ASRS Database Report Set

Checklist Incidents

Report Set Description..........................................A sampling of reports from all aviation arenas referencing checklist issues (design, procedures, distraction, etc.).

Update Number...................................................38

Date of Update....................................................March 7, 2024

Number of Records in Report Set.........................50

Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic
TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating these data of the following points.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. Such incidents are independently submitted and are not corroborated by NASA, the FAA or NTSB. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be clarified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Becky L. Hooey, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to report. Thus, the data can reflect reporting biases. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.

One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concerning specific event types represents the lower measure of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that the real power of ASRS data is the qualitative information contained in report narratives. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, why it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.
Report Synopses
**ACN: 2034107 (1 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

SR-20 flight Instructor reported a message that stated a cylinder problem appeared prior to landing but after following the checklist, the message was gone. Upon roll-out, the engine failed and the aircraft stopped partially on the runway. The flight Instructor and Student pilot coordinated pushing the aircraft off the runway, restarted the engine, and taxied to parking.

**ACN: 2031812 (2 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

B737-700 flight crew reported an engine overheat after starting up Engine #1 following two aborted start attempts on Engine #2 while on the ground. Although the QRH deemed firing both extinguishing bottles into the affected engine unnecessary, the flight crew’s company procedures had it as a required step.

**ACN: 2019819 (3 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

CRJ-200 Captain reported a right bleed duct warning message during climb out while operating a training flight. The Captain performed the checklist procedure and returned to the departure airport for a safe landing.

**ACN: 2018511 (4 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

C172 pilot reported engine power fluctuations during cruise required a diversion to a nearby airport. Pilot stated the checklist does not provide a procedure for this problem and the placement of the placard for switching fuel tanks is in a location that is difficult to view.

**ACN: 2016795 (5 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

Navion pilot reported landing on the runway gear up and was assisted by airport personnel in tugging the aircraft to the hangar. It was a hot day and the pilot reported not following the checklist procedures properly, and did not confirm the landing gear was down and locked.
### ACN: 1993175 (6 of 50)

**Synopsis**
B737 flight crew reported anti skid system failure after selecting gear up. The flight crew ran the QRH and checklists, then checked the autobrake system, which also failed. The flight crew continued to destination airport.

### ACN: 1992246 (7 of 50)

**Synopsis**
A319 Captain reported that the ECAM HYD Y RSVR LO LVL appeared while in cruise. As the flight crew ran and followed the QRH and checklists, there was confusion regarding a procedure with a hydraulic pump. After consulting with Dispatch and Maintenance Control, the flight crew performed an air turnback.

### ACN: 1983222 (8 of 50)

**Synopsis**
B737 Flight Crew reported a suspected Fuel Leak after takeoff. The Flight Crew ran the QRH and checklists and then requested vectors to return to the departure airport. The suspected Fuel Leak continued to worsen, so the Flight Crew requested priority handling and performed an in flight shut down. When complying with the inflight shutdown QRH, it was discovered that the Cross Feed Valve was still open. The flight crew continued to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.

### ACN: 1971341 (9 of 50)

**Synopsis**
ERJ 170/175 Flight Crew reported Engine #2 vibrations in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklist and QRH, solving the vibration problem. Engine #2 then failed. The Flight Crew performed an in flight shut down, and diverted to make a precautionary landing.

### ACN: 1965134 (10 of 50)

**Synopsis**
C560 Flight Crew reported 5 minutes into cruise at FL330 the Master Caution Illuminated and Cabin ALT Illuminated. The Flight Crew requested priority handling and descended, donning oxygen masks. After running the QRH, the Pressurization Control Source Selector was placed in normal and pressurization control was regained. The Flight Crew elected to perform an air turn back and land at departure airport for maintenance.
### ACN: 1942258 (11 of 50)

**Synopsis**

Flight Crew reported a fuel imbalance that increased in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklists and QRH. An in flight shut down of the left engine was accomplished and a request for priority handling was made. The Flight Crew elected to divert and make a precautionary landing.

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### ACN: 1935229 (12 of 50)

**Synopsis**

B737 Flight Crew reported reference to the QRH for engine oil quantity alert failed to provide any situational information, resulting in a diversion.

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### ACN: 1926048 (13 of 50)

**Synopsis**

Air carrier pilot reported GPS Jamming. The reporter also reported a lack of guidance in the QRH when receiving a Terrain Alert while encountering known GPS Jamming.

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### ACN: 1921992 (14 of 50)

**Synopsis**

EMB-170 Flight Crew reported a CABIN ALT HI EICAS Message illuminated passing 10,000 ft. The Flight Crew descended immediately and ran the QRH and checklists. It was discovered that the Cabin Pressurization Selector Knob was not in AUTO. The knob was placed in AUTO and the flight returned to departure airport.

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### ACN: 1919153 (15 of 50)

**Synopsis**

B757 Flight Crew reported receiving a Master Warning and CABIN ALTITUDE EICAS message at cruise. The Crew immediately descended and ran the QRH procedures and were able to continue to the destination airport.

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### ACN: 1909164 (16 of 50)
## Synopsis

B737 NG Flight Crew reported receiving a terrain warning on short final approach to DEN airport due to flap misconfiguration. Flight crew stated they received a late runway change which resulted in a higher-than-normal rate of descent and not completing a checklist.

### ACN: 1903778 (17 of 50)

## Synopsis

B737 First Officer reported a flap asymmetry problem on approach. The Flight Crew executed a go-around and complied with the Checklist/QRH procedures. The Flight Crew then flew the approach to landing at destination airport.

### ACN: 1902025 (18 of 50)

## Synopsis

EMB-145 Flight Crew reported the failure of the HS 1 bleed valve. The pilots stated they ran the QRH, descended to a lower altitude, realized there was not enough fuel to complete the mission at the lower altitude and diverted. The pilots were in communication with their Dispatcher.

### ACN: 1894250 (19 of 50)

## Synopsis

Flight crew reported confusion during QRH procedures for a hydraulic system low quantity event. This led to an unnecessary manual extension of the landing gear, complicating the landing at destination airport.

### ACN: 1894045 (20 of 50)

## Synopsis

First officer reported a Leading Edge Flaps in Transit light on approach. The flight crew requested vectors for troubleshooting and to perform the QRH procedures. The flight crew then resumed the approach to landing at destination airport.

### ACN: 1893085 (21 of 50)

## Synopsis
B737 First Officer reported operating an aircraft with a long history of leading edge flap asymmetry discrepancies. This aircraft had a repeat discrepancy occur during approach to landing. The flight crew performed a go around and complied with the QRH procedures and rejoined the approach and landing at destination airport.

**ACN: 1892419 (22 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
SA-227 Flight Crew reported landing gear failed to retract when selected up after take off. The Flight Crew ran the QRH procedures and elected to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.

**ACN: 1885604 (23 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
Air Carrier Captain reported receiving a warning of smoke in the cargo compartment and returned to departure airport. The Captain reported the QRH does not adequately explain the procedure to resolve this warning.

**ACN: 1861169 (24 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
B757 Captain reported EFB content crashed while doing checklists for an engine fire. Reporter recommends retaining the paper copies of the QRH on the aircraft to mitigate this situation.

**ACN: 1838870 (25 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
Flight crew reported distractions from a near mid air collision resulted in the landing checklist not being performed and a gear up landing.

**ACN: 1838807 (26 of 50)**

**Synopsis**
Flight Attendant reported a required checklist was missing and was found to be non MELable. This caused a breakdown in crew communications and a delay.
**ACN: 1836639 (27 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

EMB-175 Captain reported not finding a QRH procedure for an EICAS caution message and confusion over an associated MEL. The crew requested communicating with maintenance but was denied assistance while in flight.

**ACN: 1824764 (28 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a Stabilizer Out of Trim problem during climb out. They completed the appropriate QRH checklist and performed an air turn back.

**ACN: 1819346 (29 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

Flight crew flying 737 MAX aircraft reported missing the before takeoff checklist and Flight Attendant notification prior to takeoff due to engine warm up time constraints.

**ACN: 1817740 (30 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

B737 flight crew reported that complications and distractions due to weather led to the lack of proper checklist completion, resulting in the nose wheel steering being unavailable during taxi.

**ACN: 1813994 (31 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported fatigue and procedural deviations led to the landing gear not being lowered per the checklist resulting in an unstabilized approach.

**ACN: 1810675 (32 of 50)**

**Synopsis**

B737 MAX Captain reported not activating the auto brake system for RTO when completing the before takeoff checklist.
ACN: 1802425 (33 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported not performing the Before Taxi Checklist and subsequently had not set the flaps to the takeoff setting prior to moving the aircraft. Reporter cited distraction from dealing with face mask issues in the cabin area may have contributed to the event.

ACN: 1784065 (34 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported forgetting to do the pre-takeoff checklist due to being distracted by a passenger being boarded without permission and another passenger not complying with face mask policy.

ACN: 1765654 (35 of 50)

Synopsis
After returning to departure airport with unreliable airspeed indication, the Captain suggested moving necessary charts to the relevant portion of the QRH for ease in location and use.

ACN: 1757535 (36 of 50)

Synopsis
First Officer reported two EICAS messages on final, causing a go around to allow time to run the QRH, landing safely on next approach.

ACN: 1757193 (37 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported auto pilot not engaging as required and non QRH procedures were used to get autopilot to function correctly.

ACN: 1756780 (38 of 50)
Synopsis
B737-700 flight crew could not find checklist for Leading Edge Devices Not Extended.

ACN: 1748126 (39 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported taxiing out to the runway and finding items were missed during their before taxi flow checklist.

ACN: 1740617 (40 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported failure to fully comply with QRH procedure following a pitch trim failure.

ACN: 1726670 (41 of 50)

Synopsis
A flight crew reported they had to shut down an engine but continued to their destination instead of landing at a closer airport as stated in the QRH.

ACN: 1718903 (42 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported a distraction during pushback caused them to taxi without flaps, and not complete the before taxi checklist.

ACN: 1717750 (43 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported a lack of clarity when following the checklist for a shattered cockpit window.

ACN: 1716108 (44 of 50)
Synopsis
B737 Check Airman reported the aircraft checklist verbiage needs to be changed to avoid improper action.

**ACN: 1702340 (45 of 50)**

Synopsis
B757 First Officer reported refusing flight due to lack of clarity with MEL and QRH regarding fuel leak checklists.

**ACN: 1702302 (46 of 50)**

Synopsis
B737-700 Captain reported that a slat malfunction occurred for which there was no QRH procedure that resulted in a precautionary landing.

**ACN: 1702279 (47 of 50)**

Synopsis
B737-700 First Officer reported that distraction and time pressure caused the crew to miss a checklist item that resulted in a fuel imbalance and a diversion.

**ACN: 1701626 (48 of 50)**

Synopsis
B777 Captain reported that, along with other crew members, iPad was missing QRH section.

**ACN: 1696464 (49 of 50)**

Synopsis
Bonanza pilot reported that distraction and failure to follow the checklist resulted in a gear-up landing.

**ACN: 1696236 (50 of 50)**
Synopsis

CRJ-900 Captain reported deviating from the before start checklist fuel section resulting in a Low Fuel warning and a diversion.
Report Narratives
ACN: 2034107 (1 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202309
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: FBO
- Make Model Name: SR20
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Training
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Route In Use: Visual Approach

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Engine
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: FBO
- Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 146
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 184
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 2034107
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

10 minutes prior to landing at ZZZ a CHT CAS message appeared for CHT on Cylinder #1. The checklist called to reduce power, increase airspeed, and increase mixture. The CHT CAS message disappeared. I kept the mixture at the new setting while returning to ZZZ to land. After landing on [Runway] XXL at ZZZ my student rolled down the runway with the power at idle. Approaching Taxiway 1 and turning to exit, my student applied throttle to complete the turn and exit the runway at [Taxiway] 1. The engine started coughing and died and we rolled just past the runway edge marking and came to a stop well before the hold-short lines. I radioed the Tower Controller to let him know that our engine died - he replied that he understood and asked that we get out and push the airplane past the hold-short line to exit the airplane. I also heard the Tower Controller tell the aircraft on final to sidestep to the parallel runway for landing. The controller also told a business jet that their departure on [Runway] XXL would be slightly delayed due to a disabled aircraft still on the runway. After these radio calls I informed the Tower Controller that we would be getting out to push the aircraft past the hold-short line. As the instructor I exited the aircraft and pushed while I instructed my student to steer the aircraft. It took an estimated 3 minutes to push the airplane past the hold-short line. Once past the hold-short line I boarded the aircraft and attempted a hot start procedure - which was successful with a leaner than normal mixture setting and received clearance to taxi to parking without further problems. Our maintenance provider determined during their engine run that the engine will stall when advancing the throttle from idle with a full rich mixture, boost pump on, and air conditioning on. They also advised that with normal ground leaning that the engine appears to be running normally. Cirrus's SR20 POH does not have a high altitude ground leaning procedure. Their start procedure calls for the mixture to be set to full rich which is not ideal for operating at higher altitudes especially in ZZZ1. This incident occurred after landing where the throttle was at idle during the after landing roll-out, and because of the CHT CAS message 10 minutes prior to landing the mixture was more rich than normal - but not full rich. I believe that the student’s application of power to exit the runway may have been too abrupt and with the throttle at idle with a high mixture setting, may have caused this engine failure.

Synopsis
SR-20 flight Instructor reported a message that stated a cylinder problem appeared prior to landing but after following the checklist, the message was gone. Upon roll-out, the engine failed and the aircraft stopped partially on the runway. The flight Instructor and
Student pilot coordinated pushing the aircraft off the runway, restarted the engine, and taxied to parking.
ACN: 2031812 (2 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202309
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737-700
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Turbine Engine

**Person : 1**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 2031812

**Person : 2**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 143
Experience: Flight Crew. Type: 760
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 2031824

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result. General: Maintenance Action
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Gate
Result. Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
We operated this aircraft from ZZZ2 - ZZZ1 followed by ZZZ1 - ZZZ. We pushed from [Gate] XXX in ZZZ and disconnected. We then attempted to start the Number 2 Engine. The N2 peaked at 16% so the start was aborted. Fuel was never introduced. Ran aborted engine start QRC/QRH. We then attempted a second start on the #2 Engine this time with both my eyes and the FO (First Officer) watching closely and verifying switch positions. Again, the N2 peaked at 16% with slow acceleration. The manifold gauge showed sufficient air on both sides of the isolation valve. The packs were verified off. We terminated this start as well. Operations were notified that we would be returning to the gate. As an alternate to waiting for a tug we attempted to start the Number 1 Engine so that we could taxi back to the gate. Coincidentally, when the First Officer placed the start switch to "ground" on the number one engine the "ENGINE OVERHEAT" for the Number 2 Engine illuminated. I commanded the First Officer to abort the start - fuel had not been introduced. I asked for the QRH/QRC for engine overheat. Obviously the QRC assumes we are in flight. Regardless, it directed us to fire extinguishing agent followed by isolating bleed air. The overheat light extinguished after bleed air was removed. Considerable use of our company ADM (Aeronautical Decision Making) model directed our actions quickly back on track. Staying within the QRH firing both extinguishing bottles into the engine seemed unnecessary albeit a required step to comply with Company procedures. Company training allows deviation although emphasizes to accept no unnecessary risk. To not fire bottles increased risk. I thank our training for that.

Narrative: 2
We operated this aircraft with no issues on our first two legs. We pushed off Gate XXX in ZZZ and disconnected from the ground crew as we started Engine #2. During this first attempt to start Engine #2, I noticed that the N2 never reached above 16%, so the start was aborted. Fuel was never introduced. We then proceeded to run the aborted engine start QRC/QRH. After the checklist was preformed, we decided to try another engine start on Engine #2. We verified switch position and bleeds were configured correctly and attempted the start. Yet again, a slow start and N2 did not rise above 16%. We proceeded to conduct the Aborted Engine Start again, leading us to run the aborted engine start QRC/QRH Checklist. We noted that the manifold gauge on the bleed air supply showed sufficient pressure. After we finished the QRC/QRH Checklist, we called Operations informing them we needed to return to the gate. While waiting, we discussed the
possibility of starting our #1 Engine as an option to taxi to back to the gate. As we started Engine #1, we received an ENGINE OVERHEAT caution on the #2 Engine. The Captain told me to abort the #1 Engine start. Fuel had not been introduced. We then conducted the QRC/QRH Checklist for ENGINE OVERHEAT. Regarding the QRC, it assumes we were inflight thus taking us to the QRH items for shutting the engine down and using the fire extinguishing agent and closing the bleeds for the #2 Engine. The ENGINE OVERHEAT light was extinguished after the bleed air was removed. We worked well together to come back on track after falling behind. Using our aeronautical decision-making method we continued to work through the situation presented to us. Remaining and complying within the QRH firing both extinguishing bottles into the #2 Engine seemed unnecessary. However, it was a required step to comply with Company procedures. Training allows deviation in such an event, but we are also emphasizing to accept no unnecessary risk while operating the aircraft.

Synopsis

B737-700 flight crew reported an engine overheat after starting up Engine #1 following two aborted start attempts on Engine #2 while on the ground. Although the QRH deemed firing both extinguishing bottles into the affected engine unnecessary, the flight crew’s company procedures had it as a required step.
**Time / Day**

Date: 202307  
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON  
State Reference: US

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC  
Light: Daylight  
Ceiling: CLR

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)  
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2  
 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Nav In Use: Localizer/Glideslope/ILS: ILSXXL  
Flight Phase: Climb  
Route In Use: SID: ZZZZZ

**Component**

Aircraft Component: Pneumatic Ducting  
Aircraft Reference: X  
Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**

Location Of Person: Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function: Flight Crew: Check Pilot  
Function: Flight Crew: Captain  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine  
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 2019819  
Human Factors: Troubleshooting  
Human Factors: Time Pressure  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness  
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew  
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Flight Crew

**Events**
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

This event took place during First Officer (FO) new hire IOE. The Captain/Check Airman Person A was Pilot Flying and the FO Person B was Pilot Monitoring. We also had a Company pilot jump seating in the flight deck who was commuting. During climb out on the ZZZZZ SID, the R BLEED DUCT warning message occurred around 12000 ft. MSL. The Captain said cancel/identify. FO responded and read EICAS. Captain stated "I have the radios and controls, reference the QRH." We were not able to run the QRH fast enough and because the R BLEED DUCT warning stayed on for more than 30 seconds, the pressurization system automatically shut off both L/R bleed valves which resulted in a loss of pressurization capabilities. We were around 14000 ft. MSL when both Pressure (Regulating Shut Off Valve) PRSOVs L/R shut off. The Captain [requested priority handling] immediately following this event and initiated a descent to 10000 ft. MSL. The FO completed the QRH at 10000 ft. MSL, which following the QRH the airplane was then configured with EMER DEPRESS SWITCH engaged and PACKS OFF and ram air valve opened for unpressurized flight. We asked for a little lower to 8000 ft. and the cabin altitude caution message appeared because the cabin altitude was between 8500 - 10000 ft. This was associated and FO canceled the cabin altitude message which extinguished upon reaching 8000 ft. The passenger masks never dropped because the cabin altitude never went above 10000 ft. (masks drop automatically at 14000 + - 500 ). Captain told ATC "we need to go back to ZZZ and that the checklists were done and the airplane was in a safe configuration but had no pressurization. We do not need assistance at this time other than returning back to ZZZ" Captain told FO to set up the cockpit for visual XXL backed up by ILS. Captain called (Flight Attendant 1) (FA1) Person C and told them the airplane was safe and that landing would be normal but couldn't continue to destination. Captain informed passengers "Airplane is safe and all checklists are completed. We lost pressurization and we were not high enough where we would need masks, this altitude is safe without pressurization but we are going to return to ZZZ for a normal landing. Talk to you soon with an update, thanks." ATC gave us a quick vector and Captain informed ATC we need to get a revector to finish our normal checklists and briefings for approach. After completing a revector and finishing approach briefings (during which we discovered the fuel gauges were dashed out, after taking off at 73400 lbs. we concluded that the 72000 lb. speed cards would be adequate and based on distances and speeds at that weight) we then proceeded to land and taxi to the gate. ATC had fire trucks ready per their protocols which followed Aircraft X back to the gate. After the shutdown checklist was complete, the Captain went into the cabin and made an announcement to passengers with further details and they seemed appreciative and comfortable. It was not until after the flight had ended where I saw 2 things I should have done differently. The first thing I should have done
differently is to call for the checklist, I failed to realize this was an item on the checklist and only ran the QRH. As Captain/Check Airman I should have also recognized the need to transfer controls and perhaps run the QRH myself, especially because it was my FOs second time doing Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties during IOE. The QRH is a difficult checklist because it needs to be completed within 30 seconds otherwise this situation occurs with automatic complete shutdown of pressurization. I still believe that altogether the situation was handled safely but I do see areas for improvement for the QRH. I feel like I learned a valuable lesson myself. Suggestions are the L/R bleed duct item is the only item that is not transferred verbatim and boxed inside the QRH as well. Every other item has the same language verbatim (copied in the QRH) and then is elaborated in the QRH as well. However, the L/R Bleed Duct does not have this necessary detail in the QRH. The L/R Bleed Duct QRH item is a special item and situation because it is time limited (only 30 seconds to correct or else both PRSOVs shut off automatically). I have 2 very important suggestions. First and I believe most important, the L/R bleed duct should be copied verbatim and boxed like every other electrical item inside the QRH and then elaborated thereafter. The QRH version is highly unlikely to be able to finish in 30 seconds and it does not read as easily as the electrical checklist. If this was changed, future pilots in similar situations who call for the QRH by mistake, would still have the exact wording and reference as the electrical checklist, boxed and easy to read and should be able to finish in a timely manner. Second, this item should honestly be a required memory item and an immediate action item and boxed in on the electrical checklist as well because of the timely nature. But the QRH should be fixed first in my opinion to match the way every other electrical checklist is written and copied into the QRH.

**Synopsis**

CRJ-200 Captain reported a right bleed duct warning message during climb out while operating a training flight. The Captain performed the checklist procedure and returned to the departure airport for a safe landing.
ACN: 2018511 (4 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202307
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position: Angle: Radial: 15
- Relative Position: Distance: Nautical Miles: 6
- Altitude: MSL: Single Value: 7500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling: Single Value: 12000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace: Class D: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Reciprocating Engine Assembly

**Person**
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Private
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 541
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 42
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 541
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 2018511
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Fuel Issue
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Diverted
Result.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
I have flown 172s for the last 10 years. I recently purchased a 172G model. Placarded on the fuel selector is a note stating that pilots are to switch to a single tank from "both" after leveling off above 5000 feet. Almost no Cessna pilots do it, myself included until today. The general feeling around the community is that it is not important and that it was a political stunt by Cessna years ago while transitioning to Lycoming engines. I knew about the issue when I purchased the aircraft but don't fly often at higher altitudes and so didn't have it top of mind. I had looked into it at the time and found that it wasn't important based on community comments and so I forgot all about it. I was flying from ZZZ1 back to ZZZ2. As I was flying past ZZZ I noticed a temporary drop in engine RPMs. After about 30 seconds I lost engine power completely but then it would surge to full power and back to zero. Engine power continued to come and go. I followed the checklist, advised ATC and landed at ZZZ without issue. The issue was that the standard loss of engine checklist doesn't follow the required remediation for the issue, so pilots are not able to regain power. The published remediation requires you to fly on one tank for one minute, and then switch to the other tank, but this is not standard practice. The other issue is that the placard is down by the fuel selector, which is not something you look at often, so the issue is out of mind and often forgotten. Contributing factors are: 1. The Cessna pilot community doesn't see the issue as real. 2. The emergency checklist doesn't deal with the issue. 3. The placard is on the fuel selector where nobody is looking in flight. Other comments are that I found myself very distracted in taxiing back to the ramp. Controllers should realize that a pilot is not in his/her normal state of mind after an incident like this and offer more support for taxi at an airfield they are probably not familiar with nor have taxi diagrams ready, etc. A progressive taxi should be standard practice after a situation like this. Its easy to ask for, but I felt the controller was not aware of the compromised mental state a pilot might be in after a flight like this.

Synopsis
C172 pilot reported engine power fluctuations during cruise required a diversion to a nearby airport. Pilot stated the checklist does not provide a procedure for this problem and the placement of the placard for switching fuel tanks is in a location that is difficult to view.
Time / Day
Date : 202307
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 20
Work Environment Factor : Temperature - Extreme Ceiling.Single Value : 12000
RVR.Single Value : 3000

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.UNICOM : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Navion
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Landing
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component : Landing Gear
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Improperly Operated

Person
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 1496
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 3
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 692
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 2016795
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Loss Of Aircraft Control
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Gear Up Landing
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Evacuated
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
I cranked up the Navion to do a check on the newly installed airspeed indicator. The run-up was uneventful and I departed from Runway XX due to unusually westerly winds. The day was HOT, above 90 degrees, high humidity, and a density altitude above 1500 ft.; I left the canopy open to get air circulation. I normally do a once around the pattern with a touch-and-go to test all systems and if all checks out, I may go for a leisurely flight up at a cooler level. On doing a left downwind approach procedure I noticed the gear horn was not audible due to the noise from the open canopy. I struggled with it until I felt I could barely hear it. I completed the rest of my prelanding check and set up for a 65-kt., full flap approach to landing. Everything was just right, airspeed indicator was dead on 65 kt. However, I did not check on the 3 green lights, trusting that the horn was not making noise. The plane landed gently just above stall but made a scraping sound - my heart sank! I turned fuel boost pump, fuel valve selector, electricals and breakers all off. Complete silence following. Airport personnel assisted in raising the plane high enough to drop the gear and subsequently tug the aircraft to its hangar. Airport Authority Representative along with an FAA Safety Inspector showed up to check on me, airplane and records. Needless to say, I ran this video through my brain over and over and I feel I know why this happened. The almighty checklist needs to be followed. Had I been returning from a more involved flight, I would have pressed the button on the Avidyne to show the prelanding checklist. Do not focus on just one instrument - in my case the airspeed indicator, but rather scan the panel and always look for the infernal THREE GREEN LIGHTS. Follow recommended routines without variance. The old manual says, "On downwind pull the throttle until you hear the horn, then push forward to quiet the horn and lower the gear." That is the complete procedure just for the gear. I had modified that years ago and what I would do is slow the airplane under 87 kt., max flap and max gear speed, and then lower the gear. This eliminated the blaring horn. Hearing the horn is important! Why? Because if you don't hear the horn then you don't have safety redundancy, the blaring horn tells you have a problem, no "three green lights" tells you have a problem! As I slowed down, the horn never went off, even with the throttle at idle. The horn failed! The checklist failed! The instrument scan failed! See what's there and not what you want to be there! Thinking back at the whole thing, I don't think that horn ever blew. I wanted it to blow, the way it should, but I don't think it did, even on the ground with a dead engine and wheels retracted, dead silence!

Synopsis
Navion pilot reported landing on the runway gear up and was assisted by airport personnel in tugging the aircraft to the hangar. It was a hot day and the pilot reported not following
the checklist procedures properly, and did not confirm the landing gear was down and locked.
**ACN: 1993175 (6 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202304
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Route In Use: Vectors

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Antiskid System
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person : 1**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 15000
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 198
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 7382
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1993175
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

**Person : 2**
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 154
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2017
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1993211
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
Prior to takeoff in ZZZ1, THE ANTI SKID INOP light was not illuminated. After takeoff from Runway XXR in ZZZ, First Officer (FO) requested gear up and I noticed the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminated. Once the after takeoff checklist was called and the gear handle was placed to the off position, the anti-skid light extinguished. At cruise, the auto brakes were selected to 1, 2, and 3 to check for proper operation due to previous write ups and the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminated and did not go away. Previous write-ups from today and Day 0 confirmed that this was a chronic issue with the auto brakes but did not reference the anti-skid system being inop. The previous write up from today also referenced a transducer #2 fault. The QRH was referenced regarding both ANTI SKID INOP and AUTO BRAKE DISARM. With the possibility of another transducer fault or a possible ANTI SKID failure, as a crew we discussed our options with an ANTI SKID failure and felt continuing to ZZZ was okay with good weather, long runways and a lighter weight and speed on landing. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted to discuss the possibility of an anti skid system failure. Maintenance Control agreed with the Captain that there is a distinct possibility that the anti skid system is not working given the recent history of write ups along with the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminating now. We decided the
ANTI SKID INOP QRH took precedent over the AUTO BRAKE DISARM QRH and planned for the possibility of an ANTI SKID INOP with no auto brakes on landing. My additional thoughts were that if the gear handle was placed to the down position on arrival and the ANTI SKID INOP light returned, we would be prepared. Further, with the two previous write ups including a transducer fault, it was a distinct possibility that the anti skid system was INOP. With the possibility of hot brakes, blown tires and a loss of directional control after landing without anti skid, it was decided that we would [request priority handling], continue to ZZZ and request to land on the longest Runway XX in ZZZ. The flight attendants including Purser Person A were then brought into the loop and were given information and a briefing. At this point we had 90 minutes until landing and we discussed that we would prepare the cabin for a [priority] landing and possible evacuation when we had 45 minutes prior to landing. At 45 minutes prior to landing, I made a PA to the passengers explaining the mechanical issue we were experiencing and that the flight attendants would be preparing the cabin for a [priority] landing in addition to assuring them that we fully expected this landing to be normal but we are going to prepare for a [priority] landing as a precaution. FO and I reviewed the ANTI SKID INOP QRH and performed a thorough threat briefing to include a flaps 40 landing, the non-normal landing distance chart, an early stable approach, Captain PA announcements, touching down in the touchdown zone, manual speed brake deployment, use of max reverse thrust longer than normal, braking according to the QRH and the possibility of blown tires and directional control issues if the main wheels lock up. FO did a great job managing the threats, slowed and became stable early for the approach. At 500 ft. and approximately 30 seconds prior to landing, I made the PA, brace, brace, brace. FO flew a stable descent and touched down on center line and in the touch down zone where I manually deployed the speed brakes. Maximum reverse thrust was selected, and light steady braking was used after the nose wheel touched down. I assumed command of the aircraft at about 80 kts. and kept maximum reverse thrust in until around 40-50 kts. We vacated the Runway at XX and taxied on to X where the PA, remain seated, remain seated was made. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) responders met the aircraft and confirmed all looks normal and would follow us to the gate and check the brake temps after we parked. Brake temps were confirmed all normal after parking. The entire crew did an outstanding job preparing and executing on this situation. In the end we were able to manage the threats properly, execute a safe operation by minimizing any errors and prepared for the possibility of a non-normal landing according to our training. After we parked, Maintenance reviewed the faults and again came up with a transducer #2 fault. They assured me anti skid was indeed operative and decided to MEL the auto brake system for our next flight from ZZZ- ZZZ2 without any lengthy investigative work on the ANTI SKID INOP issues. I agreed to take the aircraft with the auto brakes MELed. On the next flight, once again the ANTI SKID INOP light was extinguished on departure but illuminated again when the gear was requested up and extinguished when the gear handle was placed to off. On this flight we suspected the anti skid was working after the assurance from ZZZ Maintenance and continued with the AUTO BRAKE DISARM MEL. Landing in ZZZ2 was uneventful. However, I believe this aircraft needs a more thorough review for ANTI SKID INOP issues given the two write ups today for ANTI SKID INOP light illuminating after takeoff. Finally, the FOM was referenced for required reports but we never did call the Chief Pilot before continuing our next flight from ZZZ to ZZZ2 due to time. However, we self-assessed as a crew and both felt comfortable continuing our day and final leg of the trip.

Narrative: 2

Prior to takeoff in ZZZ1, THE ANTI SKID INOP light was not illuminated. After takeoff from Runway XXR in ZZZ1, pilot flying (PF) requested gear up and pilot monitoring (PM) noticed the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminate. Once the after takeoff checklist was called and the gear handle was placed to the off position, the anti-skid light extinguished. At cruise, the
auto brakes were selected to 1, 2, and 3 to check for proper operation due to previous write ups and the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminated and did not go away. The QRH was referenced regarding both ANTI SKID INOP and AUTO BRAKE DISARM. With the possibility of a possible ANTI SKID failure, as a crew we discussed our options with an anti skid failure and felt continuing to ZZZ was okay with good weather, long runways and a lighter weight and speed on landing. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted to discuss the possibility of an anti skid system failure. Maintenance Control agreed with the Captain that there is a distinct possibility that the anti skid system could be INOP. We decided the ANTI SKID INOP QRH took precedent over the AUTO BRAKE DISARM QRH and planned for the possibility of an ANTI SKID INOP with no auto brakes on landing. Additional thoughts were that if the gear handle was placed to the down position on arrival and the ANTI SKID INOP light returned, we would be prepared. With the possibility of hot brakes, blown tires and a loss of control without anti skid, it was decided that we would request priority handling, continue to ZZZ and request to land on the longest Runway XX in ZZZ. The flight attendants were then brought into the loop and were given information and a briefing. At this point we had 90 minutes until landing and we discussed that we would prepare the cabin for a [priority] landing and possible evacuation when we had 45 minutes prior to landing. At 45 minutes prior to landing, the Captain made a PA to the passengers explaining the mechanical issue we were experiencing and that the flight attendants would be preparing the cabin for a [priority] landing in addition to assuring them that we fully expected this landing to be normal but we are going to prepare for a [priority] landing. PF and PM reviewed the ANTI SKID INOP QRH and performed a thorough threat briefing to include a flaps 40 landing, the non-normal landing distance chart, an early stable approach, PA announcements, touching down in the touchdown zone, manual speed brake deployment, use of max reverse thrust longer than normal, braking according to the QRH and the possibility of blown tires and directional control issues if the main wheels lock up. Aircraft was slowed and became stable early for the approach. At 500 ft. and approximately 30 seconds prior to landing, the Captain made the PA brace, brace, brace. A stable descent resulted in a touch down on center line and in the touchdown zone where the Captain manually deployed the speed brakes. Maximum reverse thrust was selected and light steady braking was used after the nose wheel touched down. The Captain assumed command of the aircraft at about 80 kts. and kept maximum reverse thrust in until around 40-50 kts. We vacated the runway at XX and taxied on to X where the PA, remain seated, remain seated was made. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) responders met the aircraft and confirmed all looked normal and would follow us to the gate and check the brake temps after we parked. Brake temps were confirmed all normal after parking. The entire crew did an outstanding job preparing and executing on this situation. In the end we were able to manage the threats properly, execute a safe operation by minimizing any errors and prepared for the possibility of a non-normal landing according to our training.

Synopsis

B737 flight crew reported anti skid system failure after selecting gear up. The flight crew ran the QRH and checklists, then checked the autobrake system, which also failed. The flight crew continued to destination airport.
ACN: 1992246

Time / Day
Date: 202304

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 35000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: A319
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Hydraulic Main System
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 122
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 616
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1992246
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Departure Airport
Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contribute Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contribute Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contribute Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
At approximately FL350 in cruise, the ECAM HYD Y RSVR LO LVL appeared. ECAM actions were followed and after completion, the ECAM HYD Y ENG 2 PUMP LO PR appeared due to turning off the Eng 2 Pump as directed by the first ECAM. After completing the ECAM, Dispatch was contacted and Maintenance Control was patched in. After consultation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control and discussion amongst fellow crew members, the decision was made to return to ZZZ. [Priority handling was requested]. While in the turn the flight attendants were called and given a briefing. Shortly after, a PA was made to the passengers briefly explaining the situation and that we would be returning to ZZZ. As the ride was smooth, the FAs (Flight Attendant) were permitted to finish the service that they had already started in order to give a sense of normalcy and calmness in the cabin. Once the 180-[turn] was completed, ATC provided a route direct to ZZZ where we advised that we would require Runway XXR for landing due to its length. After making the turn back to ZZZ, we realized that the aircraft would be overweight upon landing so a descent to FL240 was requested from and granted by ATC. This was due to attempting to burn as much fuel as possible to be as close as possible to maximum landing weight upon arrival. The Overweight Landing Checklist was completed while still in cruise back to ZZZ. Landing distance was calculated by both Dispatch and myself and the values came to within approximately 200 ft. of each other at around 8,500 ft. This gross error check satisfied us that the calculations were accurate. While in cruise back to ZZZ, discussions were had regarding status page notes and stopping technique. It was noticed during discussion of status page notes that the ECAM had the crew turn on the electric yellow hydraulic pump during the approach phase while neither of the non-normal checklists in the FM (Flight Manual) contained that procedure. As the accumulator pressure was dropping slowly and the concern of losing any remaining fluid existed, the decision was made to follow the status notes in the FM non-normals section and not turn on the yellow electric pump during approach. A normal approach briefing then took place. Once the aircraft neared ZZZ, ATC provided vectors overhead for a right downwind to [Runway] XXR. The aircraft was configured early due to flap movement being slow and the desire to have extra altitude in the event another malfunction occurred. We were then vectored for approximately a 15-mile final where a visual approach was conducted. The autopilot was selected off at approximately the FAF to get a feel of how the aircraft would handle while having the yellow hydraulic system inoperative. A normal landing was made and the
aircraft exited at Taxiway XX. After exiting the runway the aircraft was stopped and emergency vehicles surveyed the aircraft. Ground personnel advised that there was no evidence of hydraulic fluid on the aircraft. Emergency vehicles then cleared and the aircraft was taxied to the ramp where the engines were shut down and a tow-in was made to the final parking spot. Prior to the tow-in, the yellow electric pump was turned on momentarily to charge the accumulator in order to set the parking brake prior to shutting down engines and completing as much of a normal procedure as possible. After turning on the yellow electric pump, the hydraulic SD page was referenced and we noticed that the fluid quantity had dropped slightly. This led me to believe that if the pump was turned on according to the ECAM status notes during the approach phase and not left off according to the FM non-normal status notes, that all remaining fluid would have been lost. After shutting down the engines and waiting for the Tow Team to connect to the aircraft, it was discovered that the Tow Team did not have a headset available to communicate to the cockpit with. Instead, the busy Ramp frequency was used to communicate with the Tow Team, which led to confusion and a slight delay in getting the aircraft to the gate. After completion of the parking checklist, appropriate maintenance write-ups were made and debriefings took place with the crew, Operations Control Flight Operations Representative, and Chief Pilot.

Synopsis
A319 Captain reported that the ECAM HYD Y RSVR LO LVL appeared while in cruise. As the flight crew ran and followed the QRH and checklists, there was confusion regarding a procedure with a hydraulic pump. After consulting with Dispatch and Maintenance Control, the flight crew performed an air turnback.
Time / Day
Date: 202303
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Vectors

Component: 1
Aircraft Component: Fuel Crossfeed
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Component: 2
Aircraft Component: Turbine Engine
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Component: 3
Aircraft Component: Other Documentation
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1983222
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

**Person : 2**

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1983224
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

**Events**

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Fuel Issue
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Inflight Shutdown
Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Departure Airport
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Shortly after completing the after takeoff checklist I noticed that fuel was flowing from the left fuel tank at a very alarming rate. We thought that there was a fuel leak because of the rapid fuel flow out of the left tank. The First Officer (FO) continued to fly the aircraft while I ran the Engine Fuel Leak QRH. We briefly discussed continuing straight to ZZZ1 but the weather was better in ZZZ and the rate of fuel loss out of the left side was very concerning to us. While I ran the QRH the FO [requested priority handling] and requested vectors back to ZZZ. The rapid loss led us to confirm a fuel leak in the QRH which led us to shutting down the number one engine. We continued to an uneventful single engine landing in ZZZ. After securing the engine we became aware the cross feed valve was open. I know I pointed at it in the QRH and verified it closed. I did not see a dim blue light and did not expect it to be open, because the only time it is open is when I open it. While we did discuss the issue at hand before delving into the QRC we felt a great urgency to act quickly due to the very rapid loss of fuel. A longer safety pause would have been more appropriate. The FO did a great job flying the plane and handling the radios but the approach environment is very distracting. I left the checklist to get ATC SOB count after we [requested priority handling], and again to talk to the Flight Attendants (FAs) when they felt the plane turning around. Better managing distractions during critical junctures of the checklist would have gone a long way. I feel like I have good working knowledge of the 737 fuel systems, and know that one pump can overpower the others and the high power setting and fuel flow was the reason why the draw on the left side was so alarming. In retrospect there were a number of opportunities to trap this error before becoming an undesirable aircraft state. Fatigue may have been a contributing factor as this incident occurred on daylight savings day. I had a hard time falling asleep and woke up at XA:30 AM body time. My watch estimated my sleep for the night as 4 hours 13 minutes. I was tired that day and using caffeine to get me home. I have learned a lot from previous company guidance on this issue and never wanted to be the one to go down this rabbit hole. Look out for tunnel vision, confirmation bias, don't rush!

**Narrative: 2**

Shortly after completing the after takeoff checklist the Captain noticed that fuel was depleting from the left fuel tank at an alarming rate. After a quick discussion we agreed that a fuel leak was suspected. I continued flying the aircraft and took over radio duties while the Captain ran the QRH for fuel leak. I [requested priority handling] and requested radar vectors back to ZZZ after a quick discussion with the Captain as the weather was significantly better there than ZZZ1. The checklist lead us to shut down the left engine and we prepared for a single-engine approach and landing. While on downwind our jump seater noticed that our cross feed valve was in the open position and neither the Captain nor I had caught it. We were so busy and inundated with task-saturation that a step was missed in the QRH. I think we were pretty shocked to see how fast our fuel was depleting from the left side and that caused us to rush the checklist and miss key steps. The volume of radio calls and vectors kept me from doing a great job of backing up the Captain while they ran the checklist. Fatigue was definitely a contributing factor as we had an early van in ZZZ2 on the morning of daylight savings. This is a prime example of needing to slow down and take a better assessment of the situation before rushing to conclusions.

**Synopsis**

B737 Flight Crew reported a suspected Fuel Leak after takeoff. The Flight Crew ran the QRH and checklists and then requested vectors to return to the departure airport. The suspected Fuel Leak continued to worsen, so the Flight Crew requested priority handling and performed an in flight shut down. When complying with the inflight shutdown QRH, it
was discovered that the Cross Feed Valve was still open. The flight crew continued to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.
ACN: 1971341 (9 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202302
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Deferred: N
- Maintenance Status.Records Complete: Y
- Maintenance Status.Released For Service: Y
- Maintenance Status.Required / Correct Doc On Board: Y
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type: Unscheduled Maintenance
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Repair
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Inspection
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Installation

**Component : 1**
- Aircraft Component: Fan Blade
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Component : 2**
- Aircraft Component: Turbine Engine
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person : 1**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Person : 2

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1971351
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Maintenance
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Inflight Shutdown
Result.Flight Crew : Diverted
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
Prior to departure, I discovered chips in the #13 and #15 N1 Fan Blade. This was written up following standard protocol. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and completed their procedures in order to return the aircraft to service. The flight continued as planned. In cruise an abnormal vibration was observed in the #2 Engine. This vibration was only an indication on the EICAS screen and was going from green to occasional yellow indication, but did not produce an EICAS Message/Caution/Warning. An exchange of flight controls occurred and the QRH procedure was followed for High Vibrations in the Engine. A few minutes after the QRH procedure was completed for Engine Vibration, a thud was heard from the right side of the airplane and N1 began decreasing. Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) then appeared to be increasing rapidly and was observed giving a Red indication. While I was watching the ITT rise, the Captain went right to securing the Engine, rather than running the QRC. We began a descent to a lower altitude, and controls were transferred over to the First Officer (FO). Following that, the Captain ran the QRH one engine inoperative approach and landing. In doing so, the QRC was missed for suspected engine damage. The QRH procedure was completed for single engine approach and landing. A diversion to ZZZ1 was decided and a landing was accomplished at the diversion airport without issue. Improper use of checklist. Speaking up when things appear to be done improperly is of upmost importance. Keep in mind standard procedure/protocol in emergencies. In post flight debriefing, it was decided that we actually should have suspected engine damage, rather than simply an engine failure. If something isn’t completed in the proper order, I need to speak up. I should have said something and went back into querying about doing the QRC for suspected damage in flight

Narrative: 2

While preparing for departure the First Officer (FO) noticed a few nicks on Engine 2 N1 blades. I entered a discrepancy in the Maintenance log, ZZZ line Maintenance repaired the aircraft and returned it to service. While enroute we got an abnormal vibration on Engine 2. I turned the flight controls over to the FO and ran QRH ENGINE ABNORMAL VIBRATION. This fixed the problem. I took the controls back and we continued the cruise uneventfully for about 15 minutes. After that time Engine 2 made a popping noise, N1 spooled down, and an amber FAIL icon displayed over the Engine 2 N1 gauge. I again turned the controls over to the FO. Since there was rotation in both N1 and N2, I incorrectly thought that there was no engine damage and consequentially did not run the ENGINE FIRE, SEVERE DAMAGE, OR SEPARATION QRC. I was instead looking for the ENGINE 2 FAIL QRH. As I was doing this, I noticed the Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) rising rapidly to the Red Line, and went directly to securing the engine. I did this without running the QRH because of the time pressure that the rapidly rising ITT created. After securing the engine we [requested priority handling] and diverted to ZZZ1. During the descent I ran the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE APPROACH AND LANDING QRH. We asked for Crash Fire and Rescue (CFR) to be available on landing to ensure the aircraft was safe to taxi to the gate. We landed uneventfully. After CFR verified the aircraft was safe to taxi, we proceeded to the gate and deplaned. There were no passenger injuries, and I did not observe any video being recorded. In hindsight, my assessment of severe engine damage was incorrect. Since I did not know why the engine shut down, I should have considered it severely damaged and run the ENGINE FIRE, SEVERE DAMAGE, SEPARATION QRC. Additionally, I allowed the rapidly rising ITT influence my decision making towards turning the engine off rapidly to avoid an exceedance when I should have slowed down, allowed the exceedance and run the QRC. This self-imposed time pressure caused me to secure the engine without verification. Running the QRC gets one into the normal engine failure procedures and cadence.

Synopsis
ERJ 170/175 Flight Crew reported Engine #2 vibrations in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklist and QRH, solving the vibration problem. Engine #2 then failed. The Flight Crew performed an in flight shut down, and diverted to make a precautionary landing.
ACN: 1965134 (10 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202301
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Corporate
- Make Model Name: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Vectors

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Pressurization Control System
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person: 1**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Corporate
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1965134
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

**Person: 2**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Departure Airport
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Cabin Altitude Warning at FL330. 5 minutes into cruise at FL330 the Master Caution Illuminated and Cabin ALT Illuminated. I looked at Cabin Altitude and it was at 10,000 ft. We donned oxygen masks and carried out an emergency descent to 10,000 ft. During climb the pressurization was checked at 5,000, 10,000 and 18,000 ft. Both pilots recall the cabin being at 5,000 ft. with no climb and needles split. After the level off at 10 000 ft., we noticed the Pressure Source Selector was in OFF. It was selected to normal and the pressurization appeared to function normally. A return to ZZZ for a normal landing was completed and Maintenance called.

Narrative: 2

Cabin Altitude Warning at flight level 330 in early cruise. Cabin Altitude was checked 5,000, 10,000 and 18,000 ft. and the cabin altitude was set to 5,000 ft. and a differential was noticed. Noticed Cabin Altitude was 10,000 ft. and climbing, executed an immediate decent. After level off at 10,000 ft. we noticed the Pressure Source Selector was off. Once selected to normal, the Cabin Pressure appeared to function as normal. Continued back to ZZZ for a Maintenance inspection.

Synopsis

C560 Flight Crew reported 5 minutes into cruise at FL330 the Master Caution Illuminated and Cabin ALT Illuminated. The Flight Crew requested priority handling and descended, donning oxygen masks. After running the QRH, the Pressurization Control Source Selector
was placed in normal and pressurization control was regained. The Flight Crew elected to perform an air turn back and land at departure airport for maintenance.
**ACN: 1942258 (11 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202210
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 35000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Vectors

**Component: 1**
- Aircraft Component: Fuel Crossfeed
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Component: 2**
- Aircraft Component: Turbine Engine
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Component: 3**
- Aircraft Component: Powerplant Fuel System
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person: 1**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiflightengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 492
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 160
When we boarded the plane in ZZZ1 we noticed that the night before the plane had been written up for a large fuel imbalance during the flight that night. The write up had been checked and signed off so I noted the issue but felt since it had been signed off that it was safe to fly. We then departed for ZZZ2 with no issues during departure. During cruise approximately 1:30 into the flight, I noticed a 500 pound imbalance in the left wing from the right wing while still using center tank fuel. We discussed the possibility of a fuel leak since a similar write up had been made on the plane the night before. We had received a
"using reserve fuel" on the FMC and the left side wing tank had 8.12 versus the right side of 8.52. The center tank had approximately 1.1-1.4 and since we were still using center tank fuel we knew that the left side should not have been reduced at that point. We talked with the Flight Attendants and had them inspect the wing for any fuel that could be coming out of the wing or engine spar. They reported that nothing appeared to be coming out of the wing. We then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and felt it was best to divert to ZZZ. After beginning to divert we used the remaining center tank fuel at which point the left wing fuel began to drastically drop (approximately 400 pounds in about 5 minutes). At this point we decided to run the fuel leak checklist which recommended that we shut down the engine. We did that and requested priority handling. We then ran the appropriate engine out checklists and proceeded to land in ZZZ with no further incident.

**Narrative: 2**

The aircraft had overnighted in ZZZ1 and had been written up and serviced for a fuel imbalance on the inbound flight. The logbook had been closed out properly and signed off. We departed out of ZZZ1 without any issues and climbed to FL350. While at cruise (approximately 1.5 hours into flight) the Captain noticed we had a fuel imbalance while we were still operating out of the center wing tank. We had received a "using reserve fuel" on the FMC. The left side wing tank had 8.12 versus the right side of 8.52. center tank had approximately 1.1-1.4. We started discussing the possibility of us losing fuel on the left side. I began logging our fuel imbalance. XA55 - LT 8.12/ RT 8.52. We ensured that the appropriate fuel pumps were on and that the cross feed was closed. We coordinated with the Flight Attendants and had them inspect the wing for any fuel that could be coming out of the wing or engine spar. They reported that nothing appeared to be coming out of the wing. At this point we were monitoring the fuel imbalance and began looking at the flight manual for a potential fuel leak checklist as well as considering drift down altitudes and diversion options and contingencies. By XB11 our fuel imbalance was LT 8.01/RT 8.51. At this point we had used all center wing tank fuel and had started operating from the wing tanks. The left tank fuel was leaving the tank distinctly faster than the right tank and both engine fuel flow rates were relatively similar and normal. XB15 - LT 7.85/ RT 8.28. By this point we had already made the decision to divert to ZZZ. While heading south we separated duties. I flew while the Captain coordinated with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. In their discussion they had recommended we follow the appropriate QRH. XB24 - LT 7.34/ RT 7.74. We remained at FL350 while preceding south to ZZZ until we got to the point in the checklist where we needed to shutdown and secure the left side engine for a suspected fuel leak. The Captain continued to run the checklist and set us up for the single engine approach and landing. We coordinated with ZZZ ATC and requested priority handling and proceeded in through the arrival (originally cleared ZZZZZ 3 arrival). As we got closer to ZZZ we got assigned direct to the field and then vectors for a left downwind for XXL. We transferred fight controls so the Captain could make the landing. The First Officer (FO) completed the remainder of the checklist, securing the pneumatics and the deferred landing checklist. The approach was visual and the landing was safe and without incident. We stopped off the runway at XX and coordinated with CFR and had our left engine inspected for any fuel leakage before proceeding to the gate without any further incident.

**Synopsis**

Flight Crew reported a fuel imbalance that increased in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklists and QRH. An in flight shut down of the left engine was accomplished and a request for priority handling was made. The Flight Crew elected to divert and make a precautionary landing.
**ACN: 1935229**  (12 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202209
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 15
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 15000

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737-700
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Oil Indicating System
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person : 1**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 140
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 5000
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1935229
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Person : 2**
During climbout from ZZZ, flashing alert box for engine indications began and observed oil quantity had decreased to 13%. First Officer retarded the thrust lever and oil quantity indication returned to normal. We discussed gulping. Attempted to advance thrust level again past 82ish%, and again oil quantity decreased and engine alert box flashed. We made other attempts to advance thrust level, both level at 10000 ft. and 15000 ft. Both attempts yielded the same rapidly decreasing oil quantity. We referenced Quick Reference Handbook (QRH); however, there was no guidance. Made the decision to divert to ZZZ1 as we were essentially over the airport. Elected to not shut down engine due to normal engine indications at the lower power level. Diversion and landing were uneventful.

During initial climb it was observed that the right engine oil quantity indications were decreasing and low. The flashing alert box began flashing and we soon observed the right engine oil quantity showing as low as 13% and decreasing. I disconnected the autothrottles, left the autopilot engaged and informed the Captain that I would decrease power and decrease pitch attitude. Upon decreasing power below approximately 82% N1 it was observed that right engine quantity levels began to return to normal readings. We tested our hypothesis by increasing the engine power above 85% to see if the oil quantity level on the right engine would decrease. We increased and decreased engine power three times, and each time right engine oil quantity decreased when power was increased.
beyond 85% N1. These attempts happened between 10000 ft. and 15000 ft. After referencing the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and discussion we made the decision to divert to ZZZ1. We opted to keep the affected engine operating as low power settings showed normal indications. The diversion, descent, approach, landing and taxi to the gate were uneventful.

**Synopsis**

B737 Flight Crew reported reference to the QRH for engine oil quantity alert failed to provide any situational information, resulting in a diversion.
Time / Day
Date: 202208
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZAB.ARTCC
State Reference: NM
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 28000

Environment
Flight Conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 14000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZAB
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZAB

Component
Aircraft Component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 200
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 12900
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1926048
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Ground Equipment Issue
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Terrain Warning
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Software and Automation
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
While approaching ABQ on the LZZRD 4 to Runway 3, we received L and R GPS INVALID messages. We knew from the NOTAMs that GPS jamming was occurring in the White Sands Missile Range. We complied with the Operational Information guidance found in the back of the QRH and confirmed our position. Shortly thereafter we noticed an amber TERR POS indication on both NDs. Having experienced this before in ELP during jamming operations, I knew we would receive a PULLUP indication on approach at approximately 500 ft. Fortunately, the weather was VMC below 14,000 ft., so we elected to continue our visual approach with TERR INHIBIT selected. During landing rollout, our GPS's came back online and terrain data was once again displayed on our ND's. My concern is that there is no guidance on what to do for a TERR POS indication in the QRH.

Synopsis
Air carrier pilot reported GPS Jamming. The reporter also reported a lack of guidance in the QRH when receiving a Terrain Alert while encountering known GPS Jamming.
ACN: 1921992 (14 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 202208
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory, TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace, Class E: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Pressurization Control System
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person: 1
Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function, Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function, Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification, Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification, Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1921992
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown, Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown, Party 2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Narrative: 1

Day started with one aircraft that had a maintenance item being worked on by Maintenance. The First Officer (FO) and myself began to set the aircraft up for the flight and then waited for the maintenance crew to complete their service of the aircraft when we were notified of a tail swap. Proceeded as normal on the second aircraft and boarded as per usual. We departed as usual and got a clearance to a fix and up to 13,000 ft. After passing 10,000 ft., we noticed the cabin pressure was not normal and before we knew it Cabin ALT HI EICAS message was up. We followed procedure and donned our masks, I (pilot monitoring (PM)) had called for the QRC as the FO was a little behind calling for it. I told him that he’s pilot flying (PF) to descend to 10,000 ft. A moment of stress and confusion to be certain. I followed the checklist and notified ATC a return to ZZZ with a
need for some time to set up as assured the FO that he is PF and I will run the checklists as PM. We finished the checklists and noticed the pressurization knob was on LFE (Landing Field Elevation) select and not AUTO. Let's return to this moment a little bit later. We continued configuring the aircraft and noticed normal pressurization on the return to ZZZ, the FO asked if I wanted to fly the aircraft and decided that would be a good decision. We configured the aircraft and set up and briefed the approach and notified ATC we are ready to head towards ZZZ...which resulted in a go around due to tight vectors from ATC to get us in causing us to become unstable. We came back around and landed safely. The moment we noticed the Pressurization Selector knob not in AUTO still dumbfounds both pilots as we are certain that we saw it facing up (auto) earlier but when we questioned each other about it we determined we were not certain if it was that aircraft or the one prior even though flows were done on both aircraft. Possible pilot error. Have a Crew Awareness EICAS message noting the pressurization knob is not in the normal position.

**Narrative: 2**

We received a plane from maintenance due to our originally scheduled aircraft having the NAV lights MELed. The captain and I both did new originating receiving checklists due to getting a new aircraft. Climbing through 9,500 ft., I noticed the Cabin Altitude was higher than normal. I pointed this out and shortly after I pointed it out we got a "Cabin Alt High" EICAS message. Upon getting this EICAS message we accomplished the immediate action items and then promptly ran the QRC and then QRH for cabin altitude high. We leveled off around 11,000 ft. and per the QRC started a descent to 10,000 ft. While running the QRH we noticed the pressurization knob was set to "LFE" (which it would still be in automatic mode) instead of the normal "auto" position. We switch ed it back right away and got the pressurization back to normal and returned to ZZZ. The passenger masks did not deploy. I transferred controls to the Captain to make the approach and landing where we got vectored in tight to the runway to which the Captain elected to do a go around. We reset up for the approach and landed normally. Having a crew awareness EICAS message to alert the pilots of a non-normal configuration of a system would have resolved this issue.

**Synopsis**

EMB-170 Flight Crew reported a CABIN ALT HI EICAS Message illuminated passing 10,000 ft. The Flight Crew descended immediately and ran the QRH and checklists. It was discovered that the Cabin Pressurization Selector Knob was not in AUTO. The knob was placed in AUTO and the flight returned to departure airport.
**ACN: 1919153 (15 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202207
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US
- Altitude, MSL, Single Value: 35000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Night

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC/Advisory Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B757-200
- Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace, Class A: ZZZ
- Maintenance Status, Maintenance Deferred: Y
- Maintenance Status, Records Complete: Y
- Maintenance Status, Released For Service: Y
- Maintenance Status, Required / Correct Doc On Board: Y
- Maintenance Status, Maintenance Items Involved: Inspection
- Maintenance Status, Maintenance Items Involved: Testing

**Component: 1**
- Aircraft Component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Component: 2**
- Aircraft Component: Pressurization Control System
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person: 1**
- Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function, Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function, Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1919153
Human Factors : Troubleshooting

**Person : 2**

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Check Pilot
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1919161
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Troubleshooting

**Events**

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : MEL / CDL
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : MEL
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

**Narrative: 1**

During cruise at FL 350, we received a Master Warning and CABIN ALTITUDE EICAS message. Cabin altitude was approximately 11,000 feet. Crew initiated QRH procedures and descended to FL290 Initially as cabin altitude dropped to less than 10,000 feet. We continued descent to FL250 to stabilize cabin alt below 8,500 feet and [requested priority handling] with ATC. We attempted second auto controller with no different result. Crew landed at destination with no other abnormal indications.
**Narrative: 2**

During cruise at F350 which was our maximum altitude due to an MEL that made us single bleed, single pack, we received a Master Warning Cabin Altitude EICAS message. Cabin altitude was approximately 11,000 feet. We completed the QRH procedure and started a descent to lower altitude to FL 290 where we dropped below 10,000 feet cabin altitude. We continued to descent to FL250 where the cabin altitude was 8,500 feet. We [requested priority handling] and continued flight to our destination. We attempted to switch pressure controllers to reestablish proper pressurization but that did not work. Crew landed in ZZZ with no other issues or abnormal indications. Not watching the pressurization more vigilant on single air source. And the high cockpit temperature caused by the single pack. Possibly building the release on single pack single air source ops to a much lower altitude than the MEL limit of FL 350, this would have allowed more time for the crew to recognize the failure of the aircraft to maintain pressurization.

**Synopsis**

B757 Flight Crew reported receiving a Master Warning and CABIN ALTITUDE EICAS message at cruise. The Crew immediately descended and ran the QRH procedures and were able to continue to the destination airport.
**ACN: 1909164 (16 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202206
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: DEN.Airport
- State Reference: CO
- Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: DEN
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Airspace: Class B: DEN

**Person: 1**
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 18500
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 154.9
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 8000
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1909164
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Person: 2**
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 170.72
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 466.82  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1909166  
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

**Events**

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Undershoot  
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed : All Types  
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy  
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach  
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFIT  
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation  
When Detected : In-flight  
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

**Narrative: 1**

We received a clearance for a visual approach to [Runway] 35L with direct to the FAF. I was monitoring our class B floor to ensure compliance and the FO was flying 250 knots. I stepped down his altitude as required to remain in class B. ATC told us the airspeed was our discretion. As we approached the final marker we were high and fast. We did not intercept the glide slope at the marker and used vertical speed to continue. At 500 feet we were stable, but I did not get our flaps to 30. I did not hear a call and we were focused on salvaging the approach. The GPWS said "terrain" and I thought this was an error. At 50 feet I noticed the flap gauge at 25. Our Vref was 164 knots due to gusts. Clearly we should have gone around and I offer no excuse.

**Narrative: 2**

Expected ILS 35L at DEN, was given [Runway] 35R late in the descent. Pilot Flying changed ILS radio and minimus; however PF failed to change the runway in the ARR Page on the FMC. ILS 35R became visual 35R per approach control, which wasn't unexpected based on ATIS information. When the omission of the ARR runway was realized and was entered we lost vertical guidance on the PFD and added to the task saturation in the cockpit. PF attempted to slow to from 250 to 210 at approx 7 miles from FRONZ (FAF for 35R) on a 45 deg dogleg vector off the CLASH Arrival. Had to stay high due to Class B airspace airspeed restrictions, then was late to get down to 7000 feet by FRONZ which resulted in having to stay high and configure. Aircraft was high at FRONZ and for the remainder of the approach into 35R. Being high approaching FRONZ, attempted to utilize V/S Mode to capture the glide path, which resulted in a higher than necessary airspeed which then resulted in a late configuration and continuance above acceptable parameters for landing. Attempted to continue to recover the approach while still high and configuring the aircraft to a greater rate of descent to capture a stabilized approach. By 500 feet, was in excess of 1000 feet per/minute and only Flaps 25 with 1 Red and 3 white on the PAPIs Called for flaps 30 but did not verify flap movement and did not verify completion of landing checklist which would have precluded "Too Low Terrain" annunciation. Continued to landing which was uneventful and within acceptable landing parameters on the runway.

**Synopsis**
B737 NG Flight Crew reported receiving a terrain warning on short final approach to DEN airport due to flap misconfiguration. Flight crew stated they received a late runway change which resulted in a higher-than-normal rate of descent and not completing a checklist.
**ACN: 1903778 (17 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202205
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 2
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Night

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use: Visual Approach

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Trailing Edge Flap
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3200
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 185
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1050
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1903778
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Maintenance

**Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Automation: Aircraft Other Automation
Detector. Person: Flight Crew

Were Passengers Involved In Event: N
When Detected: In-flight

Result. General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result. General: Maintenance Action
Result. Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Aircraft

**Narrative: 1**

I was PM during base leg of visual approach (XL via channel). Landing checklist had been completed at Flaps 15 per company SOP. PF called for F25, PM selected F25 and then noticed trailing edge flap asymmetry (L flap 15, R flap 25) on the flap comparator. PM alerted PF to asymmetry and visual approach was terminated and crew requested a turn and climb away from the airport to conduct checklist/QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) items. No rolling moment was felt by the PF once the AP was disengaged. QRH items completed and landing was uneventful. Flaps were left down for maintenance inspection upon taxi back to ramp. Contributing factors are many. One being the company's decision to continue to operate aging aircraft well past their prime. Second being a general hesitancy amongst the pilot group to report safety/aircraft reliability concerns due to fear of the operational impact. I have witnessed numerous mechanical discrepancies get passed to maintenance verbally vice being written in the logbook. This should not be tolerated as it does not allow a history of discrepancies for a particular mechanical issue to be documented which can impact troubleshooting. This ultimately impacts reliability and aircraft availability.

**Synopsis**

B737 First Officer reported a flap asymmetry problem on approach. The Flight Crew executed a go-around and complied with the Checklist/QRH procedures. The Flight Crew then flew the approach to landing at destination airport.
**Time / Day**

Date: 20220518
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 25000

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

**Component**

Aircraft Component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning
Problem: Failed

**Person: 1**

Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1902025
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload

**Person: 2**

Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1902028
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Troubleshooting

Events

Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Detector: Automation: Aircraft Terrain Warning
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event: N
Result: Flight Crew: Diverted
Result: Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result: Flight Crew: FLC complied w/ Automation / Advisory
Result: Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1

After takeoff from ZZZ1 we had caution indication on EICAS High Stage Valve. We are followed QRH. We stayed at 25,000 feet and had two issues to resolve first the fault and secondly FO (First Officer) Display which blinked relevant report. We were in contact with the Dispatcher who after informing him about the current situation sent us our latest fuel calculations and informed us that we should go to the ZZZ as divert airport. We indeed did go to the Divert Airport ZZZ and I immediately contacted him after landing and asked new information for the next flight ZZZ-ZZZ2. I contacted with Maintenance and informing him about the two remarks by filling in technical log book.

Narrative: 2

In flight on the way from ZZZ to ZZZ1, EICAS message HS 1 Valve Fail came up. We ran the QRH procedure and diagnosed the problem. The message came back up on the EICAS shortly after so we ran the procedure again and it was diagnosed but then shortly after once again, the message came back up on the EICAS. We ran the QRH procedure differently this time and we shut bleed valve 1 off. We were limited to FL250 when we were originally planned for FL360. We sent for fuel numbers and it was determined by both Dispatch and the crew to divert to ZZZ due to a higher fuel burn and with a maintenance issue.

Synopsis

EMB-145 Flight Crew reported the failure of the HS 1 bleed valve. The pilots stated they ran the QRH, descended to a lower altitude, realized there was not enough fuel to
complete the mission at the lower altitude and diverted. The pilots were in communication with their Dispatcher.
**Time / Day**

Date: 202204
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**

Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ TRACON
State Reference: US

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use. STAR: ZZZZZ
Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

**Component**

Aircraft Component: Hydraulic Main System
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person: 1**

Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1894250
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew
While on the arrival into ZZZ, passing through approximately 12,000 feet, we had an EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) advisory message "HYD SYS 1 LO QTY" appear after ATC issued a runway change. The captain advised me to run the HYD SYS 1 LO QTY QRH. We noted that our hydraulic quantity on system 1 was in the amber range. I proceeded to run the applicable checklist while the captain took over the radios and maintained control of the aircraft. Before completing the "HYD SYS 1 LO QTY" quick reference handbook procedure, it included HYD SYS 1 FAIL procedure to be followed "as required" I should have noticed that if "HYD SYS FAIL" EICAS messages were displayed--the procedure WOULD be required. I was thinking that because our hydraulic quantity was low, we might have a system degradation based on what I read in the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH, and that it was required. I subsequently followed the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH and did
not see the HYD SYS 1 FAIL EICAS messages that corresponded to the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH. I reviewed the entire HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH procedure once verbally all the way through with minor interruptions, and proceeded to review it two more times verbally, only highlighting the gear extension and degradation information. In error, we then proceeded to execute the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH which resulted in a manual gear extension. We took all of the precautions per the QRH that some aircraft systems may be degraded and completed the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH and landed. After landing the Captain and I debriefed the event where we read back through both of the QRH procedures that we had followed and then we realized that we could likely have closely monitored the applicable hydraulic systems and dropped the landing gear early and that HYD 1 LO QTY was not a trigger for the HYD SYS 1 fail QRH. Overall I felt that communication was high, but I failed to confirm that the EICAS messages for the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH were displayed, which might have changed our course of action. I believe that had I compared the messages only for the HYD SYS 1 FAIL that were not present on our aircraft then, the "As required" statement in the HYD 1 LO QTY QRH would have been more apparent to me. CRM was used throughout the entire flight including the emergency, but I could have done a better job at highlighting that the EICAS messages for the HYD 1 SYS FAIL were not present. I made an assumption when reading the QRH that though we didn't have a hydraulic system 1 failure indication, our lack of hydraulic quantity could lead to a degradation in hydraulic systems and made the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH required. This was not the case, I will make more emphasis in verifying the EICAS messages for the applicable QRH in order to achieve a higher level of CRM.

Narrative: 2

On descent in the later part of the STAR into ZZZ the HYD 1 LOW QTY advisory was displayed on the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System). The HYD 1 sys was in the amber. After handling a late runway change the QRH was executed for HYD 1 LOW QTY, which at the end says to execute the HYD 1 FAIL QRH procedure 'as required'. This was misinterpreted as being told to act as though we were having a HYD 1 SYS failure. In hind sight it became clear that the HYD 1 SYS failure X of the QRH should not have been executed due to the fact that the trigger of having the "HYD 1 FAIL' had not yet been explicitly displayed on the EICAS. Somehow in error this trigger was overlooked and a manual gear extension was conducted along with the assumption we would have several systems inop. In hind sight the most likely outcome had this not been overlooked would have been an attempt to lower the gear early and the system would simply be 'monitored' unless that failure EICAS was displayed in flight- as well as an emergency not being declared in that case (rather just heightened awareness of that situation and the implications). In hind sight I'm not sure how the HYD 1 FAIL requirement was overlooked. CRM was ideal overall and it may have come down to QRH assumptions or an interruption at that critical point of EICAS confirmation. As mentioned, it was interpreted in part as though the QRH was driving to act as though the system was failed or imminently going to be failed. Possibly to avoid this in the future extra emphasis should be on not only confirming the correct checklist but just as importantly the presence or the absence of the EICAS message triggers for QRH portions. Both crew in the debrief realized the QRH was incorrectly executed.

Synopsis

Flight crew reported confusion during QRH procedures for a hydraulic system low quantity event. This led to an unnecessary manual extension of the landing gear, complicating the landing at destination airport.
Time / Day

Date: 202204
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-800
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E: ZZZ

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Leading Edge Flap
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Component: 2

Aircraft Component: System Monitor: Indicating and Warning
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person

Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1894045
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

Descending to 8,000 feet we were assigned speed 190 knots. After selecting flaps 1, Autopilot A kicked off. I started to hand fly, and we noticed the lower amber band was above the flaps 1 maneuver bug. We selected flaps 5, the amber band did not move and then the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) noticed the amber LE FLAPS TRANSIT was illuminated and flaps indicated < 1. We requested delay vectors from ATC and I transferred the plane and radios to the First Officer. We settled on the Trailing Edge Flap Disagree checklist in the Quick Reference Handbook. The alternate flap extension moved the flaps only to just above 1. We pulled up flap 1 data on the ACARS, and also referred to flaps up data provided by Dispatch to ensure we were able to safely land on Runway XXL. The approach and landing we uneventful, taxing clear at Taxiway N with normal braking. After parking we noticed the Proximity Electronics Unit light. Just request priority handling when dealing with flap issues, we initially did not and then got deep in the checklist and setting up for the approach and didn't think about it again.

Synopsis

First officer reported a Leading Edge Flaps in Transit light on approach. The flight crew requested vectors for troubleshooting and to perform the QRH procedures. The flight crew then resumed the approach to landing at destination airport.
ACN: 1893085 (21 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202204
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Rain
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Thunderstorm
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737-900
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use: Vectors

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Leading Edge Flap
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 141
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4333
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1893085
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Maintenance
Detector. Automation: Aircraft Other Automation
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event: N
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result. General: Maintenance Action
Result. Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
The aircraft had a history of flap issues and issues with the EECs that the Captain and I discussed in ops before the flight. In the carry forward items section of the release there was a long time fault with the #1 EEC. Then in the log history on Day 0 the aircraft had a leading edge flaps transit light stays on write up. There were a series of write ups with the flaps in the history saying #2 transit light on. The first one starting on Day 0, then Day 1 was the second occurrence, then Day 2, then on our flight on Day 3. All of these write ups had the leading edge flaps transit light on. We did discuss this history together before the flight. Normal flight up until top of descent point. Thunderstorms were starting to pop up into central [state] and there was holding into one of the airports, we think it was ZZZ1. Frequency was very saturated and difficult to get any word with ZZZ2 center or Center. We asked for lower 4 times on frequency before given our first descent and that point we were 5000+ feet high on the arrival. When finally given descent via ZZZZZ1 landing east we told ATC we would be do are best but were already very high. Speeds on the arrival were complied with and full speed brakes were used from the TOD which was my best guess FL350 down to a cleared to bottom of 6,000 feet. When we switched to approach we were vectored off the arrival for traffic and told to maintain 6,000 feet. Approach gave us a vector off the arrival and then vectored us on ILS approach course. Thunder storms were building all around ZZZ and there were some buildups and rain that we went through when being vectored and re-vectored onto the arrival. At some point during these vectors back onto the ILS Runway XXL approach course we were given a speed reduction to 210 knots. This occurred somewhere on the base leg to final. At that time the Captain called for flaps 1. All indications with the Flap position indicator showed flaps 1, the handle was at flaps 1, but the LE Flaps transit light was still illuminated. A quick glance up at the Leading Edge Devices annunciator panel showed 1 amber light, the rest were green. The amber light was located on the left hand side underneath the flaps 1 number at the top of the annunciator. We were concerned with the approaching thunderstorms to the ZZZ airport so I pulled out the paper Quick Reference Handbook and
we began running through the procedure while continuing on the approach. Went to the
flight controls tab, then the leading edge flaps transit light page read the notes out loud
quickly and then read through point 1 where it gives you the option to choose 1. We read
through the first one and ruled it out and had a quick discussion that were was no roll or
any indication of any asymmetry. Read the second one and again after some quick
discussion agreed it was our problem. Went to step 7 and started to plan for a flaps 15
landing. We set Vref 15 +15 knots. This is where I made an initial error. I selected flaps
15 Vref speed and then put +15 in the wind additive so I think the flaps 15 speed was 160
and I put the plus 15 in the wind additive for a speed of 165 knots initially. Then step 9 is
use normal wind additive winds were like 150@9 at the time so would of been + 5 but I
did not change anything at this point. Step 10 is to put the ground proximity flap inhibit
switch to inhibit so I confirmed that with the Captain and did that. Somewhere right in
here we got are last turn on to the approach course and were cleared for the approach.
The next step was to calculate landing distance so I had to go to my IPAD this the tables
are removed in the Quick Reference Handbook for that. Hit they hyperlinks for the 900ER
and found the table and read out the landing distance first for the Trailing Edge Flap
Asymmetry Flap lever 15 and then I realized this was not the right table and found the
Leading edge flaps transit flaps 15 aircraft condition. We were approximately 145,000
pounds so I read out 5,000 feet needed for good braking and 7,000 for medium. I then
looked at the adjustments to landing distance and the only one that applied was the add
per C above ISA and it was minimal. Then went to step 3 for the 15% safety margin and if
it went down to medium braking we needing about 8,200 feet of runway and less than
6,000 feet for good. The rain was not hitting the airport currently so we expected to have
600 braking. The runway is listed as 9,000 feet long on the 10-9 and 8,400 ft. available
beyond the threshold. I did all this as fast as I could and while we were intercepting the
glide slope and starting down on the approach. All through this the center and approach
frequencies were completely saturated with constant communication from ATC to other
aircraft and us with no real significant breaks between radio transmissions. I read aloud
steps 13 and 14 and then went right into the deferred items because we were at that point
already. Captain called for gear and flaps 15 somewhere in the middle of the deferred
items checklist we finished the checklist somewhere between 1,500 feet and 1,000 feet.
Captain asked if we were good and we both agreed we were to continue the approach. I
double checked the whole procedure reading it quickly through again and realized I set the
flaps 15 speed wrong so by the I think Vref 15 was 149 I added the 15 knots to 164 and
put that in on the speed line and then changed the wind additive to +5 so we had an
approach speed of 169. I did this right before we were at 1,000 feet. At some point during
all of that we were switched over to Tower and cleared to land. There was a corporate jet
on the runway and he was being told told we were fast approaching and to vacate the
runway. Then given expedite instructions and then a little above 500 feet. tower issued go
around instructions to us. We were given a heading slightly off from runway heading an
initial climb to 2,000 feet Captain gave all the correct go around commands we went to
heading select and flew the Tower assigned heading, we had a discussion of the missed
approach instructions because Captain wanted to make sure he heard them correctly and
also a discussion about going all the way to clean maneuvering speed or leaving flaps
down. Captain wanted to try and recycle the flaps to see if we got the light again. So we
did go all the way to flaps up and after takeoff. Eventually Tower gave us a turn to the
downwind and a climb to 4,000 feet and switched us back over to approach. Approach re-
 vectored us on to the course for another ILS XXL approach. Captain redid an abbreviated
approach brief and then we selected flaps 1 again and go the LE Flaps transit light. We
went through the Quick Reference Handbook again and completed all the steps to the
deferred item landing checklist. We completed the deferred item checklist after the gear
was selected down and that finished the procedure. While being vectored I did let
approach know that we were going to have a final approach speed of 170 knots we never
[requested priority handling] or let any outside source know of the flap system malfunction. Our main concern was getting into the field before the thunderstorms passed over it. Captain made an uneventful flaps 15 landing. We exited at [taxiway] 1 and were told to go straight to ramp and ramp told us to go into [the gate]. We complied with instructions and safely parked. Completed the parking checklist and then called ops to let them know of the maintenance problem and Captain put the write up into the ELB.

**Synopsis**

B737 First Officer reported operating an aircraft with a long history of leading edge flap asymmetry discrepancies. This aircraft had a repeat discrepancy occur during approach to landing. The flight crew performed a go around and complied with the QRH procedures and rejoined the approach and landing at destination airport.
**ACN: 1892419 (22 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202204
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- State Reference: US

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: SA-227 AC Metro III
- Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Climb
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Route In Use: Vectors

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1892419
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew

**Events**
- Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
- Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Departure Airport
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
During our Gear Up call out, the Captain made note of the hydraulic annunciator and we both verified loss of hydraulic pressure with the pressure gauge. ATC was then made aware of our situation. We asked for vectors to run checklists. We ran the hydraulic failure checklist and the Captain proceeded to call for the hydraulic failure checklist and the Captain proceeded to call for priority gear extension. Who omitted the landing gear lever down step due the Captain giving the checklist to me verbally and omitted the gear up step of the checklist because we received three green (down and locked) on the gear indication. We then asked for vectors back to the Runway XXR at ZZZ. As we made our final approach, the Captain notified the passengers of a possible evacuation of the aircraft on the ground. When then proceeded without final approach and landing after completing or gear down before landing checklist verifying again that we had 3 green indication and flaps still in the 1/4 position again not making note that the gear lever was still in the up position. We came to a stop toward the right side of the runway and we're in immediate contact with ops and fire. Once the aircraft was deemed safe the passengers were shuttled back to the gate and the aircraft was towed back.

Synopsis
SA-227 Flight Crew reported landing gear failed to retract when selected up after take off. The Flight Crew ran the QRH procedures and elected to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.
ACN: 1885604 (23 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 202111

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 29000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Design

Person
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multijengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 10000
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 80
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1885604
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1

We took off on Runway XXR on the ZZZZZZ departure. Climbing through 29000 ft., we received AFT COMPT LOOP FAULT. I leveled off at 30000 ft. and we ran the QRH checklist. We then received the CARGO COMPT SMOKE ECAM message and a Master Caution. I took over ATC comm 1 radio and [advised ATC] and requested return to ZZZ. The FO (First Officer) continued the checklist, changed the destination and set us up for a return to Runway XYR at ZZZ. We had an uneventful landing and the fire department used thermal cameras to check for heat signature in the AFT compartment. No indications were seen and we taxied back to the ramp. This is an edited version of my first [report] from this event. I was PF (Pilot Flying). We took off on [Runway] XXR on the ZZZZZZ departure. Climbing through 29000 ft., we had a AFT COMPT LOOP FAULT ECAM message with a Cargo Loop Fault procedure. My FO (First Officer) opened the QRH to the Cargo Loop Fault checklist. After further reflection on our actions during the event and referencing the Systems manual and QRH again, I realized the Cargo Loop Fault checklist does not fully explain how to do a Loop Test. The checklist states, "Loop Test - Perform" but does not go into detail on HOW to perform a loop test. The systems manual does, and on step X. Loop Test Pushbutton it states - "Pressed and held IN". My FO did not press and hold in the Loop Test button, he only pressed and released it. The next sentence in the QRH Cargo Loop Fault checklist states, "If SMOKE light does not illuminate for affected compartment (smoke condition exists):" My FO and I looked at each other and said, "We must have smoke." We then continued the checklist by RE-SELECTING LOOP A (which had faulted) and turned OFF the OTHER LOOP. Almost immediately we received the CARGO COMPT SMOKE ECAM Master Warning and chime as the checklist states, Procedure: CARGO COMPT SMOKE. I took over ATC communications 1 radio and [requested priority handling], requested return to ZZZ as the FO continued the checklist, changed the destination and set us up for a return to XYR back at ZZZ. Uneventful landing and the fire department used thermal cameras to check for heat signature in the AFT compartment. No indications were seen and we taxied back to the ramp. If you look at the [Aircraft] System manual, you can see the photo of the Lower Cargo Smoke Detection system and see that by re-selecting a faulted LOOP A, and turning OFF the good LOOP B, you will receive a SMOKE detection, which is what we had. In addition, if you turn the page in the QRH you will see "Additional Information" which uses the example of an Illuminated LOOP A fault. This information is very important and a reference to it should be included on page XXX of the QRH. I would recommend a change to the QRH CARGO LOOP FAULT checklist to edit the "LOOP TEST - PERFORM" to closely match the Systems manual and should read, "LOOP TEST - PRESS AND HOLD IN". All lights on the Cargo Compartment Smoke Detection panel should illuminate which will confirm a faulty loop (see second boldfaced sentence). If the SMOKE light does NOT illuminate for affected compartment, smoke condition exists. If you flip the two boldface sentences, the checklist will make more sense after you "perform a loop test" by holding the button IN. Since our FO's do not perform a Main Deck or Cargo
compartment LOOP test during their preflight, they may not understand you must hold the button in to do the loop test.

**Synopsis**

Air Carrier Captain reported receiving a warning of smoke in the cargo compartment and returned to departure airport. The Captain reported the QRH does not adequately explain the procedure to resolve this warning.
ACN: 1861169 (24 of 50)

Time / Day

Date: 202112

Place

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff / Launch
Route In Use: Vectors

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Other Documentation
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated
Problem: Design

Component: 2

Aircraft Component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person

Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1861169
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event: N
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.General: Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Software and Automation
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1

On takeoff with ENGINE FIRE/FAILURE, EFB content locker crashed. Came back up with spinning wheel and eventually was able to get the QRC to run the checklist. Pulling paper QRHs off this fleet would be a giant mistake, in my opinion. This is not the first time I've had to report the EFB and associated apps.

Synopsis

B757 Captain reported EFB content crashed while doing checklists for an engine fire. Reporter recommends retaining the paper copies of the QRH on the aircraft to mitigate this situation.
ACN: 1838870 (25 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 202109
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: .75
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Haze / Smoke
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 7
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 3500

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. CTAF: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 2 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory. CTAF: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: None
Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 17000
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 225
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 50
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1838870
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 442
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 23
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 15
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1838899
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Ground Event / Encounter: Gear Up Landing
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
Miss Distance. Horizontal: 2600
Miss Distance. Vertical: 0
Were Passengers Involved In Event: N
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: Maintenance Action
Result. Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On Date, I conducted a multi-engine commercial examination in a [small two-engine aircraft]. While conducting a simulated engine failure single-engine ILS approach to Runway XX at ZZZ, ATC, (i.e., ZZZ Approach Control), vectored the applicant onto final. Once laterally established on the approach, ATC switched the applicant over to the common traffic advisory frequency. ATC provided no further traffic advisories or alerts. The applicant then switched to the advisory frequency and announced his position as a five (5) mile final to Runway XX. Aircraft Y then announced downwind for Runway XY. I then told the applicant that in the event of go-around, both engines were available. The applicant continued while I searched for traffic in haze and seven mile visibility. The applicant reported a three (3) mile final. I continued to scan for Aircraft Y. I told the applicant that I had not spotted the traffic and then radioed that we were on a one and one-half (1 ½) mile final. In response, Aircraft Y stated they had us in sight. I asked them to go-around. Instead, they called they were turning final for Runway XY. When the applicant called one hundred feet (100') above minimums, I spotted Aircraft Y. At that time, I told the applicant the runway was in sight and the applicant removed his foggles. I pointed the traffic to the applicant at one to two o'clock and less than a quarter (1/4) mile and again asked Aircraft Y to execute a go-around, which he then did as he flew over the top of us at the intersection of Runway XX and Runway XY. As the applicant flared to land, the tail struck the pavement. Only then did I realize that the applicant failed to complete the before landing checklist, by extending the gear, which I, in turn, failed to observe.

Narrative: 2

On Date I was taking a multi-engine commercial check ride with Designated Pilot Examiner [DPE] Name. I was the pilot in command for the flight. After flying the maneuvers we set up for the ILS XX into ZZZ. We had a simulated engine failure during the approach. ZZZ approach approved frequency change and gave no traffic advisories. I made a 5 mile final call on the CTAF followed by a 3 mile final call. During a 2 mile final Aircraft Y made a final call for Runway XY. I still had the foggles on and the [DPE] was searching for the traffic. I announced we reached the DA, and at that time name told me to remove the foggles. He was still searching for the traffic and talking to the other aircraft. Aircraft Y announced they would go around and I continued my approach inbound for Runway XX. With all the confusion and concerns of a mid-air collision I failed to complete the before landing check. It wasn't realized that the gear was retracted until the tail struck. Distraction and pressure were two major human factors that contributed to this incident. The other aircraft distracted me from completing the before landing check. In addition, the pressure of flying the approach and completing the maneuver within standards played a role.

Synopsis

Flight crew reported distractions from a near mid air collision resulted in the landing check list not being performed and a gear up landing.
ACN: 1838807 (26 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 202109

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-800
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Component: 1
Aircraft Component: Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Design

Component: 2
Aircraft Component: Checklists
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1838807
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: MEL / CDL
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
Result.General : Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Contributing Factors / Situations : MEL
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: 1
I was made aware by the A [Flight Attendant] that we only had three of our four required emergency checklists for both ditching and land emergency evacuations. As a crew we determined this to be a "no-go" issue, so the A requested one each of the checklists that were missing. We were initially informed that the station didn't have any. Immediately upon being informed of the situation, the Captain became very agitated and began questioning the A as to why we needed the checklists. After an explanation was attempted, the Captain, again in a very agitated manner, proceeded to get on his cell and call the Chief Pilot. As a crew, we checked the manual to confirm that we were correct in our understanding that we had to have four on board and confirmed this to be accurate, to the best of our interpretation. Someone also called for an Inflight Supervisor to come to the gate, but I am not exactly certain which of the crew made that call. A Supervisor did arrive and informed us that they were looking for one, but she had been informed that we were ok using our [tablets] in the event they couldn't find one. At no point up to this time did I feel like anyone considered this more than an annoyance and an unnecessary interruption to their abilities to board the plane for an on time departure. I was even threatened with termination of my job after I said I would not fly if we didn't have the proper equipment. We as Flight Crew are already on high alert where safety and security was concerned, we all felt like no one else cared about anything else but the flight being delayed. I have never felt less supported or more pressured by a Captain in my time of flying. When all was said and done, they found additional copies in the training room, which was what we had recommended about 20 minutes prior.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported a required checklist was missing and was found to be non MELable. This caused a breakdown in crew communications and a delay.
Time / Day
Date: 202109
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Indicating and Warning - APU
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1836639
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: MEL / CDL
Prior to departure we briefed the multiple MEL/CDL (Configuration Deviation List)/NEFs (Non-Essential for Flight) on file for this aircraft including MEL XX-XX-XX AUXILIARY POWER UNIT. While the Form sticker said BLEED APU LEAK, the APU as a whole was deferred, so we briefed and followed the procedures for MEL XX-XX-XX as opposed to MEL YY-YY-YY (which was not listed). While in cruise at approximately XA50Z the EICAS displayed caution message BLEED APU LEAK while the APU was inoperative, off and the APU BLEED button was pushed OUT. MEL XX-XX-XX makes no mention of BLEED APU LEAK being an expected EICAS message but the QRH procedure did not make sense to me in this situation. My FO (First Officer) and I decided together it would be best to contact Maintenance for further insight, so I transferred the radios and flight controls to the FO and proceeded to contact dispatch via ARINC (Commercial Radio) at around XA53Z. After a normal exchange with ZZZ1 Radio and patching into our Dispatcher I requested to talk to Maintenance and the Dispatcher responded that "Maintenance would not talk to me in flight and to follow the QRH" even after insisting several times. We proceeded to follow the remainder of the QRH and had to descend to FL300 and continue the flight with single bleed. Upon arrival into ZZZ2 I made the appropriate entry into the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) for a BLEED APU LEAK EICAS caution message. In my opinion this was a complete breakdown in CRM between the flight crew and Dispatch/Maintenance. I accept responsibility if this MEL was incorrect and should have been YY-YY-YY, but if that is the case, it has been incorrect for 10 days worth of flights. When I saw the APU deferred as a whole I considered that an acceptable solution to an APU Bleed leak, however there is no mention in XX-XX-XX of any special procedure for BLEED APU LEAK EICAS message. Furthermore, I do not have the full information in flight as to why the APU was deferred as opposed to the APU BLEED over a week prior to this event. I believe our decision to contact Maintenance for further guidance via ARINC was sound, and if they had simply answered our call for help we could have avoided descending to FL300 with a single bleed/PACK. There are numerous examples of NTSB accident reports where a safer outcome was achieved thanks to the pilots communicating with Maintenance while in flight, and throughout my training with Company I have always been trained to use all resources available. While I do not know whether Dispatch refused to talk to Maintenance or Maintenance refused to talk to me, I strongly recommend this practice of not allowing pilots to contact Maintenance during irregular situations in flight cease immediately.
EMB-175 Captain reported not finding a QRH procedure for an EICAS caution message and confusion over an associated MEL. The crew requested communicating with maintenance but was denied assistance while in flight.
**ACN: 1824764 (28 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202107
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 17000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737-800
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person: 1**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1824764
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Person: 2**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1824530
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Workload

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Weight And Balance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Departure Airport

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1

I, the CA (Captain), was PM (Pilot Monitoring); the FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying). During the climb-out phase in level flight in mildly hazy VMC at 17,000 MSL at 290 KIAS with Autopilot B engaged the Master Caution, the "FLT CONT" item on the CA-side SAP ("6-pack"), and the right half only of the "STAB OUT OF TRIM" light illuminated. Press-to-test of the "Stab out of trim" light showed both bulbs operable. After establishing that FO was actively remaining the PF, I performed "Stabilizer Out of Trim" QRH procedure with the result that the autopilot electric trim and both pilot yokes trim switches were inoperative in both directions. I notified ATC that we had a mechanical problem that would eventually result in requesting priority and landing at a nearby airport, probably ZZZ, but for now we were content to remain at 17,000 slowly outbound from ZZZ while we worked the problem. Knowing we were also over landing weight, nicely under control, and still had a lot of checklists to run, I had no desire to rush into diving towards some final approach fix before we were ready to land. I performed the "Stabilizer Trim Inoperative" QRH procedure with the result that manual hand-cranked trimming was possible in either direction, albeit against unusually high resistance and with a "cogging" feel as if pushing against a powered but stalled electric motor. This was true even when the aircraft was in-trim. One pilot could move the trim using one arm, but two pilots using one arm each worked much better for anything more than a couple turns of the trim wheel. We found that one pilot could both hand-fly and crank the trim, but tended to make unwanted aileron inputs while doing so. So it was doable in a pinch but not smooth. The forces required to turn the trim wheel did not appreciably reduce as we later slowed & configured. In the course of reading & discussing or doing the "deferred items" section of the "Stabilizer Trim Inoperative" QRH I started to activate the GPWS Flap inhibit switch. The FO stopped me saying we were above the 250 KIAS speed limit at that time. That sounded familiar to me, but no such limitation is stated at that point in the QRH. Nevertheless, we chose to delay activating the GPWS flap inhibit until we had slowed to first configuration speed around 220KIAS. Discussed with [the] FO whether ZZZ was the best divert option and which runway to use. ZZZ & longer Runway XXL was the unanimous choice. By that time we were a few miles south of [the] VOR on a south-southwesterly course for ZZZZZZ, roughly 100nm from ZZZ. I then performed the "Non-routine Landing" QRH procedure, alerting ATC for a return to ZZZ XXL with ARFF (Airport Rescue Firefighting) standing by. Coordinated with ATC for return via direct arrival for ILS XXL. Asked Company explicitly to alert ZZZ Approach & Tower of the intended non-standard
XXL landing. Notified Dispatch via ACARS report. Briefed FAs via intercom, and passengers via PA on the situation, my expectations, and their roles. We selected the non-standard landing Runway XXL based on that runway being much longer than the more typical landing Runway XXR. That was a minor miscue, because I/we had not considered the effect of the large displaced threshold. Which I now consider insignificant. For landings eastbound the difference is 2500 feet and would be significant. Lesson learned: the big runway length number on the 10-9 page can be significantly misleading; take the time to dig into the 10-9A details page. The fact that was our takeoff runway and within Jepp FDPro I'd used the green highlighter to extend the highlighting all the way to the takeoff threshold didn't help. What had been useful to help direct my taxi to the correct threshold for takeoff became mildly misleading when evaluating which runway to land on. Which was not a side effect I noticed at the time or had considered previously. Still working as PM I performed normal divert preparations and top-of-descent procedures: Reconfigured FMS & ACARS for ZZZ arrival, obtained ATIS, set up radios and performed approach brief, landing assessment, etc. Notified ZZZ Ops of our return by direct radio call to obtain a gate assignment. We discussed that we'd be a little above the normal max landing weight, but the already requested priority covers for that administrative requirement, and the runway available was nearly double what the QRH procedure's performance chart said was required. Performed descent checklist and before landing checklists and flows as normal. Throughout the evolution the FO kept us neatly in control, tight on the FD despite sometimes having to hand-crank the trim himself, caught a few radio calls I missed, and demonstrated overall high situational awareness and excellent systems knowledge. This is especially impressive for someone fairly new to the airplane who is just back from 6 months of furlough. During descent below 10,000 ft approaching downwind we changed control to CA as PF w FO as PM. We sighted the field while on base. During the turn-on to final I was using visual lookout primary, backed up by the LNAV purple line and the ILS. There was a moment of confusion as the ILS and LNAV came together before I was aligned with what I had thought was the landing runway. Having landed on XXR dozens (hundreds?) of times over the decades, that habit was unhelpful for a few seconds before we got fully established pointing at the correct runway. We then realized that Runway XXR is concrete and very easy to see in mildly hazy conditions while Runway XXL is asphalt and much harder to see. In fact XXL was invisible until we got closer in following the LNAV & LOC. My general habit on any landing involving parallel runways is to verbalize seeing all the relevant runways by name and explicitly saying which one I'm aligning / aligned with. E.g. "I see XXL and XXR. I'm aligning with XXL." For whatever reason that verbalization didn't occur; with sorta predictable results. Intercepted final outside intermediate fix in level flight at 3,000 ft. Configured to flaps 15 early and slowed gradually to Vapp of approximately 160KIAS before glideslope intercept at final approach fix. FO kept the airplane nicely in trim on my requests. Made a flaps 15 slightly overweight (approx. 148K#) approach and landing to a smooth touchdown on ZZZ Runway XXL just shy of the 2000ft marker. Upon stopping made a PA to reassure the passengers & remind them the safety vehicles would be seen around the airplane. ATC gave us an alternate frequency to contact ARFF on. Which surprised both of us a bit. Once we were communicating with ARFF I requested they inspect us for hot brakes or damaged tires. ARFF found normal brake temps and no tire damage. At ARFF's request I released them at that point and we taxied normally to [the] gate. Following shutdown the FO attempted to manually crank the trim to the usual post-shutdown 5 units from the 8-9 units we'd used at touchdown. At zero airspeed the trim was still "cogging" and almost as difficult to move as it had been in flight. So we left the trim at the landing setting for Maintenance's edification. Which point we discussed with the Chief Pilot who met the flight and again later with the maintenance folks who also met the flight. I made appropriate aircraft maintenance log book entries for the stab trim failure and for the overweight landing. Spoke with Dispatch by phone before leaving aircraft per FOM. The next morning I filed the required report. In all I think this
event worked out pretty close to textbook, minus the small glitches identified above. The main electric trim failing was the causal factor. Everything else is just details. 1. Subsequent research on the ground shows that activating the GPWS Flap Inhibit switch is called for in 11 different QRH procedures, and in the Flaps 15 landing procedure. Only the "One Engine Inoperative" QRH procedure and the "Flaps 15 Landing" procedures mention that limit; the other 10 QRH procedures do not. I do not know whether those differences are deliberate or an oversight. Suggest someone on the 737 fleet team look into this. If the difference is deliberate there probably ought to some verbiage available in QRH or [procedures] to explain the rationale so others don't mistakenly apply a remembered restriction where it's not intended. 2. We were both surprised to see that only half of the "Stab out of trim" annunciator illuminated. Which left us wondering at first if we had a warning system malfunction or a trim malfunction. I surmise now that the right bulb is connected to FCC (Flight Control Computer) B and the left is connected to FCC A. And that had the Captain been PF, we'd have seen the left half illuminate instead. However it works, the details of left & right are not documented in [manual] where the annunciator is described. At a minimum there should be a statement like "Only half of the annunciator may illuminate. That is still a valid indication of an out-of-trim condition." 3. Overall, from the "Stab out of trim" annunciator illuminating to touchdown was about 30 minutes. From reviewing the ACARS logs I know it was at least 28 minutes and less than 35. As the CA / PM / QRH operator I was working quickly and diligently almost the entire time to accomplish all the non-routine and normal procedures in full without hurrying. Had we turned back even a couple minutes earlier the airplane would have been approaching the airport before we were fully caught up and mentally transitioned from handling an [urgent inflight situation] to performing a normal low-stress, albeit flaps 15, landing. Given the reality that following all the procedures fully takes nearly 30 minutes, I believe we do a disservice to pilots in the sim, rushing around the traffic pattern with an engine out. That encourages hurrying, doing QRH steps without really thinking them and their implications through, etc. We fight how we train, and we're training to hurry. I question the wisdom of that. Further I question the wisdom of planned arrival fuels that only allow for approximately 30 minutes to flameout at traffic pattern altitudes. The so-called FAR "45 minute reserve" is 45 minutes at cruise, not 45 minutes at traffic pattern altitude with e.g. flaps stuck partly extended. I now conclude that performing a major QRH evolution discovered in the arrival traffic pattern while down near Company planned arrival fuels would necessitate skipping a lot of steps or giving them at best a lick and a promise. I believe it is unwise to plan arrival fuels that tightly. Yes, we commonly have additional hold and / or Dispatch fuels. But each of those may legitimately be burned in delays encountered before the [urgent situation] appears. This saves Company a lot of money on the many flights that don't turn out worst-case. But it really sucks to be the pilot who draws that short straw, and is faced with either doing a rushed job of handling the [situation] or running out of fuel. That's planning, in extremis, to fail. An industry-leading FAR 121 carrier should not be planning to fail. In extremis or otherwise.

Narrative: 2

At a level off of 17,000 ft we noticed stab out of trim light. I was the PF so it was my aircraft. The Captain ran the stab out of trim QRH checklist which lead to the QRH stab trim inoperative checklist. We did not regain electric trim. Manual trim was what we were left with. Then the non-routine QRH checklist was performed. The manual trim wheel was difficult to work for both us even when the plane was near an in trim condition. Speed was slowed to about 270kts from about 290kts then. [ATC was advised] and we planned and set up for an arrival back to ZZZ. I flew the aircraft and worked the manual trim while the CA performed checklists, set up for the arrival and approach, and the briefings. Manual trim did not become much easier until on approach when aircraft was slowed to approach speed, however even then it was difficult. The CA took the aircraft and I became the PM.
The landing was nice and smooth. Once on the ground using the manual trim wheel to reset the stab trim to 5 units was still very difficult.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a Stabilizer Out of Trim problem during climb out. They completed the appropriate QRH checklist and performed an air turn back.
Time / Day
   Date : 202106
   Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place
   Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
   State Reference : US
   Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment
   Light : Daylight

Aircraft
   Reference : X
   ATC / Advisory.Ground : ZZZ
   Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
   Make Model Name : B737 MAX 8
   Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
   Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
   Mission : Passenger
   Flight Phase : Taxi

Person : 1
   Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
   Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
   Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
   Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
   Function.Flight Crew : Captain
   Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
   Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
   Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 195
   Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 10500
   ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1819346
   Human Factors : Workload
   Human Factors : Time Pressure
   Human Factors : Distraction
   Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 2
   Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
   Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
   Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
   Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
   Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
   Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
   Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
   Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
   Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 210
Experience: Flight Crew. Type: 9500
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1819354
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This was both pilots' second flight on the MAX Aircraft since its return. We briefed a single engine taxi, in order to save gas, due to carrying an alternate in ZZZ1. We determined to start the engine once we determined what the lineup was for takeoff. As we turned the corner, approaching taxiway, we saw that we were #4, and due to the long start of the MAX, we began to start the #1 engine. This turned out to still be almost too late to start the engine and ensure 3 minutes of stabilization at idle prior to takeoff. The engine was started by the time we turned onto taxiway, but both of us were very closely monitoring the time and taxiing slow as we were now #2 for takeoff. After stabilization, we remembered that we had also talked earlier in the trip about trying to remember to do the new VNAV programming procedures in order to build habit patterns. Having a minute to go before our three-minute stabilization time, we decided to program the computer for the practice. This was one more distraction added to that of watching the engine time. About the time we finished, we were cleared for takeoff with 30 seconds to go before three minutes. We saw that we were going to be good on the time, so acknowledged the clearance, turned on the lights, took the runway and took off. Only on climbout, after having cleaned up, did we realize that we had failed to run the Before Takeoff Checklist. We immediately checked in with the Flight Attendants, who confirmed the fact that we had not notified them of the takeoff clearance as required by our flows and the checklist. Due to the length of taxi, however, they were all seated with everything stowed, and nothing unfortunate occurred. The rest of the flight went uneventfully. Distractions piled up, due to being in a somewhat unfamiliar aircraft and trying to accomplish new programming procedures for climbout. While everything was being done to try to be procedurally correct in accordance with what the Company wants done, being out of normal habit patterns caused us to miss a checklist. I would suggest that regarding the MAX, until we are all much more familiar with the timing required to start the engines with motoring and still get the three minutes, that we minimize the times that we single engine taxi, doing so only when there will be an excessive amount of ground time anticipated. Beyond that, if we do accomplish a single engine taxi, and we approach the runway without the time required, rather than focus on slowing down to get the time, simply tell Tower we need a minute to allow for the three minute and accept the delay. Further, the timing for the VNAV programming needs to be codified. It can only be accomplished after the numbers are received from ATIS which is when everything is happening quickly to get us off the
gate. It might be worth adding a "VNAV Climbout programmed" step to the Before Push or Before Taxi Checklist, to prevent distractions later on.

**Narrative: 2**

Second flight in the MAX 8, since its return to service. We taxied out single engine and saw the lineup was minimal for takeoff on [Runway] XXL. Began engine start, after exiting the ramp. Because of the slow engine start with the MAX, we were closely watching the timing to ensure we got three minutes after engine start. Engine was started as we turned onto taxiway, and the aircraft in front of us was cleared for takeoff. We taxied slowly, as it looked like we would make our engine warmup time with a slow taxi. We decided to load the new VNAV Takeoff Programming Procedures. Got that loaded, just as our engine time was completed and Tower cleared us for takeoff. We rolled onto the runway and had an uneventful takeoff and climbout. Because we were distracted, we failed to accomplish the Before Takeoff Checklist or ding the flight attendants. Loading of VNAV takeoff programming should be accomplished earlier than approaching the end of the runway. I'm not sure where the best time is to load the VNAV takeoff procedure, since we are very busy after we get our numbers. This would minimize distractions at a critical point in the taxi out. MAX engine start is slow. If it looked like we needed more time for engine warm up, we should not hesitate to let Tower know we need more time.

**Synopsis**

Flight crew flying 737 MAX aircraft reported missing the before takeoff checklist and Flight Attendant notification prior to takeoff due to engine warm up time constraints.
Time / Day
Date: 202106
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-700
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Component
Aircraft Component: Nosewheel Steering
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reportor Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1817740
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 90
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 90
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1818059
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Gate
Result.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Pushing off gate/listening to Ground. There was a lot going on with weather approaching the field, certain departure gates shut off and others open. Push crew cleared off/weren't using headsets due to [weather hazards]. We were clearly distracted with what was going on with Ground as it was a question of starting one or both engines and whether we were delayed or departing immediately. We thought we were ready for taxi and with the frequency very busy; I called when there was a break. As the Captain powered up #2, it became immediately apparent that there was no nose wheel steering. Captain stopped the aircraft immediately and set parking brake. We were both at a loss that we had skipped the whole Before Taxi Flow/Checklist. We took a minute to discuss how we got there and knowing we had been distracted, "reset" ourselves and continued with the Before Taxi Flow and Checklist. [Suggest] Self awareness during high workload that things can unknowingly be skipped.
**Narrative: 2**

Pushed back and disconnected from tug. Only started one engine for departure delays due to weather at the field. As I cleared off the tug, we heard over the Ground frequency that all departure gates were closed for weather. The FO (First Officer) and I discussed our plan to taxi off ramp and wait for weather to pass. After that, I must have believed that he did the after-start flow and we did the Before Taxi Checklist. However, I was wrong. We cleared left and right and I started to move the aircraft, but immediately I knew the aircraft was not configured properly for taxi. I stopped the aircraft and started the after-push procedures again. The distraction of the weather delays got me out of my normal routine, as well as the FO's. Neither one of us trapped the errors until too late. We ended up with a return-to-gate event. While we start engines routinely and do Before Taxi Checklists several times a day, we can get distracted by outside factors. I should have delayed the discussion about weather or anything else until after the start flow and Before Taxi Checklist was complete.

**Synopsis**

B737 flight crew reported that complications and distractions due to weather led to the lack of proper checklist completion, resulting in the nose wheel steering being unavailable during taxi.
ACN: 1813994 (31 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202106
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference
- ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Night

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size
- Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Landing Gear
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person**
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1813994
- Human Factors: Fatigue
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

**Events**
- Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Automation : Aircraft RA
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

During the final segment of the approach phase on short final, we hear gear up at 960 feet RA. Captain told Pilot Monitoring to put the gear down and decided to continue to land. We decided it was safer to land rather to do the balked landing. I believe the cause of the event was fatigue and complacency. I felt a little tired and did not scan and confirm Captain checklist items that were called for. It was night time with turbulence and at a critical phase of flight were several things were happening at the same time. I need to be more aware of confirming actual checklist items at critical phases of flight and scanning everything looks good when the Captain is focused on flying the aircraft into ZZZ.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported fatigue and procedural deviations led to the landing gear not being lowered per the checklist resulting in an unstabilized approach.
ACN: 1810675 (32 of 50)

Time / Day

Date: 202105
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component

Aircraft Component: Normal Brake System
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person

Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1810675
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Were Passengers Involved In Event: N
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was doing the Captain preflight duties as specified by the Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM). This was the first time in an actual MAX aircraft (not counting the MAX return to service training in the SIM) since the aircraft were grounded 2+ years ago. As I was completing the preflight duties, I neglected to set the autobrakes to RTO. I believe the cause of this was, the autobrake selector in the MAX is in a different position than the NexGen aircraft, specifically in the center console rather than next to the landing gear selector lever. Also, the flight paperwork was placed in such a position as to cover the autobrake selector knob. When we accomplished the Before Start Checklist, of course one of the items is "AUTOBRAKE" with a response of "RTO". I responded with the appropriate call of "RTO" purely by rote memory without actually looking at the autobrake selector. I recall looking towards the landing gear lever where I expected to see the autobrake selector and for some reason was convinced I saw it and it was set properly to RTO. We taxied out and departed uneventfully. It was only upon accomplishing the clean-up items after flap retraction that we noticed the autobrake selector was in the off position. The rest of the flight continued uneventfully.

**Synopsis**

B737 MAX Captain reported not activating the auto brake system for RTO when completing the before takeoff checklist.
ACN: 1802425 (33 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 202104
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 96
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4900
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1802425
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
Pushed back from Gate X, 10 minutes late, after a Supervisor was called to the aircraft, after boarding was complete, to assist with passengers traveling with a four-year-old child. The child would not keep his/her seat belt fastened and kept removing his/her face covering. The parents had become belligerent with the flight attendants. We received a runway change just prior to pushback that would have us departing on Runway XXR verses YYL. The takeoff data for XXR included the requirement to burn off additional fuel prior to takeoff. We loaded the new takeoff data and reran the Before Push Checklist. Then we began our pushback from the gate. Knowing it would be a very short taxi to the runway, we started both engines. During the First Officer's After Start flow, I believe I interrupted his thought process by starting to voice my idea that we could taxi a short distance via [intersection] to Taxiway 1 and wait the little bit of time to burn off the additional taxi fuel. After completing the After Start flow, the First Officer did not make the "Standing by Flaps" call. Instead, we talked for a few more seconds about moving the aircraft to a spot away from the ramp so that we could burn off the additional taxi fuel. The First Officer requested taxi clearance to Taxiway [Alphabet] and notified Ground Control that we would need to hold there, to burn off fuel prior to departing. We taxied forward onto [intersection] and made the left turn onto Taxiway 1 and brought the aircraft to a stop. Once the parking brake was set, we both realized that we had not performed the Before Taxi Checklist and subsequently had not set the flaps to the Takeoff setting prior to moving the aircraft. We then set the flaps to the Takeoff setting and ran the Before Taxi Checklist. After a couple of minutes, we had burned the proper amount of fuel for the taxi and we made an uneventful departure. It was immediately clear to me that I gave too much thought to the things that had happened prior to pushback and in doing that, caused me not to focus on the required duties after pushback. I also should have allowed the First Officer to focus entirely on the after-start process before diverting his thoughts to something else.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported not performing the Before Taxi Checklist and subsequently had not set the flaps to the takeoff setting prior to moving the aircraft. Reporter cited distraction from dealing with face mask issues in the cabin area may have contributed to the event.
ACN: 1784065 (34 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 202101
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1784065

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
At the gate we had a passenger board without permission from gate agent, then we had a non-compliant passenger not wearing a mask. That was mitigated when gate agent came and explained to the elderly passenger that masks must be worn. On taxi out Captain and First Officer were discussing mitigation strategies if that event were to re-occurrence on taxi and failed to run pre-takeoff checklist. Cause - Distraction by pre-flight events with gate agent and non-compliance of the passenger. Remain focused on task at hand. Not replay scenarios until the debrief phase of flight.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported forgetting to do the pre-takeoff checklist due to being distracted by a passenger being boarded without permission and another passenger not complying with face mask policy.
**ACN: 1765654** (35 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202010
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- State Reference: US

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B767-300 and 300 ER
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Takeoff / Launch
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Airspeed Indicator
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1765654

**Events**
- Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.General: Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Departure Airport
Result.Flight Crew: FLC Overrode Automation
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Manuals

Narrative: 1

While conducting the checklist, the checklist says to refer to Flight with Unreliable Airspeed table in the performance inflight chapter. During this emergency, I was flying the airplane manually and was not able to assist the First Officer much with the checklist. If the table in the performance inflight chapter could be incorporated into the emergency checklist, this would reduce much of the stress of the situation and allow for a safer operation in an emergency situation.

Synopsis
After returning to departure airport with unreliable airspeed indication, the Captain suggested moving necessary charts to the relevant portion of the QRH for ease in location and use.
ACN: 1757535 (36 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: FO
- Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 2000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Dusk

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B747-400
- Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Route In Use: Vectors

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Landing Gear Indicating System

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1757535

**Events**
- Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
- Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Maintenance
- Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: FAR
- Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector. Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Maintenance Action
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew: FLC Overrode Automation
Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: MEL
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1

ZZZ: Departed from runway XXL. On the approach into ZZZ1 RNP X RWY XX, PF (Pilot Flying) called for gear down, flaps 20. Immediately PM (Pilot Monitoring) extended the gear lever there was a warning horn and right body gear disagreed alert followed by an EICAS message "Equipment Cooling", the second time message showed up during the flight. At 1,000 feet both pilots called for "Go Around". PF requested for vector from ATC for an immediate landing ILS runway XX. PM worked the QRH read the gear disagreed checklist. Equipment Cooling non-normal checklist was completed earlier during cruise. The message went away both times. Please note there are lots of write ups on A/C X. (LE Flaps, Outflow Valve, Thrust Reverser, W&B Indication System, Cockpit Smoke Vision, Equipment Cooling, ATC failure & Landing Gear Config warning.). These were all the numerous write ups on the aircraft from our flight and previous flights.

I suggested the Aircraft should be AOG with immediate effect and the above listed malfunctions should be rectified prior to the aircraft being released for operations. This is a classic example of chains of error, that should be broken before leading to an incident or accident. Thank you.

Synopsis

First Officer reported two EICAS messages on final, causing a go around to allow time to run the QRH, landing safely on next approach.
Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-800
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Autopilot
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1757193
Human Factors: Time Pressure

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Maintenance
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew: Regained Aircraft Control
Result.Flight Crew: FLC Overrode Automation
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance
Result. Aircraft: Equipment Problem Dissipated

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
Departing ZZZ, neither autopilot would engage during climb out. The first officer checked circuit breakers, reset the glareshield autopilot disconnect bar, and we tested each yoke disconnect button but neither autopilot would still engage. No QRH procedure could be found. We reported the autopilot issue to ATC and requested to stop our climb at an altitude below RVSM. Next we called ZZZ Maintenance and their suggestion to reset the stab trim autopilot cutout switches successfully restored autopilot function, and flight continued normally at normal cruise altitude.

This was the first flight of the day for both pilots and the first flight in several days for the aircraft. Preflight distractions included a previously unseen route error that kept wanting to reload from the CPDLC auto load and update. During pushback, a ground crew wing walker wanted us to abort our number 2 engine start because she felt the tug driver had cleared us to start sooner than she wanted the engines started. After pushback ATC informed us we only had 3 minutes to taxi to make our departure slot time.

Suggest adding "Stab Trim Cutout Switches" to the Before Start Checklist, and/or including a QRH Procedure for "Neither Autopilot Will Engage."

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported auto pilot not engaging as required and non QRH procedures were used to get autopilot to function correctly.
**ACN: 1756780 (38 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1000

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737-700
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Flap/Slat Indication
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 100
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756780

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Manuals
Primary Problem: Manuals

Narrative: 1
On approach to ZZZ XXL, First Officer called for Landing Checklist. We noticed no illuminated green "leading edge flaps extended". We did go-around and got vectors in the area at 3,000 feet while working the problem. I could not find a QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist for the omission of that light. The FO (First Officer) and I exchanged controls. He was also unable to find a QRH checklist for this problem. While being vectored we extended the flaps and could visually see by looking out our windows that the leading edge flaps were indeed extending normally, and that it was an indication problem. The following lights were not illuminating at all. Leading Edge Flap Transit, Leading Edge Flap Extend, and the overhead Leading Edge devices indication lights. After triple checking no checklists would cover our problem, and after we verified the leading edge devices were fully extended, we made a normal flaps 30 uneventful landing. After landing the PSEU (Proximity Switch Electronics Unit) light illuminated.

Narrative: 2
As the Pilot Flying (PF) I called for flaps 30 and the Before Landing Checklist on the visual approach to XXL into ZZZ. The Captain (Pilot Monitoring) ran the checklist and we discovered that the Leading Edge Flap Extend green light was not illuminated. We executed a go-around to give ourselves more time to assess the situation. At 3,000 feet and after ATC gave us vectors, the Captain proceeded to find the appropriate checklist in the QRH. He could not find any checklist for LE FLAPS EXT green light not illuminated. He then asked if I could look and I transferred aircraft control to the Captain. I looked and didn't find any checklist addressing our exact condition. At that time, I did a push to test on the LE FLAPS EXT (Green light), LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber light) and LE devices annunciator panel and all tested good. The Captain called for Flaps 1 and we visually confirmed by looking out the window that the LE Flaps did in fact deploy and the flap position indicator showed flaps 1, but LE FLAPS EXT (Green light), LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber light) and LE devices annunciator panel did not illuminate. I looked through the QRH again to see if we had missed anything and the closest checklist we could think was the LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber Light) but that light was not illuminated, so we elected to not use that checklist. Also searched the non-normal performance data to see if there was an option to select for our condition and there was not. After discussing together and visually confirming the LE flaps deployed, and no roll or yaw was felt in the controls and it correctly showed on the flaps position indicator, we elected to land normally with flaps 30. After landing during roll out, the PSEU illuminated. Maybe a QRH addressing this particular
condition. In looking back, I believe that we could have used our commuting pilot in the cabin to visually check the inboard LE Flaps and Trailing Edge flaps were deployed. Also contacted Dispatch and got Maintenance to get another perspective on the indications we were seeing in the cockpit.

**Synopsis**

B737-700 flight crew could not find checklist for Leading Edge Devices Not Extended.
**ACN: 1748126 (39 of 50)**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**

Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person:Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 21
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1452
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748126
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

**Events**

Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

After pushback and engine start, my before taxi was interrupted when I noticed the squawk was not inputted. I left the flow to enter the PDC and retrieve the code. I had some difficulty with the box, and it took longer than expected. Once the code was retrieved and entered, my concentration was interrupted by ground movement off our right wing that I was monitoring. Then Ground asked us if we were ready to taxi and I said yes. Once taxiing, we saw that the flaps were up. We stopped short of the runway and accomplished the flow checklist and looked for other errors we could have missed. I was definitely rusty having not flown much in the previous 30-90 days. So, finish a flow, accomplish the checklist, and slow down when things are busy.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported taxiing out to the runway and finding items were missed during their before taxi flow checklist.
Time / Day
Date : 202004
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1000

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase : Takeoff / Launch
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component : Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 97
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 12000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1740617
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
Departed ZZZ Runway XX, Flaps 5. Reaching 1,000 ft., I called for flaps 1 and subsequently attempted activation of the Electric Trim switch. Left yoke stab trim did not function. Asked First Officer to try his yoke trim switch. Neither trim switches functioned. Ran QRH procedure for Stabilizer Trim Inoperative. ATC was notified of flight control problem and [priority handling requested]. A large amount of questions were asked during the initial run of the QRH. The QRH gives a condition: Both of these occur:

Loss of electric trim through autopilot.
Loss of electric trim through the control switches.

As we got vectored off the departure procedure and distracted by ATC questions pertaining to the nature of our [situation], I didn't fully hear the initial reading of the condition calling for both of the above. As I had a heavy yoke from the takeoff configuration, I choose not to negative G unload the aircraft and turn on the autopilot. By not turning on the autopilot, I wasn't able to fully comply with the QRH conditions. QRH was continued and Stab Trim Cutout switches were selected to cutout. With the Cutout switches in cutout, the autopilot was not available.

During our debrief and review of the QRH procedures it was discovered that the QRH called for loss of both items, loss of autopilot and flight control switches.

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported failure to fully comply with QRH procedure following a pitch trim failure.
ACN: 1726670 (41 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 202002
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZME.ARTCC
State Reference: TN
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 17500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZTL
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZTL
Airspace.Class E: ZTL

Component
Aircraft Component: Engine
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1726670
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting

Person: 2
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1726668
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Troubleshooting

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

Upon climb out, we experienced a series of events which led to a left engine failure. The First Officer and I decided that while we were running checklists, briefing the Flight Attendant and passengers, and talking to Dispatch and ATC, that we would head toward our intended destination and be set up on final approach by the time we were finished. At the end of the QRH procedures, it says to land at the nearest suitable airport, which at the time of the event would have been a closer airport. However my thought was that by the time we would've held, completed all of our tasks and descended, we would've already been just as close to our destination anyway, which has better services for our situation. I decided that it would not adversely affect the safety of flight and elected to continue to our destination.

The main cause of this event was that I did not read the words "land at the nearest suitable airport" carefully enough and fully comprehend what it was saying. At the time, our destination was the nearest suitable airport in my mind, and once I had decided that, I had tunnel vision focus and did not consider alternatives.

Moving forward, I will be aware of my tendency to set up this tunnel vision so that I'm easily able to come out of it and consider alternatives to my plan if needed. I will not say that it was an unsafe decision to continue to destination, in fact I feel as though my decision was well-founded. However, the fact still remains that it was indeed technically contrary to the language used in the QRH.

Narrative: 2
Climbing out of 17,500 ft. for 19,000 ft. we got a master warning left oil pressure. The Captain immediately monitored the instruments and transferred the controls to me. The QRH instructed him to reduce power to idle in the affected engine. As he was pulling thrust to idle in that engine we had n2 vib n1 vib and audible vibration sound that could be felt through the cabin accompanied by the smell of burning. Around this time ITT began to spike as well. We [advised ATC] at 18000 ft. about 180 miles from our destination (to the best of my knowledge). We secured the engine via the QRH and decided to continue due to the fact that we had several checklists to run, notification to the passengers and Flight Attendant, and to the company and would be at our destination in about the time that process would take. The left engine was secure so we both agreed to ask ATC direct our destination. A suitable airport was below us at the time of the incident, however, in our mind was not the best place for landing due to the criteria listed above.

On the ground, Maintenance said an oil pump was disconnected to the assembly box that caused the engine to degress the way it did.

**Synopsis**

A flight crew reported they had to shut down an engine but continued to their destination instead of landing at a closer airport as stated in the QRH.
**Time / Day**

Date: 202001
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: DEN.Airport
State Reference: CO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**

Light: Night

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp: DEN
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi
Airspace.Class B: DEN

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 123
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 11500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1718903
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

**Events**

Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

It was the third leg out of four on the last day of a four-day trip. The First Officer and I had worked well together throughout. Preflight was normal. We pushed on-time for our flight. During the push we noticed that our takeoff speeds had deleted off the CDU and there was a message stating "OAT Disagree." We set the brake, cleared off the Push Crew, and the First Officer told Ramp we'd be delayed a couple minutes. Ramp said to call back when ready to taxi. Both engines were running at this point. Since that speed's deleted situation rarely happens, we discussed it briefly. The First Officer then updated the Takeoff Data and resubmitted it via ACARS. Within seconds we received updated Takeoff Data which we reentered into the FMC. We then reaccomplished the Before Push checklist. The First Officer told ramp we were ready to taxi and they told us to taxi which we did.

Both of us had forgotten the Before Taxi Flows and Checklist due to the distraction. While taxiing out, I did a throttle burst which caused the configuration horn and light to activate. It was then we realized we'd forgotten our Before Taxi Flows, Checklist and flaps. We set the flaps to 1 and continued taxi. Prior to takeoff with the aircraft stopped, we completed our Before Taxi Flows and Checklist followed by the Before Takeoff Checklist along with several more throttle bursts. Takeoff and the rest of the flight was uneventful.

This was the first time in XX years here I've taxied without flaps. I'm disappointed in myself for allowing it. It was a textbook distraction error straight out of the simulator. There was plenty I could've done better to manage and prevent the situation. First and foremost, I needed to recognize the distraction for what it was and insured we completed our Before Taxi Flows and checklist and then dealt with the takeoff data issue. Then I should've used the Departure Plan Checklist after taxi instead of re-accomplishing the Before Push Checklist after the new data was entered. Lastly, when the configuration horn and light sounded we never referred to the Non-Normal [checklist]. Fortunately I'm in the habit of doing throttle bursts before they're required when notifying the Flight Attendants of takeoff. So the error was caught well before we reached the runway. But it never should have happened in the first place. And clearly our communication as a Crew was lacking since neither of us caught the situation prior to taxi.

Synopsis

B737 Captain reported a distraction during pushback caused them to taxi without flaps, and not complete the before taxi checklist.
ACN: 1717750 (43 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 202001
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude, MSL, Single Value: 25000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory, Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace, Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Cockpit Window
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function, Flight Crew: Captain
Function, Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification, Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification, Flight Crew: Multiflame
Experience, Flight Crew, Total: 10736
Experience, Flight Crew, Last 90 Days: 140
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1717750
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

On climbout from ZZZ at about 25,000 feet the FO (First Officer) front window completely shattered. Our actions as a crew was an immediate level off and communicated with ATC. Reading the checklist came to a point of putting on shoulder harnesses, at this point I requested a turn for ZZZ. We worked together to get the airplane turned around with a new routing. The FO worked with ATC and I went back to the checklist for its completion. The last item on the checklist asked if the glass was inner or outer. In our case it was outer. Final line on checklist reads continue as normal and take off shoulder harnesses. So this is where I recognize the error, as dire as "put on shoulder harnesses," this was not the time to turn around.

We once again discussed our situation with one another with a completed checklist and cautiously went with the checklist, that this is ok to continue to ZZZ1. Our fuel situation was fine as we proceeded to ZZZ1 fairly quickly. We were left separated in situations and busy unnecessarily. This is my disappointment.

Synopsis

B737 Captain reported a lack of clarity when following the checklist for a shattered cockpit window.
ACN: 1716108 (44 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 202001
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Takeoff / Launch
Route In Use: Direct

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Check Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1716108
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
When the PF (Pilot Flying) called "Set Flaps Up Maneuvering Speed" the PM (Pilot Monitoring) reached for the flap handle initially then went to the MCP.

The "Set Flaps Up" part of the call seems to cause this improper action during high workload. "Set Flaps Up" should be removed from the call. The call could be changed to "Set Clean Maneuvering Speed" or something similar.

**Synopsis**

B737 Check Airman reported the aircraft checklist verbiage needs to be changed to avoid improper action.
**ACN: 1702340** (45 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201911
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Indicating and Warning - Fuel System
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Failed

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew: Total: 10463
- Experience.Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 132
- Experience.Flight Crew: Type: 4418
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1702340
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown

**Events**
- Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Manuals
- Primary Problem: Manuals

**Narrative: 1**
During preflight set up for subject flight, we noted that the inbound defect, "Fuel Quantity Indicating System Blank," Left and Totalizer indicators blank, no associated EICAS messages, had not been cleared. In addition to the blank left fuel quantity indicator and blank totalizer, we noted a FUEL QTY IND status message. Maintenance Personnel entered the flight deck around that time to check the fuel quantity indicating status. They also confirmed they were working on the indicator defect, but might have to defer it due to time constraints. Subsequently, over several minutes and a few visits to the flight deck, Maintenance Personnel confirmed MEL 28XXX would be placed on the aircraft, as well as reporting the tank stick values. The Captain and I reviewed the MEL and its potential impact to our flight.

The MEL OPS PLACARD is straight forward for fuel confirmation, preflight, fuel tracking and confirmation during normal operations. I became uncomfortable, however, when comparing procedure solutions for abnormal fuel scenarios. My concerns were as follows:

MEL note: 'FUEL CONFIG' EICAS ADVISORY MESSAGE OR WARNING LIGHT FOR LATERAL IMBALANCE MAY BE INHIBITED. This completely removes the FUEL CONFIG QRH as a checklist option.

MEL Item H: MONITOR FUEL USAGE FOR ANY UNUSUAL DECREASE IN FUEL QUANTITY AND/OR FUEL IMBALANCE. Then MEL item I. FOR OPERATIONS WITH CENTER TANK FUEL -- Item 1 regarding predicted fuel when center tanks are empty is straight forward. Item 2 regards procedures for center tank fuel exhaustion before the predicted point and that a fuel leak should be suspected. Item (A) provides six cues, any of which can be evidence of a fuel leak. They include fuel quantity decreasing abnormally, excessive fuel flow, fuel balance rate over 2,000 lbs/hr, abnormal aileron trim, visual spray from spar and up to and including engine failure. If a leak occurs on the side with the blank indicator, the cues are reduced to abnormal aileron, apparent at around 1,600 lb imbalance, fuel spray observation, or an engine failure. Of note, Maintenance reported that the tank stick values indicated a 500 lb difference. My assessment was that the discovery of a leak in a worst-case scenario by the methods above adds considerable time and unnecessary risk to addressing the emergency. Starting off with an already 500 lb imbalance added more uncertainty and concern on my part.

Confirming a leak, the MEL then refers to the FM / NON-NORMALS / FUEL / LOW FUEL as follows on procedures. Referencing the 757 QRH for a Fuel Leak, the caution at step 4 can't be fully assessed since the totalizer reading is unavailable. There were no clear solutions on how to address this, or the selections in item 10 regarding the possible messages available or not available, in order to move to the next items in the checklist.

Other concerns regarding fuel related abnormal checklists. The Abnormal Fuel Transfer checklist conditions are "Fuel quantity decreasing from the left and/or right wing tank(s) with fuel remaining in the center tank." There could be a significant delay in addressing this scenario if the leak were on the side with the blank fuel quantity.

The FUEL SYS PRESS checklist references the FUEL CONFIG light. Per the MEL, this message may not be available, adding more time to realize the situation through the cues in the MEL fuel imbalance discussion and less time to properly address the emergency. FUEL X FEED - FWD/AFT. Same as above. LOW FUEL. One of the notes indicates this message could be caused by a leak. Reference discussion above regarding concerns of the scenario without the fuel quantity and totalizer indications.

My Captain agreed with my assessment and contacted the [Chief Pilot] for guidance. On
the fuel leak checklist, the [Chief Pilot] said he saw my points and generally agreed with my assessment regarding the MEL fuel leak and unclear QRH application in the event of a fuel abnormal situation. The [Chief Pilot] thought the totalizer value could be deduced by fuel tracking in an operations normal condition, up to the time of an abnormal situation. He also said, words to the effect, that the MEL / QRH should be clearer, even re-written, saying, obviously, that it would take basically, more time than we had. I assessed that the time to ascertain a leak from a tank on the blank fuel indicator, left in this case, would take too long and reduce the amount of time and options to land safely. Also, we could not fully complete the other noted checklists, as written, with an acceptable level of confidence and in a timely manner, adding an undue threat to the operation.

Though there was general agreement with my assessment on the fuel leak checklist by my Captain and the FODM; the FODM said the MEL was legal and the captain said he would accept the new MRD when maintenance completed their actions. I removed myself from the flight as I thought the limitations in the MEL and QRH were a threat to safely completing an abnormal fuel scenario.

**Synopsis**

B757 First Officer reported refusing flight due to lack of clarity with MEL and QRH regarding fuel leak checklists.
ACN: 1702302 (46 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201911
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 4
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737-700
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Flap/Slat Indication
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 308
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1702302
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

This [report] is submitted in recognition of a scenario which is not addressed in the QRH - No LE device indicating lights upon landing configuration. This is not a one-off event since it occurred to another crew and aircraft last week. Situations were identical but crew analysis and actions were very different. No-flap landing for one and normal flap 30 landing for the other. Both flights landed uneventfully. Seems some QRH guidance here would be useful in future occurrences. An [incident report] also submitted to Company Flight Operations.

On [flight], an instance of no LE device indication on approach caused Crew confusion because it's not addressed in the QRH. On initial approach into ZZZ, aircraft was configured for landing (gear down, flaps 30). All things appeared normal mechanically; however, we noticed no green LE FLAPS EXT light. Also no LE device annunciation panel lights. They were blank. No roll tendency was evident, press to test indicated operable LE device lights, circuit breakers in, and TE flap gauge indicated normally. Upon configuring everything appeared and felt normal. The only thing not normal was the absence of LE device lights.

Conducted normal go-around to investigate and realized that this situation is not addressed in QRH. There is no discussion or guidance. Conducted a phone patch to Maintenance for enlightenment and Technician indicated that it was more than likely due to a PSEU/ FSEU fault which cannot be resolved during flight.

Since this scenario is not addressed in the QRH, we had some discussion of no-flap or flap 15 landing but only because we were trying to make our situation "fit" one of the QRH scenarios. Fortunately we had a jumpseat pilot in the cabin who could verify LE device and flap position for us. So those non-normal landing configurations were eventually ruled out because our situation did not warrant the increased risk. Using [resource management] by taking into account what we could feel and see, verification of LE and flap position with jumpseat pilot, and discussion with Maintenance, our issue appeared to be an indication problem, not an actual flight control problem. A normal configuration and landing into ZZZ ensued. PSEU light illuminated on landing. (This was due to the lack of info from the FSEU). ZZZ Contract Maintenance investigated and found the FSEU was at fault.

Synopsis

B737-700 Captain reported that a slat malfunction occurred for which there was no QRH procedure that resulted in a precautionary landing.
**ACN: 1702279 (47 of 50)**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201911
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: Mixed
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 5
- Light: Night
- Ceiling.Single Value: 1500

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: B737-700
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Fuel Crossfeed
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 468
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3000
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1702279
- Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Troubleshooting

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : MEL / CDL
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Weight And Balance
Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Fuel Issue
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Diverted

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Heavy traffic on way to airport caused Van Driver to drop us off at airport approximately 20 minutes late. We rushed to get to the gate and push as close to on time as possible. I accomplished flight duties while hearing from Captain that we had an MEL 28-X-XX. Right Center Tank fuel boost pump inoperative. I read the dispatch report as did the Captain. After push, and before takeoff, failed to recognize crossfeed valve in closed position (supposed to be open). Took off and at climbout Captain recognized that we had over 1000 pound imbalance from main tanks. We leveled off, referenced the QRH and accomplished applicable checklist. We shut off left center tank boost pump. Balanced mains and turned left center tank boost pump back on. Fuel initially fed from center tank but stopped feeding and started to feed from right main tank causing another slight imbalance. We failed to open up the crossfeed per the MEL which caused this to happen. At the time I was coordinating and programming for a diversion. Landed in ZZZ as a divert. Captain recognized the error after talking to Maintenance via telephone call.

Synopsis
B737-700 First Officer reported that distraction and time pressure caused the crew to miss a checklist item that resulted in a fuel imbalance and a diversion.
ACN: 1701626 (48 of 50)

Time / Day
Date: 201911

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 5716
Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 132
Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 193
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1701626

Events
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: FAR

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Manuals
Primary Problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: 1
While in cruise, during a conversation with my FO (First Officer) about some non-normal procedures, I realized the QRH was not loaded on my iPad Content Locker. My FO confirmed his was missing also, as did the second FO. My Content Locker was recently updated to a different app. It may have been left out then. I had not received any notice that it was no longer required, or that it was being discontinued. I just recently completed transition training on the fleet, and the curriculum was based on its availability for use on non-normals. There was no hard copy on the flight deck of the aircraft I was assigned for the flight.
Synopsis

B777 Captain reported that, along with other crew members, iPad was missing QRH section.
**ACN: 1696464 (49 of 50)**

**Time / Day**

Date: 201910
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Night

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Bonanza 36
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

**Component**

Aircraft Component: Gear Lever/Selector
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3300
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 22
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 600
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1696464
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2 : Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly. Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Ground Event / Encounter : Gear Up Landing
Detector. Person : Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result. General : Maintenance Action
Result. Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were on a night training flight for night currency. The pilot flying was planning to update her night currency. I was acting as PIC/CFI/PNF in the right seat.

We met at the airport approximately XA:45 pacific time. After preflighting the aircraft we started engines at approximately XB:20. Some engine roughness was noted at startup but was resolved after leaning and runup checklist was completed.

Additional time was lost waiting for a transient aircraft who was lost on the airport trying to find his way to a gate for exit. I informed the Pilot flying to hold position until the transient airplane was clear of all runways. We offered assistance via radio to the transient pilot whom we directed to the ramp.

We made a normal takeoff on Runway XXL, retracted the landing gear, and entered a normal left traffic pattern. On downwind we extended the landing gear and continued to a normal landing with full stop.

We then taxied back for another takeoff and entered the downwind leg. Upon reducing power for the approach we noticed some engine roughness which I attributed to "pushing the prop" because of our relatively high airspeed and being full rich at minimal power. The pilot flying thought it was an engine malfunction so I attempted to adjust the mixture to no satisfaction to the pilot flying. I directed the Pilot Flying to go to full flaps for landing as we were turning final and speed seemed high. We continued the approach to landing and failed to do a "GUMP" check for landing gear due to our distraction resulting from the engine issue.

We did not get a gear warning alarm even though the MP was at 11 inches. Had that alarm sounded, we would have, if time and altitude allowed, been able to extend the landing gear or otherwise execute a go-around.

This is a case of two senior pilots trusting each other to "Take care of business." The distraction with the engine caused me to forget the pre-landing checklist which I assumed the PF was managing but was really my responsibility as CFI/PIC.
The result was a gear-up landing which resulted as a very smooth landing with minimal damage to the aircraft and no injuries to personnel.

**Synopsis**

Bonanza pilot reported that distraction and failure to follow the checklist resulted in a gear-up landing.
ACN: 1696236 (50 of 50)

**Time / Day**
- Date: 201910
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1696236
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Fatigue
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Fuel Issue
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
During boarding in ZZZ. The First Officer and I were running the before start checklist. When we got to the fuel. We noted that the aircraft was in fact being fueled. And agreed that we would come back to the fuel. At departure time we still did not have the bag sheet and began to inquire as to where that was. In that time we got distracted and did not come back to the fuel. We did notice that fueling was complete because the auto cross flow inhibit status message was gone. In the time looking for the bag sheet I did not check the fuel load against the release. I took for granted that the fueler had the right load. I have since learned that he was giving the wrong fuel load. I let myself get distracted with trying to get out on time. And did not come back to confirming the fuel. I sent Dispatch a message as to our late door closure due to the late bag sheet. Which must have added to my distraction. About 100 miles from ZZZ1 we got the low fuel caution We [advised ATC] and requested direct to ZZZ2 landing Runway XXR. A gradual decent was started at flight idle in an effort to minimize throttle and make the necessary altitude crossings on the approach to Runway XXR. We landed without further incident and taxied to the gate.

I let myself get distracted with getting the flight out on time. I should have restarted the checklist after the fuel was done instead of planning on coming back to it. Which I did not do. I did not sleep that well the night before. So I was possibly more tired than I thought I was. I assumed that the fueler had the correct fuel load Which he did not. I know I looked at the fuel, but I clearly did not notice that it was incorrect. Why it did not register with me to check against the release I am unsure. Or if I simply saw a number that looked right. But I should have not let myself get distracted with the other factors and focused on completing the checklist properly. And should have admittedly myself that I may have been more tired than I thought and taken a moment to double check everything. It is something that I will never forget. And never let happen again.

Synopsis
CRJ-900 Captain reported deviating from the before start checklist fuel section resulting in a Low Fuel warning and a diversion.