

ASRS Database Report Set

Controller Reports

Report Set Description.....A sampling of reports from Air Traffic Controllers.

Update Number.....29.0

Date of UpdateOctober 31, 2017

Number of Records in Report Set.....50

Number of New Records in Report Set49

Type of Records in Report Set.....For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000



TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating these data of the following points.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell

Linda J. Connell, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to report. Thus, the data can reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.

One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concerning specific event types represents the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that *at least* 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS data is the **qualitative information** contained in **report narratives**. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 1474497 *(1 of 50)*

Synopsis

SYR Tower Controller reported a runway incursion due to the MQ-9 UAV taxiing too slow and an arrival landing on the runway while the drone was still exiting.

ACN: 1474496 *(2 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZFW Center Controller reported that an aircraft that was part of an aerial refueling mission departed the formation without a clearance.

ACN: 1474489 *(3 of 50)*

Synopsis

S46 TRACON Controller reported an aircraft on approach near the ILS Runway 14R FAF TOGAE at BFI was in conflict with an unidentified VFR aircraft and had to be vectored off the approach for separation.

ACN: 1474215 *(4 of 50)*

Synopsis

SCT TRACON Controller reported an aircraft had an NMAC with an unidentified VFR aircraft in the vicinity of LGB.

ACN: 1471566 *(5 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZZZ Tower Controller reported a military UAV exited the Delta airspace against current agreements between the FAA and military.

ACN: 1469196 *(6 of 50)*

Synopsis

General Aviation Pilot reported a loss of directional control upon landing, exited side of runway and adjacent taxiway coming to a stop after completing a ground loop resulting with aircraft landing gear assembly damage.

ACN: 1469162 *(7 of 50)*

Synopsis

C172 flight instructor reported forgetting to reset the altimeter to the local setting resulting in a low altitude alert from ATC.

ACN: 1468533 *(8 of 50)*

Synopsis

RDG Controller conducting on the job training observed an aircraft climbing through their assigned altitude which was not noticed by the Trainee.

ACN: 1468526 *(9 of 50)*

Synopsis

SCT Departure Controller reported a departing aircraft was in immediate conflict and received a TCAS RA with VFR aircraft transitioning the airspace not in communication with ATC.

ACN: 1468510 *(10 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZDC Center Controller reported that New York Center violated the airspace of ZDC and did not coordinate with ZDC Controllers.

ACN: 1468502 *(11 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZAU Center Controller reported their session was out of control due to traffic and no flow control from the Traffic Management Unit.

ACN: 1468493 *(12 of 50)*

Synopsis

Denver TRACON Controller reported that a SOP procedures are not being followed leading to unsafe situations.

ACN: 1468249 *(13 of 50)*

Synopsis

AGC Tower controllers and pilot reported an aircraft entered an active runway at the same time as another aircraft was beginning its takeoff roll.

ACN: 1468243 *(14 of 50)*

Synopsis

NCT TRACON Controller reported that an aircraft was inadvertently held at 3000 feet in a 4100 foot MVA area.

ACN: 1468164 *(15 of 50)*

Synopsis

Atlanta Center Controller reported aircraft being cleared into known weather.

ACN: 1467953 *(16 of 50)*

Synopsis

NCT TRACON Controller reported about confusion, an airspace violation and constant problems associated with an airport where one sector works the arrival and another sector works the departure.

ACN: 1467950 *(17 of 50)*

Synopsis

S46 TRACON Controller reported a VFR aircraft caused an airborne conflict north of the BFI area. This is a recurring issue.

ACN: 1467948 *(18 of 50)*

Synopsis

S46 TRACON Controller reported multiple incidents where VFR aircraft have caused airborne conflicts in the BFI area.

ACN: 1467937 *(19 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZID Controller acting as an Instructor/Monitor while a Supervisor gave a position certification to a trainee reported an airspace violation and violations of Letters of Agreement.

ACN: 1467662 *(20 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZDV Controller reported the D01 TRACON Controller would not allow an expedited routing for a Medevac Lifeguard aircraft.

ACN: 1467660 *(21 of 50)*

Synopsis

Two ZID Center Controllers reported that an aircraft had been issued an IFR clearance that was supposed to hold for departure, but departed into traffic landing opposite direction.

ACN: 1467295 *(22 of 50)*

Synopsis

Controller reported that the Local Controller did not follow the SOP and cleared aircraft for takeoff from a part of the runway that Local did not own.

ACN: 1467294 *(23 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZSU ARTCC Controller reported an unsafe situation relating to frequency blind spot.

ACN: 1467290 *(24 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZDC ARTCC Controller reported that an aircraft needed to perform a rapid descent through the altitude and proximity of another IFR aircraft.

ACN: 1467288 *(25 of 50)*

Synopsis

IAD Tower Controller reported that a flight crew missed the taxiway turnoff, turned around to exit, causing aircraft on final to be sent around. Instruction was too late and aircraft landed on occupied runway.

ACN: 1467286 *(26 of 50)*

Synopsis

A ZNY ARTCC Controller descended an aircraft through the altitude of opposite direction traffic.

ACN: 1467284 *(27 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZMA ARTCC Controller reported that two aircraft lost separation due to weather and the lack of a traffic management initiative to help relieve the volume.

ACN: 1467276 *(28 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZNY Center Controllers reported about a problem with a restricted area due to traffic in and out of it that caused airborne conflicts with multiple aircraft.

ACN: 1466557 *(29 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZOB Center Controller reported having to go into no notice holding and the problems that followed.

ACN: 1466556 *(30 of 50)*

Synopsis

DEN Tower Controller observed an aircraft overshoot the final approach course and had to issue parallel runway traffic go-around instructions.

ACN: 1466551 *(31 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZBW Center Controller and flight crew reported the aircraft descended below a published crossing restriction.

ACN: 1466548 *(32 of 50)*

Synopsis

ALO TRACON Controller reported a temporary loss of contact with an aircraft which descended on its own to an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 1466542 *(33 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZAU Center Controller reported a flight crew refused their descent clearance five times before complying causing the Controller to lose track of other situations developing in their sector.

ACN: 1466538 *(34 of 50)*

Synopsis

HIO Tower Controller and pilot reported of a Class Delta airspace violation and a NMAC.

ACN: 1466533 *(35 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZLC Center Controller reported that an aircraft reported a NMAC with another aircraft in an area of poor radar coverage.

ACN: 1466524 *(36 of 50)*

Synopsis

HCF Controller reported an airborne conflict between an IFR departure and a VFR aircraft.

ACN: 1466519 *(37 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZDV Center controllers reported a loss of separation during high traffic when two aircraft were in holding at the same altitude.

ACN: 1466518 *(38 of 50)*

Synopsis

BOI Tower Developmental Controller reported an extremely busy and complicated session led to an aircraft overflying another aircraft holding for departure on the runway.

ACN: 1466236 *(39 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZLC Center Controller reported that an altitude reservation was started earlier than planned which caused an aircraft to have to alter its route.

ACN: 1466234 *(40 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported that aircraft were supposed to depart in one direction, but ended up departing in the opposite direction.

ACN: 1465955 *(41 of 50)*

Synopsis

SoCal TRACON Controller reported a bad read back from a pilot which caused an instantaneous airspace violation.

ACN: 1465646 *(42 of 50)*

Synopsis

PRC Tower Controller reported a fuel truck crossed the runway as an aircraft was departing before the Tower opened.

ACN: 1465640 *(43 of 50)*

Synopsis

HCF TRACON Controllers reported a problem with three military aircraft that were not following instructions and wanting to return to their ship which was right in the middle of the departure arrival corridor.

ACN: 1465288 *(44 of 50)*

Synopsis

A11 TRACON Controller reported vectoring an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 1465287 *(45 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZAU Center Controller reported parachute jump aircraft routinely enter their airspace without any coordination from the TRACON.

ACN: 1465276 *(46 of 50)*

Synopsis

NCT TRACON Controller reported a VFR aircraft in HWD airspace flew under the OAK Runway 30 final approach course causing two conflicts with OAK arrivals. The final approach course goes through HWD Delta airspace.

ACN: 1465272 *(47 of 50)*

Synopsis

BHM TRACON Controller reported he cleared an aircraft for an approach to Robins Field (20A). The Controller did not check the NOTAMs for the airport and the runway was closed.

ACN: 1465270 *(48 of 50)*

Synopsis

Seattle Center Controllers reported an aircraft descended below the cleared altitude as well as the Minimum IFR Altitude.

ACN: 1464576 *(49 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZLA Center Controller reported that an aircraft was forgotten during a shift configuration changed and dropped by accident.

ACN: 1464572 *(50 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZAN Center Controller reported two aircraft that were VFR needed help due to weather and icing, both aircraft were helped and landed safely.

Report Narratives

Time / Day

Date : 201708
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SYR.Tower
State Reference : NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : SYR
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Landing
Route In Use : None

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : SYR
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Training
Flight Phase : Taxi
Route In Use : None

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : SYR.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1474497
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew
Analyst Callback : Completed

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working the positions of Local and Ground combined. In the tower was another controller working Flight Data Clearance Delivery and he was the Tower CIC as well. There was a significant amount of flow programs being utilized which caused extra workload for the Flight Data position and for myself on the Ground control frequency. On tower frequency was 5 aircraft in the pattern with one of the aircraft being an MQ9 remote piloted aircraft. This is not a normal operation at Syracuse Tower. The average amount of traffic in the pattern is 1 aircraft. Not only was there 5 aircraft in the pattern, but there were multiple air carrier arrivals into Syracuse as well as another MQ9 drone.

In my opinion, for traffic that was on both the Ground and Local frequencies there needed to be an extra controller in the tower. Unfortunately, due to our staffing this was not an option. The actual event that took place involved Aircraft X who was in the VFR traffic Pattern. Aircraft X was instructed to follow the MQ9 with its chase Aircraft. Aircraft X reported both aircraft in sight and was cleared for the option. Aircraft Y was observed landing while Aircraft X was on a 2 mile final. As Aircraft X touched down the MQ9 was turning off of the runway. The MQ9 drones have to taxi at a specific speed when they are on the taxiways and the runways. Their taxiing speed is significantly slower than any fixed wing aircraft. In my opinion, this was the leading contributor to the runway incursion.

I recommend that if there are more than 2 aircraft in the pattern and a MQ9, there needs to be a standalone CIC or decombine Local and Ground frequencies. An increase in staffing would have allowed for an extra "pair of eyes" for the operation. A standard strip marking procedure for pattern traffic would be helpful to provide a visual aid for increased controller workload. The MQ9 should be taxiing at a much faster pace on the runways and they can slow their taxi speed on the taxiways. A procedure should be in place to address the runway compression that occurs whenever a MQ9 lands i.e. approach separates an arrival further from the MQ9 to make up for the times it takes to get the MQ9 off of the runway.

Callback: 1

Reporter said the Military is taxiing MQ-9 UAV's at airport for training then during the time of this report they were flying them in the tower pattern. Reporter advised that the military should be doing this somewhere else and not at SYR. Reporter stated the FAA is trying to figure out how to integrate the UAVs in a normal traffic pattern.

Synopsis

SYR Tower Controller reported a runway incursion due to the MQ-9 UAV taxiing too slow and an arrival landing on the runway while the drone was still exiting.

Time / Day

Date : 201708

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZFW.ARTCC

State Reference : TX

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 24000

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZFW

Aircraft Operator : Military

Make Model Name : Military Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Refueling

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class A : ZFW

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZFW

Aircraft Operator : Military

Make Model Name : Military Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Refueling

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class A : ZFW

Aircraft : 3

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZFW

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Climb

Airspace.Class A : ZFW

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZFW.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 8
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1474496
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

I was the radar controller side with sectors combined at the end of my shift. Aircraft Z was climbing out on the normal departure when I had Aircraft X flight and Aircraft Y together in a block altitude. I believe the altitude block was 24000 to 27000 feet but I cannot remember at the time of writing this. In my opinion there was no loss of separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z. It is my opinion that Aircraft Z was put at high risk when Aircraft Y/Aircraft X decided to split from their formation and proceed as two separate flights. I asked one to come up center frequency and ident.

When the aircraft split and came up on frequency he was inside another sector's airspace and about 45 miles from his lead aircraft. Formation refueling flights are not approved to leave the formation and when prompted by me to explain why he was 40 miles away from his lead aircraft he advised that they missed their flight lead and had "trouble" rejoining the formation. This resulted in an airspace violation and a pilot deviation. I had primary targets on, but with the workload and all of the primary target clutter, it was not possible to see that the aircraft had left his flight and was off course by almost 50 miles.

When an aircraft loses their flight lead, the aircraft instead of not squawking anything should squawk a code that the FAA has not yet come up with. For example, when an aircraft loses their flight lead they could squawk 7900 or some other code to let ATC know

that the aircraft has lost their lead aircraft. This could be useful throughout the NAS. In this example, the aircraft was flying alone and in Class A airspace without proper radar identification because this procedure doesn't exist at this time for aircraft to follow.

Synopsis

ZFW Center Controller reported that an aircraft that was part of an aerial refueling mission departed the formation without a clearance.

Time / Day

Date : 201708
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : S46.TRACON
State Reference : WA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2200

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : S46
Aircraft Operator : Fractional
Make Model Name : Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B : SEA

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class E : S46

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : S46.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 6
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1474489
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

I was working arrival sectors combined. It was a busy and complex session with numerous BFI arrivals, lots of VFR targets, practice approaches in and through my airspace. Aircraft X checked in and was descended and positioned on the downwind for the ILS into BFI. The whole session I had been observing VFR aircraft in the vicinity of the BFI approach course. As such, I was proactively scanning to avoid potential conflicts, as such had already occurred about an hour before. As I turned Aircraft X to the base leg, I saw a VFR target (Aircraft Y) just northwest of the FAF tracking the localizer outbound and issued the traffic to Aircraft X. Aircraft X was looking, but very clear about not having the traffic in sight. I elected to vector Aircraft X across the localizer until the VFR was no factor prior to issuing the approach clearance for the ILS. Aircraft X landed without incident.

Closest proximity between Aircraft X and the VFR was 1.59 miles laterally and 500 feet vertically. My decision to take Aircraft X across their approach course was mainly based on the fact that VFR targets positioned like this do not typically remain 500 feet below the crossing altitude at the FAF. As such, the only way I could ensure there was no conflict was to delay the turn to final for Aircraft X. If the VFR were receiving traffic advisories from ATC, we would at least be able to restrict their altitude, or have them inform us of their intention to remain at or below an altitude that does not conflict with our arrivals to BFI.

Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow, busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign, as necessary, altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solutions are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident.

Synopsis

S46 TRACON Controller reported an aircraft on approach near the ILS Runway 14R FAF TOGAE at BFI was in conflict with an unidentified VFR aircraft and had to be vectored off the approach for separation.

Time / Day

Date : 201708

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SCT.TRACON

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : SCT

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : SCT

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : None

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class E : SCT

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : SCT.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 11

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1474215

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Vertical : 200
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was on a vector for visual approach [to SNA] level at 5000 feet. They were above much of the VFR traffic. I was busy issuing instructions to other aircraft when Aircraft X reported getting within 200 feet of an untagged VFR traffic. At the same time the conflict alert turned on.

Recommend class Bravo airspace for LGB airport so VFR traffic cannot conflict with IFR in this vicinity. Also with more people working, extra set of eyes can prevent unsafe situations.

Synopsis

SCT TRACON Controller reported an aircraft had an NMAC with an unidentified VFR aircraft in the vicinity of LGB.

Time / Day

Date : 201708

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ

Aircraft Operator : Government

Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : VFR

Mission : Training

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Flight Data / Clearance Delivery

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 7

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1471566

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Confusion

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Analyst Callback : Completed

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

The military recently started flying MQ9 unmanned drones at ZZZ. We were directed by FAA HQ that if the MQ9 exited the Class D surface area we had to file a report. The MQ9 was instructed to go to hold so Local Control could get some departures out. I witnessed the MQ9 exit the class D surface area. I questioned the ATM (Air Traffic Manager) and the FLM (Frontline Manager) about filing a report and was pretty much told not to worry about it. As of right now, the FLM and ATM have not filed a report, which is in direct violation of what FAA HQ has told our facility.

I recommend that the military terminate the flying of MQ9's at ZZZ. Every time the military has a COA/LOA with us they violate them, and our management just "sweeps it under the rug." Flying the MQ9's at ZZZ puts an inherent risk on others using the national airspace system and to me as a pilot does not seem safe, especially with the amount of commercial traffic at ZZZ.

Callback: 1

Reporter stated that the military signs the COAs and LOAs, but does not follow what is written. Management at the facility does not want any problems with the military, so the military basically does whatever they want. Reporter thinks this is very unsafe and the situation needs to be looked into.

Synopsis

ZZZ Tower Controller reported a military UAV exited the Delta airspace against current agreements between the FAA and military.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10

Light : Daylight

Ceiling.Single Value : 12000

Aircraft

Reference : X

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : RV-4

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : None

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Landing

Route In Use : Direct

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Rudder Pedal

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Failed

Component : 2

Aircraft Component : Rudder Control System

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Personal

Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

Qualification.Flight Crew : Private

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1469196

Human Factors : Distraction

Human Factors : Troubleshooting

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Ground Excursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Ground Excursion : Runway
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected.Other
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Equipment / Tooling
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

Upon touchdown, I pushed right rudder to keep the plane straight and it veered left of the centerline, attempted to add left brake input with toe brakes but could not stop travel to the left. I considered going around but decided not to do so without rudder authority. Aircraft continued off the left side of the runway and crossed adjacent taxiway and ground looped next to hangars to left of the runway approximately 1250 feet from the runway threshold. No other aircraft or property were damaged.

The right landing gear punched through the engine mount and the landing gear twisted, damaging the wheel pants and fairings. Both wheel pants appeared damaged from travel over dirt between taxiway and runway. Upon exiting the aircraft, I observed the right rudder pedal was not connected to the right rudder cable. The cotter pin holding the clevis pin which connects the rudder pedal to the cable, along with the clevis pin and washers were on the floor of the rudder well.

Prior to Runup checks preflight I confirmed all controls performed nominally with Free Clear and Correct motions. Rudder pedal connections were not normally part of my preflight inspection however I will certainly do so in the future.

Synopsis

General Aviation Pilot reported a loss of directional control upon landing, exited side of runway and adjacent taxiway coming to a stop after completing a ground loop resulting with aircraft landing gear assembly damage.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DVT.Airport

State Reference : AZ

Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 320

Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 9

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7100

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : P50

Aircraft Operator : FBO

Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Training

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use.Airway : V257

Airspace.Class B : PHX

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : FBO

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying

Function.Flight Crew : Instructor

Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial

Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor

Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 650

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 100

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 550

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1469162

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Human Factors : Confusion

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Enroute to DVT, we were told to descend to 7,100 feet from our cruising altitude of 11,000 feet. On our descent, we obtained the current weather and began our checklist for descent. Upon reaching our designated indicated altitude of 7,100 feet, Phoenix Approach contacted us with a low altitude warning of 6,800 feet. We immediately started a climb and realized we had omitted changing the altimeter from our current setting of 30.29 to the DVT area altimeter setting of 29.97. After a few minutes, Phoenix Approach told us to contact them at their local number for a Possible Pilot Deviation.

Corrective Action: When obtaining current weather, always remember to set the current altimeter setting.

Synopsis

C172 flight instructor reported forgetting to reset the altimeter to the local setting resulting in a low altitude alert from ATC.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RDG.Airport

State Reference : PA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : RDG

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Bonanza 35

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : RDG

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : RDG.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 20

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468533

Human Factors : Distraction

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was training a Supervisor at the time the deviation occurred. The trainee was distracted with trying to get the correct call sign typed into a data tag whilst Aircraft X was climbing through his assigned altitude of 4,000 feet. The trainee saw the aircraft climbing but didn't think anything of it because they had gotten rid of the strip and thought they had switched the aircraft to the next facility already which would allow them to continue his climb. Strip marking did not show that they had frequency changed the aircraft. The pilot actually brought attention to the altitude when he asked if he was cleared to 8,000 feet. At this point Aircraft X was at approximately 5,200 feet. The trainee stated no, pointed him out to the affected facility and coordinated with the receiving facility to take the aircraft at 6,000 feet.

Synopsis

RDG Controller conducting on the job training observed an aircraft climbing through their assigned altitude which was not noticed by the Trainee.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SCT.TRACON

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3300

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : LGB

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Airspace.Class D : LGB

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : SCT.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 4.0

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468526

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Detector.Automation : Aircraft RA

Detector.Person : Flight Crew

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

I was working a Radar Departure sector and acknowledged Aircraft X in the departure rundown list. At the time, there wasn't a VFR conflict in the departure corridor. A little bit of time passed, and there were 2 VFR aircraft in the corridor so I called Tower to tell them not to launch Aircraft X. As I was calling, I saw the splat (Aircraft X's target) and knew it was too late. One target was at 1,900 feet, the other was at 2,800 feet. I could not stop Aircraft X at any safe altitude. I asked Tower if they see the traffic and they said something to the effect of they had it or that they would take care of it. As I watched the situation I called Tower again to tell them to keep Aircraft X climbing. They said they were not talking to him. Aircraft X and one of the targets were almost right on top of each other at the same altitude. Aircraft X was checking in as I was on the line with Tower telling them to keep him climbing. Aircraft X checked in out of 3,300 feet responding to an RA.

[Suggest] make LGB airspace a Class C before there is a fatality.

Synopsis

SCT Departure Controller reported a departing aircraft was in immediate conflict and received a TCAS RA with VFR aircraft transitioning the airspace not in communication with ATC.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZDC.ARTCC

State Reference : OH

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 23000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Airspace.Class A : ZNY

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class A : ZNY

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZDC.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1.5

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468510

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Distraction

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working [two sectors] combined with a D-side. Washington Metro play book routes were in effect and the WEVEL routing was assigned to Aircraft X. When Aircraft X was west of PSB VOR, level at FL230, ZNY sector ran Aircraft Y, on a westbound heading at FL230 into my airspace without any coordination. The data block said level at FL230 and descending to FL220. When the D-side called ZNY to figure out what Aircraft Y was doing they claimed another sector was talking to that aircraft. When that sector was called (ZNY), they didn't have any knowledge of that aircraft or what it was doing and then hung up the line. In response I had to put Aircraft X on a westbound heading and expedite a climb to FL240. In addition, coordination with the High Sector was required. ZNY never gave us an answer on what they had planned to do to get Aircraft Y out of our airspace or if they were going to change the altitude. The two aircraft came within 12 miles of each other before positive separation was established. ZNY continued to vector the aircraft in my sector without coordination.

This is not the first time ZNY has failed to provide answers to questions regarding aircraft under their control. They have refused to answer the land line multiple times or will simply hang up. It is an internal problem at ZNY and should be discussed with their area and facility.

Synopsis

ZDC Center Controller reported that New York Center violated the airspace of ZDC and did not coordinate with ZDC Controllers.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZAU.Airport

State Reference : IL

Aircraft

Reference : X

Make Model Name : No Aircraft

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAU.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 25

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468502

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing

Primary Problem : Staffing

Narrative: 1

I returned from a break and looked at the "numbers" for BAE sector and showed a yellow 26 or 28, I can't remember. I saw there was no one on break and was assigned BAE sector to let that controller go home. I asked the Supervisor about the lack of staffing and the high traffic count coming up at BAE. [The Supervisor] said hold-overtime was not approved. I plugged in at BAE and was getting busy. I had asked for a D-side. It was getting much worse and needed help right away. I asked at least 5 times for a D-side. It took maybe 15 minutes or so before I got one. The sector was near out of control. We had [a nearby sector] traffic from the low side. It was humid and aircraft were not climbing. Swap north was getting out of hand and departures opposite direction was a problem too. Most aircraft were complaining about chop/turbulence and was tying up the freq. I stopped taking hand-offs here and there from the low side and he couldn't take my hand-offs as a

result.

Where is flow in all this! How about hold-overtime! We had plenty of people that went home. I never complain about working busy periods, I enjoy it. And I understand we need to move aircraft but this was a totally unsafe situation. I ended up 2.5 hours on the position. I completely lost track of time so times are approximate. Please really look into this.

Better flow! Better management with traffic volume forecast!

Synopsis

ZAU Center Controller reported their session was out of control due to traffic and no flow control from the Traffic Management Unit.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : D01.TRACON

State Reference : CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : D01

Aircraft Operator : Government

Make Model Name : Fighter

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : Vectors

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : D01.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 6

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468493

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Confusion

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Troubleshooting

Human Factors : Distraction

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

During triple ILS monitored approaches at DEN it is tricky to get BKF departures out safely without conflicting with DEN traffic. We have an SOP procedure that is not being followed.

It first states that the Front Line Manager (FLM) shall call BKF Tower and advise them that DEN is in a Land North Monitored operation. BKF is then supposed to avoid departing Runway 14 (at DEN Traffic) as much as possible. None of this is happening. When traffic does depart 14 the coordination is very reckless. No approval is required. The DR4 Controller simply advises the monitors and they are required to get out of the way if needed. This was extremely difficult today since no call was made. The FLM walked over and said "aircraft are rolling off 14 turning to a 200". That's it.

First, the FLM did not seem to know the procedure. Second, in these rare conditions, BKF Runway 14 departures should not be allowed unless the DEN FR Controllers can build a safe hole for these departures. Third, the "I'm going to fly someone into your airspace and you need to get out of my way" coordination needs to be fixed.

Synopsis

Denver TRACON Controller reported that a SOP procedures are not being followed leading to unsafe situations.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : AGC.Tower

State Reference : PA

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : AGC

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Taxi

Route In Use : None

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : AGC

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : VFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Takeoff

Route In Use : None

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : AGC.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 12

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468249

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Distraction

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Facility : AGC.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Trainee
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468242
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 290
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 80
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 190
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468451
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 4

Reference : 4
Location Of Person.Facility : AGC.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468238

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Chart Or Publication

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was taxiing out of an FBO ramp and made a left turn to cross the active runway after being told to taxi across the non-active runway. I was looking at a strip while giving a clearance to a different aircraft on frequency while Aircraft X crossed runway 28 hold short lines. He was noticed by the local control trainee at the time and he asked me what he was doing. At the moment I told Aircraft X to stop! The aircraft stopped and unfortunately Aircraft Y was on takeoff roll [and] was forced to abort takeoff. This is a known hot spot on the airport and is depicted on the airport diagram in the AFD. This has been an ongoing problem for years at our airport and our local safety counsel has brought it up numerous times that there needs to be better signage and better markings on the pavement.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Narrative: 3

I was leaving the FBO. ATC instructed me to taxi, cross Runway 31 and go to A5 for Runway 28. I came up to what in retrospect was A3, but also a crossing point for Runway 13-31 and Runway 10-28 and thought I maybe was supposed to cross there. In looking more carefully at the runway diagram, I can see my mistake. At the time it didn't seem right, so I stopped at the runway threshold but past the hold short line. I saw Aircraft Y on Runway 28 and realized something was wrong. About that time ATC called out to me to stop, which I already was. They then had me turn 180 degrees and taxi back. I was a little off at that point and passed A5 and stopped on A.

Then ATC informed me they needed to file a report, and that the place I made the error was previously identified as a hotspot. I had read the Hotspot report beforehand but it is not specific and only says: "HS1 - Wide pavement int multiple rwys; HS2 - Wide pavement int with ramps, twys, and rwy."

I learned a lot from this error. Study the Airport diagram when given ATC taxi instructions until I completely understand the instructions, or ask for clarification or progressive taxi. If the Hotspot interpretation isn't clear, then ask ATC for clarification. If I come to point during taxi when I am not clear on what to do, seek clarification or progressive taxi from ATC. Take my time during taxi and make sure I understand the taxi area or seek clarification.

Fortunately the outcome was benign and this was a good learning experience for me despite causing me and ATC some temporary anxiety.

Narrative: 4

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis

AGC Tower controllers and pilot reported an aircraft entered an active runway at the same time as another aircraft was beginning its takeoff roll.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : NCT.TRACON

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : NCT

Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class B : SFO

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : NCT.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 9.5

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468243

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X departed San Carlos and was handed off to me on radar vectors. I vectored the aircraft north of SJC because there were departures released off of SJC climbing to 5000 ft during west plan operations. When Aircraft X was far enough to the north of the airport, I turned it eastbound. I got distracted by a VFR hand off from the southeast at 10,500 ft MSL that was in the way of all the SJC departures. I resolved the situation to the southeast, and when I scanned back to see where Aircraft X was, I saw that it had entered the 4100 ft MVA at 3000 ft. I immediately climbed the aircraft to 5000 ft with the request to expedite the climb. Aircraft X complied with a quick climb above the MVA.

When there are Low ceilings in the SJC area, the amount of IFR departures from SQL, PAO, NUQ, and RHV increase significantly. I would recommend that management personnel keep abreast of weather conditions, and assign a hand off position before peak traffic starts. Extra sets of eyes could help minimize situations like this.

Synopsis

NCT TRACON Controller reported that an aircraft was inadvertently held at 3000 feet in a 4100 foot MVA area.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZTL.ARTCC

State Reference : GA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2400

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Weather Elements / Visibility : Thunderstorm

Weather Elements / Visibility : Rain

Aircraft

Reference : X

Aircraft Operator : Military

Make Model Name : Military

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Mission : Tactical

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use.STAR : Raggz1

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZTL.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Radar : 23

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 23

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 7

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1468164

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

Weather that was depicting heavy to extreme precipitation impacted the Tiroe sector ZTL. The area of convective activity covered a 90 mile radius in the sector. There was no "clean air" we had aircraft inbound to ATL deviate to avoid the heavy thunderstorms. They deviated into the south departure sector and also the west departure sector. It was not possible for them to join the arrival from the south west. We coordinated headings with ATL approach A80.

Our Traffic Management Unit (TMU) was informed by our Controller in Charge (CIC) that aircraft were requesting different arrival fixes. The other 3 arrival fixes and sectors in ZTL airspace had no weather at all. 2 Air carriers demanded a new arrival for safety. Our TMU responded by saying the air carriers could deviate. So we vectored aircraft to deviate north and rejoin the arrival when able. When the aircraft reached the Transfer Control Point (TCP) however the controllers at A80 said they had no knowledge of this plan and did not agree to it. Lack of communication between our TMU and A80 put the flying public safety at risk.

Our TMU said that they put out a re-route to put the arrivals on other arrivals. However the aircraft were still purposely being routed into known convective activity on the arrival into ATL. No proactive measures were taken by our TMU to off-load arrivals to safe arrivals with no convective activity. The flying public was put at risk by this lack of action and planning. In the future when an arrival sector is covered in convective activity the aircraft should be re-routed to other arrivals.

This was another example of how our management and TMU do NOT work to help the controllers of ZTL.

Synopsis

Atlanta Center Controller reported aircraft being cleared into known weather.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : NCT.TRACON

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : SQL

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : NCT

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class E : NCT

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : NCT.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467953

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Confusion

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X is inbound to SQL airport which is located in Woodside Sectors airspace. LICKE sector works the SQL IFR approach into SQL starting at AMEBY which is on the boundary of LICKE and Woodside's airspace. LICKE sector has to accomplish up to three point outs with the SQL IFR approach, point out to the TOGA sector, point out to the Woodside Sector and depends what altitude the approach crosses AMEBY point out to NUQ tower.

Aircraft X is inbound to AMEBY for the RNAV Runway30 approach to SQL. Toga point out has been accomplished the Woodside point out is in the process of a point out via automated point out procedure. Woodside calls the LICKE sector and instructs LICKE to spin Aircraft X once and then bring it in and they WILL TAKE THE POINT OUT at that time because they released a SQL IFR departure. LICKE sector instructs Aircraft X who is on an approximate 320 heading to turn left to a heading of 180. That's when I relieve the LICKE controller. A moment later I see the SQL departure depart SQL, I instruct Aircraft X to go direct AMEBY for the approach. We spun Aircraft X like the Woodside sector instructed us to do. Aircraft X made a left turn to AMEBY and made the 360 route that Woodside instructed. When I saw Aircraft X was direct AMEBY I cleared Aircraft X for the RNAV approach starting at AMEBY fully expecting Woodside to accept the point out like they stated they would. Aircraft X was approaching Woodside's airspace again and has yet to accept the automated point out.

I am not sure about the sequence events next. Woodside sector calls for coordination on their SQL departure. Woodside stated they are going to take the departure eastbound into Aircraft X the SQL arrival. I gave instructions as a receiving controller to take the aircraft south to go behind Aircraft X. So Aircraft X can continue inbound for the approach. The instruction seems to confuse the transferring controller. I then clarified to take the aircraft over OSI VOR and depart Woodside on a 110 heading which is a standard route to alleviate the confusion. Coordination ended at that. Woodside has yet to take the Point Out on Aircraft X. I call Woodside to accomplish a manual point out. Woodside refused to accept the point out because of the SQL departure in which I already gave instruction to resolve the conflict. I felt Woodside was being obstinate in refusing to take the point out. All conflicts were resolved and there was no other conflict to let Aircraft X continue inbound on the approach and for the Woodside controller to accept the point out. Instead of delaying the Aircraft X aircraft again I told the Woodside sector that Aircraft X was continuing inbound. We spun Aircraft X like Woodside instructed and anticipated that Woodside would accept the point out like they instructed. Woodside then refused to take the point out and the airspace design around AMEBY does not leave us many options to hold in our airspace that close to the IAF.

Aircraft X continued the approach, landed going through Woodside's airspace without a point out with no other incidents.

This conflict is with two different sectors in two different areas of the building. One sector works the departures that depart opposite direction head on with another sector in another area working the arrival into the same airport which is SQL. It causes confusion, there is a break down on who is doing what.

I suggest the SQL arrivals and departures are worked by the same area and same controller, this would alleviate the coordination between two different areas. SQL airport is located in Woodside's airspace and JEFNY an IAF for the RNAV approach to SQL which is in Woodside's airspace. I recommend that the IFR arrivals be routed over JEFNY and be worked by the Woodside controller this way one sector and one area can work out the

delay or sequence for the opposite direction departure vs the arrival. It would no longer have the confusion of coordination control instruction and accepting point outs.

Synopsis

NCT TRACON Controller reported about confusion, an airspace violation and constant problems associated with an airport where one sector works the arrival and another sector works the departure.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : S46.TRACON

State Reference : WA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2700

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : S46

Aircraft Operator : Fractional

Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class E : S46

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : None

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class E : S46

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : S46.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2.6

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467950

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Detector.Automation : Aircraft RA
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

Working Boeing sector stand-alone due to Flight Check aircraft maneuvering in the airspace. VFR, high volume and complexity. Aircraft X, landing BFI on the localizer for runway 13R at BFI. As I cleared Aircraft X for the visual approach, I called traffic on a VFR tag, Aircraft Y, at 2100 ft heading NE towards the final approach course for 13R. Aircraft X subsequently reported traffic in sight, but still encountered a TCAS-RA with respect to the VFR. The supervisor was immediately made aware of the TCAS-RA and Aircraft X continued on the visual approach without further incident.

This is another report of a continued problem within our airspace. The VFR traffic crossed approximately 1 NM NW of ISOGE from the SW to the NE, directly through the final approach course 100 ft below, and then climbing through, our required crossing altitude at ISOGE on the ILS. A review of the FALCON replay indicated that before the VFR and Aircraft Y crossed paths, the separation was .71NM laterally and 600 ft vertically. Fortunately, Aircraft Y only climbed 100 ft in response to the TCAS-RA, because had the aircraft elected to execute a complete go-around it would have been much worse. The Seattle final was busy, there were aircraft on the downwind in the vicinity of Aircraft X, and a Flight Check aircraft doing arcs across the Seattle finals at 1900 ft in the Class Bravo airspace.

Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow, busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign, as necessary, altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solution(s) are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident.

Synopsis

S46 TRACON Controller reported a VFR aircraft caused an airborne conflict north of the BFI area. This is a recurring issue.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : S46.TRACON

State Reference : WA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2200

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : S46

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use.Localizer/Glideslope/ILS : Runway 13R

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Airspace.Class E : S46

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : None

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class E : S46

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : S46.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2.6

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467948

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

Working sector with VFR, high volume and complexity. Aircraft X on a vector and cleared for the ILS runway 13R approach to BFI. As I cleared Aircraft X, I scanned to see a VFR target NE of the final approach course at 2800 heading towards the final, so I issued the traffic. After a moment, I decided I did not like the situation, particularly the possibility that the VFR might descend into Aircraft X, so I canceled his approach clearance and gave him a vector off the localizer to the South. The VFR did not descend, so I descended Aircraft X to my MVA and advised him to expect a visual approach. Aircraft X reported the field and traffic in sight, so I cleared him for the visual approach. Aircraft X indicated he would have to pass underneath the VFR again on the visual and wanted to verify he was cleared for the visual approach. I confirmed the approach clearance and indicated to the aircraft that if they wanted to descend it was more than understandable. Aircraft X subsequently continued to BFI and landed without further incident.

This is another report of a continued problem within our airspace. As with [another report], there was a lot going on in the airspace at the time and had traffic not been observed and a TCAS-RA resulted, it could have been much worse. The back-to-back timing of this event with my previous is a perfect illustration of how often the potential for these scenarios exist in our airspace. I wish I could get more of my coworkers to report them when they occur.

Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow, busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign, as necessary, altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solution(s) are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident.

Synopsis

S46 TRACON Controller reported multiple incidents where VFR aircraft have caused airborne conflicts in the BFI area.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZID.ARTCC

State Reference : IN

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZID

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : Direct

Airspace.Class A : ZID

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZID.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 10.5

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467937

Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working the d-side at Sectors 34/35 for a check ride. The check ride started going south and I know we violated Sector 18 with Aircraft X I think at 19,000. 18 did call me and claim radar contact when this aircraft was 3 or so miles in their airspace. I think there might have been an LOA not followed with a LOU arrival as well, but I'm not exactly sure as I was coordinating nonstop. The sector totally ran away from the trainee and I did everything possible to help out and yet not control the sector from the d-side during a check ride. The sector was controlled very well and there were a lot of panic reactions due to a lack of planning.

After this check ride took place I got to thinking at what point as an OJT Instructor do you shove the supervisor and trainee out of the way to maintain safety and keep the service we provide at an acceptable level? This I think is something most OJT Instructors probably don't have the nerve to do as they might be scared of what the supervisor might say or do since it is a "check ride". I can't say that before this situation I would have done that, but after it I think I will definitely jump in sooner than later to prevent a cluster from happening. I think it's a slippery slope during a check ride as to when or if you even take over as an OJT Instructor.

Synopsis

ZID Controller acting as an Instructor/Monitor while a Supervisor gave a position certification to a trainee reported an airspace violation and violations of Letters of Agreement.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZDV.ARTCC

State Reference : CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 21000

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZDV

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Ambulance

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Direct

Airspace.Class A : ZDV

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZDV.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 10.5

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467662

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

A Medevac aircraft was flying, initially on a direct route, level at 21,000 feet. Because of weather along the route of flight, the Radar controller rerouted Aircraft X direct [to destination]. I called the TRACON at least 15 minutes prior to the aircraft estimated at the

TRACON boundary to coordinate this priority routing at 16,000 feet. The controller denied my request without stating a reason or issuing an alternative (such as a higher altitude for possible traffic or a request for control). After a pause, I asked for a suggestion as to how to get the Medevac routing to [their destination]. The controller's response was to take the aircraft north or south over the arrival routing, which we were forced to do.

We turned the aircraft to the northeast and issued the STAR. This routing added many miles and several minutes to the aircraft's flight. As Aircraft X approached our boundary with Denver Approach, only one aircraft departed out the west departure gate. Only one aircraft could have been a factor with the inbound medevac.

Denying some sort of priority to a medevac flight is inconceivable! Especially in an instance of extremely low traffic flow and complexity. Every single controller at the TRACON should be capable of providing priority services and separation to aircraft requesting it, especially when it could involve someone's health. My recommendation is that the controllers at the TRACON be held accountable for their actions or inactions. Rerouting a Medevac as in this instance (and this is certainly not the first time this has occurred) does not meet our requirement of expeditious handling of aircraft.

A possible tool to prevent unnecessary rerouting of Medevac aircraft would be to add/change the Letter Of Agreement with Denver Approach. Medevac flights and other aircraft requesting priority (such as emergencies) should not need TRACON approval, but coordinated in advance. If the receiving controller cannot take an aircraft on requested routing, then an alternate routing or altitude should be suggested/coordinated/assigned that does not take the aircraft on an extreme course change away from their destination airport.

Synopsis

ZDV Controller reported the D01 TRACON Controller would not allow an expedited routing for a Medevac Lifeguard aircraft.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZID.ARTCC

State Reference : IN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2100

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZID

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class E : LOZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZID

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Flight Phase : Landing

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class E : LOZ

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZID.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 12.0

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467660

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Facility : ZID.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 29.0
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467940

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Departure Airport
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was on the ground requesting an IFR clearance. I instructed the aircraft to Hold for Release and then issued the clearance and to advise when ready for departure. After listening to the recording of the incident, I did not receive a read back of the hold for release. I then cleared Aircraft Y for an ILS approach. Right after Aircraft Y passed the final approach fix Aircraft X comes off of opposite direction.

I immediately issued a traffic alert to Aircraft Y and he replied that he was looking for traffic. I then issued traffic to Aircraft X to which he replied "we see the traffic passing underneath us." I informed Aircraft X that his instructions were to hold for release. I also instructed Aircraft X to maintain VFR. I then advised him of additional traffic inbound to which he replied "we're just going to cancel and return to"

I should have been clearer to the aircraft on the ground that he is not released for departure due to inbound traffic.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

Synopsis

Two ZID Center Controllers reported that an aircraft had been issued an IFR clearance that was supposed to hold for departure, but departed into traffic landing opposite direction.

Time / Day

Date : 201707
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.Tower
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Make Model Name : PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase : Takeoff
Route In Use : None

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Supervisor / CIC
Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground
Function.Air Traffic Control : Flight Data / Clearance Delivery
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 6
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467295
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working CIC/Ground Control (GC)/Flight Data (FD)/Clearance Delivery (CD) combined with Runway XY in use. In this configuration GC owns/controls Runway XXR and Runway XXL east of Runway XY and Local Control owns/controls Runway XY and Runway XXL and Runway XXR west of Runway XY. The departure for both Runway XXL and XXR are at the east end of the field.

Standard procedure is on GC in Runway XY configuration is to give taxi instructions to aircraft and include runway crossings (we has a waiver for 2 runway crossings at Taxiway Charlie). For example: [aircraft call sign] Runway XY taxi via Hotel Charlie, cross Runway XXL and Runway XXR at Charlie.

I had given taxi instructions to 2 aircraft and given runway crossings to both aircraft to cross Runway XXL and Runway XXR at Taxiway Charlie.

The Local Controller gave instructions to Aircraft X to line up and wait on Runway XXL, in the standard Runway XY configuration, Local 1 does not own/control that portion of the runway. Local 1 then proceeded to give Aircraft X a takeoff clearance at which point I came up on the recorded line and stated "Runway XXL full length your control, [controller's initials]." The Local 1 Controller stated something to the effect of, "oh yeah."

As the Ground Controller I had to go back to both taxiing aircraft and ensure that they held short of Runway XXL as there was now a departing aircraft for that runway.

A few minutes later Local 1 cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on Runway XXR. Again in the standard Runway XY configuration at my Local 1 does not own/control that portion of the runway. I brought this to the attention of the Local Controller who then after clearing a second aircraft for takeoff on a runway they did not own/control they proceeded to request control of Runway XXR full length.

As the Ground Controller I had to go back to both taxiing aircraft mentioned above and ensure that they held short of Runway XXR now as there was now a departing aircraft for that runway as well.

All of these coordination's are to take place prior to giving aircraft any type of clearance/instructions for the active/inactive runways. Essentially Local 1 gave 2 takeoff clearances on 2 inactive runways back to back while Ground Control had given 2 aircraft crossing instructions for the same runways.

Have controller re-train or have refresher training on SOP. Have controller demonstrate working knowledge of airport configuration and runway in use.

Synopsis

Controller reported that the Local Controller did not follow the SOP and cleared aircraft for takeoff from a part of the runway that Local did not own.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZSU.ARTCC

State Reference : PR

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZSU

Make Model Name : Cessna Single Turboprop Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Descent

Airspace.Class E : ZSU

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZSU

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Plan : VFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class E : ZSU

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZSU.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 7

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467294

Human Factors : Time Pressure

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was at FL110 with assigned altitude to cross GABAR intersection at FL060. When the aircraft was east of DANDE intersection, I noticed a VFR aircraft climbing opposite direction out of FL075. I attempted to communicate with Aircraft X several times for a traffic alert because the aircraft was in a frequency blind spot. I was able to relay the traffic information and a vector through company aircraft in the vicinity, to avoid a possible conflict. Closest proximity 4.7 NM and 700 feet. Area between DANDE and GABAR is a common area of frequency range problems.

The frequencies must be fixed ASAP to improve coverage. The process for getting them fixed is unacceptable and the added workload that is required to keep the unthinkable from happening is a distraction and threat to the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS).

Synopsis

ZSU ARTCC Controller reported an unsafe situation relating to frequency blind spot.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZDC.ARTCC

State Reference : VA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 33500

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZDC

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Airspace.Class A : ZDC

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZDC

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class A : ZDC

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZDC.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467290

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

Sector 39 was working Aircraft X at FL350 when he [advised of] a pressurization problem. The controller immediately requested I turn Aircraft Y out of the way so Aircraft X could descend. I did this and the 39 Controller cleared the aircraft down through the altitude of Aircraft Y once it became clear the aircraft were established on different courses. Traffic was called to Aircraft Y shortly after turning him.

This is something I've worried about in the past; if an aircraft needs to descend immediately, do we officially clear him through another aircraft? Call the traffic and say, do what you want? I would like guidance on what we need to do to help the pilots but also keep ourselves out of trouble.

Synopsis

ZDC ARTCC Controller reported that an aircraft needed to perform a rapid descent through the altitude and proximity of another IFR aircraft.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : IAD.Tower

State Reference : DC

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Weather Elements / Visibility : Windshear

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : IAD

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Taxi

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : IAD

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Landing

Airspace.Class B : IAD

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : IAD.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467288

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Distraction

Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working LC1 [Local1], LC2, and LC3 combined at the time of the event. The position was combined at LC3 which faces the west side of the airport. This configuration makes working the east side of the airport (RWY1R/19L) difficult. I also had planes on 2 separate frequencies 120.1 which is LC1 frequency and 134.42 which is LC3 frequency. This also creates confusion and potential for transmissions being stepped on.

There was weather in the area with a thunderstorm over the airport. This added complexity and extra focus necessary to issue weather updates, wind shear alerts, and RVR [Runway Visual Range] readings. I have received many briefings in the last year stressing how important weather dissemination is. This was my major focus during this event which could have lead me to get tunnel vision.

I had Aircraft X number 1 for RWY 1R and Aircraft Y number 2 for RWY 1R. Both planes were cleared to land and given weather advisories. I was working a departure in position on RWY 30 that was given weather information and was holding in position looking at the weather and deciding if they were able to depart. My attention was on the weather and trying to give accurate information and watching the TDWR [Terminal Doppler Weather Radar] for new wind shear readings because it was continuously changing. Aircraft X had safely landed and missed the last high speed exit (K2) so I instructed them to turn left J1.

At this time Aircraft Y was on a 1.5 mile final and with the speed of Aircraft X continuing down the runway I did not think timing would be a factor. The visibility was drastically reduced and the end of the runway was not visible from the tower. I was relying now on

the ASDE-X [Airport Surface Detection Equipment] to insure that Aircraft X had cleared the runway. I saw what I believed to be Aircraft X committed to the K1 exit while Aircraft Y was short final and I allowed them to continue. The Controller in Charge saw Aircraft X's target still on the ASDE-X now at J1 and instructed me to send Aircraft Y around.

I issued go around to Aircraft Y and it was too late he had already crossed the landing threshold and responded that they "had already touched down". I then realized my mistake of issuing Aircraft X to turn off the runway at J1 instead of K1 which caused confusion to the pilot because J1 is 500 feet farther down the runway. I believe Aircraft X was exiting the runway at K1 and realized he made the wrong turn and then turned back to comply with my exiting instructions of J1.

This event happened because of an incorrect runway exiting instruction, weather at the airport, the position being combined due to lack of staffing and not recognizing a developing situation due to fatigue.

I recommend that when weather is a factor and adds complexity to workload that LC1 be separate from LC2 and LC3 and worked from the proper position in the tower. The tower was improperly staffed and I believe with holdover overtime this event could have been prevented.

Synopsis

IAD Tower Controller reported that a flight crew missed the taxiway turnoff, turned around to exit, causing aircraft on final to be sent around. Instruction was too late and aircraft landed on occupied runway.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

State Reference : NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 13000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : PC-12

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : ZNY

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY

Make Model Name : Learjet 60

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class E : ZNY

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 10

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467286

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

There was training on the Handoff position and the trainee was a little behind causing data blocks to overlap and handoffs were slow which caused the sector to be more chaotic than normal. I descended Aircraft X from 16,000 feet to 10,000 feet with Aircraft Y at 13,000 feet opposite direction. I turned Aircraft X from a 250 heading to a 310 heading after I realized Aircraft X wasn't descending according to aircraft specifications. I issued traffic to Aircraft Y. When he reported traffic in sight, I told him to maintain visual separation. Aircraft Y replied and advised me he received an RA. I gave traffic to Aircraft X that Aircraft Y had him in sight and is maintaining visual separation.

I should have used vertical separation.

Synopsis

A ZNY ARTCC Controller descended an aircraft through the altitude of opposite direction traffic.

Time / Day

Date : 201707
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZMA.ARTCC
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZMA
Make Model Name : Citation X (C750)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Climb
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class E : ZMA

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZMA
Make Model Name : Super King Air 200
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Climb
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class E : ZMA

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZMA.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467284
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

I was working R46/47 with significant extreme thunderstorm activity across an arc just north of all four MIA/FLL Departure Transition Areas (DTAs), requiring all four DTAs to funnel through a single ~5 NM gap between thunderstorms. I had previously made my Front Line Manager (FLM) aware of the impending situation, as the radar history display in the control room clearly showed that the gap was closing up, and aircraft were beginning to require more extreme deviations. Despite asking for it repeatedly, at no point do I feel I was given adequate in-trail from MIA approach to have time to properly call weather to departure aircraft in accordance with FAA order 7110.65. No Traffic Management Unit (TMU) initiatives were posted until after management was made aware of the Loss of Standard Separation (LoSS) I am describing in this report.

The four DTAs were stratified, which per local standard procedure means that instead of climbing to the top of MIA Approach airspace (16,000 MSL,) FLL/FXE/Lauderdale satellite departures climb to 11,000 MSL, with our control for climb. Aircraft Y was almost due westbound, along the northern MIA Approach boundary, with thunderstorm activity ~10 NM north of him, climbing to 11,000, filed for 16,000 off FLL. Aircraft X was southwest of him, northbound, also climbing to 11,000, filed for FL210, off of FXE. I had accepted automated radar hand offs on both aircraft, assuming that MIA Approach would keep them separated until transferring control.

Just as I realized that the aircraft were essentially on right-angle converging courses, and conflict alert began to go off for the two aircraft, Aircraft Y checked on level at 11,000. My D-side had been attempting to coordinate with MIA Approach, but there was a great deal of confusion between them, as they had been trying to get higher on one of the two incident aircraft, to top a third aircraft that I do not have information on. As soon as I had Aircraft Y on my frequency, and having no turns available due to thunderstorms, I issued him an expedited climb to 13,000, with best rate of climb through 12,000, and called the traffic. He passed through 12,000 in the climb with approximately 4.1 NM lateral separation from Aircraft X. Aircraft X did not check on my frequency until the situation was resolved, and at no time did I detect a turn or change in altitude by Aircraft X from a possible MIA Approach clearance.

TMU routinely dismisses our requests for in-trail, or adjustments to traffic flow for weather, and only ever reacts to situations after they have already occurred. At no point was any Traffic Management Initiatives (TMI) or in-trail requirement issued to route aircraft away from extreme thunderstorms, or to ensure that controllers in question have enough frequency-time to issue weather, and provide adequate deviations. Only after aircraft have started to refuse routing through gaps, and are deviating into other traffic flows, such as departures deviating head-on into arrival streams, will TMU begin to issue TMIs, which are by that time already too late.

South Florida is both one of the most convective active pieces of airspace in the world, and is rapidly growing into one of the busiest, most congested areas in the country. Our local TMU needs to be far more proactive in the management of traffic as significant weather begins to impact the operation on a nearly daily basis, so that controllers aren't struggling to separate completely unpredictable traffic flows.

Synopsis

ZMA ARTCC Controller reported that two aircraft lost separation due to weather and the lack of a traffic management initiative to help relieve the volume.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

State Reference : NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 18500

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Nav In Use : GPS

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use : Direct

Airspace.Class A : ZNY

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY

Aircraft Operator : Military

Make Model Name : Military

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Mission : Tactical

Flight Phase : Climb

Airspace.Class A : ZNY

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZNY.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 10

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467276

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Time Pressure

Human Factors : Confusion

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Facility : ZNY.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Handoff / Assist
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467292
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was direct to CAMRN to cross 40 miles southeast of CAMRN at FL140. W-107 had gone active and my Radar Assist secured a point out through the warning area for Aircraft X direct to CAMRN descending to FL090.

When Aircraft X was approximately 10 miles from the boundary of sectors 86 and 66 the conflict alert started to flash with Aircraft X and the [a flight of three.] The [flight of three were] turned directly into the Aircraft X that I was working.

When I recognized the conflict I told Aircraft X to turn left for traffic, no response was received. I called a traffic alert for Aircraft X. My RA told me that [one controller] wanted me to stop Aircraft X at FL180. I told Aircraft X to maintain FL180. Aircraft X responded that he was responding to a TCAS Resolution Advisory. I did everything that I could.

As for the Aircraft Y, he was never in my airspace. The first time that I recall seeing this limited data block was when the Aircraft Y was at FL190 heading eastbound already off the Aircraft X's right side. At that point the Aircraft X was already descending down and was

out of FL189. Upon watching the Falcon playback it appears that Aircraft Y turns off his transponder. At that point there was absolutely no way for me to be able to even know he was there until the Aircraft Y turns his transponder back on.

After this second conflict cleared I was told by my RA, who was told by sector 66 to put Aircraft X on a heading of 010. I did this and transferred communications to sector 66 as they wanted to talk to him.

[The other Controller] should protect for point outs when they accept point outs from us. If they are unable to do so then they need to advise us during coordination so that a mutually agreeable solution can be determined.

Narrative: 2

I was working the D Side of sector 86. [Another controller] called to activate warning area W107. At which time I pointed out two aircraft. One already within the lateral confines of W107, one just outside, being Aircraft X. I pointed both aircraft out direct to CAMRN descending to FL090, which is the altitude the next sector 66 which also has W107 within its boundaries descends arrivals to. Both point outs were approved by [another controller]. Shortly thereafter sector 66 called to confirm both aircraft were pointed out down to FL090 with [another controller], which I replied affirmative. The first aircraft was handed off to 66 and communications transferred to them. The second aircraft as it approached the boundary between sector 86 and 66, began to flash conflict alert with a flight of 3. The data blocks of these aircraft indicating they were out of FL140 climbing to FL230 whereas Aircraft X was out of approximately out of FL220 descending to 140. Upon recognizing the conflict I contacted [another controller] to question what the flight of three were doing. They stated the aircraft were making a hard left and asked me to stop Aircraft X at FL180. At this point the Aircraft X was approximately 200 FT about FL180, so I told the R side to stop Aircraft X at FL180. The R controller issued the clearance as well as a traffic alert, however at this point Aircraft X was responding to a traffic advisory. In addition a limited data block directly above the Aircraft X was at FL190. This aircraft had shut off their transponder, presumably to avoid any TCAS alerts as they joined up with the [flight of three]. We later found out this aircraft was attempting to turn away from the Aircraft X the [the flight of three] was turning directly towards Aircraft X.

Either [other controllers] separates their traffic with point outs they accept through any warning area and remains in direct communication with their aircraft or they no longer accept point outs through these warning areas. The problem lies with aircraft already within the warning area when they go hot. Perhaps a delay in the time the warning area goes hot and the time aircraft under [air traffic] control arrive within it, to assure all non participating flights depart the warning area.

Synopsis

ZNY Center Controllers reported about a problem with a restricted area due to traffic in and out of it that caused airborne conflicts with multiple aircraft.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZOB.ARTCC

State Reference : OH

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 29000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZOB

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class A : ZOB

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZOB

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class A : ZOB

Aircraft : 3

Reference : Z

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZOB

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class A : ZOB

Aircraft : 4

Reference : A
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZOB
Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Ambulance
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class A : ZOB

Aircraft : 5

Reference : B
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZOB
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class A : ZOB

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZOB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466557
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

The Blue Ridge Controller called and informed me I was shutoff for BWI/IAD/DCA arrivals and that TMU said I should have been rerouting them. I had no knowledge of this and asked my Supervisor for clarification. My Supervisor asked TMU. TMU informed my Supervisor BWI/IAD/DCA had been shutoff. My Supervisor and I were both shocked to learn of this information from the receiving sector without prior notice from TMU. I was extremely dismayed at the obvious breakdown in communication.

I immediately had trepidation about what to do with all my BWI/IAD/DCA arrivals. Meanwhile, Aircraft X and Aircraft Y, six miles in trail, were in pending hand off status to the Blue Ridge Sector. Additionally, Aircraft Z was approximately five minutes in trail. All three were BWI arrivals. My panic was relieved when the Blue Ridge Controller said he would accept Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. Then, having to ignore shout line calls from adjacent sectors, my focus shifted to Aircraft Z, at which time I informed the pilot to slow and plan for holding or a possible reroute. After conferring with my Supervisor about how this happened and how I would proceed, I was able to reestablish my scan and get back to other priorities like point outs, hand offs, and coordination.

This period of inattention and distraction could've been avoided. During the fray I switched Aircraft A communications without a hand off, which could've lead to an airspace violation. And, I delayed about four minutes to answer an Appleton Sector point out on Aircraft B, causing the aircraft to fly into moderate precipitation and potentially endangering the passengers and crew. After more coordination with the Blue Ridge Controller, they accepted Aircraft Z. Aircraft X, Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z all exited my airspace via LUNDY, the normal route, but were quickly vectored by the Blue Ridge Controller. I imagine this created extra workload for the Blue Ridge Controller and unnecessarily put all three aircraft in a proximity to weather conditions that were undesirable. There was a failure to provide the necessary service to all the flights impacted: Aircraft X, Aircraft Y, Aircraft Z, Aircraft A and Aircraft B. Despite low volume, a highly complex and dangerous situation was created, which was unnecessary and avoidable.

I believe there was a breakdown in the prompt communication of holding/rerouting/route-shutoff. Known weather was affecting the area for hours leading to this event. The potential for holding/rerouting/shutoff should have been anticipated. I recommend contacting the sector and/or area supervisor immediately with specific call signs of which aircraft will be accepted, and which will have to hold. The same goes for when a reroute is necessary, even if a route hasn't been established yet; at least give the controller/sector team as much time as possible to prepare. This notification will also aid the supervisor in adding staffing resources quicker.

Synopsis

ZOB Center Controller reported having to go into no notice holding and the problems that followed.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : DEN.Tower

State Reference : CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6800

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : DEN

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class B : DEN

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : DEN

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 129

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class B : DEN

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : DEN.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3.5

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466556

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X checked on the frequency for the left runway. I issued a landing clearance and issued parallel traffic which was Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y checked on and I received a low altitude alert. I was issuing the low altitude alert, calling traffic about Aircraft X and issuing control instructions as Aircraft Y started going through their final all simultaneously. As Aircraft Y was now directly under Aircraft X I knew it was safe as Aircraft X was more than a 1000 foot above Aircraft Y. Not knowing what Aircraft Y was going to do, I elected to send Aircraft X around and issued those instructions. Aircraft Y maneuvered as instructed for the correct runway. Aircraft X was vectored for another approach.

Adhere to Letter of Agreement to off load foreign carriers to a runway complex without conflicting traffic. A final controller should ensure that foreign carriers, unfamiliar pilots, or anyone in question comply with instructions for final approach course intercept before communications transfer when there is possible conflicting traffic.

Synopsis

DEN Tower Controller observed an aircraft overshoot the final approach course and had to issue parallel runway traffic go-around instructions.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZBW.ARTCC

State Reference : NH

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 24000

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZBW

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Embraer Phenom 300

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use.STAR : ZELKA

Airspace.Class A : ZBW

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZBW.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2.6

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466551

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Corporate

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Glider

Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial

Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor

Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine

Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 4400

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 130

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 300

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467260

Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 7700
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 60
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467247
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X checked on descending to and almost level at 24000 feet RNAV arrival. I told the pilot to descend via the arrival and the pilot read it back correctly. The aircraft leveled at 24000 feet. I then saw the aircraft descend below 24000 feet prior to the fix which has a published altitude of 24000 feet. I stopped their descent, but not before they violated the underlying sector's airspace. I told the pilot the published altitude at the fix and asked why they descended early. They said the computer did it. Once they were in my airspace I gave them a descent clearance.

Narrative: 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Narrative: 3

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis

ZBW Center Controller and flight crew reported the aircraft descended below a published crossing restriction.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ALO.TRACON

State Reference : IA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000

Environment

Weather Elements / Visibility : Rain

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ALO

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Direct

Airspace.Class E : ALO

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ALO.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466548

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Confusion

Human Factors : Troubleshooting

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Result.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working Arrival position and was also Controller in Charge (CIC). There were some areas of weather in my airspace as well as the surrounding areas. I had just taken the position when Aircraft X checked on frequency entering my airspace as an overflight at 7000 feet. Our facility does not have weather radar so I advised the pilot of possible area of precipitation at 11 o'clock, 10 miles extending 15 miles northeast, type and intensity unknown. He acknowledged and said he would look out for it. The previous sector called to advise that Aircraft X was deviating south of course for weather.

Approximately 10 minutes later I observed Aircraft X's altitude had dropped to 6500 feet very quickly. I asked him to say altitude. I received a garbled, unreadable response. I tried to contact him again and he responded with "I need help air traffic". His altitude was dropping rapidly during this time. I asked him how I could assist him but received no response. I told him that it appeared he was in a descent and asked if he was encountering weather. After no response again I transmitted to respond when able for assistance. His next transmission was to ask if air traffic was with him and I told him I was. He did not respond and was continuing to descend. I advised him that an airport was 20 miles southeast of his position if he needed to land. He still did not respond and at that point it appeared he would not recover from the spiral dive he seemed to be in.

Another airport was 2 miles northwest of his position. As I was broadcasting the location of this airport to him the low altitude alert went off so I added that into the transmission. I only stated "Low Altitude Alert, I'm showing you at one thousand niner hundred descending." The Minimum Vectoring Altitude where he was at is 3000 feet and the lowest I saw him at was 1800 feet. He climbed to around 2000 feet so I suggested a 180 heading to avoid the weather in case that was the issue. I attempted contact again with no response. He finally reestablished contact and said he wanted to come in and land. I asked if he could climb and what his heading was. He said yes and that he was heading 114. I told him to climb to 3000 feet and remain on current heading for the airport. I asked if he needed assistance when he landed and he said no. I gave him to expect a Visual Approach and gave him the winds, runway and altimeter. When he reported airport in sight I cleared him for a Visual Approach and switched him to the tower. He landed without incident and was asked to call the facility. I didn't speak to him but he advised the Supervisor that he got disoriented in the clouds and that his headset cord came unplugged during the descent.

I'm not sure there's anything that can be done by ATC to prevent this kind of situation. For pilots I would recommend avoiding flying if there is weather along your route of flight or deviate well away from it.

Synopsis

ALO TRACON Controller reported a temporary loss of contact with an aircraft which descended on its own to an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAU.ARTCC

State Reference : IL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 36000

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAU

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class A : ZAU

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAU

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Widebody, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Cargo / Freight

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class A : ZAU

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAU.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 22

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466542

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X refused a descent clearance. I had an aircraft flying south at 36000 ft and had Aircraft X flying southwest bound at 36000 ft. I tried to descend Aircraft X but he refused. There was no loss of separation or violation of airspace. Aircraft X checked on with the wrong sector and the controller didn't acknowledge him. I had the handoff. Aircraft Y was climbing to 36000 ft and the controller didn't see the limited data tag of Aircraft X at 36000 ft. They started flashing conflict alert and I called the sector to try him again. They tried Aircraft X and he was there so he gave me two physical point outs (since they were both in my airspace), and tried to correct the situation because he was talking to both aircraft. He tried to descend Aircraft X 2 times and Aircraft X said he didn't want to go down because of weather. He turned Aircraft Y 30 degrees right and turned Aircraft X to a 140 heading and I told him to ship me both aircraft.

I had multiple aircraft flying along the same route as Aircraft X with no weather problems or deviations. I told Aircraft X he had to descend because (Aircraft Y) was catching him. He told me Aircraft Y could take a turn. I didn't have time to argue with him, he was becoming a distraction. Plus, if I turned Aircraft Y it would've taken a 180 turn to the left to miss him. I told him there was traffic in front of him at 34000 ft already along his route of flight. There were no weather deviations in the Aircraft X's area. There were no blow off shelves of weather. The extreme stuff was west/northwest 100 miles away, plus there was other aircraft flying along just fine at 34000 ft where Aircraft X was going to fly.

It took 3 clearances to descend Aircraft X. He said he wanted to go back up when able and I told him I would get him back up. Aircraft X became a distraction. I had two other aircraft eventually coming together and I missed it because of Aircraft X. Luckily one of them asked to climb to 39000 ft and then I saw the potential confliction. I had to coordinate to take that aircraft to 39000 ft because he was a MDW lander. There was also traffic southbound at 36000 ft. If Aircraft X would've descended the first time I would've had more time to assess the situation and taken the MDW arrival down.

I also didn't ship an aircraft until he was well into another sector's airspace because of Aircraft X. I left an arrival up because I was distracted by Aircraft X. What if I was really busy? This was light midshift traffic and I missed 3 things because of Aircraft X. I would've really missed way more things with busier traffic. That's unacceptable. So because of all these things I mentioned and having Aircraft X refuse 5 descent clearances from ATC I read him the pilot deviation phraseology. I wanted him to call and explain why he didn't descend 5 different times. I don't know what he said but weather shouldn't have been an excuse when there were multiple planes flying in this airspace. I think he was messing

with me because he made me read the phone number 3 times. I listened and watched the Falcon and I annunciated and spoke in a clear slow voice. This also was a distraction because another sector was trying to coordinate with me but I was busy with the dang Aircraft X. I called the traffic at 36000 ft when he passed right under Aircraft Y. The target's just about merged. When he was clear I climbed him back to 36000 ft.

I recommend Aircraft X pilot or pilots get some kind of reprimand. They have to be talked to. 5 different descent clearance and 5 refusals. He distracted me from other traffic. He was unprofessional. I've had planes in the past not want to descend with real weather right by them and I accommodated them but not like this. Look at the weather on the Falcon replay. Look at the planes flying where this guy was flying.

In all most 26 years of working air traffic I have never had this happen. It is unacceptable for a pilot to keep questioning clearances with known traffic at the same altitude. We can't have other pilots start doing this. This would become a breakdown in air traffic. These two planes came close together, they were even flashing. We're here to prevent a collision not to get grief from a pilot because he doesn't want to descend 2000 ft.

Synopsis

ZAU Center Controller reported a flight crew refused their descent clearance five times before complying causing the Controller to lose track of other situations developing in their sector.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : HIO.Tower

State Reference : OR

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1600

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : HIO

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class D : HIO

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.CTAF : 7S3

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : None

Mission : Personal

Nav In Use : GPS

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class D : HIO

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : HIO.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 10

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466538

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : Y
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 1200
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 45
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 445
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1467150
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working Local 1. There were two GA aircraft on final for Runway 31L that were cleared to land. I had one GA aircraft extended on right downwind to follow the two aircraft on final, but then I received an inbound point-out from P80, the overlying TRACON, on Aircraft X from the southeast. I asked P80 to slow Aircraft X and direct him to fly over the fix INTLL. I told the GA aircraft extended in the right downwind that I was unable to accommodate his full stop on Runway 31L because of the faster Aircraft X traffic. I instructed the GA aircraft to extend right downwind and contact the Local 2 controller on 132.8 for a full stop landing on Runway 31R. Aircraft X checked on frequency and I cleared him to land number two behind the GA aircraft on short final. Additionally, I told Aircraft X that there would be traffic ahead and to his right on extended final for the north parallel. When Aircraft X was on about a five mile final, I observed an aircraft on what appeared to be a right base about four miles from the airport. I told Aircraft X to stop his descent and that it appeared that the aircraft for the north runway was overshooting final underneath Aircraft X at 1000 MSL. At that point Aircraft X indicated 1600 MSL. Aircraft X said that he saw the aircraft and was responding to a TCAS RA, but it didn't look like one of the high wing GA aircraft. Local 2 immediately advised that that was not his aircraft, and we determined that the southwest-bound aircraft was an airspace violator. I passed this information along to Aircraft X and asked if he would like to continue the approach. Aircraft X said he could, and I cleared him to land again on Runway 31L. I did not observe

Aircraft X take any evasive maneuver to avoid the aircraft. I had both aircraft in sight the entire time, and Aircraft X appeared to cross over the violator between 400-600 feet. After Aircraft X landed the pilot called the tower and advised that the violator in question, Aircraft Y, landed at 7S3 shortly after. The pilot of Aircraft X also advised that they were reporting this incident as a near mid-air collision.

On the FALCON replay, Aircraft Y could be seen violating the airspace from the northeast and then exiting the Delta airspace and skirt the edge of the airspace south bound. Aircraft Y re-entered the airspace from the southeast and made a turn southwest bound. This put him directly under final at about 1000 MSL. Had I noticed this violator earlier, I could have prepped Aircraft X sooner. But I am confident that my timely actions to stop Aircraft X's descent prevented this from becoming a collision.

Narrative: 2

After departing [north of SPB] to 7S3 and just setting cruise after climb out I realized that I was very close to HIO Class D. I immediately turned east toward PDX and flew between their airspace until clear to the south of HIO. I then continued on to 7S3 and landed there for fuel. After fueling I was told that I had entered the Class D airspace and that I would be hearing from ATC. I was not given a number to call, but was told that since I had installed ADSB they already had my information. I believe that a contributing factor was that in approaching from the north the Class D line is missing or obscured due to all of the printing. As soon as I realized how close I was I watched for other aircraft and diverted to an area I knew to be outside. Another factor was my inexperience with the area and the short duration of the flight. Had I prepared more I might have had their frequency dialed in but I had just set the radio to 7S3 frequency and changing to HIO freq. would have required more time than simply exiting.

Synopsis

HIO Tower Controller and pilot reported of a Class Delta airspace violation and a NMAC.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZLC.ARTCC

State Reference : UT

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZLC

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : Direct

Airspace.Class E : ZLC

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Airspace.Class E : ZLC

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZLC.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 7.8

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466533

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC

Detector.Person : Flight Crew

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X called on ground at RIW looking for an IFR clearance to ZZZ. Advised aircraft that there was no flight plan on file but would file it for him. Aircraft X gave the flight info, requested routing, requested altitude, etc. I then issued Aircraft X an IFR clearance. In the area of RIW there is poor to no radar coverage below 12000 ft MSL. Aircraft X checked on after departure climbing to 16000 ft. Because Aircraft X was ADSB equipped I was able to radar identify the aircraft out of 7000 and went on with other duties. A couple minutes later, the pilot of Aircraft X broadcast that he had just had a near miss with another aircraft about 500 ft from him. There were no other targets in the area due to the lack of radar coverage so there was no way to call any traffic to him. Aircraft X happened to be on my scope because he has ADSB onboard.

Synopsis

ZLC Center Controller reported that an aircraft reported a NMAC with another aircraft in an area of poor radar coverage.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : HCF.TRACON

State Reference : HI

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4800

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Weather Elements / Visibility : Cloudy

Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10

Light : Daylight

Ceiling.Single Value : 4800

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : HCF

Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Airspace.Class E : HCF

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.CTAF : JHM

Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Plan : VFR

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class E : HCF

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : HCF.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2.75

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466524

Human Factors : Time Pressure

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was on the instrument approach into JHM. The Aircraft before him reported BKN048 10 NW of the airport. Aircraft X was 15 NW of JHM descending when a VFR aircraft on a 1200 squawk departed JHM head on. I issued traffic advisories to Aircraft X but had no idea who the other aircraft was. Traffic advisories became traffic alerts 5 miles between the two aircraft at 4800 (same ALT). Then at two miles at 4800 the Captain says "I'm going right". A right turn would have put the Aircraft X even closer and the targets would have merged. I told the Aircraft X to make a left 360 before proceeding back on course, they were below the MVA at the time but over water. I noticed Aircraft X had climbed to 5000 and asked if they had an RA. The pilot replied in the affirmative and I reported it to my Supervisor. Later we found out the other aircraft was Aircraft Y when they requested flight following from the adjacent sector.

Recommendations:

1. Request flight following in and out of JHM.
2. JHM issues a VFR code on the ground and has them contact HCF on departure.
3. Development of a VFR procedure where aircraft remain clear of the final approach course.

Synopsis

HCF Controller reported an airborne conflict between an IFR departure and a VFR aircraft.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZDV.ARTCC

State Reference : CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

Environment

Weather Elements / Visibility : Thunderstorm

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZDV

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class A : ZDV

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZDV

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Widebody, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class A : ZDV

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZDV.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466519

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Distraction

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Facility : ZDV.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466523
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Two aircraft entering hold at same altitude. Both R-side and D-side missed it. Sector was incredibly busy because Denver had just got shut off due to weather, Area 4 arrivals had been rerouted to 28, on top of normal arrivals, one route, then shut off. No relief was given to sector 28 until the traffic levels got too high with all the holding. Multiple enroute aircraft pointed towards holding pattern, as the D-side I was busy taking hand offs and making sure no enroutes were pointed at the holding stack, as well as trying to move data blocks to see the aircraft. After event, a tracker was added to the position.

Have TMU, or Supervisors, help more on spreading out the traffic and/or arrivals so it doesn't all congregate in one location. Later in that same day, Sector 30 had over 40 aircraft in their sector. It was a recurring issue all day.

Narrative: 2

I was working sectors 28 and 39 when D01 stopped accepting arrivals due to weather, so all sectors working DEN bound aircraft began holding. As traffic volume built, the D-side and I agreed that we could only handle a few more DEN landers in our holding pattern and we informed the supervisor. However, the adjacent sector was also extremely busy and we took at least three additional DEN landers to try to reduce congestion at sector 30.

At the same time, overflight traffic volume increased and the D-side and I had to issue numerous control instructions to vector overflights away from the holding stack. At the time of the loss, we had control of 21 data blocks and I believe all 21 were on frequency. Eight were in the holding pattern involved, with two others entering another holding

pattern. Neither the D-side nor I noticed the conflict until conflict alert activated due to numerous overlapping data blocks. I issued a descent to Aircraft Y and a 90-degree turn to Aircraft X, but at least one and I believe both of my first attempts at the clearances were blocked due to frequency congestion. Since I had to descend Aircraft Y to an altitude already in use by a third aircraft in the holding pattern, I issued several more clearances to various aircraft to ensure vertical separation in the stack and did not have time to issue traffic or a safety alert before I observed Aircraft X turning behind Aircraft Y. At the time, I was not sure if separation was maintained, but upon reviewing the Falcon, there were two hits with less than standard separation: 4.8 nm and 700 feet, and 3.8 nm and 900 feet.

The volume was just too high to work that many overflights while trying to separate a holding stack. We tried to limit the hand offs we accepted but didn't have much choice since the adjacent sector was too busy to work them as well. We probably should have de-combined sectors 28 and 39 when holding began but I'm not sure if we had enough staffing. We should have stopped accepting DEN landers from adjacent centers as well, but I'm not sure if that was attempted.

Synopsis

ZDV Center controllers reported a loss of separation during high traffic when two aircraft were in holding at the same altitude.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : BOI.Tower

State Reference : ID

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : BOI

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : VFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class C : BOI

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : BOI

Make Model Name : Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Recip Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Taxi

Route In Use : None

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : BOI.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Function.Air Traffic Control : Trainee

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466518

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Distraction

Human Factors : Workload

Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Very busy training session on local control, runways 28R/28L in use. My trainer and I took the local position with traffic already building from being moderate to heavy traffic. When I took the position there were 4 IFR departures ready to depart Runway 28R, Aircraft Y, first in line followed by 3 commercial airliners. An RJ was departing Runway 28R as well with a jet on a 15-20 mile final for 28R, also with a Cessna 172, approaching base cleared for the option on Runway 28R behind the departing RJ with visual separation. A Cessna 180 was told by the previous controller to make 360's north of the airport for spacing and he was also requesting touch n goes, another Cessna 182 inbound from the south as well for Runway 28L. Aircraft X checked in 15 miles to the north for a full stop Runway 28R. When he checked in, I told Aircraft X Runway 28R continue and he came back with a request for a long landing and short approach in which I responded with I have your request. The Cessna 180 who was holding north of the airport, I told him to enter the downwind and change to runway 28L and I'd call his base turn. The C172 was still on departure roll down field for 28R. I then switched the C172 to change runways and enter left closed traffic for runway 28L and also told him to extend downwind for 28L. The C180 who was on the left downwind for 28L was then told to turn base and told about the jet he was inside of for Runway 28R.

A helicopter called and requested to depart the SW corner of the airport SE bound. I gave him his instructions to depart while calling the traffic for the C172 who was crosswind to downwind for 28L now and calling traffic to the helicopter as well. Aircraft X was now told to extend downwind for 28R still inbound from the north. The C180 who was supposed to be on base for 28L did not comply with his instructions to turn base and became a conflict with the jet on 10 mile final now. This became a major distraction because the C180 was not responding and I was also calling traffic to the jet now and trying to keep the C180 off the final in front of the jet. After finally getting a response from the C180, I elected to turn him northbound and then after the jet was no factor and put the C180 on a vector heading 180 to get him south of the final now. Once the jet landed on 28R, I put Aircraft Y into LUAW status on Runway 28R and told him about Aircraft X who was now entering the downwind with an extend downwind instruction. I also had the helicopter now a factor with

the C180 who was now on course westbound after he elected to depart the area and this caused a traffic call to both aircraft along with a helicopter who had called up inbound from the south for BOI airport. I then went immediately back to Aircraft X and told him to start a right hand turn, a right base for Runway 28L now, Runway 28L cleared to land because of the stack up of departures on 28R and the C172 was out of his way. I also had a C182 inbound now from the south and another C206 from the north who had checked in and I told him to make 360's over downtown Boise because of the amount of aircraft now that I was dealing with.

I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff, scanning my runways and everything was clear. I then made another couple transmissions for other aircraft and looked up at 28R and 28L finals and back to the runways and as soon as I did that I saw Aircraft X overflying Runway 28R with Aircraft Y still sitting on the runway and Aircraft Y then keyed up and said that he just had an aircraft fly over the top of them. I immediately went back to Aircraft X and told him he was supposed to be on Runway 28L and told him to turn right and enter right closed traffic runway 28R. He turned northbound and entered the downwind for Runway 28R while apologizing. I went back to Aircraft Y and I think he asked if he was still cleared for takeoff and I recleared him for takeoff on Runway 28R without any incident. I then went back to controlling my traffic and gave Aircraft X a landing clearance for runway 28R and let him land before departing anyone else. He landed and taxied in without incident and once again apologized. I then continued on with training.

The level complexity, heavy traffic and the amount of things that were going on, made this session very, very difficult. I felt like I was keeping up with the traffic and my trainer and I were on the same page. I think the biggest thing that I could've done differently was making sure that I focused better on read back/hear backs and also using the term 'change to runway' when I changed Aircraft X to the other runway. I also should of emphasized the change to runway with a "for multiple departures off of 28R" and that would've clued him in on not landing on 28R. With multiple things taking my focus away from the runways and having to give multiple traffic calls to pilots, especially the C180 who was not responding and causing extra work for me, I just got overly task saturated.

Synopsis

BOI Tower Developmental Controller reported an extremely busy and complicated session led to an aircraft overflying another aircraft holding for departure on the runway.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZLC.ARTCC

State Reference : UT

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 16500

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZLC

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Small Transport

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class E : ZLC

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZLC.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 5

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466236

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Confusion

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Analyst Callback : Attempted

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

There is a Large Force Exercise (LFE). The stationary ALTRV (Altitude Reservation) is set for 14,000 to 17,900. The NOTAM for this ALTRV was filed for XB:00 to XF:00. The paperwork and agreement for the LFE was to activate the ALTRV at XB:30. Cowboy called the area on the phone and requested the airspace (including the ALTRV) 45 minutes early. XA:45. I informed the supervisor (who I believe was not in charge of the area at the time, but was in the area not on sector) that the airspace was not NOTAM'd below FL180 and that we could not release it. She scoffed at me and continued to allow the coordination to continue. The airspace was released to Cowboy Control at XA:45. I took the sector soon after my concerns for the rules and the safety of the flying public were disregarded.

Aircraft X called for VFR flight following soon after I took the sector. My trainee informed the aircraft that his route of flight wasn't going to be allowed because of the ALTRV. The pilot questioned us and asked for the NOTAM number. The embarrassing thing is that had our facility complied with the very clear times printed on the NOTAM available to us, as Federal Regulation requires, the aircraft would have been clear of the ALTRV before activation.

Additionally, the jurisdiction of the airspace released in the ALTRV (again, 14,000 to 17,900) didn't belong to ZLC. Mountain Home RAPCON had been given the airspace underlying that ALTRV 16,000 and below. It became evident to us on the sector that Mountain Home RAPCON had not been notified of the release of airspace to a Military Radar Unit when they called to request additional airspace (FL230 and below). This whole fiasco had no business in the NAS.

It has become clear to me that if the military asks for airspace, I must allow them to use it regardless of NOTAM status, airspace jurisdiction, or safety to the flying public. When I confronted the supervisor about the discrepancy in ZLC's actions and federal regulation, the response I received made it clear that I was in the wrong. I will now train any incoming controllers that releasing airspace to the military is of utmost importance. I will also urge and explain to my coworkers that this is how it works. We are not to follow federal regulations if it at all imposes an inconvenience or delay to a military entity.

Synopsis

ZLC Center Controller reported that an altitude reservation was started earlier than planned which caused an aircraft to have to alter its route.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : Y90.TRACON

State Reference : CT

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3500

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : BAF

Aircraft Operator : Military

Make Model Name : Military

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Tactical

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Route In Use : Vectors

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : Y90

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Flight Plan : VFR

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Vectors

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : Y90.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 7

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1466234

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

BAF Tower requested release for Aircraft X off Runway 20, my trainee issued a heading 240 degrees and released off runway 20. The pilots called airborne and were issued a climb to 10,000 feet prior to radar identification by the trainee. I observed the primary targets off the wrong direction, apparently departing Opposite Direction Operation (ODO) Runway 2. I overrode my trainee and issued a traffic alert to Aircraft X reference Aircraft Y who was VFR East of the field on vectors to CEF. Aircraft X reported the traffic in sight and that he was clear of them. I verified the number in flight as I was not near the flight progress strip and seeing the second aircraft in flight I issued a traffic alert to [the other aircraft in the flight] as well. The Aircraft X flight continued on without issue.

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported that aircraft were supposed to depart in one direction, but ended up departing in the opposite direction.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SCT.TRACON

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

Aircraft

Reference : X

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use : Vectors

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : SCT.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 4

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465955

Human Factors : Time Pressure

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Training in progress. Aircraft was on arrival into SNA at 080. We issued a descend clearance to 060 and speed of 190kts. Aircraft read back "60 to a 190". Aircraft then turned to a 190 heading directly into an MVA of 079 descending out of 080. The proximity of the boundary line to the arrival was less than 1 mile, given us not time to fix the situation until it was too late. We observed the turn and issued a stop descend, low altitude alert, and climb back to 080 immediately. Be more vigilant in verifying the correct read back when doubt occurs because of the proximity of the higher MVA.

Synopsis

SoCal TRACON Controller reported a bad read back from a pilot which caused an instantaneous airspace violation.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : PRC.Tower

State Reference : AZ

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Dawn

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.CTAF : PRC

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Route In Use : None

Airspace.Class E : PRC

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : PRC.Tower

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Other / Unknown

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 6

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465646

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical

Detector.Person : Flight Crew

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

The tower had not yet opened, but I observed a fuel truck crossing the active Runway 21L at Taxiway D3. There was a GA aircraft on departure roll, abeam Taxiway D5. After the GA

aircraft got airborne, the pilot said, "Fuel truck, you need to look before you get on a runway, I was departing." The worst part is, the vehicle should never have been there, as there are loop roads to avoid the runways available to the driver.

I did not say anything, as we were not yet legally open. Reeducate the driver, or fire him.

Synopsis

PRC Tower Controller reported a fuel truck crossed the runway as an aircraft was departing before the Tower opened.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : HNL.Airport

State Reference : HI

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12500

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : HCF

Aircraft Operator : Military

Make Model Name : Military

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : VFR

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class E : HCF

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : HCF

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A321

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Descent

Airspace.Class E : HCF

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : HCF.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Handoff / Assist

Function.Air Traffic Control : Trainee

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465640

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : HCF.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465652
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working the D4 when D3 called me for a point-out for Aircraft X heading westbound along the sector 3/4 boundary. I approved the point-out because his route appeared to not be a factor for my traffic at that time. Once Aircraft X approached the boundary between sectors 3/4 and HCF approach, Aircraft X took an unexpected sharp left turn southbound straight towards Aircraft Y and our string of inbounds into HNL as well as being in the middle of the departure corridor. We reached out and had Aircraft X turned out. We also turned Aircraft Y left to the southwest to avoid Aircraft X. After that Aircraft X went NORDO. After some time, Aircraft X came up on our (sector 4) frequency and wanted to descend and cancel flight following in the vicinity of JULLE right in the way of both the departure and arrival corridors to land on the ship that was apparently in that area. The R-side tried vectoring Aircraft X southeast out of the way of the traffic but Aircraft X left frequency again.

My biggest recommendation to resolve this conflict from happening again is to not have the aircraft carrier stationed in the middle of our corridors.

Narrative: 2

There were 3 flights of [military aircraft] flying around VFR at all different altitudes, they were flying around MKK climbing and descending getting in the way of all the IFR traffic inbound and outbound of HNL. I was working Aircraft X, VFR east bound at FL215 which was no problem, then he wanted to RTB back to the ship which was parked just south of CKH VORTAC which is in HNL approach airspace and in the outbound corridor. He was flying westbound at 125 and wanted to descend low and terminate, so I did that. Then he came up again on the east side of MKK island heading westbound at 12,500 I told him to start his descent for the ship and said he wanted to stay at that altitude, so I called

approach and they said to put him over the JULLE arrival which is the other sectors airspace. He just didn't want to cooperate with anybody and I think the problem is that the ship is parked right in the middle of all the departures and arrivals, and they wanted to play around during the rush going 400 knot east and west.

I feel someone should have coordinated them parking the ship somewhere else.

Synopsis

HCF TRACON Controllers reported a problem with three military aircraft that were not following instructions and wanting to return to their ship which was right in the middle of the departure arrival corridor.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : A11.TRACON

State Reference : AK

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : A11

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : A11

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : A11

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Aircraft : 3

Reference : Z

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : A11

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use.STAR : NEELL5

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : A11.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Function.Air Traffic Control : Handoff / Assist
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465288
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

It was a busy training session. I was training on south radar and south hand off combined. We had an unusual flight schedule due to fly-bys to Runway 7R. I was instructed to vector all of our traffic to Runway 7L, except for the Runway 7R aircraft. After the fly-by was completed, tower still didn't want any aircraft to go to Runway 7R. Aircraft X entered our airspace direct to ANC VOR at 050. I told Aircraft X to expect Runway 7L. When he reached an appropriate place to turn upwind, I gave Aircraft X a 070 heading to parallel Aircraft Y that was on downwind. I started getting busy, intending to turn Aircraft X to a 340 heading to the downwind about 5 miles in trail of Aircraft Y I had Aircraft Z that was on the NEELL5 arrival that was in conflict with Aircraft Y so I was watching that and listening to final radar to see if he had turned Aircraft Y to base. I then shipped Aircraft Z to final and continued my scan. I saw Aircraft X about 1 mile from the 6,000 feet MVA. I immediately turned Aircraft X left to a 350 heading and pulled up my EOVM [emergency obstruction video map]. Aircraft X was over the water and not near any terrain. I saw Aircraft X continue straight after acknowledging the heading so I verified that the aircraft had the terrain in sight. He answered affirmatively and was instructed to maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance. He was in the 6,000 feet MVA for a total of about 4 flying miles and remained over the water the entire time. During my debrief, my On the Job Training Instructor said that I had caught the aircraft in time and corrected it before it was a factor. I was notified by a supervisor, that the region was made aware of it and called the front office. The front office watched and listened to the entire thing and made a determination that separation from terrain was lost.

I recommend that the MVA's change around the ANC area. There are MVA's over the water (sea level) that are 060-080 feet which is ridiculous. I know the terrain makes it difficult to establish consistent MVA's but our airspace is cramped and too small as it is, now we are not utilizing it in a way to help move airplanes.

Synopsis

A11 TRACON Controller reported vectoring an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAU.ARTCC

State Reference : IL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 14500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAU

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 119

Flight Plan : VFR

Mission : Skydiving

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use : VFR Route

Airspace.Class E : ZAU

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAU.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465287

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

Lately this has become an issue. We have been "blocking" parachute jump airspace over two airports. A few months ago, TRACON started to insist that each and every time a jump aircraft climbed into our airspace, they needed to point him out. These aircraft are VFR and there is no phraseology for a VFR point out. I always just say "ok" or "I see him" or "approved". This parachute jump activity is under a north departure track so there is frequently vectors to IFR aircraft required to keep these aircraft away.

Conversely, we "block" parachute jump airspace on a daily basis with a different TRACON in two places. The duality of this situation bothers me. Someone is right and someone is wrong, so which is it? Can we put a code into the computer, and write an altitude over an airport and block for parachute jump operations or can we NOT, in which case every time they call with a pointout on an aircraft which we have no data block for, we are required to start a radar track, or put a strip in the bay. Whichever way we decide, it should be the same for both TRACONS.

The TRACON which insists that every single Parajump aircraft be pointed out, ran two Parajump aircraft through my airspace. Both aircraft went to 14,500 feet well inside my airspace, without coordination, through a busy departure track.

Synopsis

ZAU Center Controller reported parachute jump aircraft routinely enter their airspace without any coordination from the TRACON.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : NCT.TRACON

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : NCT

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class D : HWD

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : NCT

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class D : HWD

Aircraft : 3

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Tower : HWD

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Climb

Airspace.Class D : HWD

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : NCT.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465276
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was on a visual approach to OAK RWY 30 with Aircraft Y following on the visual approach. A VFR 1200 code aircraft departed HWD southeast bound and was climbing. I issued traffic to Aircraft X on the 1200 code as it appeared to climb out of 1100 feet. The 1200 code aircraft climbed to 1400 feet. Aircraft X passed over the aircraft at 2500 feet on a seven mile final. I then switched Aircraft X to OAK Tower. He eventually went around. I issued traffic to Aircraft Y on the 1200 code aircraft. When Aircraft Y did not have the aircraft in sight I instructed him to stop his descent as the aircraft passed underneath. Once Aircraft Y passed I cleared him for the visual.

The 1200 code aircraft was on a path directly underneath the OAK RWY 30 final and opposite direction. The aircraft was inside HWD delta airspace the entire time. This leads me to believe that the aircraft is in communication with the tower at this point. Our LOA with HWD Tower states that OAK RWY 30 aircraft may penetrate the class delta airspace without coordination provided they are within 1.5 nm of the centerline. We have been told by controllers and FLMS at HWD Tower that they are under direct order not to issue turns to aircraft. If this is the case it contradicts the 7110.65 and has caused numerous cases like this and is causing unsafe situations that will ultimately lead to a midair collision.

Management and [union reps] from both facilities need to get together and collaborate on a way to mitigate this unsafe practice.

Synopsis

NCT TRACON Controller reported a VFR aircraft in HWD airspace flew under the OAK Runway 30 final approach course causing two conflicts with OAK arrivals. The final approach course goes through HWD Delta airspace.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : BHM.TRACON

State Reference : AL

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.CTAF : 20A

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : BHM

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Final Approach

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class E : BHM

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : BHM.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1.75

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465272

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

When Detected : In-flight

Result.General : Police / Security Involved

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X called on the ground at ZZZ for IFR clearance to 20A. I cleared and released Aircraft X to 20A with instructions to enter controlled air space heading and climb to 4000 MSL. He called me airborne and I radar identified him. He requested the RNAV 23 to 20A. I cleared him for the approach. Passing the IAF, I told him to report cancellation of IFR and to change to advisory frequency. He changed to advisory frequency. Approximately one mile from 20A, Aircraft X reported IFR cancellation. I did check the NOTAMS page on the NIDS (National Information Display System) before assuming SR (Radar position), but I unintentionally overlooked 20A because it is used very seldom.

I did not check the NIDS to see the NOTAMs for 20A at the time of event due to the volume and complexity of active traffic. I was also in the process of splitting sectors with another controller to reduce the workload. The traffic became complex quickly and unexpectedly. It wasn't until I was relieved that I was told runway 5/23 at 20A was NOTAM closed this morning. The CIC called the local sheriff to check on the status of Aircraft X. The sheriff reported he had to go around due to vehicles on the runway and circled to a safe landing after vehicles were clear.

NOTAMS for runway closures and other significant outages are verbally disseminated to the controlling facilities at least 24 hours prior. This NOTAM was passed to BHM around XA:00 on the day of the NOTAM becoming active. The NOTAM began at XB:00.

Synopsis

BHM TRACON Controller reported he cleared an aircraft for an approach to Robins Field (20A). The Controller did not check the NOTAMs for the airport and the runway was closed.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZSE.ARTCC

State Reference : WA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12500

Environment

Light : Dusk

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZSE

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Dash 8-400

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : ZSE

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZSE.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Other / Unknown

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465270

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : ZSE.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1465274

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Distraction

Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC

Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Terrain Warning
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

There were aircraft sequenced near Glacier Peak and the R-side told the front one, the one that descended below the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude), to fly a heading and descend and maintain 13000 ft. The read back was covered by our paired freq and the R-side said something along the lines of "read back blocked, try again". I don't recall what the pilot read back but he must have missed the altitude because he made the turn and descended below the Glacier Peak MIA. The R-side immediately issued a low altitude alert once we saw the MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) flashing and the aircraft climbed to 13000 ft.

I should have suggested to split the sector earlier because we had a few instances of the paired frequencies stepping on each other.

Narrative: 2

I was training on 01/31 combined during a period of metering. The overall complexity wasn't particularly challenging, but the frequency congestion was very, very high. I was metering several aircraft on the GLASR Arrival, with a pair of aircraft at the back of the sequence. In the midst of a huge amount of frequency congestion, several aircraft were keying up at once on different transmitters (up to four airplanes talking at once in different parts of the sector and not hearing each other). I had Aircraft X turned to a 250 heading in the vicinity of Glacier Peak (Minimum IFR Altitude is 126). I instructed the pilot to descend to 130 and heard him read back 130. I then moved on to other things. Moments later, the MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) alert activated, showing the aircraft below the MIA. I issued a safety alert to pilot and he climbed back up to 13000 ft.

If I had asked for the sectors to be split, that would've probably prevented the issue from happening because the frequency congestion would've been reduced.

Synopsis

Seattle Center Controllers reported an aircraft descended below the cleared altitude as well as the Minimum IFR Altitude.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZLA.ARTCC

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZLA

Make Model Name : A320

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use.STAR : SCBBY1

Airspace.Class E : ZLA

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZLA.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1464576

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was an aircraft landing ONT. He was vectored north away from the usual initial fix on the STAR for the SCBBY1 to separate him for other traffic underneath him so he may descend. I APREQd him direct SCBBY for SCBBY1 arrival with Springs sector (combined) and it was approved. Normally from the initial fix, the aircraft descends via

with no bottom altitude. I expected this to be ok and didn't coordinate an altitude and was not told to maintain anything specific. I descended him via the arrival and initiated a handful. A few minutes later the sectors were combined for midnight configuration. The relieving controller forgot that Aircraft X was still on the ZLA frequency and removed it from her scope. The aircraft continued to descend via below the MIAs and Springs called and told her to stop his descent which she did. The aircraft was then switched to the appropriate frequency

An altitude should have been coordinated by either myself or Springs sector to ensure this doesn't happen again.

Synopsis

ZLA Center Controller reported that an aircraft was forgotten during a shift configuration changed and dropped by accident.

Time / Day

Date : 201707

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAN.ARTCC

State Reference : AK

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11500

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAN

Make Model Name : Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : VFR

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class E : ZAN

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAN

Make Model Name : Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase : Cruise

Airspace.Class E : ZAN

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAN.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Developmental

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1464572

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : VFR In IMC

Detector.Person : Flight Crew

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

I was training on the R-Side on Sectors 04-15-16, and FAI Approach called my D-side concerning a VFR aircraft, Aircraft Y, having trouble maintaining VFR. The aircraft was at 15,500 feet headed northeast bound from FAI. We immediately started researching weather through the Flight Data Printer (FDP), weather cameras, and gathering PIREPs from other aircraft. We decided that the airports west of FAI were the best options and sent him in that direction. One of my biggest concerns for this pilot was hypoxia. He didn't have oxygen on board the aircraft.

Shortly thereafter Aircraft X called from the same area at 11,500 feet having the same issue only he was in IMC, and was unable to climb higher. We sent him in the same direction and he started picking up icing. He then began having trouble maintaining altitude, but he was well above the terrain. For this reason we [gave priority handling to] the aircraft.

We continued gathering PIREPs and working them far enough east that they were able to find clear air. Both aircraft were eventually handed off to FAI approach and they were able to land safely.

Synopsis

ZAN Center Controller reported two aircraft that were VFR needed help due to weather and icing, both aircraft were helped and landed safely.