 5,600 ft. They didn't comply; I issued a heading north and a climb. They were not responding which increased my workload even more. Based on their position, I might [have] even had an airspace violation. Again, no one seemed available to help.

The airspace could be changed to help prevent VFR aircraft from being able to climb to the approach altitudes of ZZZ or [nearby] airports. Mainly I needed assistance and was not able to obtain any.

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller without an Assist reported an unidentified VFR aircraft climbed into traffic on a final approach course and another aircraft deviated from their course into a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude Area.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

State Reference : NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 23000

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Airspace.Class A : ZNY

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 4

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611052

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I issued an incorrect altitude to Aircraft X on a crossing restriction. (A point-out to Sector X, was approved descending to FL250.) I cleared Aircraft X to cross ZZZZZ at FL230. The pilot readback FL230 correctly. FL230 is not in my area of jurisdiction. I did, however, type the intended altitude of FL250 into the data block, and subsequently made a handoff to

the Sector Y. The receiving controller at Sector Y alerted me of the error when the pilot checked in vacating FL250 for FL230. Separation was not lost with any surrounding aircraft. However, this did cause a violation of airspace with Sector Z, whose area of jurisdiction is FL230 and below.

I cannot recall issuing the incorrect altitude. Traffic was light and not complex. Although I felt rested and capable, my focus was obviously not where it should have been. I do not remember being distracted. But, there were conversations about the current state of affairs regarding the government shutdown, lack of funding, and potential resolutions and/or outcomes. Consciously and subconsciously, I have been very concerned about my personal financial situation since the start of the shutdown. With each passing day my worries grow and fears fester. My sleep patterns have become increasingly intermittent despite proper fatigue mitigation techniques. I feel extremely exhausted and stressed by this situation. I worry for the health and safety of my wife and children. I wonder how am I going to support my family as my financial savings dwindle ever closer to zero.

My focus is obviously not where it should be.

In order to perform my duties I must have absolute attention and focus. I have reached the demoralizing conclusion that I am no longer in control of my financial situation. This burden must be relieved in order to regain my focus.

Synopsis

ZNY Center Controller reported an airspace violation due to external distractions.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : PSP.Tower

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 900

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : PSP

Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class D : PSP

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : PSP.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Other / Unknown

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 5

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611048

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather

Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

Weather was deteriorating at PSP. We had just started advertising RNAV approaches (only) in use to RWY 31L. SCT coordinated one last try of the VOR-B approach by Aircraft X. The local controller and I figured, all that can happen is he'll try, if he makes it, he

makes it, if not, he goes missed. Pilot checked on like normal. After crossing Mulch at 3,000 ft. (per approach plate), pilot descended to 1,800 MSL. The minimum is 2,300 ft, but the chart lists 1,826 ft. as height above airport. LC (Local Controller) asks pilot if he has the field in sight. Pilot states he does not. LC queries the pilot if he is aware the minimum is 2,300 ft. The pilot says he is aware. LC asks again, does pilot have airport in sight. Pilot states he does. LC or I never see aircraft at this point. Pilot asks if he can circle left for left downwind. Due to terrain, this is not authorized per the approach plate. LC informs pilot of this. Pilot is now over the airport at 1,800 ft. heading roughly 310 (to my best recollection). Pilot turns right to join a right downwind. Pilot ends up on the extended center line, final for RWY 31L going the opposite direction (heading 130). He then turns right (toward terrain), but the turn is tight, so the terrain is no factor. He is descending to 900 ft. Pilot ends up in a close in left downwind for RWY 31L, except going the opposite direction (heading 330) at 900 MSL. LC tells me he may hit the tower. I seriously consider this is going to be the case. The LC is about to key up to tell the pilot to execute a missed approach when the pilot keys up and tells us he hit a cloud bank and is going to perform the missed. LC tells the pilot to execute the published missed approach procedure (right turn direct PSP VORTAC, climb to 4,000). LC and I are relieved.

This is the only point LC and I ever see the aircraft. It is in the left downwind, opposite direction, heading 320 or so, about 1/4 mile south of the tower, and about 300 ft. above it, but in a climb. Once LC observes the pilot in a climb and safely away from the ground, LC hands off radar and communication of aircraft to SCT. LC and I then watch. Pilot remains runway heading (310) and climbs to 4,000. While talking to SCT, he begins descending to 3,500 MSL. SCT instructs him to turn direct the PSP VOR. Pilot begins a left turn (would have been a left 240 versus a right 120). SCT observes the descent and tells pilot to climb. SCT observes the left turn and tells pilot to turn right. Within three sweeps of the radar, roughly 12 seconds, pilot climbs 3,000 ft. SCT has to stop his insanely quick climb due to traffic. Pilot complies. That's about when LC and I couldn't even watch anymore out of pure exhaustion and pandemonium. I believe the rest of his flight over Coachella Valley was uneventful. Afterwards, I called SCT up and told them not to allow the pilot to return on the VOR-B approach, and no further VOR-B approaches would be accepted.

I don't know about recommendations. Maybe IQ tests for pilots. Or maybe the pilot was suicidal, so a psychology test? All I know is that if I could have a do-over, I would have never let SCT even allow the pilot to try the VOR-B Approach. Next time, when we advertise an approach in use, that is the only approach we will accept.

Synopsis

Palm Springs Tower Controller reported an unsafe approach due to weather and possible piloting issues.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : RSW.TRACON

State Reference : FL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : RSW

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Airspace.Class E : RSW

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : RSW

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : VFR

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class E : RSW

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : RSW.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 6

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1611038

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working East radar and took a handoff on Aircraft X. This was immediately followed up by a call from the sector advising me of traffic 20 miles ahead at 10300 ft. about 3 miles East of LBV. This traffic was NW-bound and would not be a factor. The sector advised me that Aircraft X was released for lower. After I got off the line, LBV sector called me to coordinate with an arrival that was going south of a prohibited area and coming towards my airspace. We had a back and forth on the line when I suddenly realized that Aircraft X and the VFR traffic were a factor. I immediately hung up and issued a traffic alert with a left turn. Aircraft X advised that they responded with a turn and descent. I was able to review the tapes and the VFR aircraft flew passed LBV at 10300 ft. made a left 360 degree turn back into Aircraft X, causing a NMAC.

1) I should have told the Center to descend Aircraft X to 8000 instead of taking the information that he was my control. I also, should not have gotten distracted with a pointless coordination of an aircraft that never got in my airspace.

Synopsis

RSW TRACON Controller reported NMAC with an airliner and a VFR aircraft due in part to being distracted.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

State Reference : NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 17000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY

Make Model Name : Gulfstream V / G500 / G550

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Airspace.Class A : ZNY

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Plan : None

Flight Phase : Climb

Airspace.Class A : ZNY

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1610816

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Fatigue

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Took radar on Aircraft X from Liberty South, climbing to 17000, direct WHITE. Soon after I took the aircraft, I saw a Mode C intruder about 8 miles off to the west of him, moving eastbound fast and climbing. The Mode C intruder was probably around 15000 and climbing while Aircraft X was at 16000 climbing to 17000. Liberty South Controller switched Aircraft X to me. The targets appeared like they were going to merge and I had to assume the Mode C intruder was going to climb, I had no information about him other than what I saw. I immediately climbed Aircraft X into ZNY sector 56's airspace without making a point out. The Mode C intruder indeed did cross Aircraft X's path and climbed as high as 17600 at one point. I believe they would have merged. I believe that fatigue is likely to have been a factor in this incident. I know that I have been working very long hours and today is my 6th day of the week (overtime). I can imagine that the controllers around me feel the same. Furthermore, I have heard that ZNY management has been looking at the use of sick leave during the ongoing government shutdown in an effort to penalize controllers who are taking furlough leave. I do not know if this is true, but this is what I have [heard] and I know that it scares me. I believe that it has probably scared other controllers into coming into work when they might not be able to perform to the best of their ability. This incident has definitely been an eye-opener for me to be extra cautious when controllers are being stretched thin. I don't think that Liberty South should have switched the aircraft without calling traffic or resolving the conflict. I do not know if they were talking to the Mode C intruder but they must have seen him. Also if I had caught the Mode C intruder sooner, I would have been able to complete a point out to 56 before climbing my traffic. As it was, I think that the airspace violation with Sector 56 was unavoidable in order to keep Aircraft X safe.

Synopsis

ZNY Controller reported an airborne conflict which was avoided by climbing an aircraft into another sectors airspace without a correct point-out. Reporter stated fatigue issues related to the government shutdown.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : Stratotanker 135
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 4
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Descent
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : Fighter
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Tactical
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1610813
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

I was vectoring Aircraft X for a RWY32 ILS Approach into ZZZ from the south. He was too high to intercept the localizer below glideslope so I issued him a vector across the localizer (to the east) for descent. There was a flight of two [military fighters] in trail so I didn't want to use the west side of the localizer. The MVA on the east side of the localizer is 3900 so I issued a descent to 4000 and told him to expect a turn back towards the localizer in a few miles. Approximately 2-3 miles later I issued the turn back to the localizer with no response. I tried multiple times on different transmitters without a response. Aircraft X was now approaching a 5900 MVA and descending through 5500. I keyed up on guard frequency to attempt to issue the turn again which Aircraft X responded to and advised that they could no longer hear me on the original frequency of [VHF]. Aircraft X executed their turn approximately 1 mile away from the 5900 MVA descending through 4500. I instructed Aircraft X to expect vectors on guard or to change to my frequency [UHF] if able. Aircraft X came up on [UHF] and no further communication issues were noted. I could have kept Aircraft X at 6000 until he began his turn back toward the localizer but I wanted to ensure he had enough time for descent to be below the glideslope. I was also running out of airspace and would have needed a point out with [Center], so I opted to start Aircraft X's descent early. I also probably should have issued a low altitude alert on guard, but wanted to attempt the turn away from the MVA while I still had time.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported no response from a military aircraft until using guard frequency. Flight was then switched to UHF and turned before entering a higher MVA.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.Tower

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ

Make Model Name : Cessna Citation Mustang (C510)

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Ambulance

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Function.Air Traffic Control : Trainee

Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1610808

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was training Local and Ground combined. Airport was IFR with snow removal in progress. OS [Operational Supervisor] handed me an updated list of NOTAMS for field conditions. An opposite direction arrival to Runway 21 was coordinated and approved by me. Aircraft X was approximately 20 miles north of the field. I concentrated on updating the IDS-4 [Information Display System] and did not check the radar scope as I should have. I am still learning to adapt to IDS-4 requirements of my new facility. No one in the tower pointed out to me the position of the inbound aircraft. Aircraft X checked in on a 6 mile final. I had to scramble to get vehicles off of the runway. Aircraft X really should have been sent around. Personnel in the tower at the time. OS on CIC. Training on TRCAB. Controller monitoring between me and TRCAB. OJTI plugged in with me. Total persons including myself 6. This situation was allowed to develop to prove a point to me. While I do allow conditions to develop so trainees can learn, with the weather and vehicles on the runway, this was too dangerous of a situation to allow this to happen. I do take responsibility for not checking the radar, but at the minimum the supervisor should have said something to keep the operation safe. Stress the importance of tower team concept. Describe when it is appropriate to allow situations to develop and when it is not. This should be included in some type of training such as recurrent training.

Synopsis

Tower Controller reported rushing to clear the runway of vehicles for landing traffic while training.

Time / Day

Date : 201901
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SFO.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : SFO
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : NCT
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B : SFO

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : SFO
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A321
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B : SFO

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : SFO.TOWER
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 19
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1610372
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

The traffic was moderate with very high complexity due to the wind PIREPs and what the pilots could expect - 25 knot tailwind at 2000 ft, decreasing to 15 knots at 1500, at 900 ft. decreasing below 10 knots, followed by a calm wind at 200 ft. I had a previous foreign airline go-around when I did not explain the wind to them. I gave it to every arrival after that.

There was a pair on final; Aircraft X for Runway 28L, and Aircraft Y for Runway 28R. The spacing was great between the preceding pair and this one, so I departed two aircraft off of Runways 1 in front of Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. Meanwhile, I tried many times to get a hold of Aircraft X and Local Assist was calling to the arrival sector to get them as well. The arrival sector kept saying that "They should be with you". I kept trying by keying up and clearing them to land over and over. When they got to the threshold, the runway was clear and was prepared to watch them either land or go around.

The light gun no longer hangs from the ceiling and could not be quickly accessed to utilize. Then Aircraft Y keyed up and said they have to go around, too high too fast I assumed (900 ft. and 210 ground speed at about 1 1/2 mile final). I gave Aircraft Y a right turn heading 310 and 3000 ft. While Aircraft Y read it back, I watched Aircraft X go around. As soon as they were both clear of Runway 1, I departed two more aircraft. Aircraft Y was shipped to departure with the traffic advisories for the last Runway 1 Left departure and Aircraft X going around straight out Runway 28L. Then about two miles upwind, Aircraft X checked in on the missed approach. I confirmed 280 heading and 3000 ft, then shipped them to departure. There was no issue with Aircraft X as far as I was concerned, they were protected for the go around/published missed at all times. I am not sure why we were not in communication with Aircraft X.

Synopsis

SFO Tower Controller reported simultaneous go-arounds, one associated with a loss of communication.

Time / Day

Date : 201901

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZMP.ARTCC

State Reference : MN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 19000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZMP

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Airspace.Class A : ZMP

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZMP

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Airspace.Class A : ZMP

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZMP.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 26

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1610370

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Speed : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were both arrivals into MCI. My airspace was from FL240 and above. I gave both arrivals FL240 and handed them off to ZMP Sector 26. Aircraft X was in front so I assigned him 300 knots or greater; Aircraft Y I assigned 280 knots or less. They were both indicating 500 knots (Aircraft X was descending through FL250 and Aircraft Y was descending through FL310. Sector 26 took the hand off on both aircraft and entered their new assigned altitude of FL190. I issued the new altitudes to both aircraft.

As Aircraft X was descending through FL230 for FL190, I noticed that his airspeed indicated 462 knots while Aircraft Y, who was descending through FL300 to FL190 was indicating 503 knots. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were 9 miles apart with a large overtake. Aircraft Y was leaving FL250 for FL190 and 30 knots faster than Aircraft X who was level at FL190. I increased Aircraft X's airspeed to 310 or greater and stopped Aircraft Y at FL200. This was all done 4000-5000 feet below my airspace! I then had to coordinate with the ZKC sector my new plan since they had the hand off on both aircraft. I also needed to coordinate my new plan with Sector 26 (both aircraft were in his airspace).

Apparently, after reviewing the Falcon, ZKC didn't like my plan and told the ZMP Sector 26 to descend Aircraft Y to FL190 and increase his airspeed to 300 knots or less. What? Speed that back guy up and assign him the same altitude as the aircraft in front? There was only 6 miles of separation! ZKC also said that FL200 was not approved on Aircraft Y. I was providing positive separation on these two aircraft and ZKC was trying to be difficult by denying us to use FL200. Sector 26 had to back coordinate to me to tell me this information because ZKC called the sector that should be working these two aircraft. I never received this information and shipped both aircraft to ZKC without incident.

This new procedure is flawed and dangerous! Sector 39 is working aircraft 5000 ft. below their airspace for no reason! I am coordinating with two sectors and controlling aircraft that are no longer in my airspace! I had no time to do all of that coordination! I did not hear ZKC unable FL200 or issue the new speed assignments! This whole situation would be resolved if I had descended both aircraft to cross 10 west of PWE at FL240 and shipped them both to sector 26! Sector 26 could have amended the speeds/altitude and coordinate with ZKC themselves on two aircraft that were in their own airspace! This new procedure is unsafe!

The high altitude sector is always busier [than] Sector 26 to have this many distractions and restrictions! Critical safety information was missed because the sectors around us don't realize ZMP high altitude sectors are working aircraft in the low altitude sectors! There is no reason to have this procedure! Altitudes are being entered in the data block by

a sector that is not working or controlling those aircraft! We are relying on good memory to determine if that altitude was issued or not. There [are] no tools to indicate if the altitude was issued or going to be issued! Unsafe!

Synopsis

ZMP Center Controller reported an unsafe procedure that was resolved, but was not what the center controller wanted, which would have led to an operational error.