ASRS Database Report Set

Controller Reports

Report Set Description.....A sampling of reports from Air Traffic Controllers.

Update Number.....36

Date of Update.....September 10, 2024

Number of Records in Report Set.....50

Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000

TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating these data of the following points.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. Such incidents are independently submitted and are not corroborated by NASA, the FAA or NTSB. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be clarified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

B Hooey

Becky L. Hooey, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to report. Thus, the data can reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more aware of the ASRS program and more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.

One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concerning specific event types represents the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS data is the **qualitative information** contained in **report narratives**. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 2105330 *(1 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZAB Controller reported the complexity and workload levels at sectors were unsafe due to scheduled GPS jamming causing navigational errors and frequency congestion.

ACN: 2105322 *(2 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported they could not provide adequate assistance to a small aircraft requesting priority handling due to workload of working combined sectors because of chronic lack of staffing issues at their facility.

ACN: 2103770 *(3 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported Tower allowed aircraft to depart opposite direction into arrival traffic due to confusion during a runway configuration change.

ACN: 2103769 *(4 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZAU Controller reported IND Tower and SBN TRACON use the same UHF Frequency of 257.8 which caused confusion when the controller attempted to issue frequency change.

ACN: 2103382 *(5 of 50)*

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported using wrong call sign when issuing descent instructions resulted in confusion on readbacks and a CFTT event.

ACN: 2103375 *(6 of 50)*

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported failure to hear readback altitude error, resulted in descent below MVA and a CFTT event.

ACN: 2103374 *(7 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZAB Controllers reported White Sands Missile Range GPS jamming exercises severely affected sector workload and complexity of ELP westbound departures. Controllers also reported the decision was made to stop the exercises due to degradation of safety of flight.

ACN: 2102100 *(8 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller and corporate jet pilot reported the controller issued a Low Altitude Alert due to the pilot descending to 2000 feet when they were assigned 3000 feet.

ACN: 2100867 *(9 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Tower Local Controller reported they cleared an aircraft onto the runway with another aircraft on short final.

ACN: 2100496 *(10 of 50)*

Synopsis

Center Controller reported the OM was refusing to comply with policy in stopping GPS jamming despite the workload and aircraft navigational difficulties it was causing.

ACN: 2100054 *(11 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported they did not correct a pilot readback of the wrong frequency resulting in loss of contact with the aircraft as it flew below the Minimum IFR Altitude.

ACN: 2100051 *(12 of 50)*

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude. The Controller issued a low altitude alert and a traffic alert.

ACN: 2100050 *(13 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported the Operations Manager would not comply with the Area's Supervisor request to terminate planned GPS jamming contrary to the facility SOP's regarding GPS jamming.

ACN: 2099557 *(14 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported an aircraft on an ILS approach encountered severe turbulence and descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 2098635 *(15 of 50)*

Synopsis

Tower Controller reported being later notified of aircraft that had a landing incident also had a possible touchdown prior to landing runway.

ACN: 2098625 *(16 of 50)*

Synopsis

Controller reported failure to climb traffic above subsequent higher MVA resulting in a CFTT event.

ACN: 2097564 *(17 of 50)*

Synopsis

Tower Controller trainee and their instructor reported an aircraft on upwind in the pattern reported a NMAC with another aircraft.

ACN: 2096127 *(18 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported conflicting information with NOTAM, procedures, and personnel resulted in unknown runway safety status.

ACN: 2095755 *(19 of 50)*

Synopsis

MRY Tower Local Controller reported TRACON handed off two aircraft with a large overtake that required immediate action to resolve. The reporter stated TRACON routinely hands off aircraft to them that are in confliction.

ACN: 2095449 *(20 of 50)*

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported vectoring an aircraft below the MVA towards a lower MVA and away from conflicting traffic. When clear of traffic ATC climbed the aircraft without further incident.

ACN: 2095039 *(21 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Ground Control trainee and their Instructor reported a taxiing aircraft had to stop suddenly to avoid another aircraft taxiing through an intersection.

ACN: 2093647 *(22 of 50)*

Synopsis

D01 Controller reported aircraft acknowledged traffic in sight then returned on frequency to report a NMAC.

ACN: 2093299 *(23 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported they issued a clearance to an aircraft that caused it to fly below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 2092994 *(24 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported they vectored a departing aircraft below the Minimum IFR Altitude.

ACN: 2092033 *(25 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZBW Controller reported limited radio capability to issue a climb clearance resulted in an aircraft entering a higher MVA and a CFTT event.

ACN: 2091195 *(26 of 50)*

Synopsis

A ZAB Center Controller reported they had to request the Operations Manager to coordinate ceasing intentional GPS jamming so a medical flight could conduct a RNAV approach to LRU.

ACN: 2091194 *(27 of 50)*

Synopsis

Albuquerque Center Controller reported they routinely have difficulty communicating with aircraft due to faulty transmitters.

ACN: 2091189 *(28 of 50)*

Synopsis

ZAB Center Controller reported planned GPS jamming in their sectors near the TXO VOR caused an air carrier and other aircraft to experience navigation difficulties.

ACN: 2091187 *(29 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Tower Local Controller reported a VFR aircraft overshot the final approach course into confliction with VFR traffic on the parallel runway resulting in a NMAC.

ACN: 2091178 *(30 of 50)*

Synopsis

LAF Tower Controller reported the lack of an operational crash phone hinders the ability to contact first responders as highlighted by a recent aircraft loss of power incident.

ACN: 2090425 *(31 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Tower Controller reported an aircraft did not comply with their taxi instructions and proceeded onto a taxiway that a helicopter was cleared to land on.

ACN: 2090112 *(32 of 50)*

Synopsis

Two Center Controllers reported an aircraft transiting their sector flew below minimum safe altitude. Controller directed an immediate climb to the aircraft.

ACN: 2089650 *(33 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Tower Controller reported a NMAC occurred due to TRACON turning a departing C172 into the path of a subsequent business jet departure without coordination.

ACN: 2089492 *(34 of 50)*

Synopsis

EDC Tower Controller reported an arriving aircraft made an incorrect position report and flew across the departure end of the active runway without notifying ATC. The reporter stated there is no radar display at the facility and Controllers cannot see most of the aircraft until they are within close proximity.

ACN: 2086529 *(35 of 50)*

Synopsis

P50 TRACON Controller reported very poor radio quality resulted in altitude readback error and a CFTT event.

ACN: 2085583 *(36 of 50)*

Synopsis

PUB Tower Controller reported issuing a low altitude alert to a night VFR arrival that entered the pattern below minimum safe altitude, resulted in a CFTT event.

ACN: 2085582 *(37 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Tower Local Controller providing OJT reported they did not notice their trainee cleared an aircraft to line up and wait from an intersection on a runway when another aircraft taking off from full length overflew them by less than 200 feet.

ACN: 2085581 *(38 of 50)*

Synopsis

Tower Controllers reported they did not notice an aircraft lined up on short final for the wrong runway with another aircraft holding in position on the runway until the ASDE X alerted them.

ACN: 2084287 *(39 of 50)*

Synopsis

TRACON and Tower Controllers reported traffic landed on closed parallel runway at night, without a clearance. Controllers reported that the lit X closure indicator was not in place and it was difficult for tower to determine aircraft runway alignment at night.

ACN: 2084286 *(40 of 50)*

Synopsis

A Tower Ground Controller reported the Local Controller cleared an aircraft for takeoff while another aircraft was taxiing across the runway.

ACN: 2082692 *(41 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Handoff/Assist controller reported the Radar Controller vectored a departing aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 2082683 *(42 of 50)*

Synopsis

Chicago Center Controller reported an aircraft deviated from direct MOBIL clearance because they entered the fix MOBLE in their FMS which is also a fix in the NAS.

ACN: 2081579 *(43 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported they descended an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude due to misreading the Minimum Vectoring Map.

ACN: 2081184 *(44 of 50)*

Synopsis

Tower Ground Controller reported a taxing aircraft began to stray from its clearance and caused a critical ground conflict with a landing craft. The Controller states there were several calls to the wayward aircraft before contact was made.

ACN: 2081180 *(45 of 50)*

Synopsis

Air traffic Controller reported being distracted with briefings and sector updating while an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude.

ACN: 2080752 *(46 of 50)*

Synopsis

Local controller reported aircraft on go around did not respond to control instructions resulting in aircraft flying at an altitude that would be below the MVA. Aircraft finally responded to control instructions at an altitude above and turning away from the obstacle.

ACN: 2080747 *(47 of 50)*

Synopsis

A TRACON Supervisor working a sector reported they turned an aircraft the wrong direction which placed it below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 2076812 *(48 of 50)*

Synopsis

A New York ARTCC Controller reported their frequency 125.32 is routinely mistaken for Boston ARTCC 135.32. Both sectors work N90 departure traffic resulting in separation errors and confusion when aircraft are issued or read back the wrong similar sounding frequency.

ACN: 2076185 *(49 of 50)*

Synopsis

Air Traffic Controller reported military UAS started a descent that was not coordinated by adjacent facility, resulting in an airspace violation.

ACN: 2076177 *(50 of 50)*

Synopsis

Approach Controller reported an aircraft did not fly the published missed approach and the pilot reported encountering severe icing conditions and several equipment malfunctions/failures while in IMC. Controller vectored pilot to another airport and they landed without further incident.

Report Narratives

ACN: 2105330 *(1 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202404
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
State Reference : NM

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAB
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan : IFR
Nav In Use : GPS
Flight Phase : Climb
Flight Phase : Descent
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class A : ZAB
Airspace.Class E : ZAB

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2105330
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Ground Equipment Issue
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

We had weather today with a high volume workload due to additional weather in the Houston metro. This caused more aircraft to be routed into the area and cause our numbers to be near or above most of the morning and early afternoon. Starting at XA30, GPS jamming from White Sands started and immediately aircraft started to take over the frequencies and talk about losing their ADSB and transponders. Multiple controllers on sectors quickly asked the supervisor to "stop buzzer" because the complexity and workload was increased to unsafe levels. The supervisor talked to the Operational Manager about stop buzzer and it didn't take affect until at least 30 minutes to an hour. I'm not sure how long it took, but I called the OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge) line directly to talk to the Operational Manager, but it was forwarded to TMU (Traffic Management Unit), which was both frustrating and surprising. I had an aircraft almost deviate into the range because they were having navigational issues and I had thought that jamming had stopped. We were also told before the shift when our supervisor went to standup briefing that there would be no jamming because they were going to take the DMN radar out of service. When multiple controllers ask for stop buzzer and there is no response it shows how both unprofessional and how disrespected the controllers feel. If they don't trust us with stop buzzer, then why have the ability make the request? Also, why is the OMIC line forwarded to TMU? We can't even have a direct line to the Operational Manager and have to go through a third party just to get ahold of them. If a request is made by controllers, why is it questioned so much? They don't trust us to make a decision and would rather us work in unsafe situations with complex and high volume traffic.

Synopsis

ZAB Controller reported the complexity and workload levels at sectors were unsafe due to scheduled GPS jamming causing navigational errors and frequency congestion.

ACN: 2105322 *(2 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202404
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SCT.TRACON
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : SCT
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class E : SCT

Component

Aircraft Component : Unknown
Aircraft Reference : X

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : SCT.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 12
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2105322
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Physiological - Other
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Fatigue

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Routine Inspection
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Staffing

Narrative: 1

I chose this aircraft as an example but I really want to report is the unsafe conditions the FAA is making us work. We have been short staffed for too many years and it's creating so many unsafe situations. This example is one of many over the years. Middle of the day sectors combined, that shouldn't be, too many aircraft on 2 frequencies and the Aircraft X calls for [priority handling] and I have no time or resources to help. We don't do VFR flight following or practice approaches due to short staffing. We can't call traffic in the VFR practice area. We can't call for help like a handoff or an extra set of eyes. The FAA has created an unsafe environment to work and for the flying public. The controllers mental health is deteriorating. We are stressed, angry and filling reports (so call problems) with each other. Problems that short staffing has created over years of poorly staffed areas and poor supervision. There's also a sense of no accountability. Controllers are using more sick leave to get a break from the intense sessions we get from over working. We are also forced to work a 6th day. So we can't even plan our lives in our days off. Something has to change. And yes permission to share Prioritize staffing and cancel peoples details days and extra activities. Aggressively hire controllers. Many procedural problems that are reported in the last few years are probably related to staffing and the shortcuts we are forced to take to make it work.

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported they could not provide adequate assistance to a small aircraft requesting priority handling due to workload of working combined sectors because of chronic lack of staffing issues at their facility.

ACN: 2103770 *(3 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202404
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : D21.TRACON
State Reference : MI

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : D21
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Climb
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class B : DTW

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : D21
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B : DTW

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : D21.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 15
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2103770
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

In the process of changing flows from south to north flow. The arrival end was vectoring to 04L and 03R the Tower departed two aircraft off of 21L opposite direction. Tower put the two aircraft on my frequency climbing via and on the SID. I had to turn both aircraft immediately to avoid a midair collision. The controller started to vector aircraft to the north runways even though the Tower still had two aircraft going to depart. The Tower Controller was not paying attention to what was happening and shipped the aircraft to my frequency as a normal departure. This is not the first time something like this has happened and it continues to get worst. What is the next incident going to be like? Recommendation: Don't allow the next one to happen and be an actual midair! The Tower needs to pay attention and look out the window and/or D-Bright. I've worked at D21 for a very long time, and I've never seen something so bad where I truly felt there was a possibility of a crash! Don't brush this under the rug!!!

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported Tower allowed aircraft to depart opposite direction into arrival traffic due to confusion during a runway configuration change.

ACN: 2103769 *(4 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202404
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAU.ARTCC
State Reference : IL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAU
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : Medium Large Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class E : ZAU

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAU
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 14
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2103769
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Ground Equipment Issue
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was requesting UHF frequency for SBN. We shipped aircraft to SBN [Approach] on 257.8 and aircraft came back and told us the people on 257.8 told them its the wrong frequency. I contacted SBN approach to verify their frequency was 125.75 and UHF of 257.8. They verified and so I again shipped the aircraft to UHF 257.8. The aircraft came back again and they said they hear Indy tower or something. I contacted SBN and they told me they heard Aircraft X check on and issued altimeter but he didn't respond. We did some digging and brought up IND approach plate and found that IND Tower is using same UHF frequency of 257.8 noted on the approach plate. I notified the supervisor of this situation and eventually shipped the aircraft back to SBN approach on a different frequency. I recommend that either IND tower or SBN come off of UHF 257.8 so there isn't any confusion.

Synopsis

ZAU Controller reported IND Tower and SBN TRACON use the same UHF Frequency of 257.8 which caused confusion when the controller attempted to issue frequency change.

ACN: 2103382 *(5 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4600

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Descent
Route In Use : Vectors

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Phase : Descent

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2103382
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Fatigue
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I descended Aircraft X to 5500ft, and told them to keep their speed up for the sequence. I then thought that I had slowed and descended Aircraft Y to 210kts and 4000ft, but I misspoke and clipped that particular transmission and only had the last syllable and I also said incorrect callsign instead of the correct callsign. I missed the read back from Aircraft X slowing and descending to 4000ft assuming it was Aircraft Y reading back. When Aircraft Y did not slow as expected, I issued a new instruction to them to reduce speed further and then descend to 4000ft. I then noticed that Aircraft X was descending below 5500ft and asked them to verify that they were only descending to 5500ft. They read back that they were descending to 4000ft, so I told Aircraft X to climb and maintain 5500ft. I did not issue the low altitude alert since it had not alarmed and did not alarm. I also questioned Aircraft X when they were at 5200ft, so I did not think that a low altitude alert was necessary at that point. I was on an overtime shift and it was my 6th day towards the end of my shift. Suggestion: I just need to ensure that I say the correct call signs and listen better to read backs.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported using wrong call sign when issuing descent instructions resulted in confusion on readbacks and a CFTT event.

ACN: 2103375 *(6 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202404
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Ambulance
Flight Phase : Descent
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2103375
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was being vectored for the ILS XR at ZZZ. On initial call I descended Aircraft X to 060 to avoid a 056 MVA west of ZZZ. A few moments later I noticed Aircraft X was descending through 055 in the 056 MVA, at which case I climbed them back to 060; however. Aircraft X had already reached 051 before climbing back up to 060. After listening to the replay, I did indeed give Aircraft X 060, but did not catch him reading back 050. Suggestion: Normally, I am quick to catch a read back error; however, in this case one got by me. I would recommend being extra vigilant in the future to prevent these mishaps.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported failure to hear readback altitude error, resulted in descent below MVA and a CFTT event.

ACN: 2103374 *(7 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
State Reference : NM

Aircraft

Reference : X
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2103374
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2102632
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred : Unwanted Situation
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1

On Day 0 at approximately XA00Z White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) began their GPS Jamming procedures that they conduct annually around this time of year. Typically GPS jamming exercises have less of an impact in the previous years than now. Working Sector 19 with westbound ELP departures with GPS jamming is becoming a real problem. Every single ELP departure during the GPS jamming exercise required a heading because they were unable to navigate. This increased the complexity of the sector drastically. On top of that, every single aircraft checking on into Sector 19 was inquiring about the issues with their ADSB and/or their GPS being unusable. This, in itself, created a lot of frequency congestion in the sector. Sector 19 also had areas of moderate-extreme precipitation affecting aircraft routing and navigation. The OS (Operations Supervisor) on duty at the time was standing behind me to overlook the sector because he knew that I was very busy. Even after seeing what was going on in the sector, the OS did not issue a STOP BUZZARD. I myself did not ask for it either, but it was very apparent that it needed to be done. Previous days and days after Day 0, Controllers had multiple issues with the GPS jamming exercises and requested a STOP BUZZARD. At one instance, an aircraft actually had issues maintaining altitude during the jamming in an area of high terrain. Another day in particular, a STOP BUZZARD was requested to the OM (Operations Manager) on another busy session with jamming and the OM refused the request. THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE. If a controller working the sector requests a STOP BUZZARD it should immediately be turned in with no hesitation and the jamming should stop. The sector is the Air Traffic Controllers jurisdiction and is ultimately the one who determines when safety is of concern. Suggestions: - WSMR should conduct their GPS jamming exercises at a time of day when traffic volume is lower to limit the amount of commercial and private aircraft that are affected by it. OS/CIC (Controller in Charge) need to be more proactive and call a STOP BUZZARD when it is apparent that the controller is getting busy. It seems that some OS's and more so CIC's are hesitant to call a STOP BUZZARD. The chain of command that a STOP BUZZARD request goes through should be re-evaluated. Why do we need the approval from the OM? What does the OM know about the current state of a sector receiving GPS jamming? At least have the OM monitor the sector at times during GPS jamming to see how it is affecting the commercial and private aircraft. GPS jamming exercises are posted in the NOTAM system. However the pilots are NEVER aware. GPS jamming should become a more important notice to pilots so that they are better prepared. this would also help with the frequency congestion.

Narrative: 2

I came in on Day 0 and took over the desk as a CIC (Controller in Charge) about XH00 local. I was briefed that conditions on sector 20/63 were not ideal, that frequencies were not working well, aircraft were deviating for weather, there was mod-sev mountain wave and mod-sev icing reported. Volume was high even with all adjacent sectors open, but we had got approval to lower the numbers by 2, so instead of 20 planes there should be no more than 18. The controller had been sitting there for awhile, and was still somewhat overwhelmed. I later came to find out that GPS jamming was also playing a major role in the complexity of the traffic volume and sector 19 was also being overwhelmed due to calls about ADS-B outages; GPS outages; needs for headings; bad rides; and weather deviations. Also our coordination lines to MTY were out of service and controllers had no way to get a hold of MTY in a timely manner. After talking to the controller who had been

busy on 19 for over an hour and visibly frustrated with the added complexity and unsafe situation that had arrised due to jamming, combined with weather deviations and bad rides, I made the call to help out and Stop Buzzer. Several controllers thought it would be the safest call to stop jamming, because they already had a lot of complexity with the weather/rides/volume/coordination issues. I called the OM (Operations Manager) to stop buzzer, admittedly with slight hesitation, because of the recent pushback in the facility on halting GPS jamming. Its my job to maintain the safety of the NAS so I laid out the situation for for the OM clearly, as not to get any pushback. The OM asked if I could get some callsigns of A/C the jamming was affecting. I told him it was affecting all A/C as they were all asking about it, clogging up frequencies, and requiring headings. He came down to the area and it was explained to him again. Once the jamming stopped the controllers were able to better gather themselves and perform their jobs better and safer. I thought what we had done was a good move and when I spoke to the OM again, to my surprise, he was extremely dissapointed. He had the radar display replay pulled up of Sector 19 struggling with GPS jamming. Suggestion: Our agreement has been that anytime the FLM (Front Line Manager)/CIC deems GPS jamming a safety issue it is our call to ask the OM to Stop Buzzer. Why there has been any pushback at all is beyond me. Why we have to provide any more of a reason than its unsafe and overwhelming to our controllers is beyond me. It's a major safety issue, especially when you already have the complexity of bad rides and weather, during the busiest hours of the day. I was happy with the call I made. All I'd like to do is to follow the agreements in place and not be treated with disrespect for making a safety call. This has become a major point of issue, without proper explanation as to why our OM's get upset when we ask to stop buzzer.

Synopsis

ZAB Controllers reported White Sands Missile Range GPS jamming exercises severely affected sector workload and complexity of ELP westbound departures. Controllers also reported the decision was made to stop the exercises due to degradation of safety of flight.

ACN: 2102100 *(8 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Ceiling.Single Value : 800

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Challenger 350
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Route In Use : Vectors
Route In Use.Airway : X
Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Person : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 12
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2102100
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Person : 2

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 4482
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 23
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 290
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2102991
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was vectoring Aircraft X for ILS approach to Runway X. I issued decend to 3000 feet and fly heading 320. Near ZZZ1 airport the low altitude alert sounded and I told Aircraft X low altitude alert, climb and maintain 4000. The pilot thought I had issued a decent to 2000. I told him I did not issue 2000. There was heavy volume and complexity at the time due to weather and two different center sectors were off-loading ZZZ2 arrivals on to me. The pilot thought I had given a decent to 2000. Also he never gave a read back saying 2000 feet at any time. So there was a miss communication somewhere.

Narrative: 2

I was second-in-command, and the non-flying pilot (pilot monitoring), of a Challenger 350 from ZZZ3 to ZZZ by IFR. At approximately XA:45, while being vectored to final for the ILS Runway X at ZZZ, we were advised by ZZZ Approach on frequency XXX.X to "check altitude" and immediately "climb to 4000 feet." We complied and ZZZ continued vectoring us to the final approach course without incident. Upon landing at ZZZ the crew of Aircraft X was given a number to call ZZZ Tower controller, which we did. The Tower Control supervisor collected our information and advised there may have been a pilot deviation, and that information he collected would be sent along to the FSDO for determination. Aircraft X flew from ZZZ3 to ZZZ under Part 91. Weather at time of arrival was forecasted to be 05011G21KT 6SM -SHRA BR OVC008. In a two-hour TEMPO period just prior to our arrival, weather was forecast as 2SM TSRA BR OVC010. Prior to initial descent we were

given new routing by Center to avoid easterly moving weather build-ups, and then during descent we requested and were granted further deviations until being handed over to ZZZ Approach on XXX.X at approximately XA:38. Upon handover, I attempted to contact the Approach Controller two times with aircraft ID, altitude, ATIS code, and type of Approach requested. I did so after a listening watch during which there were no other transmissions. I did not receive a reply until a third attempt in which I queried the controller as to how he was receiving our transmissions. He replied that he heard us and cleared us down to an altitude of 10,000 feet and vector deviation of 10 degrees left. I estimate approximately two and half minutes elapsed from the time of my initial attempts to establish contact and the controller's positive handling of Aircraft X. We were then given further clearance to 8,000 feet and direct ZZZZZ (intermediate point along localizer course), followed approximately one minute later by a clearance to 3,000 feet. We complied. At approximately XA:43, were given a heading of 320 degrees and an altitude for vectors to final. Having been previously cleared to 3,000, we believed we heard a clearance to a lower of 2,000 feet and continued to descend while turning to 320. At approximately XA:45 ZZZ ATC advised our immediate climb. We received no TCAS alerts. At completion of the flight, the Captain of Aircraft X and I conducted a debrief of the events and our crew interactions. Some key takeaways from our discussion are: While the Captain is responsible for the overall safety and compliance of the aircraft and its crew, as pilot monitoring, I am responsible for among other tasks: communicating with ATC; obtaining and reading back clearances accurately and timely; cross-monitoring systems; and setting altitudes in the flight guidance system. Upon review, it appears I either missed hearing or did not properly read back altitude assignments within the terminal area. This likely contributed to our misunderstanding of the last altitude given. In the future, I will endeavor to be more proactive in fully reading back clearances. The controller did not prompt me after omissions of altitude in two read-backs to ensure we heard him correctly. A more thorough review and brief of the approach plate for ILS X would've revealed an MSA of 2,500, so a descent to 2,000 feet while be vectored to the final course would not make sense. Even if we thought we heard a clearance to below the MSA, it would be essential to query the controller under the circumstances. We failed to do so. In the future, we will ensure all pertinent aspects of the approach are thoroughly briefed. The delay in our handling by ZZZ Approach after handover from ZZZ Center led us to be rushed in our final checklist tasks and landing preparation while in less-than-marginal weather. The delay may have come from atmospheric interference - which we previously encountered with ZZZ Center - or task-saturation of a controller if he was simultaneously handling traffic on the ZZZ Approach East frequency. More than one aircraft had to prompt the controller for further timely guidance such as obtaining lower altitudes during our time on frequency. There are likely more lessons to be learned and we intend to discuss them as a crew in the coming days. As professional pilots, we take seriously any event like the foregoing and seek ways to prevent future occurrences within our crew but to share lessons learned to possibly prevent something similar in other crews. While these were "honest" mistakes, the associated threats could have been better mitigated in this situation.

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller and corporate jet pilot reported the controller issued a Low Altitude Alert due to the pilot descending to 2000 feet when they were assigned 3000 feet.

ACN: 2100867 *(9 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : BJC.Tower
State Reference : CO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5900

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : BJC
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class D : BJC

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : BJC
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Taxi
Route In Use : None

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : BJC.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2100867
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

5 minutes after taking position from previous controller, splitting off LC2 (Local Control) to accommodate increasing volume of traffic. After briefing given to parallel controller and while monitoring departures from the south runway to switch pattern traffic to a different frequency, Aircraft X calls ready for departure. Radar tag for Aircraft Y was observed dropping off of the scope, which usually correlates with the aircraft touching down on the runway, and Aircraft X was issued LUAW (Line Up and Wait) instruction. As they read it back, I see Aircraft Y about to touch down, so at first I attempt to make Aircraft X stop, but they have immediately begun moving at near takeoff speed to taxi onto the runway and ignore this transmission, so I instead tell Aircraft Y to go around, with which they comply. No further issues arise and Aircraft Y comes back around to land without issue after Aircraft X is cleared for takeoff. During winter months when there is snow on the ground it is extremely difficult to see aircraft on final for Runway 30R once they pass below the horizon. If it is possible to change the tolerance of the radar to keep tags on the scope until they touch the surface it would be very beneficial for keeping our increasing volume of traffic in proper sequence. Additionally this was during a back-to-back briefing situation with CIC (Controller in Charge) combined with GC, so no available oversight to catch mistakes, we need greater staffing numbers in order to keep all of our positions open so these things can be caught more easily.

Synopsis

A Tower Local Controller reported they cleared an aircraft onto the runway with another aircraft on short final.

ACN: 2100496 *(10 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Flight Phase : Descent
Flight Phase : Climb

Component

Aircraft Component : GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2100496
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Workload
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Software and Automation
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

GPS jamming was causing a ton of issues in the sector. I was getting overwhelmed with reports about aircraft losing equipment. Some aircraft needed headings as they could no longer navigate point-to-point. Per the LOA (Letter of Agreement) we cancelled the RNAV STARS into ZZZ so I also had to reroute every ZZZ lander. Aircraft X wanted to know why we were allowing jamming during the day as per his experience it normally happens only at night. One aircraft reported a complete loss of all autopilot systems and was temporarily unable to maintain altitude. He lost about 300 ft. Another aircraft departed VFR from ZZZ1 and requested to pick up IFR in the air but then but then advised that they couldn't proceed IFR anymore because of the GPS jamming and elected to remain VFR. Numerous aircraft reported transponder issues as well as ADS-B issues and navigation losses. After the one aircraft lost the ability to maintain altitude, I requested that GPS jamming be paused. The FLM (Front Line Manager) agreed. The OM however did not want to stop GPS jamming and kept refusing. The OM directed the FLM to get more information from me. So now in addition to all the extra workload I kept getting distracted by questions that the OM wanted answered. The OM didn't want anything recorded on the line so the FLM had to keep leaving the area to speak with the OM. After about 15 minutes went by from my request to stop jamming the OM finally agreed and paused the jamming. Surrounding areas should advise inbound aircraft to Sector XX/YY that GPS jamming is in effect. TMU (Traffic Management Unit) should assist in sending T-routes to aircraft that are not direct to VORs or on airways. Sector numbers should be lowered during periods of jamming to reflect the increased complexity and workload on the controller. Lastly, when controllers ask for help and to temporarily pause jamming, Management should comply. Per ZZZ [ARTCC] policy OM's are supposed to delegate authority to CIC (Controller in Charge)/FLM to stop jamming but the OM in charge that day refuses to comply with the written procedure. ZZZ [ARTCC] Management has a long history of refusing to stop jamming for any reason and ignoring jamming procedures and this compromises safety.

Synopsis

Center Controller reported the OM was refusing to comply with policy in stopping GPS jamming despite the workload and aircraft navigational difficulties it was causing.

ACN: 2100054 *(11 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 6
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2100054
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was on route at 7000 feet heading east bound. The next sector accepted the handoff, and I switched them to their frequency XXX.X. On readback, I thought I may have heard the aircraft read back XXX.X5 so I went to correct him but remembered that a lot of times, frequencies have a "5" at the end don't matter and so I let him go thinking that I was in the wrong and the aircraft was right. The aircraft never went over to the right frequency and ran into an area of terrain where the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) altitude was 7200. By that time everyone was listening to me and telling me what to try, to reach the aircraft. I was doing everything possible and when he finally did come back to us, I immediately climbed him but was not able to issue the appropriate safety alert phraseology. This was a complete misunderstanding on my part.

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported they did not correct a pilot readback of the wrong frequency resulting in loss of contact with the aircraft as it flew below the Minimum IFR Altitude.

ACN: 2100051 *(12 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Beech 1900
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight Phase : Descent
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 14
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2100051
Human Factors : Workload

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was on a visual approach, descending to 080 Direct to the airport. Aircraft Y Departed, ZZZ, Direct ZZZ1 Level at 070. I issue traffic to both aircraft and both acknowledged. Aircraft X Descended through his assigned altitude, Lowest observed altitude was 7800 ft. When I seen him through 7900 ft. began to Key up and ask him if he was leveling off at 8000 ft. before. The transmission was made observed him at 7800 ft. and begin issued a low altitude alert, and a traffic alert. Immediately, after keying up, I Observed Aircraft X Climbing back to his assigned altitude of 8000 ft.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude. The Controller issued a low altitude alert and a traffic alert.

ACN: 2100050 *(13 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2100050
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Workload
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Ground Equipment Issue
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

Yet another serious safety issue, by the same OM I reported a couple weeks ago, due to not doing a "Stop Buzzer" call as per our facility standard operating procedures, SOP. Yesterday we had GPS jamming in effect with multiple aircraft on headings, aircraft turning on their own about 40 degrees and weather up to about 33000 ft. The OS (Operations Supervisor) called the OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge) to ask to stop GPS jamming due to controller workload issues. The OM and the OS then had an offline, not recorded, conversation about the issue. The OM played the "20 questions" game with the OS and decided to not make the "Stop Buzzer" call to the proponent. Again, I would like to reiterate from my last report, the OMIC does not make the final determination to "Stop Buzzer," the OS/CIC (Controller in Charge) does. The only reason why the OMIC is

referenced in the SOP directive is because they have the phone numbers for the proponent, and they are required to report on the network when they make the call. A little while later another CIC called the OM for the same thing. The OM again played 20 questions with the CIC, asking "is this really a safety issue." The OM then had an offline, unrecorded conversation about the jamming. The OM ultimately stopped the jamming but not after a long period of time where controllers were overworked and overloaded. This was [a] very unsafe situation that lasted way too long due to OM's inactions. The OM's continued disregard for safety and the agreed upon facility SOP is going to get someone seriously injured or killed. GPS jamming is a serious issue and needs to be mitigated when warranted. The determination to stop jamming lies within the Specialties as per the SOP. The Specialties have the most up-to-date information on jamming effects. When an OS/CIC makes the call, jamming needs to be immediately stopped. Weather season for ZZZ [ARTCC] has begun, again, someone is going to get hurt. I recommend that the OM is counseled on this issue. If counseling is not effective, he should be removed from the OM position. The OM continues to make dangerous, overriding decisions that are not his, which are a danger to the flying public.

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported the Operations Manager would not comply with the Area's Supervisor request to terminate planned GPS jamming contrary to the facility SOP's regarding GPS jamming.

ACN: 2099557 *(14 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2100

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Function.Air Traffic Control : Trainee
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2099557
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X (approximate) was cleared for the ILS runway XX into ZZZ airport. There was weather in the area and the aircraft was issued the weather. Instructed the aircraft to maintain 021 until established. I noticed the aircraft was at 020 so I issued the altitude again to maintain 021. At that point the aircraft stated they were receiving severe turbulence and altitude went down to 015. I issued a low altitude alert and issued the MVA of 018. I later realized the MVA was 019 but the aircraft was already past 020 again. I'm also wasn't sure if I used the correct phraseology. I think I left out "check your altitude immediately." I also didn't cancel his approach clearance but I did issue him a new clearance to another airport after he requested it. None. I just need to stay calm and ensure I use appropriate phraseology and make sure I have the correct MVA.

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported an aircraft on an ILS approach encountered severe turbulence and descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 2098635 *(15 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Aircraft

Reference : X
Make Model Name : M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase : Landing
Route In Use : None

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Non Radar : 10
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2098635

Events

Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Loss Of Aircraft Control
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector.Person : Other Person
When Detected.Other
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aicraft X seen on Taxiway 1 after landing Runway XXR with a collapsed front gear and prop striking the asphalt, Pilot was notified to shut down engine. 30 minutes after, we were notified by airport authority that aircraft possible touched down short of the Runway in grass. Tower was not made aware of possible touchdown prior to Runway until some time later after the aircraft had been towed off the Taxiway and pilot was not available.

Synopsis

Tower Controller reported being later notified of aircraft that had a landing incident also had a possible touchdown prior to landing runway.

ACN: 2098625 *(16 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Radar : 18
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2098625
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft had been given a clearance ZZZ-ZZZ1 at 040. This is a normal VFR route below 040 feet. I was working many 172's in this area that were VFR. I lost sight of this one being IFR. Just as they entered the 060 at 040 I climbed them to 060 and they confirmed with me that they had all the terrain in sight and continued on a slow climb to 060. An MIA warning on the strip would have been nice.

Synopsis

Controller reported failure to climb traffic above subsequent higher MVA resulting in a CFTT event.

ACN: 2097564 *(17 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.Tower
State Reference : US

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : FBO
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Training
Flight Phase : Climb
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Aircraft : 3

Reference : Z
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Phase : Climb

Person : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TWR
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Function.Air Traffic Control : Trainee

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2097564
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Person : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TWR
Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2097572
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was training on LC (Local Control) and had 6 aircraft in the left traffic pattern for RWY XXL not including arriving/departing itinerants. Upwind and downwinds were being extended to accommodate all requests. Aircraft X reported going around at the approach end and was instructed to follow the aircraft ahead on upwind which was Aircraft Y. Aircraft X reported aircraft in sight. Aircraft Z was the next aircraft to the runway. Multiple aircraft called ready for departure and inbound to include a Skywagon from the south inbound to land. I gave the Skywagon a left traffic entry and to maintain at or above 6500

ft. in reference to my traffic pattern. Also at this time there were aircraft "stepping" on each other as well as a convective SIGMET that needed to be read. At this point I believed I had all my traffic sequenced enough to read the SIGMET as my instructor advised me to. I did not realize I had not given Aircraft Z an upwind instruction though my intent was to have them follow Aircraft X ahead of the Skywagon. As I continued working my traffic Aircraft Z questioned if I still needed him straight out. I looked out the window as well as the RADAR to ensure i had enough space infront of the Skywagon. Spacing appeared good so I instructed Aircraft Z to turn crosswind. Aircraft Z then advised they could not turned crosswind. I then scanned again to understand why since they did not give a reason. I did not see one out the window due to distant and building weather to the south but as I looked back at the RADAR Aircraft X's target reappeared after having dropped off. At this time their target appeared abeam and passing Aircraft Z. I then again gave Aircraft Z a crosswind turn. Aircraft X position was unexpected due to the aircraft they were instructed to follow being significantly further downwind. I continued to work the session which remained busy for 15 plus minutes and was not fully aware of the severity of the issue. I was still on position when the Supervisor advised that an aircraft wanted to report a possible aircraft collision. I tried to not get distracted as the supervisor spoke with my trainer specifics about the incidents and what i should have done. Traffic load and frequency congestion was definitely a factor. Having specific VFR reporting/ pattern entries could help alleviate some of the conflicts with the traffic pattern and help standardize the flow. Also a local assist could help be an extra pair of eyes dedicated to specific congested spots in the pattern. Having a standard pattern limit may also be something to consider.

Narrative: 2

Training on LC (Local Control), I was the OJTI (On-the-job Training Instructor). At the time we had a minimum of 5 to 6 aircraft in the left traffic pattern for RWY XXL. Aircraft were being extended upwind and downwind to work in arrivals and departures. Aircraft X said he was going around. He was instructed to follow the aircraft ahead on upwind which was Aircraft Y, Aircraft X said they had them in sight. Behind Aircraft X was Aircraft Z. After this touch and go Aircraft Z never got an upwind instruction. At this time multiple aircraft were calling ready for departure and also aircraft from outside the airspace were calling to be sequenced in for arrival. Also a Convective SIGMET was placed at the position and the Supervisor asked that I have my trainee read it over the frequency. At some point Aircraft Y turned downwind and Aircraft X continued on the upwind, and his VFR tag disappeared from Radar. After multiple departures Aircraft Z asked if we wanted him to continue straight out. The trainee looked at the Radar display and saw a SkyWagon inbound for left traffic restricted at an altitude of at or above 6500 ft, 500 ft. above the traffic pattern, and was about 3 miles SW of Aircraft Z. Any other conflicting aircraft appeared to be about a mile and a half to 2 miles behind Aircraft Z on the downwind. The trainee told Aircraft Z to turn crosswind, a moment later Aircraft Z said "we can't turn downwind", so the controller then said Aircraft Z fly straight out. Then I noticed a primary radar tag slightly ahead and to the left of Aircraft Z's RADAR tag. I looked out the window but the aircraft was so far extended (about 4-4 1/2 miles upwind), when I looked back at the RADAR display I then saw a VFR target reappear on the scope next to Aircraft Z. I told the trainee I believe there is an aircraft in the downwind that disappeared off radar next to Aircraft Z. The trainee then told Aircraft Z to follow the aircraft off "his left wing", he said he would follow. We continued to work the traffic. When Aircraft Z landed he informed the Ground Controller that he almost turned into an aircraft on the downwind when he was told to turn crosswind and that was when we realized what he meant when he said he couldn't turn crosswind. This was an extremely busy session. Normally most of the VFR traffic pattern will be put on (Local Control 2 but there was a new trainee on his first session working the local traffic and his trainer requested we take "it easy on him" so we kept 6 aircraft in our pattern. This is not normal. There was multiple factors that contributed to this happening.

Aircraft not following instructions. Aircraft X didn't follow Aircraft Y as instructed and extended upwind significantly before turning crosswind. Aircraft X then dropped off radar, Aircraft Z did not receive instructions on the upwind, the amount of traffic, aircraft stepping on each other and having to repeat instructions, the Supervisor who was working GC insisting we read a weather advisory at a time that the workload did not permit.

Synopsis

Tower Controller trainee and their instructor reported an aircraft on upwind in the pattern reported a NMAC with another aircraft.

ACN: 2096127 *(18 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Radar : 17
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2096127
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Ground Equipment Issue
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft was IFR from the north landing ZZZ. When I read them the NOTAMS, I noticed that one of the NOTAMS was "ZZZ RWY XX/XY WIP (Work in Progress) HVY EQPT". There

was no other NOTAM for a PPR (Prior Permission Required) required. I had the CIC (Controller in Charge) call the airport who told us to have the aircraft contact them on CTAF and they would get the equipment off the runway. This was accomplished, but I felt the situation was extremely unclear and moderately unsafe. The pilot seemed to agree, as when I initially read the NOTAM, the pilot asked "so is the airport closed or not?" Suggestion: If there is heavy equipment on a runway, the runway either needs to be closed or there needs to be a clearly defined way to ensure the landing can be accomplished safely (PPR required). There was some debate between myself and others in the area as to whether I should instruct the aircraft to talk to the airport on CTAF, sort of a defacto PPR. I feel like this is relying on the pilot to ensure the runway is clear which is not their job.

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported conflicting information with NOTAM, procedures, and personnel resulted in unknown runway safety status.

ACN: 2095755 *(19 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MRY.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : MRY
Aircraft Operator : Fractional
Make Model Name : Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class C : MRY

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : MRY
Aircraft Operator : Fractional
Make Model Name : Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : GPS
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Airspace.Class C : MRY

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : MRY.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 21
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2095755
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X, was on a Visual Approach to MRY about 6 mile final, cleared to land on my frequency. Aircraft Y, was on RNAV Y 28L approach and was rapidly closing on Aircraft X. Aircraft X was at 140 knots, Aircraft Y was 250 knots and descending rapidly at Aircraft X's altitude and location. I saw there was a serious collision hazard about to occur so I keyed up to see if Aircraft Y was on my frequency by chance. He was not. I was about to push the button to key up to NCT to break for control and make sure they were handling it when Aircraft Y checked on my frequency. I was shocked they were handed off to me in a near imminent collision situation. I asked Aircraft Y if they had traffic in sight, 12 o clock, less than a mile, 2500 descending in sight. They did not. I asked if they had the airport in sight, as I was going through my options mentally how to separate these aircraft as Aircraft Y was below the MVA. I thought if he reported the airport in sight I would break him off to the north downwind for a Visual Approach. Aircraft Y did not answer. NCT then chimes in repeatedly on the shout line, as I'm trying fix this situation. The aircraft are around a mile apart, 200 feet vertical separation with Aircraft Y higher than Aircraft X, and Aircraft Y 110 knots faster. I answer the shout line only because I thought NCT would actually be giving me alternate climbout instructions which they did not. Instead they gave useless information about how he broke Aircraft Y off the approach, which was later found to be false. He simply shipped Aircraft Y to me in a significant event/separation loss status. I asked them what they wanted me to do with Aircraft Y, which they replied to climb them on runway heading to 5000 ft. I go back to Aircraft Y and tell them to climb to 5000 ft. present heading, which they did not respond. I again tell them to climb to 5000 ft. heading 280, approach clearance cancelled, climb to 5000 ft. heading 280. Aircraft Y complies. Around 20 minutes earlier than this incident, NCT sent me a strikingly similiar situation with a regional jet and a business jet, and NCT does this quite frequently. MRY Supervisor calls the Ops Manager at NCT to have them check into this event to which the Ops Manager tells us to look out the window and apply tower visual separation, what is going on down there at MRY. First of all, tower visual separation does not apply to an aircraft on an IFR approach procedure. Next, both aircraft were 5 to 6 miles east of MRY and nearly impossible to see with the naked eye, though I had the lead aircraft, Aircraft X, in sight. The Aircraft Y was so close he blended in with the lead aircraft. Next after the Conflict Alarm is going off my attention is on the radar scope trying to figure my options to pry these aircraft apart before collision that I was handed from NCT. Both aircraft are below the MVA, the lead aircraft is on a Visual Approach, the trailing aircraft is on an instrument approach. My only legal option for the trailing aircraft is to climb him. NCT has to get better at coordination with MRY. We have multiple situations daily at MRY where

information is not passed and NCT has not separated aircraft and MRY ends up bailing them out and even situations where NCT will turn aircraft into other aircraft that are talking to MRY. NCT controllers need to be taught basic air traffic control that you cannot hand off an aircraft until all conflicts are resolved, and certainly not hand off a literal deal or safety incident. NCT controllers need to be taught how to sequence, and especially speed sequence, aircraft and be taught basic flight characteristics that aircraft have to slow down to land and the trailing aircraft cannot keep boring down on them at ridiculous closure rates. This is a daily occurrence at MRY and it needs to stop. NCT controllers and Ops Managers need to be taught the rules of tower applied visual separation and when it can be applied, and how to do it. Tower has to actually have aircraft in sight and actually be talking to at least one of them and aircraft are on visual approaches. NCT needs to realize VFR aircraft have to be separated and sequenced as well from IFR aircraft in Class C airspace, as this is also a daily occurrence that MRY ends up bailing NCT out of busted separation. MRY will be sending out more and more [reports] now that this incident with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y narrowly avoided a disaster until NCT does their job of actually sequencing the aircraft they are tasked to. If they cannot handle their responsibility anymore, I highly, highly and am very serious when I suggest the TRACON should be returned back to MRY as better handling would certainly result, since NCT for years has been extremely lacking in their handling of Seca/Fremont airspace that used to be here at MRY as a Tower/TRACON.

Synopsis

MRY Tower Local Controller reported TRACON handed off two aircraft with a large overtake that required immediate action to resolve. The reporter stated TRACON routinely hands off aircraft to them that are in confliction.

ACN: 2095449 *(20 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Climb
Route In Use.SID : ZZZZZ X
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ.TRACON

Person

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 20
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2095449
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Working all sectors combined. ZZZ Tower just opened and I released Aircraft X on ZZZZZ X SID. I was working out arrivals and departures to ZZZ1 and did not see conflict for Aircraft X until he was airborne climbing out of 025. Initial communication to Aircraft X was traffic alert and stopped his climb at 030 for unidentified aircraft indicating 040 converging (MVA is 040). I radared Aircraft X and turned him towards 030 MVA and gradually stepped up his altitude based on indicated alt from other aircraft. Aircraft Y called me and I identified him and immediately turned him away from Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was identified as an EC35, who reported Aircraft X in sight . I issued a low alt alert to Aircraft X and expedited his climb to 15000. The pilot of Aircraft Y said he had been in contact with the tower the whole time and wondered why they didn't "ship him earlier so this whole thing could have been avoided". The tower never communicated the traffic or the conflict to myself or Aircraft X prior to shipping the departure. Suggestion: The TRSA over the ZZZ airport does not provide adequate protection for departures off ZZZ. There is no communication or altitude requirement allowing non participating aircraft to fly directly into departure (and arrival corridors). The airspace needs to be updated to Class C to adapt to modern traffic requirements. Tower should have resolved a known conflict prior to launching Aircraft X. Tower should have issued traffic to Aircraft X. Tower should have transferred communication of Aircraft Y to me in time to resolve conflict and advised me that aircraft saw Aircraft X. Sectors could have been de combined sooner to allow for better scan.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported vectoring an aircraft below the MVA towards a lower MVA and away from conflicting traffic. When clear of traffic ATC climbed the aircraft without further incident.

ACN: 2095039 *(21 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Taxi

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Taxi

Person : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground
Function.Air Traffic Control : Trainee
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2095039
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor
Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 6
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2095040

Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Illness / Injury
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was a CPC-IT on Ground Control on west flow. After taking the position with my trainer, Aircraft X was issued [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 1 via [Taxiways] 2, 3 prior to me taking the position and had stopped on 2 for traffic on [Taxiway] 4. Shortly after Aircraft X reported that the severity of braking for traffic caused the injury of a flight attendant. I, along with my trainer, promptly relayed the information to the OS/CIC (Controller in Charge). Initially, the pilot's intentions were to return to the gate; however, the pilot later decided to continue taxi for departure, and departed without further incident. During and after this situation, there was debate as to whether or not the traffic on [Taxiway] 4 had the right of way due to them not being established in the "core". I am unaware as to whether or not a MOR was filed. On east flow, there is clear guidance on "right-of-way" traffic regarding to traffic both established in the core and established on an adjacent taxiway. On west flow, however, no such guidance exists. Mitigation of an event like this may warrant more clarity on the taxi flow plans, especially now due the construction projects in that area. This can be accomplished by adding "join behind" annotations on the west flow charts or, rather, removing the annotations from the east flow charts in order to return to the default aircraft established on a taxiway have right-of-way.

Narrative: 2

My trainee wasn't on time so I took Ground Control myself to relieve the other controller in a timely fashion. I taxied several airplanes and then the trainee finally showed up. While I was giving him an abbreviated briefing since I retained the position the whole time I looked up and saw Aircraft X south on [Taxiway] 1 stopped at [Taxiway] 2 while a fast taxiing Aircraft Y went in front. The trainee then said "sorry they were supposed to give way, continue" Not correct, we/I missed the call. A couple transmissions later Aircraft X keyed up and said that when they stopped hard for the Aircraft Y a flight attendant got knocked over and was injured and they would need to return to the gate. I quickly overkeyed the trainee and told Aircraft X to go right on [Taxiway] 3 so that we could get them back quickly as opposed to them continuing in the line of departures and getting stuck. The trainee worked a couple of more planes before Aircraft X keyed up and said the

flight attendant was actually ok and they were able to continue the flight. The trainee then resequenced them. Just before frequency change Aircraft X keyed up again (Captain I think, different voice) and asked if the Aircraft Y was supposed to have given way. I keyed up and said I am the trainer and no, that was our missed traffic call and my responsibility and I understand your frustration. I then shipped them to Tower. Immediately define who has right of way at that intersection. It should be Ground Control giving [Taxiway] 2 short of [Taxiway] 1 on initial contact and then evaluating as they get closer. The aircraft that use this route land [Runway] XXR and come all the way down [Taxiway] 4 to [Taxiway] 2 and tend be moving fast after a long taxi and being on a two mile straightaway. I think this event proves that this is a conflict point that needs to be addressed definitively. As it is right now the Aircraft Y was on [Taxiway] 2 was established and I owned the call and I accept responsibility for this event.

Synopsis

A Ground Control trainee and their Instructor reported a taxiing aircraft had to stop suddenly to avoid another aircraft taxiing through an intersection.

ACN: 2093647 *(22 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BJC.Airport
State Reference : CO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7100

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : D01
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class E : D01

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Skydiving
Flight Phase : Landing
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class E : D01

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : D01.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Radar : 14
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2093647

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred : Unwanted Situation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Airport

Narrative: 1

I had Aircraft X, VFR, on the practice approach for 12L at BJC at 7,100. As the aircraft was passing BDU pattern, I called traffic on two aircraft at 1 O'clock and 3 miles indicating 8,000. They appeared to be a glider and a tow aircraft, which I included in the traffic call. Aircraft X reported the traffic in sight, and I switched him to BJC Tower. A couple miles later, Aircraft X turned to the east and checked back on with me reporting a near mid-air. I asked who it was with, and they said it was an aircraft doing a rapid spiral descent and they had to turn to avoid. There were no other aircraft in Aircraft X's path, so I believe this was the glider tow aircraft descending back into BDU's pattern. Aircraft X stated they would leave the area and return to ZZZ. This VFR corridor is very congested, and we have multiple approaches that fly through it. Including many jet aircraft. I recommend we either work on adjusting the BJC approach to be farther away from BDU, or do pilot outreach, especially to BDU glider ops, to show them what to watch for, or help work out where it is best for them to do their climbs/descents. Maybe similar to how we work with Parachute Ops at LMO. There was nothing I could have done different in this situation. Traffic was issued, they were indicating 1000 ft. apart, and the pilot had them in sight. The BDU pattern traffic did something dramatic and unexpected. We either start doing pilot outreach, or we start denying practice approaches due to unsafe VFR volume in the area. It is scary to run traffic in this area, and we HAVE TO run all aircraft through this area when we are landing 12L.I will start denying approaches to 12L if I have to from now on. This is getting dangerous.

Synopsis

D01 Controller reported aircraft acknowledged traffic in sight then returned on frequency to report a NMAC.

ACN: 2093299 *(23 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3200

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 14
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2093299
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I had 3 aircraft inbound in line from the northeast fix and Aircraft X was the 3rd aircraft in that line. I had told all 3 to expect the RNAV-Z RWY XX initially. I then received an aircraft from the southwestern fix which was Aircraft Y. I had initially planned for Aircraft Z to be number four to the airport but because Aircraft Z was high and fast, and there was major compression on final because of the strong winds, I had changed plans and decided to make Aircraft Z number three behind a heavy aircraft and I told Aircraft X to now expect the ILS-Z RWY XX which would cause it to fly a longer downwind and provide for a more natural sequence. As I monitored the way things were playing out, I cleared Aircraft Y for their visual approach and then after a little more monitoring and I cleared Aircraft X for their approach. In my mind I thought I had cleared Aircraft X for the ILS-Z RWY XX because I clearly remember looking at the scratch pad data and looking at the approach plate name as I was speaking but after reviewing the tape, I had actually cleared Aircraft X for the RNAV-Z RWY XX. After issuing both approach clearances, I continued to monitor their progress and noticed that Aircraft X is turning in towards the airport in front of Aircraft Y. I knew that Aircraft X was below the MVA but I took that risk of issuing Aircraft X a vector for the sake of prying the 2 aircraft apart. I issued traffic in the hopes that I could get Visual Separation. Aircraft X did eventually get Aircraft Y in sight but only after I lost lateral separation between the two. Suggestion: I am dealing with a personal situation. When I notified management of my family situation, they gave me the option to use the leave that I have and/or LWOP (leave without pay). I had asked if there was an option to use advanced leave but they told me that my situation did not qualify for it. No offer was extended to place me on some kind of light duty function. I returned to work after I had used all of my 4 days worth of leave. I recognized that I was not in the frame of mind to work busy traffic so I asked some of my peers and the Supervisors on duty to help me and keep me away from busy traffic. I recommend that more should be offered to those members dealing with family situations. Something more than LWOP.

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported they issued a clearance to an aircraft that caused it to fly below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 2092994 *(24 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7100

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Corporate
Make Model Name : Beech F90
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2092994
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

Issued a clearance "as filed" to a King Air that departed ZZZ airport VFR. They were climbing out and would conflict with military airspace in the next sector. I wanted to turn them out to get them started away from the airspace so they could climb above it. I glanced at their position before I issued the turn and thought they were in a 7000 ft. MIA, but it was 7500 ft. Aircraft turned out of 7100 ft. and did not meet the subsequent 8000 ft. MIA. I should have waited for the turn, however due to VFR traffic in the area and the airspace I wanted to start them east as soon as possible. If this sector were terminal controlled the MIA's would be lower and there would be more flexibility in moving aircraft efficiently.

Synopsis

A Center Controller reported they vectored a departing aircraft below the Minimum IFR Altitude.

ACN: 2092033 *(25 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZBW.ARTCC
State Reference : NH
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZBW
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : BGR
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class E : ZBW

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZBW.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Radar : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2092033
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Ground Equipment Issue
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X from WVL-ZZZ was coming to us from Bangor approach. They flashed them early and told us Aircraft X was able 070 and our control if we needed it. About a half hour earlier we discovered the BGR site for frequency XXX.XX was broken so we told BGR to use YYY.YY which is also located at BGR. We waited for the aircraft to come over so we could climb them to avoid a 058 MIA that is just outside of BGR approaches airspace. BGR called and said Aircraft X tried YYY.YY and could [not] reach us. We told them to try it again and if no luck to use XXX.XX as the site was working so we eventually would get the aircraft it just may be a bit before we can talk to them. At the time Aircraft X was about 2 minutes from the 058 MIA while still at 050. We called BGR back and asked them to climb Aircraft X to 070 which they did. By the time Aircraft X was climbing they hit the 058 shelf while starting the climb out of 050. We were still unable to communicate with the aircraft and once they were clear of the shelf and above 060 we finally got communications with them on the site. Suggestion: Even though we didn't know about YYY.YY being down at the time we should have told BGR to climb Aircraft X when they first called to prevent any more frequency issues that could happen and we eventually did run into. Starting off by using positive control and getting the aircraft climbing where we know they are communicating with someone to ensure a safe altitude would have prevent them being below the MIA.

Synopsis

ZBW Controller reported limited radio capability to issue a climb clearance resulted in an aircraft entering a higher MVA and a CFTT event.

ACN: 2091195 *(26 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
State Reference : NM
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 21000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAB
Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Small Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Ambulance
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class E : ZAB

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 8
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2091195
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Software and Automation
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

We had military GPS Jamming in effect and airports were reporting IMC/IFR conditions. Aircraft X was a Medevac aircraft that needed to fly the RNAV approach into LRU but did not have a GPS signal due to the Jamming. I called the OMIC (Operating Manager in Charge) to have them stop the jamming so that the aircraft could get into LRU safely. The response was "I will try" and asked for "how long". I gave an estimate to the best of my ability. OMIC called me back and said, "They are going to stop until XA40". I was watching the time and still did not have a cancellation from the aircraft at around XA35". I called the OMIC back and [indicated] that I needed more time before they started jamming again. Got an extension. I then had an aircraft call me for an IFR departure from the same airport. I called the OMIC back again and said I needed even more time. Asked me how long and I said I was unsure. The back and forth between the OMIC and myself was not necessary and did not follow the GPS Jamming procedure in the SOP. The procedure is to stop the jamming then to tell the proponent when they can start again. If I would have not watched the clock and asked for an extension when Aircraft X was on approach, lives could have been lost. I recommend that the ZAB management team is rebriefed on GPS Jamming Procedure in the SOP and also briefed on an annual basis. A meeting with ZAB and Terminal Service would be beneficial.

Synopsis

A ZAB Center Controller reported they had to request the Operations Manager to coordinate ceasing intentional GPS jamming so a medical flight could conduct a RNAV approach to LRU.

ACN: 2091194 *(27 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
State Reference : NM
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7500

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAB
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 2 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class E : ZAB

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 2
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2091194
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Ground Equipment Issue
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

We have three transmitter sites and multiple aircraft were having trouble hearing me on all three. It sounds clear on our end, but I'll try making multiple transmissions to them without a response. When you do finally get a hold of them, the pilots say that we're coming in weak and scratchy. I also had a Supervisor trying to help by giving me

suggestions that I had already been trying, adding an additional distraction. I recommend getting new radio transmitters for all of our south side sectors. We run into this same issue every single day. It's only a matter of time before there's an accident with an aircraft that we can't talk to or find the right radio settings in time to save.

Synopsis

Albuquerque Center Controller reported they routinely have difficulty communicating with aircraft due to faulty transmitters.

ACN: 2091189 *(28 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
State Reference : NM

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAB
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class A : ZAB
Airspace.Class E : ZAB

Component

Aircraft Component : GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAB.ARTCC
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 18
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2091189
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Software and Automation
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

There was GPS jamming going on near the TXO VOR. I took the position around XA30 and immediately started seeing target jumps that I initially considered a radar issue. I questioned the pilot, and he said he thought he was on course but was having issues with his GPS. After turning that into the Controller in Charge, I started having multiple pilots report issues with failing ADSB equipment and their GPS's not working. While taking these reports, an Aircraft X flight going to ZZZ reported that he would have to come off his RNAV routing if the GPS jamming did not stop. During and after this interaction with the Aircraft X flight, the Supervisor in the area was on the phone, working on coordination for another sector in the area. Feeling that safety was degrading, I called the Operation Manager on my VSCS (Voice Switching Control System) only to find that it was forwarded to TMU (Traffic Management Unit). I asked the TMU to have the Operations Manager call me, not understanding why the line was forwarded to TMU in the first place. After hanging up, multiple pilots said they had GPS and ADSB issues. I called the Operations Manager again, and the line was still forwarded to TMU. I asked her to relay to the Operations Manager that the GPS jamming needed to stop and that aircraft were advising they would potentially have to come off their route. After hanging up, the Supervisor in the area finished his phone coordination and left the area to discuss the situation, only to return with the understanding that the Operations Manager had decided to continue the GPS jamming and not "stop the buzzer" because the aircraft still had other ways to navigate. This decision is not the process that has been repeatedly briefed to the workforce. While not as severe as some prior GPS jamming events, tonight's events were unsafe and could hurt people in a more severe or complex situation. This issue has been going on for years at ZAB. There have been multiple briefings on the order, with several serious conversations with the military on the effects of GPS jamming. It has been repeatedly briefed to our facility that if jamming is affecting one aircraft, much less multiple, they are to stop the jamming operation and "stop buzzer." The Manager On Duty deciding that the effect on the plane wasn't severe enough to stop jamming is alarming. Someone not flying the plane nor working the positions taking the equipment failure reports should be deciding to continue jamming. Someone will get hurt ignoring the pilot reports or deciding for pilots how much equipment can fail or be unreliable before they "agree" or decide to stop GPS jamming. Suggestion: Stop GPS jamming when aircraft equipment starts to fail or is unreliable. Retrain Operation Managers on how critical a situation is when equipment fails or is unreliable in an aircraft. Follow existing protocol for GPS jamming and "stop buzzer" procedures. Brief the workforce on the process to stop GPS jamming.

Synopsis

ZAB Center Controller reported planned GPS jamming in their sectors near the TXO VOR caused an air carrier and other aircraft to experience navigation difficulties.

ACN: 2091187 *(29 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 400

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : PA-18/19 Super Cub
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2091187
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was approaching a 2nm final for Runway XXR, cleared for the option. Aircraft Y was about to turn a 2nm left base for Runway XXL. I issued Aircraft Y the traffic information about Aircraft X. Aircraft Y reported traffic in sight. I issued Aircraft X traffic information about Aircraft Y. Aircraft X reported traffic in sight. About 30 seconds to 1 minute later Aircraft X reported that Aircraft Y almost ran into him on final and that he had to deviate off of his approach. He stated that Aircraft Y was about 20 ft. away from him. Aircraft X rejoined final, completed his touch and go, on Runway XXR and Aircraft Y landed safely on Runway XXL. After landing Aircraft Y reported that his student took the aircraft through final and he did not recover in time, but he estimated that he was about 200 ft. away from Aircraft X. Although this event was not ideal, this is how a Class D airspace and parallel Runways work with 2 VFR aircraft. Appropriate traffic information was exchanged between the two aircraft, they had each other in sight, and saw and avoided. If Aircraft X is correct about only having 20 ft. between him and the parallel traffic, separation was still not lost. The only way to fully correct this at ZZZ would be to either fully eliminate simultaneous parallel runway operations or change our class of airspace to require more stringent separation.

Synopsis

A Tower Local Controller reported a VFR aircraft overshot the final approach course into confliction with VFR traffic on the parallel runway resulting in a NMAC.

ACN: 2091178 *(30 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202403
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : LAF.Tower
State Reference : IN

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : LAF
Aircraft Operator : FBO
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Training
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class D : LAF

Component

Aircraft Component : Electrical Power
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : LAF.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2091178
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Workload
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Departure Airport
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was in the pattern for runway 10 along with a few other aircraft and after his last touch and go reported loss of power over the departure end runway 10. Runway 23 was immediately offered to the pilot reference their altitude and position over the field. The pilot stated that they could accept Runway 23 and was cleared to land. As the pilot began to make the turn for runway 23, they advised that they were getting partial power back but was unable to align safely with runway 23 and would prefer runway 28. Aircraft X was then cleared to land runway 28 opposite direction and issued the current winds. Because Aircraft X was landing opposite direction to all other traffic two aircraft were sent around on runway 10. Aircraft Y was sent around at about a mile final runway 10 as well as Aircraft Z on about a 2 mile final. Aircraft X was able to safely land runway 28 and exit at taxiway Charlie 2. Aircraft X was also able to successfully taxi back to parking via taxiways Charlie, Bravo, and Delta. Currently there is no crash phone at LAF and given the situation of unexpected opposite direction operations, my first intention was to clear all other aircraft out of the way for Aircraft X in distress. Once all potential conflicts were tended to, Aircraft X successfully landed the aircraft and said that they did not require any further assistance. All of the necessary paperwork and point of contacts were notified in a timely manner. Had there been an operational crash phone available in the cab, I would have been able to quickly and promptly call both the police and fire department while continuing to work simultaneously. Luckily they were not needed and people are property were protected. I think LAF should be provided an operational crash phone asap for potential events similar to this one. Again, luckily everything worked out fine but if it had been an inexperienced pilot operating Aircraft X that aircraft could have easily ended up landing in the grass or on a non movement area. Being able to continue to work and simultaneously talk to the proper authorities is huge when dealing with low altitude and spontaneous situations taking place directly at the field.

Synopsis

LAF Tower Controller reported the lack of an operational crash phone hinders the ability to contact first responders as highlighted by a recent aircraft loss of power incident.

ACN: 2090425 *(31 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.Tower
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 100

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Corporate
Make Model Name : Jet/Long Ranger/206
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase : Descent
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Lancair IV/IVP
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase : Taxi
Route In Use : None

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Supervisor / CIC
Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 1
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2090425
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working Ground Control combined with Controller in Charge (CIC) when a lancair landed at ZZZ and was told to taxi to local flight school via taxiway 1. Meanwhile, another aircraft requested to land taxiway 1 with a helicopter, which I approved. The lancair would have been off taxiway 1 in front of the helicopter. Since he had sounded unfamiliar while on local's frequency which I had been monitoring as CIC I clearly instructed him that he should take the left turn at taxi lane 2 to get to his destination, and that a helicopter would be landing on the other side of taxiway 2 on taxiway 1. He read it all back. But a few minutes later, I saw him taxiing past taxiway 2 with the helicopter above the ramp coming down to land. I immediately told the lancair to hold his position and got the read back. At this point he was still past where the helicopter would land. Also told local to send the helicopter around, which he did. After the helicopter was clear of the runway again, I told the lancair to continue taxiing, and gave local permission again for landing on taxiway 1. There was nothing else I could have done for this pilot; I needed him to be more familiar with the airport, or to ask questions if he was unsure about my instructions.

Synopsis

A Tower Controller reported an aircraft did not comply with their taxi instructions and proceeded onto a taxiway that a helicopter was cleared to land on.

ACN: 2090112 *(32 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Make Model Name : PA-34-200T Turbo Seneca II
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Direct
Route In Use : VFR Route

Person : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 15
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 0
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2090112
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Person : 2

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 14
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 0
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2090118
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X IFR ZZZ to ZZZ1, canceled IFR and requested flight following. Approximately 20 miles later requested to pick up IFR again. I issued clearance "Aircraft X cleared to ZZZ1 via direct ZZZZZ direct ZZZ1 maintain 100." Aircraft X's readback was stepped on but upon reviewing the playback it sounds like her read back "cleared to ZZZ1 via direct." Multiple fighters were recovering the from SUAs (special use airspace) at the time and I neglected to follow up on the readback that was covered. I was alerted to the MSAW alert by the next Controller, I could not discern it from the erroneous alerts caused by the fighter recovery. When I was made aware of the situation I issued a climb to the ZZZ2. "Aircraft X climb and maintain 110 immediately" I then issued a low altitude alert. Suggestions: Get clarification on readback if it is covered.

Narrative: 2

Aircraft X was on an IFR flight plan with good route and altitude and cancelled IFR for flight fallowing and turned direct to his destination, the fighters started recovering from the military airspace in different flight configurations and callsigns than they entered the airspace on. I became task saturated on the D-side entering fighter flight plans and getting the R-side beacon codes in a timely manor. During this period Aircraft X asked again for an IFR clearance and was clearly issued his previous route of ZZZZZ direct ZZZ1 at 100 which is good route and altitude, his read back was partially covered by multiple aircraft but it is a familiar flight and route and we also both observed the aircraft turn towards ZZZZZ and moved on to other duties. I was not watching the scope much at all and fixing/entering fighter flight plans when sector 3 called and asked about the aircraft route. I pointed to it on the score and the R-side immediately climbed the aircraft. I′m unaware of when the MSAW started because all the fighter flights were triggering alerts as usual. Comms in this area are not good at 100 and the pilot had to be issued the climb twice before acknowledging. And was issued a low altitude alert. Splitting the sector was not an option given the timing of the bump in traffic, and had it been split ahead of time all this occurred in sector 06 so I don′t believe it would have helped the frequency congestion or traffic load. It was a missed read back and expectation bias given the route filed, altitude, and the flight being a regular one in the area, on this route regularly.

Synopsis

Two Center Controllers reported an aircraft transiting their sector flew below minimum safe altitude. Controller directed an immediate climb to the aircraft.

ACN: 2089650 *(33 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.Tower
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase : Initial Climb
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Corporate
Make Model Name : Falcon 2000
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Climb
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 9
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2089650
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

This ties into safety concern filed earlier in the same day about ZZZ [TRACON]/ZZZ [Tower] LOA (Letter of Agreement) downwind entries, and how it relates into a near mid air collision in this report. Upon arrival to the facility and working the local control position, working on Runway XX, the main runway that benefits us running the agreed upon northwest heading with our departures because numerous aircraft depart that direction. There is only one prop heading without it. Please see previous report for all details. The crew I was relieving stated that ZZZ [TRACON] informed ZZZ [Tower] that we were unable to depart any aircraft on the northwest heading because ZZZ1 an airport 8 miles southwest of ZZZ was on runway XY. Please note that there is nothing agreed to in the LOA that states the Northwest departure are unusable for that configuration. It only states that ZZZ [Tower] has the authority to turn off the downwind arrival acceptance from ZZZ [TRACON]. These were agreed upon at the same time. At most, the configuration would involve having the VFR aircraft fly north a little further before turning Northwest. These are examples of the situations that cause concerns about positions being staffed and willingness to work the aircraft as our traffic quickly increases in numbers. The tower continued to allow downwind entries, more than likely because of the complaints when they are turned off. The tower was, at times dealing with aircraft they could not get out and departed traffic on the only prop heading available, which was southeast. It caused unnecessary delays for departing aircraft. An aircraft decided to taxi back to a hangar from the excessive delays on the ground. These are reported from the controllers working at the time. ZZZ controller continued to work without the LOA assigned heading and allowing VFR downwind entries for several hours. The incident today happened a few hours later after the controllers continued to put prop aircraft out on the southeast heading (90 percent were wanting to go Northwest). The Local Controller cleared Aircraft X for takeoff, departing runway XX on a heading of 140. The Local Controller then cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff heading 170. Once Aircraft Y was off the runway, the ZZZ [TRACON] controller turned Aircraft X to west and the tag displayed the west sector. After the aircraft was turning observed out the window the ZZZ [TRACON] controller asked if Aircraft X could turn west because that was the direction he wanted to go. The local controller told ZZZ [TRACON] that Aircraft Y was departing at that time. After the ZZZ [TRACON] controller hung up, Aircraft Y was observed flying directly at Aircraft X altitude 017 ft. Aircraft X was at 1500 ft. and climbing to 3000 ft. The local controller immediately turned Aircraft Y to a 140 heading. The targets began to merge on the radar, but thankfully Aircraft Y was observed turning in time out the window to miss Aircraft X. I think the overall cause of a situation like this is what I brought up in the previous report, It's easy to make aircraft fly miles out of their way because it takes more effort to work them in the general direction they want to go. It's also easier to put all aircraft into the downwind for tower to sequence. At some point a realization needs to occur. It does make since for the VFR

aircraft to go westbound. But this aircraft was flying miles out of their way and turned back into the departure corridor without tower coordination. No turns back into the final without coordination. Its easier to not coordinate and do it anyway. This airport, and this airspace is becoming too busy. The northwest heading was desperately needed to untie the tower's hands and move all this VFR traffic. There needs to be real justification to take it away. ZZZ [Tower] needs more standardization. We need traffic sequenced by the approach control and we need to be able to depart the growing number of aircraft safely. If we were able to depart northwest to begin with, this would not have happened. There should not be a reason the tower cannot launch VFR aircraft on 200 heading off of runway XX. ZZZ [TRACON] was worried about the current procedure that put VFR aircraft on a downwind departure off of runway XX, clear of runway XZ final and then switched on a 300 heading. It's too much for the tower and put aircraft in the general direction of the 19 final, although it still works fine. A 200 heading would be easier for the tower and give ZZZ [TRACON] more options. 8 miles southwest should be no concern for a VFR C172 aircraft on a 200 heading. This would also allow ZZZ [Tower] to depart aircraft without having to place on a downwind and then turn clear of the crossing final and spend more time scanning the runway.

Synopsis

A Tower Controller reported a NMAC occurred due to TRACON turning a departing C172 into the path of a subsequent business jet departure without coordination.

ACN: 2089492 *(34 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202312
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : EDC.Airport
State Reference : TX

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10
Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : EDC
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class D : EDC

Person

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location Of Person.Facility : EDC.Tower
Reporter Organization : Contracted Service
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Non Radar : 9
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Military : 6
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 9
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2089492
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Pilot was flying VFR, checked on frequency to the east of the airport. I gave him instructions to enter a left downwind at midfield for Runway 13 and advised he was not in sight. He read back the instructions. He later keys up and asks if he's supposed to make a right turn to enter the left downwind. I told him if he was coming from the east at midfield like instructed, he was in fact supposed to make a right turn to enter the left downwind. I then noticed an aircraft flying over the departure end of my runway from south to north and verified with the pilot if that was him. He confirmed and said he no longer wanted to land and wanted to go on course to his destination. This whole ordeal was very unsafe and if I had traffic he would have been a very serious problem. If we had a radar display at this facility this whole situation could have been avoided without any sort of incident or confusion. We cannot see 90% of aircraft until they're about 1 - 2 miles away. This is unacceptable on the pilot's part as well as he should report the correct direction he is coming from. Please do something about this before something seriously bad happens. Get us a radar display, take some pilot certifications, and update our Management when actions are taken so we know something is being done. We do not have access to Cedar here as we are a new contract Tower. We don't have access to the FAA network to properly put in deviations. This is the 3rd report I have made in the last few months or so.

Synopsis

EDC Tower Controller reported an arriving aircraft made an incorrect position report and flew across the departure end of the active runway without notifying ATC. The reporter stated there is no radar display at the facility and Controllers cannot see most of the aircraft until they are within close proximity.

ACN: 2086529 *(35 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : P50.TRACON
State Reference : AZ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12000

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : P50
Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class B : PHX

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : P50
Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class B : PHX

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : P50.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Radar : 5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2086529
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X called on frequency, and I assigned them to cross YOLOW at 7,000. Pilot read back cross YOLOW at 7,000. I called another aircraft (Aircraft Y) and told them that traffic was no factor, descend and maintain 6,000. Our radios are terrible on the sector (previously reported by me), and apparently Aircraft X read back maintain 6,000 instead of or at the same time as Aircraft Y. Aircraft X descended below the MVA by 200 feet, and said airport in sight. I just cleared the aircraft for the visual approach at that point (bypassing a safety alert as he was only few hundred feet below the MVA and had the airport in sight). I've previously asked that we add "EXPECT to CROSS YOLOW at 7,000" on the DSERT2 STAR as this altitude bust is a common problem but nothing has been done. Suggestions: Fix the radio issues at the sector so that coverage is better and it doesn't sound like an HF radio with a lot of garbled messages as well as add "Expect to cross YOLOW at 7,000" on the DSERT2 STAR.

Synopsis

P50 TRACON Controller reported very poor radio quality resulted in altitude readback error and a CFTT event.

ACN: 2085583 *(36 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : PUB.Airport
State Reference : CO

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : PUB
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class D : PUB

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : PUB.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Non Radar : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2085583
Human Factors : Troubleshooting

Events

Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X called up VFR from the north and requested a full stop taxi back. I instructed Aircraft X to enter a left downwind for Runway 8R. Aircraft X continued inbound. As Aircraft X was approaching the PUB radar and turning to join the downwind I noticed that the aircraft appeared very low. I checked the tower radar display and observed the aircraft

at 4,900 ft. I issued a low altitude alert to Aircraft X and issued the PUB Altimeter and traffic pattern altitude. Aircraft X climbed back to a safe altitude and landed safely. The ATIS was out of service when this happened but I don't believe it played into this incident. MSAW did not activate because the aircraft was VFR. Suggestion: Pilots should be aware of their altitude and the different hazards associated with night flight.

Synopsis

PUB Tower Controller reported issuing a low altitude alert to a night VFR arrival that entered the pattern below minimum safe altitude, resulted in a CFTT event.

ACN: 2085582 *(37 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Initial Climb
Route In Use : None

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : M-7
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Taxi
Route In Use : None

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2085582
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

During a training session on Local 1, my trainee had cleared Aircraft X for takeoff on Runway XXR full length. Departure called requesting the transfer on an Aicraft that had departed IFR and was previously transferred. The IFR Aircraft was eastbound flying towards ZZZ finals and this took immediate priority in my opinion which is what I was focused on. My trainee decided to issue an instruction to Aircraft Y "Runway XXR, Line Up and Wait". I ignored this instruction and went to the IFR Aircraft to transfer control to Departure again. From where I was standing I could not see the strip for Aircraft Y. I did not know that Aircraft Y was at intersection 1. I turned back to the Runway in time to see Aircraft X airborne, over flying Aircraft Y, who had taxied onto Runway XXR at [intersection] 1, by approximately 150-200AGL. I was focused on several things that the trainee had going on. He had just turned 2 VFR Aircraft right at each other to the southeast. He didn't get a readback on the IFR Aircraft when he transferred control, which prompted me to have to call Departure and let them know the pilot needed to read back their instructions. When Departure called back, it was clearly a situation that needed to be fixed right away. When the trainee told Aircraft Y to Line Up and Wait, he didn't use "at [intersection] 1" which we later found out, he didn't read the strip and also didn't know Aircraft Y was at [intersection] 1. From where we all have to stand while training local 1, it makes it very difficult to read the strips in the bay, as the bay is located between local 1 and ground control.

Synopsis

A Tower Local Controller providing OJT reported they did not notice their trainee cleared an aircraft to line up and wait from an intersection on a runway when another aircraft taking off from full length overflew them by less than 200 feet.

ACN: 2085581 *(38 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.Tower
State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Learjet 45
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Ambulance
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-900
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Person : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Traffic Management
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 13
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2085581
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure

Person : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2085955

Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Person : 3

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Handoff / Assist
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 13
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2086510
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

As I was working the Traffic Management position, I was scanning the ASDE monitor located at my position. As I was watching the monitor, I noticed the runway lights on Runway XXR light up like it usually does when an aircraft is either on departure roll, or on short final and touching down on Runway XXR. It struck me as odd that the runway was lighting up because at the same time, I noticed Aircraft crossing Runway XXR downfield, and that there was no aircraft on departure roll. I immediately ran over to the Local position to alert them of possible traffic lined up to land on the wrong runway. At that point, the audible alert activated of a "WARNING" to runway XXR. I yelled out to send the traffic around!! Local immediately sent Aircraft X around. I strongly recommend a change both locally and nationally at the position of record in the control tower. The Local controller and local assist are scanning and listening to read backs and could easily miss

noticing if an aircraft is lined up to the correct runway. Here are my recommendations. Start Staffing a position called, "Final Surveillance" or "Local Surveillance". The Final Surveillance position would utilize the TMC (traffic management center) radar scope located next to the Local position to Surveil a close range of 3-5 miles surrounding the finals for ZZZ [airport]. This position of record would be responsible for monitoring to ensure that each arrival on BOTH complexes are correctly lined up to the assigned runway based on the depicted radar data. At the 3 mile final point, if the aircraft isn't correctly lined up to its assigned runway, that controller would alert the affected Local position by calling on a landline and/or alerting them by stating it audibly in the cab. This layer of safety would ensure that ALL inbound aircraft to its assigned runway are correctly lined up to the correct runway. This Local Surveillance position would not monitor any frequencies, only monitor the final. We've had runway closures and complex taxiway closures adding to the unfamiliar scenario to both our flight crews and our controllers. We've had wintry weather affecting the configuration of ZZZ with more forecasted before the end of the month, which will add risk to the situation. Finally, this landing on wrong surfaces issue has been a top nationwide issue. Lets not wait to implement safety related tools which will help fix the problem now. Lets not rely on an ASDEX equipment which is routinely out of service either planned or unplanned to alert us to aircraft lined up for the wrong runway. Lets get ahead of this thing NOW!

Narrative: 2

Aircraft X was on Visual approach Runway XXL and was cleared to land. Traffic was given that traffic in position will depart prior to their arrival. The aircraft on Runway XXL departed and I was trying to give traffic on another aircraft that departed Runway XXL. As I was looking west to give the traffic. Aircraft X on a Visual Approach lined up for the wrong runway. I had lined up Aircraft Y on Runway XXR with traffic crossing down field. That's when the alarm went off the send Aircraft X around. So I did. The departing traffic on the upwind was no factor with Aircraft X Go around so traffic wasn't given. It was standard go around instructions. Suggestion: Better scan from me.

Narrative: 3

I was Local Assist when Aircraft X checked in for [Runway] XXL. Local Control told Aircraft X that traffic would hold in position and XXL cleared to land. Meanwhile the spacing was looking tight to get the GA aircraft holding in position out while having 3 miles with the previous departure off of XXR. Being a local flight, I offered to coordinate an inside turn to 200 with the GA aircraft off XXL to get them airborne before arrival of Aircraft X. Local Control opted for a turn at the shoreline instead of early turn to 200 with the GA. This required some focus on the upwind to get visual separation applied until the GA had turned inside the previous XXR departure. With attention on the upwind, alarm for XXR went off. I shouted "Aircraft X go around" hoping Local Control would say exactly that, and they did. I coordinated the go around with departure. I do wish there was an easier way to decipher the track on the arrival. The markings on the map are so close together for XXL or XXR. ZZZ is such a compact airport, it's hard to get much improvement in that area I suppose. I personally mitigate this with a map that isn't zoomed out very far.

Synopsis

Tower Controllers reported they did not notice an aircraft lined up on short final for the wrong runway with another aircraft holding in position on the runway until the ASDE X alerted them.

ACN: 2084287 *(39 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Landing
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class D : ZZZ

Person : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Non Radar : 5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2084287
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Person : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Radar : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2084048
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Landing Without Clearance

Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Airport

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was cleared to land on runway XXL, but landed without receiving a landing clearance on a closed runway while personnel and equipment were occupying the departure end of runway XXR. The aircraft exited the runway at taxiway 1 (approximately 3600 ft. available - where the personnel and equipment were. No injuries or damage occurred. Brasher warning was given via recorded landline. Additional information - Runway edge lights were off, however FAA personnel were on the departure end of runway XXR erecting the first runway 'X' closure signs for runway XYL (Runway XXR 'X' was not up yet). Also, the MALSF approach lights (airport managed, not FAA) were on a low visibility setting, which could have affected the outcome of this deviation/incursion if they has been turned completely off. Suggestions: #1 In order to prevent aircraft from being able to visually line up with a closed runway, suggest the airport to make sure all runway lights, including the approach lights, are turned off. #2 Ensure pilots understand that they need a valid landing clearance from the tower before landing on any runway. If in doubt, ask ATC to clarify if they are cleared to land. #3 Even during the day, from the tower's vantage point, all aircraft appear to be aligned with either runway; you cannot tell which runway they are aligned with until they are fewer than 700 feet above it. Now it's even harder to discern if they are aligned with the assigned runway at night.

Narrative: 2

Aircraft X was cleared for a visual approach to runway XXL at ZZZ. The aircraft landed on closed runway XXR. ZZZ tower was open. I had no idea this happened until I received a text this morning. After listening to my recording, I became aware that I cleared this aircraft for a visual approach to runway XXL and instructed them to contact ZZZ tower. They readback, "cleared visual approach, contact tower". After some research into this event, there were holes in the swiss cheese everywhere. I have not yet gotten briefed on exactly what happened at ZZZ but there seems to be many issues that could have stopped this incident from occurring. A few contributing factors (some I learned after the incident). I don't believe the aircraft was ever cleared to land. After speaking to some prior ZZZ tower controllers, I learned that at night it is very hard to see whether and aircraft is lined up for XXL or XXR. It's impossible to see if an aircraft is landing XXL or XXR on our scope because of how close the runways are together. I heard that the runway lights/approach lights were not set appropriately. I believe a prior controller told the aircraft to expect runway XXR, possibly not knowing about the closure or told them prior to the closure occurring. The aircraft had VA (visual approach) in the scratch pad indicating to me they were already issued a runway assignment. I believe the aircraft had an ATIS that did not advertise the closure. The pilot also did not sound very proficient on the tapes. Suggestion: In hindsight, I should have clarified that the pilot was cleared visual approach to runway XXL and that the right side was closed. Though this was not the best readback, it was a correct readback.

Synopsis

TRACON and Tower Controllers reported traffic landed on closed parallel runway at night, without a clearance. Controllers reported that the lit X closure indicator was not in place and it was difficult for tower to determine aircraft runway alignment at night.

ACN: 2084286 *(40 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A321
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Mission : Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight Phase : Taxi
Route In Use : None

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : PC-24
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Takeoff / Launch
Route In Use : None

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 15
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2084286
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working GC and coordinated to cross runway XX at [taxiway] 1. LC (training in progress) approved the runway crossing. I instructed Maintenance to cross RWY XX at 1 and turn right on TWY 2 for their engine runs. While I was reading a clearance I heard Local Control clear an aircraft for takeoff but I wasn't sure which runway. I then stopped reading my clearance and started scanning. I then told LC that I was still crossing runway XX and the trainer tried to cancel the takeoff clearance, but they said to "cancel their landing clearance." Then the OJTI keyed up and told Company to cancel their takeoff clearance, but I think they used the incorrect call sign. There was also a Company aircraft on final. Then the OJTI issued the cancel takeoff clearance with the correct call sign, and the aircraft turned off the runway. I'm not sure what recommendations to make other that we must all remain vigilant and continue to scan, use team work, and coordinate runway crossings accurately to prevent runway incursions.

Synopsis

A Tower Ground Controller reported the Local Controller cleared an aircraft for takeoff while another aircraft was taxiing across the runway.

ACN: 2082692 *(41 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Fractional
Make Model Name : Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Climb
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Function.Air Traffic Control : Handoff / Assist
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2082692
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working the Radar Assist Position at Location A sector. I released an IFR departure (Aircraft X) on the ZZZZZ Departure climbing to 4000 ft. The Radar Controller was busy with a recent runway change and sequencing the arrivals into a difficult runway operation. I did my best to let the controller know that I released an IFR departure off ZZZ. The aircraft departed on the wrong beacon code and I alerted the controller that the aircraft needed to be on XXXX beacon code as the aircraft was IFR. At ZZZ it is not uncommon for aircraft to call for their IFR beacon code and depart VFR to pickup their IFR flight plan in the air. The Controller Radar identified the aircraft after a few minutes due to the complexity of the sector at the time. The controller then turned the aircraft to a 360 heading to move them away from other traffic but failed to climb the aircraft. During this time as the Assist, I was coordinating with other aircraft on the ground at ZZZ awaiting their IFR departures while trying to keep my eyes on the scope. Once I realized Aircraft X was northbound at 4000 ft. in an MVA of 6000 ft. it was too late and I told the controller to turn and climb the aircraft away from the terrain. The Low Altitude alert went off, and the controller never gave the Low Altitude Alert phraseology as he felt the turn and climb was sufficient to get the aircraft away from the terrain while dealing the rest of the sector at the time. He told me that he thought the aircraft departed VFR and was looking for the IFR clearance in the air. Obviously there was a communication breakdown and we weren't on the same page. The assist holds to right to release IFR departures off ZZZ, and it is customary to let the Radar Controller know that you have released an IFR departure off a satellite airport. If there was any change that needs to happen, it would be that the assist would change the radar tag to VFR if aircraft who depart VFR to eliminate any confusion on the status of the flight.

Synopsis

A TRACON Handoff/Assist controller reported the Radar Controller vectored a departing aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 2082683 *(42 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202402
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZAU.ARTCC
State Reference : IL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 9000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZAU
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class E : ZAU

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZAU.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 17
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2082683
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Chart Or Publication

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X reported on frequency. Everything appeared normal so I climbed him to 23000 ft. Aircraft began making a left turn off course. I asked if the aircraft was going to fix. He said yes. Continued to turn, near another departure, also climbing out. Approach called on shout line asking what aircraft was doing, and stopped other aircraft at 8000 ft. I turned aircraft away from other aircraft and expedited him to an altitude above other aircraft. Apparently, Aircraft X had MOBIL, rather than MOBLE. Original flight plan had correct fix. Not sure where the foul up was. Next time I will ask with phonetics rather than clear common language.

Synopsis

Chicago Center Controller reported an aircraft deviated from direct MOBIL clearance because they entered the fix MOBLE in their FMS which is also a fix in the NAS.

ACN: 2081579 *(43 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202401
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Bonanza 33
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Direct
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 8
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2081579
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Working SB and multiple reports of icing between 4000 and 2500 ft. ZZZ called and said they were busy so I told them to give me all aircraft altitude separated and everything was approved. Aircraft X checked in and the first call, I believe, the pilot said he was in icing and requested lower. I pulled up the MVA and saw 2000 ft. so I got on the line with ZZZ and requested control for descent. ZZZ gave me control and I issued a decent from 3000 ft. to 2000 ft. The Low Altitude alarm went off shortly after and I issued a low altitude alert and climbed Aircraft X up to 3000 ft. No recommendations, this was my failure to correctly read the MVA map.

Synopsis

A TRACON Controller reported they descended an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude due to misreading the Minimum Vectoring Map.

ACN: 2081184 *(44 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202401
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Ground : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : Military
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Training
Flight Phase : Taxi

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y
Aircraft Operator : Corporate
Make Model Name : Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Landing

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Ground
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 16
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 0
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2081184
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I taxied Aircraft X from FBO to Runway XXR for departure via taxiway 1 initially, to hold short of Runway YY. After receiving permission from Local Control 2 I continued their taxi with a left on Runway YY, crossing Runway XXC, and then a right on taxiway 2 to the full length. The above was readback correctly and it appeared Aircraft X was complying. Local Control 2 informed me of Aircraft X deviated from the aforementioned route and heading towards the intersection of Runway XXR and Runway YY where it appeared Aircraft Y was on landing roll-out. I pleaded with "Aircraft X" to stop several times before adding the "[last part of their call sign]". I later saw them make an unprompted 180 and begin heading back southbound on Runway ZZ, so I issued a left on taxiway 2. It definitely appeared Aircraft X had crossed the hold line for the intersecting runways but couldn't determine what their proximity was with the Aircraft Y. The Tower team saved the day today, especially the watchful eye of Local Controller 2. It definitely seems like 100% pilot error in this particular case. No recommendations.

Synopsis

Tower Ground Controller reported a taxing aircraft began to stray from its clearance and caused a critical ground conflict with a landing craft. The Controller states there were several calls to the wayward aircraft before contact was made.

ACN: 2081180 *(45 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202401
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use : GPS
Flight Phase : Descent

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 15
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 0
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2081180
Human Factors : Other / Unknown
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I gave Company "reduce speed to 170 then descend and maintain 9 thousand." It was read-back correctly. Right after I passed on a PIREP to a Supervisor and gave a relief briefing to split off half of my airspace. I frequently give 8 thousand as an altitude assignment in this area so it didn't catch my attention when they descended below 9. However the moment they descended below 8 thousand I stopped the descent and climbed them back up. The MVA was 075 but rose to 080 before they got to 080. I did not report this to the supervisor because I have been issued a proposed 1-day suspension due to allegations brought forth by the same Supervisor. I feel extremely uncomfortable working around this person.

Synopsis

Air traffic Controller reported being distracted with briefings and sector updating while an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude.

ACN: 2080752 *(46 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202401
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.Tower
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5300

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TOWER
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Instructor
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 13
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) : 0
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2080752
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was training on Local Control. Aircraft X was on a visual approach to RWY XX. The pilot instead of joining the straight in final for RWY XX turned back to join our offset final on the RNAV Y RWY XX approach. I believe this to be the contributing factor as why the aircraft was unstable and went around. If these pilots intend to back up the visual with this approach, they should inform the radar controller so they can vector appropriately. But when they are cleared for visual expecting a straight in and then turn back across they create an unstable approach. When the aircraft went around, I instructed the trainee to ask the pilot if they would prefer to stay in the traffic pattern or to be handed off to radar for resequencing. The pilot thought for a moment and requested to stay with us in the pattern so I instructed him to enter the right downwind. I chose the right downwind because we had traffic arriving and departing RWY XY. I was discussing with my trainee what needs to be done with go arounds and also how another aircraft in our patterned needed to be handled and coordination that needed to be done with radar controller reference both aircraft. I looked up to the scope and noticed that the pilot still hadn't turned downwind as instructed and was 10 miles out on the crosswind leg. This is way further than I expected. We have heavy aircraft in the pattern all the time that remain within 5 miles. I instructed the pilot to turn downwind and told him about antennas that the aircraft was pointing at. After observing that the aircraft still hadn't turned I issued a heading to turn to avoid the antennae and an altitude of the current MVA. the aircraft was slow to take that heading and issued a stronger heading to avoid the antennae. At that time I should had also issued a new altitude of 6000 feet but I thought I was giving a heading that would turn to avoid the 6000 ft MVA. I did not issue a low altitude alert because the aircraft was at an altitude above and a heading turned away from the obstacle. Suggestion: If pilots intend to back up their visual approaches and fly the offset final instead of the straight in they should inform the radar controller of their intentions or simply just request the RNAV Y approach. This will allow for a wider and longer turn to final to help for a more stable approach or choose to use the LDA RWY XX as a back up instead. The pilot should have turned downwind sooner as instructed and the obstacle would not have been a factor. Even after I went back and instructed to turn downwind they flew a couple/few more miles before turning, again pointing them directly at the antennas. I feel that even if I had instructed the pilot to climb to 6000 ft for the next MVA it would not have changed the outcome because the aircraft never turned as instructed and was already at an altitude above the obstacle and would not have time to climb much higher by the time reaching a proximity to the obstacle. What is a reasonable pattern? 10 mile crosswind is not reasonable, and who knows how long it would have been if I didn't again instruct to turn downwind.15, 20 miles? If the pilots feel that a pattern doesn't give them sufficient time to debrief or setup then they should have requested to be resequenced with radar. (they were given the option and didn't comply) Going forward I will send Go-Arounds on our local missed approach heading and back to approach for resequencing, and train my trainees to do the same.

Synopsis

Local controller reported aircraft on go around did not respond to control instructions resulting in aircraft flying at an altitude that would be below the MVA. Aircraft finally responded to control instructions at an altitude above and turning away from the obstacle.

ACN: 2080747 *(47 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202401
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Caravan 208A
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 23
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2080747
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was going to build some space for a ZZZ inbound at 6000 ft. to get under a string of ZZZ1 arrivals opposite direction at 5000 ft. I stopped and turned Aircraft X at 6000 ft. and left turn to a 290 heading, and then later right to heading 210, when I meant to continue left. After I realized my mistake, I issued another heading, Low Altitude Alert, and climb to 7000 ft, which was the MVA he entered. Just an old Supervisor trying to get currency and making a mental error. Just a concentration error, I have no recommendation except to be better.

Synopsis

A TRACON Supervisor working a sector reported they turned an aircraft the wrong direction which placed it below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

ACN: 2076812 *(48 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202401
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZNY.ARTCC
State Reference : NY
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 247
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 14
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 29000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility : Rain
Weather Elements / Visibility : Thunderstorm
Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 5000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZNY
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Flight Phase : Initial Climb
Route In Use : Direct
Airspace.Class A : ZNY
Airspace.Class E : ZNY

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZNY.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Supervisor / CIC
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 14
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2076812
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1

Systemic similar frequency issue that has occurred countless times and been reported through faa system previously. ZNY (New York ARTCC) area B sector 56 (Kennedy) has a similar frequency of 125.32 as a sector in ZBW (Boston ARTCC) area B sector 38 (Athens) of 135.32. Both of these sectors work departures off of N90 (New York TRACON) and multiple times per day aircraft are incorrectly switched to the ZNY area B sector 56 controller. This is an extremely dangerous situation that results in frequency congestion and aircraft incorrectly taking climb clearances for other aircraft with similar sounding call signs. This has resulted in significant losses of separation and wake turbulence events. This is a systemic issue that has been pushed up the chain of command by controllers and operation supervisors at ZNY ARTCC but has not been addressed for numerous years. The necessary action to mitigate this systemic safety issue would be to have one of the ATC sectors frequencies changed. This is a human factors issue and all attempts to mitigate this situation by air traffic controllers have not been successful over an extended period of time. Additional information that supports the need for a frequency change is that the ZNY area B sector R56 (Kennedy) is the busiest sector at ZNY ARTCC and is often combined with an additional sector of R42 (east Texas) due to ongoing staffing shortages of ATC personnel at the ZNY ARTCC. These staffing shortfalls negatively affect the safety of the NAS and have no near term solutions. Please push for this change as it is a known and on going systemic issue that is outside of the controller work force's control and a factor that contributes to a reduction in the safety of the National Airspace System.

Synopsis

A New York ARTCC Controller reported their frequency 125.32 is routinely mistaken for Boston ARTCC 135.32. Both sectors work N90 departure traffic resulting in separation errors and confusion when aircraft are issued or read back the wrong similar sounding frequency.

ACN: 2076185 *(49 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202401
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : Large UAS (At or above 1320 lbs)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ
Configuration (UAS) : Fixed Wing

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Radar : 8
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2076185
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
UAS Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Other
UAS Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Remote PIC

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I accepted a handoff from RXX on this aircraft descending to 100. Upon talking to the pilot, I asked what altitude they'd like to enter the range at. They replied that they were fine entering at 100, so I coordinated with RXX that Aircraft X was going to stay at 100. As the aircraft neared the boundary of MOA X, they still had not received a clearance onto the range, so I called the range officer to ensure that they were cleared in at 100, which was confirmed by ZZZ Range control. The UAV pilot was talking to the range officer simultaneously, so he did not hear me initially, but on the second try I told him to maintain 100 until established in the range, and terminated his radar service. As he transitioned into MOA Y (070-180), Aircraft X started to descend at a pretty high vertical rate (>1k fpm) all the way down to 020, where the aircraft started to do tight circles over a point. After a few turns, they headed into RXXXX and remained there until I was relieved. Solution: Itinerant military aircraft must have a more thorough briefing of what airspace is or is not hot, and how to remain in their protected airspace unless otherwise coordinated. This is even more critical with UAV ops that do not have the ability to see-and-avoid. In this particular case, my sector was very slow (mostly acting as a frequency relief for [sector] X,) and there was no one under the MOAs for this traffic to conflict with. If there had been a Cherokee or 172 transiting under the MOA as happens very frequently, I wouldn't have been able to get them away from the better-performing-but-effectively-blind UAV in order to prevent an Loss [of separation] or worse.

Synopsis

Air Traffic Controller reported military UAS started a descent that was not coordinated by adjacent facility, resulting in an airspace violation.

ACN: 2076177 *(50 of 50)*

Time / Day

Date : 202401
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : GRB.TRACON
State Reference : WI
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility : Icing

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : GRB
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Nav In Use : GPS
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class E : GRB

Component

Aircraft Component : Manifold Pressure Indication
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Location Of Person.Facility : GRB.TACON
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2076177
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : FAR

Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

At XA:XX Aircraft X requested and was cleared for the GPS RWY 14 Approach into 3D2. I (the approach controller) obtained the weather at 3D2 and advised the pilot that there was 1/4 mile visibility and 002 ceiling with fog. They told me thanks for the update and continued with their approach. Just inside the IAF they were switched to advisory frequency and told to report IFR cancellation when able. Upon their missed approach, the aircraft did not fly the missed approach procedure, but instead went under their own navigation and attempted to land at 3D2 for the next several minutes. Approach control attempted several times on frequency and guard to contact the aircraft and obtain their intentions. Finally, when they were unable to land, the pilot climbed to 030 and contacted approach, requesting a GPS approach into ZZZ. Approach informed the pilot that ZZZ also had ceilings reported below GPS minimums and requested intentions. The pilot chose to divert to ZZZ1. The Approach controller issued a vector for the GPSXX into ZZZ1, and shortly thereafter noticed that the pilot seemed to be unable to maintain a vector. The Controller inquired into the condition of the pilot and the aircraft, to which the pilot then reported that at 3D2 they had picked up severe icing and had several equipment malfunctions/failures. The pilot went on to say that the equipment had all come back and they had come out of the icing, but they still had a 'frozen manifold pressure gauge'. The controller asked if they were in an emergency situation and required assistance, to which the pilot declined and said they were able to continue without assistance. The pilot was then told to call GRB TRACON when on deck, to talk more about the situation. The pilot landed at ZZZ1 at XB:XX without further incident, and called at XB:XY. After asking about what happened, the pilot told me that from the point where they began their approach into 3D2, they had begun to pick up ice, and by the time they were overflying the field, they had 'lost everything'. They attempted several times to land, but could not get the field in sight, and eventually climbed and came back to me. Suggestion: I would like pilots to report any unusual or unsafe condition as soon as possible (i.e. icing as soon as they began their approach, major equipment failure) and also to monitor guard if able. The weather reported at the field was well below minimums for the type of approach attempted. I should have issued more a warning against attempting the requested approach, instead of just issuing the reported weather again.

Synopsis

Approach Controller reported an aircraft did not fly the published missed approach and the pilot reported encountering severe icing conditions and several equipment malfunctions/failures while in IMC. Controller vectored pilot to another airport and they landed without further incident.