

CALLBACK

From NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System



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What Would You Have Done?

This month, *CALLBACK* again offers the reader a chance to “interact” with the information given in a selection of ASRS reports. In “The First Half of the Story,” you will find report excerpts describing an event or situation up to a point where a specific decision must be made, an immediate action must be taken, or a non-normal condition must be actively managed. You may then exercise your own judgment to make a decision, determine a possible course of action, or devise a plan that might best resolve the situation.

The selected ASRS reports may not provide all the information you want, and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to refine your aviation judgment and decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story...” you will find the actions that were taken by reporters in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action, and there may not be a “right” answer. Our intent is to stimulate thought, training, and discussion related to these reported incidents.

The First Half of the Story

Part 91 – Fooled, but Not Fueled

A Falcon 900 Captain's Report

■ ...During initial climbout...at approximately 8,000 feet, the flying pilot noticed a reduced rate of climb and lower than expected airspeed and thrust performance. Upon scanning engine instruments, we both observed that the No. 3 (right) Engine had failed completely.

What Would You Have Done?

Part 121 – A Shattered View

An Air Carrier CRJ700 First Officer's Report

■ Prior to departure, I noted some scratches on the windshield that could potentially be a structural issue inflight while waiting to depart from ZZZ to ZZZ1 in the middle of the afternoon. Maintenance came to inspect it and deemed it safe to fly as long as it wasn't going to be a distraction for me, as I was the pilot flying that leg. I deemed it wasn't an issue

for me, as I could see outside with no issues or obstructions. We departed on time and were about halfway through the flight when we suddenly heard a loud popping sound. I took my eyes off the charts that I was briefing quietly to prepare to brief my Captain to look at a windshield that completely shattered, but remained intact. Simultaneously, the windshield heat caution message appeared on our EICAS display.

What Would You Have Done?

Part 135 – Partial Control

An Air Taxi C550 Captain's Report

■ ...Performed Before Taxi and Taxi Checklists in detail. Got released by ATC, performed Takeoff Checklist. First Officer was PF, Captain PM. Transferred controls to PF. Upon rotation, there was a noticeable yaw to the right. Positive rate, gear up. 400 ft., flaps up, ... At this moment, I saw PF PFD (Primary Flight Display) at 45 degrees of bank.

What Would You Have Done?

The Rest of the Story...

Part 91 – Fooled, but Not Fueled

■ ATC communications were maintained with ZZZ TRACON followed by ZZZ Center. Subsequent review indicated that the failure was due to fuel exhaustion in the No. 3 Tank. The aircraft had a known discrepancy with the fuel gauge only, not the fuel system. It had been deferred as “known issue” by operator after multiple attempts of resolving issue by maintenance facilities. Ultimately, it appeared that the problem extended beyond the gauge itself. The No. 3 Tank does not uplift fuel from single point panel when set to “partial.” ...Unfortunately, this (fueling, not gauge) issue was not communicated to the flight crew. The crew assumption was that the tank quantities and usage would be reflected similarly across all tanks such as practiced in simulator when having an inflight gauge issue...we had an inoperative fuel gauge with no indication if the tank had fuel. Contributing factors: Known but uncorrected aircraft discrepancy (fuel gauge problem); Incomplete information provided by the operator regarding No. 3 Tank fuel

characteristics while uplifting fuel; Assumption regarding fuel tank status and system behavior; Complacency and over-reliance on operator's assurances; Judgment lapse in trust and accepting the aircraft with known fuel gauge indication issue due to complacency; Confirmation bias with assumption of all three fuel tanks being equal. Assuming this, we had a known amount of fuel on board (math in gallons uplifted worked out with this assumption)... Crew... secured the failed engine via Abnormal Procedures Checklist and continued the flight without further incident. Moving forward, I will no longer accept an aircraft with unresolved or inadequately explained fuel system discrepancies per MEL. More rigorous verification of fuel feed and system operations will be conducted prior to departure, and assumptions will not replace direct verification. I will self-evaluate and confirm there is no complacency.

Part 121 – A Shattered View

■ I immediately put my shoulder harnesses on and called for the QRH checklist on shattered windshield while I took over radios and flight controls to keep ATC informed of our situation. I requested a lower altitude based on the QRH checklist recommendation while the Captain called Dispatch and Maintenance via AIRINC. The result of the discussion was to divert to ZZZ2 to swap out planes and allow Maintenance to work out the problem and repair or replace the windshield. I requested to divert to ZZZ2 through ATC, and we were given clearance direct to the airport. We were 15 minutes away from ZZZ2 at this point, and my Captain called the flight attendants to notify them of the situation while I prepared the aircraft for arrival into ZZZ2 airport. Captain made a PA to the passengers about our plan while I continued to coordinate with ATC... We returned back to briefing the arrival and approach into ZZZ2 and determined it was a safe plan to transfer controls to the Captain for the approach and landing portion of the flight, as it was critical to have a clear visual of the airport and runway environment with a clear windshield. We transferred controls and autopilot controls, and I kept control of the radios for the approach and arrival. We landed on XXR and completed the landing portion of the QRH while taxiing into the gate.... Cause: Uncertain of the cause, as focal point of the shatter occurred in a separate area away from the windshield scratches and there were no write-ups about previous bird strikes on the FO (First Officer) side windshield. We had the windshield heat turned on the low switch setting during the After Takeoff Checklist... Certainly, inspecting the windshield's structural integrity is always a good recommendation, especially when it comes to older aircraft

in our fleet. There's no telling when a windshield could structurally fail unless there was documentation provided to show when it needs to be replaced.

Part 135 – Partial Control

■ I said, "Bank" and pointed. FO reacted to correct. He called for autopilot on and I engaged autopilot. A few seconds later, there was the autopilot disconnect chime and PF requested a second time autopilot on. I engaged autopilot and immediately noticed autopilot FAIL. PF was struggling to maintain directional control. I requested the aircraft and we exchanged controls. Somewhere before I took controls, I had contacted Departure and was radar contact. Was instructed to climb to 5000 and informed Aircraft Y was nearby. We were IMC at around 2200 ft. and therefore made no visual contact. I immediately recognized that [our] plane was banking to the right and had to exert considerable force to keep wings level. I myself corrected the aircraft from going past 45-degree bank angle. Before reaching 5000, I requested return to ZZZ. ATC asked if they could be of assistance and I said, "No," and wanted the ILS since we were IMC. At this time, things were happening very fast and we were still trying to figure out what was taking place. After what seemed to be 20 – 30 seconds of flying, I requested cancelling ILS and to have vectors for a visual. I was unsure if we could fly an entire ILS and wanted to get the aircraft to the ground as soon as possible. We were given vectors which I tried to follow. Recognizing that we were approaching ZZZ, I asked for 2500 hoping to pop out of IMC. It was granted. We popped in and out of clouds and FO found the airport, at which time I declared, "Field in sight," and flew a visual to the field. Landing was uneventful, smooth and centerline. We taxied back to FBO, shut down engines, and I informed passengers that the plane was not responding as I wanted and decided to return. Everyone on board said, "Good choice," and "Thank you." ... For myself, there was a moment that I thought if this loss of control continued, we would not make it back.

The reports featured in CALLBACK are offered in the spirit of stimulating thought and discussion. While NASA ASRS does not verify or validate reports, we encourage you, our readers, to explore them and draw your own conclusions.



NASA ASRS UAS/Drone Safety Reporting

Anyone involved in UAS/Drone operations can file a NASA ASRS report to describe close calls, hazards, violations, and safety related incidents.

ASRS Alerts Issued in January 2026	
Subject of Alert	No. of Alerts
Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment	2
Airport Facility or Procedure	19
ATC Equipment or Procedure	11
Hazard to Flight	2
Other	8
TOTAL	42

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January 2026 Report Intake	
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots	4,507
Flight Attendants	1,367
General Aviation Pilots	1,232
Military/Other	681
Controllers	260
Mechanics	239
Dispatchers	205
TOTAL	8,491