ASRS Database Report Set

COVID-19 Related Events

Report Set Description

Reports from flight crews, flight attendants, controllers, mechanics, dispatchers, ground personnel and others regarding COVID-19 related issues.

Update Number

2

Date of Update

November 16, 2020

Number of Records in Report Set

837

Number of New Records in Report Set

641

Type of Records in Report Set

For each update, new records received at ASRS will be added to this report set. Records within this Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating these data of the following points.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. Such incidents are independently submitted and are not corroborated by NASA, the FAA or NTSB. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be clarified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Becky L. Hooey, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to report. Thus, the data can reflect reporting biases. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.

One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concerning specific event types represents the lower measure of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that the real power of ASRS data is the qualitative information contained in report narratives. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, why it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.
Report Synopses
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACN</th>
<th>Synopsis</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1760916</td>
<td>GA pilot reported flying the incorrect pattern after the Tower closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760902</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger complained about sitting next to another passenger and did not comply with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760901</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760899</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was removed from flight due to not complying with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760875</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a flap misconfiguration leading to an unstabilized approach and go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760864</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation and cited fatigue and lack of flying as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760833</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported calling in fatigued and being told months later they are expected to fly fatigued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760818</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a track heading deviation and cited First Officer's lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760738</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported there were only 3 fully operational lavatories during a long haul flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760736</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger that sat in the exit row had hearing problems and was displaying symptoms of possibly being sick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760679</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot reported being distracted by the Tower Controller working Ground and Local Control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760619</td>
<td>Corporate pilot reported overshooting assigned altitude on departure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760614</td>
<td>Pilot reported flying nearby an area of smoke and was unable to find an associated TFR. After the flight, pilot confirmed a TFR was active but did not post in time on EFB software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760562</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported cleaners did not sanitize the aircraft per company standards/policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760561</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported passengers wearing non-approved face masks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760560</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported failing to conduct a required briefing after many distractions during deplaning/boarding including cleaners entering while passengers were deplaning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760544</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was removed due to non-compliance with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760539</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760536</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported observing multiple events of non-compliance with face mask wearing among passengers and crew members, and cited a lack of policy enforcement as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760463</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an RA inbound to Newark and cited Controller workload as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760452</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot reported a passenger was removed due to non-compliance with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760437</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760411</td>
<td>Customer Service Agent reported that agents are doing baggage handling during the COVID-19 pandemic and may get hurt lifting so many bags per shift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760403</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported an air cooling machine issue during taxi out resulting in excessive heat in the rear of the aircraft and a return to gate. Maintenance reportedly wanted to defer the issue, but the crew and Dispatch decided against it and opted for an aircraft swap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760374</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported not making the second crossing restriction on arrival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760348</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a group of passengers appeared to be intoxicated during boarding. One of the passengers was removed from the flight, the others were reportedly not compliant with face mask policy during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760308</td>
<td>Pilot reported violating a sporting event TFR during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760306</td>
<td>Pilot reported concerns with some flight schools not requiring face mask to be worn during flights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760296</td>
<td>Pilot reported an airspace violation due to a fast climbing, lighter than usual aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760237</td>
<td>Flight instructor reported difficulty talking to passenger while wearing a face mask and had an airspace violation while attempting to fix the communication issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760218</td>
<td>Pilot reported ATC being too busy to communicate with them while attempting to request a clearance to descend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760152</td>
<td>Part 121 pilot reported not being sure if he was current to fly a Part 91 flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760111</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that cleaners were barging onboard and &quot;swimming&quot; upstream while passengers were trying to deplane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760105</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported social distancing concerns with seat assignments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760104</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported gate agent issued seats that according to company policy were not supposed to be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760103</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a row that is typically blocked for Flight Attendant use was released for passenger seating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760102</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that agents filled seats that, per social distancing guidelines, should have remained empty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760099</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a Gate Agent filled seats that were not supposed to be filled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760097</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that another Flight Attendant who reportedly had not flown for over 5 months, sat in the wrong seat for takeoff and did not follow procedures for opening a door.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760017</td>
<td>First Officer reported not realizing that they did not receive a re-release.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759940</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was removed for non-compliance with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759827</td>
<td>Ground worker reported not being informed by management that a co-worker tested positive for COVID-19. The ground worker had worked with the co-worker and then visited family, resulting in possible exposure.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1759824</td>
<td>Ramp worker reported that an inadequate number of conveyor belts at a terminal resulted in ramp crew hand-carrying baggage up jet bridge stairs repeatedly, exposing them to multiple safety risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759820</td>
<td>Ramp worker reported that a co-worker tested positive for COVID-19. The ramp worker was not notified by management and continued to work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759810</td>
<td>Center Controller reported an airborne conflict while working combined sectors and cited handoff related issues contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759807</td>
<td>Center Controller reported that during a controller de-brief/switch an airborne conflict occurred due to the distraction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759796</td>
<td>Tower Controller reported not being sure if a landing clearance was given to an arrival aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759781</td>
<td>Tower Controller reported an aircraft lined up for the wrong runway during approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759780</td>
<td>ZFW Center Controller working combined sectors reported an airborne conflict and cited workload and staffing issues as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759745</td>
<td>GA pilot reported a NMAC on final to SMO airport. Tower closure was cited as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759720</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported forgetting to disarm the R1 door and cited lack of flying in this specific aircraft type as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759718</td>
<td>Flight attendants reported two passengers were not compliant with face mask policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759709</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported not notifying the Dispatcher of a navigation light that was out of service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759647</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported going over 250 knots below 10,000 feet. Pilot flying made reference to lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759574</td>
<td>Ground Controller reported inadvertently taxing an aircraft into a restricted area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759543</td>
<td>Small Transport aircraft pilot reported not contacting Departure Control and stayed with Tower until switching to Center Control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759522</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported a passenger was wearing a vented face mask which is not in compliance with policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759518</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759515</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger boarding was wearing a vented face mask which is not in compliance with policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759498</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported concerns with having to fly with a Flight Attendant that had been in contact with another Flight Attendant that had tested positive for COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759478</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a passenger appeared intoxicated during boarding, but was allowed to fly. During the flight the passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759411</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported altitude deviation on a departure and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759382</td>
<td>Air carrier Flight Attendant reported setting and taking off with an incorrect flap position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759319</td>
<td>Air Carrier Flight Attendant reported that a Flight Attendant did not use correct procedures arming and disarming the aircraft door. In addition, the Flight Attendant did not follow face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759313</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that having to wear a face mask could affect the FA's ability to perform certain safety functions, especially in the case of an emergency situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759282</td>
<td>Air Carrier flight crew reported taking off without an ATC clearance. Captain reported having not flown in 6 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759279</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported taking an ATC clearance for a similar sounding aircraft on the same frequency. The Captain reported the Controller was working multiple sectors at the time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759266</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot reported the Captain's windshield cracked in cruise and the flight diverted successfully. Pilot surmised that the plane's lengthy time being parked contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759213</td>
<td>Ramp Agent reported damaging the aircraft during cargo loading because the agent's eye glasses were fogging up due to the face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759211</td>
<td>Ramp worker reported that a tailstand was not available to support the plane while passengers were deplaned from the front of the aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759187</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported the flight departed with incorrect release documentation. The First Officer referenced not having flown in the last 6 months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759162</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was removed from flight due to non compliance with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759113</td>
<td>TRACON Controllers reported a loss of separation while working combined positions due to staffing and handoff/communication issues. The First Officer of one of the aircrafts involved also reported the conflict and made reference to the miss-communication between controllers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759034</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was not compliant with seat belt, carry on placement and face mask policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759026</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported not briefing an exit row passenger due to the late arrival of the passenger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759020</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported being overwhelmed with aircraft due to staffing shortages and computer system difficulties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758920</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a Flight Attendant was not seated for departure due to having to deal with passengers not properly wearing face masks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1758916</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported numerous changes to the arrival resulted in a crossing restriction altitude overshoot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758904</td>
<td>Pilot reported being out of communication with ATC in Class A due to inadvertently changing frequencies and not noticing it until some time later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758752</td>
<td>Air Carrier flight crew reported reoccurring altimeter and airspeed maintenance problems on an aircraft that had been in and out of service several times during the &quot;economic downturn.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758738</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict followed by TCAS RA instructions which they adhered to by leveling off. The Captain made reference that the aircraft was light in weight for this flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758726</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported failure to enter a maintenance discrepancy in log book. Captain was distracted due to an extended briefing with the Flight Attendants regarding the personal impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758703</td>
<td>Air Carrier flight crew reported flying an unstabilized approach. First Officer was the Pilot Flying and had not flown in 30 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758641</td>
<td>Air Carrier First Officer reported missing an altitude constraint during arrival and cited workload, fatigue and lack of flight currency as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758627</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported diverting due to an impassable line of thunderstorms. Crew stated that Dispatch was pressuring them to continue on planned routing to destination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758598</td>
<td>Tower Controller reported being distracted with sanitizing the work area while operations were still going on in an aircraft being cleared to taxi on to the runway while another aircraft was landing on an intersecting runway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758535</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger boarded the aircraft with a non compliant type of face mask. Flight Attendant questioned how customer service missed the passenger wearing the non compliant face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758529</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to comply with the face mask policy during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758518</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported safety concerns with having to follow COVID-19 procedures regarding the use of the crew rest area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758517</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a commuting Captain was non compliant with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758500</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a speed deviation on landing and attributes the error to being distracted as they looked for birds pointed out by ATC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758486</td>
<td>Air Carrier First Officer reported that after having to divert they were unable to disembark the aircraft due to COVID-19 restrictions at that airport. The crew decided to refuel and return to the origin airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758478</td>
<td>air carrier Captain reported several passengers were not complying with the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758439</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported ingesting aerosol fumes in the flight deck from cleaners that were on board sanitizing the aircraft without making sure it was empty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758347</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non compliant with face mask policy and also changing seats while in turbulence and on final approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758346</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non compliant with face mask policy during flight. Reporter stated the passenger said he had a medical condition, but it was not noted in the crew's records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758344</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported allowing a child to fly without wearing a face mask. The child had refused to wear it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758342</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported problems associated with passengers wearing face masks improperly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758326</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported experiencing a stick shaker at 10 feet on final and cited a low Vref due to the aircraft being light in weight as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758276</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a family was removed from a flight during boarding due non compliance with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758247</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported a maintenance delay combined with COVID-19 procedures resulting in being unfit to fly due to fatigue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758133</td>
<td>Pilot reported a possible airspace violation and states the reason was due to the lack of flying time in the last 6 months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758116</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a non-revenue passenger was allowed to ride on the flight and not required to wear a face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758114</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported being displaced from the seats assigned due to COVID-19 changes, by passengers assigned to the seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758109</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported being told by a ground person that one of the deplaning passengers was wearing a face mask that did not meet regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758059</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported experiencing unreliable airspeed and altitude indications. Captain stated that due to not reviewing the logbook before the flight and an improper preflight, the potential pitot-static system issue was not identified prior to the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758054</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported not entering required verbiage onto a form and said that lack of recent flying contributed to the oversight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758029</td>
<td>Ground employee cited several reasons why face masks should be optional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757915</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger who had previously violated the face mask policy was allowed to board this flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757912</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported non-revenue passenger refused to comply with the company's face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757910</td>
<td>Flight attendants reported a passenger was not complying with wearing a face mask and had to be told three times to wear it correctly.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1757908</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported having to tell one passenger to wear a face mask while another passenger spoke up to the Flight Attendant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757905</td>
<td>Flight Attendant stated a door strap would not fully retract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757904</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported aircraft being hot during boarding and that the aircraft did not cool off until the engines were started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757896</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that an old version of the safety demo was presented due to being rushed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757829</td>
<td>Ground employee reported concerns about peers not wearing face masks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757783</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot stated hotel was not keeping crews separate from each other on crew transportation from the hotel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757761</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported ATC gave them a clearance meant for another company flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757736</td>
<td>Tower Controller working combined positions reported an aircraft did not call Ramp Tower as expected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757700</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported not calling Ground Control after clearing the runway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757667</td>
<td>GA pilot reported entering a sporting TFR and wasn’t sure if these type of TFRs are still in place during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757607</td>
<td>Corporate pilot reported not being current for a night flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757590</td>
<td>A321 Flight Attendant crew reported a fume event of varying intensity of &quot;dirty socks&quot; odor during initial climb and lasting until arrival at destination gate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757583</td>
<td>Flight attendants reported a customer service agent advised them a passenger was not complying with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757580</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported passengers did not comply with the face mask policy during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757569</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported family boarded with a child not wearing a face mask. The family refused to comply with the mask policy, but was allowed to remain on the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757565</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported a deadheading pilot and a non-revenue pilot refused to follow face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757563</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was not complying with the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757505</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported concerns regarding the products used to disinfect the cabin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757493</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported overshooting the assigned altitude due to high speeds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757452</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported the oil quantity fluctuated during a flight on an aircraft that had been stationary for a long time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757412</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a speed deviation during departure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757407</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a passenger did not comply with wearing a face mask during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757389</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported taking off and being very light and realizing they did not arm the LNAV/VNAV for departure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757341</td>
<td>Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict and cited fatigue from being understaffed as contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757328</td>
<td>Pilot reported Controller was overworked and unable to respond to many frequency transmissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757266</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger had to be told to wear a mask while on board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757262</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported passengers boarded with face masks that had vents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757253</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a family would not comply with the face mask policy and that it was disturbing to other passengers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757249</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported passenger refused to comply with the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757188</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported they were informed by ATC of a possible altitude deviation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757152</td>
<td>Air Carrier First Officer reported calling in fatigued due to chronic and acute fatigue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757035</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported not being seated during landing due to having to deal with a non-compliant passenger regarding the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757033</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757013</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported erroneously giving permission for a flight to depart early.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756995</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a miscommunication during initial climb in a lightly-loaded aircraft resulted in retracting the flaps prematurely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756901</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported inadvertently not installing a backup battery while complying with a return to service task card.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756894</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that a passenger was not being compliant with wearing a face mask during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756841</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported the crew did not send an additional text message regarding a fuel door.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756839</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported inadvertently crossing the runway hold short line while attempting to turn onto a taxiway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756730</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported an aircraft sanitizing vendor started spraying the aircraft while maintenance personal were still on board. Technician reports one mechanic became ill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756721</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported deciding to serve only sealed snack and beverage items to customers due to COVID-19 safety concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756715</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported experiencing headaches and allergic reactions after wearing a face mask during flight. The effects reportedly subside once the face mask is removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756714</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that allowing passengers to sit in seats that are directly opposite flight attendant jumpseats could jeopardize flight attendant health.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756713</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported the main door Flight Attendant is distracted during passenger boarding from their safety duties because of having to hand out sanitizing wipes to passengers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756708</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported it was necessary to move passengers for social distancing issues, and one passenger was non-compliant regarding the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756706</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported the aircraft cleaners are proceeding onto the aircraft before all passengers are deplaned which does not conform with social distancing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756705</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported the Captain's face mask probably did not conform to policy and in the FA's opinion did little to prevent the spread of COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756682</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported the lack of flying was a factor in experiencing an unstabilized approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756672</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation due to distraction. The pilot crew was listening to a Flight Attendant describe details of a non-compliant passenger regarding the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756647</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a runway incursion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756645</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that a passenger refused to comply with face mask policy and was removed from the flight before departure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756601</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported that re-qualification training was inadequate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756593</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation during arrival and cited communication issues with ATC as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756587</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported there was no food available at the hotel and food was not boarded for crew to consume during the flight. COVID-19 related time constraints were cited as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756550</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported not being able to talk to ATC due to Controller working multiple frequencies and being task overloaded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756534</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported during pre-flight a passenger erected a personal tent bubble after sitting in the cabin area. Captain described the safety implications of having a tent over your body in an emergency situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756524</td>
<td>Center Controller reported an airborne conflict and cited staffing levels as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756502</td>
<td>Pilot reported the Tower closed due to COVID-19 staffing, and was not sure as to what they should be squawking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756481</td>
<td>Pilot reported a sporting TFR airspace incursion due to not having it selected on the app being used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756465</td>
<td>Pilot reported thinking they were cleared for a touch and go, but were given a clearance to land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756419</td>
<td>Flight Instructor reported a student flew solo without a student pilot license.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756370</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a family was not wearing face masks and had to be reminded often during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756365</td>
<td>Flight attendants reported that a child was unable to wear a face mask due to crying, resulting in a stressful situation. The child and parent were reseated and the situation was resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756345</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported filing the wrong destination and not realizing it until the FO advised they were going to the wrong airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756299</td>
<td>Captain reported that the Flight Attendant told them that passengers in a specific row were not wearing face masks and were instructed to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756290</td>
<td>Captain reported cleaning crew came onto plane after passengers left, but most did not wear face masks as per company instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756247</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation due to the aircraft going into vertical speed mode for the descent after deviating for weather.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756077</td>
<td>Pilot reported flying in possible violation of FAR 61.57 attributed to COVID-19 related disruptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756074</td>
<td>Single pilot reported becoming confused with ATC's instructions because the Controller was using nonstandard COVID induced workload shortcuts at this location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756030</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755997</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported the aircraft was very light weight. The pilots were unprepared for the quick low altitude level off and deviated from the clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755987</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a deviation from the ramp taxi procedure and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755971</td>
<td>Ground Agent reported that a passenger had tested positive for COVID-19; however, agents in the terminal were not notified of this until 24 hours after the flight had departed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755913</td>
<td>Single pilot reported an airspace deviation occurred while attempting to get an IFR clearance. Pilot was unable to get an IFR clearance due to ATC workload and told to try again in 30 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755891</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755878</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to comply with the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755856</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported that they did not get the fuel service form before departing due to significant delays and late receipt of paperwork.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755850</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported an altitude deviation was the result of too much time away from work because of COVID-19 lack of flying.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1755816</td>
<td>Customer Service Agent reported concerns with the daily under staffing in the airport lobby and the difficulties it is creating during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755798</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported the Captain mistakenly shut the cockpit door before a Flight Attendant went into the cockpit during a bathroom break.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755789</td>
<td>TRACON Controller working combined positions reported an airborne conflict that could have been worse, but was saved by another Controller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755787</td>
<td>Pilot and Controller reported an airborne conflict on departure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755722</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported that a cleaning employee began spraying disinfectant inside the aircraft while the Technician was still inside performing work. The Technician experienced adverse physiological reaction as a result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755703</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported differences between pilot resting areas and those of the flight attendants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755701</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that a passenger refused to wear a face mask. When customer service came on board the passenger agreed to wear the face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755695</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that a passenger did not comply with wearing a face mask during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755611</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported flying the wrong transition on a STAR due to a possible FMS entry error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755590</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported programming the FMC incorrectly for the SID, which resulted in a track deviation. Reporter noted several delays that contributed to rushing through cockpit set up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755564</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain and First Officer reported that while sanitizing the MCP during crew change, the ALT knob may have been inadvertently bumped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755525</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that while waiting to depart, they were locked for 2 hours in a small bus with not enough seats for everyone and no bathroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755522</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported having to use bedding and pillows during crew rest that were previously used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755521</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a speed deviation during departure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755520</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported an SOP error by not informing Load Planning and Dispatch of the actual FOB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755423</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was wearing face shield, but no face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755420</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant about wearing a face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755418</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported passengers were not compliant with wearing a face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755355</td>
<td>First Officer reported a near miss during approach with GA traffic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755324</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported they departed with an inoperative lavatory sink.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755317</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported difficulty receiving a revised clearance for weather deviation because ATC was saturated with traffic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755316</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain self reported not following the latest update regarding face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755283</td>
<td>TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation occurred after rearranging altitudes in the ATC system to accommodate arriving aircraft in his sector due to another ATC site closing for COVID-19 sanitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755243</td>
<td>Pilot reported confusion on whether a sporting TFR is in effect during the COVID-19 Pandemic when spectators are not allowed at the game.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755169</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported a child who refused to wear a face mask was allowed to board the aircraft causing a delay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755162</td>
<td>Flight attendants reported a passenger was allowed to fly without wearing a face mask due to a self-reported medical condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755153</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that a call was made that the cleaners were off the aircraft when they actually were not. Passengers were allowed on and had to duck into rows to allow the cleaning crew off the aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755144</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported several passengers not properly wearing face masks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755142</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a face mask during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755037</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported not filling out Fuel Door verification paperwork because they thought it wasn't necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755020</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported making a wrong turn on an arrival, but corrected soon after Approach Control pointed out the error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755002</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported turning right instead of left on departure. ATC and First Officer immediately pointed out the error and heading was corrected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755001</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported landing without a clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754998</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to a thrust setting caution advisory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754995</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported being high and fast as they were &quot;leading the pack&quot; during a visual approach. The crew cited lack of flying and pressure to maintain their speed to not hold up other aircraft behind as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754918</td>
<td>Small aircraft pilot reported an airspace violation due to rusty flying skills after a long absence from flying during COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754889</td>
<td>Aircraft mechanic reported not completing an operations check due to distractions from other tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754883</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger would not comply with the face mask policy even though the passenger had a special exemption to take it off for periods at a time.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754841</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported using an illegal airport as an alternate. The Dispatcher reported another operations center was closed for COVID-19 sanitizing. This had increased the workload for the Dispatcher and contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754828</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported landing without a landing clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754821</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported missing a logbook entry involving a new procedure. Lack of flying was cited as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754761</td>
<td>Tower Controller working combined positions described safety of flight concerns due to added workload issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754722</td>
<td>GA pilot reported, after not flying in the last several months due to COVID-19, unintentionally landed and departed on a Displaced Threshold at the destination airport. Pilot reported rusty preflight procedures, runway markings that have not been maintained and are difficult to see contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754706</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported the misconduct of a group of passengers during the flight regarding compliance with face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754702</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported communication and procedural issues experienced with another Flight Attendant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754699</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported changing seats during takeoff and landing in order to stay a safe distance from a passenger who appeared ill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754697</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was asked several times to comply with the face mask policy during the flight. The passenger did not comply and was met on arrival by a Customer Service Supervisor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754598</td>
<td>Tower Controller reported a flight crew had to go-around after being high and fast due to a reported flap problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754544</td>
<td>Pilot reported flying an aircraft with an expired medical certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754520</td>
<td>Technician reported the FAA questioned why pitot covers were now installed on probes and sensors with the aircraft being in a hanger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754513</td>
<td>Technician reported not completing the correct paperwork for a ferry flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754511</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported cleaners came on board before passengers were off and started spraying the aircraft with a reportedly toxic product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754509</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant with wearing a face mask during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754507</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported having a compliance issue with a family that had to be continuously reminded to wear their face masks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754506</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger came on board the aircraft with a non approved face mask. A proper face mask was provided to the passenger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754500</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger misconduct incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754497</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger moved into the exit row after the briefing. Passenger was asked to move back to original seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754496</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that a passenger refused to wear a face mask during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754493</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a deadheading pilot pushed his way past her while doing the safety demonstration to use the lavatory and coughed profusely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754485</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that passengers were boarded onto an aircraft that was too hot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754416</td>
<td>Captain reported a GA aircraft departed in opposite direction while they were on the runway ready for takeoff. The Tower was closed at the time of the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754413</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported not making a crossing restriction during arrival and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754408</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported being issued a crossing restriction that was not in the FMS. Post flight the crew found out the fix was in the FMS and may have been accidentally deleted it during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754357</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754315</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported being high on the approach and not making a crossing restriction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754275</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported being high on the approach due to task saturation, communications errors and focusing outside for traffic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754257</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a Flight Attendant became ill during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754202</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported flying after the deadline for completing Consolidation of Knowledge (FAR 121.43) had expired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754142</td>
<td>Tower Controller reported a busy session working three combined positions and having to delay an aircraft for 15 minutes due to traffic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754140</td>
<td>Local Controller reported an airborne conflict between two air carriers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754119</td>
<td>Flight instructor reported a new student to him did not have a student pilot solo certificate as the student had said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754091</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported not giving the exit row briefing because they were dealing with face mask issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754089</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with wearing a face mask during flight and exhibited other non-compliant behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754084</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported the Captain did not have a face mask on while exiting the cockpit numerous times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1754082</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported another Flight Attendant locked the bathroom door and put an out of order sign on it, so he would not have to get close to people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754081</td>
<td>Purser reported multiple issues and difficulties during the boarding process and cited not having enough flight attendants to properly staff the flight as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754079</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported aircraft cleaners got onboard before passengers deplaned affecting social distancing efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754035</td>
<td>Ground employee reported pushing an aircraft into a parked aircraft while maneuvering through a congested parking area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754032</td>
<td>Ground employee reported being told to return to work after completing a 14-day quarantine. Reporter stated that they had not been previously told to self-quarantine nor had they been notified they had been exposed to a co-worker who tested positive for COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754019</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a passenger vomited multiple times during push back. Captain elected to return to gate and have passenger removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754018</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that the flight attendants were not comfortable coming into the flight deck while the pilot was on a restroom break, until the remaining pilot was wearing a face mask. Reporter described safety concerns with having to wear a face mask in the cockpit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754011</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that an ill passenger boarded and was not wearing a face mask. Captain decided to have passenger removed from flight due to length of the flight and passenger's condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753972</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and lining up for the incorrect runway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753867</td>
<td>Pilot reported experiencing a Class B airspace violation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753847</td>
<td>Pilot reported an NMAC at a closed towered airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753819</td>
<td>Pilot reported a runway incursion and cited lack of flying and unfamiliarity with the airport as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753811</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported confusion whether a non-rev passenger could sit in a specific jump seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753809</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that two passengers were observed spitting, and wiping their saliva and blood over their entire seating area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753757</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an altitude deviation during departure. Flight crew did not hear the 1,000 feet altitude alert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753753</td>
<td>Pilot suggested putting a hand sanitizing dispenser at the bottom of the jet bridges to allow people to clean their hands before getting on the aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753747</td>
<td>Center Controller reported an airspace violation and cited having to take approach control's airspace as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753746</td>
<td>Tower Controller reported the Front Line Manager was inundated with VFR and IFR traffic while working a combined position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753741</td>
<td>Tower Controller working 3 Local positions reported an airborne conflict between two departures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753735</td>
<td>TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict and cited traffic volume being very high for one Controller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753682</td>
<td>Technician reported an aircraft battery had to be replaced due to incorrect storage procedure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753680</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with wearing a face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753676</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger could not breathe, so oxygen was administered until passenger felt well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753673</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported moving to an unassigned jumpseat for social distancing purposes. The move conflicted with FAR regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753672</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported concerns with aircraft cleaning and sanitizing procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753653</td>
<td>First Officer reported receiving an RA and overshooting the assigned altitude by 500 feet due to a light load.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753593</td>
<td>First Officer reported a passenger was not complying with wearing a face mask pre-departure and was ultimately allowed to fly without having to wear it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753581</td>
<td>Center Controller reported an airspace violation and cited an unusual sector airspace configuration contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753572</td>
<td>Instructor pilot reported a NMAC with an aircraft on final at an airport with the Tower closed at the time of the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753517</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported two passengers were not compliant wearing face masks during the flight. Another passenger was uncomfortable with them not wearing the face masks and confronted the crew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753516</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported only serving sealed drinks and no coffee during flight. Flight Attendant did not feel safe serving coffee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753514</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported passengers taking off their face masks to order coffee or tea and then waiting for it to cool off, without face masks on.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1753512</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a non-revenue passenger was not wearing a face mask and had to be told to comply with the policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753511</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported having trouble with a mother and two young children wearing face masks on the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753507</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that a child was not wearing a face mask and was coughing. Parents attempted to put mask on the child, but were not successful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753506</td>
<td>Flight attendants reported that a deadheading pilot did not follow face mask policy during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753488</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that during takeoff the galley trash door opened but the trash bin did not move.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753367</td>
<td>Ground employee reported there is a lack of cleaning supplies in the ramp break room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753364</td>
<td>Ground employee reported that some personnel are allowed to bypass the temperature check.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753361</td>
<td>Ground employee reported large numbers of aircraft are being moved in and out of storage without proper procedures in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753360</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported two passengers became verbally abusive to the flight attendants when they were asked to follow face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753326</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported difficulty understanding ATC instructions possibly due to the Controller wearing a face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753255</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported departing with an inoperative safety item that should have been inspected by maintenance prior to departure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753211</td>
<td>Pilot reported VFR transponder certification went overdue due to COVID-19 lockdown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753200</td>
<td>Pilot reported flying the approach traffic pattern in the wrong direction after Tower had closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753198</td>
<td>Pilot reported entering restricted airspace and referenced lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753148</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger became argumentative when told they could not switch seats due to social distancing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753103</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported having non-compliant passenger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753101</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot reported being advised about a possible non-compliant passenger regarding mask wear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753069</td>
<td>Center Controller reported an altitude excursion and referenced wearing a mask may have muffled the transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753022</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot reported experiencing a ground conflict and cited reduced level of awareness due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753000</td>
<td>Flight Attendant was told by an unaccompanied minor that the child's mother had COVID-19 and the child was on the way to stay with family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752999</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger complained because other passengers were not wearing a mask while they were eating a snack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752991</td>
<td>Flight attendants reported a passenger not wearing a mask due to a reported medical condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752989</td>
<td>Flight attendants reported 3 guests were unhappy with seating arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752986</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger had to be continuously reminded to wear a mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752942</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported being on final to a Class Bravo airport and having to go-around due to a small aircraft that was not talking to Tower, which caused the airborne conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752939</td>
<td>Pilot reported questionable maintenance procedures regarding the temporary repair of delamination in the area of the ADG door.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752858</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported two passengers were abusive to flight attendants after they were reminded of mask requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752839</td>
<td>Center Controller reported an aircraft descended below what the Controller thought was the assigned altitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752803</td>
<td>Pilot reported flying over a sporting event during a game and wondered if they had violated a TFR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752733</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported problems with other technicians not following the correct company policy for aircraft checks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752718</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported a passenger had to be continuously reminded to wear a mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752712</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported another flight attendant did not sit in the assigned jumpseat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752706</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported they asked a passenger to move to an upgraded seat for social distancing purposes, but the passenger refused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752705</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported a passenger was not wearing a COVID-19 mask because he stated that he had a medical condition, but was unable to provide any documentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752691</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported confusion about airline policy relating to the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752685</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported two passengers not wearing COVID-19 masks during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752679</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported confusion about airline policy relating to the face mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752678</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported being advised about a troublesome passenger before the flight and stated the passenger refused to wear a mask claiming a medical condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752668</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported release issues relating to flights that are not assigned to Dispatcher in a timely manner. Reporter stated this has been a problem since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752664</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that during their takeoff roll, FWA ATC Tower gave a full clearance routing to another aircraft. The Captain described concerns with the high level of distraction created during a critical phase.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1752590</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a recent trend of being dispatched with minimum fuel loads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752579</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a communication issues with TRACON Control during arrival. TRACON was working on two frequencies. ATC informed the crew they were short staffed due to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752555</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported an aircraft issue during cruise resulted in a diversion. First Officer stated they did not have the correct charts onboard the aircraft due to possible cost saving measures by the airline during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752546</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported overshooting the assigned altitude during climbout. The pilot described the aircraft's weight as very light due to the small passenger count.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752533</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported taking off with the flight attendants not seated due to the flight's weight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752471</td>
<td>Airline Ground Agent reported the breakroom is not being sanitized properly for COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752406</td>
<td>Pilot reported a NMAC with another aircraft while attempting to land at an airport where the tower was closed due to COVID-19 staffing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752391</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported moving a passenger due to a dirty seat and for social distancing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752390</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a possibly intoxicated person was removed from flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752385</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger being confrontational about wearing a face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752380</td>
<td>Flight Attendants reported a passenger complained that another passenger did not wear a face mask during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752373</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a face mask during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752371</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a gate agent put a passenger in a seat which they shouldn't have.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752204</td>
<td>Pilot reported contacting ATC on guard and being advised they were NORDO for 150 miles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752166</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported communication issues related to wearing a face mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752042</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported missing the IFR release time due to general aviation traffic in the pattern and the Tower being closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751993</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a flap overspeed on departure climbout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751804</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported executing a CAT II confidence check approach which was not authorized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751800</td>
<td>Ground employees reported supertug parking aircraft issues and combining separate parking crews, which undermines current COVID-19 policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751701</td>
<td>Technician reported problems with job cards not being signed off correctly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751692</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger using the restroom numerous times, coughing and having to constantly be reminded to wear a mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751668</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported taxiing to the gate at LGA airport without contacting Ramp Control. The crew cited as contributing factors a confusing ramp diagram and the expectation that Ramp Control was closed due to the pandemic situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751666</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that continual, significant changes in crew schedules over the past months are causing cumulative fatigue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751661</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported they taxied to the ramp as cleared by EWR Tower and did not contact Ramp Control because it appeared to be closed. First Officer stated that due to the changing responsibilities of controllers, it was difficult to know what the correct procedures were.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751647</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported the First Officer made a sudden steep turn on departure while following command bars. The Captain took control of the aircraft and noted that the FO was very tired and had not done a takeoff or landing in over a year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751639</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a 30 minute delay in response from Dispatch regarding a deviation for weather. Dispatcher cited reductions in staffing due to COVID-19 as contributing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751611</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported concern about the airline’s policy of dispatching flights with very low fuel reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751585</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported noticing during preflight that electronic charts for his destination were not loaded in his tablet computer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751573</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported departing without proper takeoff data, citing high workload and career uncertainties related to COVID-19 cutbacks as contributing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751568</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported they had numbers for a full runway takeoff, but were given and executed an intersection takeoff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751543</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a taxiway incursion. Captain cited lack of recent flying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751531</td>
<td>ZAB ARTCC Controller reported staffing issues, TMU lack of airspace knowledge and social distancing concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751509</td>
<td>Pilot reported that during taxi another aircraft was blocking entry into the parking area and that parking options were limited due to many parked aircraft since COVID-19 started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751433</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751417</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported having mild symptoms of being ill, but decided to take another two day trip. Flight Attendant continued to feel ill after the two day trip warranting a COVID test, which was positive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751372</td>
<td>Air carrier flight attendant reported a passenger was upset with being told to comply with regulations regarding their child seat. Flight Attendant suggested many passengers seem more stressed than usual because of COVID-19 pandemic procedures.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1751362</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was upset with the airline's COVID-19 policies when observing other passengers removing their masks to eat and drink.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751348</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to comply with COVID-19 mask requirements in flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751330</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported failure to call for the Before Push checklist, then also failing to call for the Before Taxi checklist, citing lack of flying due to COVID-19 cutbacks as contributing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751324</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported landing without a clearance, citing fatigue and scarcity of other aircraft operating due to COVID-19 reductions as contributing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751315</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported difficulty communicating with the tug driver during pushback because the tug driver was not seated as the flight departed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751299</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported the difficulties experienced with Dispatch and Clearance Delivery as they requested an alternate route to avoid thunderstorms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751290</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported inadvertently moving the pack switches to off instead of high flow causing a cabin depressurization during climbout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751272</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported missing an altitude crossing restriction while on arrival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751266</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported a &quot;Slow Airspeed Warning&quot; situation during a weather related go-around event and cited lack of flying time as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751209</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported company policy was not followed regarding Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) when the pilot crew arrived at the gate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751150</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported an altitude deviation citing distraction and not working for several months as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751143</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported an unstable approach while on flight to maintain landing currency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751136</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew experienced an altitude deviation while descending on approach and attempting to slow the aircraft. Crew stated that loss of situational awareness and Captain's lack of recent flying contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751123</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported taking off without a clearance and stated that being distracted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the state of the airline contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751121</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported retracting the flaps during climb before the appropriate airspeed and stated that fatigue, hunger, and excessive heat in the aircraft contributed to the event, and the COVID-19 mask was a distraction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751102</td>
<td>Technician completing a routine check on stored aircraft reported finding torn speed tape in the Pack 1 and 2 inlets and exhaust. Reporter could not visually verify if the tape had entered the system due to the duct bends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751096</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance from Tower and stated that fatigue and lack of recent flying contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751094</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported they are not being provided with proper disinfectant wipes and PPE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751065</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported the flight was left high by ATC on arrival which contributed to missing step down altitudes and receiving a low altitude alert as the flight descended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751042</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a taxiway incursion and stated that Ground Control did not issue direction of turn instructions as they typically do and appeared to be overworked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751027</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported they left an engine running after parking at the gate. They cited as contributing factors the failure to complete a checklist due to distraction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750965</td>
<td>Technician reported installing a new PBE on an aircraft without informing, nor training the flight crew on how to use it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750962</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported being distracted with having to verify that a passenger had a medical condition and therefore did not have to wear a mask. During the distraction the Flight Attendant missed the Captain's PA &quot;prepare for takeoff&quot; and was not seated as the flight departed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750943</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around. The crew also stated they overshot their altitude during the go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750923</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing a speed deviation during departure and stated lack of flying contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750887</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported concerns with lack of flying and the possibility of being paired with a First Officer who has also not flown in months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750882</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported non functional PAPI lights at airport for a specific runway and the safety hazards it could pose in weather conditions, especially when crews are not flying as often due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750876</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a taxiway incursion and stated distraction from COVID-19 pre-flight related procedures contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750804</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that upon arrival at destination, a COVID-19 positive passenger on board as well as the crew, had to be medically assessed before being allowed to leave the aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750718</td>
<td>Center Controller reported a Supervisor who had tested positive for COVID-19 had interacted with controllers. Controller suggested allowing only essential workers in the building.</td>
</tr>
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<td>1750709</td>
<td>Corporate pilot reported having to execute a missed approach after a delayed approach clearance left the flight too high to conduct a stabilized approach. The pilot stated that the Controller was very busy working multiple frequencies and asked flights to stand by for call backs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750708</td>
<td>Flight Instructor reported experiencing an electrical and avionics failure while conducting a training flight. While attempting to speak to the student without using a headset, the instructor noted it was difficult to communicate because the COVID-19 mask muffled the voice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750671</td>
<td>Air carrier maintenance technicians reported that the rudder was inadvertently damaged while preparing to perform rudder lube on an aircraft that was being returned to service from storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750666</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported that there are two types of CPR devices available on board, however flight attendants are qualified to use only one, which requires removal of the personal protective mask in order to use. Reporter requests training on the other device to keep everyone safe in a COVID-19 environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750656</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a runway incursion which resulted from a call sign misunderstanding. A contributing factor was that the Tower Controller was managing multiple frequencies and runways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750649</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported that while attempting to lose altitude on an unstable approach the Captain exceeded a 45-degree bank angle and a flap overspeed occurred. A second overspeed occurred during the subsequent go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750645</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported not realizing that Dispatch did not add an MEL to the dispatch release until they were airborne. The deferral requires the crew to look up the EPR climb settings before takeoff, which they failed to do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750637</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported they executed three go-arounds before successfully landing on the fourth attempt. Captain cited gusty conditions, lack of recent flying and unfamiliarity with airport as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750618</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and flaps not at final setting before 1,000 feet AGL. Captain stated he should have commanded the First Officer to go-around and cited lack of recent flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750617</td>
<td>First Officer reported being instructed to secure the number two engine for a single engine taxi to the gate, but accidentally shut off both engines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750436</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported taxiway incursion in a foreign country citing language barrier and unfamiliarity with the airport as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750396</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a taxiway incursion during an unstabilized approach and electing to go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750367</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported taking off with a deferred item resulting in the autothrottle arm switch to be in the &quot;OFF&quot; position. The deferral requires the crew to look up the EPR climb settings before takeoff, which they failed to do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750354</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported crews are not wearing COVID-19 mask in briefing rooms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750353</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported a rejected takeoff after the master caution illuminated and subsequently noticing a non functional airspeed indication on the First Officer's Primary Flight Display.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750245</td>
<td>Pilot reported feeling sleepy while flying and suspected that it was the COVID-19 mask that was causing the problem. The pilot removed the mask and felt fine afterward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750203</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported the Captain did not wear a COVID-19 type mask during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750171</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a speed deviation and flap overspeed on final.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750150</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing a track heading deviation after missing an intersection on the routing received from the PDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750118</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a speed deviation and flap overspeed while executing a go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750112</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported they were given multiple runway changes resulting in an unstabilized approach and go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750102</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported missing a crossing restriction during departure and referenced lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750062</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported not realizing that Dispatch did not add an MEL to the dispatch release until they were airborne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750056</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported a rejected takeoff due to mechanical issues with an aircraft that had been sitting for a couple of months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750049</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported flying an incorrect departure transition that had a similar sounding name as the clearance transition. The crew stated that lack of recent flying was a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750044</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot reported losing the green hydraulic system while on arrival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750016</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a taxiway incursion after receiving a non-standard taxi instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750008</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and electing to go-a-round.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749997</td>
<td>Ground employee reported there is not enough alcohol gel available in the office for employees to use during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749833</td>
<td>Tower Controller reported an operational error while working five positions at once.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749931</td>
<td>Pilot reported flying a trip with the aircraft being over due on the CFR 135.185 weighing requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749915</td>
<td>Supervising Maintenance Technician reported signing off work without verifying it had been completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Synopsis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749913</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported flight crew generated a write up when they found the circuit breakers for the pitot system with CB collars installed. The aircraft had been sitting for three days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749902</td>
<td>Flight Attendant was interrupted during the briefing by a passenger who was concerned about the seating arrangement due to COVID-19 reasons. Flight Attendant was not sure if the briefing was completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749900</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a mask during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749794</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported a flight departed early into a Flow Constrained Area (FCA) and questioned company procedures that allowed this to occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749775</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported an ATC reroute was received via ACARS, however it went unnoticed, resulting in a course deviation. Captain cited not having flown recently as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749747</td>
<td>Ground crew reported a wing-tip collision occurred while they were towing an aircraft to a made-up parking spot that was created due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The crew stated there were no markings to guide the aircraft to the spot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749727</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an altitude deviation while crossing an arrival fix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749718</td>
<td>ZMP Center Controller reported an airspace deviation while working combined sectors. COVID-19 staffing levels contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749683</td>
<td>Pilot reported incorrectly reading back their landing sequence number and turning in front of another aircraft on final approach. The pilot of the other aircraft reported taking immediate evasive action to avoid a collision. Both pilots reported the traffic pattern was busy and the Controller was handling both Ground and Tower operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749672</td>
<td>Mechanic reported being unknowingly exposed to a COVID-19 positive employee and not being notified of the exposure by company management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749667</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that during taxi out a passenger refused several times to wear a COVID-19 protective mask and also mocked the flight attendant when he was reminded to wear the mask. The flight taxied back to the gate and the passenger was removed from the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749615</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported experiencing a flap overspeed during initial climb and cited distraction while talking to ATC and recency of experience as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749607</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported an uneventful landing from an unstable approach instead of executing go-around per standard procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749603</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported being notified in flight that the destination city required a COVID-19 test upon arrival. Based on multiple concerns with the testing process, the crew elected to return to their departure airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749509</td>
<td>Technician reported that the residue film left from fogging the aircraft for COVID-19 may affect temperature sensors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749502</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that several passengers boarded without wearing COVID-19 protective masks and had to retrieve them from carry-on luggage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749479</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported asking a passenger multiple times to wear a COVID-19 protective mask and to not sit in the emergency exit row before the passenger complied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749470</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported the aircraft started to level off at the incorrect altitude resulting in a speed deviation while troubleshooting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749437</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing a taxiway incursion after receiving complex taxi instructions. The FO cited as contributing factors a lack of recent flight experience and having not been to the airport in several years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749435</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported experiencing an airspeed deviation and cited fatigue and lack of recent flying experience as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749387</td>
<td>Customer Service Representative reported that management is not enforcing the COVID-19 mask policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749386</td>
<td>Ground employee reported that co-workers are not adhering to quarantine rules and are not wearing COVID-19 protective masks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749383</td>
<td>Ground employee reported that gate agents are not wearing COVID-19 protective masks in the work and common areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749377</td>
<td>Ground employee expressed concern that the aircraft pits are not being sanitized, potentially exposing workers to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749369</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported the crew experienced an altitude deviation while the Captain was hand-flying the approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749269</td>
<td>Corporate pilot reported leveling off at the wrong altitude while being distracted with the cowl flaps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749195</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported momentarily overspeeding the flaps while configuring for approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749194</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported a fuel imbalance in flight required the fuel crossfeed valve to be cycled twice before balancing took place. FO noted that aircraft had been in storage for several months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749124</td>
<td>Controller reported an operations vehicle that was allowed onto a runway caused landing traffic to go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749032</td>
<td>Corporate flight crew reported flying the incorrect pattern to a landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749024</td>
<td>Air taxi flight crew reported landing at an airport and being advised that the runway was closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748952</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with COVID-19 mask wearing requirements during the flight.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1748941</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported feeling hot, sweaty and nearly fainting while having to wear a COVID-19 mask during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748940</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was feeling uncomfortable sitting so close to two other passengers and was allowed to move to a different seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748935</td>
<td>Dead heading Flight Attendant reported issues with a passenger who was not wearing a COVID-19 mask at all times on the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748927</td>
<td>Flight Attendants reported COVID-19 seating related issues involving flight attendant pre-assigned seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748889</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported communication issues with Departure Control and made reference to Controller possibly being overworked or stressed out due to COVID-19 staffing levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748818</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported communication issues with Center and attributed it to COVID-19 ATC staffing of facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748780</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported they may have landed passed the touchdown zone. First Officer stated lack of flying contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748771</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported landing without contacting Tower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748726</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported being unsure if they were supposed to descend on the approach clearance received from ATC resulting in an altitude deviation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748714</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported an airborne conflict attributed to the Local Controller working more than one combined position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748675</td>
<td>Tower Controller and pilot reported a runway incursion due to expectation bias. Pilot stated the Controller was working multiple positions at the time of the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748670</td>
<td>Controller reported that someone in the facility had tested positive for COVID-19. Controller was concerned about the decontamination process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748666</td>
<td>MRI Tower Controller reported LOA problems with the overlying A11 TRACON.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748648</td>
<td>Tower Controller and small aircraft pilot reported a runway incursion resulting in an aircraft having to go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748593</td>
<td>Technician reported flight crews are concerned that when they receive an aircraft that has sat for a few days some switches are in the wrong position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748591</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported that aircraft are coming out of storage with circuit breakers and other systems in the incorrect setting/position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748585</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported confusion on who is responsible for cleaning bio-hazards in the interior of the aircraft cabin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748574</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported not completing the exit row briefing until airborne because of distraction caused by moving a passenger to a different seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748573</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported moving passengers around due to COVID-19, but didn't brief the emergency row until after the main cabin door was closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748566</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported social distancing concerns during boarding and deplaning the aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748559</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported the time allotted for the required checks and briefings is not enough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748558</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748543</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported fatigue issues while flying as a reserve pilot for a 4 day pairing during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748516</td>
<td>Air carrier flight reported due to ATC staffing issues the flight would have to be delay vectored. They opted to land at an alternate airport and receive more fuel, then continued on to destination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748506</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance after dialing in the incorrect frequency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748482</td>
<td>Ground employee reported concerns with being notified that someone he had contact with tested positive for COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748460</td>
<td>Ground employee reported problems associated with clearing the ramp during a lightning storm and while parking aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748455</td>
<td>Ground employee reported concerns with touching bags on a daily basis and would like the bags to be sprayed to prevent infection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748443</td>
<td>Customer service employee reported the Airport Authority had turned off the lights in the over-sized baggage for cost cutting purposes during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748435</td>
<td>Ground employee raised concerns with the health effects of people wearing a COVID-19 type mask for long durations of time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748405</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported problems with the SATCOM lines going unanswered due to COVID-19 staffing levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748404</td>
<td>Dispatchers reported problems with taking an aircraft out of storage and an associated MEL that was not applied before takeoff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748383</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was non-compliant with wearing a face mask during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748376</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported experiencing mechanical problems after pushback resulting in a return to gate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748340</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported flying three flights in an aircraft with an expired CAT III status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748315</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that many of the first officers he flies with are not current, especially in the landing environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748311</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported they unintentionally missed the revised route segment given in their PDC.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1748303</td>
<td>Pilot reported an increase in the number of pilots who are non current due to the current schedule reduction and reserve staffing levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748283</td>
<td>Tower Controller reported a &quot;plethora of deals&quot; due to working with small arrival holes and not using the designated departure runway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748282</td>
<td>Center Controller reported being overloaded with traffic. MAP [Monitor Alert Parameter] was in the red, having a loss of separation, and an airspace violation due to COVID-19 staffing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748275</td>
<td>ZDC Center Controller reported a loss of separation between two aircraft while working 6 sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748229</td>
<td>Maintenance technicians reported that while performing a test of the pitot/static system on an aircraft, the job card failed to ensure the Mode S transponders were disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748223</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that the smoke detector alarm was triggered by a passenger smoking an e-cigarette in a lavatory. Flight Attendant stated that wearing a personal face mask made it hard to smell the smoke/vapor plumage to determine whether the smell was due to an e-cigarette or other burning material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748208</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported problems associated with wearing the required COVID-19 type mask while performing duties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748186</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported not reading a NOTAM completely caused problems relating to limiting the hours of operations at a foreign airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748156</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a runway incursion during taxi and cited several factors including a runway change and communication issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748126</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported taxiing out to the runway and finding items were missed during their before taxi flow checklist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748102</td>
<td>Pilot reported not being able to turn as required by the SID because of traffic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748019</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported being distracted and not arming the autothrottle prior to departure resulting in a rejected takeoff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748014</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported after a mechanical issue, switching planes and a lengthy delay; they had a speed deviation on the departure SID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747998</td>
<td>Flight crew reported they departed without an ETOPS Pre-Departure Check and an open AML write-up for the same issue. Maintenance personnel reported the aircraft was not assigned to anyone, therefore the work was not accomplished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747998</td>
<td>Flight crew reported that during takeoff they dialed in an incorrect frequency while trying to contact Departure. The crew attributed the error in part, to the Tower Controller working both Local and Ground positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747955</td>
<td>Local Controller reported an aircraft departed wanting to fly just under the clouds, but encountered IFR and the pilot was not certified for IFR flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747951</td>
<td>Instructor and trainee pilots reported experiencing an airspace incursion into Class C airspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747907</td>
<td>Pilot reported they were advised by ATC they forgot to cancel VFR flight following.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747902</td>
<td>Pilot taxi'd without clearance because he thought Tower was still closed, but it was actually 15 minutes after the Tower had opened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747863</td>
<td>Pilot reported encountering multiple delays from ATC while on an IFR flight and was given an approach clearance into the wrong airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747854</td>
<td>Pilot reported thinking the Tower was closed due to no response on the radio and departed airport. While airborne pilot realized the radio was not functioning correctly therefore had taken off without a clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747851</td>
<td>Pilot reported forgetting to set the correct code in the transponder due to not talking to Clearance Delivery, but rather the overlying TRACON since the Tower was closed due to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747849</td>
<td>Captain reported various issues with having to wear a mask during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747810</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger seated next to her was coughing and not wearing a mask. Flight attendant posed the question as to whether or not she could move to other non-assigned seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747722</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported multiple system switches are set in the wrong position on aircraft coming out of storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747685</td>
<td>Pilot reported forgetting to arm the thrust reversers upon landing and cited distraction and lack of flying as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747656</td>
<td>Captain reported the First Officer's seat belt broke delaying the flight until the next day due in part to operational issues caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747597</td>
<td>ZID Center Controller reported an airborne conflict while working all sectors in Controller's area during COVID-19 scheduling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747418</td>
<td>Pilot reported radio communication confusion as to which runway they had been cleared to land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747416</td>
<td>Instructor pilot reported dialing the incorrect CTAF frequency and landed while an aircraft was lining up to takeoff on the same runway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747388</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported an unstabilized approach, citing FO's lack of flying and a late change by Approach Control as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747387</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported being advised by a Flight Attendant that while wearing the COVID-19 type mask Flight Attendant felt hypoxia like symptoms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747359</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported a taxiway incursion due to distraction from dealing with Engine 1 indications being higher than Engine 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747234</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing an altitude overshoot during climbout while hand flying and attributed it to lack of flying.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1747217</td>
<td>Pilot reported finding bird droppings in the cockpit and throughout the aircraft after aircraft had come out of long-term storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747165</td>
<td>Ground Controller reported an airliner taxied in the wrong direction toward the ramp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747136</td>
<td>Pilot reported taking off in the wrong runway direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747125</td>
<td>Technician reported a work order was missed and not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747061</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported receiving a cabin pressure master warning during departure and executed a return to departure airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747020</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a waypoint crossing altitude dropping out of the FMS and not knowing why resulting in an altitude deviation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746999</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported getting confusing intersections and routings they were not familiar with and were also concerned about being routed more than 50 miles off shore by ZJX Center, which reportedly does this often.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746974</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported they began taxiing out without clearance. Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746929</td>
<td>Pilot departed airport without communication with Tower. Pilot mistook LOCAL time for ZULU time, and departed the airport when Tower was open.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746913</td>
<td>Pilot reported listening to the ATIS which stated the Tower was closed, and started a taxi towards the runway when Ground called the pilot and advised Tower was still open.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746906</td>
<td>Pilot reported landing without clearance due to a sticky radio switch and lack of incoming radio transmission, and thinking the Tower was closed due to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746796</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a track heading deviation. ATC questioned their routing and the crew realized they had an amended clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746792</td>
<td>Pilot reported due to light weight and high climb rate the aircraft received a Resolution Advisory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746781</td>
<td>Flight crew reported not flying the assigned heading on departure and being corrected by ATC. The crew referenced lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746769</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing a course deviation and stated being away from flying was a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746754</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported experiencing a track heading deviation due to FO entering the wrong heading on the PFD. Captain and ATC caught the mistake and corrected the heading.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746744</td>
<td>Pilot reported departing a runway and then observing an aircraft departing from a crossing runway causing an airborne conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746726</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a route change that was not on the filed route.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746706</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation after accidentally pressing the heading select switch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746571</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported forgetting to get a landing clearance from Tower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746549</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported executing a go-around due to a quartering tailwind and then electing to divert to filed alternate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746536</td>
<td>Center Controller reported clearing an aircraft for a NA (Not Authorized) Approach, and observing the aircraft descend below the MEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746530</td>
<td>F11 TRACON Controller reported a conflict after an aircraft came over at the incorrect altitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746513</td>
<td>Pilots reported entering the incorrect routing in the FMS resulting in a track heading deviation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746493</td>
<td>Pilot reported receiving a traffic alert shortly after takeoff requiring immediate evasive action. Pilot noted that the PHL TRACON Controller seemed incredibly busy, thereby potentially missing the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746463</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported feeling dizzy along with another Flight Attendant and attributed it to having to wear a protective mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746444</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a taxiway incursion due to expectation bias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746439</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported being notified that the flight release had not been signed prior to departure. The FO stated that technology challenges as a result of COVID-19 procedures contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746434</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that the over-wing doors were not armed and the aircraft had been flown for several days in this condition. The aircraft had recently come from storage and the escape slides had not been enabled for deployment by Maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746383</td>
<td>ZOB Center Controller reported forgetting to ask 3 different aircraft if they had weather and NOTAMs for their landing airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746354</td>
<td>Pilot reported issues with the service provided by SLC Tower and cited Controller workload as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746329</td>
<td>Mechanic reported that after performing work on the nose gear door, the aircraft had nose gear problems in flight. Mechanic was concerned that fatigue due to changes in work schedule hours contributed to a possible error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746320</td>
<td>Air carrier Flight Attendant reported a sick passenger boarded a flight, but was removed from the flight prior to departure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746311</td>
<td>Air carrier flight attendants reported that a passenger was vaping in the lavatory and was not wearing a personal protective mask during the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746310</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported experiencing fatigue from extended work hours and additional duties due to change in flight schedules in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746282</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported having inadequate cleaning supplies to sanitize their cockpit equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746254</td>
<td>Pilot reported a track heading deviation and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746189</td>
<td>Pilot reported a track heading deviation when executing a 360 turn resulting from confusing a fix name which sounds like the number 360.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746167</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported a CFTT incident citing unfamiliarity with the airport and issues relating to the surrounding terrain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746158</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported experiencing a runway incursion after landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746099</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported forgetting to turn off APU and later exceeding the APU ceiling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746060</td>
<td>TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation event and made reference to COVID-19 staffing levels as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746005</td>
<td>ZLA Center Controller reported losing separation due to traffic volume, watching too large of an area and the COVID-19 configuration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745982</td>
<td>Captain reported ATC issued a climb 2,000 feet above the field altitude, crew took the altitude and did not question ATC. Another Center Sector Controller eventually asked crew why they were going to newly assigned altitude instead of filed altitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745951</td>
<td>Pilot reported flying into a restricted area and attributed it to weather and not receiving ATC flight following.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745930</td>
<td>Pilot reported concerns with the limitations imposed by the SFAR concerning the ability to exercise instrument privileges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745872</td>
<td>Pilot reported an altitude deviation due to excessive climb rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745854</td>
<td>Technician reported work card discrepancies for two different types of aircraft and being pressured to continue working after finding these errors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745850</td>
<td>Technician reported being distracted by possible lay-offs and did not complete a work order correctly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745712</td>
<td>Pilot reported attempting to land at an airport with a closed Control Tower and other aircraft landing on an unlit runway at night.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745709</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported a miscommunication problem with TPA TRACON resulting in an altitude deviation and attributed it partly due to not flying because of COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745694</td>
<td>Pilots reported being advised that the aircraft was flown with open write ups on three legs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745666</td>
<td>SCT TRACON Controller reported experiencing an airborne conflict between an air carrier and a GA aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745614</td>
<td>Lead Flight Attendant reported the red tag was not put in place after disarming the door.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745547</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an altitude deviation during approach. Lack of flying and proficiency were contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745485</td>
<td>Pilot reported a taxiway incursion, citing distraction with aircraft condition and lack of recent flying as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745467</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported forgetting to turn on three of the four window heat switches during pre-flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745422</td>
<td>Flight crew reported overshooting altitude and then returning to assigned altitude. The Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745410</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a loud hum during climbout emanating from the door and having to return to departure airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745376</td>
<td>Pilot reported experiencing a track heading deviation and cited rustiness and lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745365</td>
<td>Instructor pilot reported taking off with incorrect transponder code and cited lack of flying due to the COVID-19 as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745329</td>
<td>Pilot reported exceeding 250 knots below 10,000 feet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745290</td>
<td>TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation occurred due to lack of coordination. Traffic volume was cited as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745186</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around. Unfamiliarity with the airport and rustiness from lack of flying were cited as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745174</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation during arrival. Captain stated rustiness due to lack of flying was a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745071</td>
<td>Pilot reported being rusty after lack of flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic resulting in communication issues with ATC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745059</td>
<td>Pilot reported an alleged airspace violation while being under flight following and handed off to a Tower by Approach Control. Reportedly, Tower Controller was working numerous frequencies/positions and advised pilot that he had violated the Class Delta airspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745054</td>
<td>Pilot instructor and student reported distraction in the cockpit resulted in executing a touch and go without ATC clearance and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1745052</td>
<td>Pilot reported while on a sightseeing trip they went too low, pilot eventually caught the mistake and climbed back to a normal altitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745049</td>
<td>Pilot reported communications issues due to Tower Controller working multiple positions on same frequency due to facility staffing issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744987</td>
<td>Pilot reported a taxiway incursion and cited being off for a month and a half as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744964</td>
<td>Pilot reported clearance was different than what they had filed and would like to see HPN ATC Facilities re-open.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744945</td>
<td>Pilot reported a taxiway incursion partially due to expectation bias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744942</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a low speed buffet alert during cruise due to having the aircraft in the incorrect configuration with autothrottles not engaged. Lack of flying was cited as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744800</td>
<td>Air carrier Mechanic reported that wearing a mask and safety glasses causes the glasses to fog up, resulting in safety concerns when working on ladders, lifts, and in tight places. Mechanic also expressed concern that while working with chemicals, they could inadvertently be transferred to the mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744783</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew experienced a high work load during an approach which resulted in unstable approach and a missed approach. The crew cited lack of experience and recent flying as contributing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744763</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported an airframe overspeed in cruise that likely resulted from the autothrust not being engaged during takeoff. Captain noted that the failure to see the FMA indications resulted from a lack of proficiency and recency of flying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744694</td>
<td>Instructor pilot reported an airborne conflict with an aircraft that was not on correct frequency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744678</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported forgetting to turn on the probe heat and stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744573</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that another Flight Attendant refused to wear a mask during boarding and throughout the flight. Reporter expressed concern that the health of passengers and other cabin crew were put at risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744482</td>
<td>GA pilot experienced an airspace incursion while returning from a practice flight. Pilot reported not being fully prepared for the flight and had not flown lately due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744433</td>
<td>Lead Aircraft Technician reported an aircraft in storage had both engines run with no oil in either the main oil tank or accessory gearbox.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744430</td>
<td>Air carrier Maintenance employee reported adverse health symptoms after exposure to an aircraft just cleaned using electrostatic spraying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174435</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported rejecting a takeoff in response to multiple warning lights. The aircraft had been in storage and anti-ice circuit breakers had been collared and not removed by Maintenance prior to flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744314</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported concerns with re-qualification training courses after not flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744310</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported inconsistent use of masks per guidelines by crewmembers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744306</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported concerns with wearing masks during pre-flight crew briefings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744199</td>
<td>Pilot reported a communication issue resulted in an altitude deviation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744193</td>
<td>Pilot reported being on the incorrect frequency and thinking it was odd that no other aircraft were heard while landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744138</td>
<td>Flight crew reported missing a crossing restriction during approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744131</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744087</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported having to remove a passenger showing symptoms of illness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744071</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported re-routing issues associated with the deferral of a flight's CPDLC system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744067</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported he had inadvertently pushed the thrust levers into detent setting on takeoff, which was not recognized until reaching cruise flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744042</td>
<td>TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict and attributed it to staffing levels due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744041</td>
<td>Center Controller reported an aircraft attempting to land on the wrong runway resulting in another aircraft executing a go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743932</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported that Tower instructed them to abort the takeoff roll which was requested by the ARTCC facility due to traffic and staffing issues and could not yet accept the flight into their airspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743906</td>
<td>Pilot reported that after checking in on Center frequency, no response was received for some time. The pilot delayed locating an alternative frequency due to the quiet frequencies that have become prevalent during COVID-19 reduction in air traffic volume.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743857</td>
<td>Air carrier Flight Attendant reported forgetting to notify other FAs that the AFT doors were disarmed. Flight Attendant stated not having been in an airplane for an extended time due to the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743853</td>
<td>Air carrier Flight Attendant reported interacting with a sick passenger in flight who was possibly exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743844</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported not recognizing until cruise that the transponder was set incorrectly. Captain recommended that crews visually confirm checklist items since many pilots are flying infrequently due to COVID-19 reductions in travel demands.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1743828</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a series of miscommunications regarding a boarding passenger who was possibly contagious with COVID-19. After the Captain spent time resolving the issue, it was determined that the passenger could be allowed to board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743824</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain had an airspeed deviation and cited being rusty due lack of flying as contributing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743792</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain forgot to do a SELCAL check and cited as contributing factors multiple tasks in a short period and having not flown in a long time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743769</td>
<td>Controller reported using a configuration that did not show an airspace that was open. Controller thought airspace was closed and had an airspace violation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743749</td>
<td>Corporate pilot reported having an altitude deviation while hand-flying the aircraft and attributed it to lack of flying due to the COVID-19 slow down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743722</td>
<td>Air carrier Flight Attendant expressed multiple concerns regarding company COVID-19 protocols, including alternative jumpseat locations, social distancing in the flight deck, safety equipment demonstrations, and the wearing of protective masks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743562</td>
<td>GA pilot reported experiencing an airborne conflict during departure having to take evasive action. Reporter cited an increase in traffic due to the lifting of stay at home restrictions as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743554</td>
<td>GA pilot reported inadvertently leaving the transponder code set from the previous flight. The pilot was accustomed to getting a code from the Tower, however the Tower had closed early due to COVID-19 hours and the pilot did not check the transponder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174351</td>
<td>Pilot reported calling on radio for traffic and attempting to depart in a 2 minute window, when an aircraft on final requested the pilot to hold position, but ultimately had to go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743473</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported that deferred maintenance items were not properly documented due to multiple distractions in the flight deck, including international COVID-19 screening protocols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743466</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported aborting a takeoff roll when the tiller was accidentally bumped, causing the steering to disengage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743435</td>
<td>Pilot reported an unstable approach and requesting a 360 turn on final from Approach. Reporter cited lack of flying and distractions during the approach as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743200</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported a brake issue on landing and re-occurring at the gate. Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743199</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported equipment problems and having to change destinations due to COVID-19 restrictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743149</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported forgetting to brief the over the wing passengers until at 10,000 feet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743084</td>
<td>Center Controller reported being distracted due to COVID-19 issues and did not hear a wrong read back from a crew, which resulted in an altitude deviation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743080</td>
<td>Pilot reported inadvertently flying into Class Bravo airspace and cited lack of flying during the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742979</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot described the potential negative aspects of wearing a face mask in the flight deck.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742952</td>
<td>GA pilot reported misinterpreting an altitude alert and descended from assigned altitude while on approach. Lack of familiarity with the instrument panel and lack of recent flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic were cited as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742870</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported alcohol from cleaning products may be entering the boom mike causing the equipment to malfunction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742867</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported being advised of an aircraft that took off with incorrect weights and the need to ensure a certain row in the aircraft was empty to be within limits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742866</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported experiencing an unstabilized approach in which they should have executed a go-around but decided to continue and stabilized at 500 feet. Captain reported rustiness from lack of flying contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742861</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported multiple changes to the arrival and runway resulted in a track heading deviation. Flight crew stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742856</td>
<td>First Officer reported setting the incorrect flaps resulting in an immediate rejected takeoff after receiving a configuration warning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742825</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported operating flights with an incorrect MEL applied. The flight deck sanitizing process was cited as a reason for not closely reviewing the logbook and MEL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742814</td>
<td>Corporate Captain reported experiencing an undershoot of a crossing restriction and cited lack of recent flying experience due to the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742780</td>
<td>GA pilot reported not being sure if he was cleared into Class B Airspace. Reportedly, the decision to fly into Class B airspace was based on the lack of traffic due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742767</td>
<td>Pilot reported being switched from Approach to Tower, but dialed incorrect frequency resulting in a go-around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742760</td>
<td>GA pilot reported forgetting to turn on Navigation Lights so the ADS-B would activate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742716</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger’s displeasure with other passengers not wearing masks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742698</td>
<td>Flight crew reported climbing 500 feet above assigned block altitudes and cited COVID-19 conversation distractions and fatigue as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742622</td>
<td>Center Controller reported a loss of separation event due to being distracted while cleaning equipment.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1742507</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer requested guidance in a scenario where two air carrier pilots, neither of whom has flown within the prior 90 days due to the new 2-month FAA extension, are operating on the same flight. The First Officer expressed concern regarding the issue of pilot currency versus pilot proficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742475</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that the aircraft departed with passenger distribution data different from the actual distribution due to one passenger changing seats. The Captain noted the aircraft was very lightly loaded and it was important to ensure an accurate record of passenger location, as this could affecting weight and balance data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742319</td>
<td>Pilot reported having to descend to avoid a collision, then realized aircraft may have been too low over a group of people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742312</td>
<td>Pilot reported wind gust caused the aircraft to porpoise twice during landing causing minor propeller damage. Pilot cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742311</td>
<td>Instructor pilot reported thinking Tower instructions for them were for another aircraft resulting in a heading deviation. Reporter cited Tower staffing issues due the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742273</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger cleaned the seat with bleach. Bleach was removed from aircraft and flight departed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742271</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported difficulty and confusion with guidelines when trying to enforce the mandatory mask requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742175</td>
<td>Pilot reported experiencing an altitude deviation during departure. Reporter cited routing clearance issues and lack of flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic as contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742161</td>
<td>Pilot reported being unsure if he had a release to get airborne on a flight. Fatigue from COVID-19 restrictions was cited as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742159</td>
<td>Pilot reported after landing a crosswind took control of the aircraft causing a runway excursion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742152</td>
<td>Pilot reported landing without clearance and cited the COVID-19 environment as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742121</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported not being informed of passengers on the aircraft with COVID-19 symptoms until after airborne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742058</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported taking off without a required alternate. A delay due to spraying for COVID-19 was cited as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742028</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that airline is not following the SAFO2009 guidance during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742024</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was removed from flight due to exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms. Reporter suggested masks should be mandatory for all passengers and there should be screening for COVID-19 symptoms at security checkpoints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742005</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported not calling Ramp before taxiing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741998</td>
<td>Center Controller reported working 3 sectors combined during the COVID-19 pandemic and did not point out an aircraft resulting in an airspace violation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741968</td>
<td>Instructor pilot reported that while flying with a student they struck the ground with the tail of the aircraft during landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741944</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported catering personnel were not wearing masks, and a non-revenue pilot was not complying with mask usage until pilot was asked twice to comply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741926</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported they departed with the flight release form still in the aircraft. Reportedly, ramp personnel forgot the form in the aircraft after the crew had handed it to them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741905</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance. The Captain made reference to lack of flying time in recent weeks as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741873</td>
<td>Center Controller and Front Line Manager reported an airborne conflict event while working Center airspace along with three other Approach Control airspaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741854</td>
<td>Pilot reported flying out of radio contact with the Center due to complacency from the reduction of air traffic caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741839</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported issues with the passenger count on board and social distance seating guidelines which delayed the flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741756</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported being asked to continue flying after being notified of being in contact with a crew member who had tested positive for COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741713</td>
<td>Pilot reported doing pattern work, practice landings and takeoffs at an airport that had been NOTAMed closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741701</td>
<td>GA pilot reported landing on a closed runway, that was NOTAMed closed after pilot had already checked NOTAMs and had departed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741693</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger asked for a different seat, but Flight Attendant was unable to comply with the request due to social distancing concerns from other passengers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741691</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported they found a 3/4 used cigarette on the aircraft while doing initial inspections and wondered how the cleaning crew missed it. Also, there were no alcohol based cleaning/sanitation supplies on the aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741688</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported initially forgetting to move the door flag to the disarmed position due distraction from putting a mask on to avoid COVID-19 exposure.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1741683</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported an immediate burning sensation in eyes/nose/throat/lungs and an immediate headache, from the cleaning products used to combat COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741644</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported pushing back before brakes were release causing the tow bar shear pin to break.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741632</td>
<td>Pilot reported flying aircraft with an overdue inspection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741625</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported smelling a burning smell during cruise. Post-flight Maintenance briefing advised the pilots alcohol from wipes may be shorting out wires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741536</td>
<td>Pilot reported being outside of flight currency requirements and cited distraction from the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741533</td>
<td>Pilot reported experiencing an altitude deviation and cited lack of flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741509</td>
<td>Two flight attendants reported having to work a flight a few days later after being on a flight with a passenger who had tested positive for COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741474</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported being notified that he had operated a flight with the vertical stabilizer probe covers on during flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741452</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported mistakes in flight release documentation relating to the number of jumpseaters on board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741398</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported significant safety compromises with wearing face masks during the COVID-19 pandemic and associated problems with oxygen masks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741389</td>
<td>TRACON Controller working COVID-19 schedule reported a loss of separation between two IFR aircraft while accidentally providing VFR instructions to one of the aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741388</td>
<td>TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation due to an aircraft taking too long to turn inbound on the approach. Controller made reference to COVID-19 related issues contributing to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741300</td>
<td>Ground employee expressed concern over being the only employee who wears a face mask and works in close proximity with other team employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741275</td>
<td>Corporate pilot reported turning the wrong direction to a heading issued by ATC. The pilot stated they were new to the airplane and had not flown much recently due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741266</td>
<td>GA flight instructor reported lining up on final approach with a runway parallel to the assigned runway. Cited as contributing were weather conditions and a lack of recent proficiency flights due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741227</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain misread the BOW (Basic Operating Weight) placard which resulted in a weight and balance miscalculation. The placard had become distorted and worn due to COVID-19 cockpit cleaning procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741215</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported being notified by the company of a possible exposure to COVID-19 through another crew member. The Captain expressed concern that deadheading crew was notified before the on-duty crew and suggested that they should have been removed from duty sooner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741192</td>
<td>Air taxi pilot reported that while deviating around thunderstorms, the track resulted in flying farther offshore than allowed by company Ops Specs. The pilot noted that due to COVID-19 the co-pilot's overwater training had been cancelled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741165</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported an altitude overshoot during approach and cited reduced flying as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741125</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported various issues relating to the COVID-19 pandemic including FAs not properly using masks, passenger complaints regarding seating issues and lack of flying time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741118</td>
<td>Pilot reported executing the wrong missed approach procedure after not being issued missed approach instructions. ATC cleared the pilot for the approach and issued instructions to contact airport advisory frequency, however there was no such frequency published for the airport and the Tower was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741074</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger vomited throughout aircraft causing aircraft to be taken out of service after landing at destination. Flight Attendant suggested passengers should wear masks and have their temperature checked prior to boarding during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741073</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger brought on board a smelly spray container made with an alcohol base mixture. Passenger reportedly started spraying walls, windows, seats and armrests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741072</td>
<td>Flight attendant reported passenger sneezed directly into Flight Attendant's face without attempting to cover the sneeze. Flight Attendant suggested passengers should be given hygiene tips during pre-boarding announcements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741053</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported being scheduled a flight at full passenger capacity and was concerned about social distancing and exposure to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741023</td>
<td>Ground employee reported concerns about having to wear commonly shared wireless headsets during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741022</td>
<td>Air carrier ground crew reported that while repositioning an aircraft in a remote parking location, the wing struck an adjacent parked aircraft. The crew reported that the move was done to fit more aircraft into the parking location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741018</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported inadvertently flying with an expired FMC database. The Captain noted that distractions due to numerous added cautions for cockpit cleanliness may have contributed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACN</td>
<td>Synopsis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740938</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported wearing a personal face mask while demonstrating oxygen mask use during the pre-departure safety briefing. The Flight Attendant was concerned that passengers would think it would be acceptable to place an oxygen mask over a personal mask.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740911</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported no sani-wipes were on the aircraft, nor available from operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740830</td>
<td>Ground employee reported the use of shared headsets exposes ramp employees to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740849</td>
<td>Flight crew reported having to move passengers from two rows for weight and balance causing a delay, and then once airborne crew was told they took off with incorrect final weights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740815</td>
<td>Flight crew reported a similar callsign issue resulting in a takeoff without clearance. The crew attributed this to a lack of alertness and complacency due to the irregular times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740738</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a flap setting warning horn during initial power push for takeoff. The Captain cited lack of sleep as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740666</td>
<td>Ground employee reported a flight departed with incorrect weight and balance numbers. Reporter cited COVID-19 guidelines and social distancing issues as contributing to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740684</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported being advised after departure that a passenger's family member had been exposed to COVID-19. The crew followed proper CDC protocol at destination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740683</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported no Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) or sanitizing equipment were provided for a round trip flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740640</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported concerns about safety and security issues relating to new COVID-19 jumpseat arrangements and social distancing guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740585</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported concerns with another Flight Attendant bringing a passenger on the shuttle bus and flight during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740550</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported no sanitation equipment was available for use while at a foreign destination during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740533</td>
<td>GA pilot had a Class B airspace incursion after assuming they were cleared through the airspace by ATC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740532</td>
<td>GA pilot reported flying formation with the wrong aircraft. Reporter cited a number of contributing factors that led to this confusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740524</td>
<td>GA pilot reported a flight over homes may have been too low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740471</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported being exposed to COVID-19 from another pilot and having to self quarantine after notification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740411</td>
<td>Pilot reported experiencing a track/heading deviation. Pilot stated the deviation occurred in part due to flying with an inexperienced co-pilot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740685</td>
<td>Ground employee reported two team members were less than 6 feet apart and not in accordance with social distancing government guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740521</td>
<td>Technician reported an aircraft was supposed to be deep cleaned after possible COVID-19 contamination, but when cleaners where questioned they had not been advised to deep clean the aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740401</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger complained about a deadheading pilot who was coughing and requested deadheading pilot put on a mask. Passenger ended up moving to a different seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740396</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported concerns with being pressured to board early with only a few passengers. Flight Attendant stated it would be best to avoid boarding unnecessarily early to minimize the time of possibly being exposed to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740373</td>
<td>Corporate First Officer reported descending prior to a crossing restriction during arrival. First Officer referenced being distracted talking about COVID-19 related logistical issues that may have contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740337</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported thinking she was drinking out of her own cup and realized cleaners had put a different used cup in place, and was concerned about possible COVID-19 exposure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740294</td>
<td>Ground employee reported a person came to work after a family member had allegedly tested positive for COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740283</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported many delays encountered to get a flight going that eventually departed the next day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740275</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot reported concerns with the inability to maintain proper social distancing in the cockpit during the COVID-19 pandemic. Reporter suggested guidelines should allow for pilots to wear surgical masks in the cockpit during this time to minimize COVID-19 exposure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740252</td>
<td>GA pilot reported experiencing a taxiway incursion citing multiple distractions and other human factors as contributing to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACN</td>
<td>Synopsis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740241</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported concerns with passenger use of masks during the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of instructions to remove them in order use the oxygen masks in case of a rapid decompression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740238</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger was coughing in the gate area making the crew and other passengers uncomfortable due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740213</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported pushing without contacting ground, citing COVID-19 operations as the reason for disrupting flows and habits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740159</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported questions and concerns relating to cleaning techniques for aircraft during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740092</td>
<td>General Aviation pilot flying VFR reported experiencing an airborne conflict with an airliner. Pilot stated that lighter traffic during the COVID-19 pandemic was a factor in the decision to not contact ATC, which may have contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740086</td>
<td>Flight Attendant suggested changing the safety announcement during the COVID-19 pandemic to include instructions for passengers to remove their personal protective masks before donning drop-down oxygen masks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739963</td>
<td>Technician reported a Supervisor made two calls before reluctantly providing him with a mask. Technician stated they are not adequately being supplied with PPE equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739948</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that the crew was transported to the aircraft in the same bus as the passengers to a remote hard stand, and that a separate bus would lessen the risk of exposure to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739882</td>
<td>Center Controller reported that while working through COVID-19 Operations, they became very busy working combined sectors resulting in an airborne conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739830</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported a passenger violated COVID-19 social distancing rules when approaching the galley mid-flight to ask for a beverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739795</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported having to ferry a flight for storage due the COVID-19 pandemic without correct maintenance release documentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739663</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported they are not being provided with adequate cleaning supplies and sanitizers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Flight Attendant also expressed concern with the flight being overstaffed for no reason.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739613</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported conducting an unstable approach to a landing into an unfamiliar airport. The crew cited flying frequency as the main cause attributed to a reduction of flights during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739597</td>
<td>Center Controller reported management was not following COVID-19 related facility policy for social distancing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739596</td>
<td>Center Controller reported holding several aircraft due to weather at intended airport, interacting with TMU, lining aircraft up 20 MIT, then after the first three aircraft the Controller was told to hold remaining aircraft. Controller reported that due to the COVID-19 pandemic he did not call for D-Side help because of social distancing concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739595</td>
<td>Flight Attendant expressed concern that attending a scheduled recurrent training class with a group of flight attendants could increase the risk of spreading the COVID-19 virus to other crew members and passengers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739577</td>
<td>Technician reported being told the aircraft was “okay” to board, but received no documentation stating the aircraft was properly sanitized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739520</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported the flight crew decided not to write up a minor in-flight equipment malfunction as a discrepancy, which might not be deferrable. The decision was due, in part, to the crew’s uncertainty around recent changes in COVID-19 screening procedures at the destination airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739456</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported a similar callsign issue and cancellations attributed in part to COVID-19 pandemic related work environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739384</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported a collision with an object while taxiing aircraft for maintenance. The rush to ground planes due to the COVID-19 pandemic was referenced as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739379</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported having difficulty clarifying the company’s current policy on the use of shared jumpseats and social distancing. The Flight Attendant occupied a passenger seat during takeoff and landing, rather than the assigned jumpseat. After the flight, the Flight Attendant found that jumpseat policy changes had not been put in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739319</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer expressed concern about the erosion of skills and knowledge while awaiting OE and consolidation flights. A restrictive flight schedule due to the COVID-19 pandemic was cited as contributing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739228</td>
<td>GA pilot had difficulty finding a flight instructor during the COVID-19 pandemic to conduct a flight review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739176</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported the aircraft had a bounced landing resulting in a go-around. The crew cited the handling and performance characteristics of the lightly loaded aircraft as a contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738848</td>
<td>Ground employee reported problems associated with sharing headsets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738713</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported that due to weight and balance needs, the Operations Agent directed passengers on a nearly empty flight to sit close together, violating social distancing requirements. The Captain suggested that weight and balance be reworked to allow appropriate spacing between passengers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738687</td>
<td>Flight crew reported landing without clearance due to fatigue and lack of recent flying assignments due to COVID-19-related decrease in flights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738676</td>
<td>Reporter was concerned that there weren’t safety masks or respirators available for use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738653</td>
<td>Flight crew member reported the bag containing protective gear for COVID-19 was not boarded on the aircraft, and that the on duty in-flight Supervisor directed the crew to depart without the bag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738644</td>
<td>Flight crew member reported the company was sending crews out during pandemic without proper safety equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738571</td>
<td>Air carrier ramp agent reported being uncomfortable with a company procedure requiring wearing shared headsets amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738454</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported that a crewmember had possibly been exposed to COVID-19. For social distancing purposes, Flight Attendant sat in a cabin seat for takeoff and landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738408</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew reported the ATC Tower changed hours of operation and was closed due to COVID-19, resulting in a takeoff before curfew ended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738292</td>
<td>Ground personnel reported that persons exposed to COVID-19 were allowed to continue to work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738571</td>
<td>Air carrier ramp agent reported being uncomfortable with a company procedure requiring wearing shared headsets amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738277</td>
<td>Air carrier First Officer reported the company training center and simulators could benefit from more sanitation and cleaning supplies for staff and trainees in order to support a safe training environment. The crew member suggested that the company pursue FAA approval to extend training events deadlines in order to have time to deep clean the training facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738069</td>
<td>Flight Attendant stated preoccupation with COVID-19 concerns resulted in forgetting to bring the EFB to work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738047</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported prior to flight departure, a required alternate airport was NOTAMed unavailable due to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738026</td>
<td>Air carrier Captain reported receiving a TCAS RA related to an abnormally high climb rate associated with very lightly loaded aircraft because of the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737991</td>
<td>Ramp agent reported working too close to others and not having sufficient antiseptic wipes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737824</td>
<td>Center Controller reported unusual traffic flows due to COVID-19 and its effect on the normal workload.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737774</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported not following procedures during the disarming of doors after the arrival and stated distraction and anxiety about COVID-19 contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737730</td>
<td>First Officer reported concerns with having to ride a bus full of crammed passengers from the gate to the aircraft increasing their risk of being exposed to Coronavirus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737668</td>
<td>Ground employee reported the employee bus carries more than 10 passengers and 6 feet social distancing separation is impossible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737757</td>
<td>Center Controller reported that under-staffing due to COVID-19 has resulted in numerous aircraft reroutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737462</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported lack of disinfectant wipes and cleaning agents on the round trip flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737150</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported a lack of personal protection equipment and improper cleaning and sanitizing of the dispatchers’ office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737116</td>
<td>Air carrier flight crew received a momentary EGPWS terrain warning while turning base on a nighttime visual approach. The flight continued to a safe landing. The crew noted that distraction due to the COVID-19 pandemic, its impact on the company, and family concerns contributed to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737091</td>
<td>Center Controller In Charge reported an unacceptable workload was placed on the facility which resulted in controllers being unable to practice social distancing at the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737008</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported that concerns about COVID-19 and possible furlough resulted in an unstabilized approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736993</td>
<td>Gate Agent reported computers at this company’s terminal need a deep cleaning for employee safety. The only cleaning items currently available are wipes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736891</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported being unable to obtain hand sanitizers at base and throughout other company locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736477</td>
<td>Ground employee reported the lack of sanitizing agents especially in the clock in/out areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736437</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported the crew made the decision to suspend in-flight service for COVID-19 social distancing reasons contrary to company policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736386</td>
<td>Maintenance Technician reported an aircraft arrived at the facility as a result of a “Corona issue” and needed deep cleaning. The Maintenance Technician reported that there are no policies in place for this issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736305</td>
<td>Flight Attendants reported concerns about a sick passenger in their flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736278</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported a NOTAM runway closure was overlooked due to the increased workload created by the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1735831</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported ill passengers on the flight and was concerned regarding lack of COVID-19 testing for the crew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1734918</td>
<td>Dispatcher reported there was concern and confusion regarding an ill passenger due to the lack of defined policy and procedures for situations involving COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1734850</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported there were no protective gloves on the aircraft nor available at the station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1734659</td>
<td>Air Carrier Captain reported the only available means to clean the crew O2 mask was to use SaniWipes, which are reportedly inadequate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1733973</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported the aircraft departed with one working lavatory sink which impacted the ability of crew and passengers to wash their hands to help prevent the spread of COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1733947</td>
<td>Flight Attendant reported one lavatory sink inoperative and no hand soap available on multiple flights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1733143</td>
<td>Air carrier pilot gave suggestions to improve passenger safety during the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Report Narratives
**ACN: 1760916**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202009
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 1
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1200

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 37
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 240
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760916
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

As I was approaching from the northwest to an airport with parallel runways, intending to land on the eastern of the two runways. The Tower closed early because of COVID-19, and traffic was using Runways XXL and XXR. I elected to fly a left downwind to land on Runway XXR, partially because there was traffic to the east of the field that was planning to fly a right downwind to XXR, and I did not have visual contact. I landed uneventfully, but in hindsight, it would have been better to follow the proper pattern by overflying the field, and descending to join the right downwind for XXR.

**Synopsis**

GA pilot reported flying the incorrect pattern after the Tower closed.
Narrative: 1

Had passenger board and was complaining that he was sitting next to another passenger and what was I going to do about it. Then proceeded to tell me he would not wear his mask the whole flight because he has asthma. I told him he needs to wear the mask at all times. The lady sitting next to him was asked if she was [ok] sitting by him as we had no open rows, she said she was fine. I then was putting her bag in the overhead for her as
the man tells me to grab his suit jacket as he didn't want her bag near it. I had the CA call customer service to help the situation, customer service comes and he says he has no problem complying.

He was rude in flight, tried to take mask down again and I asked him to put it on, he did. We land and he cuts the lady off to grab his stuff from the overhead and get off, has his mask off as he is getting off the plane.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger complained about sitting next to another passenger and did not comply with face mask policy.
**ACN: 1760901**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202009  
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing  
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Cruise

**Person**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area  
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function. Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge  
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current  
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1760901  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Attendant  
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Other

**Events**

Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct  
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant  
When Detected: In-flight  
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative:**

Passenger [would] not wear the mask over his nose. He was asked multiple times and then said he can't breathe with it on. I explained our policy, told him the consequences and he said - "Call the Captain, I don't care I can't breathe." I came back, asked him one more time and he said it's not my fault and I said I realize that, but when you agreed to fly you agreed to our mask policy.

Fine whatever, was his response. The passenger in seat XX first called it to my attention.
during takeoff then again when I walked by a second time. He was not combative in any way, but refused to comply.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy during flight.
ACN: 1760899

Time / Day
Date : 202009
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Parked

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : General Seating Area
Cabin Activity : Boarding
Cabin Activity : Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1760899
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Passenger walking back as FA B and [I] saw her not wearing her mask and asked her to put it on. While FA A was walking back to the front she saw she was not wearing her mask and asked her to put her mask on to which she said she would not. I called the Captain and explained how I asked once and FA A asked a second time and there was a refusal. He said he would call ops and we would return to the gate.

After the gate agent came on I was told by FA A that the passenger was basically saying she was going to eat and drink the whole duration of the flight which is still not complying. FA A said that still made her uncomfortable and I agree because she is going against compliance and stating that she is going to go around the rules. Also, apparently she is saying that she was never told to put on a mask but she was told two times once by both of us. The second time when I asked if she was not going to put it on she was already showing an increased attitude.

A Supervisor [came] on board to escort her off the plane. From what I learned in the back we [deplaned] the entire plane because she refused to get off the plane.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was removed from flight due to not complying with face mask policy.
ACN: 1760875

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 500

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility: Turbulence
Weather Elements / Visibility: Windshear
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760875
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Automation: Aircraft Terrain Warning
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This event was undoubtedly the most humbling and perhaps a first in my almost XX years with (airline) and going on X years as Captain. While there will always be a first, it will certainly serve as a professional learning opportunity for me personally. I take full accountability as Captain for not directing a go-around sooner. The ZZZ1-ZZZ flight was leg three on a three day pairing. We were approaching an 8 hour flight block and over 10 hour duty on our flight to ZZZ. Flight paperwork review prior to departure indicated weather conditions which ended up being inconsistent with what we encountered in ZZZ. Due to an ATIS outage that had spanned several hours, we were only able to retrieve hourly METAR reports for ZZZ. The last hourly report indicated significant changes with respect to gusty crosswinds from the East with smoke slightly lowering visibility. As it came close to time to brief, I sent a message to Dispatch inquiring about ZZZ ATIS. The message we received back indicated there indeed was an outage. Unfortunately we were out of range to obtain the VHF ATIS prior to our briefing, but later obtained ATIS information over VHF in our descent. Prior to TOD, we briefed the approach that we anticipated in ZZZ, the visual backed up by the ILS for [Runway] XYR. We discussed relevant threats of gusty crosswinds, night, fatigue and potential for arrival changes and runway re-assignment. I set up with the VSD to be able to monitor flight path. On initial hand off to ZZZ Approach, we were assigned Runway XYL. As PM, I loaded the approach for the ILS XYL in the FMC, set new baro minimums, entered the new runway data, and set up the NAV frequency/course for XYL, briefed the changes, and then ran the change triangle Descent checklist. Approach Control directed us to go direct ZZZZZ on the approach, maintain 4,000 until ZZZZZ, and were subsequently cleared for the approach. My FO as PF attempted to mitigate the threat of being high on path maintaining higher speed as directed previously by ATC (delete speed restrictions on the arrival) and I monitored using the VSD.

As we joined final, it was evident from wind data on the PFD, that the winds on approach were strong challenging gusty crosswinds from the East. After joining final for XYL, my FO struggled with maintaining the LOC course and GP with the gusty dynamic crosswinds. With LOC and GP deviation call outs as PM, my FO did an outstanding job re-establishing proper path and we were able to achieve what we thought was stable criteria. In the time frame of attempting to get better alignment established on final and simultaneously run the landing checklist, I inadvertently missed the final flap 30 selection, and we both missed the flap misconfiguration on the checklist. While we ran the landing checklist, our attention was diverted enough to not note the flaps 25 configuration. Cumulative fatigue from a long flying day with challenging weather contributed to the inadvertent omission. It wasn’t until the GPWS Flaps alert that we noted the misconfiguration. Out of concern for speed due to gusty winds, I selected flaps 30 just as I directed the go-around due to unstable landing criteria. While I normally look at flap configuration at the 500 feet gate as an additional check, the cumulative fatigue and dynamic wind conditions had my attention more focused on monitoring winds and flight path. After having time to reflect on the encounter, the wisdom it has imparted is the absolute importance of an early go-around if conditions are not coming together as planned for an early stable approach. A go-around at 1,000, due to challenges with flight path would have afforded an easier go-around scenario with dynamic gusty winds after 8 hours of cumulative flying for the day.
While we both had no currency issues and had sufficient recent experience, it's undeniable that pairing constructions that culminate in 8-9 hours of block time landing close to midnight on day three of a trip that consisted of two to three legs every day with aircraft swaps only add to fatigue. In this new era of COVID, there are added stresses which only serve to raise the overall underlying level of surge fatigue that exists from operating on the front lines and dealing with constant change. While I take full accountability for my actions and omissions, I have concerns over the impact of future pairing construction given my recent encounters.

With respect to lessons learned, our encounter highlights the importance of an early go-around in dynamic weather conditions when the approach is not coming together as planned. As mentioned in the narrative, it's undeniable that pairing constructions that culminate in 8-9 hours of block time landing close to midnight on day three of a trip that consisted of two to three legs every day with aircraft swaps only add to cumulative fatigue. We are operating in a new normal, and pairing design and construction should consider the added underlying level of fatigue and operational stress that cannot be easily mitigated. Pairings with a 3-2-3 leg-day design with multiple aircraft swaps should be strongly avoided so as to not be conducive to creating conditions ripe for encounters such as the one described above.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a flap misconfiguration leading to an unstabilized approach and go-around.
ACN: 1760864

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760864
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760874

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Captain - PM. FO - PF (First PF leg in nearly 2 months - briefed as a threat during the brief).

Weather conditions - Turbulent air and smoke causing low visibility and low level wind shear up to short final. Reported calm winds on the ground.

ZZZ traffic was moderate and spacing was tight.

ATC had given a clearance of 250 KIAS and a descent to 6,000 feet shortly after departing ZZZZZ on the ZZZZ4 arrival to join up for the ILS for [Runway] XXL.

Inside of 15 DME from ZZZZZ1 ATC clearance was to slow to 170 KIAS and at or above 4,000 feet.

Approaching the 90 degree turn at ZZZZZ1 ATC apologized for the late turn clearance and asked if we could still join the localizer for XXL, in which we responded we thought we could.

Autopilot was engaged as the aircraft was approaching 4,000 feet while the PF turned heading to intercept the inbound course. The clearance was inbound course only yet the PF reached to engage both autopilots and arm approach mode. Instead of engaging the second autopilot the PF inadvertently depressed autopilot 2 button disengaging the autopilot all together. PF announced "autopilot disengaged, I have control." This happened while in the turn and the aircraft was leveling. In the brief confusion of the autopilot disengagement as the crew sought to arm the LOC the PF allowed the aircraft to dip below 4,000 feet. The PM announced the altitude and the PF began to correct. The speed brakes had been out during this time to assist with the 170KIAS request and at this time LS was creeping up. There was a lag in the auto thrust to re-spool the engines for dipping below 4,000 feet so the PF went to TOGA thrust momentarily to initiate the spool up which sequenced the go-around function. Once LS and VS reversal was accomplished the PF moved the thrust levers to idle which disengaged the auto thrust and degrading automation even further. The PF announced that the auto thrust was disengaged. With the initial increase of power the aircraft climbed to roughly 4,500 feet. All this took place in about 10-15 seconds. This created a high level of initial confusion as the PM worked to reload the arrival and approach as well as respond to ATC to further slow to 160 KIAS and cleared ILS XXL. The crew worked together to rebuild the automation, silence the altitude aural warning, and re-engage the autopilot and autothrust systems while configuring the aircraft. All this was completed well before the FAF and even with shifting winds on final the remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful.

Even though there wasn't a deviation from regulations and in fact ATC thanked us for our
"help" with the late intercept clearance and tight spacing there is plenty to learn from here.

Key take-aways:

Fatigue played a factor - prior to departing from ZZZ1 there was a ground delay for roughly 40 minutes while passengers were on the aircraft. Weather departing ZZZ1 continued to play a factor with low level wind shear with thunderstorms in the vicinity. The flight was a 5 hour leg to ZZZ.

Lacking proficiency played a factor - this was the first leg in which the FO was the PF since July.

Responding reactively to ATC's requests which caused the crew to be rushed.

Instinctively degrading automation instead of using automation to reduce work load by the PF. Lack of proficiency in rebuilding the automation by the PM. However, good leadership by the Captain and good CRM by both crew members allowed for a successful outcome and a good learning.

**Narrative: 2**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation and cited fatigue and lack of flying as contributing factors.
I was informed yesterday, by Chief Pilot, that I am expected to fly when I am fatigued, if I expect to be paid. I experienced a fatigue event back on date, during which I didn't feel adequately rested to fly. I was unable to get an appropriate amount of sleep at home due to various issues and was not comfortable trying to fly 4 legs, in and out of 3 different airports, during an XX 1/2 hour duty day, on a little over 2 hours of sleep. Evidently, my XY+ hours in the Captain’s seat is not enough time for me to determine whether or not I'm sufficiently rested enough to fly.
I'm not a "morning person," and I don't typically fly trips that sign-in before XF:00 AM. But, because my original sequence was canceled due to COVID-19, I was assigned a trip that signed in at XC:00 AM. I went to bed early the night before, but awoke after a couple of hours of sleep and was unable to go back to sleep. While getting ready for the trip, I recognized that I was not adequately rested and I called in fatigued at approximately XA:30 AM.

I believe that if the company is going to assign trips, there should be some consideration given to circadian rhythm and preferences of the Pilot being assigned.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported calling in fatigued and being told months later they are expected to fly fatigued.
ACN: 1760818

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 4849
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1760818
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 1100
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1760819
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I am writing this narrative in regards to a possible pilot deviation from earlier today date at ZZZ around XA:45 local time. My ZZZ1 based First Officer (FO) and I (ZZZ2 based Captain) were working Aircraft X to ZZZ3 and were cleared to depart Runway XX L with a climb via the ZZZZZ2. This SID has an initial heading of 356 and a slight right turn to 013 before reaching the first fix of ZZZZZ1. With that said, the event went as follows: we were cleared to takeoff, RNAV to ZZZZZ1, FO executed a standard ALT-To takeoff and rotated at VR. At acceleration altitude, (around 1,400 feet MSL or 800 AGL), I was given a frequency change to departure and we entered IMC 100 feet later at 900 AGL. I switched, but the wrong frequency was programmed in so I went back to my chart to locate the proper one. I also completed the after takeoff flow and noticed a drift to the right of the course. The Departure Controller was talking to another airplane and then started to call our call sign instructing us to fly a heading of north. First Officer was still hand flying and complied. The Controller stated that we were within a few miles of Aircraft Y climbing off Runway XY at ZZZ4. Neither of us got an RA but we did get a TA. The rest of the departure was uneventful and we landed just under an hour later in ZZZ3. My FO was following the flight director. I did verify that the correct runway and SID was programmed in the FMS. I believe FO started to drift and when the flight director made the right turn for the SID FO overreacted not fully realizing we were already to the right of the course. According to the track log, we got to a heading of 085 at 2300 feet MSL (1,600 AGL) before we started correcting back to the north. This entire event lasted under 45 seconds from takeoff.

My FO is trying to complete hours for consolidation, was the pilot flying. FO was hired last year but didn't fly enough to consolidate, plus COVID hit and the base was closed for several months. FO had flown three legs prior in the sequence and FO's flying was up to standards. This was [the] FO's first real encounter with IMC conditions below a couple thousand feet. I think everything was moving faster than FO expected and just started to drift then over shot the turn due to the flight director's abrupt movement.

It's my opinion that FO should really focus on maintaining the directions on the SID and to double check before making turns when hand flying a SID.
Narrative: 2

I was pilot flying, this was the second leg of the day and also my second leg of pilot flying for the day. Everything had been programmed, verified, and confirmed for the ZZZZZ 2 RNAV departure off of Runway XXL. As we were climbing out I knew to expect a right hand turn to 013. Meanwhile, the Captain was heads down programming the Departure Frequency. The profile was flown correctly and as I called for the after takeoff checklist, the flight director started to make the right hand turn, I followed the flight director and then realized that I was going off course to the right and was on a heading of 050 and needed to correct to the left, and as I was going to ask the Captain to verify that I needed to not follow the flight director, ATC called to give us a heading of 360. I immediately complied with that heading and then we received a traffic advisory within 5 miles and 1,000 feet. I believe it was 1,000 feet below. This all happened in a matter of 30 to 45 seconds in Instrument Meteorological Conditions. After the heading of 360 we complied with the next heading of 085 and then direct to a fix. Even after the event we went back to verify, once again, that the correct departure was in with the correct sequencing and courses and it was. I am a low time pilot. I only have XYZ hours in the aircraft and XX hours towards the second round of consolidation at the completion of this day. I was released from IOE on date. I then sat airport standby for almost 2 months straight with little actual flying. I was scheduled for consolidation flying in March and with approximately XX hours in the airframe flew with a crewmember who tested positive for COVID-19. I was then removed from duty to quarantine for 14 days. I was unable to complete consolidation and was sent to recurrent/retraining training in May. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic I did not fly an aircraft again until July. Since then I have just over XX more hours in the airframe and seat.

I believe the cause is lack of flying time, and over reliance on automation. I was flying the flight director but it was giving erroneous readings.

Suggestions for erroneous flight director guidance in simulator scenarios.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported a track heading deviation and cited First Officer's lack of flying as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1760738

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Locale Reference: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Toilet Furnishing
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Lavatory
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1760738
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
ZZZZ-ZZZ 14.40 duty day operated Aircraft X with XXX souls on board with 3 working lavatories. Cockpit informed us we would operate all lavs in order to depart but not have running water in the other lavatories. Captain's decision. Cockpit had 1400 sanitary wipes boarded. FA's not comfortable with non COVID procedures so it was agreed to lock other lavs off and operate only 3 lavs with running water. Please note ZZZZ has increased their COVID protocol due to increased COVID numbers.

Under no circumstance should an aircraft operate without the ability to wash your hands especially on long range flying. As a situation arises during a pandemic, even though a policy has not been updated to reflect COVID procedures, it is imperative a Captain make a decision based on the health and safety of the crew. We had 3 working LAVs. That's not acceptable during COVID. CDC recommends hand washing.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported there were only 3 fully operational lavatories during a long haul flight.
**ACN: 1760736**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202009

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Cabin Lighting: High

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760736
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Pre-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While A [Flight Attendant] was doing her final walk through prior to takeoff, she noticed a child seat behind the exit row. I was C, and could not see the seat from where I was standing in the exit row, and did not notice the passengers placing it during boarding. I was busy greeting passengers as they walked through, and telling people who sat in the exit row that they were seated in the exit row, and verifying they were willing to sit there. One woman was not responding to me, and I realized she could not hear me. She said her ears were blocked from the last landing, and they had not cleared. Since she was unable to hear or respond to my questions, I told her I would have to re-seat her. A gentleman in the exit row loudly said she was sick, and should not be allowed on the plane. I asked her if she was sick, and she said no. She appeared to be congested, which is likely the reason her ears blocked on landing. I had her trade seats with another passenger, briefed the exit row and secured the forward cabin from the exit row forward. When I got to the front, I informed A the exit row was briefed and the forward cabin was secure. I did not hear a PA that the aft cabin was secure. I informed the A that the woman I moved from the exit row could not hear, that she was congested but said she was not sick. The A said she did not appear sick or have any COVID symptoms when she boarded. I said congestion could be a COVID symptom, and A seemed surprised, and said she never heard that. By then operations was in front with us, and he and A said all I was required to do was ask if they are sick, and if the response is no, then we leave it alone. I did not know if the passenger had allergies, a cold, or something more serious.

The A was doing her final walk through prior to takeoff, and noticed a child seat directly behind the exit row. Someone notified the Captain, and A and D quickly had passengers change rows. The captain rang, I answered, and he asked if they were finished. I said I was C in front, and they were not quite done. He asked to be notified, and a few seconds later I let him know the exchange was complete.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger that sat in the exit row had hearing problems and was displaying symptoms of possibly being sick.
ACN: 1760679

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760679
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
19.6 mile final switched to Tower cleared on visual approach. Tower Controller was working both Ground and Tower on same frequency. She was giving clearances to taxi to entire bank. Controlling approaches and takeoffs and all the ground traffic. When there is a light load. It is distracting. When the Ground push with all the readbacks and Controller directions during a bank push this is very unsafe for the pilots flying the aircraft. Unsafe unsafe unsafe! I wanted to turn off the Tower frequency.

Controller working multiple frequencies.

Make Controller only work the Tower frequency. Flying pilots should not hear Ground Clearances on the Tower frequency.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier pilot reported being distracted by the Tower Controller working Ground and Local Control.
ACN: 1760619

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 15
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10500

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 14500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 30
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1800
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760619
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight  
Result: Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

We planned to depart ZZZ VFR before the Tower opened and pick up our IFR clearance from ZZZ Center airborne. The Tower opened as we approached the runway. We received our clearance on the ground. I overshot my cleared altitude (10,000 feet MSL) while rolling out on course. No traffic nearby.

Extremely early departure, very limited recent flying due to pandemic, very limited recent night operations.

**Synopsis**

Corporate pilot reported overshooting assigned altitude on departure.
**ACN: 1760614**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202009
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 9
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Haze / Smoke
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1366
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 22
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 871
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760614
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
During a personal flight, I observed smoke associated with a fire, and lots of aerial traffic swarming around that area, according to ADS-B. The location of the fire was approximately X NM NW of ZZZ1, while I was flying a line between ZZZ and ZZZ1. My EFB software was not showing a TFR in this location, but did show other TFR’s. The activity suggested there was a TFR, so I adjusted my position to be further east. Checking the FAA TFR site on my phone upon landing ZZZ1 showed there was a TFR created since my preflight briefing at home, but before entering the area in the flight. I believe I remained clear, but very close.

Contributing factors:
TFR was created in that window of time between briefing and flight. In-flight data is relied on for these updates, but the TFR did not post in time. ATC has been difficult to get flight following since Pandemic made them busier, so I stopped trying for short flights.

Discovery was recognizing the situation, and corrective action was making room for fire fighting.

Synopsis
Pilot reported flying nearby an area of smoke and was unable to find an associated TFR. After the flight, pilot confirmed a TFR was active but did not post in time on EFB software.
ACN: 1760562

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760562
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I had felt since my trip on beginning of month that the spraying being done in ZZZ was not being done as it was supposed to be due to the lack of smell and wetness that is left at all other stations. On (date) we were advised spraying had been done on aircraft and that he had done it prior to our boarding as the stairs were down next turn in ZZZ the overhead bins were closed when we boarded, so they apparently were not sprayed as they were dry but they told the Supervisor it was and we were told to board. We had been at gate the whole time and aircraft had been secured with stairs up.

Today the FO and I were on aircraft when sprayer showed up to spray we observed him spray at first bins on only one side then it was a spray here and spray there missing most bins. We got off aircraft as he got closer to us. I was in jetbridge for flight before due to mask issue and overheard the FO ask the sprayer about the spray process and the sprayer insisted he did every bin. The FO walked back on the aircraft with the sprayer and checked overhead bins where some were wet and most dry. The sprayer at that time resprayed correctly. We then notified via company that tables had not been cleaned by anyone, however they had left the clean checklist which was actually put in jetbridge and signed off on before anyone had done anything on aircraft. 3 people were sent back to clean trays tables. One female went through cabin putting trays down in aisles. A male showed up with what appeared to be a wet rag and another females showed up with a wipe as well. I was finishing up that I mentioned earlier and when the cleaners got off the other FA came up and told me she watched them wipe the aisle trays but never lowered the trays in window seats and clean them. I checked a few trays and there was food and dirt still on some trays.

As I am discussing this with pilots and we send another message via company the gate agent comes down and tells us to write a report on it and board. Instead we requested cleaners to come back as the cabin was not up to airlines standards and did not reflect what we tell passengers in our announcements. A supervisor showed up asked what happened we told him and showed him a couple of the tray tables. He left came back and cleaned them himself. All of this caused us to be delayed 30 mins which would never would have happened if they had just cleaned the airplane properly the first time.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported cleaners did not sanitize the aircraft per company standards/policy.
ACN: 1760561

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760561
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passengers in XX1 and XY2 boarded the aircraft in ZZZ wearing neck/face masks. They removed those during flight and put on white mask with a filter valve that had hose connected to it and the other end connected a powered air filter that hung around their necks. When I talked with both of them I advised them they could not use the air filter or a mask with a valve. He began to argue that he called reservations and was told it was fine. He then demanded for me to show him where it said that. I pulled up the face mask information with no valves he took picture of page. At that point passenger took her mask off and replaced it with the neck/face mask she wore on boarding but he did not. When he was ready to deplane he changed mask he was wearing back to the neck/face mask he had originally worn as he boarded.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported passengers wearing non-approved face masks.
**ACN: 1760560**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202009
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Cabin Activity: Deplaning
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760560
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**
I noticed inbound to ZZZ that for the outbound back to ZZZ1 we were scheduled to have a blind passenger. Inbound we had an aisle chair and 2 unaccompanied minors. Immediately
upon arrival into ZZZ, the agent opened the door and walked away. We had no paperwork for the return flight and the time period after that was plagued with over tasks, issue laden, behind schedule and a myriad of other issues. Cabin cleaners literally swarmed the aircraft. We had the inbound aisle passenger in first class that eventually needed to be taken off the aircraft and her family was up and about the cabin trying to retrieve her items while deplaning was commencing, one row at a time due to COVID procedures. The cabin cleaners were crowding me in the galley and one had entered the lav to clean. More were trying to get on the aircraft to clean while passengers were continuously deplaning due to the row by row deplaning. The cabin cleaners were so aggressive that the FO eventually halted them from entering the aircraft and would not let the one in the lav enter the cabin. The aisle chair assists were also in the aisle talking to the passengers (without the aisle chair) during deplaning. It was total chaos.

After the passengers were all off, the assists came on to get the aisle chair passenger and I had 2 unaccompanied minors to take to the terminal. There were no assists to take the unaccompanied minors since they were terminating. I had to wait. When I got back from taking the unaccompanied minors out, the cleaners were finishing up. We were already running behind schedule and the agents were buying passengers off the flight. By this time, I had forgotten that I had looked ahead and noticed the blind passenger for the flight home. The blind passenger was not pre-boarded, which further contributed to my lack of remembrance. The pre-boarding of special assist passenger is the best cue and reminder for required briefings. This did not occur for this passenger on this flight. She boarded with regular boarding with her traveling companion.

Boarding was further complicated by the over sales and the volunteers being seated at the last minute, one by one. The agents had to come onto the aircraft several times for seat counts. We had oversized baggage in the last row which needed to be checked also. I was trying to get the baggage up to the front to be checked while the agents were counting seats and the aisle was not clogged. I had called the FA in the back to send up the bags but he was dealing with seat dupes. I called a second time to get the bags up before the last few people were put on the aircraft. I finally had to make a PA for the passenger to bring the bags to the front of the aircraft. The agent was in the last row dealing with seat dupes; apparently the entire row was duped up. I finally got the 2 bags up from the front. Previous to this I had to obtain, in advance for the agent, the final destination of the passenger bag. Another agent came on to do another seat count while the one was dealing with the seat dupes. Four or 5 more passengers were boarded. Then there was another issue with whether or not a blocked seat near a FA jumpseat could be used. Needless to say, there was much over tasking and task overload by FAs AND agents.

During taxi out I remembered and called all the other FAs to alert and tell them we needed to get the briefing done after we got in the air as we were getting ready to take off. Again, there were issues after takeoff, several call lights and other needs which caused me to forget again. It was about 45 minutes prior to landing that I remembered and asked the other FAs if any of them had briefed her as she was sitting in row 22 and I had alerted them right before takeoff. None of them had briefed her so I immediately went to brief her. I apologized. I asked if she traveled frequently and she said yes. She was traveling with another person. I apologized again and told her I should have already briefed her but she did not pre-board and I had missed it. She said she did not pre-board as she must not have been in the gate area at the time. I briefed her and apologized again and mentioned the heavy task load which was no excuse.

Honestly I don't know if this could have been prevented yesterday. It was the most chaotic day I've had at work in ages. One of the biggest distractions was the action of the cabin
cleaners. Although I understand why the policy exists for them to enter the aircraft ASAP. I'm not joking when I say they literally swarmed the aircraft yesterday. There were so many other issues at play yesterday that it was a perfect storm. They were relentless until the FO stepped in and kept them from entering the aircraft. There was lot going on in first class with the aisle passenger and her family and the cleaners swarming the area and the galley made it worse. It was crazy. I pride myself of doing the best I can and accomplished these required briefings in a timely and professional manner. I don't like that I missed this one, and that the accountability of the rest of my crew failed also. That's just how unreal and crazy yesterday was. In the end, the briefing was done.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported failing to conduct a required briefing after many distractions during deplaning/boarding including cleaners entering while passengers were deplaning.
ACN: 1760544

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ
Cabin Lighting: High

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760544
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I am reporting this due to minimum crew onboard. During the boarding process from ZZZ-ZZZ1, I noticed that a passenger in the jetway was not wearing a face covering. When she entered the aircraft, at the forward entry, I politely asked the passenger if she had a face covering or a mask and if so, I kindly asked her to put it on. She shook her head and said "Whatever." I politely informed her of policy concerning wearing a face covering throughout her journey and offered her a complimentary mask. She appeared to be searching for her personal mask in her purse and refused a complimentary mask and walked away.

After the boarding process was totally complete, the Ops Agent confirmed with me that all of the passengers were onboard.

I proceeded to make the All Passengers Onboard PA. Afterward, I closed a few forward overhead bins a concerned passenger informed me that when she went to the aft lavatory, the passenger who came onboard without a face covering had taken it off. I thanked the concerned passenger and reminded her that the mask can be briefly removed for eating or taking medicine and also, thanked her for bringing it to my attention.

Because, it was brought to my attention. I proceeded to address the passenger who boarded without a face covering and noticed once again that she was not complying and was not wearing a face covering. I politely approached her and kindly asked her to comply with airline policy and to put on her mask. Before, I could say anything else she immediately interrupted me and her tone of voice became aggressive toward me. In her aggressive tone of voice, she said: "What! You got a problem with me." I said no ma'am and quietly walked away.

Because, she was not wearing a mask and her tone of voice elevated and she became aggressive. I did not want any potential traveling droplets to make contact with my eyes. Therefore, I quietly walked away.

At this point, we were still at the gate and I knew I only had a short window to have the non-complaint passenger addressed concerning her not wearing a face covering.

Therefore, I went to inform the Captain but he was in the lavatory. Also, I knew the Ops Agent had confirmed with me that boarding was complete. Then, I asked the C-Flight Attendant to stand at the forward entry, so, I could notify the Ops Agent for the appropriate Ground Operations or Supervisor to address the non-complaint passenger then I returned back to the aircraft.

When the Ground Operations or Supervisor(s) arrived, I remained in the forward entry while they talked to the non-complaint passenger. I am not sure what she told them or what they said to her, but she and someone traveling with her were escorted off the aircraft. After, they deplaned. The Ops Agent said goodbye and closed the door.

With the world-wide spread of the coronavirus that could potentially spread through respiratory droplets, from person-to-person. In my mind, I was thinking this is a precaution COVID concern for the health and safety of the wellbeing of every passenger and crew member onboard and the best time to address policy is before we pushed back or have to return back to the gate because of a non-compliant passenger who was not
wearing a face covering. The Captain was in the lavatory, the boarding process was totally complete and confirmed by the Ops Agent that the last person had boarded the aircraft. I had made the All Passengers Onboard PA. The concerned passenger was watching me after I spoke to the non-complaint passenger to see what I was going to do about the issue. I wanted to be proactive and take precaution, before closing the forward entry door, or possibly having to return back to the gate with a potentially bigger problem. The forward exits were monitored by Flight Attendant C. The aft exits were monitored by Flight Attendant B. When I returned back to the aircraft both Flight Attendants were visible to the passengers.

In closing, for the safety, health, and wellbeing of all of our passengers, the crew, and myself, I am committed to upholding airline policy and value every customer, their concerns, their health, their safety, their wellbeing, their business, and their flight experience when they board our aircraft.

I believe it would be helpful if someone from ground operations could be visually within reach, for at least the last ten minutes before departure, to address or assist with any matter that may occur onboard or during the remaining minutes before departure time.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was removed due to non-compliance with face mask policy.
Narrative: 1

Me and the C Flight Attendant were in the forward cabin just talking when a customer brought to the C Flight Attendant attention that a customer did not have his mask on. I
personally did not interact with the customer. The C just turned around and said that he was sleeping and that was that. I made PA during the flight reminding passengers of our mask policy. I would make the PA if passengers were sleeping as a way to not single people out.

Talk to all crew members so everyone is together on the mask policy so one person is not more easy going than the other and not making one flight attendant look bad for being scene as "the mask police".

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy.
ACN: 1760536

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Cabin Lighting: High

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Door Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1760536
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
When we landed on ZZZ I talked with operations about working together on these bag issues and masks. More details outlined below of what was said below and suggestions.

Flight XX ZZZ-ZZZ1 a very large number of passengers were coming on board not wearing masks (pulled down around neck or not covering nose). I had to stop boarding and address the situation and met with hostility. In their seats I had to address it again. Prior to takeoff I had to have operations come down and address it. The worst offender had an altercation even then. Operations Person X did stand her ground. I had said I want them removed. One of the people traveling said he was the older relative and would take accountability for them. I looked at her we decided to go; it was time to push. It wasn't until she was closing the door that I got the full story of what transpired up top prior to them coming down. It all has to stop.

When I checked in for this 3 day...as I walked through ZZZ Airport 2 TSA agents just sitting on a bench no mask! yep! I see police with mask below their noses. These people won't enforce the rules. ZZZ1 is a code red COVID.

I cannot fully do my job and protect passengers nor ourselves unless management steps it up, please...asking for help. We carry people with all types of health issues. The other day Passenger X had to have his COVID test then start his treatments. Only to have a few rows back of them a 2 year old with a non-compliant parent screaming and kicking back of its seat if the mom even held up the mask.

Other thing I had this 3 day [were] pilots not even knowing 2 year olds had to wear a mask. Or the no medical conditions preclude wearing a mask. In the last 14 days I actually worked, only 4 cockpit crews wore mask properly.

We have great policies in place; however lack of execution has got to change. Passengers notice when our promise isn't fulfilled and employees don't feel safe. Staff have been fabulous about putting out what is expected. Follow-through isn't there from whomever/departments that are tasked to do just that. 1st and [foremost] IF OPS HAS TROUBLE WITH A PAX/PAXS tell us prior to them coming down. If masks are off again...which they usually are then they don't board. That would have made not only this flight but many others go so much better. Passengers appreciate it when they see us enforce policies. The ones I have to address are the ones ALL THROUGH a FLIGHT I have to continually ask to place mask back on. (I'm not talking about just slipping off the nose). Ground (customer service and operations) must monitor gate area and have passengers comply with mask upon entering the area. If a child refuses to place mask on this is when denying boarding must be made. They do not keep them on in the aircraft either. Listen to the parent if they say child won't wear one. They know that child better than we do. Every single one we had trouble with said that. Passengers know when they buy that ticket that their child won't comply and will get away with it. Start fining passengers and employees for non-compliance. It is hard when I work with FAs not agreeing and not enforcing the policy. More don't than do. Please go back to having unannounced check rides. Our passengers are too precious of a commodity to not be protected or have FA's sit and not at least go through the cabin and pick up trash. Some don't get up at all. So much it breaks my heart. Our passengers are everything to me. I love it when I do get a crew. Pilots need to be checked. Personal opinions need to stay out of carrying out policies and procedures especially with this Pandemic. They need to wear a mask if visible in the cockpit during boarding when passengers can see them. WE HAVE DUTIES TOO THAT MAKE WEARING MASKS DIFFICULT. They could be removed briefly while doing a preflight check then put it back on. This is causing a lot of trouble with blow back while trying to enforce mask rule.
Pilots are revered as should be; it took a lot to get to their position. But don't let that put another work group at a disadvantage. It shows that our safety promise is all for air.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported observing multiple events of non-compliance with face mask wearing among passengers and crew members, and cited a lack of policy enforcement as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1760463

Time / Day
- Date: 202009
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
- Locale Reference, ATC Facility: N90.TRACON
- State Reference: NY
- Altitude, MSL, Single Value: 8000

Environment
- Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory, TRACON: N90
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Airspace, Class B: EWR

Person: 1
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function, Flight Crew: Captain
- Function, Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1760463
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
  Communication Breakdown, Party 1: Flight Crew
  Communication Breakdown, Party 2: ATC

Person: 2
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function, Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function, Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Narrative: 1

At 8,000 feet, we were issued a 040 heading by Newark approach. After a few minutes on this heading, we received a Traffic Advisory on TCAS showing the traffic at our altitude 5 miles away at our twelve o'clock position. Both of us started to scan visually for the traffic and I asked the pilot monitoring to query the Controller. The Controller was so busy issuing instructions to other aircraft and not leaving any time for us to call him without stepping all over other transmissions. As the traffic approached 3 miles away, we received a Resolution Advisory at the exact same time that the Controller called us and issued us a descent to 4,000 feet. I disconnected the autopilot and started an immediate descent to 4,000 feet complying with the RA and the approach controller's instruction. During the descent, we acquired the traffic visually and estimate we were about 1-2 miles away and about 500 feet below and descending away from the traffic. Since the controller's clearance coincided with the Resolution Advisory there was no altitude deviation. As we leveled at 4,000 feet, we informed the Controller that we responded to an RA during our descent.

Approach Controller issued us a vector off the arrival but not a descent. He was working too many aircraft, forgot about us on a heading at 8,000 feet and issued us our descent instructions from 8,000 feet to 4,000 feet too late to avoid a TA and RA.

The Newark Approach Controller seemed extremely busy working all the aircraft in this area until handoffs to Newark Tower. Normally we are handed off to another Controller before Newark Tower. We had a hard time checking in with him during the handoff from Washington Center as well as when we needed to query him about the traffic advisory. He was leaving no time between transmissions to let other aircraft transmit. I believe his area
of responsibility and all the aircraft he was working led to task saturation and he forgot about us on a 040 heading and at co altitude 8,000 feet with the approaching airplane. His descent instructions were probably about one to two miles late and this lead to the TA and RA event. I think this would have been prevented if this Controller was not working such a large area and volume of airplanes.

**Narrative: 2**

Talking to Newark Approach Control [Actually N90], we were on an assigned heading of 040 deg at 8,000 feet. We got a traffic alert and saw that there was a target at our altitude just inside the 5 mile ring. I tried to query ATC, but he was so busy that I couldn't contact him. The next three things seemed to have happened almost simultaneously. We got an RA starting monitor vertical speed, we saw the traffic, and ATC issued a descent to 4,000 feet. The Captain turned off the autopilot and began a descent. We estimate that we were 1-2 miles away from the traffic with about 500 feet of vertical separation. It took me a while again to get a chance to notify ATC of the RA because he was so busy.

I believe that the workload of the Controller was too high. Not only was he working too many aircraft, but the frequency was so congested that it was extremely difficult to initiate communication with him. I understand that the NY area airspace is extremely busy, but this seemed worse than other times that I have flown up there.

I know that lately controllers have been working multiple sectors due to low traffic volume. If that is the case in this instance, it is my opinion that the volume was too high for one controller to manage safely.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an RA inbound to Newark and cited Controller workload as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1760452

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760452
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
At the gate, just prior to pushback, a Flight Attendant came up and informed me that she had a passenger who was "non-compliant" in regards to face mask usage. She informed
me that three flight attendants had already spoken to this passenger and he still refused to comply. I called for a Customer Service Manager to remove the passenger. The Manager arrived a few minutes later and the passenger was removed.

Some people view face mask usage as some sort of infringement on their personal rights. The airline has made it very clear that using a face mask is a requirement.

I think the airline has done an admirable job in communicating the mask usage policy. Gate agents, flight attendants, and the Captain all make announcements regarding this requirement. People will always want to test the limits. I feel removal is the right move, and sends a message that the policy will be enforced as much as possible.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier pilot reported a passenger was removed due to non-compliance with face mask policy.
ACN: 1760437

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude MSL Single Value: 1000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function Flight Crew: First Officer
Function Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number Accession Number: 1760437
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly Deviation Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly Deviation Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly Deviation Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly Inflight Event Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result Flight Crew: Executed Go Around Missed Approach
Result Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

CA was Pilot Monitoring (PM) and FO was Pilot Flying (PF). As PF prior to descent into ZZZ [Airport], reviewed ZZZZZ 4, NOTAMs, and ATIS for expected RNAV GPS Y XXL. ZZZ Center cleared descend via ZZZZZ 4. Handoff to ZZZ Approach modified ZZZZZ 4 descent to 6,000 feet instead of 4,000 feet. While enroute to terminating fix ZZZZZ2, redirected to ZZZZZ1 while maintaining 6,000 feet instead of lower altitude. Also, no type of approach was assigned yet. Please note ZZZZZ2 was not on approach plate RNAV Y GPS XXL. Since an unfamiliar identifier and location of ZZZZZ2 was given, utilized FMS waypoints for situational awareness. Discovered ZZZZZ2 was only 5 miles away while still at 6,000 feet instead of 3,100 feet. Proceeded LNAV direct ZZZZZ2 then subsequently cleared ILS XXL while still very high. Also, haze prevented additional situational awareness to closing distance to ZZZ. PM reset FMS approach, DA, NAVAIDs, and briefed approach. PF initiated descent, disconnected autopilot, and started landing configuration. However, very late type of approach assignment (different than ATIS expected approach approach) and unusually high altitude (6,000 feet instead of 3,100 feet) prior to GS intercept made it impossible to achieve full landing configuration by 1,000 feet. Initiated go-around and told to maintain runway heading to 3,000 feet then 5,000 feet. Cleaned up aircraft maintaining runway heading. During climb, ATC directed 120 heading climb to 5,000 feet. PM repeated 120 heading and altitude without turn direction. ATC did not correct read back with missing turn direction. ATC did not correct read back with missing turn direction. Based on current aircraft heading, initiated shortest direction left hand turn to 120 heading. During turn, ATC asked for steeper turn and PF increased bank to 30 degrees. New vector given to 090 and further climb to 6,000 feet. Subsequently received vectors for ILS XXL. Nominal approach and landing ILS XXL. Normal gate arrival and shutdown.

First, entire approach sequence must be considered in conjunction with the go-around event and subsequent climbout instructions. Second, this was the first flight after 4 months of leave for the PF and into an unfamiliar domestic destination. ZZZZZ 4 STAR was normal until approaching STAR terminating fix of ZZZZZ2. Third, directed to maintain higher than normal 6,000 feet instead of 4,000 feet. Fourth, upon reaching ZZZZZ2, approach directed to proceed to ZZZZZ1 without stating type of approach. Fifth, unfamiliar with newly assigned fix ZZZZZ1 which could not be found on ATIS expected approach of RNAV GPS Y XXL. Sixth, while at unusually high altitude, given approach clearance to ILS XXL. Seventh, higher than normal approach altitude (6,000 feet instead of 3,100 feet at ZZZZZ1) made it impossible to meet approach and landing configuration requirements. Eighth, during go-around, a possible partially blocked radio call from ATC provided only heading 120 and 3,000 feet. Ninth, PM provided read back of heading and altitude but ATC did not correct read back with missing turn direction. Tenth, based on current aircraft heading, turned shortest direction to assigned heading of 120. Eleventh, a partial turn instead of a 180 degree turn would help ensure proper turn direction. Twelfth, PF and PM were not aware of deviation until call to ATC.

ATC should assign type of approach upon initial contact. ATC should avoid approach clearances different than ATIS expected approach clearances close to FAF. ATC should provide adequate time and distance for descents to better able air crews to become properly established on approach. Please note ATC required 6,000 feet instead of 3,100 feet approaching ZZZZZZ1 making it impossible to comply with approach and landing.
configuration requirements. Fourth, ATC should correct read backs of missing turn direction when required. Fifth, provide partial turns instead of 180 degrees to ensure proper turn direction.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around.
ACN: 1760411

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Gate Agent / CSR
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760411
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Gate Agent / CSR
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Since the removal of the baggage handlers from the ticket counter the agents are picking up all of the checked baggage. Granted, the number is much reduced from the pre-COVID days, but to go from lifting 5-10 bags per shift to over 100 is an OJI [On The Job Injury] waiting to happen. I understand it is part of the job, but I have suggested several times that we attempt to rotate the employees to share the lifting and minimize the injury risk, but it has mostly fallen on deaf ears. I believe this is a legitimate safety risk and I don't want to see anyone injured if it is preventable.

Synopsis
Customer Service Agent reported that agents are doing baggage handling during the COVID-19 pandemic and may get hurt lifting so many bags per shift.
ACN: 1760403

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Work Environment Factor: Temperature - Extreme

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 16700
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 40
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 3777
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1760403
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.General: Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Gate

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
In the blocks the right pack tripped twice. Both times we submitted an ELB [Electronic Log Book] entry and maintenance was able to get it to reset after a fairly long cool down period. They felt it was the excessive heat in ZZZ and that it would operate normally on engine air. During taxi out with both engines running, we noticed an approximately 1% difference in FMC N1 limit values with the right side being higher, but no warning lights illuminated. This coupled with the flight attendants calling to report no airflow and excessive heat in the rear of the aircraft made it clear that there was a much bigger cooling issue. We tried various configurations to cool the rear of the airplane to no avail. As passengers were beginning to get up and express their discomfort we advised ground and ramp that we needed a gate return and that it was too hot to trouble shoot away from the gate. Maintenance later determined the problem to be the air cooling machine. Maintenance wanted to defer the pack inop. Dispatch refused a deferral due to the incredibly hot temperature in ZZZ. I fully agreed with the refusal due to our inability to keep the rear of the aircraft cool on initial taxi and COVID air flow concerns. A spare was found and the flight continued to destination. Flight was fully debriefed.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported an air cooling machine issue during taxi out resulting in excessive heat in the rear of the aircraft and a return to gate. Maintenance reportedly wanted to defer the issue, but the crew and Dispatch decided against it and opted for an aircraft swap.
ACN: 1760374

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760374
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Descending on the ZZZZZ 3 Arrival, in FMC level automation both laterally and vertically, we received a clearance to descend and maintain 5,000 feet. The PF set 5,000 feet in the altitude selector window, and the PM confirmed it. However, the PF did not press Altitude Intervention, and the PM did not verify that it had been selected. Therefore, the 9,000 feet crossing restriction at ZZZZZ1 remained in the FMC, and the aircraft leveled at 9,000 feet. ATC trapped the error, and we continued our descent to 5,000 feet and landed at ZZZ uneventfully.

The PM had not flown in almost three weeks and was admittedly a little "rusty." Flying regularly maintains proficiency with skill sets. This was the first leg of the trip and the PM and PF had never flown together before. The PF displayed very good attention to detail which may have contributed to the PM's lack of alertness and not challenging the PF when Altitude Intervention was not utilized to erase the 9,000 feet crossing restriction at ZZZZZ1. The PM must continually be asking his or herself "What actions would I take to ensure the aircraft does what I want it to do?" even when the PF is demonstrating a high level of proficiency. Another technique that would have ensured the aircraft's descent all the way to 5,000 feet would have been to utilize MCP level automation such as Level Change or Vertical Speed.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported not making the second crossing restriction on arrival.
ACN: 1760348

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 125
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 9750
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760348

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

During boarding, flight attendants noticed four passengers that were being loud and disruptive and using foul language. There was discussion on the possibility of some of those in that group being intoxicated. Ground Supervisor was notified and came to address the situation. He elected to remove one of the passengers in that group. The determination was made between the crew to continue with the other Customers in that group.

Approximately 30 minutes before arrival in ZZZ1 the in-flight crew called the cockpit to request another Ground Supervisor meet the aircraft due to those remaining three individuals in that group refused to comply with putting their masks over their nose and mouth. Dispatch was not notified at the time due to task loading during the descent and coordinating with Ground Ops and the usual business during the descent/landing phase of flight. After helping ensure the situation was being resolved upon arrival, I neglected to contact Dispatch.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported a group of passengers appeared to be intoxicated during boarding. One of the passengers was removed from the flight, the others were reportedly not compliant with face mask policy during the flight.
ACN: 1760308

Time / Day
Date : 202009
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility : Turbulence
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility : 10
Light : Night
Ceiling.Single Value : 8000

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.TFR : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 11
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 280
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1760308
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1
I was level at 2,500 MSL along ZZZ1 X route northbound under ZZZ Class B airspace. Light haze, light to moderate turbulence and a strong 30 kt crosswind from about 220. I have flown this route several times. ZZZ Controllers kept me out of B airspace which begins at 3,000 MSL as they always do. After crossing XYZ I noticed bright lights of sporting field and thought about a possible TFR. I had ForeFlight running on my iPad but had accidentally disabled TFR layer. I switched on the TFR layer and found that I was in the middle of the airspace. I decided to remain on present heading noting that the sporting event was completely empty due to COVID-19, not wanting to turn out to a large area of inland water, and realizing that I would clear the TFR in less than a minute on heading. ZZZ Controllers with whom I was in constant contact did not advise of TFR nor did they seem to notice that I’d busted the airspace.

I should have been more thorough on the flight briefing. Obviously I did not consider possible TFRs in my planning. Originally I had planned on flying around Class B to the west but the winds aloft were quite strong and I realized minutes before departing that I could take the X route and cut 10-15 minutes off my enroute time. Additionally I had passengers aboard whom I thought would (and did) appreciate the scenic view of the X route at night. This caused me to change my route at the last minute. I had flown this route several times so I felt comfortable which led to some degree of complacency and corner cutting in my planning. I’m well aware that sporting events are common drivers of TFRs and I know about and have considered in the past TFRs in the area.

Synopsis
Pilot reported violating a sporting event TFR during the COVID-19 pandemic.
This report is in response to the FAA’s request for the general aviation community to submit reports about any COVID-19 related challenges to flying safely. The response of flight schools and CFI's to the pandemic situation has varied with individual states, flight schools, and instructors. Some have taken the risk seriously and applied risk management/risk mitigation actions such as disinfecting aircraft high-touch surfaces and requiring everyone to wear masks when flying. Others have proceeded with "business as usual" with little or no actions to address the COVID situation. While economic factors are strong and important, you can keep a flight school open and take reasonable actions to address the COVID risk to students, instructors, and staff. The two are not mutually exclusive. My own local flight school falls in the "business as usual" category as wearing a mask during flight is "too inconvenient." If you don't like the policy, you can fly elsewhere. This attitude is problematic for several reasons: a) flying with a mask is a minor inconvenience but does not typically interfere with communications or instruction on a typical GA flight so the benefit outweighs the cost; b) it sends the message that not every client is valued and the business is willing to cut you lose if you have a legitimate health concern; and c) it sends the wrong message about ADM [Aeronautical Decision Making] and risk management. CFI's deal with risks and risk management on every flight. COVID-19 is just a new risk to deal with that could impact crew health and safety. Why should
this risk be treated differently than other risks such as inadequate fuel or poor weather? Analyze and mitigate the risk! Those who don't take this risk seriously may not take other risks seriously either. Sounds like the hazardous attitudes of Anti-Authority and Invulnerability. Aviation and aeronautics are based on science. When you exceed the critical angle of attack, the wing stalls whether you believe it will or not. COVID-19 is also based on science, and simple risk mitigation steps are appropriate to help keep everyone safe and flying!

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported concerns with some flight schools not requiring face mask to be worn during flights.
ACN: 1760296

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 850
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 16
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 850
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760296
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I took off in Aircraft X with lighter than normal weight due to COVID...no passengers. It was just me and about 1/3 tank of fuel. The plane climbed much faster than I am used to. Typically, I fly at gross with fuel and passengers. On initial climbout I may have ever so slightly clipped ZZZ airspace. I was with ATC, and given the "own nav" instruction. I took that to mean I could continue my climb. However, that climb may have been just a little too fast. In the future, I need to be more careful when climbing when I'm significantly below gross.

Synopsis
Pilot reported an airspace violation due to a fast climbing, lighter than usual aircraft.
ACN: 1760237

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 5
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements/Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 12000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1200
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 1
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760237
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
**Events**

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR  
Detector.Person : Flight Crew  
When Detected : In-flight  
Result.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Performed an intercom check on the ground, between myself and passenger, which was satisfactory. Departed on an introductory training flight as the instructor. It was my second flight using a mask required by our flight school's new COVID-19 related policies and procedures. The route of flight was to be per my normal introductory flight. Turned south towards ZZZ after above a safe altitude. Experienced difficulty communicating with the passenger as my mask was interfering with my microphone. I repositioned my headset's microphone from the outside to the inside of the mask which resolved the communication problem. At this point I identified the road which runs tangentially to the northern edge of the lateral boundary of ZZZ's Class D airspace. After initiating my usual turn to the West to avoid the Class D airspace, I realized that I had mistakenly used the wrong road which was 1 mile south of the correct road and I was now in ZZZ's Class D airspace. I continued turn to a northerly heading in order to exit the airspace and then continued on the introductory flight's route as usual.

I was momentarily distracted and failed to maintain situational awareness. As a result, I entered Class D airspace before establishing radio contact. Once the airplane began to turn, the error was apparent and immediately corrected. I should have prioritized tasks and addressed the intercom problem after ensuring correct navigation and situational awareness.

**Synopsis**

Flight instructor reported difficulty talking to passenger while wearing a face mask and had an airspace violation while attempting to fix the communication issue.
ACN: 1760218

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 50
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 16000

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility: Haze / Smoke
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 3
Ceiling.Single Value: 900

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 19000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 30
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760218
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party1 : Flight Crew  
Communication Breakdown. Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly. ATC Issue : All Types  
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy  
Detector. Person : Flight Crew  
When Detected : In-flight  
Result. Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Primary Problem : Staffing

Narrative: 1

On a recent IFR flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ we encountered very poor service from Approach Control facility. We were descending from FL380 anticipating radar vectors for the ILS Runway XXL at ZZZ. We were handed over to Approach from Center and experienced a challenging time trying to establish and maintain VHF communications with Approach. We had to request a descent numerous times during the arrival phase of our flight. Approach was managing a huge area of airspace with numerous aircraft and firefighting aircraft all trying to accomplish their particular mission. By the time I arrived at ZZZZZ Intersection of the ILS approach to Runway XXL at ZZZ I was still at 8,000 feet MSL and still trying to continue the descent. The Controller was just too busy to accommodate or even acknowledge our requests for descent. Since the advent of the COVID virus service from ATC has not been very good. I'm not trying to place blame on any individual controllers rather I'm trying to highlight the need for more ATC Staff. Operating shorthanded is dangerous. Please make it known that our air traffic control system is currently hobbled and I don't feel confident with their service right now.

Synopsis

Pilot reported ATC being too busy to communicate with them while attempting to request a clearance to descend.
ACN: 1760152

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 3
Ceiling. Single Value: 800

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 23000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 135
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1760152
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected. Other
Result. General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Logbook Entry
Primary Problem : Logbook Entry

Narrative: 1

I work for a Part 121 Airline and I'm kept current through them, but instead of six month check rides because of AQP we now do check rides over 9 months. So I keep a log to record approaches so I'm current for General Aviation. My friends who work for the airline tell me I'm always current as long as I work for the airline. I use a electronic logbook but my phone broke in March because of COVID all the apple stores where closed and I did not get it repaired until May. So I was not able to record my approaches. With the reduced schedules at work and my phone being broke I can't verify I have enough approaches to be current I talked it over with several people and they said I was current because of the airline requirements.

Which makes sense that if I can go fly an airliner I should be able to fly Part 91. Which in most cases is less restrictive. But I filed IFR flight on date. Afterwards I tried to find where I was still legal for Part 91 and could not find it. So on the date I got an IPC. To make sure I was legal in the future. But I might not have been current the day before.

Synopsis
Part 121 pilot reported not being sure if he was current to fly a Part 91 flight.
**ACN: 1760111**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202009
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Deplaning
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760111
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected.Other
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Upon deplaning in ZZZ the cleaners barged their way on board before any passengers had even deplaned. Crowding the galley and the First Class area. This is not safe for social
distancing purposes and disrupts the entire deplaning process. I explained they needed to wait for passengers to get off and the cleaners became very combative saying that they were following their protocol. The cleaner took off his mask to reprimand the D Flight Attendant after I pointed out their actions weren't safe. Furthermore, we have an hour and a half on the ground so such haste is not necessary. The practice of cleaners barging onboard and swimming upstream during deplaning is not safe and makes it even more impossible to socially distance. Cleaners in ZZZ need to be reminded to give passengers space upon deplaning. The practice of coming onboard immediately after the L1 door opens needs to be stopped. Cleaners should also be reminded to leave their masks on when interacting with flight attendants.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported that cleaners were barging onboard and "swimming" upstream while passengers were trying to deplane.
ACN: 1760105

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760105
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party 1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party 2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy
**Narrative: 1**

It is very unsafe to allow passengers to sit in row XX 4/5/6 on Aircraft X due to social distancing. When the B FA is in their jumpseat, they are touching knees with the person in XX6. Having three people facing directly at the FA with only a foot or two of space is very unsafe, even with masks. At the very least, XX6 and 5 need to be blocked for social distancing.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported social distancing concerns with seat assignments.
ACN: 1760104

**Time / Day**
Date: 202009  
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference: US  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
Reference: X  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Parked  
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
Reference: 1  
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area  
Cabin Activity: Boarding  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current  
Experience.Flight Attendant.Airline Total: 11  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760104  
Human Factors: Confusion  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Human Factors: Troubleshooting  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness  
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant  
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant  
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate  
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

The flight was a full flight. According to the policy seats XX 2/3 are supposed to be blocked due to the COVID 19 pandemic. I realize that the company has to make a profit but not at the expense and of its passengers and employees. I felt that the aircraft did not conform to social distancing policy and guidelines per the CDC guidelines and company policy.

I ask the gate agents to block these seats and they stated the flight was oversold and the aircraft would go out full. At this point I contacted our inflight support group and expressed my concerns. They advise write this safety report.

Comply with the CDC guidelines.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported gate agent issued seats that according to company policy were not supposed to be used.
**ACN: 1760103**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202009

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1760103
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result. General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

FA D on this aircraft is assigned a jumpseat that is located in the aisle at/adjacent to the AFT RH LAV door (legs and feet cross pass LAV door). With COVID precautions to lower the spread of this disease, the X row of this aircraft is normally blocked for FA use only. At boarding time, someone released the X row and filled with paying passenger, even though this flight went out with 8-10 non-revs and had an additional 7 open seats (scattered about the main cabin). At cruise level of flight, FA D used a galley box to sit on in the AFT Galley to enable passenger's access to the AFT LAV without tripping over feet and/or possible exchange of disease between passengers and FA. FA was in assigned jumpseat
for taxi, takeoff, and landing.

Equip this aircraft with a jumpseat at the AFT RH door so that FA D is out of path to LAV and is closest to the AFT RH door for evacuation needs.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a row that is typically blocked for Flight Attendant use was released for passenger seating.
ACN: 1760102

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760102

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Agents filled seats X2 and X5 with upgrades on flight that wasn't full. Per social distancing guidelines these seats should have remained empty.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported that agents filled seats that, per social distancing guidelines, should have remained empty.
Agents filled seats X2 and X5 which are supposed to be assigned when required for demand of seats on a full flight, not just because they want to upgrade someone. There is no shield between me and people sitting in those seats like the luxury the agents have with plastic shields. There were plenty of other seats for them to sit in besides X2/5. This
is a constant occurrence on the commercial fixed wing. Agents taking advantage of policy change. When I talked to agent her response was "They are eligible upgrades and seats are available." There will always be eligible upgrades, but these seats are not being blocked by the agents.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a Gate Agent filled seats that were not supposed to be filled.
ACN: 1760097

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Component
Aircraft Component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1760097
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Taxi

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was sitting at [seat] XX. We are taxiing to takeoff, and there was no Flight Attendant sitting at XY! I sat in my brace position wondering what happened to the other FA? After it
was safe to get up from our seats, the other FA walked up to work in first class. I asked where she was? She said she was sitting in the back, XZ. I told her she is supposed to sit at XY, and she said okay. On our descent to ZZZ, she sat at XY and I'm sitting at XX in my brace position. I looked towards my left and there is a passenger near me! I told him to go back and sit down, but I could see we are seconds from touching down. I told him to buckle in the seat next to me. He said he was feeling sick from the turbulence. We arrive at our gate and disarm our doors and received the ALL CALL. The Customer Service Agent knocked on the window waiting to get the thumbs up to open the door. But the FA cracked the door open at XY!!! I told the FA she is not supposed to crack the door open, she pushed the handle down and the Agent was able to open the door. The CS Agent made eye contact with me and we both gave each other looks of shock. All of the inflight crew were working the same plane back to ZZZ1. We all waited on the jet bridge as the airplane was cleaned. I took the opportunity to discuss with the FA how nervous she made me feel. I wanted the other crew members to listen to the reasons as to why this FA made me nervous. I did not get any input from them. I asked the FA if she went over the operations of [aircraft type] door. She said she had not flown [for over 5 months], but she knew what she was doing.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported that another Flight Attendant who reportedly had not flown for over 5 months, sat in the wrong seat for takeoff and did not follow procedures for opening a door.
ACN: 1760017

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude: AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1760017
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown: Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown: Party 2: Dispatch

Events
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

FO’s leg home, we observed and discussed the re-release on ground in ZZZZ, commented that it was unusual to see it coming from Continent X. Approaching ZZZZZ we never received the re-release and FO (flying) and Relief Pilot (monitoring) with CA on break failed to catch it. We didn’t realize the mistake until CA asked me "OBW [Oh By the Way] how’d that re-release go while I was asleep" while taxiing to gate at ZZZ!

1. FO’s First flight in nearly 6 months.
2. Unaccustomed to seeing re-release out of Continent X.
3. Crew failed to brief it when we swapped out for last break.
4. Dispatch failed to send it.
5. Should have put a reminder in computer, as a last ditch catch all, or a tried and true sticky note on dash.

Avoid complacency, any number of reminders via sticky note, computer, following crew swap brief outline, timer, blaze yellow highlighter!

Synopsis

First Officer reported not realizing that they did not receive a re-release.
ACN: 1759940

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759940
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I removed a passenger for non-compliance with a condition of carriage — wearing the mask.

I asked the passenger to don his mask three separate times. Each time, he gave me some sass.

I notified him that I saw his actions as refusal to comply with our mask policy and told him that if I couldn't rely on his compliance, he would not be able to fly with us to ZZZ1.

I got another "whatever" from him, so I initiated the removal process by speaking to the gate agent, who called the CSA, who removed the passenger from our flight.

The CSA later informed me that the passenger in question was traveling with 3 companions. (I only saw two companions, and they were each initially non-compliant as well, but then did comply after I spoke to them.) The CSA asked me if I wanted all 4 passengers removed or just the one passenger. I told her that I was only concerned with the one passenger and that the other 3 were free to come with us. I do not know whether they took our flight without their companion, or whether they took the next flight with their companion.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was removed for non-compliance with face mask policy.
On Day 5, an employee in the X office was told they had COVID-19 and notified management of the situation. I worked with this employee all day in the office on Day 0. I was not notified by the company that the employee had contracted COVID. I had visited my family that weekend, when I returned home where I live with my girlfriend who is very high risk due to some medical conditions. This is unacceptable according to CDC guidelines you are supposed to contact trace and notify all employees that have come in contact for more than 6 hrs on that day with the person who is infected, you not only put myself, my children and my girlfriend at risk, and god forbid worse things could have happened.

This is not the first time ZZZ has failed to notify employees that have been around others that have contracted COVID, thank god when I came back to work I got tested and was negative but I never want to be put in this situation ever again where I am worried I may get my family and especially my girlfriend sick or worse killed due to negligence.
Ground worker reported not being informed by management that a co-worker tested positive for COVID-19. The ground worker had worked with the co-worker and then visited family, resulting in possible exposure.
ACN: 1759824

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude: AGL: Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Air Carrier Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Ground Personnel: Ramp
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1759824

Events
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
Detector: Person: Ground Personnel
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

During arriving Flight ABCD, ZZZ1-ZZZ, the ramp crew had approximately 20 gate checked bags that needed to be delivered to the passengers in the jet bridge. Large numbers of gate checked bags are a constant when dealing with flights utilizing the X type of aircraft. In ZZZ, the vast majority of these flights were sent to Terminal X, where most of the jet bridges are furnished with conveyor belts allowing for safe delivery of the bags to the passengers. Since Terminal X is closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, these returning aircraft are being sent to Terminal Y where there are not nearly as many jet bridges furnished with said conveyor belts. Such was the case with Flight ABCD. The ramp crew needed to walk the baggage up the jet bridge stairs. Mostly one at a time as this allowed them to maintain a grip on the handrail. Even though it was the safest way, it puts tremendous strain as they needed to walk up and down approximately 14 steps about twenty times. The only ways to avoid this is to take two bags at a time, which increases exposure to a fall, hand the bags up to the landing from the ground level, which makes
the agent reach repeatedly into the red zone, thus putting them at risk, or use a belt loader to act as a conveyor to the landing, which it isn't designed for.

**Synopsis**
Ramp worker reported that an inadequate number of conveyor belts at a terminal resulted in ramp crew hand-carrying baggage up jet bridge stairs repeatedly, exposing them to multiple safety risks.
**ACN: 1759820**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Ground Personnel: Ramp

**ASRS Report Number**
- Accession Number: 1759820

**Human Factors**
- Communication Breakdown
  - Party1: Ground Personnel
  - Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Ground Personnel
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

Came to work the following day after being tested the previous day for COVID-19. Was notified a close co-worker tested positive for COVID-19, who I was in contact with the day of my testing to help him make an appointment for his test. I wasn't notified by management regarding his positive testing and continued to work.

**Synopsis**

Ramp worker reported that a co-worker tested positive for COVID-19. The ramp worker was not notified by management and continued to work.
ACN: 1759810

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 24000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Fractional
Make Model Name: Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Aircraft: 3
Reference: Z
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Aircraft: 4
Reference: A
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

**Person**

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 11
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1759810
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

**Events**

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Staffing

**Narrative: 1**

I was working Sectors X/Y/Z combined up with no D-side. I had Aircraft Y, Aircraft Z, and Aircraft A to ZZZ descending via the ZZZZZZ arrival. Aircraft Y had been shipped to ZZZ Approach at the time of the incident.

I was working a sequence into ZZZ1, giving a clearance off of ZZZ2, giving clearances off of ZZZ3, clearances into ZZZ4 and other overflights. This sector configuration encompasses a lot of airspace and a small scale.

I had Aircraft X check in at FL240 at the same time about 3 other aircraft call on other
transmitters. One of them canceling at ZZZ1. I did not have the handoff on Aircraft X who was deviating into my ZZZ arrivals. I immediately turned Aircraft X to a heading of 260 for traffic then to a 240 heading. I told Aircraft Z to expedite their descent to through FL230. Aircraft A was already talking to Approach. The aircraft were about 11 miles head on when positive separation was achieved we had about 7.9 miles.

Aircraft X was put on my frequency without a call or completed handoff. At that location there are also a lot of limited data blocks associated with Approach. Sector A had the handoff and told Aircraft X he was cleared to deviate left when able ZZZ5. Sector A flashed Aircraft X to Sector B/C. Sector D/C flashed the aircraft onto me at Sector X.

Controllers are not following the rules. They are waiting too long before calling for handoffs or pointouts. It is too late when the aircraft is in the other person's airspace. There is zero accountability any more.

The Controller on Sector B really needs to be talked to and put on some kind of a plan. He does not comply with the rules and procedures. I had previously talked with the Supervisor after a very busy session on Sector B which he was on my D-side and did absolutely nothing to help. Now he was the Controller on B/C who flashed through the Aircraft X to me and did not ensure a handoff.

We need [to] return all controllers to work. We need to have a lot of refresher training because controllers are not following procedures.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller reported an airborne conflict while working combined sectors and cited handoff related issues contributed to the event.
ACN: 1759807

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 33000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 15.33
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759807
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Detector.Automation : Aircraft RA
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I plugged in on Sector X after getting my weather briefing. The R side started the briefing as I was getting familiar with the position. Since traffic has dropped and picked back up from COVID my area often works in unusual configurations to manage traffic. I plugged into Sector X and noticed that I was going to working low altitude Y and two high altitude sectors X and Z. This meant I was going to be working the ground to FL370. I was listening to the briefing and scanning the board when I saw two aircraft flashing. The Controller had issued descend via the ZZZZZ3 to Aircraft Y at FL320 with clearance to 16,000 in our airspace and descend via the ZZZZZ1 to Aircraft X at FL340 converging together east of ZZZ3 VOR. I had not even gotten to the point of scanning the data blocks yet in the briefing because I would have mentioned this as appearing to be unsafe. Aircraft X started down as the two aircraft were converging (which started the flashing) and the R-side told Aircraft X to maintain FL330 when they were out of FL334. I worried that the aircraft wouldn't be able to stop their descent in time, but the pilot read back something like, "Okay stopping at FL330." The pilot didn't say they couldn't stop the descent and the Controller assumed that the pilot didn't need a traffic call because they would be able to level off in time. The R-side giving me the briefing said I thought these two procedures were separated. I told them that Aircraft X was direct ZZZZZ for the ZZZZZ3 which negates the prior restrictions and would make that a pilot's discretion descent to ZZZZZ. The aircraft came from Area [A] which is required to have the aircraft on full routing or APREQ the shortcut. Area [A] didn't APREQ the shortcut and the R-side didn't notice the abbreviated routing. Aircraft X descended to FL328 and told the controller that they got an RA. The R-side was finishing the briefing at this time and unplugged to I called traffic to Aircraft Y when they were approximately 1 NM past each other.

Area [A] should leave aircraft on the appropriate routing or APREQ the shortcut. I see multiple times in each work day where aircraft are not on the right routing and I do not get a call to APREQ it. This is a recurring problem. Also, my area changes the configuration constantly throughout the shift to keep sectors from going 'red.' I appreciate that the Supervisor or CIC is trying to prevent a red sector but constantly changing configurations is confusing. Since March I have only worked this configuration (Y/X/Z) one other time and it is starting to seem like there is no consistency in the area. Lastly, the R-side should have read the routes of the two aircraft and not issued the descend via clearance to Aircraft X. Aircraft X started down earlier than expected but well within their ability and Aircraft Y stayed much higher than normal. Both aircraft did everything right. The two clearances are not separated when a shortcut is issued.

Synopsis
Center Controller reported that during a controller de-brief/switch an airborne conflict occurred due to the distraction.
ACN: 1759796

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ. Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude AGL: Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ.TOWER
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Traffic Management
Function. Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 5
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1759796
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Landing Without Clearance
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
My last session working before end of shift. Started working all LC [Local Control] combined, was moved to TMU [Traffic Management Unit] for re-certification mid-session and then put back into LC combined for end of session. There was a consistent mix of arrivals and departures. Nothing complex or high workload but consistently keeping you engaged. Throughout my session there were moments when departure strips were being passed late from GC [Ground Control] and I had to retrieve or wait for them to be passed, that occurred around the time Aircraft X should’ve been checking in. I believe social distancing was a partial factor in the movement of strips. I remember observing Aircraft X on the STARS [Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System] display and continuing my scan of arrivals/departures and out the window. I was missing a strip or two compared to the aircraft nearing the end of Runway XXR and it did not register with me that Aircraft X did not check on with me. The Aircraft X was part of my scan and I did plan for their arrival and time on runway reference departures and other aircraft. I do not recall if I had turned the data block blue on the STARS display to show the aircraft had been cleared to land.

Suggestion: Digital strips/flight boards to assist in social distancing and decrease workload/heads downtime. Would also include inbound aircraft and not just departing aircraft.

Synopsis

Tower Controller reported not being sure if a landing clearance was given to an arrival aircraft.
ACN: 1759781

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 10
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759781
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Aircraft X was on an approach to Runway XX. ZZZ [Approach] changed Aircraft X to an approach to Runway XXL to help another aircraft turn ahead of them for a Runway XY approach. Aircraft X turned out the West. I saw the aircraft turning out to the West and fly through the final for Runway XXL and Runway XXR outside of my airspace. Aircraft X then turned back East toward the airport. I was launching airplanes and trying to be an extra set of eyes for LCE [Local Control East] who was very busy at the time being combined with [XYZ position]. Aircraft X then checked on to my frequency for Runway XXL and I cleared them to land Runway XXL. They appeared to still be SE toward Runway XXL. As I noticed they may be lined up for the incorrect runway ZZZ Approach called and asked me check as well. I informed the pilot they were lined up for the wrong runway and they chose to go around on about a 3 mile final.

Some of my focus was on aiding the traffic for LCE. If we had more staffing we could have had a [XYZ] Controller aiding with that.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller reported an aircraft lined up for the wrong runway during approach.
ACN: 1759780

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZFW.ARTCC
State Reference: TX
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 23000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZFW
Aircraft Operator: Military
Make Model Name: Military
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class A: ZFW

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZFW
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace. Class A: ZFW

Aircraft: 3
Reference: Z
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Military
Make Model Name: Military
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZFW

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZFW.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1759780
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

I was working Sector 35 and had just taken Sector 34 back (combined positions). SPS Approach launched Aircraft X and one other [same type aircraft] on a cross country flight around the same time. I climbed both aircraft to FL230, pointed them both out to Sector 48, both were acknowledged, flashed the aircraft at Sector 48 and shipped the front aircraft. I thought I had flashed Aircraft X to Sector 48 but I actually hadn't. I shipped Aircraft X to them and they climbed the aircraft to FL250 without verifying his position. Aircraft X began a climb to FL250 with Aircraft Y descending out of FL260 for FL250. Both aircraft received a TCAS RA.

During this time, I was trying to become acquainted to the new airspace I had just taken over and was quickly becoming overwhelmed because my OKC-L (sector 35) UHF frequency was only working intermittently. During that session, several aircraft had to be called 3-5 times before they acknowledged my clearance or instruction. It was quite distracting. After this event, I reported the frequency issues to the COM. I was told it was atmospheric conditions and nothing could be done to fix it. Several aircraft on both OKC-L UHF and SPS-L UHF complained about excessive static and not being able to hear me on frequencies that day.

Additionally, I was working several [same type aircraft as Aircraft X] in and out of the Westover MOAs. All these aircraft, while all UHF, were on different frequencies and stepping on one another (which is normal). The traffic was both moderately busy and fairly complex.

The sectors probably needed to remain split for about 5-10 minutes more when we combined them, but there was significant pressure on all parties to combine positions as soon as possible due to low staffing for COVID-19 social distancing procedures.

Improve frequency reception on these 2 sectors. There is a dead spot just south of the Washita MOA that UHF aircraft usually can't hear us on [Sector] 35’s UHF frequency. The frequencies should work despite if there are "atmospheric conditions" or not. The frequencies not working correctly and no alternates was very distracting.

If SPS Approach were to space these cross countries out a bit I could see that being
beneficial. Or have the Westover departures depart at a different time than the cross countries. They all go out and all come back at the same time, it's a mad rush to get everyone climbing and out to the MOA's/higher on their cross countries, then we have extended periods of nothing going on at all.

Synopsis

ZFW Center Controller working combined sectors reported an airborne conflict and cited workload and staffing issues as contributing factors.
**ACN: 1759745**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202009  
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: SMO.Airport  
State Reference: CA  
Relative Position. Distance. Nautical Miles: 1  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 500

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: Mixed  
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10  
Light: Daylight  
Ceiling. Single Value: 1000

**Aircraft : 1**

Reference: X  
ATC / Advisory. CTAF: SMO  
ATC / Advisory. Tower: SMO  
Aircraft Operator: Personal  
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear  
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Personal  
Flight Phase: Final Approach  
Route In Use: Visual Approach  
Route In Use: Direct  
Airspace. Class G: SMO

**Aircraft : 2**

Reference: Y  
ATC / Advisory. CTAF: SMO  
Aircraft Operator: FBO  
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear  
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91  
Flight Plan: None  
Mission: Training  
Flight Phase: Final Approach  
Airspace. Class G: SMO

**Person**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Personal  
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Commercial
Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 2200
Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 88
Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 1900
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1759745
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly: Conflict: NMAC
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
Miss Distance: Horizontal: 50
Miss Distance: Vertical: 50
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1
At the time, SMO was under about a 1,000 foot MSL marine layer (i.e. low cloud stratus layer) extending from the west to just east and encompassing both north and south of the runway. I was flying under an IFR flight plan and had already been cleared for the approach. Because the Tower was closed and because I could see that I could see the airport (coming from the east looking at Runway 21) I cancelled IFR and continued inbound on the visual making appropriate calls on the CTAF. As I got to a 1 mile final (which was called out on CTAF), Aircraft Y began turning base to final and asked where I actually was as he did not have me in sight. I advised him that I was at his 2 o'clock. It would appear that he never had me in sight as he continued his turn to final. He ended cutting me off ending up just left and about 50 feet above/in front of me. I informed him that he had cut me off, but he continued on course and descending. Because of the situation, I decided the best course to avoid a collision was to make a right turn. I also noted that the marine layer cloud edge extended out to the position where I made the turn (3/4 mile final) I then proceeded to continue that right turn into a 360 to rejoin the final and then landed. It is notable that because of the marine layer, the likely student pilot in the Aircraft Y, should never have even been flying the "standard" pattern" (i.e. left traffic 21) as it was not legal to do so because the VFR requirements for the overlying Echo airspace could not be met (i.e. 1,000 feet above the clouds) due to the height of the marine layer. Thus, his descent to turn base at around the freeway clearly violated VFR minimums. I did inform the person who runs the school of the situation. He informed me that he himself had an NMAC just the very day before. Had the Tower been operating on normal or slightly longer hours at the time, such incidents would not have been able to occur. The currency reduced Tower hours should be extended ASAP, in order to prevent an
accident as the airspace is very busy, and can be challenging in the event of a marine layer, which precludes the use of the pattern.

**Synopsis**

GA pilot reported a NMAC on final to SMO airport. Tower closure was cited as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1759720

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude: AGL. Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1759720
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Upon our return to the gate into ZZZ, I failed to disarm R1. I haven't worked on the jet in
quite a while since being based in ZZZ1, so memory was still working other aircraft type
trips. I take responsibility and have since reviewed two videos on arming and disarming doors on the aircraft. This has been a learning lesson. I have also spoken with my Supervisor. I have reviewed the arming and disarming videos through our training department and will also go over procedures before my trips.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported forgetting to disarm the R1 door and cited lack of flying in this specific aircraft type as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1759718

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759718
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759723
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passenger X when stepping on to the plane refused to be compliant. When boarding I reminded her of the requirement to cover her nose with her face covering. She avoided looking at me and said "Okay!" with an attitude but didn't comply. I then told Flight Attendant B about my telling her and she did ask her to comply as well. She put the mask on after Flight Attendant B told her and she removed her mask after the wheels came up and it remained off while not eating or drinking during ascending phase. She then brought out a large bag of popcorn eating it one by one. When she was done with that she would take mini sips of her drink whenever we would walk by to give the appearance of constantly eating or drinking. Because "briefly eating" leaves a window that is open for debate and we weren't sure what to do and felt because if she presented an attitude when boarding, it would cause a larger than life scene. She and her husband whom I've also had to tell about his mask mocked us making faces taking off their masks making faces to the passenger across from them about how they avoided us. Not sure how to approach this.

Narrative: 2
Passenger X was told 2 times before taxi out to make sure she was wearing her face mask properly, above her nose as she wasn't wearing it right. She put it on briefly but then took it off during taxi and takeoff. She put it on when we were able to get up again. As we were doing trash she had brought out a large bag of popcorn, which she ate one by one throughout the entire flight, keeping her mask off the entire time even though we made other announcements that masks were only to be removed briefly when actively eating or drinks she continued to take advantage of an unclear situation. More direction as to what "briefly" eating or drinking means and something to be able to show guests what briefly is.

Synopsis
Flight attendants reported two passengers were not compliant with face mask policies.
ACN: 1759709

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759709
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Dispatch

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759710
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Workload
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Dispatch

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: MEL
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result. General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

During preflight inspection, I discovered a burned out navigation light on the right wing. I informed the Captain. The Captain notified maintenance of the issue and he was informed that Maintenance was on their way to the aircraft. The Captain and I continued performing duties to prepare for departure. We had signed fit for duty and received release 0.

Maintenance came aboard the aircraft and proceeded to defer the navigation light, and returned the aircraft logbook to the Captain. The Captain and I confirmed that the logbook was filled out correctly. We then briefed the MEL, ran the originating and receiving checklist and the before start checklist, pushed back, and departed the gate. We later noticed that we had received a message. It was a message from Dispatch for amendment to the release for the addition of the MEL related to the navigation light. We realized that we had failed to communicate with the Dispatcher to receive amendment to the release.

Factors contributing to our error were external pressures to be on time, and also recency of flying for the Captain. Maintenance was still on the aircraft within a couple minutes of departure time. I definitely was influenced by trying to depart on time. At the time, I felt that we were being thorough. In retrospect, I could have slowed down and made sure that all necessary steps were completed even if we took another minute or two to depart the gate.

Prior to the flight we discussed the fact that the Captain has not had much flying recently. He explained that he had several phone calls with the company within the couple of hours prior to the flight to ensure that he met the recent flight requirements. This also created external pressure for him. Also, habits can degrade after being out of the flight deck for even a couple weeks and it can be easy to miss steps especially when a distraction such as a small maintenance issue arises. Despite this, I as the First Officer should have been able to realize and correct our error.

To avoid similar future errors, it is important to slow down and take care of minor maintenance issues a step at a time to ensure that all necessary communications with the company are accomplished. During future similar events, I will be more aware of communications from Dispatch about amendments to the release. Perhaps creating cues
to remind myself would be helpful (such as writing a note on a piece of paper and placing it between the thrust levers or over the MCDU).

**Narrative: 2**

I had a rough morning during my 2 hour call out sorting out landing currency as I was awarded this trip as well as unknown "SIM Training" by Crew Scheduling. I asked if it was a currency SIM and the Scheduler had no idea. I went through my logbook and missed a small detail, causing emails and phone calls to go to multiple departments. The first call back from training informed me that my online training was expired (it is at the end of the month.) After the dust settled, I hurried my routine to get ready for my afternoon flight to ZZZ.

I was going about my pre-flight duties a little slower than usual, but no issues. When the First Officer finished his walk around, he notified me that the RH navigation light was dead. I finished my current flow. I then wrote up and made the call about 5 minutes later, at XA:40 for a XB:00 departure. I finished my flow first because I had done the Standby Nav procedure over the phone multiple times. Maintenance asked when we were leaving over the phone. When I told him 20 minutes, he said he would send a guy out. So I put all checklists on hold and notified the gate agent. While at the top of the Jet Bridge, there was a guest who could not find his boarding pass. The agent said the passenger was acting weird and notified me that she would investigate if he returned. Later the gate agent came down to notify me that he was still acting strange, but didn't smell like alcohol and was polite. I notified my flight attendants saying that there was no "issues" yet, but to contact me with anything related. It was now a minute before departure and maintenance had the logbook finished. He handed it back to me to look up the deferred item. It was entered correct, I briefed the First Officer on the item quick. I then ran check lists starting with originating and receiving. Then we closed the door late. After pushing, we received the amendment release for the MEL in our ACARS. Causal Factors would be the excess of information and people that are needed when contacting certain departments. No departments are tied together. This process took an hour out of my work preparation time. This feeds into flight time and unknown delays. This information was given to me mid work day, if it is not processed today, I have to get up earlier than the offices open tomorrow to fly to a training event I don't need. Stress went through the roof. I then take a quick shower, have lost my time to cook or make coffee. Add that to recency issues, and I make mistakes on simple problems.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported not notifying the Dispatcher of a navigation light that was out of service.
ACN: 1759647

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 9800

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person : 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759647
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Person : 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759648
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
This incident occurred during the approach phase of the second leg of the flight. I was the pilot flying from the right seat. We were instructed by ATC to hold 10,000 feet and I had selected 265 knots for the speed. When ATC gave us a lower altitude, I selected the lower altitude on the MCP and set the speed to 250 knots. As my attention was directed to the speed window on the MCP, the Pilot Monitoring alerted me that we were descending below 10,000 feet with the speed greater than 250 knots. I immediately selected ALT HLD and allowed the speed to slow to 250 knots before continuing the descent. Our altitude was no lower than 9,800 above 250 knots and the speed was less than 265, but above 250 knots between 9,800 and 10,000 feet.

I should have slowed the aircraft prior to the descent. One of the contributing factors was I had been on reserve duty during the previous month and had operated only one flight during the entire month and the only other flight prior to this one was in a different variant of the aircraft. Nevertheless, I should have mitigated the lack of recency of experience in the seat by having slowed the aircraft to 250 knots while we were level at 10,000 feet as I was expecting ATC clearance for a lower altitude. Or I should have mentally prepared to slow the aircraft prior to descending.

Narrative: 2
I was the PM for this flight. We were in the descent to ZZZ1, level flight at 10,000 feet at approximately 270 KIAS. We were given a lower altitude of 7,000 feet (I think). We did not slow the aircraft before descending. The PF put in the correct lower altitude and then selected FLCH. I immediately asked for ALT HOLD. The aircraft held level at approximately 9,800 feet to allow for slowing to 250 KIAS.

I think 'get-there-itis' may have been a factor in this incident. Flying at 10,000 feet at 270 KIAS vs. 250 KIAS, when you know that a lower altitude is mere seconds away does not add much overall value to the flight. Better situational awareness to anticipate known ATC structure can add safety and professionalism to my operating climate I foster as a Captain.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported going over 250 knots below 10,000 feet. Pilot flying made reference to lack of flying as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1759574

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Taxi

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Taxi

Aircraft: 3
Reference: Z
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Phase: Taxi

Aircraft: 4
Reference: A
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Ground
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Developmental
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759574
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was working ground during a departure push. I had 3 IFR aircraft taxiing on the Bravo taxiway, one IFR taxiing on taxiway AXX to Runway XXL, and VFR aircraft taxiing to Runway XXR. I was busy coordinating a runway crossing at AY for Aircraft X while taxiing Aircraft Y to Runway XXL at BX, Aircraft Z to Runway XXL at BYY, and Aircraft A to Runway XXL at AX. After getting the approval to cross Runway XXL at AY with the Aircraft X, I instructed him to taxi Runway XXL full length via Bravo. Taxiway Bravo had a wingspan restriction between BY to BZZ to aircraft with a wingspan greater than XX feet. During the numerous transmissions I was making I failed to realize my mistake of taxiing Aircraft X full length instead of to BX for back taxi. My Supervisor/CIC noticed when the aircraft was taking the runway. FOD was reported by workers in the area in their work area. This was my 3rd day of work after a quick turn, from a 1 day weekend, having worked 5 days before that. I was also on a new schedule returning from 5 on 5 off, working this shift for the first time in 6 months.

Recommendation: To be more vigilant in knowing NOTAMs and issue correct taxi instructions to correct aircraft types.

Synopsis
Ground Controller reported inadvertently taxiing an aircraft into a restricted area.
ACN: 1759543

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 40
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 25000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3200
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 100
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 400
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759543
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
**Events**

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy  
Detector.Person : Flight Crew  
When Detected : In-flight

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Upon initial climbout I was given a turn on course direct to my destination. I was not told to contact Departure so I stayed on with Tower. I was flying the aircraft as I wanted to maintain proficiency in my flight skills. I have not flown this aircraft for nearly two months, and I had a forward passenger who kept trying to talk after I politely reminded him that I could not talk until cruise. Even though I have a lot of time in this aircraft I should have used the autopilot to maintain better situational awareness. Approximately 4,000 feet 6 nm into the flight I noticed I was still on with Tower. I switched to ZZZ Center, told my altitude they then gave me a clearance up to 13,000 feet MSL. There was absolutely no issue, but I just wanted to fill out this report anyways.

**Synopsis**

Small Transport aircraft pilot reported not contacting Departure Control and stayed with Tower until switching to Center Control.
ACN: 1759522

Time / Day
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759522
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Guest noted with vented mask enroute. Was advised of the policy change which prevents those vented masks. She indicated she was a doctor and was explaining the venting technology. I apologized and referred to the policy. If the station catches these prior it would reduce the in-flight workload.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendant reported a passenger was wearing a vented face mask which is not in compliance with policy.
ACN: 1759518

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759518
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contribution Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Passenger X entered aircraft with mask below his nose. I requested that he pull it up before boarding. He complied and sat. Several times throughout the flight I walked cabin to collect trash and reminded many people to pull up mask over nose. I asked Passenger X once and he complied. The next time I asked, he informed me "I can't breathe."

I told him I was sorry but he agreed to our terms of face masks when he checked in. He pulled mask up. I did another trash run and mask was lowered again. I reminded him of policy. Instead of pulling it up, he requested to see the policy in writing. He then spoke with other FA and said he was being singled out because of his tattoos. She told him she had seen me as I had reminded several others. She said further non-compliance could result in a ban on flying.

I called Captain and asked to make the nose and mouth announcement. Captain did. I went back to show him the verbiage which explicitly spells out the policy. I asked him if he would please comply. He said "I am complying, #%^!" His nostrils were clearly visible. I left and called Captain, informing them of the non-compliance. Captain confirmed and would notify the ground agents to meet the plane.

Passenger Y talked to other FA and said I was harassing Passenger X. He said others around him felt uncomfortable. I said we needed people to comply with safety rules. He said I hadn't said anything to a nearby woman when her mask was off, and I tried to explain it was because she was still eating and drinking. But he was convinced I was discriminating in my enforcement.

Make an announcement at boarding gate that explicitly tells people they can be banned for failure to comply with nose and mouth covered rule.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy during the flight.
**ACN: 1759515**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1759515
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Pre-flight

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
- Observed a guest prior to departure and one enroute with vented masks. Guests were offered masks from onboard stock. X weeks post policy change how can we still be policing the policy change? Safety for the crew should be looked after.

**Synopsis**
Flight Attendant reported a passenger boarding was wearing a vented face mask which is not in compliance with policy.
Today during Aircraft X flight, I and the B [Flight Attendant] were notified by the A [Flight Attendant] that she flew a 3 day trip that ended yesterday with someone who tested positive for the COVID-19 virus yesterday after their trip. She said she came in an hour early to check in for her trip and notify base management, so that they would have time to pull and replace her. She was told that they couldn't do that, she has to fly until she's
notified by the company and then pulled. The B called the Operations with me on speaker phone in between flights to notify them that she should have been pulled and we were not comfortable being confined in our workspace with her for another flight. We wanted to limit our exposure. He told us that there is a process and when it goes through that process then she would be called. We know that the A that she flew with yesterday had already been notified and had her schedule pulled. The company put us at risk by making us fly with her, knowing her exposure. They knew she had to be quarantined, but made her fly and now increased our risk of exposure and that of our passengers. She served ice water to passengers. On the second flight, the B and I did all service to minimize passenger exposure to the A. The Operations suggestion was that we could call in sick. Clearly, our management has not been given needed authority to pull someone from flying while waiting for this process to be followed. As a result, we were at higher risk today for exposure and this was completely unnecessary. Our policy states that we are not to fly when we know we have been exposed to someone who tested positive and she did the right thing by reporting that prior to flying but she was told to fly anyway. In fact, our EFB addresses this issue. She met that criteria and she should have not been required to come to work. She was supposed to stay home, but she was told to go ahead and work or she was given the option of calling in sick and being paid out of her sick leave. That's not an appropriate option. She wasn't sick and she should not be penalized for doing her job and flying with someone who tests positive on the same day that she flew with said person. She spoke with Supervisor.

They were apparently following directions from headquarters that they are not allowed to pull her, even though they have been notified by her and the person who tested positive. They were not allowed to pull our A and as a result, our entire crew and all passengers were exposed to someone who should have been quarantined immediately. The company failed to protect me and in fact, knowingly put my health at risk. This is unacceptable. My life is important. The company has an obligation to protect me. I would also like to note that the FA who tested positive, tested on date and notified a Supervisor or Operations that she was being tested. I was informed that she was told to call the next day to advise them of her results. She got her results that same night. Why was she told to call the next day with her results? She should be told to call the Operations immediately with her results so that pulls could begin before we started our trips. There were reserves in ZZZ that could have worked that trip for our A and lessened our chances of exposure. She had literally been breathing in this virus for 3 days with this crew member and now you had us breathing in the same air from her and not knowing whether or not she had the virus or might be contagious, in a close up environment. I know that we are being told repeatedly about the air flow and filters and how safe it is. When we are on the ground boarding and deplaning, none of that occurs. There is no filter then. Also, the masks that we are wearing are not medical grade PPE, which also increases our risk.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported concerns with having to fly with a Flight Attendant that had been in contact with another Flight Attendant that had tested positive for COVID-19.
ACN: 1759478

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759478
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

During boarding, the Flight Attendant notified me of a passenger that she thought appeared to be intoxicated. We called the customer service to notify her that a passenger appeared to be intoxicated. Customer service stated to me that the passenger did not appear to be intoxicated at that time. Under my observation, she did not appear that she was intoxicated. Enroute, I received a call from the Flight Attendant that the passenger was struggling to buckle her seatbelt and continued to take her mask off after multiple requests had been made. I made the non-compliance announcement for mask requirements, and she did not comply with the request either. We decided to have ZZZ1 customer service meet us at the gate to have the passenger removed. I notified Dispatch and ZZZ1 Operations to ensure we had someone meeting us at the aircraft. Upon arrival, customer service removed the passenger without any further issues.

The event was caused by a passenger being intoxicated and a delayed reaction of the alcohol entering the blood stream, causing the effects of the alcohol to not become noticeable until enroute.

Next time a passenger is appearing to be intoxicated, although multiple opinions on whether they appear to be intoxicated, have the passenger removed and tested for alcohol.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported a passenger appeared intoxicated during boarding, but was allowed to fly. During the flight the passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy.
ACN: 1759411

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 10
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use.SID: ZZZZZ1
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 6642
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 4
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2073
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759411
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was 500 feet high at ZZZZZ on the ZZZZZ1 RNAV SID from ZZZ. My flying skills and scan have degraded because I haven't flown for 6 months prior to this trip because of COVID-19.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported altitude deviation on a departure and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1759362

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202009
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Work Environment Factor: Glare

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Flight Phase: Takeoff
- Route In Use: Direct

**Component : 1**
- Aircraft Component: Flap/Slat Control System
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Component : 2**
- Aircraft Component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 14000
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 150
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 300
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759362
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Fatigue
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I have never set flaps incorrectly, or departed, with an incorrect flap setting. This was the First Officer's takeoff. Both he and I departed with the incorrect flap setting today. After flying 4 tough, weather legs between ZZZ and ZZZ1 the day prior, I believe we were both still tired from dealing with the thunderstorms the day before. I didn't sleep well. Earlier, we discussed some serious stressors regarding challenges of a forced commute from a mandatory displacement and we could no longer rely on securing a passenger seat to work. My First Officer is being furloughed and was very concerned about the future and our Company. I had not been into ZZZ1 for a very long time. They had numerous taxiways closed and under construction. Initially, I thought I understood the taxi clearance, then realized I had it wrong. While doing the taxi checklist on the way out, I was preoccupied with my EFB trying to verify taxiway names. My EFB was (and remains) very slow to respond to screen manipulations. So, I was a bit frustrated looking back and forth between my device and the called checklist items. Given the glare of the sun against the flap gauge, and my difficulty reading it (I had not yet switched to sunglasses), I simply was distracted and misread the gauge. On the before takeoff checklist, I guess I simply "saw what I expected to see." I have a hard time believing I missed it. Once airborne on takeoff, I directed further acceleration in the climb to account for the flap discrepancy. The flight proceeded normally without further event.

What I could have done differently: I should have stopped the taxi when I could not get the EFB to respond. I should have put on my prescription sunglasses earlier. Having noted this error, I asked myself what else could I do in the future so this never happens again. Here's my personal fix (apart from being darn sure I read the gauge correctly). Since the throttle position blocks the view of the flap lever for the Captain, there is a metal ridge line just aft of the throttle quadrant. Follow that line and it takes you right to the flaps 15 position. Going forward, I know if that line doesn't carry into the flap handle, I am not at flaps 15.

Other thoughts: Why not add physically touching the flap handle and looking at it to confirm its position in addition to current practice. I will do this myself. I think it's easier to see than the MCDU or gauge. Since FOQUA monitoring captures errors, is it possible to program this system to alert the pilots when the flap setting disagrees with the programmed takeoff data?

Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain reported setting and taking off with an incorrect flap position.
ACN: 1759319

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi
Flight Phase: Parked
Route In Use: Direct

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Door Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759319
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: Taxi
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Flight Attendant (FA) A did not follow proper procedure arming his door and also when we arrived at the gate to have the agent open the door. He also continuously pulls his face mask away from his face when speaking and has trouble keeping it over his nose. Not sure how we can expect customers to comply with the face mask policy when the purser cannot comply.

Arming the door: he started by putting the girt bar in the brackets, not putting the red streamer over the window. When we arrived at the gate: he disarmed the door and soon after he cracked the door, before the jet bridge was even pulled up to the plane! Then when the gate agent was not opening the door FA A became frustrated. The gate agent was very confused and I could tell he wanted to address the issue but chose not to. Someone needs to go over door procedures and proper face mask wearing with FA A.

Synopsis

Air Carrier Flight Attendant reported that a Flight Attendant did not use correct procedures arming and disarming the aircraft door. In addition, the Flight Attendant did not follow face mask policy.
**ACN: 1759313**

**Time / Day**

Date : 202008

**Aircraft**

Reference : X
Make Model Name : No Aircraft

**Person**

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Cabin Jumpseat
Cabin Activity : Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1759313

**Events**

Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred : All Types
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

**Narrative: 1**

Exceptions for face coverings is active eating and drinking and clarified as safety related duties including making a PA per policy. However, I have sought clarification from in-flight and have failed to address critical phases of flight concerns and emergency procedures. Wearing a face covering reduces the ability to perform safety functions critical to the safety of everyone on board. Why are we sitting away from jumpseats while customers are able to sit in all usable seats. We need to sit in our assigned jumpseats and not use alternate seating especially on full flights. Safest place is a jumpseat. Takeoff and landing, we need to stay in brace position and a face covering can hinder evacuation commands, communications with flight deck and instant situational awareness that is distracting due to face coverings. Pilots are able to remove face coverings for safety of flight issues on the flight deck and why are flight attendants not being allowed to be subject to the same safety and security standards? We need exceptions that are not political, safety of flight is our top concern.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that having to wear a face mask could affect the FA's ability to perform certain safety functions, especially in the case of an emergency situation.
**ACN: 1759282**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ ARTCC
- State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory, TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Flight Phase: Takeoff
- Route In Use: Direct

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function, Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1759282
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown, Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown, Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function, Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1759285
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Communication Breakdown, Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown, Party2: ATC
Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
The day began with a maintenance delay. In ZZZ XXX Radio issued us a Hold For Release Clearance about 15 minutes prior to departure. I read the clearance back and wrote down "HFR" at the bottom of my clearance.
Once bag loading was complete we started engines taxied, and took off. After takeoff XXX Radio called us and asked if we had departed. We then realized we had not gotten ATC release. Nothing further.
Keep the pacing normal, no need to rush.
Develop a technique to remind you that you do not have takeoff clearance.
On the next leg we also had a Hold For Release clearance and I put the checklist between the throttles to remind me and verbally repeated "Hold For Release" on every radio call on CTAF frequency.

Narrative: 2
We were running late due to an FMC issue in ZZZ and trying to make up time. XXX radio said they would issue us a hold for release time when we had a better idea when we would be taking off. We finished up with loading, engine start and check lists. We took off and before we reported in with ZZZZ radar XXX called and asked when we would be taking off. We explained that we had forgotten to get the hold for release time and were enroute. They activated our flight plan and we proceeded without event. They gave us a phone number for ZZZZ and we called reaching ZZZ1.

I had not flown in 6 months due to the pandemic. In the future I will go slower and put out a visual reminder when ever issued a hold for release, such as a QRC between the throttles.

Synopsis
Air Carrier flight crew reported taking off without an ATC clearance. Captain reported having not flown in 6 months.
ACN: 1759279

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 8000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Cruise
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew, Last 90 Days: 110
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759279
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Descending into ZZZ via the ZZZZZZ it appears there was confusion caused by similar sounding call-signs. Although our controller did not specifically identify whether he or I made the mistake, it seemed like our flight ended up on a heading and descending to an altitude that was not intended.

We were operating Flight ABCD. The flight had been uneventful and we were "DESCENDING VIA" the ZZZZZZ from the ZZZZZ transition into ZZZ. We were handed off to ZZZ Approach who appeared to be moderately busy on our frequency. Both the FO and I heard ABDC also on the frequency. At approximately ZZZZZZ1, the Controller issued us a clearance to 11,000 feet at 230 knots. I acknowledged the clearance. The FO remarked that was a "different" speed and altitude than we typically received on this arrival. Shortly thereafter, we both thought we heard the Controller issue us, ABCD, a left turn to a heading of 330 and a descent to 8,000 feet. I acknowledged the clearance and we executed the clearance. Within a minute, the Controller came onto the frequency and I believe he said (without a mentioning a callsign) "you took the other's call," then told us to stop descent at 11,000 feet - which we were just descending through. The FO, without hesitation, disabled the Autopilot and stopped the descent and maintained 11,000 feet. The Controller then issued a turn back to 090. We made the turn and reset the automation. Shortly thereafter, we were cleared direct to ZZZZZZ2 and we continued the flight without further event. We both did notice that every subsequent Controller seemed to excessively emphasize our callsign for the remainder of the flight which makes me suspect that perhaps I did "take" ABDC's call (330 Heading / 8000 feet MSL). However, the FO and I both felt relatively sure that we had heard our callsign.

Initially I thought it may have been poor planning, that put two similar sounding call-signs into the same airport at the same time without some mitigating tool like an "A" designator after the normal call-sign. However, some after-the-fact research seems to indicate that ABDC had incurred a long delay that put our flights in proximity. These flights would not normally operate in the approach environment at the same time. With the COVID-19 pandemic, we have seen FAA ATC consolidate many sectors. In this case, the Approach Controller was - at the very least - working arrivals from both the southwest and southeast. As flight schedules have increased a bit in July and August, I have had several experiences where Controller - and particularly frequency - saturation have occurred. Perhaps increasing ATC staffing levels - particularly in the approach environment would be appropriate.

Synopsis

Air Carrier Captain reported taking an ATC clearance for a similar sounding aircraft on the same frequency. The Captain reported the Controller was working multiple sectors at the time.
ACN: 1759256

Time / Day
Date: 202009

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Cockpit Window
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1759256

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Diverted
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Flight Crew: Landed in Emergency Condition
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Primary Problem: Aircraft
**Narrative: 1**

After level off at cruise altitude FLXX0 I noticed a small crack in the lower left corner of the Captain's windshield. Approximately XX minutes later there was a complete failure of the outer layers of the Captain's windshield which caused spiderweb cracking everywhere. We elected to advise ATC and land successfully at nearby ZZZ airport without any further complications and parked at the terminal gate.

This aircraft had been parked at ZZZ1 for a number of months. I would surmise that this contributed significantly to this event.

Require these aircraft that have been parked for such a long period of time to be test flown first.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier pilot reported the Captain's windshield cracked in cruise and the flight diverted successfully. Pilot surmised that the plane's lengthy time being parked contributed to the event.
ACN: 1759213

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: No Aircraft
Mission: Other
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Ground Personnel: Ramp
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1759213
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter: Object
Detector: Person: Ground Personnel
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
Loading one piece XXX lbs of freight, I stopped power-stow to check and had 1/2 to 1/4 inch clearance. It was dark and my glasses were foggy due to wearing mask and I could not see bolts protruding from freight which scratched cargo door.

Synopsis
Ramp Agent reported damaging the aircraft during cargo loading because the agent's eye glasses were fogging up due to the face mask.
The aircraft arrived and ramp did not have a tail stand available and was going to start downloading [the] front of aircraft and telling [the] agent [it was] okay to attach jetbridge without the tail stand being installed. I spoke to Ramp Lead and he said it was okay to attach once again. I was concerned to do this since the procedures to offload passengers [in] X rows at time leaves the tail heavy still as ramp downloads the front. As we were attaching the bridge the Flight Attendant cracked door and started to open [it], but bridge was not attached yet [and] was about 3 feet away.
Ramp worker reported that a tailstand was not available to support the plane while passengers were deplaned from the front of the aircraft.
ACN: 1759187

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: GPS
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Direct

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 6642.17
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 4.15
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2073.37
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1759187
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Dispatch

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Detector.Person: Dispatch
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken
**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

We departed ZZZ with incorrect release. Both the Captain and I missed that we were on release 2. There was a re-route which ATC had to read to us. The Dispatcher thought he published release 2 before the Captain signed release 1. He was mistaken. Captain signed for release 1 three minutes before the Dispatcher submitted release 2. The Captain and I should have caught the error when the Final Weight Manifest was reviewed. This was my third flight after being off for 6 months because of COVID-19.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported the flight departed with incorrect release documentation. The First Officer referenced not having flown in the last 6 months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1759162

Time / Day
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
- Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 21000
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 12
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 737
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759162
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: Pre-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1


Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was removed from flight due to non compliance with face mask policy.
ACN: 1759113

Time / Day
Date: 202009
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5500

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 2.5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759113
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
**Person : 2**

Reference : 2  
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.TRACON  
Reporter Organization : Government  
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach  
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1759394  
Human Factors : Situational Awareness  
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown  
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC  
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC  
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew  

**Person : 3**

Reference : 3  
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X  
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying  
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 7000  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1759592  

**Events**

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types  
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy  
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control  
When Detected : In-flight  
Result.General : None Reported / Taken  

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing  
Primary Problem : Human Factors  

**Narrative: 1**

I had just taken the X and Y sectors from Z position during Configuration #X (A configuration that we rarely use and I haven’t worked in at least 8 months) and did a recorded briefing. During briefing I took point outs from Z sector on 2 aircraft. One was Aircraft X who was on right downwind for Runway XR. Aircraft X was yellow as a point out on my scope. I was talking to Aircraft Y who was in trail of Aircraft X and descended him to the MVA of XXX. I then was setting up preferences and frequencies for the sector. The Z Controller was late turning base and I didn’t notice. I turned base at my normal base turn not noticing that Aircraft X had turned a late base. When I noticed the mistake both aircraft were at same altitude and I immediately issued traffic alert to Aircraft Y and he reported responding to an RA and climbed. During that time after the loss of separation
the Z Controller got visual separation from Aircraft X. I turned Aircraft Y to the northeast and set him back up for a right base to XR. Both landed without further incident.

I shouldn't have taken a point out on aircraft who was still on downwind. Also I felt a little rusty on the configuration as we rarely use it. Also with the COVID staffing I have been working mostly mid shifts and hadn't adjusted the sleep patterns well enough and hadn't worked the busier traffic for a while.

**Narrative: 2**

It was configuration #X at ZZZ where we depart the [Runway] Ys and pair up the arrivals for XL and XR. I was working the Z sector, which deals with the arrivals from the southeast and southwest, as well as the Y sector, which deals with everything in and out of ZZZ1, and the final sector, which works all arrivals into ZZZ. The traffic was mostly light with a slight moderate up-tick. The CIC decided to open up the final sector to deal with a little push. By the time the Controller sat down and was ready to take the brief I had a few things to clean up first. Once I was ready to give the brief for the final position I had 2 aircraft that I was just going to keep and point out to the new final Controller considering where they were at on approach. I had Aircraft Y within 15 miles of the airport on the straight in cleared for XR. Then I had Aircraft X over ZZZ1 at 6,000 set up to follow the straight in. I gave the briefing like normal, stating runways, non standard things, what runway ZZZ1 was on and then traffic. I displayed both the straight in aircraft as well as Aircraft X on the final Controller's scope stating that I would just keep those 2 and the rest will be his. At this point I went to talk to an arrival that had just checked on over ZZZZZ, telling him to expect XL. Once I finished that transmission I went to base Aircraft X. I gave him a 280 heading and 5,500. Once the aircraft rolls out on the 280 heading I called the airport and he said in sight. I then cleared him for the visual approach to Runway XR. I then shipped the straight in to the Tower and went back to issue a heading and descent to an arrival from the southeast. As I am issuing these instructions, I hear the final Controller say, what are you doing, at which point my attention is pulled back to Aircraft X who is on a dog leg to join the final on the visual approach. I see another aircraft turned directly at Aircraft X also descending to 5,500. I then issued traffic to Aircraft X and he responded with, in sight, and that they were responding to an RA. Aircraft X responded by descending further and the other aircraft, which was Aircraft Y, also responded by climbing. I believe the final Controller issued a traffic alert to Aircraft Y as well as turned him further to the north. Both aircraft were 1.38 miles apart when they were at the same altitude, once we got 1,000 feet they were only 0.54 miles apart. Aircraft X continued on the visual approach and landed without incident. Aircraft Y was boxed back around and also landed without incident. In the end, the new final Controller got distracted and turned Aircraft Y too early which resulted in the loss of separation.

In order to avoid this in the future I could have just waited to give up the final position so that I was the one working both aircraft, or I suppose I could have just given the final Controller all of the aircraft instead of keeping 2 of them. I don't like issuing frequency changes that low and close to the airport, which is why I didn't, but at this point it would have probably avoided the situation. The position could have also been opened just 5 minutes sooner and all aircraft would have gone to the new final Controller. I also should have issued a traffic alert instead of just traffic, but being caught by surprise that didn't happen. Honestly there isn't a whole lot more that could have been done differently. The final controller spaced and turned way too early resulting in the loss.

**Narrative: 3**
I was the FO and PM on flight operating from ZZZ1-ZZZ on (date). Preflight through descent were normal. During approach, we were on vectors with Approach Control for the Visual to Runway XR. We were given a right dog-leg to final vector for Runway XR. Once we called the runway in sight, we were cleared the Visual Approach to Runway XR, but were not switched to ZZZ Tower yet. At approximately 7 NM from the field on a right dog-leg to final, and at approximately 4,500 feet MSL, we received a TCAS TA followed quickly by a TCAS RA to "Descend."

I referenced the traffic displayed on the PFD and immediately looked outside to my right and visually saw another aircraft that appeared to be on a right base or dog-leg to final for either Runway XR or XL at approximately co-altitude and approximately 1 NM to our right. I verbalized to the PF that I had the traffic in sight and they were climbing (as I verified we were complying with the "Descend" TCAS RA displayed on the PFD). Our maneuvers to comply with the TCAS RA were smooth and measured.

Shortly thereafter, we received a Clear of Conflict TCAS call. We were just joining the final approach course and above 1,000 feet AGL. Once clear of the conflict, we determined that we were stable and well above 1,000 feet AGL. I reported to Approach Control that we had received a descending TCAS RA and responded accordingly. We continued the approach and were told to switch to Tower frequency. The Approach Controller acknowledged our report and apologized and said that the Approach controllers had a mis-communication (or something to that effect). We switched to Tower and landed on Runway XR uneventfully.

I feel that the TCAS TA and RA alerts did the job they were designed to do. The TCAS system design, as well as our policies and procedures worked exactly as they should have for this situation. I think the fact that ZZZ was landing Runways XL and XR may have contributed to the inadequate aircraft spacing by Approach Control because landing on Runway YYL is by far the most utilized runway for the commercial airlines at ZZZ. We never received a traffic call from Approach Control the entire time we were on their frequency.

**Synopsis**

TRACON Controllers reported a loss of separation while working combined positions due to staffing and handoff/communication issues. The First Officer of one of the aircrafts involved also reported the conflict and made reference to the miss-communication between controllers.
ACN: 1759034

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759034
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passenger X was asked to put on his seatbelt 3 times before the aircraft door was closed and asked to place his carry on item under the seat but he didn't, also his face covering
was on his chin. I asked him to put his bag under the seat put his seat belt on and place the face covering over his nose and mouth but after the door was closed Passenger X still didn't comply. I let Flight Attendant A know.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was not compliant with seat belt, carry on placement and face mask policies.
ACN: 1759026

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Cabin Lighting: High

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1759026
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Prior to pushback, after "all passengers boarded" PA had been done, I did my briefing to the passengers who had been seated there. At this time seat XX2 had still been unoccupied. On my way forward, I secured the forward portion of the aircraft, where I had 2 passengers in seats Y1 and Y3 with all 3 tray tables down and all their carry-on items in the middle seat. I asked them to stow their items and continued forward. In the time that I made it forward, 3 more passengers boarded. First a gentleman, then 2 others that were traveling together. Without stepping in front of the first gentleman I acknowledged to him that there were still empty rows left in the back of the aircraft. I said the same thing to the two guys (traveling together). I saw the 2 guys make it to the back, but did notice the first gentleman sit down.

During the demo, on my first walk-through, I had to stop at row X for the second time to address the carry-on and tray tables, although I would have most likely noticed the gentleman at this time, I did not. I knew we had been told we were on a "short taxi" so there was a time constraint already. During my oxygen demo, I once again had to address row X, as they still had not moved their carry-on and now were not wearing their facial coverings. Again, I did not notice the gentleman.

We quickly got up after 10,000 feet, I went to the back to get the snacks and this is when I realized he had not been sitting there when I briefed initially. I distributed snacks and then went to the gentleman who was sitting in seat XX3 and his wife who had moved to YY2 after he boarded. I gave him a briefing at that time.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported not briefing an exit row passenger due to the late arrival of the passenger.
ACN: 1759020

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude AGL Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function Dispatch: Dispatcher
Qualification Dispatch: Dispatcher
ASRS Report Number Accession Number: 1759020
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector Person: Dispatch

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
This morning I had XX aircraft on my desk and all of a sudden the ATC strips were not filing. I had to then manually file all my flight strips which is a lengthy process with so many aircraft and immediately I was task saturated. I was able to get a few flights to depart but after I had to call in a ZZZ1 flight, I lost the ability to flight follow since that process takes a longer time than manually filing strips over the internet.
The issue we have is everyone was affected and I couldn't ask another Dispatcher for help since they were also having issues and didn't have the free time to look after additional flights along with thunderstorms all over.

Having IT issues is nothing new and we need to have faster resolutions and our workload is so high we can easily get over our head in an instant. We need more dispatchers for this shift and we have many dispatchers on furlough that could come in and work and it would help to have someone from IT inside for help.

The big issue is our company cares more for the bottom line than for the safety of the thousands of passengers we fly. I'm very fearful we will have some major incident soon.

**Synopsis**

Dispatcher reported being overwhelmed with aircraft due to staffing shortages and computer system difficulties.
**ACN: 1758920**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Night

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Takeoff

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 154
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3000
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758920
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification:Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number:Accession Number : 1758942
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Attendant

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
The A Flight Attendant immediately contacted us through the service interphone after hearing the single ring indicating our climb through 10,000 feet. He stated that he was not seated during takeoff, his galley was not secure, and that coffee had spilled on himself and his iPad. He then went on to state that the reason he was not able to complete his tasks prior to pushback and departure was because he was having to deal with passengers and their improper usage of masks. The B, C, and D Flight Attendants did not mention any passenger issues to us.

As the First Officer, take a more proactive role in ensuring the flight attendants acknowledge the single ring prior to takeoff. Also, it is my understanding that the flight attendants are supposed to immediately inform the pilots of any disruption or disturbance in the cabin in which they are unable to perform or complete their required tasks.

Narrative: 2
After giving the chime and monitoring the bell across the PA I called for the Before Takeoff Checklist. After completing the checklist we switched the radio to Tower and they cleared us for takeoff with an aircraft on a 3 NM final. With this distraction, I failed to listen to the A FA make his Departure PA. Around 10,000 feet the A FA called to say he had been in the aisle during takeoff. He told the FO he had been talking to a couple of passengers about wearing their masks and hadn't received the attendant chime. He told the FO he had not fully secured the galley and had coffee spilled on his EFB and personal device. He said he had no physical injury or harm and that overall he was fine. I clearly heard the chime, but failed to monitor his PA.

A FA should not be monitoring masks before takeoff at that time because non compliant passengers are less of a safety risk than delaying preparation for takeoff. I will be more cognizant of listening to the FA PA per the AOM in the future.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a Flight Attendant was not seated for departure due to having to deal with passengers not properly wearing face masks.
ACN: 1758916

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 17000

Environment
Light: Dusk

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use. STAR: ZZZZZ
Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 59
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 59
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1758916
Human Factors: Fatigue
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Workload

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 55
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 6000
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1758930
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
ATC changed the arrival and issued a speed up followed by a slow down speed restriction and also a descent clearance somewhere in there. The PF inadvertently deleted the crossing altitude restriction at ZZZZZ. He selected VERT SPEED to continue the descent and I failed to ensure we changed the MCP altitude to prevent going below 17,000 feet. Subsequently, I verbally intervened just prior to descending below 17,000 feet, but didn't do so effectively. We descended to 16,750 feet before recovering to 17,000 feet.

Contributing factors included: Day one of UOE [Upgrade Operating Experience]. PF has been on an AM schedule. PM didn't sleep well the night prior. PM lack of recent experience in FO seat.

I made the assumption that the PF was aware of the restriction and would meet it. When I noticed that the MCP altitude window was incorrect, I verbally intervened but did so ineffectively. I should have done a better job of bringing it to his attention and physically intervened as necessary.

Narrative: 2
We were descending on the ZZZZZ1 STAR into ZZZ. I was the PF on my first day of UOE [Upgrade Operating Experience]. During the descent, ATC changed the arrival to the ZZZZZ STAR and to descend via the STAR. Then we were assigned to cross ZZZZZ at 17,000 feet, and instructed to start the descent prior to our VNAV profile descent point. I selected Vertical Speed mode on the MCP and verbalized and verified that mode. I did not reset the MCP altitude from the lowest published altitude to 17,000 feet for the change in mode. As we approached 17,000 feet at ZZZZZ, the PM said, "There's 17,000 feet." As I realized that we weren't leveling off, I spun the Vert Speed back into a climb and reset the altitude window to 17,000 feet. The lowest altimeter reading I saw was 16,720 feet, and we corrected back to 17,000 feet. The PM told ATC that we were at ZZZZZ at 16,700 feet,
and ATC directed us to descend via the ZZZZZ. There were no other issues with this flight or event.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported numerous changes to the arrival resulted in a crossing restriction altitude overshoot.
ACN: 1758904

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 26000

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Icing
Weather Elements / Visibility: Thunderstorm
Weather Elements / Visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Transport
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: PFD
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 4605
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 121
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 86
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1758904
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Moderate to extreme precipitation throughout State X, enroute from ZZZ to ZZZ1 at 26,000 feet. Cleared by ZZZ Center about 60 NM south southeast of ZZZ VOR to deviate as needed for weather, when able direct ZZZ2. Using both radar and weather depicted on [the GPS], a flight path to avoid the worst of the weather was successfully flown.

Apparently in evaluating the weather display, and scrolling ahead to see where further weather was present on the GPS touchscreen nav/com, the COM1 soft button on the touch screen was inadvertently touched, and so center frequency for ZZZ Center was inadvertently swapped back to another/previous frequency. The issue was not immediately recognized because I was busy circumnavigating weather, and besides, with COVID, air traffic and comms are reduced. And since we had received clearance to deviate, when able direct ZZZ2, there was no need to immediately communicate further with center.

As a best practice, I will normally monitor guard on COM2, especially when flying in Class A airspace. However, with the additional workload of avoiding weather since takeoff, I did not do this.

As a result, I had inadvertently left Center frequency, and did not notice the problem until shortly after I crossed the boundary of ZZZ/ZZZ2 airspace, maybe XX minutes later, at which time I queried ZZZ Center on the frequency I thought was ATC freq. No answer. So called on previous frequency, was advised they had been looking for me, and handed me over to ZZZ2 Center.

After another XX minutes had passed, ZZZ2 Center asked me to call ZZZ Center upon landing because of a possible pilot deviation. I did so, and was advised being NORDO for XXX miles in Class A airspace is reportable as a pilot deviation in the wake of the Payne Stewart mishap.

Lessons learned?
1. Take extra care when using scroll or zoom features on GPS unit or any touch screen navigator to ensure frequencies / other settings are not inadvertently changed.
2. Always monitor guard on COM2, but especially in Class A airspace.

Synopsis

Pilot reported being out of communication with ATC in Class A due to inadvertently changing frequencies and not noticing it until some time later.
ACN: 1758752

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 37000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Component: 1
Aircraft Component: Altimeter
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Component: 2
Aircraft Component: Airspeed Indicator
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Component: 3
Aircraft Component: Air Data Computer
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758752
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

**Person : 2**

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1758755
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Workload

**Events**

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed : All Types
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Diverted
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Aircraft : Equipment Problem Dissipated

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Aircraft

**Narrative: 1**

Captain (CA) PF, First Officer (FO) PM. At FL370 while in cruise phase just north of ZZZ I noticed my airspeed starting to deteriorate. I glanced over at the FO's instruments and noticed his airspeed increasing. I then disconnected the A/P, A/T and went on Standby Attitude Indicator and began a descent to 16,000 feet, requested priority handling and began running the QRH for IAS Disagree. We also experienced an altimetry anomaly. FO showing high and CA showing low. As we descended my airspeed reached 120 Knots and was below the stick shaker "hook" on the Speed Tape while the FO's airspeed indicator was showing at or in excess of Maximum. Notified Dispatch, the flight attendants, passengers and ATC. At about FL200 the instruments on our PFDs began to stabilize in the normal range. This particular issue had been written up in the Aircraft Logbook 5 previous times. I asked Operations if they rather have the aircraft in ZZZ1 or ZZZ2. Returned to ZZZ1 as per Operations request. Cruised at 14,000 feet in order to land below MAX Landing Weight. Landed in ZZZ1 at 144,000 pounds with no further incident.

Repetitive AML Entry.

Keep aircrafts either parked or flying for the duration of this economic downturn, do not rotate aircraft in and out.
**Narrative: 2**

[Narrative provided no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

Air Carrier flight crew reported reoccurring altimeter and airspeed maintenance problems on an aircraft that had been in and out of service several times during the "economic downturn."
ACN: 1758738

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758738
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Vertical : 1000
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Light aircraft, 270 heading off Runway XXC climbing out of 6,000 at 3.8 feet per minute climb rate we received a TA/RA. Instructed to level off. We had traffic in sight and complied with the level off. Cleared conflict with about 1,000 feet plus separation and VFR horizontal separation.

Light aircraft high climb rate.
Reduction of throttle and lower pitch and complied with RA.

Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict followed by TCAS RA instructions which they adhered to by leveling off. The Captain made reference that the aircraft was light in weight for this flight.
ACN: 1758726

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758726
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contribution Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contribution Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On a quick turn at ZZZ I closed out the flight and walked up to the terminal and spoke with the gate agent. I asked for number of passengers on the outbound flight among other things.

When I walked back down the jetway, a ramper showed me a photo of the inside of the cargo door where a nut was missing. I acknowledged that I intended to write up the maintenance issue.

I stopped in the forward galley to perform the Flight Attendant (FA) Briefing. It took longer due to side talking about FA's personal impact from COVID.

I got the cockpit and prepared the plane for the next flight forgetting to write up the maintenance issue (cargo door missing nut). I did not make the First Officer aware of the issue.

Quick turn. Distracted.

Pilots should verify maintenance issues first hand at the time it is brought to their attention. Pilots should write up all maintenance issues prior to beginning next flight. Pilots should follow the write up with a call to maintenance.

Synopsis

Air Carrier Captain reported failure to enter a maintenance discrepancy in log book. Captain was distracted due to an extended briefing with the Flight Attendants regarding the personal impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1758703

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: GPS
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758703
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Time Pressure

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758708
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Some background, I am a new Captain, and this pairing I was flying with a First Officer (FO) [for whom] this was his second trip off IOE and had not flown for 30 days. I was the pilot monitoring, and the FO was the pilot flying. Descending into the airport we were assigned an RNAV approach. The FO did a good job setting up for the approach and giving the brief. We discussed some of the things about the approach including what to setup in the box and what needs to be done on the Mode Control Panel while we are flying the approach. There was lots of traffic in the area and the Controller turned us on the downwind a little early to avoid traffic that just had gone around. As we proceeded the Controller then vectored us on base and then on a 120 degree heading to intercept the approach coarse. We were also cleared down to 1,500 feet MSL and instructed to hold that altitude until established. The FO was slowing down and getting the aircraft configured prior to the FAF. As the aircraft approached 2 miles from the FAF we were flaps 5, the LNAV course just captured and we were level at 1,500 feet. I just finished checking in with Tower and got our landing clearance when the FO called "below 200 flaps 15." I did not verify the Gear was down, like I normally do and selected the flaps to 15 at which time the gear horn went off. It caught us both off guard, but I immediately selected a lower flap setting to quiet the horn and selected the gear down. The FO then called for the remaining flaps on schedule. While we were lowering the flaps the FO noticed that we just passed the FAF and the aircraft was not descending. The reason was he had not set the altitude window to the DA when cleared for the approach, and I had not noticed it because of the communication with Tower followed by the gear horn. Once he realized it he clicked off the autopilot and started the descent. I immediately set the altitude window to the correct altitude. As I glanced up I notice he had just passed through 1,000 feet MSL and was at 1,400 feet VS and reducing. As I mentioned the VS and was considering a go-around he was at 1,000 feet VS and on path so we proceeded. The landing was uneventful and on speed within the touch down zone.

New as a Captain, new First Officer, his second trip off IOE and 30 days between trips.

I let the FO land the next landing and fly the approach. We made sure that it was well briefed and I have added in my approach to landing brief about go-arounds, because the more I think about it we should just have done a go-around.

Narrative: 2

Given heading 120 at 1500 feet to land XL just outside the FAF in ZZZ. Slowing down and configuring the aircraft I called for flaps 15 before calling for the gear. Gear horn sounded, Captain initially brought flaps back to 5 and I called for gear. Got configured for landing at FAF. Shortly after crossing the FAF noticed the plane wasn't descending, disconnected the autopilot and began a descent, initially a little too abrupt, noticed about 1,400 feet per
minute descent. Became stable at 800 feet, continued and landed without issues.

New to the plane, and a long break in between flights, 30 days since my last flight. The gear horn disoriented us enough to miss the altitude still set at 1,500 and not the DA.

Configure earlier and be sure to call for gear before calling for flaps 15. Continue to scan, keep situational awareness.

Synopsis

Air Carrier flight crew reported flying an unstabilized approach. First Officer was the Pilot Flying and had not flown in 30 days.
**ACN: 1758641**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ ARTCC
- State Reference: US
- Altitude MSL Single Value: 2100

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number Accession Number: 1758641
- Human Factors: Fatigue
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification

**Events**
- Anomaly Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
- Anomaly Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Anomaly Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
- Detector Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Before departure we were re-routed because of convective activity over ZZZ1. After airborne we were re-routed 2 more times and assigned the ZZZZZ2 arrival and 17,000 feet as a final altitude. Later we climbed to FL210 for a better ride. We had checked the arrival constraints while at our cruise altitude of 17,000 feet and after climbing to FL210 we didn't notice that we were now missing a published constraint at ZZZZZ Intersection. Just prior to ZZZZZ Intersection, we were cleared to descend via the arrival so we set the bottom altitude, confirmed it and started the descent. The First Officer noticed the constraint on the chart and brought it to my attention, so I leveled off and added the constraint to the FMS and shortly resumed the descent. ATC did not mention the early descent and we were unsure of how far off the published path we got.

Cause - High workload, weather, lack of currency, failure to recheck descent profile after climbing. End of a long 3 leg day.

Suggestions - Automation awareness during low altitude cruise operations.

**Synopsis**

Air Carrier First Officer reported missing an altitude constraint during arrival and cited workload, fatigue and lack of flight currency as contributing factors.
ACN: 1758627

Time / Day
  Date: 202008
  Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
  Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
  State Reference: US

Environment
  Weather Elements / Visibility: Thunderstorm
  Light: Dusk

Aircraft
  Reference: X
  ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
  Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
  Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
  Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
  Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
  Flight Plan: IFR
  Mission: Passenger
  Flight Phase: Cruise
  Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person: 1
  Reference: 1
  Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
  Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
  Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
  Function. Flight Crew: Captain
  Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
  Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
  Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
  Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
  Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 3230
  Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 70
  Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 1045
  ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1758627
  Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
  Human Factors: Time Pressure
  Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
  Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Dispatch

Person: 2
  Reference: 2
  Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
  Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
  Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
  Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Events

Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result. Flight Crew: Diverted

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather
Primary Problem: Weather

Narrative: 1

We diverted back to ZZZ midflight due to a severe line of thunderstorms.

Dispatch was pressuring us to go when we did not feel that our planned routing would keep us clear of extremely hazardous weather. They filed us at XX,000 feet right in the convective cloud base on a flight that should have been closer to YY,000 [feet]. The squall line extended from ZZZ1 to east of ZZZ2. There were no gaps in the wall greater than 10 miles between storms prior to departure. I told Dispatch that it would be a waste of fuel and the passenger's time to conduct the flight because there was a very good chance of diverting. They still wanted us to go.

Nearing ZZZ [VOR] way point we observed extreme radar returns and did not see a safe way of maintaining proper distance from the severe weather. We contacted ATC for deviations and then ultimately a return to ZZZ. We had to hold and burn off fuel to land under MLW (Maximum Landing Weight).

In times such as these I understand that the company wants to complete as many revenue flights as possible. However if in the opinion of the Captain, the flight cannot be completed safely and would in turn cost the company $X's more by attempting the flight, dispatchers should hold the flights crews evaluation of the situation to a higher standard and not be in a position to pressure crews and ultimately waste company dollars.

Narrative: 2

Diverted back to ZZZ after approaching a wall of thunderstorms. We saw from the ground on radar that it was likely not safely navigable. Dispatch asked us to go anyway. When approaching the storm the inflight radar was nearly 100% attenuated at 50 miles.

If pilots aren't confident of making it around storms flight should have been delayed until storms have passed or broke up.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported diverting due to an impassable line of thunderstorms. Crew stated that Dispatch was pressuring them to continue on planned routing to destination.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft: 1</th>
<th>Aircraft: 2</th>
<th>Aircraft: 3</th>
<th>Aircraft: 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier</td>
<td>Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier</td>
<td>Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier</td>
<td>Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing</td>
<td>Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing</td>
<td>Make Model Name: Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng</td>
<td>Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route In Use: None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 4
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1758598
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Confusion

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I had just taken the positions and had began to disinfect my work areas. I cleared Aircraft X to land on Runway XX, the aircraft was approximately 6 miles out. I saw that I had Aircraft Y, with a release time, approaching Runway XY. West Departure began flashing me a point-out for Aircraft Z assigned 040, moving into my departure path. West then called on the shout-line, to provide me with more information regarding Aircraft Z’s intentions to fly a radial from Center for 20 miles, and will approach my departure path. I then cleared another Aircraft Y’s company flight to land on Runway XX.

At this point I was distracted with avoiding the point-out, making the release time for Aircraft Y, and disinfecting the work area. I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on runway XY, and had overlooked the Aircraft X that was cleared to land on Runway XX. By the time I noticed my mistake, Aircraft X was over the threshold of Runway XX and Aircraft Y was aligned with the runway. I canceled Aircraft Y’s takeoff clearance, before Aircraft Y began the takeoff roll, and kept him in position on the runway. Aircraft X landed runway XX, followed by the other Aircraft Y’s company flight. Before clearing Aircraft Y for departure. Even though Aircraft Y could have departed in between the Aircraft X and the following Aircraft Y’s company flight, I decided to go with the larger gap.
Under normal circumstances, even with working all the positions, I would not have overlooked Aircraft Y that was cleared to land on Runway XX. All of the memory aides were in use. However, my scan was ineffective because I was distracted with disinfecting my work area; and remembering what stuff I had cleaned or did not clean, what stuff I touched that was clean or was not clean, and to disinfect my hand before touching already cleaned surfaces, if I touched something that was not clean. Combine that with the required head-down time to disinfect and that I had just taken the position, led to me being mentally unfocused enough to scan properly or remember my previous instructions.

I honestly am unsure about what could be changed. It is not really possible to clean a position before you take it, as the person still working the position needs to be there and touch everything, and cleaning around a person would be distracting. Aside from eliminating COVID-19 or testing everyone when they get to the facility, work is still the most likely place for me to contract the coronavirus.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller reported being distracted with sanitizing the work area while operations were still going on resulting in an aircraft being cleared to taxi on to the runway while another aircraft was landing on an intersecting runway.
ACN: 1758535

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758535
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy

Narrative:

Noted after informing the flight deck of final passenger count that a guest had a mask with direct vent. Approached guest and apologized noting our policy requires a mask without a vent and offered to get one from stock on board. Guest switched it out no issues. Did station miss this? How is this communicated to guests if [they have] the wrong mask?

Ensure during boarding guests have proper masks.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger boarded the aircraft with a non compliant type of face mask. Flight Attendant questioned how customer service missed the passenger wearing the non compliant face mask.
ACN: 1758529

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Cruise
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1758529
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

We went through with our beverage service with no problems. After the second trash service, Flight Attendant (FA) D came back and informed us that she had to ask [Passenger in] XX4 to put his mask on since he was no longer eating or drinking. We believe the person was supposed to be seated in XX5 but was with his family. She then had to ask him a few more times to put his mask back on. When we went to go by with the final trash service before landing, we noticed he again was not wearing his mask at all and not actively eating or drinking. I went up to him and informed him that we need him to wear his mask and it needs to be over his nose and mouth as part of the policy. He then informed me that he had a medical issue preventing him from wearing the mask. I let him know that it has been a policy that every person flying must wear their mask over their nose and mouth and that I didn't want to report him which would suspend his travel privileges with us. He looked at me very annoyed and said "well if I hold my water bottle, I cannot wear my mask, right?" I let him know that our policy is to wear your mask when not actively eating or drinking. So if he isn't drinking, he needs to be wearing his mask. I let him know that if he has a medical condition, then he may need to fly with a different carrier for the time being and that if he had a return flight, he would need to comply. He then took his mask off, and started to actively drink his water slowly so he didn't have to wear it. We were about to land, and at that point it was too late to give him another warning. I spoke to the Customer Service Agent upon landing and informed her of the situation and she discovered they were flying back in a week. I let her know I was going to fill out a report and she said she would talk to her lead about what to do next. Potentially suspend his flying privileges, but not his wife and child. They were complying the whole time. He was the only one not complying.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to comply with the face mask policy during flight.
ACN: 1758518

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Crew Rest Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758518
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Temporary, COVID inspired FARs require that only one Flight Attendant (FA) can take their break in the crew facility per break. However, FARs (and company policies as well) state that if the crew facility is occupied at all, the bunk with the phone in it 'must' be occupied as well. Therefore, if FAs are not allowed to occupy more than one bunk per break in order to keep physical distance from other FAs and not re-use any bunks, then we would actually be violating the FAR that requires the phone bunk to be occupied.

Therefore, I occupied the phone bunk on this flight for my break in order to fulfill that FAR and safe practice. I left my mask on during my contractual rest break. There was another FA in the facility as well, in the most forward bunk furthest away from the phone bunk, which is the most aft on the right side.

For the second break, another FA occupied the phone bunk (after I had wiped all surfaces
I had touched) in order to fulfill that safety requirement--but in violation of the COVID policy not reusing of bunk rule. There was also another FA taking their (second) break in the facility.

I feel it is 'more' unsafe to not comply with the requirement of having a FA in the phone bunk if the rest area is being occupied, therefore I complied with the older (and more logical) FAR. Senior FA who chose to use bunk for their break did not want to use the phone bunk.

Also, I feel it is unsafe to only have one FA taking their contractual rest break in the facility per rest break. I have occasionally encountered FAs on rest breaks that have had health issues that needed medical attention. If someone were to suffer a health emergency while alone on a rest break, it could be a long time before another crew member could be alerted.

Also, if a fire were to break out in the rest area we would not have enough FAs to both fight the fire and to communicate to the cockpit on the status of such an incident.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported safety concerns with having to follow COVID-19 procedures regarding the use of the crew rest area.
**ACN: 1758517**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Route In Use: Direct
- Cabin Lighting: High

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Deplaning
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1758517
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

A commuting Captain was not wearing [a] mask the whole flight. The situation started when I asked the [commuting] Captain during the flight to wear his mask, his reason [was] because of the open bottled water he was holding the whole flight. When deplaning the commuting Captain approached me before he is about to leave the aircraft and asked me about the wearing of the mask policy and mentioned that I was being [demanding].

I do believe that safety is our priority [for] both passengers and employees, and I believe that the Captain should be the model to all the passengers for wearing the mask in the aircraft, but he is the one who breaks the procedure.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a commuting Captain was non compliant with face mask policy.
ACN: 1758500

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758500
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

After landing we realized we had landed at 150 knots when approach speed was supposed to be 136. 150 knots was our clearance to the final approach fix. We were distracted looking for birds the Controller told us were at our approach end. This was my second flight after not flying in three months.

At 500 feet instead of saying stabilize clear to land should have verified approach speed bugged and actually flying.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a speed deviation on landing and attributes the error to being distracted as they looked for birds pointed out by ATC.
ACN: 1758486

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: FO

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: GPS
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Direct

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758486
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Departure Airport
Result.Flight Crew: Diverted

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
About 45 minutes from landing at ZZZZ1, we received a message from Dispatch advising us that a natural event was being tracked in an area that would interfere with our approach and landing. Dispatch was working to provide us with a diversion airport suitable to the aircraft we were flying. Workload was compressed due to fuel range, crew duty, and COVID-19 regulations which were in effect. During descent we communicated via ACARS that the crew would need rest accommodations at the landing airport. I believe I failed to communicate my precise intentions to Dispatch concerning this phase. We were told that management was working to find a suitable diversion situation for us. At this time the [Captain] and myself agreed to get the airplane on the ground safely and then decide what we would do from there. We set up and conducted an approach to Runway XX in ZZZZ. Upon landing we were given a gate, but were unable to open doors due to the virus lock down. We agreed that our only reasonable option was to take fuel and Dispatch back to ZZZ, and this we did. We discussed our best way of conducting this flight and signed a fit for duty release. After takeoff on Runway XX, we proceeded to ZZZ and landed without incident.

The divert was unexpected, but of course this sometimes happens. The COVID-19 procedures in effect at our divert airports was definitely a factor. Also, the aircraft we were flying was further limited due to it not being authorized for certain operations in this country. We experienced ACARS no comm at certain phases of descent. We didn't feel we were getting a good picture of what our options would be once we landed, but decided to proceed one step at a time. I take full responsibility for my decision to continue the flight to ZZZ. We actively used tools we had been taught in training. I feel under the onerous conditions of the situation that we acted in a safe and responsible manner.

I believe this situation was made more difficult due to the unusual conditions of COVID-19. The only thing I would suggest, is to use another type aircraft for operations to ZZZZ1, as this would provide us with more flexibility during a divert.

**Synopsis**

Air Carrier First Officer reported that after having to divert they were unable to disembark the aircraft due to COVID-19 restrictions at that airport. The crew decided to refuel and return to the origin airport.
ACN: 1758478

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1758478
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events

Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Aircraft X was enroute when Flight Attendant notified the Captain that several passengers were not complying with crewmember instructions by refusing to correctly wear their face coverings in flight. Numerous nearby passengers complained to the cabin crew and the cabin crew unsuccessfully tried to get the passengers to comply. After multiple attempts all three passengers did not comply with Flight Attendant instructions. The flight continued without further incident.

Passengers were not taking Flight Attendant instructions seriously. Perhaps enacting more severe penalties for non compliance with current face covering policy would make passengers take the situation more seriously.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported several passengers were not complying with the face mask policy.
**ACN: 1758439**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3173
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 96
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3173
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758439
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Company Policy
**Narrative: 1**

The Captain left the flight deck to get some food in the terminal. I remained on the flight deck preparing for the next flight back to ZZZ1. Cleaners came on board as usual to clean the aircraft. Someone had partially closed the flight deck door during this process. The next thing I know I'm overwhelmed and choking on what feels like a strong aerosol type spray. I immediately departed the flight deck as it was hard to breathe. When I exit the aircraft on to the jet bridge the entire cabin crew and deadhead crew were waiting for the cleaners and sprayers to complete the cleaning process. I got some water to try and clear my airway. While I was doing that one of the flight attendants went to talk to the gate agent regarding this situation. Apparently this had happened before. No one knew I was on the flight deck nor did they properly clear the aircraft before spraying. I don't know how long I was breathing those chemicals before it overwhelmed me. I was never informed that the aircraft was going to be sprayed while I was on board.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported ingesting aerosol fumes in the flight deck from cleaners that were on board sanitizing the aircraft without making sure it was empty.
ACN: 1758347

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758347
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Passenger came onboard without a mask (wasn’t even on his person). The other FA asked him to put a mask on and he did. During boarding, he had to be reminded to wear his mask. During climbout, passenger ignored seatbelt sign and got up. Announcement was reiterated to remain seated. He sat back down but did not put seatbelt back on until he was approached to do so. During service, he was again, not wearing mask. I told him to put it on and he complied. During walk through, his seatbelt was once again off while the seatbelt sign was on. He had to be asked again to put it on. He wasn’t happy about it but complied. After the cabin had been secured for landing and the cabin had been secured for anticipated turbulence, he took his mask back off. At that point, it was turbulent and unsafe for us to get up. The other FA had to motion for him to put the mask back on. He complied but the mask continued to come off and we continued to motion to put it back on. After gear came down, the passenger got up (in moderate turbulence and on final approach) and moved seats. We made an announcement for him to be seated immediately. He did not stay in his original seat, but ultimately moved to a different seat anyways.

Upon landing, the other FA told him moving when he did was absolutely unsafe and completely unacceptable. He just got off the airplane. The passenger got up in turbulence on final approach after gear came down and moved seats despite being told not to. It was unsafe to make him move back to seat for weight and balance.

This passenger had a complete disregard for safety and was incredibly non compliant. While all little non compliant moments at first, it continued until he did something that was truly dangerous to the people sitting near him. Not only was he non compliant with our mask policy but his reckless behavior in moving around during turbulence after being told not to could have easily injured those around him. He shouldn't be allowed to travel with us in the future.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non compliant with face mask policy and also changing seats while in turbulence and on final approach.
**ACN: 1758346**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758346
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

**Events**

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was the B FA on Aircraft X. We had a passenger that did not want to wear his mask. Said he had a medical condition. I told him since it was not said or documented in our records [the mask] had to be over his nose if he was not drinking or eating. Passenger was seated in XX1. FA A told me she was talking to him before takeoff. I had to remind him on service. FA D came and said he was not in compliance. We explained to her. Breakdown was in CRM on my part. Allow medical notes from doctors.
Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non compliant with face mask policy during flight. Reporter stated the passenger said he had a medical condition, but it was not noted in the crew's records.
Parents stated their X year old child will not wear [a] mask when we were just about to take off. I was doing final walk through when I discovered [this]. Due to the timing I decided to not enforce mask policy. I stated to parents they may not be able to fly again if
their child does not comply with policy. I asked customer service to meet plane to explain policy for their next flight. Please remove mask policy for children under 5 at minimum.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported allowing a child to fly without wearing a face mask. The child had refused to wear it.
**ACN: 1758342**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758342
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
This is not simply an issue for this flight, but after 5 days of working flights, I want to report the concern since it happened very frequently on this one. Although we make the announcements about masks often and model proper behavior, passengers often forget to pull the mask up to cover nose and mouth, letting it rest on chin. What is especially problematic is that when I am serving, many pull it down and talk right at my face. I step
back and ask and motion to them to pull it up but often they seem confused. This happens many many times on each flight.

Merely making announcements doesn't seem to do the trick. Serving does not feel safe for me as a result. It may seem like a silly idea, but what about a role play with the two flight attendants after takeoff in front of cabin to demonstrate not to pull down mask? Sort of like the safety demo, with a set script where the one pretends to pull down mask and the other says "Please don't do that!"

It's worth a try. It could stick in people's heads better with a demo, based on teaching techniques.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported problems associated with passengers wearing face masks improperly.
**ACN: 1758326**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 10

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 40
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758326
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
- Detector.Automation: Aircraft Other Automation
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

I was pilot flying. We were light with only XX passengers. Vref was 125. FO called Ref plus 6 at 100 foot call-out. I started reducing power smoothly and power was idle at about 50 feet AGL. Flare was initiate at about 25 feet AGL. We received stick shaker just prior to 10 feet call-out. Slightly lowered the nose and landed normally with mains first.

I believe that the main cause of the shaker activation was the Vref being so low due to the lower than normal weight due to less passengers and fuel. Vref being so low and closer to low speed cue may have caused the stick shaker to activate while flaring. Another cause could have been from reducing the power too early however I’m unsure if this is the cause due to being on speed at 100 feet with a speed of Vref +6 and slowly reduced power until the 50 foot call-out from the RA. I would however like any insight that can be given so that this does not reoccur.

I believe I should have kept the power in a little longer and possibly even kept the aircraft a little faster even though we were on speed at 100 feet. Also a go-around should have been performed as soon as the stick shaker activated due to an unstable approach. The aircraft was still flying and was close to the ground so I gently relieved back pressure to reduce angle of attack until the aircraft touched down, but could have performed a balked landing and came around to try again.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing a stick shaker at 10 feet on final and cited a low Vref due to the aircraft being light in weight as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1758276

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758276
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was Captain on Aircraft X, ZZZ to ZZZ1 today. A large family traveling together with some adolescent children created a disturbance at the gate area and continued after boarding. The station CSM [Customer Service Manager] tried to help contain their behavior, however; after my FA asked one of the children to wear their mask properly once boarded, the family took exception and caused a stir using unacceptable language. I stepped back to salvage the situation and calm the passengers, but I was not successful, and I asked for several of them to deplane. Local security and both station managers and in flight managers arrived to assist. Good work by the local ZZZ CSM allowed us to only remove the X adults and the several children. This resulted in a delay, of which we made up some enroute. Flight was uneventful otherwise and several passengers stated appreciation for our handling of the situation.

CSM attempted to preempt any problems prior to boarding. She was a great CSM.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a family was removed from a flight during boarding due non compliance with face mask policy.
ACN: 1758247

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Other

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 11234
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 64.3
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3267
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758247
Human Factors: Physiological - Other

Events
Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred: All Types
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: Work Refused

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
After reporting at XA:15 for a XB:45 pushback to ZZZZ, we were delayed for a maintenance issue. Our CCO time was XD:28, we waived and agreed to extend for 2 hours
until XF:28. The time ran out and we were delayed because of legality issues. It took us 1 hour to get to the hotel, because of late night and COVID-19 procedures. I entered my room at XG:30. I tried to find some food because the intention was to complete the 15 hour flight to ZZZZ. I found no food so elected to try to rest. I rolled around trying to decompress and unwind from the on again off again rolling delay of the maintenance issue. I finally fell asleep around XJ:00. At XK:00, the hotel started to come alive. There were numerous door openings and closings. They were obviously crew members leaving for work. Not 45 minutes after numerous crew members departed for work housekeeping arrived to clean and disinfect the rooms. It seemed like due to COVID-19 the process took longer and was much louder than it should have been. By that time it was XN:00 and I had slept for maybe 60 minutes. I decided I was not fit to fly due to operational caused fatigue and informed the crew desk at XO:00.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported a maintenance delay combined with COVID-19 procedures resulted in being unfit to fly due to fatigue.
ACN: 1758133

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ机场
State Reference: US
Relative Position. Distance. Nautical Miles: 5
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 1800

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Haze / Smoke
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 3
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 20000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification. Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 10000
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 4
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 200
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1758133
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Was told to remain clear of Class C. Haze and smoke worse than expected, and due to reduced visibility was momentarily distracted. Filed to maintain clearance from Class C. Controller did not mention it, but I looked at GPS when I had a moment, and was in Class C or very close.

Really, the issue here was due to COVID, I have little flying time in last 6 months, and was behind the airplane as a result. Messing around with brand new avionics, I was distracted long enough to breach Class C.

Synopsis
Pilot reported a possible airspace violation and states the reason was due to the lack of flying time in the last 6 months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
On this flight, I feel the safety of passengers and crew were put in jeopardy. A uniformed, non-revenue pilot felt that the company policy that all passengers and crew members must wear a face covering didn't apply to him. He stated that he had a doctor's note
stating he didn't have to wear it. The agent spoke with him and the working pilot, and they both decided that he didn't need to wear the mask. I didn't feel safe enough to fly, and removed myself from the flight. I question why, in a pandemic, the Captain has sole authority over this type of safety procedure.

All employees need to be aware of company safety procedures.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a non-revenue passenger was allowed to ride on the flight and not required to wear a face mask.
**ACN: 1758114**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: AGL: Single Value: 0

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1758114

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Ambiguous

**Narrative:**

This flight was originally scheduled to be a type X aircraft, but was downgraded to a type Y aircraft. One of the Customer Service Reps asked me if they could use the blocked seats, X5 and X6 because first was booked with too many people and they would have to downgrade two passengers. I said no, X5 is my assigned jumpseat due to the FAA exemption guide due to COVID. My normal jumpseat is X5 inboard, but the exemption reference guide has my assigned jumpseat as seat X12 for this aircraft. There were three agents working the flight. Boarding was chaotic as they were trying to depart to as close on time (the aircraft swap made the flight late) as possible. The door was closed quickly and there were two passengers sitting in seats X5 and X6. I asked them if they were assigned those seats, because when I looked 20 minutes prior they were still blocked in my link. They had boarding passes that gave them those seats, so I had to sit in my normal jumpseat of X12 inboard. I was specifically asked about it and I said no, so I’m not sure why two passengers were placed in those seats and how those seats were able to be unblocked in the first place.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported being displaced from the seats assigned due to COVID-19 changes, by passengers assigned to the seats.
ACN: 1758109

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Door Area
Cabin Activity: Deplaning
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758109
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
As the crew was leaving the plane one of the ground personnel told the whole crew (very loud and rudely) that one of our passengers was wearing a bandanna as a face covering. We were not aware during boarding; no one had a bandanna on. I told him we cannot police everyone changing masks. I personally believe he changed it as they were leaving
the plane as I never saw a bandanna on anyone as they deplaned. Flight Attendant C handed a mask to the gentleman that we saw in customs wearing a bandanna mask. She had one and asked him to wear it instead of the bandanna.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported being told by a ground person that one of the deplaning passengers was wearing a face mask that did not meet regulations.
ACN: 1758059

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component: 1
Aircraft Component: Airspeed Indicator
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Component: 2
Aircraft Component: Altimeter
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758059
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Ground operations were relatively uneventful except for some discrepancies with the aircraft upon arrival. APU was running and ground power was on the aircraft, there was 300 pounds of fuel in the center tank and there was a 400 pounds split in the mains with the left side lower. I discussed with the FO our cost saving measures which require waiting to start the APU. I elected to run the APU off of a right main with cross feed open in order to balance fuel prior to takeoff. Our release was scheduled for 10,500 pounds but we had 12,000 pounds in the tanks and was surprised the release was not accurate. The FO and I discussed TO and Landing data, fuel distribution, and the location of center body fuel pumps as well as the requirement to monitor the cockpit if center pumps are used. We also discussed the need to be extra vigilant when flying into or out of ZZZ or ZZZ1 due to maintenance and storage at those locations. Forms review revealed [seats] X 1, 2, 3 power ports inoperative and I requested the gate agent re-seat the passengers from X1 AND X2 prior to boarding. FO did the walk around about 20-15 minutes prior to departure. On return I asked if he saw the pumps in the wheel well, since no one had shown them to him, we went out quickly and I pointed 4 fuel pumps accessed from the wheel well. The rest of ground operations appeared uneventful. We pushed back 5 minutes early with no abnormal last chance from the ground crew and then we were give a controlled TO time due to flow control into ZZZ2.

We were cleared for Takeoff and as PF I hand flew the aircraft to approximately 12-15,000 feet and then engaged the left autopilot. After level off we were cleared direct ZZZZZZ (feeder fix for ZZZZZ ZZZ2). During cruise @ FL220 I burned the 300 pounds from center tank and cross fed to balance mains. At approximately 20 minutes after TO, while in cruise I notice the CA and FO altimeters were "bouncing" about 20 feet standby was normal and all 3 airspeed indicators agreed. We discussed possible mountain wave, or some static port icing. Airspeed was stable but we set 280 KIAS then we set 290 KIAS for STAR transition. Then we were cleared ZZZZZZ and I set 270 KIAS to match STAR restriction. Then 20 miles prior to top of descent we were given "descend via ZZZZZ4". I set 6000 feet in the MCP and verified VNAV path and executed the "descend now" for 1000 VVI to capture the path. Then CA and FO altimeters were about 20 feet different and they were about 250-300 feet from the standby altimeter. During the descent we were given 17,000 then stopped at 11,000 feet then direct ZZZZZZ for XXL then Descend and maintain 5,000 feet.

During the descent, the split from standby altimeter was reduced and the bounce seemed to quicken and lessen. By 7,000 feet it had disappeared completely. All indications were normal. We configured Flaps 30 degrees Brakes 2 with a standard landing assessment. I disengaged the autopilot at about 1,000 feet and the landing rollout and taxi back to X22 were uneventful.

I had failed to sign the logbook prior to flight. So, after flight I reviewed the last 7-10 days to see if there were any similar write-ups. I saw the aircraft sat for 3 days. I didn't notice anything else in the logbook and signed it.

I met the oncoming CA on the jet bridge and discussed what I saw. I offered to write it in the logbook if he wanted and he declined. I said it was a little weird but seemed to self correct and didn't want to waste Maintenance time on something that they "could not duplicate." Later I received a call from a safety representative and was told about an air
return for an unreliable airspeed / altitude. We agreed I should have written up the event in the log book and this is the reason for my report.

Causal factors include:
1: Maintenance procedure not complied with or annotated in logbook.
2: Aircraft repositioning crew failed to notice static blockage.
3: Inattention to detail. Flight crew failed to notice static blockage during walk around.
4: Low sun angle and Jet bridge may have partially obscure view of blockage.
5: Ground push crew failed to notice blockage during ground operation.
6: Arrival ground crew failed to notice blockage.
7: PIC failed to make a logbook entry regarding altitude anomalies even though they appeared to self correct.
8: Ground/Maintenance failed to notice blockage and PIC did not do a post flight inspection after having knowledge of the possible problem with the static ports.

Suggestions:
1: Write up any abnormal indications and let maintenance determine if it's acceptable or not.
2: Be extra vigilant because airplanes are being stored and they break more often.
3: ZZZ is a maintenance base, so consider an early show and have both pilots do the walk around.
4: Focus! Many FOs are distracted with job security.
5: PIC post flight. Take the extra minute to do a post flight walk around after an event like this or one requiring a write-up.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing unreliable airspeed and altitude indications. Captain stated that due to not reviewing the logbook before the flight and an improper preflight, the potential pitot-static system issue was not identified prior to the flight.
We were preparing the cockpit for departure and were given a form for the Refueling Door Cycling Procedure. I remember reading about this and I remember that a message must be sent. I also remember there was some verbiage that needed to be written in the text field.
I could not remember exactly what needed to be written. I found the reference and read through it quickly and I missed the area that had the required verbiage. Being close to departure time and not able to locate the exact verbiage I entered the Fuel on Board figure.

As a suggestion move the verbiage into a message. Also it would be very helpful if the reminder about the entry could include the verbiage on the form given to the cockpit crew from the fueler. The procedure and information that we need is readily available on this form.

This was my first trip back flying in over 5 months and I was not as comfortable as I normally would be if I was flying a regular basis. I will make sure that this does not happen again in the future.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported not entering required verbiage onto a form and said that lack of recent flying contributed to the oversight.
**ACN: 1758029**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Ground Personnel: Ramp
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1758029
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred: All Types
- Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

Wearing a mask, difficulty breathing indoors, and outdoors in 90+ degree weather. Lack of oxygen, creates confusion and lack of situational awareness. Social distancing should be practiced and mandatory masks should be repealed. Mask optional.

**Synopsis**

Ground employee cited several reasons why face masks should be optional.
Flight Attendant Crew was told before boarding that we had passenger boarded on our flight who had gotten a warning on his previous flight but the Supervisor said as long as he kept his mask on during boarding he was okay to fly on our flight.
This seems like a straight forward violation of policy and safety. The policy is very straight forward. Are the Airline's supervisors not following the procedure because that's their instructions and if so, why not?

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger who had previously violated the face mask policy was allowed to board this flight.
ACN: 1757912

Time / Day
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Door Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757912
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passenger A boarded and I noticed her mask was down I advised her to cover her nose for boarding. She was sitting in X6. She later came up to first class as the Customer Service Agent (CSA) upgraded her. She came up with her mask below her nose. I told her please cover your nose and this is the 2nd time I've had to tell you. She then said is this required I said yes it is required. I spoke to the CSA who informed me she is a non-revenue passenger. This made me very uncomfortable. I asked her if she was non-revenue and who she knew at the Airline. She asked me why and I said because you aren't wearing your mask and I need to report it. She refused to give me the name. I honestly didn't feel comfortable having her be seated in first class and on the flight. He said it was up to me to have her off. I decided to let her go. This is unacceptable behavior for a non-revenue passenger.

I shouldn't have to feel unsafe or have her argue with me about wearing the mask. I would also let them know flight benefits can be removed and how serious COVID-19 is taken.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported non-revenue passenger refused to comply with the company's face mask policy.
ACN: 1757910

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: AGL: Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1757910
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown: Party 1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown: Party 2: Other

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1757914
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown: Party 1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown: Party 2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Guest noted with mask not over nose. Was asked to bring mask over nose in compliance with policy. He gave some body language he was not pleased, but he appeared to bring the mask up. Requested FA B to check as she worked on compliance to ensure passenger's mask was properly donned. It appeared it came down again. During demo he leaned his head in so I did not have a clear view but requested a third time for guest to adhere to the policy of the nose being fully covered. He expressed concern he had trouble seeing. I apologized but thanked him for adherence to the policy indicating it is not fun for anyone. Prior to taxi FA B and I discussed what the next steps would be as this had been the third request for compliance already. I relayed what appeared to be the root of the issue and we concurred if he had his mask properly donned no further action would be needed.

Please have the gate engage with guests before they are allowed to board: 95% of the issues could be resolved if this was followed. Having FA's be the last line is really not great during the pandemic and it appears gate partners are no longer actively enforcing the policy change that occurred on [date].

Narrative: 2

Passenger was notified by both FA A and B to cover nose with face covering. For final compliance guest had nose covered.

Synopsis

Flight attendants reported a passenger was not complying with wearing a face mask and had to be told three times to wear it correctly.
**ACN: 1757908**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ. ARTCC
State Reference: US

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1757908
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

**Events**

Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Passenger in [seat] X3 yelled at FA while FA was doing beverage service because he was upset. I asked passenger in [seat] Y1 to wear his mask while not actively eating or drinking. Which then caused other passengers to speak up on FA behalf. FA A had asked passenger in Y1 twice already to wear his mask when he walked on and wore it as an eye mask and when he took his seat. I told him "I'm going to ask one last time for you to wear your mask, and they will also ask you while connecting to ZZZ1 to wear it."

He put his mask on and I continued service. When I got to X3 he began yelling and asking me how I didn't know the gentleman didn't have a heart condition. I stated it was policy to wear masks regardless and unless specified. He said I was wrong and too authoritative to the gentleman. I calmly stated "Okay, sir" and continued to do my service.

The rest of the flight went fine and no other words were exchanged. Give FA material stating policy explicitly so they can hand material to questioning guests. Passenger in X3 should be suspended for being rude and causing commotion.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported having to tell one passenger to wear a face mask while another passenger spoke up to the Flight Attendant.
During boarding we noticed door strap not fully retracted into housing. I wouldn't normally think this was a big thing but this is the 2nd time in as many weeks that I noticed the door strap not retracted. The earlier incident however caused a delay due to door being closed.
with strap not fully retracted resulting in damage to safety strap housing. I suspect this strap being more often used by cabin cleaners when aircraft is being sprayed which happens every day and in some cases multiple times a day.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant stated a door strap would not fully retract.
ACN: 1757904

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757904
Human Factors: Physiological - Other

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
Upon boarding at XA:19 it was found the aircraft had hot air flowing and unbearable for customers and crews to be onboard. Cleaners were off the airplane. Pilots arrived shortly after and [I] told them the airplane was too hot. Due to the temperature and horrible condition Aircraft X provided the airplane was never appropriately cooled until we had both
engines on and it was nearly unbearable to the crew and passengers being forced to wear a face covering during extreme heat conditions.

Also showed the spraying took place at XA:24 and that time was not accurate as the cleaners were not onboard the plane when we arrived. I cannot confirm it was actually accomplished by the time frame.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported aircraft being hot during boarding and that the aircraft did not cool off until the engines were started.
ACN: 1757896

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi
Cabin Lighting: High

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757896
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

We had a DH at the beginning of our day that was an hour and fifteen minutes late and then an aircraft swap after that. The inbound crew stayed and boarded our passenger, so the plane was full when we arrived. We were rushed to make announcements and pushback. I got distracted by the rush and all the new COVID and mask PA's and I said the old safety demo PA.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that an old version of the safety demo was presented due to being rushed.
ACN: 1757829

Time / Day
Date : 202008

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft
Reference : X
Make Model Name : No Aircraft

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1757829

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Ground Personnel
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1
When company announced the requirements for wearing a mask anytime we could not practice 6 feet of distance, I was happy and felt coming into work would be more safe. Problem is this policy has been in place and it seems like management is not enforcing employees to wear the mask. I haven't seen it myself but I've been told an entire shift doesn't wear mask except maybe two employees. I do feel like it's hard coming into work because I don't feel safe with co-workers who aren't following the new policy and management who allows it to happen.

Synopsis
Ground employee reported concerns about peers not wearing face masks.
**ACN: 1757783**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Night

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying

**ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757783**

**Human Factors**
- Situational Awareness
- Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

The crew vans from the hotel in ZZZ were overloaded with crew. The vans seat 15 and could probably seat seven or eight with social distance and were loaded to 10 or more crew members. Further, the hotel provided three vans for the XA00 AM shuttle, all were equally or greater loaded and the crews were not directed to the van they were assigned by flight number, though the hotel did have a detailed sheet about which crew was supposed to be in which van.

Company needs to send or coordinate a team to assist this property in partitioning off unusable seats. Other locations with the same style van use placards or tape to mark unusable seats. This property is incapable of doing this on their own. The same thing happened on the afternoon pickup and I was forced to pay for my crew due to van overcrowding. Further, contract tracing for crews overnighting at this hotel must assume we were all in the same van. They were mixing crews and vans so that any paperwork that they provide to assist who was on a van with whom is inaccurate. Until company can verify
this hotel's compliance, we are putting every crew member at risk and potentially stranding 30 or more crew members per day due to contact tracing.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier pilot stated hotel was not keeping crews separate from each other on crew transportation from the hotel.
ACN: 1757761

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 5
Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person: 1

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 90
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 15700
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757761
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2

Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1757770
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
During descent we were given a clearance to depart ZZZ [VOR] on heading of 230 and descend to 8,000 feet. Concurrently another Company aircraft, (Flight ABC) was given a descent clearance to cross 15 SW of ZZZ [VOR] at 8,000 feet. They were subsequently given a frequency change. At ZZZ [VOR] we took up a 230 heading. At approximately 15 SW of ZZZ [VOR] at 10,000 feet, the Controller asked if we were going to comply with the 8,000 feet restriction 15 SW of ZZZ [VOR]. I told him no, we were already at that point and we had not been given that clearance. The Controller believed he had given us the same clearance as (Company Flight ABC). He then gave me a frequency change and no further mention of the erroneous clearance.

Narrative: 2
On the ZZZZZ 5 Arrival into ZZZ [airport], approaching ZZZ [VOR] ATC gave us "Depart ZZZ [VOR] heading 230 descend and maintain 8,000 feet. We were complying with the clearance and a few minutes later ATC questioned if we were going to make it to 15 Miles South of ZZZ [VOR] at 8,000 feet. We advised that that was not our clearance and ATC issues the clearance of cross 15 miles south of ZZZ [VOR] at 8,000 feet; however, upon issue of said clearance we were already at 15 miles and at 9,000 feet, so we advised that we were unable. Of note, visibility was poor and ATC radio was highly congested with numerous VFR traffic. I think our call sign just got confused with someone else. We did hear a (Company Flight ABC) also get a similar clearance before the confusion occurred.

I think the airspace was just too saturated and the congestion is what caused the mistakes. We were never issued that clearance, nor did we ever read it back.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported ATC gave them a clearance meant for another company flight.
ACN: 1757736

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757736
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Other Person
When Detected: Taxi
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was combined everything for the cleansing of the cab. Aircraft X landed Runway XX Left, and while rolling out I checked for their gate. They were going to the Ramp as they must have been an International arrival. I issued them keep their speed up to Tango, traffic two miles in trail, then taxi via Bravo to the ramp and to contact Ramp prior to Bravo [X]. They read it back.

Once they exited, I resumed my end of shift clean-up before the first mid shift person showed up in about 7 minutes. There were no other aircraft to work. I gave that next arrival the same instructions (to the Ramp via Bravo) and left out the Ramp contact as they are regular users of that Ramp Control.

As I continued to clean, the line rang from Ramp Tower. When I answered they asked me to have Aircraft X call them as the flight was taxiing in without communicating with them. I hung up the line and tried Aircraft X. The second call they answered and I told them they should have called Ramp Control at Bravo [X]. The pilot communicating said "We are working on it."

I have thoroughly provided anyone going into the Ramp, while the other Ramp closed until traffic picks back up, with the exception of Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y aircraft the exact communication changeover stated in the previous narrative. I really do not know what else I can recommend other than them calling as described and read back.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller working combined positions reported an aircraft did not call Ramp Tower as expected.
ACN: 1757700

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 6638
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 34
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 770
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757700
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This was my first flight in a jet in 5 months due to COVID. We were doing 6 full stop landings at ZZZ. After landing number 3 (I think) while still on the runway we were told by tower to contact Ground. I didn’t want to call Ground while on the runway, so I opted to work on setting up the plane for the next takeoff.

The FMS has to be re-programmed from scratch after each landing which is a lot of work. I was busy doing that and we taxied for 1/4 mile without calling Ground. Tower reached out to us and asked our intentions.

I was in a rush to get the FMS and plane reset for the next takeoff and forgot to call Ground. I’ve never done multiple landings in this plane so this was a non-normal operation for me.

Next time I should not distract myself from contacting ground by doing other work.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported not calling Ground Control after clearing the runway.
**ACN: 1757667**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Angle.Radial: 100
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 15
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1600

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 30
- Light: Night
- Ceiling.Single Value: 10000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: None
- Airspace.TFR: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 700
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 15
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 600
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757667
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
This flight was a sightseeing flight along the ZZZ Skyline with two passengers; at the location at issue I was operating at 1,600 feet MSL underneath the outer shelf of ZZZ Class B Airspace (which begins at 3,600 feet MSL). Upon reaching the southeast edge of the 3 NM ring of the sporting TFR, I noticed that the lights were illuminated. Due to the issues regarding coronavirus I was not sure whether this TFR would be considered active even if a game was playing, given the fact that the games are currently being played with the facility empty. Notwithstanding that, I made an immediate turn to the east to exit that airspace, however, it is possible that I was within the outer limits of that TFR.

Because of the media hysteria regarding coronavirus, and my belief that many games have been cancelled or postponed, I was lulled into a sense of complacency regarding my usual check of active games prior to giving sightseeing flights of the ZZZ skyline.

Although I accept responsibility for this possible regulation violation, I really do not like the idea of having permanent TFRs from one hour prior to the start of an event to one hour after it ends. Regarding the latter, it is very hard to know when a game ends as there is no fixed ending time (and the websites for applicable sports teams often do not report the ending time of a game). I do not believe that having permanent TFRs of this sort do anything to enhance the safety of the fans who attend these particular events--if anyone was heck-bent on causing a serious incident at an event, using an aircraft, he/she would not care about the rules. I would urge the readers of this report to try to influence the FAA to lift these restrictions altogether, or at the very least, pass a regulation prohibiting excessive loitering (for example, continually circling around an event).

**Synopsis**

GA pilot reported entering a sporting TFR and wasn't sure if these type of TFRs are still in place during the COVID-19 pandemic.
## ACN: 1757607

### Time / Day
- **Date:** 202006
- **Local Time Of Day:** 1801-2400

### Place
- **Altitude.AGL.Single Value:** 0

### Environment
- **Flight Conditions:** VMC
- **Light:** Night

### Aircraft
- **Reference:** X
- **Aircraft Operator:** Corporate
- **Make Model Name:** Light Transport, High Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
- **Crew Size.Number Of Crew:** 1
- **Operating Under FAR Part:** Part 91
- **Flight Plan:** IFR
- **Mission:** Passenger
- **Flight Phase:** Takeoff

### Person
- **Reference:** 1
- **Location Of Person.Aircraft:** X
- **Location In Aircraft:** Flight Deck
- **Reporter Organization:** Corporate
- **Function.Flight Crew:** Captain, Pilot Flying, Single Pilot
- **Qualification.Flight Crew:** Instrument, Air Transport Pilot (ATP), Flight Instructor, Multiengine
- **Experience.Flight Crew.Total:** 11600
- **Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days:** 100
- **Experience.Flight Crew.Type:** 190
- **ASRS Report Number.Accession Number:** 1757607
- **Human Factors:** Training / Qualification

### Events
- **Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural:** Published Material / Policy
- **Detector.Person:** Flight Crew
- **Result.General:** None Reported / Taken

### Assessments
- **Contributing Factors / Situations:** Environment - Non Weather Related
- **Contributing Factors / Situations:** Human Factors
- **Primary Problem:** Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

I usually don't need to worry about landing currency - I am busy enough with regular flying that I am always current. I was reviewing my logbook today and realized that I flew this one night flight while not night current. With the decrease in flying associated with the COVID pandemic I lost track of the situation. The flight was uneventful.

In the future I'll use the "currency" feature of my electronic logbook and make sure I am current at all times so something like this can't sneak up on me.

**Synopsis**

Corporate pilot reported not being current for a night flight.
**ACN: 1757590**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: A321
- Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Flight Phase: Initial Climb

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function. Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1757590
- Human Factors: Physiological - Other

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1757582
- Human Factors: Physiological - Other

**Person: 3**
- Reference: 3
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity : Service
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function : Flight Attendant : Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification : Flight Attendant : Current
ASRS Report Number : Accession Number : 1757584
Human Factors : Physiological - Other

Events
Anomaly : Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Anomaly : Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector : Person : Flight Attendant
When Detected : In-flight
Result : General : Maintenance Action
Result : Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
During landing as I sat in my jumpseat near the 1L/1R doors, I noticed a distinctive odor coming from the airplane cabin. It smelled sweet and of sweaty gym socks. I could smell it through my face mask. I briefly brought my mask below my nose in order to further evaluate the odor. I did this a few times because I wanted to determine if it would dissipate or linger; it lingered. I then called the flight attendants in the back of the plane to ask them if they also smelled this odor. They did, and they told me "it was really bad," that it was quite strong in the back of the plane where they sat at their jumpseats. I then broke sterile cockpit and called the Captain to alert him of the situation because I was concerned that we were having a toxic fume event. He told me he was busy with landing, but that he could turn the heat up to dissipate it some, and that he'd write it up on landing. The fumes never dissipated. For the rest of landing, we smelled this distinctive odor. Upon arriving at the gate, the Captain wrote up the odor in the log book for maintenance. No Flight Service Manager (FSM) met the plane. I noticed a little bit of a burning sensation in my nasal passages, throat, and lungs. When I got in the fresh air later, walking to my car, I felt a slight burning, tingling sensation in my eyes. When I got home, I then received a call from a Flight Service Manager. The FSM wanted to know how I felt, and I told her that I just got home and was still monitoring my symptoms. I am still monitoring myself for any latent or delayed effects and reactions. PLEASE NOTE: Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the new rules that go with it, unless I am having a life or death emergency or suspect I have COVID-19, I was not able to go to the emergency room within X hours of this fume event to have my blood tested, which is standard operating procedure under normal circumstances.

Pilot should have called a Medic and a Flight Service Manager to meet the flight to evaluate crew's health and wellbeing.

Narrative: 2
Walking through the cabin midflight I smelled a strange odor mid cabin. But I thought it was a smelly passenger. While clearing the cabin the smell got stronger and was creeping to the back of the plane. By the time we were done clearing the cabin the smell was super strong. FA A called and asked us if we could smell anything. We said yes, and she said she would call the Captain. FA A said the Captain was going to raise the temperature in the
cabin to dissipate the smell. We smelled it until we were on the ground in the back of the cabin.

**Narrative: 3**

During takeoff I smelled an odor like dirty socks (wet dog). I didn't think anything just thought it was a bad body odor. I didn't say anything to my crew members thought it was nothing. I didn't smell it again until midflight when we were picking up trash preparing the cabin for arrival. The odor became stronger and my nose started to run. My eyes were irritated but not bad. The B [FA] asked me if I smell the bad body odor and I said yes. The A [FA] called an asked if we smelled something like dirty socks and we said yes.

**Synopsis**

A321 Flight Attendant crew reported a fume event of varying intensity of "dirty socks" odor during initial climb and lasting until arrival at destination gate.
ACN: 1757583

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757583
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757585
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Other Person
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Gate agent in ZZZ notified me that passenger was not complying with the mask wearing. He would put it up (handkerchief) over his mouth then let it fall down when she walked away. I talked to him before shutting the door informing him of our policy and that he would not be allowed to fly if he didn't wear his mask. He was surly saying he was getting ready to eat. He said he would wear it when he wasn't eating. He continued to keep it down around his neck, only lifting it up over his mouth when we did our checks throughout the flight. I again told him he wouldn't be allowed to fly on his connecting flight if he didn't comply. He informed me that I was interfering with his constitutional rights. I said you have a right to refuse to wear a mask. The company also has the right to deny your passage on the flight. He said fine-he didn't need to go to ZZZ1 Traveling with a woman and 2 children.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
Flight attendants reported a customer service agent advised them a passenger was not complying with face mask policy.
ACN: 1757580

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Flight Phase: Climb
Flight Phase: Cruise
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Flight Phase: Landing
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757580
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On Aircraft X there were passengers that had masks on when they boarded but then immediately took their masks off and sipped on water bottles the whole flight and didn't wear their mask. I couldn't see their faces. I noticed during service that they were drinking their water, so I didn't say anything but after we secured the cabin for landing (we had to do it early because the Captain was anticipating turbulence), Flight Attendant Y called me and told me that they didn't have their masks on and that one of the passengers moved from their original seat forward to sit with his friend and we didn't catch it until it was close to landing and it wouldn't have been safe for us to get out of our seats to talk to him and I didn't want him to get up and move back to his original seat either for safety reasons. What do you suggest is the proper way to handle people that won't wear their mask and act like they're drinking water the whole flight?

**Synopsis**

Flight attendant reported passengers did not comply with the face mask policy during flight.
**ACN: 1757569**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008

**Place**
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Cabin Lighting: High

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Door Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757569
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative:**

An X-year old child boarded the flight without a mask on with his parents. I politely informed the parents of the policy and they refused to comply, so I had a Customer Service Supervisor meet the plane to talk to them. He tells me that he "doesn't have the heart to remove them from the plane," despite our mask policy. Because he was allowed
to fly, other passengers were at higher risk to contract COVID-19 and it negates our policy.

Customer Service and employees, in general, need to unite and follow our policies. Clearly, other employees (including Ops) saw this family through the process and did not address it. This family should have never gotten to the plane before this was addressed. If we are going to make exemptions, then all work groups need to be on the same page. Customer Service Supervisors need to be trained to address these situations as outlined in our mask policy.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported family boarded with a child not wearing a face mask. The family refused to comply with the mask policy, but was allowed to remain on the flight.
ACN: 1757565

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Flight Phase: Cruise
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757565
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

I had a Deadheading (DH) pilot and Non-Revenue (NR) Pilot boarding at different times ID's on and refusing to wear masks. I asked both if they could please use their masks, both refused saying they were actively drinking!

I addressed the NR Pilot's X type wrap he had primarily around his shoulder, when I asked him to place it on [he] refused. I shared the requirements that went into effect. He said it does [meet the requirements]. Plus it looked like it was a weave similar to what we used to wear as kids to cover our mouths and neck in the Midwest winters. Not a tight weave at all. I looked up the policy. It didn't say much about weave, so I went and apologized to him, only to have my head bit off more.

This walking, talking while holding a cup of coffee is not actively drinking. The only ACTIVE action is their germs being spread over the area and on us. Also showing passengers how to circumvent the procedure.

DH Pilot only had mask on for takeoff, but did not cover his nose. When I did my walk through I asked to have it please place over his mouth. He slumped down in his seat I was unable to see if complied with keeping his nose covered. The NR did not use mask until we were taxing into ZZZ.

Both kept using their drink and very very slowly eating as an excuse not to comply. NR Pilot after landing PA and I did my walkthrough had his bag pulled out from under his seat and had his iPad placed on top and was watching his program, mask off. I asked my B to handle it I didn't think my asking him to comply was the proper thing to do. She did; he moved his bag. B relayed to me later he said he was mad that everyone gives him a hassle about his wrap.

I did all I was able to do. Tools are not in place to handle these situations.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendant reported a deadheading pilot and a non-revenue pilot refused to follow face mask policy.
ACN: 1757563

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Other

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757563
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
The passenger occupying seat X3, throughout boarding, taxi, takeoff, most of the flight, as well as descent, final descent, landing and taxi in, was not wearing a mask. I asked him numerous times to put on his mask. He avoided complying by having a bag of apples slices next to him and every few minutes or two putting one into his mouth and slowly chewing it. So technically, he was eating, as well as occasionally coughing, throughout the majority of the flight. After making one final plea, telling him that he was making me very uncomfortable and to please put on his mask, and his insistence that he was eating, I opted to occupy the middle seat, in row X, (seat 4) for landing, as to not have to sit within 6 feet of this passenger who was very obviously using loopholes to not comply with airlines mask policy. I informed the A Flight Attendant prior to being seated for landing that I would not be sitting in my assigned seat, and as we were on final descent when I made this decision, it was too late contact the flight deck to request an Ops Supervisor to meet the aircraft.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was not complying with the face mask policy.
ACN: 1757505

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 11918
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 120
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 9164
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757505
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Hazardous Material Violation
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
The disinfectant cabin wipes provided for crews are being used with no knowledge by flight attendants of the hazard they pose. I have mentioned this to flight ops management and some onboard inflight supervisors who all expressed surprise and a willingness to get the word out. Apparently that effort is short of the target if they've tried. Virtually 90% of the flight attendants I brief when I see this product on board are completely surprised of the apparent hazard of the product. Many use it like a Clorox wipe often without gloves. The bottle warns against contact with the skin and says to contact a poison control center after rinsing for 20 minutes. Would you either get the word out to crews about how to use this or remove it from the plane?

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported concerns regarding the products used to disinfect the cabin.
ACN: 1757493

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 12844
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 80
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 7040
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757493
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew returned to clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
As the flying pilot, on the ZZZZZ X RNAV departure out of ZZZ, I was hand flying in VMC conditions. We were given a speed restriction and I missed our level off of 10,000 feet at ZZZZZ1.

I saw the command bars pitch down, but was preoccupied in my mind with the change in V speeds on our takeoff. They had a substantial increase between our planned V speeds and the actual ones, which increased our takeoff roll distance. The Captain commented on the increased takeoff distance. I was preoccupied in my mind trying to figure out if I had made a mistake in requesting the takeoff data. I leveled off about 4-500' feet high and immediately pitched down to hold 10,000 feet until crossing the fix. ATC did not comment, nor did the Captain call out anything.

[Factors] Pandemic Distraction and Fatigue.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported overshooting the assigned altitude due to high speeds.
**ACN: 1757452**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Oil Storage
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Failed

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757452

**Events**
- Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Detector.Automation: Aircraft Other Automation
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Primary Problem: Aircraft
**Narrative: 1**

Dispatched on a Ferry Flight Aircraft X, from ZZZ to ZZZ1. The aircraft had not been flown in a long time. Departed ZZZ with 18.5 qts on #2 and 18 qts on #1. My FO was new on the Aircraft and restricted. We departed ZZZ uneventfully and all indications were very normal till well into cruise. We both noticed during our checks that the #1 Engine Oil quantity was decreasing with all other indications being normal and no vibrations present. The Oil quantity would decrease then increase. That pattern continued on the descent into ZZZ1. I advised Approach Control of the situation and we were given vectors to a short final ILS XXL. On final the oil quantity indicated below 4 qts to 3.5. I requested priority handling. With a new FO I took the airplane and landed uneventfully Runway XXL at ZZZ1. Oil quantity increased back to 7.5 qts during taxi in.

I was called the night before and given a heads up that the plane had not flown in a long time. Maintenance, my FO, and myself all did extremely thorough walk-around and internal inspection of the entire cabin. We were well prepared for this ferry flight. These type of Maintenance items/events seem to happen to planes that sit for extended periods of time.

I believe these planes should not sit for extended periods if that can be avoided somehow.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported the oil quantity fluctuated during a flight on an aircraft that had been stationary for a long time.
ACN: 1757412

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 4000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1757412
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
ZZZZZ2 Departure to ZZZZZ at 4,000 feet. Max airspeed at ZZZZZ1 230 kts, restriction loaded in FMS and briefed. Light aircraft with high climb performance, PF became concerned FD and AT commands would cause difficult level off. Lowered pitch below FD command bar to correct which resulted in acceleration, PF thought VNAV and AT weren't complying restriction and began to reduce thrust. PM commanded correction to FD pitch and proper speed, but during correction speed accelerated above 230 kts to approximately 250 kts momentarily before correcting to 230 kts.

Improper pitch and power for VNAV guidance and flight conditions. Proper understanding of how VNAV modes handle restrictions and good briefing of anticipated modes and performance beforehand.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported a speed deviation during departure.
ACN: 1757407

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1757407

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Notified by the flight attendants that a passenger refused to wear his mask. Crew followed SOP and flight attendants indicated that they were submitting reports concerning the issue.

I do not know what led the passenger to be non-compliant with the face covering policy. The flight was proceeding on schedule and in accordance with company SOP.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported a passenger did not comply with wearing a face mask during the flight.
Taxied out to Runway XX for takeoff. Instructed to hold short of taxiway. Upon arriving at taxiway, told to switch to Tower and given takeoff clearance. About the same time, the FO reminded me that the takeoff checklist was not completed. Completed take off briefing and checklist as we approached runway. Aircraft weight was 230,000. TO data called for max power. Due to our light weight aircraft accelerated very quickly. Once airborne we cleaned
up the flaps and leveled at 3,000 feet. As we leveled I was still hand flying as I was unable to get the auto pilot on due to how quickly the airplane was climbing. Speed was now exceeding 250 knots. I clicked the auto throttles off and realized we had not armed LNAV/VNAV for takeoff. It was quickly selected and once course and speed corrections where completed, automation was selected on. About the same time we were given higher and the rest of the flight was uneventful.

As is usually the case this report was compounded by several items. The most significant was not arming LNAV/VNAV for departure. This was attributed to rushing the briefing due to calling for the Takeoff checklist late as we approached the runway for takeoff. Another obvious issue was the very fast acceleration and climb due to max power takeoff and a light aircraft. Due to city traffic we arrived later than normal to the aircraft. This aircraft had multiple deferrals that took time and as well. None extremely significant on their own but when place together it caused the issue that lead to this report. First Officer and I reviewed our actions and fully understand the importance of making sure our pre-flight, briefings and checklists are properly completed.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported taking off and being very light and realizing they did not arm the LNAV/VNAV for departure.
ACN: 1757341

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 8000

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace: Class D: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Corporate
- Make Model Name: Medium Transport
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace: Class D: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function: Air Traffic Control: Local
- Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience: Air Traffic Control: Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 1.5
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1757341
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Staffing

Narrative: 1

There was Aircraft X transitioning from south to north at 077. Before I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff, I told him the position, altitude and intention of Aircraft X. When he tagged up, I called the traffic again, he didn't have him in sight. I turned Aircraft X 20 degrees left, thinking that would be enough.

The traffic started to build so the CIC insisted on opening LC-2. Since Aircraft Y still did not have Aircraft X in sight, I told him to remain my frequency, so I didn't send him the departure with a conflict. The CIC got in my ear and insisted on the briefing in that moment since the traffic was building. As I was giving the briefing, Aircraft Y was at 080, his clearance limit, while Aircraft X was still at 077. He told me he was responding to an RA and climbing through his limit.

In hindsight I should have turned Aircraft X more drastically to get him out of the way. We've had fires in the local area, so although the weather was "clear," the sky was filled with smoke, impeding his view.

Fatigue. We are very short staffed as it is, and have 3 people out for medical reasons, and one out on bid leave.

We are still working with too few people in the cab, when we're already so fatigued. The fatigue in this facility is growing exponentially. Our MOU states we need X CPCs per day. We really need X+1, but with our staffing number of X+3, we couldn't accomplish X+1 per day even when we're 100% staffed.

Synopsis

Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict and cited fatigue from being understaffed as contributing factor.
**ACN: 1757328**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference
  - ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 28000

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 7500
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 25
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 300
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757328
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1

I was enroute from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. I was with ZZZ on frequency for at least 30 minutes, including cruise at FL280 until about 10,000 feet when I was handed off to ZZZ2 Tower at about XA:00 local. I was Aircraft X.

The Center Controller was overwhelmed with workload: military, corporate planes, airliners, IFR departures and arrivals, and requests for deviations around numerous scattered thunderstorms. I live in [State X] so I am accustomed to busy ATC frequencies, but this Controller was buried by the workload. There was another plane on frequency who requested a weather deviation. The Controller said he had to stay on his route unless he descended from the flight levels to 16,000 feet. Other than "military airspace," the Controller did not offer any information on the vertical or horizontal dimensions of this airspace. In my case, I was issued vectors around this airspace at least twice - but was not provided any information on how long I would be on the vector. Normally, I would have inquired about this - but the Controller was so busy and the off-route vector was not creating any operational issues for me - so I silently endured to provide time to others who might need the Controller's help more than I did.

Additionally, the Controller seemed to be working a large swath of northern [State Y]. I would hear airplanes responding to his transmissions, but I couldn't hear many of the transmissions. Another pilot finally asked about this and the Controller explained that he was using several different transmitter locations for frequency - and planes couldn't hear the faraway ground transmissions - but could hear the airborne replies.

I am not faulting the Controller. He was a competent, hard-working gentleman. But I am faulting ZZZ Center for being understaffed and assigning such a large sector to one Controller. In fact, after I landed at ZZZ2, I asked the Ground Controller for a phone for ZZZ. I called the Supervisor at ZZZ Center and told him his frequency Controller was overwhelmed. The Supervisor said he was aware of it, but was out of bodies.

The Controller's high workload and stress level was obvious - to the point that I felt safety was being compromised. If I had needed a greater level of ATC service or assistance, I am not confident that I would have received that help. And I don't know how much fuel pressure was created for the pilot who was forced to descend to 16,000 feet because the Controller was too busy to explain his options or to create other options.

Synopsis
Pilot reported Controller was overworked and unable to respond to many frequency transmissions.
ACN: 1757266

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Report Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757266
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party 1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party 2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Guest boarded with a face shield only. Approached guest and inquired if she had a mask she could wear in compliance with the policy. Guest I guess was having a bad day but initially pushed back asking when that had started. Informed her we had started this policy on the [date] and we had masks on board to assist with. She indicated she had her own cloth mask. Don't allow guest onboard without proper face masks. Makes it very difficult to work and gain complaints onboard.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger had to be told to wear a mask while on board.
ACN: 1757262

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757262
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
Found two guest with masks that have vents. Was missed due to guest with face shield and no mask. Is the station even checking for the proper masks?

Please tighten up the mask enforcement prior to boarding. Guests are still boarding with direct vents. It's very taxing on the flight crew to ensure mask compliance on top of normal duties.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported passengers boarded with face masks that had vents.
Passengers X and Y boarded shortly before door closure. They were sitting in seats X4 and Y4. They had two children with them. One was sitting in seat X6 the other was an infant. Passenger Y was changing her infant’s diaper in the seat. I went to go speak to her about
it and the passenger in seat X12, Passenger Z, stopped me to ask me to move seats because it was disgusting and smelled. I apologize to him and told him I was taking care of the situation and that he could move to seat Z12. I asked Passenger Y to change the baby in the lavatory because there was a changing table in there and she just looked at me and said that she was finishing.

During the flight I had to repeatedly remind Passenger Y to keep her mask on and also her husband. She told me to quit bothering her about it. I reminded her about the face mask policy and didn't bother her again. Passenger X and Y continued to not abide by the mask policy. During the breakfast service Passenger Z came to me to complain [about] the family again because they didn't have their mask on. I assure him that I had spoken to them numerous times to no avail and that it was now in the company's hands at this point and they would be addressing it with them.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a family would not comply with the face mask policy and that it was disturbing to other passengers.
Passenger in X6, Mr. A, did not want to comply with mask policy and refused to stop his conversation on his phone when we [were] getting ready for pushback. He got very loud and ornery with me. I went to inform the Captain about the situation and the passenger's
behavior and the Captain turned me and said "what do you want me to do about it." I was shocked at his response. I figured he was not going to give any support to the situation so I just turned and walked out of the flight deck. Another crew member told me that Mr. A gave him attitude also. At this point I felt that the Captain was not going to give us any support to the situation so I briefed the rest of the flight attendants to not address Mr. A. about wearing his mask so that we would not have a bad situation happen inflight. I put the face mask policy on Mr. A's console and left the situation alone after that. Mr. A. did not wear his mask at all during the flight.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported passenger refused to comply with the face mask policy.
ACN: 1757188

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Person: 1

Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1757188
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2

Reference: 2
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: Captain
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1757195
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events

Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: Other
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1

Upon initial contact with Approach we were told to expect the visual or RNAV Runway XXR. At approximately mid field right downwind we were instructed by Approach Control to contact Tower. Upon contact with Tower we were cleared to land on Runway XXR. We continued our descent and approach. A little while later, Tower instructed us to return to approach. Approach Control advised us of a possible pilot deviation as we were not cleared for an approach. We were given a base turn and asked if the airport was in sight. We were then cleared for a visual approach and again instructed to contact the Tower.

In hindsight, the instruction to contact the Tower came at an unusual time; mid field left downwind. But when cleared to land by the Tower, I thought nothing more of it. It was the instruction to return to approach and the subsequent notification of a potential pilot deviation that causes me to question the initial instruction.

Pay closer attention when instructions are given in a non-normal order/environment.

Narrative: 2

Approach Control switched us to Tower. Checking in with Tower we were cleared to land [Runway] XXR. So we descended prior to ZZZZZ (on the arrival is 210 knots at 11,000 feet.) After Tower cleared us to land he sent us back to Approach frequency where we were told we needed to get a phone number for a possible violation. After we received landing clearance we did descend prior to ZZZZZ to approximately 10,000 feet.

With COVID procedures in effect maybe we should have questioned the Tower about the frequency change, but with so many towers at 1/2 staff and/or closed I do not know what all the different operating procedures are from airport to airport. Being cleared to land on downwind maybe unusual but not unheard of.

Closer monitoring of flight number on the radio but I am absolutely sure I heard him switch our flight over to Tower. I really didn't have any clue something was wrong until the Controller told us of possible violation.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported they were informed by ATC of a possible altitude deviation.
Subject of chronic and acute fatigue. Chronic: Worked 10 of the last 11 days. Prior to this, had not flown since May. I was no longer used to the grind of the job and I had become accustomed to 8 hours of great sleep at home each night. I also found wearing a mask everywhere fatiguing and frustrating (layover and airport). Acute: I estimate I got 4 hours of sleep in my hotel the night before my fatigue call. Noise of people could be heard in my room late into the night. I tried earplugs but still was awakened several times. I considered changing rooms but to wake myself up completely at that hour would only have made it worse for me trying to fall asleep. I estimate I finally fell asleep around XA AM only to wake up around XE30 AM and unable to fall back asleep with thoughts of likely furlough on my mind. I decided not to call in fatigued at that point because I had a dead-
head my first leg from ZZZ to ZZZ1 so I continued on and tried to sleep on the aircraft which often works for me. I found myself unable to sleep with a mask on. The mask hurts my ears, itches my face, and gives me feelings of claustrophobia when worn for lengths of time. For my scheduled sit in ZZZ1 between legs, I found out that no pillows or blankets were currently being allowed plus a mask is required even in operations. At that point, I decided I was done. I was tired, burnt out, and my mind was no longer in it. This was my first fatigue call ever.

**Synopsis**

Air Carrier First Officer reported calling in fatigued due to chronic and acute fatigue.
Passenger in XX2 was non-compliant with mask during final cleanup and securing of cabin for landing in ZZZ (turbulent procedures). Flight Attendant B came forward for assistance and by the time I was finished gaining compliance we were on final descent. I was unable to take my jumpseat.

Plan ahead for communication with other FAs and flight deck if needed through intercom and do your best to be seated for personal safety.
Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported not being seated during landing due to having to deal with a non-compliant passenger regarding the face mask policy.
Narrative: 1

I was the Purser on flight. During boarding and after takeoff, all required announcements including the announcement regarding the wearing of face masks were made. As I took meal orders, I observed the Passenger X, [was] not wearing a face mask. I advised her of the mask policy when I took her lunch preference.
After takeoff, I once again observed that she was not wearing her mask. The primary service was being served, so I decided I would monitor her for compliance once the meal service was complete.

As I did a final pickup, I once again observed Passenger X not in compliance with the mask policy. She was sitting in her seat, not consuming any food or beverages, and her mask was laying next to her seat. I made an additional PA regarding the mandatory mask policy hoping she would hear the PA and comply. I waited approximately 10-15 minutes to see if she would wear her mask. I approached her and said, "Hello again, I'm the purser on today's flight. I know I reminded you earlier about the mask; please understand that it is a requirement that it be worn unless you are actively eating food or drinking a beverage." She rolled her eyes and said, "I am drinking," as she held an empty blue plastic cup at her chin. I explained to her that I had observed her not wearing the mask since prior to takeoff and that I needed her to comply for everyone's safety. As I turned to walk away, she took the mask and threw it in the aisle. I looked at the manifest and discovered that Passenger X was a non-revenue passenger.

I contacted the cockpit to advise the Captain of the situation. The Captain advised me to inform Passenger X that she must comply with the mask wearing policy. If she refused, he was going to have the aircraft met upon arrival in ZZZ1. I retrieved one of the mask policy slips that explains the mask policy and once again approached Passenger X. I asked her to confirm her last name as I wanted to be certain that it was truly her occupying seat XA. She confirmed her identity as well as confirmed that she was traveling as a non-revenue passenger. I gave her the form and explained in great detail that failure to comply with the mask policy would likely result in severe disciplinary action. I explained that the policy is mandatory and that the Captain wanted me to inform her that failure to comply would result in the aircraft being met upon arrival in ZZZ1. She had requested more alcohol to drink so I informed her that the Captain and I had made the decision to not serve her anymore alcohol since she was being belligerent. She put her hand up towards my face, shook her head and said "really? This is so messed up. %$#%#! (Yes, she used the %$#%# [language] towards me) The mask that she pushed into the aisle was still there so I had another mask with me as I didn't want her to wear a mask that had been in contact with the floor. I asked her if she would like a clean mask. She accepted my offer of a mask. I then informed her that I would pass along to the Captain how she responded.

The FO exited the cockpit for a break shortly after my conversation with Passenger X. FO also observed Passenger X sitting in seat XA without wearing her mask. I once again contacted the cockpit and advised the Captain that Passenger X was still refusing to comply and that FO also witnessed her being non-compliant. Shortly after FO went on her break, I observed Passenger X put her mask on the right of her seat and pull the blanket up over her head. She kept her head covered until we prepared the cabin for landing. As we did final safety checks, I observed her remove the blanket from her head. She was not wearing a mask the entire time she had her head under the blanket.

Upon arrival in ZZZ1, the plane was met by two Customer Service Managers as well as In-flight Supervisor. I explained the situation to all three ladies and I identified Passenger X as she exited the aircraft.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy.
ACN: 1757013

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1757013
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Dispatch
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
The flight was planned for an on the hour departure. The flight crew sent an acars requestin
Was clicking a little too quickly and mouse cursor apparently was just out of place. Part of the problem was also that my management-dictated COVID-19 mask was causing my prescription glasses to fog, making it harder than usual to see the mouse on the computer screen.

**Synopsis**

Dispatcher reported erroneously giving permission for a flight to depart early.
## Time / Day
- **Date**: 202008
- **Local Time Of Day**: 1801-2400

## Place
- **Locale Reference**: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- **State Reference**: US

## Aircraft
- **Reference**: X
- **Aircraft Operator**: Air Carrier
- **Make Model Name**: Commercial Fixed Wing
- **Crew Size**: Number Of Crew: 2
- **Operating Under FAR Part**: Part 121
- **Flight Plan**: IFR
- **Mission**: Passenger
- **Flight Phase**: Climb
- **Airspace.Class B**: ZZZ

## Person: 1
- **Reference**: 1
- **Location Of Person.Aircraft**: X
- **Location In Aircraft**: Flight Deck
- **Reporter Organization**: Air Carrier
- **Function.Flight Crew**: First Officer
- **Function.Flight Crew**: Pilot Flying
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- **ASRS Report Number.Accession Number**: 1756995
- **Human Factors**: Communication Breakdown
- **Human Factors**: Situational Awareness
- **Human Factors**: Time Pressure
- **Communication Breakdown.Party1**: Flight Crew
- **Communication Breakdown.Party2**: Flight Crew

## Person: 2
- **Reference**: 2
- **Location Of Person.Aircraft**: X
- **Location In Aircraft**: Flight Deck
- **Reporter Organization**: Air Carrier
- **Function.Flight Crew**: Captain
- **Function.Flight Crew**: Pilot Not Flying
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- **ASRS Report Number.Accession Number**: 1756995
- **Human Factors**: Training / Qualification
- **Human Factors**: Communication Breakdown
- **Human Factors**: Distraction
- **Communication Breakdown.Party1**: Flight Crew
- **Communication Breakdown.Party2**: Flight Crew
Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
As pilot flying we departed on Runway XXL, normal takeoff. As we reached acceleration altitude I reduced power to climb and stated "climb." As I said this the Captain started his check in with departure. I waited for him to finish the call and stated "climb" again. At this point I saw the hook coming up and safe speed was gone. I said something to the nature of we are below flap speed, lowering the nose and accelerating. The hook immediately started going back down, climb never stopped. We made our departure altitudes and continued climb.

This all came together at once. The PM was making a call and I believe he mistook what I said. It was clearly a miscommunication. The Captain had mentioned before we left the gate that he had not flown recently, this probably also played a role. We were in a light weight airliner and the climb and acceleration were quicker than we see with full aircraft.

For myself I will delay the power call until there is a break in radio calls. Out of habit we pull the power and say climb.

Narrative: 2
I was flying as PM. On departure several duties occurred simultaneously, I became temporarily distracted and thought I heard the PF call for "Flaps up." I reached for the flap lever and raised the flaps while looking at the airspeed indicator to ensure we were at the correct speed. I believe I raised the flaps too early, before flap retraction speed, because after I moved the flap handle I saw our speed was very close to the "hook" and was probably below normal flap retraction speed. I was about to return the flaps to the Flaps 1 position but I saw that the speed was staying above the hook, accelerating and the PF said he'd lower the nose to accelerate faster. Looking back I must have heard "Flaps Up" when the PF called "Climb Power"

Recency of experience probably contributed to my timing errors regarding the normal Flaps Up call out. Several distractions contributed to the mistake - A radio call to contact Departure, failure to recheck our departure frequency on my taxi out, other calls to different aircraft at the same time as our "Climb Power" call, as well as my lack of recent flying all contributed to my mistake in raising the flaps too early.

Slow down, verify speed before flap retraction, double check frequencies on taxi out.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a miscommunication during initial climb in a lightly-loaded aircraft resulted in retracting the flaps prematurely.
ACN: 1756901

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Phase: Parked
Maintenance Status.Required / Correct Doc On Board: N
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type: Scheduled Maintenance
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Installation

Component
Aircraft Component: DC Battery
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756901
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result.General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
While complying with the return to service from short term storage task card, there was a step to install APU battery, main battery, and the fly by wire backup battery. I had installed the main battery and the APU battery and signed off the task card block accidentally overlooking the step to install the fly by wire backup battery. The fly by wire backup battery was not installed.

A lack of concentration and ensuring that all of the work performed had been properly performed is what led to the fly by wire backup battery not being installed.

More focus and attention to detail when signing off work performed will prevent incidents like this from happening in the future.

**Synopsis**

Maintenance Technician reported inadvertently not installing a backup battery while complying with a return to service task card.
ACN: 1756894

Time / Day
Date: 2020-08

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1756894
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Today I had a passenger that would put on his mask when told then he would take it off. When boarding I did not notice if he was wearing a mask or not but kindly a passenger on board notified me that he was not wearing a mask and by the looks of it she had told him and he wouldn't listen so I kindly asked him to put on a mask but he didn't have one so I gave him one. After boarding was complete and the door was closed I did all my walk
throughs and everything was good. While up in the air I did my service announcement which is telling passengers that I won't be doing a service and that a mask must be worn during the entire flight, I did the mask announcement twice before departure and while in the air...I just sat during the flight until it was time to do the final approach announcement. I walked back to collect any garbage and I noticed that he was sleeping and did not have his mask on. I kindly told him again that he needed to have his mask on. He put it on and I kept walking. The same passenger that had notified me the first time that he didn't have a mask is a Company X employee. She showed me her badge and said that he hadn't had his mask the entire flight and that she would report the flight because I did not do anything. I told her that that was OK. I walked back to the galley, threw out the trash and walked back to do my compliance check and the passenger had removed his mask I told him that he needed to put it on again this time more strictly. I walked to my jumpseat and got ready for landing. While deplaning this passenger did not have his mask on. I'm not sure what I was supposed to do in this situation. I did not notify the Captain because we were landing in a few and [the passenger] was not verbally rude or aggressive.

I do not think it is my fault that a passenger refused to wear his mask, I did all the right announcements and helped him with a mask and asked him a couple times to put it on.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported that a passenger was not being compliant with wearing a face mask during the flight.
Narrative: 1

Misc XX fuel door message, myself and the two FO's were unaware of the additional text message that had to be sent. We sent just the Misc XX message only, no text. I hadn't
been in the Captain seat for over four months. In my landing sim they mentioned the Misc XX report. I also read the message sent about the Misc XX that day. Both FO's didn't remember anything the text portion either. On our return flight from ZZZZ we performed the same procedure. Misc XX only no text message.

[Suggest having] Dispatch remind the crew to send the text message. Especially in these times of low flights available to fly.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported the crew did not send an additional text message regarding a fuel door.
ACN: 1756839

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756839
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756842
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

**Events**

- Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Anomaly. Ground Incursion: Runway
- Detector. Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
- Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**

- Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Ambiguous

**Narrative: 1**

During taxi out we were given instructions to taxi XXL via Mike, hold short of Echo Delta. Upon stopping short of Echo Delta, ground then instructed us to "make the right turn on Echo Delta, hold short of XXR approach." While the Captain was turning I noted the hold short line was immediately in front of us. By the time he realized what I said the aircraft nose stopped just past the hold short line. We immediately notified Ground who then instructed us to continue taxi to XXL.

The wording the Ground Controller used to "make the right turn onto echo delta" is somewhat misleading. The hold short line is so close to the taxiway intersection there is no way the aircraft can even turn 90 degrees and still hold short.

I would say the controllers should stay with our original taxi clearance of "hold short of Echo Delta on Mike" until cleared through the XXR approach path.

**Narrative: 2**

During taxi out to XXL we were told to taxi on Mike, hold short [taxiways] ED (Echo and Delta). As I was slowing to stop at ED we were told to turn right and hold short of XXR approach. I started my right turn and the FO told me we needed to hold short but by starting the right turn I had already crossed the hold short line. I immediately stopped and told the FO to notify the tower our nose was over the line. Tower told us to continue to XXL.

Probably a little behind due to three month leave of absence. This probably contributed to me not briefing the hot spot as I normally would have. I also had forgotten my noise canceling headset which made hearing transmissions more challenging.

It is absolutely critical to do a thorough departure briefing with emphasis on hot spots and any other threats. I am confident this would have prevented my mistake.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported inadvertently crossing the runway hold short line while attempting to turn onto a taxiway.
ACN: 1756730

**Time / Day**
Date: 202008

**Place**
Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Maintenance: Technician
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1756730
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Ground Personnel

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Maintenance
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General: Maintenance Action

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
During a turn of the aircraft, a spraying for sanitizing process was performed by a local vendor in an inadequate manner.

Technicians were aboard the plane and had asked the vendor to hold off spraying the cabin till maintenance was finished with a log item. Communication broke down between the vendor and maintenance personnel and the spraying procedure began.
Soon after, a Technician on board the aircraft started to experience lightheadedness. The immediate Supervisor was informed and the Technician was escorted to medical.

Myself, and other members of the safety team happened to be in the office when the Technician began experiencing lightheadedness and followed up with an observation.

We are concerned that there seems to be no effective way to communicate to maintenance personnel that spraying is being performed on an aircraft. We would prefer either an assigned item to the planned work or a log write/up. In other words, Technicians are unaware if it will be performed on a given aircraft turn.

Secondly, with regard to operational control, we would like to devise a plan and communicate it to personnel. The Maintenance Controller, X Vendor and Maintenance should devise a plan about who has control. Airworthiness of the aircraft and time allocation should prevail. We mention this because the technicians stated that the vendor pushed for completion of his work first. Our concern here is there appears to be a case where the vendor chose to break procedures and spray the cabin with maintenance on board. They failed to clear the aircraft prior to spraying.

The spray information sheet is alarming. The dilution formula, is it safe? The new procedures that recently went into effect in the manual indicate that there is no wait time before people can board the aircraft. Previously, there was a 10 minute wait period after completion of spraying before personnel and passengers could board the aircraft.

Furthermore, the new procedures do not require excess fluid/residue to be wiped up with a clean rag. Were these new procedures intentional or simply overlooked? The gentleman who went to medical most likely had an allergic reaction to the mixture. We are asking to reconsider re-implementing a sufficient wait period prior to entering the aircraft.

**Synopsis**

Maintenance Technician reported an aircraft sanitizing vendor started spraying the aircraft while maintenance personnel were still on board. Technician reports one mechanic became ill.
We did not provide coffee on a 1 hour flight because I felt it was unsafe. I decided for my own safety to only provide guests with sealed beverages and snacks as are required.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported deciding to serve only sealed snack and beverage items to customers due to COVID-19 safety concerns.
**ACN: 1756715**

**Time / Day**
Date : 202008

**Aircraft**
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger

**Person**
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : General Seating Area
Cabin Activity : Deplaning
Cabin Activity : Boarding
Cabin Activity : Service
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1756715
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Physiological - Other

**Events**
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Illness
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
When Detected.Other
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

**Narrative:**
Due to extended wearing of face mask coverings, with no exceptions per policies and procedures, severe headaches and an increased in allergic reactions are common after every duty day since these mandates were issued. Once mask is removed, after a few minutes, the side effects subside and start improving the more oxygen I'm able to receive. This has applied to many flights and not limited to this one. Other crews have voiced similar concerns.

**Synopsis**
Flight Attendant reported experiencing headaches and allergic reactions after wearing a face mask during flight. The effects reportedly subside once the face mask is removed.
Today upon checking in for my last flight for the day in ZZZ, I was told by the gate agents that [seats] XX and XY are available for passengers if needed. I didn't understand exactly why, so I spoke to Person X and she verified this.

Essentially, the company is putting revenue above Flight Attendant safety. I find this to be unacceptable for obvious reasons. The health and safety of colleagues of the company are of the utmost importance as the company always says.

The seat in XX has a view panel that is required to be open for taxi, takeoff, landing and
turbulence. The Purser has to sit in the jumpseat facing all passengers with that view panel open. This is not safe for the Flight Attendant sitting directly in their jumpseat at XZ. Also the last seat in the rear of the aircraft on the aisle should not be available if needed, but rather blocked.

Yes, the policy is that the mask is to be placed over the nose and mouth and that no vented masks are acceptable on board. It is also stated that if a passenger doesn't comply, to provide the customer(s) with the company's policy for masks. I would then file a report and inform the appropriate parties, including the Flight Deck.

This doesn't negate the safety issue at hand of the passenger in XX not complying or when they are eating and/or drinking.

I would appreciate a prompt review of the following as now my health could be in jeopardy.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that allowing passengers to sit in seats that are directly opposite flight attendant jumpseats could jeopardize flight attendant health.
Having the Flight Attendant (FA) door greeter handing out sanitizing wipes distracts the door greeter from being able to monitor safety duties at the forward door. The FA is unable to monitor baggage and other issues that the FAA requires because of passing out non-safety related items exclusively. These items should be passed out to the boarding passengers from the Customer Service Agent who has time before boarding and the manpower to distribute them.
Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported the main door Flight Attendant is distracted during passenger boarding from their safety duties because of having to hand out sanitizing wipes to passengers.
Prior to door closure passenger at [seat] XX3 requested to be moved for social distancing.

Moved from XX3 to YY1 after door closure.
Was told after safety demonstration there was a conflict with passengers in YY1, YY4, and YY6 due to non mask compliance. Made PA announcements on mask policy for everyone on board.

Moved passenger from YY1 to Z6.

Listened to YYD and YY6 side of story to de-escalate situation. Passengers upset that YY1 was upgraded without charge and non-compliance with mask policy. They did not want to turn back to gate and cause delay.

Spoke to passenger at Z6. Listened to her side of story to deescalate situation. Repeated the company mask policy, repeated announcements over PA.

Informed flight deck and crew but determined situation had been contained. Continued to monitor both parties through flight.

Gave customer care items to YY4, YY6, and XX3.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported it was necessary to move passengers for social distancing issues, and one passenger was non-compliant regarding the face mask policy.
Narrative: 1

Cleaners came onboard during deplaning, standing in the way of passengers deplaning. The cleaners were supposed to maintain separation from others due to social distancing. How can you clean a plane to COVID-19 cleaning standards if you have cleaners onboard and in the way of our customers? This increases exposure with numerous less than 6 foot encounters. The cleaners spend all day exposed to dirty environments.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported the aircraft cleaners are proceeding onto the aircraft before all passengers are deplaned which does not conform with social distancing.
I was deadheading today ZZZ-ZZZ1 and was waiting to board with other deadheaders. The Captain joined us wearing this unorthodox face covering. It's a sheer veil that does not appear to conform with any of the most basic requirements for a face covering: it's open at the bottom and is sheer enough to see through (so small particles from breathing can escape) and does not offer any protections for those around the individual. It does not appear to do anything to arrest the spread of COVID-19. I didn't feel comfortable speaking with the Captain about the mask in the boarding area, since I don't know the individual personally.
We all need to be on the same page in order to assure the traveling public that it's safe to fly with us.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported the Captain's face mask probably did not conform to policy and in the FA's opinion did little to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
**ACN: 1756682**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756682
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
- Result.Flight Crew: FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
- Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

**Assessments**
I was the PIC and flying pilot. During our assessment for our approach into ZZZ, we mentioned the high rate of unstable approaches into ZZZ as noted on the airport page. I even stated I would be slowing and configuring early to make sure we met the stable approach criteria. When cleared for the approach and about 20 NM out, I started slowing and configuring. The next thing I realized was we were getting high on our vertical path and I was unable to safely catch up. As we passed 1,500 feet AGL, I told the First Officer (FO) to prepare for a go-around. I dove for the path but found myself 40 knots too fast as we approached 1,000 feet AGL. At 1,000 feet and no hope for safely recovering, I told the FO to advise ZZZ Tower we were going around. A go-around was completed to a second successful approach to a full stop.

We briefed it, we were completely aware of the high frequency of unstable approaches into ZZZ and still fell victim to my poor energy management. A three week gap of no flying prior to this trip took the sharpness out of my flying. I "chair flew" a departure the evening before to help mitigate my lack of frequency but my lack of focus during the approach led to this situation.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported the lack of flying was a factor in experiencing an unstabilized approach.
ACN: 1756672

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 15000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756672
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756681
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

**Events**

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

While on descent into ZZZ I received a call from one of the flight attendants alerting me to non-compliance issue that was being had with a couple passengers in regards to our mask policy. I relayed the information to the Captain and we discussed our course of action. The delinquent passengers were seated in row 12 and we made note of that and repeated it several times in our discussion. I then switched to operations to explain the situation to them. While with operations ATC cleared us to cross ZZZZZ at 16,000 feet. I was busy with operations and did not hear this transmission. Most likely due to the primacy of "12" in our minds the captain set 12,000 feet in the altitude alerter. Once I had finished with operations the Captain and I finished the discussion of how to handle the non compliance. ATC then had us switch frequencies. The new Controller asked us what altitude we had been given and that is when the mistake was realized. We temporarily leveled at 15,000 feet before ATC cleared us lower. ATC's reaction was that it was not a concern. The remainder of the descent and landing were uneventful. All of this occurred in a very short period of time.

The most obvious take away from this is aviate, navigate, and communicate. The altitude verification process was missed because I never heard the call and we jumped right into the discussion of what to do with the passengers rather than the captain alerting me to the changes.

**Narrative: 2**

ATC cleared us to cross ZZZZZ at 16,000 feet and 250 knots. Simultaneously, my First Officer (FO) was on the interphone with a Flight Attendant regarding passenger's non-compliance of our face mask rules. Said passengers were in row 12, and I assume that for that reason, I set the altitude alerter to 12,000 feet, not 16,000 feet. The error wasn't discovered until we were handed off to approach, descending through about 15,500 feet. We ended up leveling momentarily at 15,000 feet. ATC ensured us it was no big deal, as there was no conflicting traffic. Rest of approach and landing uneventful.

As this happened in the descent phase and us getting fairly close to our destination, and
given the new directive to contact Dispatch and Station regarding non-compliance, I let myself get rushed contacting Dispatch via ACARS, and my attention diverted from verifying new altitude/speed with my FO when he got off the interphone.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation due to distraction. The pilot crew was listening to a Flight Attendant describe details of a non-compliant passenger regarding the face mask policy.
ACN: 1756647

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756647
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756651
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Ground Incursion: Runway
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: Taxi
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were number three for takeoff on schedule. Third day of a three day trip. Assigned Runway XXR. Aircraft ahead was cleared for takeoff, and in a moment of complacency, I taxied across the first hold short line. First indication that I had done it was from the tower controller asking, "Flight ABC, where're ya goin'." We stopped short of the Runway XXR second hold short line and we're cleared for takeoff shortly thereafter.

Cause - Simple complacency, loss of situational awareness, and a false sense of comfort. I have flown in and out of ZZZ on XXR many times. I know the hold short lines and their significance at XXR/YY.

I should have (and will in the future) emphasized the XXR/YY hotspot more in the departure briefing and should have cultivated more self-awareness during the taxi. I simply followed the aircraft in front of me in a momentary loss of situational awareness.

Narrative: 2

At Hotspot number X, taxiing up to hold short of Runway XXR at ZZZ, we inadvertently crossed the first "hold short" line at the entrance to both runways XXR and YY, but held short of the second "hold short" line for XXR. The Tower Controller advised us and cleared a landing aircraft to sidestep to Runway XXL. We continued the takeoff and remainder of the flight normally.

Distraction over my last day of flying before taking a leave of absence.

Paying better attention to surroundings and making an extra effort to fight complacency.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a runway incursion.
ACN: 1756645

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756645

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
During gate departure from ZZZ, passenger refused to comply with mask policy. The jet bridge was brought back to the aircraft and the passenger removed.
The passenger was not compliant with face covering policy.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported that a passenger refused to comply with face mask policy and was removed from the flight before departure.
**ACN: 1756601**

**Time / Day**
- Date : 202008

**Place**
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference : X
- Make Model Name : No Aircraft

**Person**
- Reference : 1
- Location Of Person : Company
- Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1756601
- Human Factors : Situational Awareness
- Human Factors : Training / Qualification

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person : Flight Crew
- Result.General : None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
- Primary Problem : Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

I was scheduled to complete the one day training event for the X type aircraft as a result of downgrade due to planned furloughs. I was previously an X type aircraft Captain. However, between my last flight as an X type aircraft Captain and being assigned this training, I completed the Y and Z type aircraft Qualification Course as I was awarded a bid to Y and Z type aircraft Captain prior to the planned downsizing. I was bumped from that position prior to IOE but after the completion of the course (I was home awaiting an IOE trip). My final position was X type aircraft FO after the bump bids. I asked multiple different sources and all seemed to agree that my situation would dictate at least a multi-day re-qualification course. I was surprised when I was scheduled for the 1 day class, landings event. Yes, I have XXXX hours in the FO seat of the aircraft but my last experience was X years ago. Yes, I was a Captain on it for a year but again, I last flew the aircraft 6 months ago and had an entire course on a different airframe in the interim. When I asked about this I was told "If you need more training just ask for it." Fortunately the simulator broke and we were unable to complete the enhanced items so I will need to go back for another sim period. I'm going to be blunt and tell you there is no way I should have had one period, let alone one period where I get 2 hours to relearn everything and
have to share it with another student. In my particular case I should have had the entire X hour period to myself or been scheduled for a multi-day day re-qualification event. Had I gone on a different aircraft IOE and activated that bid would I have been scheduled differently? If the answer is yes, then brake release on IOE needs to be re-evaluated as the line. If the answer is no then the entire thought process behind this needs some serious examination. The course would have been fine if I had been coming directly and untainted from the left seat.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported that re-qualification training was inadequate.
ACN: 1756593

Time / Day
  Date: 202008
  Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
  Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
  State Reference: US
  Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 26000

Environment
  Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
  Reference: X
  ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
  Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
  Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
  Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
  Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
  Flight Plan: IFR
  Mission: Passenger
  Flight Phase: Descent
  Airspace. Class A: ZZZ1

Person
  Reference: 1
  Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
  Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
  Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
  Function. Flight Crew: Captain
  Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 4330
  Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 61
  Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 4132
  ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1756593
  Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
  Human Factors: Situational Awareness
  Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
  Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
  Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
  Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
  Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
  Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
  Detector. Person: Flight Crew
  When Detected: In-flight
  Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
  Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On a routine flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 conducting Re-qualification training for a former Captain returning to the aircraft FO seat we were only 30 minutes into the flight when ZZZ Center issued direct ZZZ1 and shortly thereafter we were issued direct ZZZZZ (on the ZZZZZ4 arrival which was our filed route). For almost 2 hours, we were flying direct to the initial fix for the STAR we had been filed for. In ZZZ1 Center airspace, the second Controller issued a descent clearance to FL240 (pilot discretion). The PF (FO in training) had been descending in a cruise descent based on a previous Controller's issuance of "Descend to FL300." I was discussing what was happening to our speed due to the re-cruise with the low cost index when the Controller issued "descend via the ZZZZZ5 Arrival" (which we had not been given as we had been filed/cleared via the ZZZZZ4). I repeated the clearance and even set the appropriate altitude on direction from the PF. Something seemed off but I did not query ATC. Moments later, ZZZ1 Controller asked if we were turning towards ZZZZZ2 or "It looks like you are headed towards ZZZZZ6 (which is on the ZZZZZ4). I answered that indeed it appeared we were turning towards ZZZZZ6 and that I'd take a look. We were given a heading and altitude (10 degrees left) and told to contact Approach and that they would have vectors. Upon check-in with ZZZ1 Approach, we were told expect vectors to XXL and sensed all was fine. The approach etc., was non-eventful. I believe, given the low traffic environment and ATC being so helpful a thousand miles or so earlier may have contributed to the confusion on descent as we should have been given the ZZZZZ5 arrival but were never issued the arrival change (as we passed through ZZZ2/ZZZ3/ZZZ2 Center. Being cleared direct ZZZZZ so far out may have caused an assumption that a STAR change had been issued (ZZZZZ is on both STARS). Traffic was light and no loss of separation occurred.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation during arrival and cited communication issues with ATC as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1756587

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ. ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 33000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 3793
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 38
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 3793
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1756587
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
Nothing open at the hotel. We boarded the hotel van at XA:50L. COVID temp checks and Cockpit decontamination procedures have been put in place. This creates a time compression. I did not ask the flight attendants if meals were boarded. Again, they are under COVID time constraints too. When we got up to cruise and asked about food, they said nothing had been boarded and the cooling bag on our aircraft was empty. We were supposed to have had a snack and a meal.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported there was no food available at the hotel and food was not boarded for crew to consume during the flight. COVID-19 related time constraints were cited as contributing factors.
ACN: 1756550

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 20000

Environment
Flight Conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 150
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 13000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756550
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

ATC was working multiple frequencies, and was task overloaded. At XA:30 Local time with heavy thunderstorm activity I need to be able to effectively communicate with my Controller. This was not possible today. Controller staffing needs to be returned to a safe level. We deserve that layer of Safety and Service.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported not being able to talk to ATC due to Controller working multiple frequencies and being task overloaded.
ACN: 1756534

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756534
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

During boarding, a passenger erected a personal tent bubble and placed it completely over her upper body after taking her seat. The Flight Attendant and I agreed that the tent must be stowed during takeoff and landing and the passenger reluctantly complied. She then deployed her tent after takeoff and sat in her seat during cruise totally enclosed, then stowed her tent during descent for landing. Upon review of available Company procedures and guidance, I could not find anything that would prohibit the use of a personal tent during cruise.

This brings up a couple of Safety concerns: The tent could impede the passenger's ability to reach for the overhead oxygen mask during a slow or rapid decompression event. If in that scenario, if the tent is thrown off the passenger to reach the oxygen mask, the tent could impede adjacent passengers from reaching their oxygen masks. The tent will also block the passenger sitting next to the tent from access to the lavatory.

Establish overarching guidance prohibiting passengers from erecting a temporary structure (i.e. tent bubble) in the cabin.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported during pre-flight a passenger erected a personal tent bubble after sitting in the cabin area. Captain described the safety implications of having a tent over your body in an emergency situation.
These two aircraft were deviating south around a cell of weather, the ZZZ aircraft was in front of the ZZZ1 aircraft by a couple of miles and diverging. I was planning on descending the ZZZ1 as he was under the ZZZ and stepping the ZZZ aircraft down under the ZZZ1.
Instead I descended the ZZZ aircraft to 320 and showed the altitude in the data block, immediately as I unkeyed I realized my mistake and told the ZZZ aircraft at FL410 to maintain FL410. He repeated my instruction and the data block never showed him leaving FL410. A couple seconds later the ZZZ aircraft reported that he had descended about 100 feet or so, but was now back up at FL410. I said Roger, the data block never showed any altitude other than FL410. Conflict alert never went off.

I had been on position at the same sector as that is my only R side, a long time that day with weather deviations. Staffing has been kept purposely low due to COVID 19 and social distancing, however; staffing has been kept so low that we are working 1.5-2 hours on position every time which is tiring, especially during the summer with weather deviations. Breaks can only give you so much recovery towards the end of the day when it is constant issues with weather. Deviations are much more taxing mentally and sector XX is a small sector without the room to operate outside of pre-determined routes and procedures.

Being a developmental with only one sector to return to is also mentally taxing. There is no coming back to a different change of pace, but just the same complex sector again and again. And with training frozen no hope of continuing on the horizon while we continue to work with skeleton crews and traffic and complexity continue to ramp up.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller reported an airborne conflict and cited staffing levels as a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1756502**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US

**Environment**
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling: CLR

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory. UNICOM: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Takeoff
- Route In Use: None
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3500
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 10
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 700
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1756502
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1

After completion of maintenance, flight check to determine if ELT would activate erroneously during flight. ZZZ Tower operating under COVID-19 with restricted staffing closed the Tower at XA:00 and advised that airspace was reverting to Class E.

Traditional Squawk for pattern operations is XXXX without ATC approval. Very confusing as to use without tower operating. Did one circuit with Squawk of XXXX and determined no ELT issues. After discussion determined that may have not followed proper guidelines that were established for COVID-19 restricted operations by not contacting ATC for another squawk code after Tower closure. Have reviewed and implemented process to assure compliance until normal Tower operations resume.

Synopsis
Pilot reported the Tower closed due to COVID-19 staffing, and was not sure as to what they should be squawking.
ACN: 1756481

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 1600

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: VFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. TFR: ZZZ

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification. Flight Crew: Private
Experience. Flight Crew: Total: 107
Experience. Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 21
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1756481
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction

Events

Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected. Other
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Airspace Structure

**Narrative: 1**

I had a possible unintentional TFR violation by clipping the corner of a sporting TFR in ZZZ. I assumed the TFR wasn't active due to COVID-19 and there not being over 30,000 people in attendance in the event. I make my flight plans on Foreflight and didn't see an active TFR in the area. However, I later realized I didn't see the TFR because I didn't have TFR's turned on on Foreflight. I now have that setting turned on on my iPad. I will prevent another occurrence like this by making sure my settings are turned on properly and by being more diligent in my flight planning both on the ground and in air.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported a sporting TFR airspace incursion due to not having it selected on the app being used.
ACN: 1756465

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1480
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 2
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 557
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756465
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I had not been flying much due to the COVID-19 pandemic. I was out flying locally to get familiar again with the airplane (just needed to go out and practice). Departed from ZZZ and flew out west over the lakes. Then decided to go to ZZZ1 to practice some touch and goes. In my mind, I was thinking about doing the Touch & Goes. However, I actually did not say that after I got passed over from ZZZ Approach to ZZZ Tower. So, in my head, I knew what I was planning on doing, but I allowed my mind to think about other things like the new injectors we had just installed, getting the gear down, looking for other traffic I was to follow, etc. Then ZZZ Tower told me I was, "Cleared to Land." To my mind, I just ticked off the box - "have permission," without carefully thinking about what he said. He said "Cleared to Land," he did not say "Cleared for the Touch and Go," but my brain did not pick up on that. I continued the approach, landed, continued the roll, advanced the throttle and then began to take off again. I knew I had messed up when the controller asked, "What are your intentions?" That is when it sunk in, I had made a mental error and not told him I was planning on doing a Touch and Go. I was thinking it, but I didn't say it. I think the best thing I can do is try and make sure I am spending more time flying, so I stay more proficient and more tasks become "automatic" so that I can focus more of my mind on carefully thinking about each phase of flight, and paying more attention to the phraseology with ATC. I did apologize to the Controller, a couple times, and he was very nice about it, but pointed out that bad things can happen when they don't know what we pilots are planning on doing - which I completely agree with.

Synopsis

Pilot reported thinking they were cleared for a touch and go, but were given a clearance to land.
ACN: 1756419

Time / Day
Date: 082020
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Ceiling: CLR

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.UNICOM: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: FBO
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 11925
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 70
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 250
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756419
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Other Person
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I am a very busy CFI. Also work multiple jobs, including another flying job. Had a young student solo on the morning of [Date]. As I was doing his paperwork to sign him off for solo, I realized that neither I nor the other instructor he had flown with had submitted his 8710 for his student pilot license. Submitted the 8710 on the day he soloed, but this means he flew by himself without his student pilot license in hand. This was simply an oversight on my part. Apparently I thought I had already submitted his form, and quite clearly I did not.

The problem arose because I did not submit my student's 8710 in a timely manner. Contributing factors were overwhelm and stress due to current pandemic situation and piled on top of that, weeks of unexpected overwhelm from a job. It was discovered when I asked him for his student pilot license, and he handed me his medical.

The human factors all come down to me. I am usually quite adept at keeping up with all the piles of paperwork involved in being a CFI. This was an oversight on my part. Factors affecting the quality (or lack thereof) of my work were stress caused by the general discombobulation due to the pandemic, and overwhelm from one of my other jobs.

My action was to file the 8710 immediately and to call the FAA help desk the next day for information on when the temporary certificate would show up. My student is terribly disappointed that he cannot solo till his paperwork come through. I apologized for my massive paperwork blunder.

**Synopsis**

Flight Instructor reported a student flew solo without a student pilot license.
ACN: 1756372

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756372
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Passenger X boarded without his mask over his nose. I told him nicely to put it over his nose. He rolled his eyes at me put it on and walked to his seat and defiantly pulled it down again. Several other members of his party did the same. I let A [FA] know. A FA went over and politely but firmly told them of our policy and that mask use over their nose and mouth is a requirement to fly. They put it on but would slip it down just enough to be questionable. They were upset with us for asking them to comply. It was a quick flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1 so we couldn’t safely keep going back to check and remind. They need a good reminder of our policy and that we are just here to keep them and everyone else on board safe. A FA had let the agent know as well before we had finished boarding just in case.

Passengers in party need a reminder on our mask policy and agree to adhere to it or not fly until the requirement is not in place.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a group of passengers not wearing face masks during flight.
ACN: 1756370

Time / Day

Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Service
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1756370
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events

Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

All passengers in this party did not comply with mask policy. They were not eating or drinking and had to be reminded to put their mask on. They would put a beverage on their tray and not be drinking but say they were actively drinking just, so they would not have
to wear their mask. The children rang their call button over and over wanting more items. When the crew would approach we'd have to ask them to put their mask on. We had repeated interactions with this whole family. Again, most times their mask was off or not covering their nose. PA's were made to remind guests of our mask policy. They blatantly disregarded under the guise of drinking, or a few members would go by to gather trash they might put it on but take it off the moment we passed with trash. This is a safety risk to others onboard and crew.

They should not be allowed to fly with us if they cannot follow the CDC guidelines for everyone's safety. Once the mask requirement is gone then they can fly with us. We need to make a hard stance on this issue.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a family was not wearing face masks and had to be reminded often during flight.
ACN: 1756365

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756365
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756368
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Woman and her X-year old child boarded the aircraft, child was not wearing a mask and gate agents let us know that they have asked the mom and child to wear the mask multiple times. My other FA moved the passenger in row XX up so we could move the mother and child towards the back, hoping to make other guests happy, and to avoid complaints about the child not wearing a mask. During compliance, child is still not wearing a mask. FA offers a cookie trying to convince the child to wear a mask. Mother of child informs us she screams and cries when she wears it. Asked Customer Service lead to give a final warning to mother. Was a very uncomfortable situation as we witnessed the mother begin to pull out her phone. Mother was very upset. FA and I tried our best to assure the mother that we realize these times are hard and confusing and we empathize with her for her situation as it was tough for all of us. They both seemed to be happy towards end of flight as we provided snack and beverages to ease the situation.

I do not think we should enforce young children to wear masks. Child could possibly have disability and be unable to wear the mask. We are unaware of the family's situation and it is very hard to enforce grown adults to wear masks, let alone young children who don't understand what is going on.

Narrative: 2
Passenger came onboard with X-year old child not wearing a mask. Gate agent tells me they were told to put it on and the child was screaming. I go to the back with a cookie and kindly ask if she can put her mask on and the mom tries to put it on and the child refuses. I asked if she is willing to sit in row XX so she wouldn't be near any of the other passengers. I moved passengers that were within 3 rows away from the mom and child. The mom looked stressed and her eyes were red. I know our policy is black and white regarding our process and removing a passenger. I felt like moving the passenger was the best thing to do, as I did not want this to turn into another public nightmare. I also asked if anybody felt uncomfortable with the small child taking the mask off at times while she is sitting far from everybody else and they all agreed it was OK. I told Captain the situation and they called a duty officer on their behalf to clear us to leave. The reason for making the exception made sense. She was at least 3 rows away from the nearest person, we avoided a meltdown, she was getting her camera ready and the bathroom in the back was inop so we knew nobody would go back there. I believe no further action was needed. We got guidance on the full procedure from our pilots and everyone was extremely grateful for a resolution to make everyone happy onboard.

We need a better mask policy for children, especially if they might have a disability.

Synopsis
Flight attendants reported that a child was unable to wear a face mask due to crying, resulting in a stressful situation. The child and parent were reseated and the situation was resolved.
ACN: 1756345

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Fractional
Make Model Name: Small Transport
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Fractional
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1756345
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This was day 2 with a brand new FO but it was the FO's first day doing a preflight as we started flying the day before after I had an FO swap part the way through the day. I did the flight planning the night before and had a few conversations with operations about possible passenger catering (that turned out to be an old note) and customs payment arrangements at this airport. I had read "ZZZZ" on the trip sheet before getting to the hotel and somehow my brain registered that as "ZZZZ1" and not "ZZZZ." When I entered my flight plans the night before I instinctively typed in "ZZZZ1" into [app]. I made sure to get up early to print out all the international paperwork and all other necessary paperwork before we left the hotel so I could devote my full attention and time to the preflight inspection lesson as well as getting the raft in the morning. After going through the full preflight together, we got the clearance to ZZZZ1 and departed. Shortly after taking off we were given "direct destination" by ATC and we did so. After being given a frequency change ATC again cleared us direct destination. I stated on the radio that we had already been cleared direct and were proceeding there. ATC then stated our track was taking us over ZZZZ2 and I zoomed out on the INAV map and saw that ZZZZ had accidentally been entered as the destination instead of ZZZZ1 per the flight plan. I changed the destination to ZZZZ1 in the FMS and we started flying to the airport. Just as I did that, however, my FO mentioned that ZZZZ1 was not the airport that was on the trip sheet. I looked, and FO was correct, I had mistakenly filed the flight plan to the wrong airport. We got an amended clearance from ATC and preceded to ZZZZ. I called ZZZZ2 radio enroute to get weather and NOTAMs for the new airport and verified our fuel status would still be safe. We landed at ZZZZ without incident, picked up our passengers and then returned to ZZZ after we refilled the return flight plan. I can only think that unnoticed built up fatigue from the days before caused the error filing the flight plan. I started my cycle out west so I transitioned a few time zones and overnighted at ZZZ1 the day before the FO swap causing a long drive to and from the hotel. Home life has also been stressful, as I have had a few COVID-19 scares with my immediate family. Since I thought fatigue could be a threat, I decided to stay in ZZZ that night instead of doing the empty repo to ZZZZ2 as originally planned.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported filing the wrong destination and not realizing it until the FO advised they were going to the wrong airport.
**ACN: 1756299**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace: Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 2366
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 58
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 2366
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1756299

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
- Flight Attendant informed me that passengers in Row XX were told by flight attendants numerous times to wear face covering.

**Synopsis**
- Captain reported that the Flight Attendant told them that passengers in a specific row were not wearing face masks and were instructed to do so.
**Time / Day**
Date: 202008

**Place**
Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 13752
Experience: Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 24
Experience: Flight Crew.Type: 2769
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1756290
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

**Events**
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Other
Result: General: Maintenance Action

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative:** 1
After parking at the gate XY in ZZZ and passengers deplaned, the cleaning crew got on the airplane. Half of them were not wearing masks. After having been reminded all but one put them on correctly. The last person was reminded multiple times by me (Captain) that it has to cover both nose and mouth. She walked to the back of the airplane without covering her nose. One person had a mask on with a vent, which I reminded her was not allowed. She seemed surprised but changed her mask.

Synopsis

Captain reported cleaning crew came onto plane after passengers left, but most did not wear face masks as per company instructions.
ACN: 1756247

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 8580

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiflight
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756247
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiflight
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756251
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Descending via the ZZZZZ into ZZZ there was a small buildup near the ZZZZZ1 waypoint. The Captain deviated just a few degrees to the west of it then proceeded back on course via the ZZZZZ arrival. A few moments later ATC told us to stop the descent immediately because of traffic. I looked up and saw that we were at about 8,580 feet about five miles prior to ZZZZZZ waypoint. ZZZZZZ has a restriction of 9,000 feet. We leveled and began the climb back up to 9,000 feet, of which I informed ATC. ATC asked us what happened and the Captain explained the situation. By selecting heading for those few degrees to get around the buildup, the airplane went into vertical speed mode for the descent. Neither of us caught it.

I was a little distracted by looking at arrival information on my iPad. I just didn't realize we were in vertical speed mode. I know that's what happens, but I just didn't catch it.

Double check the FMA any time changes are made to the different modes of the autopilot.

Narrative: 2
Cleared to descend via the ZZZZZ, profile descent was working perfectly in the aircraft managed mode, until I selected 2-3 degrees right of course to graze a single cumulus build up on the arrival line followed by a quick jog back to the course line for passenger comfort. (Deviation was about a wingspan width laterally for less than 5 seconds) I selected NAV again to manage the course line and forgot vertical nav had reverted to vertical speed. The level off should have been 9,000 feet and I inadvertently let the aircraft hit a low point of approximately 8,600 feet before I intervened and climbed back up to 9,000 feet. At approximately the same time I saw my mistake and started climbing ATC called and told us to immediately stop our descent, I was already in the process of returning to the proper altitude. Shortly after our level off the TCAS showed traffic but we already had more than enough separation and the Controller verified this when he queried us for information on why we had descended early/ before ZZZZZZ. I completely and honestly told him of my mismanagement of the FCU/FMS and humbly "owned" the mistake. His reply was well we caught it before there were any problems...then he gave us a frequency change and I asked if this was going to give me any problems down the road and he said no. Fingers crossed that that is in fact the case.

I can't come up with anything other than "I know better than this" with having thousands of hours in the aircraft. I should have verified my inputs better than I did and paid more attention. A little bump would have been more welcome than a possible altitude violation
and I should have just let the aircraft manage itself since it was already doing a fine job until I fat fingered it up.

Just paying more attention or asking for a weather deviation would have avoided this situation in the first place. We would have dialed in a hard altitude and vertical speed wouldn't have been an issue. I'm not flying as much as I'd like on reserve to maintain a super level of currency right now with our reduced schedules and would like more flying that's not there to have, since transferring over to the left seat. I completely owned that mistake and as I said above I know better than this and have been trained better than this. I'll use more care to monitor things especially when it's a change from the normal routine.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation due to the aircraft going into vertical speed mode for the descent after deviating for weather.
**Time / Day**

Date: 202008  
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference: US  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC  
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10  
Light: Daylight  
Ceiling.Single Value: 25000

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
Aircraft Operator: Personal  
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91  
Flight Plan: None  
Mission: Personal  
Flight Phase: Takeoff  
Route In Use: None

**Person**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Personal  
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying  
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot  
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument  
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine  
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 12600  
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 5  
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756077  
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

**Events**

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR  
Detector.Person: Flight Crew  
When Detected.Other  
Result-General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
On Day 3, I flew as pilot in command of a local flight with two family members, and a personal/business friend as passengers. A violation of FAR 61.57 may have occurred on Day 3. I fly fixed wing aircraft and helicopters as pilot-in-command. While I had flown the fixed wing aircraft several times in the 90 day period preceding Day 3, my flights of the helicopter in the 90 day period preceding Day 3 may not be sufficient to satisfy FAR 61.57. In anticipation of the flight, I had flown the helicopter as pilot in command on Day 1. During the Day 1 flight to ZZZ, I made 4 to 7 practice takeoffs and landings and conducted various maneuvers including pedal turns. This Day 1 flight also included flight at near cruise speed and flight at altitudes up to 800 feet to 1,000 feet AGL. There were no abnormalities observed. Nor did I experience any difficulty maneuvering or controlling the aircraft. I then took off again and flew to my home landing site where I had performed takeoff and landings approximately 10 times per year for 10 years. On Day 3, the planned flight with passengers was conducted.

I am concerned about whether I have complied with the three takeoff and landing requirement of FAR 61.57. When I conducted the flight on Day 3, I presumed that the Day 1 flight was sufficient to establish compliance with FAR 61.57. However, upon review of the flight and the regulation, I am uncertain as to whether compliance was established by the Day 1 flight although it included maneuvers. To avoid this issue in the future, compliance can be established by recording detailed flight information needed to establish currency, reviewing records of flights for compliance, and conducting full takeoff and landing sequences in the helicopter to establish currency.

Contributing factors would include disruption of normal flying routines due to COVID-19.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported flying in possible violation of FAR 61.57 attributed to COVID-19 related disruptions.
ACN: 1756074

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 217
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 10
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 217

**ASRS Report Number: Accession Number**: 1756074
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Anomaly: Ground Incursion: Taxiway
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1

Began takeoff roll on Taxiway Alpha - went 30 feet and realized I was still on taxiway, I stopped at the same time the Tower was telling me to do the same, I then turned around left at Taxiway G back to H then departed [Runway] XXR.

Contributing factors: 1. I am a low-time Tower controlled departure pilot; 2. The COVID scenario changed departure frequency from published XXY.Z to XAB.C. 3. When I first contacted Clearance Delivery they asked if I was requesting flight following and I affirmed this and the readback from Clearance Delivery terminated in an abbreviated sentence of "NXXXXX request." I waited a time and asked what that meant and the controlled told me he was working on my request and gave the squawk code and the Departure Frequency and to contact Ground. 4. Ground told me to proceed to XXR via Hotel but didn't tell me to use Alpha or the apron. I proceeded to Hotel via the apron, did my runup. I contacted Tower and they cleared me for XXR. I crossed single-yellow solid/stripped and then proceeded to accelerate down Alpha. I realized at the same time Tower notified me to stop that I was on taxiway (despite all the signs and my previous awareness that Hot Spot 1 exists and I reviewed that prior to flight) - went about 30 feet.

There are many assumptions that are made in communicating with Clearance Delivery, Ground, Tower - some of which are not obvious - the one word "request" didn't tell me to wait while waiting for the request while he worked on it. Also, when to change frequencies and when to stay.

I spoke to ZZZ controller and he explained to me why XAB.C was given to me rather than published XXY.Z (COVID change), and when to change to Tower frequency without explicitly being told to change frequencies. This is different than when communicating to ATC while in-flight - they tell you when to change frequencies.

Synopsis
Single pilot reported becoming confused with ATC's instructions because the Controller was using nonstandard COVID induced workload shortcuts at this location.
ACN: 1756030

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Deplaning
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1756030
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Taxi
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While doing the demo the B Flight Attendant (FA) noticed a child in Row X of age required to wear a mask was not wearing one. The B FA asked her to put her mask back on. She complied, but later during the flight the same child and adult accompanying her consciously removed their mask despite being told 5 times that they were required. However this was a XX minute flight so I informed the Captain on arrival that there was an issue regarding a noncompliant passenger. He agreed that getting a Supervisor was needed. I let the agent who met the flight know that we needed a Supervisor. She sent the Station Manager before the deplaning process happened. The Captain made an announcement to re-inform the passengers that masks are required throughout the flight. The same passenger proceeded to deplane without a mask while the Captain observed and then she hurried up and put it back on. Nevertheless, the manager informed us that her record would be flagged and she had a conversation with her. We later notice her in baggage claim yet again without a mask.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported passenger was non-compliant with face mask policy.
ACN: 1755997

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755997
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: FLC complied w/ Automation / Advisory
Result: Flight Crew: FLC Overrode Automation
Result: Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Second leg after launch from airport standby. Short return leg from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Basically empty jet (takeoff weight 223,000 LBS) with low level off for departure (3,000 feet MSL, 2300 feet AGL). We had discussed and decided to leave the power setting in Climb 2 due to the low level off. At 1,000 feet AGL the PF called for VNAV. I pressed the VNAV button, but I believe the aircraft had already gone to altitude capture mode and did not take the VNAV selection - which I didn't immediately catch because I was busy raising the flaps as the jet was rapidly accelerating. The FO commented that "VNAV was doing something strange." I looked at the MCP and FMAs and saw that 128 KTS was the commanded speed and we were not in VNAV, however the autothrottles were trying to advance to climb power. The PF was hand-flying and over-riding the autothrottles. The momentary confusion and light aircraft weight caused us to miss our 3,000 foot level off. We ballooned to approximately 3,500 feet before getting back down to 3,000 feet. ZZZ Tower never said anything to us and switched us to Regional Departure. They queried "what happened back there?" I explained that we were light and had some issues with our automation. No further inquiries were made.

Abnormally low level off with a very light jet.

I should have done a better job of monitoring the FMAs when I initially pressed the VNAV button. This would've helped me be a better PM and point out what was happening earlier. I also don't think I was quite mentally prepared for how low the level off was and how much excess performance the jet would have at our light weight. I think this was partially due to inexperience with this scenario and also just being a bit rusty (flown 1 time in the previous 3 weeks due to vacation).

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported the aircraft was very light weight. The pilots were unprepared for the quick low altitude level off and deviated from the clearance.
ACN: 1755987

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755987
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755988
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Other Person
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Called for push at X1, got the cleared to push and thought ramp said go to metering. Contacted metering and received taxi instructions. Received a call from the chief pilot making me aware that ramp wanted us to call them for taxi before contacting metering.

Long day after a 3 hour sit and I believe that I just miss heard what was said on the push back. I have had only a handful of flights since being off and I should have questioned the Ramp Controller.

I should have questioned the contact metering part that I thought that I heard and called Ramp again for taxi regardless.

Narrative: 2
I was on the intercom with the push crew while the first officer was communicating with Ramp on VHF2 to request push clearance. After pushback and disconnect I received a salute. With the engine start and checklist complete, I called flaps 1 taxi. The first officer contacted Ground metering who then told us to monitor Ground. I taxied about 100 feet up the ramp but short of the taxiway. Ground Control cleared us to taxi to XXL. The first officer failed to call ramp control prior to contacting metering and I didn't catch it since I was monitoring VHF1.

The first officer was fresh off of a 3 month leave of absence which could have contributed. Also, we just had a 3 hour sit in the airport between flights. 11+ hour duty day.

Better frequency monitoring when using multiple radios.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a deviation from the ramp taxi procedure and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
Passenger traveling tested positive for COVID-19. Agents at the terminal were not made aware of this at the time and not notified until nearly 24 hours after the flight left ZZZ.

Synopsis
Ground Agent reported that a passenger had tested positive for COVID-19; however, agents in the terminal were not notified of this until 24 hours after the flight had departed.
ACN: 1755913

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Angle.Radial: 300
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 3
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2500

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 950
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 15
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 950
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755913
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Narrative: 1

I had filed an IFR flight plan from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and received back an expected route from ATC. I had planned to depart Runway XX, as the wind was calm. The field was initially IFR. I started the engine and entered the expected route into my GPS. By the time I was ready to taxi, the weather had become marginal VFR and aircraft had started using Runway YY. So, I taxied to YY for departure. As I taxied out, I got a radio check from UNICOM.

ZZZ is a non-towered airport, so I used the ATC frequency given on the approach plates to contact clearance. This was my usual procedure at this airport. However, after trying many times I could not get a response from anyone on the clearance frequency. Since the field was marginal VFR at that time and weather at my destination was clear, I decided to depart VFR and see if I could get a clearance in the air. Otherwise, I planned to just proceed VFR. There was a low layer of clouds to the west and it was clear to the north. If I could not get a clearance, my plan was to climb to the northeast until I was at an altitude sufficiently above the clouds to the west and then turn west.

There is a class C airspace to the west of ZZZ. As I climbed out, I turned to the right to avoid the class C airspace. However, I guess I still had in mind my plan to depart Runway XX and only turned to the right the amount I usually do when departing Runway XX to easily clear the class C airspace. The low layer of clouds to the west prevented me from visually realizing that I had not turned far enough to the right. Another issue, that was a distraction as I climbed out, was my attempt to contact departure to get my clearance or get flight following. The Departure Controller was refusing to talk to any VFR traffic. He finally told all VFR traffic to try again in 30 minutes.

After giving up on ATC, I realized from my GPS that I had entered the northeast corner of the class C airspace to the west. I immediately turned to the northeast to exit the airspace. The ADS-B on my GPS did not show any traffic anywhere near me.

I clearly did not keep foremost in mind that I was not departing from the runway that I had planned to and the impact of departing VFR instead of IFR at the last minute, because I could not get a clearance. I certainly will be more careful in the future. I will also change my expectations of the usual high level of service from ATC while COVID-19 is in place. The initial reduction in ATC staffing because of reduced flight operations due to COVID-19 has not yet been followed by an increase in staffing as GA operations in this area have increased substantially.

Synopsis

Single pilot reported an airspace deviation occurred while attempting to get an IFR clearance. Pilot was unable to get an IFR clearance due to ATC workload and told to try again in 30 minutes.
**ACN: 1755891**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1755891
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Security
- Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: General: Police / Security Involved

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Once we finished the safety demo FA X informed me that [Passenger in] X1 was not wearing his mask and that during the safety demo she had to ask him twice to put on his
mask. He was on a phone call after door closure. I went over and asked him to wear his mask properly as it was not covering his nose. I preceded to give him a warning. We, the crew, agreed that this aggressive behavior would not be tolerated as we did not want anything to escalate once in the air.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with the face mask policy.
ACN: 1755878

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1755878
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result. General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
Upon final descent as I was making my final walk through I noticed that the man in XX1 was not wearing his mask, seatbelt, and his seat back was in the recline position. I politely asked him to comply with the mask policy and prepare for landing by buckling his seatbelt and putting his seat back in the upright position. He began shaking his head, putting his fingers in his ears and saying, "No, no, I am not gonna to wear my mask right now." I asked him once again explaining the importance of the policies that I was asking him to comply to and he continued to ignore me. His flight mate came up to him and told him to buckle his seat belt and put his chair up and began to assist him in doing so. He also told her that he would not put his seatbelt on and that he wanted to go to the bathroom. I asked the woman if he was OK and she said, "Yes" and then more forcefully told him to buckle his seatbelt and put his chair up. He then complied but still verbally refused to put his mask on. I asked the woman to help ask him to put on his mask and I explained to both of them that if he didn't wear his mask he would then be banned from flying. He still refused. I informed both passengers that the Captain and Gate Agent will be informed of this refusal and that the appropriate actions would be taken against him for not complying with the mask policy. Upon arrival the Gate Agent spoke to the party involved and the man in question refused to speak and the woman who assisted stated that he refused to wear the mask because "he couldn't hear" and that he was "sleeping". Neither of these statements are true.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to comply with the face mask policy.
Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Thunderstorm
Weather Elements / Visibility: Rain

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Door
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755856
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Person: 2
Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Dispatch
When Detected.Other
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Sat on transportation bus for approximately one hour for ground stop blue light (thunderstorms overhead) conditions at ZZZZ after processing through immigration. Arrived at aircraft and stood underneath nose in the rain for approximately 20 minutes. Accomplished walk around while Captain continued to wait underneath the nose of the aircraft until we were allowed on the aircraft. Paperwork delivered to aircraft approximately 30 minutes after boarding aircraft. During pre-flight compared previously printed ACARS fuel data with actual ACARS. Captain entered A1 for fuel type and asked for confirmation. I stated no FSF (Fuel Service Form) yet. We were waiting for new release form at which time Jumpseater opened chiller door at the same time ground crew was closing Door X due to heavy rain. Chiller door contacted Door X causing minor damage to Door X. We annotated the damage in the AML and notified maintenance. Subsequently, new release form with sign off, DG paperwork, and final W&B (Weight and Balance) all arrived at the same time. Completed review of new paperwork then ran before engine start checklist and confirmed W&B and fuel computations. After uneventful flight and landing with 23.0 FOB, ACARS would not close. No response on SATCOM or cell phone so Skyped flight office from hotel at which time we realized maintenance never provided FSF.

Significant delays caused by COVID screening, weather, and transportation issues combined with distractions caused by Door X damage and late paperwork delivery resulted in overlooking the missing FSF.
Slow down procedures and verification of required paperwork regardless of perceived time constraints and other distractions.

**Narrative: 2**

In Country X taking over an hour to go through the COVID-19 process we got on the terminal bus to go to the aircraft across the field. While on the bus, thunderstorms created a blue light (thunderstorms) conditions and the bus was stopped for over one hour. After the conduction subsided the bus continued to the aircraft. Once the air stairs were against the aircraft we got off the bus to board the aircraft. Ramp personnel stopped us and we had to stand under the nose while it was raining for approximately 20 minutes (the bus had left). During normal preflight I ask of fuel type and FO stated we hadn’t gotten a fuel ticket yet. I entered A1 in MCDU for fuel from historical knowledge. While waiting for a new release form, a jumpseater has opened the chiller door. Door X coming down hit the chiller door and did some slight damage. We made a write up [in] AML about the cooler door and called maintenance. We received DG paperwork, a new release form with sign off, and final all at the same time. Completing these tasks just before push we cleared the aircraft of ground personnel and closed the doors. Ran before engine start checklist and confirmed weight and balance and fuel computations. After an uneventful flight and landing with 23.0 FOB ACARS would not close the flight out. After calling flight coordination, we realized ZZZZ maintenance never gave us a fuel service form.

Significant delays from COVID screening, weather, and transportation combined with jumpseater and Door X damage and late paperwork resulted in overlooking the missed FSF.

Slowing down and following procedures even though having perceived time constraints for being late and other distractions.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported that they did not get the fuel service form before departing due to significant delays and late receipt of paperwork.
ACN: 1755850

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 29500

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755850
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were in the climb to our last assigned altitude of FL300 and switched to ZZZ Center as we were passing through FL295. On the initial check in the FO [PF] incorrectly heard to continue climb to FL330 associated with our call sign. The PF pointed at the Altitude Window for FL330 to confirm, the CA [PM] wasn't 100% sure whether they had given us FL330. The PF immediately initiated a level off pressing the Vertical Speed 0 Button. We ended up leveling off at approximately 30,100 feet and in the level off ZZZ Center confirmed that they had not given us higher. Reset FL300 in the window and managed the descent back to our previously cleared altitude. The location of the event occurred IVO (in vicinity of) the ZZZZZ waypoint. Following the event ZZZ Center never mentioned anything about a loss of separation or about us being off our altitude by 100 feet. There were no aircraft in the immediate vicinity on TCAS. We landed safely at ZZZ1 and debriefed the event. As a crew we trapped an error utilizing SOP with the PF/PM both confirming the altitude set in the Altitude Window and prevented what could have been a major altitude deviation and possibly a loss of separation from another aircraft.

Primary casual factors that contributed to the confusion and minor altitude deviation were as follows: PF was current, but not proficient after coming off a recent 4 month leave period, expectation bias of a continued climb since FL300 was not our planned final / expected final from ATC, and situational awareness to the fact that based on our position relative to our planned STAR / transition that a further climb wouldn't have made much sense under the circumstances.

If there's any confusion to a clearance then immediately confirm with ATC and get clarification. If both crew members aren't 100% sure what they heard was correct, then the hairs on your neck should stick up until that's resolved. Additionally, following SOP prevented what could have been a significant altitude deviation. With many crew members coming off long leave periods, and stress due to COVID and possible furloughs, now more than ever it's important for all of us to follow SOP, do not rush, and back each other up if something doesn't look or sound right.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported an altitude deviation was the result of too much time away from work because of COVID-19 lack of flying.
Every day the Lobby at midday and after is short staffed. Today was even more so! I was assigned to Position X to help passengers with their check in on kiosks. Both Position X and X1 were open for passenger use. There had only been myself and another agent assigned in that area and before I was even half an hour into my shift I was the only Customer Service (CS) agent working in both Position X and X1! Absolutely unacceptable and unbelievable! As I was working with a passenger, other agents were directing passengers who were unable to use kiosk on their own to see me. Passengers started tapping and pulling at me to get me to attend to them but I was the only CS agent working in Position X and X1. I kindly asked passengers to please stop touching and tugging at me, especially during this time of COVID. I had no idea that the other agent...
who had been in Position X working was asked by a (Supervisor) to sign in to Position X2 to help clear the line leaving me all alone to assist all guests in X and X1. Staffing needs to be properly assigned to the Lobby and not leave the Lobby short staffed on a continual basis and causing Lobby agents to burn out from overload.

Synopsis

Customer Service Agent reported concerns with the daily under staffing in the airport lobby and the difficulties it is creating during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1755798

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 39000

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 100
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 9500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755798
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 130
Experience: Flight Crew. Type: 130
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1755802
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Security
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
When the Captain left the flight deck to take a bathroom break he failed to allow a Flight Attendant into the flight deck. The Captain proceeded to the lavatory and once he realized he didn't allow a Flight Attendant to enter the flight deck, realized his mistake and called up to the First Officer. The First Officer answered the call and allowed the Captain back into the flight deck. The flight continued uneventfully.

Anytime leaving the flight deck allow a Flight Attendant to access the flight deck. Once the Captain shut the door to the flight deck a Flight Attendant should have said something right away to the Captain, reminding him that a Flight Attendant must occupy the flight deck and there should be two Crew Members in the flight deck at all times.

Narrative: 2
My First Officer called back to the cabin informing the Flight Attendants that we needed a bathroom break. The B Flight Attendant came up while my First Officer used the bathroom. He returned eventually to the flight deck. I then proceeded out to use the bathroom, closing the cockpit door behind me without realizing no Flight Attendant had gone up into the cockpit. After coming out of the bathroom, my mistake was brought to my attention. I returned to the cockpit and apologized to the Flight Attendants and my First Officer. The flight continued on and landed uneventfully.

I have been off from work for almost five weeks. I honestly think the time away from routine procedures (such as this) had an effect. I certainly won't make the same mistake in the future.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported the Captain mistakenly shut the cockpit door before a Flight Attendant went into the cockpit during a bathroom break.
ACN: 1755789

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude, MSL, Single Value: 14000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory, TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use, STAR: ZZZZZ
Airspace, Class E: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory, TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace, Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person, Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function, Air Traffic Control: Departure
Function, Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification, Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience, Air Traffic Control: Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 14
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1755789
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I think we're all familiar with the swiss cheese model/metaphor...this one has lots of swiss cheese. I had just got to work. I was taking the ZZZ position, which was combined with the ZZZ1 position. Is it normal for ZZZ1 to be combined with ZZZ at this time of the day you may ask? Only during COVID. Should it have been split? Should it be split more often than what it is? I don't know. I received the briefing from a Controller whose radar display settings are darker than mine (everyone's settings are darker/dimmer than mine). We're trying to maintain social distancing to the best extent possible so, basically, I'm not directly over her shoulder and I tried my best to see what everyone's doing as per the briefing. I can't remember the exact wording the Controller used, but it was something along the lines of Aircraft Y was descending via except maintaining 140. This is a standard practice right now because there's a TFR along the route of the ZZZZZZ arrival. What's not standard practice is putting a Aircraft Y on a STAR that's designed for turbojet and turboprop aircraft only. So, another hole in the swiss cheese is an aircraft on a route that shouldn't have been on it.

The Controller before me issued the descend via except maintain 140 clearance so I don't know for sure if there might have been a read-back issue. Supposedly, management reviewed it all and said, "we're clean." We had legal separation. I doubt that, but that's not why I'm submitting this report. So, when the previous Controller told me the Aircraft Y was descending via except maintaining 140, "expectation bias" started kicking in...though I didn't see his altitude for myself...from where I was at while I was receiving the briefing. The Aircraft X on the ZZZZZZ1 arrival was approaching the airspace but I took the handoff on that guy just after I assumed the position so the center didn't have to spin him. That's when I should have looked to make sure Aircraft Y was meeting his restrictions. I did not though. What I was doing was trying to sign into the STARS, and I was (regrettably) wondering why the Controller was doing some things that, let's just say I, wouldn't have done. If you need to know what it was just make the request and I'll explain, but either way, it took away my attention from the conflict that was brewing. 100% on me. That's on my personality (which isn't great). The other issue that was distracting me, which I have a problem with, is an issue I've reported before. ZZZ2 GCA, has this weird automation issue where, if an aircraft is typed in, landing in a ZZZ3 sector the handoff will bypass the ZZZ sector and go straight to the ZZZ4 sectors. I refuse to believe this is an unsolvable issue. I just don't buy it. I'm not sure if it's a money issue or someone's just being lazy or what the issue is. But it's been going on for years. What had happened was, ZZZ2 GCA gave a VFR aircraft flight following to ZZ6. As it was typed into ZZZ5, the autoflash or whatever they got there, directed the hand off to the ZZZ5 sector. The guy working that sector was a bit overzealous as he is new (though it'll turn out to be an incredibly fortuitous trait here
in a minute) and just takes radar on anything flashing at him. So there's now a VFR
aircraft calling me that I have no idea about and he's talking at me like I should know who
he is and he's telling me about how he wants to take pictures for his survey work. I finish
signing into my settings. I issue a couple of frequency changes. This specifically frustrates
me because I've reported this before. I call the ZZZ4 sector to see if he did take radar on
the aircraft to see what was going on with the automation and he did. So, now that I know
he wants to take pictures, I go to give him a new code so there's not a problem with a
center generated code and a guy flying around for 4 hours taking pictures messing up
someone else's hand off. All the while the expectation bias is that the two descend vias are
separated. I think something else of a mundane nature happened in the mean time but I
can't recall what it was. I remember what it was now. The previous Controller had an
aircraft on a "flow" that was a little off. The aircraft was supposed to be over or south of
the ZZZZZZ2 intersection on a heading of 280. The previous Controller had him north on a
heading of 290. I remember being frustrated that I felt obligated to call and appreq
(because I was trained to never appreq anything unless you had to) the heading north of
ZZZZZZ2 since I wasn't meeting the appropriate criteria. Instead, I just turned him to a
280 heading and just hoped I didn't piss off the center nor did it cause them to have a loss
of any type. Next thing I know, that same overzealous ZZZ4 Controller (who now had
radar on Aircraft Y) came over to me and asked if I was good with the Aircraft X and
Aircraft Y. I looked over and they were both at 140 converging. The Aircraft Y had
descended early. The Aircraft X hadn't checked in yet, he was probably waiting to. I
immediately put a 3 mile J ring on Aircraft Y. The Aircraft X does descend on the STAR
and, initially, I was hoping the Aircraft X would descend under Aircraft Y. After evaluating
for about a second and a half that it wasn't happening (because Aircraft X was doing what
he was supposed to do as per the arrival), I can't remember what I did first, but I believe I
issued an unrestricted descent to Aircraft X. I probably should have issued a traffic alert
and I regret doing that now. I then issued a vector Aircraft Y to the right hoping to
increase lateral separation. After seeing that vertical separation and lateral separation
wasn't going to give me what I needed...I issued a climb to Aircraft Y. I honestly can't
remember if I called traffic or not. I hope I did...to at least one of them...but I don't recall.
From what I remember, Aircraft X entered the J ring which was around Aircraft Y prior to
there being 1,000 feet of separation (of course the Aircraft Y never climbed). I issued a
descend via clearance back to Aircraft X. I then issued a heading and altitude back to
Aircraft Y.

So, to sum it all up. Supposedly, there wasn't a loss but there could have been and much
worse. This is because of [Controller] in the area who better get recognition for a
save...even if after all the review I'm totally or even partially at fault. That guy saved, at
the LEAST, a TCAS and a NMAC. I've reported this to my area rep, my facility rep, my FLM
(who was on the swing because we didn't have an FLM on the day shift only CICs- which
was the Controller I received incidentally...in case anyone thinks there might be a
personality conflict between us...there isn't...and the OM's who were on the day shift...I
don't know their names. There's a lot to learn from this scenario.

I never liked this box. I have recommended so much but it falls on deaf ears. Look
through all my reports. ZZZ should be two sectors...it's one....and it's combined with
another sector 99% of the time since COVID. ZZZ2 GCA should have equipment that has
seamless interphase with us...but they don't.

**Synopsis**

TRACON Controller working combined positions reported an airborne conflict that could
have been worse, but was saved by another Controller.
ACN: 1755787

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2500

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 3
Reference: Z
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Helicopter
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Photo Shoot
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 4
Reference: A
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 5**

Reference: B
ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 6**

Reference: C
ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

**Person : 1**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Facility: ZZZ. Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function: Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience: Air Traffic Control: Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon): 4
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1755787
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction

**Person : 2**

Reference: 2
Location Of Person: Aircraft: Y
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument  
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1755869  
Human Factors: Distraction  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**

- Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- Anomaly. Deviation - Track/Heading: All Types
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material/Policy
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector. Automation: Aircraft RA
- Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result. Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action
- Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory/Alert

**Assessments**

- Contributing Factors/Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors/Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

It was a VFR summer day with light to moderate traffic. RNAV departures were in use and I was working departures on Runway XXL and arrivals on Runway XXR. After putting Aircraft X in position, an unexpected Aircraft Z checked in to the NW requesting to take pictures on "site 4." No pre-coordination of "site 4" or an expected photo flight was previously relayed. I delayed Aircraft X's takeoff clearance until I understood where the Aircraft Z would be in relation to the departures. Around XA:52Z I cleared Aircraft Z into the BRAVO airspace and clarified his intentions, where he wanted to go and how long he would be there. At XA:53:50Z I cleared Aircraft X for Takeoff via RNAV ZZZZZ. He read back the clearance with ZZZZZ as the appropriate initial RNAV fix. I put Aircraft A into position and cleared him for takeoff on a North RNAV routing at XA:54:30 and put Aircraft B into position. At XA:54:50Z I coordinated a handoff for Aircraft Z with LC3 that ended at XA:55:03Z where I described "site 4's" location and duration of the photoshoot for pop-up VFR Aircraft Z. During this time I was scanning Runway XXR for Aircraft C on short final and Runway XXL for Aircraft A's departure roll. LC3 accepted the handoff and immediately started a traffic call for his departure Aircraft Y who was lifting off Runway XYR. During our coordination Aircraft X made a hard left turn to the Southwest right off the departure end. At XA:55:07Z I started issuing a safety alert. At XA:55:08 the CA [Conflict Alert] on the radar activated. LC3 shouted his guy was stopped at 2,000 with my guy in sight. With Aircraft X climbing out of 025 rapidly, I looked at the window and verified that Aircraft B had leveled and was behind Aircraft X. I stopped the safety alert and advised traffic was no longer a factor and issued a turn to a heading of 295. Aircraft A was rolling and I wanted to make sure I had room before turning further. After checking Aircraft A's position in his roll, I turned Aircraft X to a 360 heading and eventually back to a 290 heading before switching him to departure.

Part of our procedures is to ensure that departures are on the correct RNAV track prior to switching them to departure. The pivot where the RNAV tracks split is about 1.25 miles off the departure end of Runway XXL. At 180 knots (3 miles a minute) it takes about 15 seconds for a departure to leave the departure end and turn on their appropriate track. It
is clearly inappropriate to fixate on any part of the operation for 15 seconds, yet at any point in that 15 seconds the pilot has the ability to inadvertently turn off course; in which case it is our responsibility to notice and correct. Any time I am looking at the departure end, I am not looking at the runway, final, radar, etc. The scan is vital and takes time. When I last looked at Aircraft X before the event, he was flying straight on course. After scanning both runways and the final during my coordination, I look back expecting to see him approaching his pivot point. Instead I see him half a mile off course in a southwest bound turn. There was some expectation bias there on my part. I wouldn't say the timing of the coordination was a cause of delay in seeing the wrong turn, as I was still scanning during coordination. Had the aircraft that lined up on Runway XXL started rolling without a clearance, I would have seen that immediately as that is where I was in my scan. I would say the timing of my scan needs to be adjusted to make sure an aircraft doesn't immediately turn left off the departure end as this one did and then come back to check the RNAV track a few moment later. I usually check when they are about .5-1 mile off the departure end which I did in this case but with his turn being as early as it was, a half mile put them approaching the Runway XYP departure corridor rapidly. I waited to launch Aircraft X while collecting information from Aircraft Z as that is not something I do every day, and as a TMC before the COVID schedule, rarely did at all. I could have gone ahead and coordinated with LC3 before launching Aircraft X so it was taken care of. In hind sight, this would have delayed the departures by a minute or two but, in this situation, it would be justified in my opinion. It would also have been helpful to have a sheet depicting where site 4 was so that so much time wasn't taken up having Aircraft Z verbally relay it, and then relaying that information to LC3. While it is well within our ability to handle VFR pop-ups, the extra coordination does take time and attention. From the pilot side, we were always required to verify departures in the FMS, fix by fix, together as a crew and agree on the programming. The Captain would typically enter the data and the Co-pilot, with the departure plate out, would verify every fix. It took an extra few minutes to do this but was deemed essential as a wrong turn out of ZZZ or ZZZ1 was not an option. It was mandated on every flight to prevent situations just like this. I'm not sure if every company has a similar policy but they should. If [airline] were to implement such a procedure it could help nation wide.

**Narrative: 2**

We were departing Runway XYR in ZZZ on the ZZZZZ1 departure. After autopilot was engaged at 600 feet, but before reaching acceleration altitude of 1,000, I was checking the FMA for FMS and Autopilot engagement, when I saw an Amber TCAS mark showing +600 feet and much too close to us. At that moment my First Officer verbalized seeing an aircraft very close out the window. The other aircraft was climbing above us and crossing our RNAV path from right to left. I immediately turned off the autopilot and stopped my climb. Then we received "Monitor Vertical Rate." Tower then requested for us to level off, which we had already done. Then we received, "Clear Of Conflict." We could see the other aircraft adjusting with a right turn back to their proper path. We proceeded to clean up our aircraft and complete all checklists. When we were clear, ATC gave us instructions to continue our climb. We continued on the ZZZZZ1 and on to our destination without further event.

It seems as though the other involved aircraft took off of XXL and made an abrupt and incorrect left turn in to our XYR departure corridor.

**Synopsis**

Pilot and Controller reported an airborne conflict on departure.
The cleaning employee asked if he could disinfect spray the inside of the aircraft, I said no not yet, we’re right in the middle of maintenance on the aircraft. I said, "give us 5 minutes please," he said okay. Next thing I know he's spraying the entire aircraft with the cockpit door open, Technician Y in the electronics and equipment compartment and no announcement or even a "heads up" he was going to spray. I was still in the cockpit working on a pack issue and saw him coming up the aisle spraying. He left the aircraft shortly after and approximately 10 minutes later in the planning office, I realized I had become congested and started coughing. We need some safety measures in place and adequate "air out" time for the fuselage.

Synopsis
Maintenance Technician reported that a cleaning employee began spraying disinfectant inside the aircraft while the Technician was still inside performing work. The Technician experienced adverse physiological reaction as a result.
ACN: 1755703

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Crew Rest Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1755703
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Troubleshooting

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
We are unable to use crew rest facilities except for only one Flight Attendant while pilots are able to use both bunks in their crew rest and we are required to be separated. The 3 crew rest seats provided in seating area are not appropriate since it does not have a curtain to block the light and due to passenger placement, we are unable to remove masks for the time on crew rest which promotes fatigue and other negative effects of long term mask wearing. Unable to get adequate rest due to the COVID-19 restrictions the company has imposed while pilots operate as normal and with no mask restrictions.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported differences between pilot resting areas and those of the flight attendants.
**ACN: 1755701**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202008

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

**Environment**
Light : Daylight

**Aircraft**
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Parked
Cabin Lighting : High

**Person**
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : General Seating Area
Cabin Activity : Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity : Boarding
Report Organization : Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1755701
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

**Events**
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

A passenger traveling with a pet refused to wear her mask and customer service had to come to the aircraft to remove her from the flight. She began to scream and yell that she had to go home and she paid for the ticket. This occurred after myself and the Gate Agent informed her of our mask policy. She then started to rant how the virus is a political hoax and that she doesn't wear a mask. When customer service tried to get her to come off the plane, she started to scream that she will wear the mask and the passengers around her started to yell with her to give her the mask. We gave her the mask and she put it on.

Gate Agents need to ensure the passengers have on their proper masks before they come down to the aircraft. Also, it would help if the CA would make an announcement about the mask policy, and the possible return to the gate for not wearing the mask.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that a passenger refused to wear a face mask. When customer service came on board the passenger agreed to wear the face mask.
ACN: 1755695

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Cabin Lighting: High

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755695
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
We had a passenger that refused to wear her mask. She felt ill and was unable to wear it. I informed that she had to wear it or that we would have to return to the gate due to policy. I informed the Captain that we had to return and he suggested that he park and for us to speak with her again. FA C spoke with her and she told her the same thing, I then came up while she was shaking her head no. I then informed her that we were going back to the gate. She then put it on as if she was going to comply. As soon as we took off, she took it off again and kept it off the entire flight. We then called the Captain to have the plane met with customer service person in ZZZ. Our company requires face coverings, but we are still seeing the wrong types of face covering being worn. Is this to be addressed by FA's or the gate agents before they come down to the aircraft?

I think the wearing of and the proper types of masks need to be emphasized at the gate before passengers come down to the aircraft. Airport/gate agents should be assisting with the new normal of wearing masks. It is challenging to watch bags and masks wearing all at the same time.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that a passenger did not comply with wearing a face mask during flight.
**ACN: 1755611**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Dawn

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Route In Use.STAR: ZZZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755611
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were at cruise [and] ZZZ Center told us to descend via ZZZZZ landing north. We read it back and continued. After the ZZZZZ1 turn they asked if we were on the ZZZZZ1 or ZZZZZ2 [transition]. We said the ZZZZZ1 [transition] and the Controller said it looked [like] we were cleared the ZZZZZ2 transition. Controller said no problem and we continued to descend via while reviewing the fixes again and discussing how it could have happened. After a few minutes there was a different Controller on the frequency and we could hear him talking to other aircraft. So we queried him a few times to no avail. I then input the approach frequency from the IAP and contacted them there since we had not heard a hand off. They said they were trying us on guard for the last few minutes. Since we were still at 9,000 instead of diving and spoilers etc., we elected a box vector for the descent. The flight continued with no further incident.

[Cause was] improper FMS entry. Still not sure when it changed as we briefed it properly, but we were given the ZZZZZ4 by ZZZ Tower. After push and an FMS change was made at which point the ZZZZZ1 transition could have been selected instead of ZZZZZ2. First trip back after more than 2 months off and forgot to input guard into the standby like I do every other flight. One of the small but beneficial habits that begin to fade without repetition and use.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported flying the wrong transition on a STAR due to a possible FMS entry error.
ACN: 1755590

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 29000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 10274.05
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 10274.05
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1755590
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Time Pressure

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Before we were able walk onboard our plane we had to go to gate XX for a temperature check.

Once on board our FA said our crew meals were not boarded and airport operations informed us catering was shut down. CA went to procure 2 sandwiches in the terminal while I set up the cockpit. I rushed through the cockpit setup as we arrived later than planned to the plane.

Our clearance was ZZZZZX.ZZZ then as filed. While loading the route in the FMC the ZZZZZX departure was loaded without selecting the ZZZ [VOR] transition. Upon returning from the preflight inspection 15 minutes before scheduled departure time, I proceeded to verify the route. I did not catch the error that the ZZZZZX departure was loaded without the ZZZ transition.

On the before takeoff checklist, I missed another opportunity to catch the error when I read FMC ...ZZZZZX ZZZZZ. The box should have been loaded ZZZZZX departure ZZZ transition.

After takeoff during initial climb, I noticed the airplane symbol was off course on the Jeppesen ZZZZZX.ZZZ SID. I brought this to the CA's attention, but before we could investigate further ATC called to say we were off course. We flew ZZZZZ direct ZZZ rather than the ZZZZZ.ZZZ, which was our clearance.

ATC cleared us direct ZZZ. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported programming the FMC incorrectly for the SID, which resulted in a track deviation. Reporter noted several delays that contributed to rushing through cockpit set up.
ACN: 1755564

Time / Day

Date : 202008

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 40000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 3
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Oceanic

Component

Aircraft Component : MCP
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Improperly Operated

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 13254
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 212
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1022
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1755564

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 2488
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 242
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 481
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1755510

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
During crew change, crew cleaned MCP with sanitizer wipes. "MAY" have bumped ALT Knob on MCP. No changes made or observed on MCP. Message sent to ZZZZ Center via CPDLC: MCP touched. Center sent message questioning crew. Crew explained what may have happened. Center understood and explained no deviations were noted but they have been having these issues lately and their engineers were wondering what could be the cause.

They are cleaning their equipment as we are due to COVID-19.

Narrative: 2
[At] FL400 during crew change received message from ZZZZ Center on CPDLC CONFIRM LEVEL FL400. Crew accepted and confirmed FL400 CPDLC as well as voice that there was no change. Just prior to this message during crew change the crew was cleaning their relief station. There could have been an inadvertent activation of the ALT knob during cleaning MCP panel with wipes that resulted in a CPDLC deviation message. There was no sign or indication on the MCP or FLT instruments of such a deviation, and aircraft maintained its assigned ALT of FL400. The crew relayed the information to ATC and they reported that this same type of issue has happened before with the MCP deviation alert, but crew verifying no deviation.

ATC replied that engineering is collecting data for this issue. In good humor, they said their keyboards have never been cleaner since the COVID-19.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain and First Officer reported that while sanitizing the MCP during crew change, the ALT knob may have been inadvertently bumped.
**ACN: 1755525**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: FO
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Company
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 17746.52
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3898.62
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755525

**Events**
- Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred: All Types
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected.Other
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

We have a scheduled X hour and XX minute sit in ZZZZ until our return to ZZZZ1. My concern is the bus that they locked us into for two hours with not enough seats and no bathroom. I stood for two hours due to not enough seats to space out with during this pandemic. I understand these are tough times, but we need to at least get a tour bus so we can spread out.
Bottom line, we are on a X-day trip, back side of the clock, had to wait an hour for the ZZZZ1 crew to de-plane due to COVID, then get locked in a people mover bus for 2 hours with not enough seats and no lavatory, unable to spread out so some had to stand or sit on the floor. At a minimum we need a tour bus with a large enough area to spread out.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported that while waiting to depart, they were locked for 2 hours in a small bus with not enough seats for everyone and no bathroom.
ACN: 1755522

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Crew Rest Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 13765
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 172
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4347
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755522
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Crew Rest Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 5259
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 47
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1308
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755535
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
When pre-flighting the cabin for Flight ABC, it was noticed that there were no pillows at all brought on board for the pilot crew rest facility. This flight originally begins in ZZZZ1 it makes a short stop in ZZZZ then continues to ZZZ.

The pilots who originate the beginning of Flight ABC in ZZZZ1 should preflight the entire airplane including provisioning for the crew rest on the longer section from ZZZZ to ZZZ. There is no provisioning allowed at all in ZZZZ.

The flight attendants were able to find three first class seats that were unoccupied and pillows from those seats, note that this is less provisioning per pilot than normal (1 pillow vs 2) and one pilot which happens to be myself which received no pillows at all.

In this one instance I happened to find pillows that were tucked into our used bedding area in the crew bunk. It became a decision between canceling a flight due to a lack of pillows or me using the used pillows from the inbound Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZZ.

I feel it is unacceptable to be forced into a situation of using used bedding especially in this time of a pandemic or canceling a flight. The decision to accept the used bedding was mine and I did get rest on the flight as I should have but the concerns of using potentially tainted pillows and blankets I feel is unacceptable and this should be corrected.

With all of the protective measures these days trying to make sure we protect our flight crews from contracting the COVID-19 virus, this is total disregard for our safety and well being. When pre-flighting the aircraft, we found all crew rest provisions had been used at least once and possibly multiple times prior to our flight. With a double augmented crew, this also meant that the onboard provisions would have to be used at least twice more. We tried diligently to get clean provisions before departure to no avail. The on duty operations manager actually stated, "Use a first class duvet for a pillow." This would be if there were even any duvets. This aircraft came from ZZZZ2 with XXX passengers onboard. We are warned to clean our cockpits thoroughly before and after the flights. We all use face masks diligently. What good does this do when we have to put our head on pillows and bodies on blankets that have been used by multiple people.

Air carrier flight crew reported having to use bedding and pillows during crew rest that were previously used.
ACN: 1755521

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 6000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 2611
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 12
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 2611
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1755521
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 6978
Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 37
Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 3217
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1755533
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This was leg #3 of 3, the last flight of the 2 day trip. We had a little over 2 hour sit in ZZZ. It was the FO’s leg. Our trip was going smoothly, and our CRM was going well for our trip. The FO programmed the FMC and I checked it. The FO programmed an NAPD2, ‘L3’ climb he put clean maneuvering speed/ 3,000 AGL in the L3 speed restriction, but left the L2 restriction at the ECON speeds. (forgot to put ‘250’ to restrict the speed after 3,000 feet in the L2 position). During my pre-flight, I checked the climb page, but didn't notice the omission. Taxi and takeoff were uneventful. Sometime passing around 6,000 feet, I noticed our airspeed to be approximately 280 kts. I called out 'airspeed.' The FO corrected the deviation by climbing faster. We debriefed the error once we got to cruise.
He made the programming error, and I missed it on my review. On climbout, he followed the VNAV guidance and sped up, and I didn't notice the increase until later. With these very light weights we are operating at, the airplane handles differently. There is a normal nose-down cue when we accelerate to climb speed passing 10,000 feet. I didn't feel any such pronounced nose down event...and I was surprised to see the speed that high.

Narrative: 2

The flight was our third flight of the day flying on the second and last day of our pairing together. I was the pilot flying the departure out of ZZZ. Due to incorrectly programming the VNAV "Climb" page in the FMC, after reaching acceleration altitude the VNAV commanded acceleration to climb speed appropriate above 10,000 feet. I failed to catch the error and proceeded to accelerate towards this speed while we were still below 10,000 feet. The Captain recognized the error as we were accelerating around 270 KIAS, which occurred around 6,000 MSL. He verbally informed me of the deviation and I immediately corrected the error. ATC was not involved in the incident and never contacted us on the radio or any other manner.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a speed deviation during departure.
ACN: 1755520

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 5557
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 81
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4074
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755520
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Dispatch

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 4007
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 39
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 4007
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1755530
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Dispatch

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
In ZZZ the Captain and I arrived at the aircraft we noticed that there was a fuel sheet showing a zero uplift that our actual fuel was above our flight planned fuel. We discussed that and were happy for the extra pad on the fuel. At this time we had a conflict with station operation on catering not supplying water. As well there was no PPE in the cockpit to clean the cockpit correctly for safety. We had a Supervisor trying the best to help us in the cockpit get this issue resolved, which never did. At that time we saw that there was a release 2 out. So we the flight crew down loaded the flight plan. The preliminary number for the runway had been ran, ran with the actual fuel load and the new ZFW. About this time we were informed ready to push.

After receiving our final weights we discussed the higher planned takeoff weight and determined it was the conservative approach to use the higher weights for are performance calculations. We took off with I believe 129.5 numbers.

After takeoff we received an ACARS message that Dispatch had not been contacted. This was a mistake we as a crew understood. The rest of the flight went smoothly and we landed using a conservative landing data. After landing during our debrief we discussed the errors of the flight.

Narrative: 2
Arrived at aircraft and noticed fuel on board was 17.5. Planned fuel on release 1 was 13.2. Made a mental note to notify Dispatch of the higher inbound fuel from previous flight.
During pre-flight checks, several operational issues came about regarding sanitizing flight
deck due to COVID concerns while trying to acquire required PPE items from station personnel since inbound crew did not leave any on the flight deck. Then we had customer service issues regarding adequate water supply for the flight as well as pressure from local operations to achieve an on time departure. During this time Release 2 was issued by Dispatch and accepted by myself. Release 2 had a revised ZFW which we noted and added to our current FOB to obtain accurate takeoff data. With all of these distractions and pressures, we neglected unintentionally to notify Dispatch of the current FOB which is SOP in this situation. Our flight departed safely with accurate takeoff data for the current weight of aircraft with the actual FOB calculation. The SOP error was not informing Load Planning and Dispatch of the actual FOB. After debrief, we agreed that the distractions prior to departure added to this threat. Attached is the takeoff data message for assumed weight of 129.5 which is higher than the planned weight of 123.3 and we of course used the higher weight for our takeoff using the actual FOB.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported an SOP error by not informing Load Planning and Dispatch of the actual FOB.
ACN: 1755423

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755423
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Primary Problem : Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**  
Passenger in seat X4 boarded wearing a face shield. I told her a face mask was required as well. She argued and said it says "face covering." I said, "it's vague yes, but simply means like mask or scarf." I told FA B and pilots. Pilots said, "...face shields alone are not okay..." [but did not enforce]. I'd suggest not using the wording "face covering" I'd state "mask."

**Synopsis**  
Flight Attendant reported a passenger was wearing face shield, but no face mask.
ACN: 1755420

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755420
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passenger was non compliant for the mask policy. During boarding I had to ask her once to cover her face with the mask, as it was completely off. Second, she had it below her nose after takeoff and I asked her to cover her nose and she turned away and ignored me, so I stood there and asked again and she reluctantly barely covered her nose. She was eating and drinking a lot, to the point where she wouldn't keep her mask on. It was not briefly like the announcement stated. I gave her a final warning as I gave her the benefit of the doubt and she was disrespectful and rude about the situation. She accused me of not letting her eat or drink and I explained the policy and how it works. That was my final warning and I called the pilots to request a Supervisor or CSR to meet the aircraft and have a discussion with her.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant about wearing a face mask.
ACN: 1755418

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755418
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Passengers in X3 and 4 were not complying with the mask policy from the start of boarding. [Passenger] X4 came on with his mask off, so I asked him to put his mask on. As I was doing cabin secure I noticed their masks were below their nose almost showing their mouth so I told them again that I do not want to have to ask again for them to put their masks on. I gave them the benefit of the doubt and they were unhappy with how I approached the situation, but they were not complying from the beginning. They were also non-rev passengers. I even had passengers thank me for reinforcing the mask policy because they noticed their masks were off.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported passengers were not compliant with wearing a face mask.
Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use.STAR: ZZZZZ
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755355
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: NMAC
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were descending on the ZZZZZ RNAV arrival landing [Runway] XXR in ZZZ, either just prior to ZZZZZ1, or just after, level at 6,000 feet. We heard the Controller talking to another aircraft, Aircraft Y also at 6,000 feet. That aircraft was issued a descent, but did not comply. A few moments later the Controller asked if they had us in sight, and told Aircraft Y to descend immediately, and if they did not see us, to also turn immediately. This is about the time we received the TA, and saw them ahead of us and at our altitude, on TCAS, then we received the RA, I executed the TCAS escape maneuver, TCAS issued a very steep climb, close to 6,000 FT/min. The aircraft passed beneath us at 150-200 feet. I would call this one a near miss.

I'm not certain whether the Controller lost situational awareness with this GA aircraft, or whether the pilot of that aircraft was not properly following instruction; or possibly both. We were at our last assigned altitude, on the arrival in level flight.

The Controller appeared to be working two frequencies, and seemed task saturated. Again, I'm not sure whether the Controller lost sight of the situation, or whether this extreme RA was due to the GA pilot not following Controller instructions.

Synopsis

First Officer reported a near miss during approach with GA traffic.
ACN: 1755324

**Time / Day**
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Parked
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Component**
Aircraft Component: Toilet Furnishing
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

**Person: 1**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755324
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party 2: Flight Attendant

**Person: 2**
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1755326
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
During pre-flight of Flight ABCD ZZZ-ZZZ1, Flight Attendant informed the Captain that the sink was empty of water and a note had been left in the lavatory informing of the issue. Noting that potable water is not available at the outstation, the Captain made the decision to depart as scheduled to meet on time arrival at ZZZ1. Upon arrival at ZZZ1, crew noted that ground operations did re-fill [the] potable water tank. Crew was unaware that the lavatory sink itself was inoperative.

Narrative: 2
Flight Attendant notified me of a note in the lavatory stating that there was no water in the lavatory sink. The Flight Attendant said she could not get any water to dispense from the sink. I made an assumption that the reservoir was empty, and that was the reason why it was not working. I made the decision to continue with the flight knowing that ZZZ did not have the capability to refill the reservoir. Thinking we could have it filled in ZZZ1. I was notified later in the day that the sink in that aircraft was inoperative and it had caused a delay on the aircraft’s next flight. [I] was given a call and counseled about having potable water in the aircraft lavatories due to COVID-19. I regret the decision that I made as Captain. I just wanted to get the passengers to their final destination. I should have complied with Standard Operating Procedures.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported they departed with an inoperative lavatory sink.
ACN: 1755317

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 20
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 11000

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 176
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 721
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755317
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types  
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence  
Detector.Person : Flight Crew  
When Detected : In-flight  
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification  
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Staffing

Narrative: 1

Throughout the last several weeks at least, communication with ATC has been difficult on many occasions throughout the day due to ATC saturation. More than usual, Controllers are working multiple sectors, combining multiple frequencies, and overall being task-saturated far more often than I am used to. It is my perception that ATC staffing was adjusted several months ago to match decreased traffic counts associated with the COVID downturn, and now that traffic counts have largely rebounded, ATC staffing has not increased anywhere nearly as quickly. A great example was on this flight leg, inbound to ZZZ - as far as we could tell, one Controller was working all ZZZ of Approach/Departure, leading to his absolute saturation trying to handle IFR inbounds/outbounds to/from ZZZ and several satellite airports, and being compounded significantly by a handful of VFR aircraft operating in the area. We tried for quite some time to request a heading deviation for towering cumulus buildups in the vicinity of the STAR course, and were glad to finally get a word in before we would have needed to choose to either accept worse turbulence than we needed to or deviate from a clearance. There is no doubt that the ATC saturation was at a level which compromised Safety several times over the last few days of flying.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported difficulty receiving a revised clearance for weather deviation because ATC was saturated with traffic.
ACN: 1755316

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 70
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 9000
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755316
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I removed my mask/facial covering upon boarding an empty aircraft and stowed my personal belongings in the cockpit. The B Flight Attendant asked why I wasn't wearing a mask in the cabin. (Again, the aircraft was empty, except for the six-person crew.) I stated it was not required when not in view of customers. She said it was. I checked my manual updates and sure enough she was correct. I notified the Flight Attendant that I had seen the [update]. Flight departed on time and landed safely in ZZZ.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain self reported not following the latest update regarding face mask policy.
ACN: 1755283

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 12000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Nav In Use: GPS
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 5
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1755283
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Automation: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related
**Narrative: 1**

ZZZ Center was closed due to COVID decontamination on a midnight shift. We were here to work the airspace during the closure. Our airspace is delegated 10,000 feet and below.

I received two flight plans for the two aircraft en-route from ZZZ1 Approach. The assigned altitudes were both 10,000 feet. When the targets appeared on my scope, they were at 12,000 feet. I called ZZZ2 Approach and coordinated 12,000 feet so the aircraft would not have to descend back down. They approved the coordination. I then called ZZZ1 and told them to leave the Aircraft at 12,000 feet, but in the system at 10,000 feet so the flight plan would stay in my airspace.

The communication was not entirely clear that the airspace was closed prior to working the abnormal midnight shift.

**Synopsis**

TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation occurred after rearranging altitudes in the ATC system to accommodate arriving aircraft in his sector due to another ATC site closing for COVID-19 sanitation.
ACN: 1755243

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 1000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: None
Airspace. TFR: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification. Flight Crew: Commercial
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 250
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 20
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 133
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1755243
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1
I was operating in the ZZZ SFRA and may have inadvertently violated a sporting TFR. The sporting event in question was played without fans due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Prior to the flight, and as part of my preflight planning, I reviewed current TFRs for the intended flight path using the FAA's TFR website (tfr.faa.gov). Sporting TFRs do not appear on this list, however they historically have appeared in EFB applications, including Garmin Pilot which I reviewed prior to this flight. Garmin Pilot did not show any TFRs over this sporting event either prior to the flight or during the flight.

The flight operation took place in the ZZZ SFRA. I was not contacted during the flight by ATC, nor was I notified by ATC or the FBO at the destination airport of any issues with the flight.

To add to the confusion, another pilot also operating in the vicinity during the time of the game was in contact with ZZZ1 Tower and was notified that there was no TFR because there were no spectators.

A few days later, I received notification from Garmin that sporting TFRs were not appearing in the Garmin Pilot application due to an issue with Garmin's data supplier related to COVID-19.

I felt this report was prudent since even prior to COVID-19, these sporting TFRs were already difficult to find. During the COVID-19 pandemic, they are even more difficult to find since the typical data sources may or may not accurately display them.

To help avoid any issues with these TFRs in the future. I have joined a local industry group who among other services, provides notifications to pilots about sporting TFRs and other TFRs. I will also be reviewing local teams' schedules directly in addition to using the 3rd party EFB applications.

Synopsis
Pilot reported confusion on whether a sporting TFR is in effect during the COVID-19 Pandemic when spectators are not allowed at the game.
**ACN: 1755169**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755169
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Gate Agent / CSR
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**
Received a message that there was [a] "little kid won't wear his mask." I approached the parent and asked her "How old is he"? She replied "X". Gate Agent allowed kid to board
without PPE on. After informing the parent that the child is required to wear a mask, parent said she could not get him to wear it. The Gate agent should not have allowed passenger to board the aircraft, causing our delay.

Synopsis

Flight attendant reported a child who refused to wear a face mask was allowed to board the aircraft causing a delay.
**ACN: 1755162**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755162
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755163
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Illness
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Gate Agent / CSR
When Detected : Pre-flight
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

Myself and the FA A arrived to the gate in ZZZ for our departure Flight ABC to ZZZ1 where we would meet the [rest of] crew for the flight. When arriving we noticed the customer service having a hefty conversation with what I had assumed was a passenger for Flight ABC.

Another agent checked the crew in for boarding, whom mentioned she would be controlling and boarding the flight. She continued by stating she wasn't aware with what the agent at the counter was dealing with, but would find out more. A short time after myself and the additional crew boarded, customer service advised us "we now have a passenger who cannot wear a mask on our flight due to medical reasons." We all asked if there was evidence to support her statement. He replied that she did not and also stated he asked for support from his leads whom told him the passenger did not need any.

At this time the crew and I asked for inflight supervisors to come to the aircraft. I continued to research the latest inflight documents and COVID-19 requirements. We as a crew were aware that a document stating passengers were required to have proof of exemption to wear a mask. As the aircraft continued to fill up for boarding the A FA and D FA remained in the forward galley speaking to inflight Supervisor.

When I approached the forward galley area, Supervisor A asked me how [I was] inward feeling. My response was that "I don't feel comfortable having a passenger on board the aircraft who states they can't wear a mask." Supervisor A stated that I had the opportunity to call crew scheduling to call out of the trip if I didn't feel comfortable. I replied that that wasn't a favorable option. I would then have to call in sick when not sick, affecting my attendance, and then find my own way home from ZZZ.

At this time we decided to continue to fly due to not having many options other than to do so. I still wasn't comfortable having interactions with the passenger so the D FA AND myself, B FA, switch positions for the duration of the flight. We re-briefed with the crew and continued the flight.

I'm still extremely upset that there was no company or management support for a passenger who claimed to have a medical condition but no proof. Passengers must wear mask or not fly regardless of medical conditions.

Narrative: 2
Upon arrival at the gate, I saw an interaction between the gate agent and a passenger. We presumed that whatever the issue might be that it would be pertinent to our flight. The crew and I then inquired with the agent who then informed the crew that a passenger had notified him that she cannot wear a mask. We asked him if she had a note from a medical professional indicating that she was safe and well enough to fly and was indeed exempt because at this point we had no indicators on our manifest of such an exemption. He said no. We requested a Supervisor and interacted with two, one of which was Supervisor A. The crew told Supervisor A and the other Supervisor that we did not feel safe a number of times, and every time it was dismissed. We were told by both supervisors that asking for a note would violate Health Information Privacy and Accountability Act (HIPPA). From my understanding, one is allowed to ask for documentation for a mask a exemption. HIPPA is not applicable as it only applies to people with access to medical records. Individuals cannot cite that law when refusing to disclose a request for medical exemption as a customer. This was also ignored by supervisors. We searched for supporting facts and our attempts were met with disdain and followed by opinions and lies. Finally, After coming to the realization that management was not going to protect us, I inquired with Supervisor A as to what our recourse was. Supervisor A happily told me that airline has plenty of options in the event that we did not feel safe. The first option would be to call in sick. The second option would be, to put it in her words, "That's what leaves are for." To clarify, a Supervisor instructed me to lie to the company and tell them that I am unwell when I am not sick, and left to find my own accommodations or way home in a different state in which I didn't live. Option two in my opinion was inappropriate and irresponsible for Supervisor A to say so casually, as if we did not have families to support or a need for a roof over our heads. I found this comment disheartening and we felt like we had no options left but to work. Supervisor A then continued to tell me that because I was working in the forward cabin that I would have minimal exposure and would be fine, completely disregarding any concern for the well being of the three other crew members in that aircraft. Not only was this disrespectful and unprofessional, but it was also incorrect. Social distancing is almost impossible within crews. We have duties to fulfill including briefing, pilot breaks, cabin service, and emergencies as well as shuttle rides to and from airports that would require a close proximity to one another. I was particularly angered by this reasoning because if a medical or cabin safety issue should arise, management's statement takes the assumption that I would deny my responsibility as the medic, police, and fire personnel on board because of an imaginary line segmenting responsibilities within cabin crew positions. As these conversations were happening I requested Medical and was never patched. I cannot accept this situation because I care about my job, my family, and other people that it could affect by this carelessness.

Changes in policies that concretely state protections for FA's, hazard pay, and better alternatives than calling in sick or taking leave.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendants reported a passenger was allowed to fly without wearing a face mask due to a self-reported medical condition.
ACN: 1755153

Time / Day
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Deplaning
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755153
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Cleaners radioed "cleaners off" when in fact they were not off the plane. They were still in the back of the aircraft, so they started boarding with cleaners still on. Passengers had to tuck into the row in first class to let them by. Also cleaners stated "Sorry we don't have a vacuum," so no vacuuming was done on aircraft before it was boarded with new passengers.

Passengers were within inches of the cleaners and no social distancing protocol was adhered to as they were co-mingling getting the cleaners off while passengers were boarding.

Do not board until it is verified that the cleaners are off. The agents did not ask the crew that cleaners were off, just the standard cabin temp on? They went by the cleaners saying they were off (when they were not).

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that a call was made that the cleaners were off the aircraft when they actually were not. Passengers were allowed on and had to duck into rows to allow the cleaning crew off the aircraft.
**ACN: 1755144**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: AGL: Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Flight Phase: Cruise

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Deplaning
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1755144
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Pre-flight
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

Probably about 15 passengers were not wearing their masks correctly over their nose and mouth during boarding and during the flight. They would comply briefly then take them down. State X is a COVID hot spot and I feel like the safety of complying customers and crew is compromised with them not following CDC guidelines.

We made announcements and is what we were supposed to. We reminded the passengers. Other guests were upset as they wanted to be safe and were not. We need a hard line of compliance. No mask or a mask purposely worn incorrectly needs to not fly until the pandemic is over. Any medical reasons need to be addressed before boarding and by medlink.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendant reported several passengers not properly wearing face masks.
**ACN: 1755142**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755142
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Passenger refuses to wear a mask. She boarded in one and was also wearing it during compliance. She refuses to comply after being asked by both me and the D Flight Attendant. She says she can't wear them for a long period of time. I kindly reminded her it
is part of the agreement by choosing to fly in these times, but she refuses.

It is unsafe for those around her and us, as crew, who continually have to stop by her row when she rings her call light. Since this is a matter of safety and the well-being of both passengers and employees in an unprecedented global pandemic, a medical exemption should require a medical clearance from a doctor, as well as a negative COVID test within 72 hours of flying with us.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a face mask during flight.
ACN: 1755037

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755037
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755038
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: MEL
Detector.Person: Other Person
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Fuel Door verification procedures were not accomplished. On the day prior to this trip, we had flown Flight ABCB ZZZ to ZZZZ in which we had accomplished the Fuel Door verification procedure. Upon departure at ZZZZ we were taking the exact aircraft we'd flown in. We'd ferried fuel in the day before and assumed that we would not require the verification procedure because we figured the fuel door would not have been opened. We misunderstood that the requirement was for all flights, regardless of any extenuating circumstances.

Closer attention to detail in reviewing recent policy and procedure changes, especially after a long layoff.

Narrative: 2
Did not submit Fuel Door verification pre-departure in ZZZZ due to no fuel added. Operated Flight ABCB day prior ZZZ-ZZZZ, complied with MEL requirement departing ZZZ. Due to no fuel added and dispatching with fuel as onboard did not believe it was necessary to submit Fuel Door verification.

I directed the fueler not to open the fuel panel so as to not have to submit fuel form and meet the MEL requirement. Believed this to be unnecessary.

Nearly all operations with this type aircraft require fuel to be added. Would be helpful to describe this procedure to highlight these circumstances where fuel is not added.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported not filling out Fuel Door verification paperwork because they thought it wasn’t necessary.
ACN: 1755020

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: STAR: ZZZZZ
Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1755020

Events
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result: Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were cleared to descend via the ZZZZZ Arrival (I cannot remember if they said landing North or South). At the time the ATIS reported landing south. Runways XXC and XXR were in use for landing. We planned on landing XXC. We swapped over to Approach (not sure if FO checked in with our ATIS) and approach did not say a new ATIS was out or what direction of landing was being used. Time was about XA:00Z. A few minutes later we made
the turn to the north going to ZZZZZ1. After another two or three minutes Approach informed us we were flying the wrong way, they were landing north now, and gave us a turn back to the southwest heading 210. We reset and briefed landing [Runway] YC. Everything else was fine.

I was focusing on flying the arrival. FO was familiarizing himself with the airport, I think he said he has never been there before. Both of us went nearly four months without flying. We didn't check for a new ATIS at the top of the hour.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported making a wrong turn on an arrival, but corrected soon after Approach Control pointed out the error.
ACN: 1755002

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Fractional
Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Component
Aircraft Component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Fractional
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1755002
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly: Conflict: Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result: Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
Several factors lead to an initial bank in the wrong direction after takeoff. The PM and ATC caught it immediately almost simultaneously. No true heading deviation occurred, but it is a good lesson in multiple distractions. Factor 1: due to reduced COVID operations and initial training on another type, this was only my third day flying X aircraft type in the last three months. The PM is new to the type and similarly short on recency. Factor 2: this was our department's first flight with a new checklist revision, created due to the manufacturer's addition of a new step to transfer bleeds from the APU to the engines during taxi. The PM and I discussed the timing of the transfer in depth during the preflight, and how its placement in our new checklist was in fact not ideal. If a long delay is taken at the runway, the crew would elect to hold the checklist at the bleed transfer. They would then be required to complete 13 items between receiving a takeoff clearance and the takeoff roll. Factor 3: we planned to depart [Runway] XXL, and I briefed a left turn. I also briefed an immediate left turn to land [Runway] XYC in the event of smoke/fire in the cockpit or cabin. The airport turned just as we called for taxi, and Ground assigned us XYC for departure. We re-briefed the departure during taxi. The initial turn would be to the right, but I elected to brief an emergency return with a left pattern to XYC for the sake of my own visibility. Factor 4: As we sat at the hold short awaiting our takeoff clearance with Aircraft Y opposite us, I noticed that the Environmental Control System (ECS) was supplying a much higher temperature to the cabin than was requested, and we began to discuss. Factor 5: As we were discussing the ECS (with the checklist held at 13 items to go), the Local Controller issued a takeoff clearance to "Aircraft X." The aircraft opposite us, Aircraft Y, took the clearance and began to move toward the runway. Tower quickly stopped Aircraft Y and reissued the takeoff clearance to us, Aircraft X, with a right turn to the east. We accepted the takeoff clearance and began moving onto the runway as we finished the remainder of our checklist items and flows. During this time I was focused on ensuring we got through the checklist thoroughly and reminded the PM to complete an item that was missed on his flow. Again, he is relatively new to the type and the low pace
of operations means he has had very little opportunity to fly the airplane. With all of that
completed we departed. Upon reaching 1,500 feet I banked the airplane to the left. The
PM called out "right turn" and Tower transmitted the same to us almost immediately
thereafter. I corrected the bank back to the right and the flight continued uneventfully.

There were a litany of factors that lead to my error in handling the airplane, but the
overriding lesson is one in managing cockpit distraction and continued vigilance in the low
paced COVID operational environment. Also, I should have considered briefing a right turn
in the event of an immediate return, as I had briefed a left turn for all three other
scenarios (XXL departure, XXL emergency return, XYC emergency return). I lost
situational awareness due to multiple internal and external distractions and my brain just
said go left.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported turning right instead of left on departure. ATC and First Officer
immediately pointed out the error and heading was corrected.
ACN: 1755001

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1755001
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Landing Without Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

We failed to switch to Tower Controller and get a landing clearance. Lack of recent flying experience, my 2nd leg after 3 months off. Fatigue due to not getting much sleep in before red eye flight. Lack of recent flying by non flying pilot as well. Slam dunk approach by Controller, task saturated. I needed the gear and flaps out and was asking for them at the same time the Controller was switching us to Tower.

I don't recall the Approach Controller asking us a second time to switch to Tower, the Tower said later when we called them that they tried us on guard (I did have it tuned and up a little bit, surprised I didn't hear it) and did light signals but didn't mention calling Approach Control and asking them to tell us to go to Tower again. The other thing is tough, I know why the pilot flying doesn't do the flaps and gear himself, but in this case my asking for them right after the non flying pilot read back instructions to switch to Tower I think caused him forget to switch over and check in. Lastly, it's pretty ingrained in me to call out "landing" before touching down, but going forward I'm going to be less concerned about saying the word and concerned with the 3 things we need to land.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported landing without a clearance.
**ACN: 1754998**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Other
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person:Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function:Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function:Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification:Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1754998
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person:Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function:Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function:Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification:Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1754996
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification

**Events**
- Anomaly:Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector:Person: Flight Crew
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1

Crew rejected the takeoff due to FLEX not set Caution Advisory during the takeoff roll. At initial thrust setting the #1 thrust lever would not seat properly in the FLEX Detent. CA adjusted the thrust lever and got proper indication that FLEX was set properly, FO made the FLEX Set call out. After accelerating through 80 knots the crew received a caution advisory that the thrust was not set, CA initiated a reject in response to the caution advisory. Crew returned to the gate for follow-up maintenance.

After having reduced flying due to a limited flight schedule, there is a higher potential for errors, therefore as Captain, I decided to take a more cautious approach and rejected the takeoff.

Suggestions - Place more of an emphasis on rejected takeoff considerations during crew brief.

Narrative: 2

[Report Narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to a thrust setting caution advisory.
ACN: 1754995

Time / Day
Date : 202008
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Person : 1
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1754995
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 2
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1754997
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was Pilot Flying. I believe we were "leading the pack" of airplanes to ZZZ. Approach encouraged us to keep our speed up. While trying to comply and also trying to find the field for our night visual approach, I allowed those two concerns to distract me from preparing properly for the approach. While configured, I found myself higher and faster than I was used to. We did descend and slow down. I do not believe we exceeded any of the criteria for a stable approach. The final approach and landing were stable and uneventful. There were no ATC communications other than the standard Tower clearances. Taxi in was also uneventful.

I feel there were several factors which contributed. First my priorities were mis-managed. I was concerned with keeping my speed up, when we received a shortcut (Direct ZZZZZZ), I was slow to recognize that I needed to slow. Second, while in March I was flying FO regularly, this was my fourth landing in four and a half months, and my first night visual in likely 6 months. I believe if I had recognized earlier the need to slow down it would have resolved any issues. I was rested and prepared for the flight, but allowed myself to be distracted by ATC requests. In the future, I will be more conservative especially at night. Lesson learned but I write this so that others losing currency to COVID might be aware of potential pitfalls.

Be Conservative. Knowing that I have not flown FO as often as I would like, I feel it is imperative to be conservative and to recognize that night flying requires even more attention.

Narrative: 2
Cleared Direct ZZZZZZ visual approaches in use, close to Dusk, FO Pilot Flying, on final, was a little high at ZZZZZ1, and possibly descended slightly greater than 2,000 FPM at Below 2,000 feet, but stable at 1,000 feet and 500 feet, normal landing.

FO and myself not much recent flying experience due to COVOD-19, dusk turning dark not able to see runway clearly to accept visual approach, ATC kept us slightly higher than normal because had not called the field in sight.

Due to lack of recent flight currency, a good idea would [be] to reiterate to crew and in the approach briefing that you haven’t flown in a while and for the PM to be on alert with increased vigilance.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported being high and fast as they were "leading the pack" during a visual approach. The crew cited lack of flying and pressure to maintain their speed to not hold up other aircraft behind as contributing factors.
ACN: 1754918

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Angle.Radial: 270
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 8
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1800

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 12000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualifier.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualifier.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualifier.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualifier.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 9500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 3
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1530
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754918
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Months with no flying activity due to COVID-19. VFR departure from Runway XX at home non-towered airport. Climbing and turning northwest to clear airport ZZZ. Looking for traffic. Checking ADS-B traffic display. Altitude alert set for 1,500 feet MSL to stay below Class B airspace of 1,700 feet. Scanned instruments in turn and switching frequency to departure when I noticed altitude at 1,900 feet MSL. Immediately descended and made check in call to Departure.

Procedural skills were rusty from inactivity.

Synopsis

Small aircraft pilot reported an airspace violation due to rusty flying skills after a long absence from flying during COVID-19.
I became aware by aircraft mechanics that another mechanic in the line, had to rework the crew oxygen bottle. After reading the documentation, I remembered that I did not complete my operations check tasks. This was due to a distraction by my work partner.
that needed immediate help with another task in the cabin (Lavatories). I know for sure this [was] a contributing factor of me not completing the task outlined and required per the maintenance manual. I was new doing this task and also having many stresses from possible layoffs.

Complete task prior to engaging in another task. Pay more attention in the future. A confirmation check by another mechanic would be adequate for this task.

**Synopsis**

Aircraft mechanic reported not completing an operations check due to distractions from other tasks.
**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754883
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While passengers were boarding Passenger X assigned to seat XX3 did not have a mask on. The Gate Agent had not briefed the flight attendants on any exemptions, so I looked on EFB and just saw an Infant in XX3. I asked the Forward FA to ask the Gate Agent who was standing in the galley if we had any late exemptions and he advised no. Gate Agent came to back of plane to talk to Passenger X and advised him he would have to wear a mask since there was not an exemption. Passenger X advised he had gotten an exemption in ZZZ1 on way to ZZZ and showed a boarding pass that in ink was written exemption from mask but we had no idea who wrote it. Passenger X then pulled out a letter that only stated he was disabled and that he gets paid a certain amount. Gate Agent was advising it was OK with him for Passenger X to go, but I said no we need to talk to the Captain in regards to this. We went to the Captain who made a phone call and was told passenger would need to get an exemption for our flight. The Gate Agent at that time went to gate to meet a Supervisor and see if anything was in the record. When he came back suddenly there was a record for the passenger with the exemption of taking mask off for XX minute intervals. I then looked at my EFB and now it showed a wheelchair where the infant had been and the infant moved to XX4. We closed up after advising Passenger X of the exemption and the XX minutes only. During the 2 hour 30 minute flight we had to tell Passenger X at least 4 times that he had to put mask on and when he did we had to tell him over his nose and mouth not just his chin. Passenger also had a very disruptive 2 yr old as well, that was coughing and sneezing and Passenger X advised us his children gave him high anxiety and that was why he could not wear mask.

Passenger X's total disregard of mask rule and even though he got [an] exemption to take mask off for XX minute intervals he did not follow the exemption.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger would not comply with the face mask policy even though the passenger had a special exemption to take it off for periods at a time.
Flight was dispatched with an illegal alternate. ZZZ airport was used, but ZZZ VOR was [out of service] at the time it was needed, therefore I should not have used it.

On this day, all of the desks were heavy on flights. I made mention to our management along with another coworker we needed to add more people on [X day of the week] as there were too many flights and not enough dispatchers to handle the workload. Management is looking at the schedule and adding manning. This desk had several added flights as well [due to] Center shutdown for a COVID cleaning and I had flights in the air that had to be coordinated with the closing. This type of flight was not usually on this desk, and it was right in the middle of everything else I was doing. I totally overlooked the VOR being OTS.
Suggestions - More people on shift with reduced flight workload. In the last 7 days when I have been working, I have had more flights than I can remember and it's been different sectors. Coupled with bad weather, trying to flight follow, which is nearly impossible. The company is setting us up to fail. Any hiccup on the desk with a maintenance issue, or delay that requires attention and you are sunk on trying to get anything done on time.

Synopsis
Dispatcher reported using an illegal airport as an alternate. The Dispatcher reported another operations center was closed for COVID-19 sanitizing. This had increased the workload for the Dispatcher and contributed to the event.
Time / Day
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.SINGLE VALUE: 0

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754828
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Landing Without Clearance
- Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors
Narrative: 1

After landing and clearing Runway XXR at ZZZ we discovered comm 1 radio was still selected to Approach Control with ZZZ Tower frequency in the pre-select window. On change over to Tower we were cleared to gate XX, and asked to call the Tower. I was informed that we were given a green light from the Tower and they attempted to contact us on guard. We did not see the Tower light signal and didn't hear them call on guard. I was told everything was fine and they just wanted to know that we were on the same page. I apologized and thanked them.

1. We were in the midst of slowing the aircraft in order to achieve a stabilized approach and I must have become distracted as the call to change to Tower happened at the same time.
2. I should have had the radio volume set higher for comm 2.
3. End of a trans-con red-eye.
4. Both pilots have had minimal recent flying over the last few months.

More vigilance in monitoring guard frequency. Positively confirm landing (and takeoff) clearances with other pilot.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported landing without a landing clearance.
ACN: 1754821

**Time / Day**
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Parked
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Component : 1**
Aircraft Component: Fuel System
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

**Component : 2**
Aircraft Component: Airframe
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754821
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I arrived at the gate for my flight. I noticed that there were numerous items in the logbook. These items required extensive review and actions that needed to be achieved. These items distracted me from my normal preflight sequence. As the Captain returned to the flight deck, we both went over the MEL items. He thoroughly reviewed the logbook and signed it. As I am very new on the plane with only 55 hours in the last 6 months, I concentrated on my expanded checklist as well as the aircraft internal checklist to accomplish the preflight. It was at this time I must have overlooked the new entry "FUEL DOOR CYCLE FORM REC."

Cause - There were multiple write ups [and a] new [fuel door] procedure.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported missing a logbook entry involving a new procedure. Lack of flying was cited as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1754761

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 9
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754761
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Taxi
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
Was forced to work Local Center, Local East, and City combined this afternoon with busy arrivals and multiple VFR aircraft. Taxiway [X] requires a back taxi for departing aircraft in our south configuration. Multiple aircraft lined up waiting to back taxi. And multiple VFR and IFR aircraft arriving. I had to time up the back taxi, hoping for no confusion, while
working three different frequency with near constant congestion. I requested extra spacing to Runway XX and did not get it. I also had multiple arrivals to Runway YYL and VFR traffic on the Tower radar position. I was totally task saturated and counting on everything to go right as there was no way I could scan the multiple situations happening at the same time.

Management knows that this type of situation has become common place with our limited staffing. And yet, they refuse to meter in arrivals to provide spacing. Even when directly requested by a Controller. The confusion on frequency is pretty high as I can't respond to many of the aircraft on a timely basis. We are expected to do our best and really it's just a hope that something really ugly doesn't happen. I continue to submit these reports because I want it documented that there were warning signs before an incident happens. We have tried to mitigate some of the complexity by limiting VFR services in the Bravo airspace. But there is still a lot of congestion because they are constantly calling in for requests. These measures are not nearly enough when we still have multiple aircraft that need to back taxi on Runway XX and a constant stream of arrivals. I see it as a safety priority to slow the arrival rate, but it appears airline schedules are more important. I was fortunate to not have a go-around (despite multiple close calls) during this session, but there is very little protection right now for unexpected events. I feel completely beat down this week. The attitude right now in our facility is every man for himself.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller working combined positions described safety of flight concerns due to added workload issues.
**Time / Day**
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling: CLR
RVR.Single Value: 10000

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.UNICOM: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Route In Use: None

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 2246
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 7
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1430
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754722
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Airport

Narrative: 1

A beautiful morning for a solo sightseeing flight. I haven't flown much the past few months because of the pandemic. The flight was to go to a couple of nearby airports for a full stop landing then home to run the airplane but also maintain 90 day currency. Upon arrival at ZZZ winds were calm so any of the two runways would be suitable. Another aircraft was in the pattern for Runway XX so I joined the downwind for XX behind that aircraft. On final I noticed that the runway markings on XX were unreadable from the air, apparently they haven't been maintained for some time. The aircraft ahead of me had rolled to a stop on the runway and I was considering a go-around when they began to move and turned off at a taxiway intersection. I continued the approach and landing which was uneventful. I followed the preceding aircraft down the parallel taxiway and we both stopped with him at the hold short lines and me some distance behind him. The hold short lines are some distance from the actual end of the taxiway for XX because Runway Y starts at that point but does not intersect XX. The aircraft in front of me made his departure radio call then proceeded to taxi to the end of XX and began his takeoff roll. I waited at the hold short lines on the parallel taxiway until he lifted off and then cleared the area visually, made my departure radio call and also taxied to the end of XX and began my takeoff roll. During my takeoff roll I noticed a faint arrow head marking that appeared to be a faded yellow. At that point I realized I had started my takeoff roll on the safety area of a displaced threshold. I have only landed at ZZZ a handful of times in all the years I've been flying and each time it has been on Runway Y which is the primary runway for this airport. In retrospect my lack of preflight planning in regards to familiarizing myself with ALL the runways at this airport and also playing follow the leader with the aircraft ahead of me lead me in to a false sense of security. The factors of this event are as follows. Virtually unreadable runway markings. My poor preflight planning, just doing what the airplane was doing in front of me without thinking for myself resulting in poor situational awareness. My concentration on the aircraft ahead of me during the landing and poor runway marking visibility causing me to not see the displaced threshold upon landing. (Again, this would not have been an issue had I better familiarized myself with this runway during preflight planning.) My original plan was to use Runway ZZ but adjusted at the last minute because of other traffic. Lesson learned! Make sure you are familiar with ALL the runways at your destination in all aspects not just runway length.

Synopsis

GA pilot reported, after not flying in the last several months due to COVID-19, unintentionally landed and departed on a Displaced Threshold at the destination airport. Pilot reported rusty preflight procedures, runway markings that have not been maintained and are difficult to see contributed to the event.
Passenger in XX2 was asked 4 times to have his mask on. Passenger in YY1 told XX2 to hold a bottle of water, use it as an excuse enabling him to keep talking to YY5. [Passenger] YY1 then pulled his mask off and pretended to be drinking through the flight. During final approach he was again asked to put face mask on and he did not comply. He proceeded to eat something just to keep himself from wearing the mask. [Passengers] YY5 and YY1 would not comply with the seatbelt PA during turbulence and taxi-in. Both passengers YY1 and XX2 were standing up during taxi. Both were ask to take their seats and they did, but not properly.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported the misconduct of a group of passengers during the flight regarding compliance with face mask policy.
**ACN: 1754702**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754702
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

We boarded through the 1L door. FA A did not allow passengers to pass through the forward galley during boarding to expedite the boarding process. FA B tried his best to direct traffic at the 1L door. Due to FA A blocking traffic from coming through the forward galley passengers were only able to get to their seat using the aircraft left aisle until they reached the mid galley. This caused a delay for departure. We still had bags out and overhead bins open when the FA A made the PA that the boarding door had been closed, and to arm our doors. I ran forward and told her we were still getting bags put away, and still had open overhead bins. She stated the agent had closed the door. I stated that she should have told them we were not ready to close the boarding door. After that, all FAs armed doors and tried to get all bags and overhead bins taken care of as quickly as possible. We then felt ground movement. I looked out of the window. We had started moving backwards. We had not received an All Call, and we were still trying to get all bags stowed and overhead bins closed. I (FA C) grabbed the phone at my jumpseat and made an All Call. The FA A hung up the phone almost as soon as she answered. She simply stated her name. I stated my name and that I initiated an All Call since she had not and we were pushing back. Note that this also means she had closed the flight deck door. If the flight deck door was closed then the flight deck must have thought we were seated and stowed, when in fact we were not. After she answered her phone and stated her name, and I stated I had started the All Call, she hung up. The rest of us proceeded with stating our doors had been armed and cross checked. My phone then rang. I answered the phone stating my name. FA A stated she was now performing the All Call. I stated we had just done the All Call. She then hung up her phone. FA A also would not make the COVID-19/mask announcement. FA D made the required PA. FA A had stated to FA E that she knew one of us (FA D or myself) would make it, since she was not going to make it. We did not know she was not going to make the PA and waited until he made the decision to just make the PA since we were not hearing it being made by her.

The FA A needs to be spoken to about the FARs that were violated, as well as procedures that MUST be followed. This created a very chaotic and potentially hazardous environment for all on board. Passengers and crew.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported communication and procedural issues experienced with another Flight Attendant.
I was flying C [position] and taking off in [seat] X4. The lady in Y4, who was a through passenger, had started coughing and sniffing profusely after pushback and during the safety demo. I didn't feel comfortable moving her or the passenger in X3 as they were both wheelchair passengers and we had begun surface movement. In these heightened times of COVID, I did not feel comfortable sitting directly in front of her, nor rejoining the A [Flight Attendant] in the jumpseat for takeoff and landing. I chose to protect myself and take off in X6 for this flight only, knowing they were deplaning in ZZZ1.
Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported changing seats during takeoff and landing in order to stay a safe distance from a passenger who appeared ill.
ACN: 1754697

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Deplaning
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1754697
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Other

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

When we began our inflight service, I walked through the cabin offering snacks. I noticed a passenger not wearing his mask properly. The mask was only covering his mouth. I reminded him to wear his mask so that it covered both his nose and mouth. He shook his head no and continued reading his book. I asked him again to adjust his mask and he
said, "I'm not going to wear my mask like that for the next two hours." I reminded him that he had agreed to wear a mask when he checked in for his flight. He then adjusted the mask so that it covered both his nose and mouth.

After finishing snack service, I went to the forward galley to share with the A and C Flight Attendants about my interaction with the passenger. The A FA said she also had to ask him to put his mask on during the final walk-through just before takeoff. We decided that if he had to be asked a third time to wear his mask properly, we would contact the pilots and request a Customer Service Supervisor to meet the aircraft in ZZZ1.

As I returned to the aft galley and passed the passenger's row, I noticed his mask was once again only covering his mouth. I tried to get his attention, but he would not look up from his book. I stated that his mask needed to cover both his nose and mouth and asked if he was going to comply. Again, he would not look up from his book or verbally respond.

I continued back to the aft galley and shared with the B FA about the interactions with the passenger and then called the pilots to inform them of the situation and to request a Customer Service Supervisor to meet the aircraft in ZZZ1.

A few minutes later, another passenger who was seated in the row directly in front of him walked back to the aft galley. She had observed/heard my interactions with the passenger and was very unsettled by his noncompliance. I apologized for the situation and invited her to relocate to an empty row toward the back of the aircraft.

During our final descent into ZZZ1, we secured the cabin and I again noticed the passenger wearing his mask improperly, but did not make any attempts to communicate with him about it. The C FA and I swapped positions so I would have an opportunity to speak with the Customer Service Supervisor in the jetbridge before the passenger deplaned. Once the passenger deplaned, the Customer Service Supervisor accompanied him up the jetbridge.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was asked several times to comply with the face mask policy during the flight. The passenger did not comply and was met on arrival by a Customer Service Supervisor.
ACN: 1754589

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1300

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi
- Route In Use: Visual Approach

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Flap/Slat Control System
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
- Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 20.6
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754589
- Human Factors: Distraction
Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X was arriving to Runway XX Left with multiple arrivals to both XX Left and XX Right. We were XX/XY Right Turns due to the wind strong out of the Southwest. Air speeds on final were very consistent the whole session until Aircraft X was coming in. The aircraft was at a 3 mile final showing 1,300 and 170 knots. I said out loud to the FLM, who was about 6 feet to my right monitoring, that Aircraft X was usually high and fast. I had no traffic conflicts if they were to go-around, so I watched them. At about a 2 mile final they were 1,100 and 160 knots and appeared to have leveled off. I waited for them to tell me they were going around, and when they did I assigned runway heading and 3,000. They read back the altitude only. I waited a few seconds to let them get a positive rate and stable climb, then confirmed to fly runway heading for vector final approach course. They read it back. I cleared Aircraft Y to cross Runway 28 Left at Tango, since Aircraft X was going around. I handed Aircraft X's target off to TRACON and waited until Aircraft X neared 3,000. To confirm the reason too high, too fast for the go around. They said a flap issue. I confirmed they would need no assistance, just to run a checklist. They confirmed no assistance required and confirmed needing to run their checklist. I told them to stand by while I told TRACON. I coordinated with CI-1 the reason for the go-around. As I was coordinating, Aircraft Y called to confirm cross Runway 28 Left at Tango. I confirmed they were cleared to cross, as they had stopped over the hold short line. I assume there must have been confusion on the flight deck, especially with all of the Aircraft X communication going on. I then shipped Aircraft X to Departure.

About 5 minutes later the aircraft showed up on the scope left downswing and the FLM confirmed with TRACON no assistance. The aircraft landed a short time later.

The only thing I would suggest is advising sooner about the flap issue, however with the lighter traffic during this pandemic, it really was no problem. As far as Aircraft Y goes, strange times call for a greater degree of diligence, and they asked to confirm as they should of there is a question; just make sure to hold short first if they are going to pause to ask. Had they not been cleared it would have been a Runway Incursion at that point.

Synopsis
Tower Controller reported a flight crew had to go-around after being high and fast due to a reported flap problem.
**ACN: 1754588**

**Time / Day**
- **Date**: 202008
- **Local Time Of Day**: 1201-1800

**Place**
- **Locale Reference**: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- **State Reference**: US

**Aircraft : 1**
- **Reference**: X
- **ATC / Advisory**: Tower: ZZZ
- **Aircraft Operator**: Air Carrier
- **Make Model Name**: Commercial Fixed Wing
- **Crew Size**: Number Of Crew: 2
- **Operating Under FAR Part**: Part 121
- **Flight Plan**: IFR
- **Mission**: Passenger
- **Flight Phase**: Final Approach
- **Route In Use**: Other
- **Airspace**: Class B: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 2**
- **Reference**: Y
- **Aircraft Operator**: Personal
- **Make Model Name**: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- **Crew Size**: Number Of Crew: 1
- **Operating Under FAR Part**: Part 91
- **Flight Plan**: None
- **Flight Phase**: Cruise
- **Airspace**: Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- **Reference**: 1
- **Location Of Person**: Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- **Reporter Organization**: Government
- **Function**: Air Traffic Control: Local
- **Qualification**: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- **Experience**: Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 9
- **ASRS Report Number**: Accession Number: 1754588
- **Human Factors**: Situational Awareness
- **Human Factors**: Workload
- **Human Factors**: Distraction

**Events**
- **Anomaly**: ATC Issue: All Types
- **Anomaly**: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- **Anomaly**: Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
- **Anomaly**: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- **Detector**: Automation: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
I was working the Local Control East and West position combined, south operation, landing Runway XXR and Runway YYL, departing Runway XXR and Runway YYR. Aircraft X checked in on final approach to Runway XXR and was cleared to land. I continued with the duties required of me at the time when the conflict alert alarmed. I processed the information as quickly as I could (overlapping tags), then immediately began to issue traffic while realizing the conflicting aircraft had passed east of my traffic.

Keep a SUP/CIC in the Tower not combined with any other position to help scan the movement areas and assist as needed. Although, we are working half the traffic that we are accustomed to, complexity is added due to the combining of positions, runway, and taxiway closures, numerous vehicle calls due to airport construction. Due to the global pandemic we are already working short staffed, so I would not recommend taking a needed body off a crew to accommodate leave on another shift.

Synopsis
Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict between an IFR arrival and a VFR aircraft while working combined Local positions.
ACN: 1754544

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3200
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 25
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 500
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1754544
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Operated an aircraft with an expired medical. With COVID 19 causing the FAA to extend a grace period I knew I had time to get it scheduled when things opened back up. I had scheduled an appointment that got canceled. I heard that the FAA had extended the grace period again into August, upon further investigation I believe that info was incorrect. Immediately realizing the issue I scheduled my medical and completed it promptly. The confusion of the FAA dates and crazy schedules with the COVID closures and a hectic work schedule contributed to this oversight. I will stay more focused on the situation in the future to make sure I do not operate an aircraft with an expired medical.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported flying an aircraft with an expired medical certificate.
ACN: 1754520

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754520
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Other Person
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result.General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
We were tasked with aircraft outside to remove bagging, covers from Aircraft X, and accomplish APU and engine run prior to docking in hangar. Removal of bagging from AOA vanes pitot probes covers and RAT probes bagging, engine APU pack inlet outlet covers were accomplished outside and according to job card and stamped prior to docking aircraft in Hangar. During its time in hangar the FAA questioned why pitot covers were now installed on probes and sensors.
Once the aircraft is docked in Hangar a docking/undocking card should have been issued. This card requires installing covers on probes and sensors with the removal, undocking portion of card removing covers on probes.

**Synopsis**

Technician reported the FAA questioned why pitot covers were now installed on probes and sensors with the aircraft being in a hanger.
Narrative: 1

I took over Aircraft X which was scheduled for a ferry flight later that day from ZZZ to ZZZ1 for storage. I started reviewing the logbook to find out which overtimes needed to be added to ferry permit, which items needed to be addressed before departure and any other items required before ferry could depart. I found approximately 4-5 additional items that would be overtime and proceeded to make the open write-ups required and lock log pages for the ferry. We also [were working] off of for deviations allowed for returning the aircraft to flying condition after storage.
As part of this the most notable deviation allowed was the allowance to place (5th stage check vlv inspection) on DIP (Deferred in Place) for 5 cycles and placing one engine hi stage vlv on either MEL XXXXX or XXXXY. This aircraft already had MEL XXXXY applied when I took it over, the DIP was not created yet.

After a thorough review of all log pages created, items I created, review with planning of overtime items and making sure all required log pages were locked for the ferry, which took over an hour, everything appeared to be in order. Except for the fact I still hadn’t started a log page for placing a DIP on accomplishing the FCD inspection. Approximately an hour before schedule departure time we created a DIP on Log page for accomplishing remaining steps for AMM XX-XX-XX.

Once ZZZ stated they were done with all work required, I did one last review and everything appeared to be in order so the MFD was sent to the aircraft. Approximately 45 minutes after the aircraft departed on it's ferry flight, it finally dawned on me about the DIP required and I wasn't sure if it had been accomplished. I went back and searched DIP log pages and all closed log pages looking to see if it had been accidentally closed, it had not, and was determined the log page was never created and did in fact get missed.

At no time was the safety of the aircraft in question so I planned to make the writeup and place it on DIP once the aircraft arrived in ZZZ1 for storage.

**Synopsis**

Technician reported not completing the correct paperwork for a ferry fight.
ACN: 1754511

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Deplaning
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1754511
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected. Other
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
The cleaners came on during deplaning and started spraying the toxic cleaner. I was trying to stand and say goodbye to passengers, but the spray was burning my lungs, through my mask. I saw one cleaner wet their rag with multiple sprays as a child walked by right next to it. I was hoping with some fresh air my lungs would feel better, but they don’t.

This practice of bombarding crew and passengers with this spray during deplaning is hazardous to everyone’s health. Toxic cleaning spray being sprayed during deplaning both in First Class and the bathroom and galley shrouded my area during deplaning.

Burned my lungs. Hoping fresh air will help. Giving it 24 hours to feel better. Otherwise will see a Doctor. Airline needs to let people off the plane before they start with the spraying of the cleaner. I have (had) great lungs, so if it’s affecting me, then anyone with any lung issue is going to be in big trouble.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported cleaners came on board before passengers were off and started spraying the aircraft with a reportedly toxic product.
Saw a man cough without his mask on takeoff. He was sleeping when I starting service when I was back to him I did tap his shoulder to let him know that his mouth and nose did need to be covered. It woke him up but I wouldn’t want him to cough again without it because people are seated directly in front of him. I did say it politely though.
He also did not have his nose covered on his way to the bathroom. He also mentioned it to me after in a rather upset manner that I woke him up but it was okay that everyone else had theirs down because they were eating and drinking. Had he worn his mask when I heard him cough and worn it properly after I would not have had to wake him up. I was trying to explain why I did what I did but he walked away. I stand by it because right now safety and health care [are] the same thing and I'm protecting everyone when it comes to making sure masks are worn correctly. Also while he was being upset with me he didn't have his nose covered by his mask. So he was still wearing it incorrectly after being told.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was non-compliant with wearing a face mask during flight.
ACN: 1754507

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754507
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.Genral: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

It started out during boarding I had to tell part of a family that they had to put on their face mask. A few moments later I had to make a PA Regarding the face covering because [of] the same family members. My partner had to ask them to secure their face masks. All this was before the boarding door was closed. Once we got up in the air we repeatedly had to tell them about keeping on their face mask. We had a customer complain about them not keeping on their face mask. Their excuse was they were eating.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported having a compliance issue with a family that had to be continuously reminded to wear their face masks.
**ACN: 1754506**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754506
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

**Events**
Anomaly.Flight Deck/Cabin/Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative:** 1
Passenger in X3 came aboard with a restaurant mouth shield to use on flight without a mask. I stopped X3 at boarding door and advised he needed a mask to cover nose and mouth for flight. He advised he had been using this plastic mask, that only covered his mouth, for the last 3 months with no problem. Since I felt this would escalate, when he did not want to take mask I offered, I let him take his seat. [We requested a] customer service representative to plane whom I also showed the mask and he advised oh no way he should never [have been] boarded. Which I told him I agreed but that his gate agent is the one that let him down to board. Customer service representative approached X3 who agreed to wear a proper mask for the flight.

Gate Agent not following procedures that have been in place for quite some time. She should have never let him down without a proper mask leaving it to crew to take care of. Make sure Gate Agents are following policies and procedures.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported a passenger came on board the aircraft with a non approved face mask. A proper face mask was provided to the passenger.
ACN: 1754500

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754500
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was in jumpseat as we taxied out and passenger slid trying to be unnoticed into [seat] XX12 from YY12. I called Captain and asked him to let me check on situation and I would call him right back after. He said OK. I went back and asked passenger if they were in the exit row or did they move and she said she moved because she wanted a window seat. I explained I needed her to move back to her original seat as we had not briefed her for the exit row. I told her I would come back and explain more about why after we got in the air. She moved back. I went back to my FWD jumpseat and called the Captain to tell him we were secure and passenger was back in her seat. AFT FA made a PA telling passenger of need to keep masks on then told me that same passenger had removed hers. As he walked up during our service in flight he said he thought he noticed a beer bottle on her seat tray. I asked him if he wanted me to check and he said yes. I walked back and there was an open beer bottle can on her tray. I asked her what was in the bottle and asked if it was an X brand beer and alcohol. She said yes and I told her she could not have her alcohol on board. She asked why but said OK, and I took it and showed the aft FA in the galley then threw it away and immediately called the flight deck. The FO apparently answered and I told him the same passenger that had tried to move in to the exit row and we had a mask issue with had an open beer on her tray that we took from. I told him she did not appear drunk as she was answering my questions clearly and cognitively, but had a little smart attitude. During the rest of the flight I continued to collect trash in the aisle about every 10 minutes to check on her. It seemed she had 2 other friends in the exit row area that she was talking to that she kept looking back at then looked at us to see if we were watching but she didn't seem to be doing anything else wrong until she removed her mask then the aft FA gave her a warning and she kept her mask on after that except for drinking some water the other FA said he thought it was. After we deplaned another passenger in seat Z4, said as he deplaned - Do you want to talk to me? I said yes the Captain would because at that point I wasn't sure what he meant but he had given me eye contact during the flight like he did not know what to think of the passenger. Another passenger deplaned who had been sitting in A2 was not happy with the passenger either apparently. Passenger in Z4 told the Captain on the jet bridge that she had been saying swear words and how she was going to write a letter to airline and what she was going to do the other FA and I? The passenger had never slurred words or acted incoherent so there was never a sign of intoxication to us. I explained that again to the Captain as well. Misbehaving passenger.

In flight - aft FA noticed it, FWD FA confirmed it. Neither [of us] knew she was saying bad things since we could not hear her in the cabin due to airplane, etc. noise and every time we went back she was quiet.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger misconduct incident.
ACN: 1754497

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754497
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Narrative: 1

I briefed exit row. Only 1 passenger in there. I did the pre-departure and when I was walking back a woman snuck in exit row when my back was turned. I saw after out of sterile, when I went to wash my hands for service. I asked her when she moved, she said after I had walked through and I said she had to move back to original seat. She did.

She wanted to move but never asked me or informed me she took it upon herself. People are wanting to spread out because of COVID.

I don't really have a suggestion if they do it upon [themselves] and after my sweep with my back turned. I don't know how to control it. I saw after takeoff when I went to wash my hands for service.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger moved into the exit row after the briefing. Passenger was asked to move back to original seat.
ACN: 1754496

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
Experience. Flight Attendant. Airline Total: 7
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1754496
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
A passenger came back to use the lavatory during flight, I noticed he had his mask hanging around one ear not covering his mouth. When he came out of the lavatory, I asked him to put on his mask, he replied, "Why? Is something going on that I should know about?" and walked to his seat, he did not put his mask on. I went over to his seat and asked him to put on his mask again for everyone's safety. He replied, "Why? Am I not wearing it right?" I responded that the mask needed to cover his mouth and nose. He then grabbed the mask and broke the string, he said, "Damn it, I guess I can't wear it now." I told him we have more masks and went in the back to the galley and grabbed another mask for him. After handing it to him, I left. Later on in the flight after my final descent announcement, I was passing through the cabin doing my final sweep and saw he was still not wearing the mask. I asked him again to put it on, that it is a requirement to wear a mask while on the aircraft. He told me he can't breathe with it on and unless I had a ventilator he wasn't going to wear it. At this point, I felt that it wasn't constructive anymore and he wasn't going to comply, I didn't know what else to do so I left.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that a passenger refused to wear a face mask during the flight.
**ACN: 1754493**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754493
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: Pre-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors
Narrative: 1

During the safety demonstration (it had just begun) the deadheading pilot in X1, got up from their seat, push me aside, physically, to go to the forward lav. His face was red and eyes watering. Proceeded to cough profusely in the lav. I called the Captain at this time. I told him what was happening. The Captain told me as long as he is wearing a mask that he, the Captain, will not do anything. The pilot in the lav remained there throughout the whole safety demonstration. I never stopped the demonstration. But I am supposed to if everyone isn't in their seats.

I should follow what I know is right and stop the safety demonstration. Even if it is a deadheading pilot and not worry about any repercussions from the Captain even though he didn't act in a manner that was supportive of my and everyone’s safety.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a deadheading pilot pushed his way past her while doing the safety demonstration to use the lavatory and coughed profusely.
ACN: 1754485

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Work Environment Factor: Temperature - Extreme

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754485
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
My inbound crew was delayed due to weather, customs, and CA request [for] a meal break. FAs arrived at approx XA:30 and FD arrived at XA:45. Paperwork indicates flight was closed at XA:35. Standby FAs told us they were called and when they advised the agents the plane was too hot, they were told they must board and passengers said they boarded on time. There was minimum power (lights only) NO AC and NO air circulating. Passengers were fanning themselves, perspiring profusely and said they had been waiting for about 45 minutes. The CA said it was 27 Celsius onboard which may meet the standards to board, but not to sit on a full (including X children) plane for an extended time. When I asked the agent if he had checked the onboard temperature, he said he had no way to do that. 2 Managers (did not introduce themselves) later came onboard and said the plane was hooked up to the APU, and I suggested they talk with the passengers about their experience. I later saw the agents on the bridge with what appeared to be a temperature gauge. My concerns are (1) our passengers were needlessly made to sit on a hot plane. (2) Pre-boarders expressed their concerns and they were ignored, and (3) the plane was full so there was no social distancing.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that passengers were boarded onto an aircraft that was too hot.
ACN: 1754416

Time / Day
Date : 202007
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.UNICOM : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Taxi

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase : Takeoff
Airspace.Class G : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1754416
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1

While taking Runway X for departure in ZZZ, we saw a single engine tail wheel GA aircraft climbing on the upwind leg and turning out to the north around midfield after taking off the opposite direction on Runway YY. We were unaware of this departing traffic until seeing them airborne at what I would guess 200 feet AGL. I stopped the aircraft around the runway numbers when I saw the airborne aircraft and we had not initiated our takeoff roll. They were most likely off the ground by the time we taxied onto the runway, but we could not see all the way to the opposite end due to runway slope. The GA aircraft made a CTAF radio call telling us he had self announced his intersection departure off Runway YY. We told them we were unaware they were taking off the opposite direction.

The airport was uncontrolled at this time of day due to reduced Control Tower hours of operation. We were monitoring CTAF frequency while holding short of the runway and simultaneously getting our IFR clearance from Center. I remember hearing a call on CTAF but couldn't clearly understand it. This was further hindered by listening to both radios at the same time. I don't recall hearing any previous CTAF calls such as this other aircraft self announcing their taxi. When the other aircraft called us after taking off, my First Officer mentioned he believed to have heard the aircraft announce departure off Runway XX. The aircraft stated he announced an intersection takeoff for Runway YY. Main contributing factors were an airport that has enough traffic volume to require a Control Tower not having their Tower open, nice VFR weather for GA flying, the GA pilot not being clear about their intentions over CTAF or speaking up when we announced our takeoff intentions for the opposite runway, calm winds allowing for takeoff from either direction, and not pausing as a crew before taking the runway to verify we understood the unclear CTAF call and would be clear of conflicting traffic.

I would assume the Control Tower is running a reduced schedule due to less air traffic than normal given the current coronavirus climate. It would be better if they were open at this time in the morning when Part 121 flights are scheduled. Self announcing on CTAF is everyone's responsibility at an uncontrolled airport. The GA aircraft could've been clearer about their intentions and made more calls. As a crew, we did our part by announcing our intentions, and that should caught the attention of the opposite direction traffic. The only remaining factor that could've prevented this potential runway incursion would be for us to use good CRM by each focusing our listening attention on individual comm radios during situations requiring monitoring of both, and ensuring to verify that any unclear radio calls are not coming from any potentially conflicting traffic.

Synopsis

Captain reported a GA aircraft departed in opposite direction while they were on the runway ready for takeoff. The Tower was closed at the time of the event.
ACN: 1754413

Time / Day
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 8500

Environment
- Flight Conditions: IMC
- Light: Daylight

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754413
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Undershoot
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While descending on the ZZZZZZ2 arrival and approaching the ZZZZZ intersection, PM was distracted by radio calls and clearances. Upon reaching ZZZZZZ intersection PM identified that we were approximately 500 feet high crossing the way point. PF corrected by increasing rate of descent to reach 8,000 feet. Around the time that we were leveling off at 8,000 feet received clearance to 7,000 feet. While descending we identified that conditions had changed and that a full ILS approach brief would be warranted. Approaching 7,000 feet, ATC cleared up to descend to 4,000 feet and it was not noticed that the aircraft had captured the altitude after 4,000 feet was set. ATC later gave a clearance to descend to 4,000 feet and we identified our error and quickly initiated our descent.

Both the PF and PM have been doing little flying over the last several months due to the COVID 19 pandemic. As such it had been some time since last arriving in ZZZ. As well as the short duration of flight and the changing weather conditions led to being behind the aircraft.

Making more time by asking ATC for vectors in order to brief the approach. Briefing the full approach even when not expecting IMC conditions.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported not making a crossing restriction during arrival and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1754408**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202007

**Place**
Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ. ARTCC
State Reference: US

**Environment**
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace, Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function, Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function, Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification, Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification, Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1754408
Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
Anomaly, Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly, Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly, Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly, Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Result, General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
While in cruise we received a crossing restriction for a fix not in our FMS. We then asked ATC to verify they want us to go to the fix they assigned us a crossing restriction for and we did and crossed at the appropriate altitude. The fix was on our flight plan, but not in our FMS. Before block out we verified all the points in the FMS so I think the fix might of been deleted when we programmed the approach.

We were having passenger troubles with mask, alcohol, and vaping noncompliance.

When programming new items into the FMS ensure all fixes are still in the FMS.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported being issued a crossing restriction that was not in the FMS. Post flight the crew found out the fix was in the FMS and may have been accidentally deleted it during the flight.
ACN: 1754357

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude:AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1754357
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1754364
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Landing Without Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On right downwind to land on XXL at ZZZ, Tower offered a tight visual approach to avoid traffic. We accepted the approach and the Captain immediately turned off the autopilot and hand flew the visual approach, intercepting final just inside the final approach fix. We accomplished all checklists and configured the aircraft for a stable approach. After landing, we noticed that the landing light was turned off and realized we were still on approach frequency. We exited the runway, contacted Ground and apologized for the mistake. Looking back at the event, I don't believe we were ever instructed to contact the Tower.

Failure to ensure we were on the correct frequency. I would develop a personal habit of checking the nose taxi light for verification of landing clearance prior to making the "stable and cleared to land" call out.

Narrative: 2
On right downwind to land on XXL at ZZZ, Tower offered us a tight visual approach to avoid traffic in the approach corridor. We were daylight VMC in a good position to accept the approach but it would be tight. We accepted and I immediately turned off the automation and hand flew the visual approach because we were going to turn final inside the Final Approach Fix and to automate that would have been more difficult. My FO did a great job of monitoring my approach while configuring on speed, accomplishing the checklist, and making all the call outs. The approach and landing was stable, on profile and without any deviations. After landing, I was about to call for the after landing checklist and noticed the nose gear light switch was off then looked to see that we were still on approach frequency. We contacted Ground who was also Tower and apologized for our mistake and asked if there was any problem. I don't believe that we were ever handed off but it was still my responsibility to verify the landing clearance. I almost always touch the nose gear switch at the cleared to land call but the tight approach and hand flown operation caused me to not physically check the switch. I don't think we were handed off but it was still my responsibility to verify the landing clearance. The FO PM was swamped with a last minute runway change and unexpected
tight visual approach in hill covered terrain. He did a great job of monitoring but missed that he had not been cleared when he made the cleared to land call because of the rushed nature of the approach.

Realize that in the current environment of COVID for our particular operations that fatigue is going to play increased role. Identify and verbalize the increased risk associated with what feels like a never ending peak environment and be more aware of the need to use the fatigue call when necessary. I don’t feel that the choice to accept a tighter than normal approach was unsafe but to increase my awareness of the heavier load that I placed on the PM.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance.
ACN: 1754315

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace. Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1754315
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Undershoot
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was the Captain and PF on Aircraft X. We were filed for the ZZZZZ2 Star. Due to construction, Runway XXR was closed and ATIS was reporting visual approaches to Runway XXL were in use. Upon viewing the available approaches for Runway XXL at ZZZ it was learned that they are all RNAV approaches. I chose to use the RNAV (RNP) Y Runway XXL since it was authorized and the Initial Fix was the terminating point of our STAR. Even though the weather was good with clear visibility I chose to fly the RNAV to keep it simple since I have not flown frequently during the previous months. We briefed threats, STAR restrictions and the approach and asked the FO to request the RNAV upon check in with Approach.

Initial cruise altitude was FL380 and we were given various step down altitudes to FL220. Shortly after reaching FL220 I noticed the optimum descent path going below so we asked for lower. It seemed that ATC had forgotten about us and by the time they found us and issued a lower altitude we were quite a bit off our profile. I recall being cleared direct to ZZZZZ3 at 10,000 feet and were never given a descend via clearance.

I was aggressively trying to descend with speed brakes and slowing down so we could extend flaps and gear to aid in getting back on profile. As we approached ZZZZZ3 we were switched to Approach Control and initially cleared for a visual approach. We asked for the RNAV as we had previously briefed and were granted the approach. I switched from the STAR page to the RNAV page and we lowered the MCP altitude to minimums as we continued to descend toward the path. A little while later Approach stated "You're kind of high, would you like a different approach." In hindsight, I should have asked for a visual and either continue flying the lateral track of the RNAV or extend downwind thus eliminating any restrictions of the RNAV approach. Both of us could easily see the airport while on our arrival and approach and never felt as if we would not be able to make a stabilized final approach which we did. Unfortunately, I missed making the 10,000 restriction at ZZZZZ3. When I switched to the RNAV page and began to concentrate on the approach I missed the ZZZZZ3 (IF) mandatory speed and altitude of 210 and 10,000 feet. While I was so focused on meeting the speed restrictions (which we did) and getting on the path, I overlooked the hard altitude of 10,000 feet even though I had seen it and discussed it during the brief. The lack of frequent flying and my attention becoming focused on obtaining the path while configuring caused me to miss an important restriction that I could have eliminated so easily by several means if I had not become so narrowly focused on other tasks.

Lack of frequent flying (currency). Delayed descent to lower altitude by ATC. Attention becoming narrowly focused on specific items. The (IF) restrictions being of small print compared to other information.

Improving the visibility of (IF) restrictions on the Approach page. Using the highlight feature of the FD Pro X app to highlight important items to the STAR and/or Approach.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported being high on the approach and not making a crossing restriction.
**ACN: 1754275**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202008
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference
- ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754275
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754291
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

**Events**

- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

**Assessments**

- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

While on a left dogleg to final we were set up for a visual approach to XXL. We had selected the ILS as a backup. We were set up to come down to the glideslope from the dogleg and intercept the localizer at approximately the FAF, with a aircraft intercepting the north runway (XYR) from the other direction and approximately abeam our position. The Controller initially incorrectly cleared us for a visual to XYR at the same time the PF set the MCP altitude to what we thought was the FAF altitude. In the task saturated moment of looking for traffic, verifying and correcting the clearance, and a configuration change we failed to select the approach mode on the MCP and flew down below the glideslope toward an incorrectly set MCP altitude. As it was a visual approach we elected to level off and re-intercept the glideslope at approximately 1,300-1,400 AGL. The approach was stable after glideslope intercept.

Task saturation and communications errors, along with a focus outside for traffic, led to a slow response as PM.

I should have paid more attention to the setup for the approach and suggested earlier configuration changes to be more stable during the turn to final. After several months of little flight time I need to pay more attention to slowing down and controlling the pace better than I did today.

**Narrative: 2**

We were setup for visual Runway XXL. On base leg with airport in sight. Controller accidentally cleared us for visual Runway XYR. We queried and he corrected it to Runway XXL. The CA said "set 2,300" in the MCP since we are cleared visual. I did not verify that on the chart because I was saturated with getting the speed back and configured. We should have set 2,800 until crossing ZZZZZ. We ended up descending below glideslope and leveled off once we noticed. We intercepted glideslope about 1,400 AGL. We were stable and never heard anything from ATC about it.

We were task saturated in a busy traffic environment on approach to parallel runways. I failed to double check the altitude on the approach chart once we were cleared for the visual. A contributing factor was the ATC clearance for visual approach to a runway other than what we had been previously told to expect.

If I had double checked the altitude on the chart when the Captain said set 2,300, the event would not have happened.
Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported being high on the approach due to task saturation, communications errors and focusing outside for traffic.
Enroute from ZZZ-ZZZ1, the Purser and relief Captain (who was in the cabin at the time) informed the Captain flying that one of the flight attendants was experiencing coughing and an itching feeling in the chest area. The Flight Attendant in question was isolated in the rear of the aircraft and instructed to continue wearing her mask and limit her
interaction with the passengers and other crew members. After receiving the information, the flight crew called Ops control via SatCom in the flight deck. We were connected with MedLink and given a phone number and reference number to provide to the Flight Attendant with symptoms. Upon landing, she was isolated as much as possible, made contact with medical, and scheduled an appointment for consultation in her hotel room. The next day, she made me aware that her consultation resulted in a diagnosis consistent with a condition other than COVID-19.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a Flight Attendant became ill during flight.
ACN: 1754202

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Dawn

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754202
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
FAR 121.434 violation Consolidation of knowledge. I got my type rating on X Date and because of the coronavirus I was sent home one day later. Approximately 3 months had past and I went to finish my simulator training. For that reason I thought my time for consolidation would begin 3 months from original date, which was the day I officially finished my simulator training. Not knowing that my 120 days of consolidation [had] expired. I accepted flights on the XXth and XYth after expiration. Two of the flights were ferry flights the last one on the XYth was a Part 121 flight. Therefore I unknowingly violated FAR 121.434.

When I figured out what I had done I notified my Chief pilot. I misinterpreted part 121.434 by thinking that the 120 day clock for 100 hours of consolidation started on [date]. I also know that we have scheduling software that tracks flight time and duty periods for Part 117. I thought it would track consolidation also. I think I could have been scheduled to do a P/C check while I was completing my simulation in [month] and having a better understanding of FAR 121.434 are two things that could have prevented this issue.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported flying after the deadline for completing Consolidation of Knowledge (FAR 121.43) had expired.
ACN: 1754142

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 4
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Taxi
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 9.5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754142
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
Working short staffed again. Forced to work local center, local east, and city combined. Worked a two hour busy session that is usually split between 3 controllers. Plus the Supervisor was working ground so I did not have line up and wait. There was frequency
congestion throughout and pilots repeatedly had to repeat transmissions. Aircraft X requested Runway XXR due to weight and the hot day. Because that runway was busy with arrivals, he had about a 15 minute delay. No request was made to switch arrivals because the "TMC" was too busy working ground. I was also limited in my coordination's because of the busy traffic. The airport has construction all over which adds to the complexity with back taxing aircraft and extra coordination on ground. I was extremely fatigued mentally towards the end of my position but there is nothing anyone could do because of our ridiculous staffing.

I felt unsafe working those positions combined with that traffic load. Especially not having a supervisor watching what I was doing. This entire week has beat me down and I am beyond frustrated. Now I am having trouble sleeping because of work. But I know I have to go in because I will only make it worse for other controllers if I don't. Management refuses to slow the arrival rate (despite controllers requesting it) even though it is absolutely needed during that time and many others. A couple departures were delayed because I couldn't line up and wait and the TRACON simply continued pushing arrivals like it was any other day. We are expected to work full traffic loads with combined positions and no oversight. This is an emergency situation, I understand that. But why are we not being protected? Why are there people eligible to work OT that aren't assigned it days in advanced? Everything this summer has been forced down our throats and controllers are fed up. The facility safety culture going forward will be difficult because management has shown us what they think of collaboration. I don't know if anyone even reads these reports. I don't get any feedback. But I am keeping a copy in case something catastrophic happens. I want it documented that this was foreseen.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller reported a busy session working three combined positions and having to delay an aircraft for 15 minutes due to traffic.
**ACN: 1754140**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ. Tower
- State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use: None
- Airspace: Class D: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Facility: ZZZ. Tower
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function: Air Traffic Control: Local
- Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience: Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 23
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1754140
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was working Local and had cleared Aircraft X to land Runway XX. On approximately, a 1 mile final Aircraft X advised me that they were going around. I asked Aircraft X if they wanted to cancel and stay in the pattern or go back to Center. They said they would cancel...
and stay in the pattern. I then told Aircraft X "when able, turn left and make left traffic Runway XX - maintain VFR." Aircraft X read back "left traffic, VFR." Approximately 1/2 mile off the departure end of Runway XX Aircraft X was advised of traffic 4 miles south descending out of 048 and again told them to make left traffic. I look to see what my other traffic was doing then took a quick glance at the radar. All at the same time I went to look for Aircraft X and Aircraft Y out the window while I was issuing instructions to separate the two aircraft because I had noticed that Aircraft X had drifted to the right of the centerline. Almost at the same time both aircraft advised that they were responding to RA's. At this time I said "Oh CRAP," although bad timing it was because my glasses fogged up so I could not see anything and not for what was going on out the window. My glasses were fogging up all morning due to my COVID mask.

After both aircraft passed each other Aircraft X was given instructions that his altitude was at his discretion and that there was additional traffic 7 miles ahead moving SSW. Aircraft X then started their turn for left traffic and were given a clearance to land when they were at midfield. After landing, Ground Control asked Aircraft X to call the tower so we could collect the information needed to fill out the report.

I don't feel that there is a need to change policy or procedures. I do feel there is a need, especially me, to better follow the procedures, SOP's and policies already in place.

**Synopsis**

Local Controller reported an airborne conflict between two air carriers.
ACN: 1754119

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Mission: Training

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1320
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1075
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754119
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Prefacing this with: Paperwork issue, nothing damaged, no one hurt, no incidents occurred, strictly paperwork.
Earlier in the year a student and his instructor working at the same flight school as me had worked together for months prior. At some point the student was in training and had been soloed by his previous instructor at this time. The coronavirus pandemic occurred at this time and that instructor elected to no longer continue working. I had picked this student up to continue training. The student told me he soloed and had been soloing until I picked him up as a student. I provided the student with training and re-currency training until I found him proficient in the same plane. The student mentioned he had his student pilot certificate medical and government issued photo ID and I took his word for it. He was acting PIC and he knew the rules so I endorsed him for his additional 90 days and sent him out of the office. I took record of the endorsement and at that point he went to work with another instructor at our school. After a few weeks the student was about to solo again, I went to him and asked to see his documents as a safety precaution. I found out he did not have his student pilot certificate and lied to me about having it originally. I told the student he was no longer allowed to solo. My boss and supervising instructor has now talked to the student and is working with him to figure out where or if he has his certificate and how to go about this next. The underlying issue was the student lying to me about having it when he did not because he was so eager to solo. Trusting the older flight instructor who said the student has his certificate, and me not physically verifying where the students documents were. It is not currently clear where the student pilot certificate was and at this time the chief instructor is working on finding it.

Synopsis

Flight instructor reported a new student to him did not have a student pilot solo certificate as the student had said.
I forgot to brief the exit row Aircraft X, because we were dealing with three mask issues. I was able to brief our guest once we were in the air.
Flight Attendant reported not giving the exit row briefing because they were dealing with face mask issues.
Passenger X seated in XX1 had to be reminded repeated times to stow her backpack and book bag that she let sit in the seat besides her prior to takeoff as well as to please pull her mask up from under her chin that other guests were complaining to me (FA B). I conveyed what had happed to both FA A and the CA. Shortly after 10,000 feet as I was
heading forward to retrieve a set of headphones for another guest, as I walk by, I find her laying across XX1 and 2 with her head propped up on her book bag on the aisle arm rest, head hanging over into the aisle without a mask. I tried rousing her quietly with no response from her and then gently tapped her on the shoulder and her exclaiming, "What?! What do you want?" I politely asked her to please put her mask on and cover both her nose and mouth as required and to please ensure her seatbelt remained fastened while the seatbelt sign was on as we were still ascending. She begrudgingly complied as she continued to complain and others around her asked her to wear it as well.

During service, once again, Passenger X had her mask below her chin as she sat with her foot propped up in the seat and was painting her toenails. I politely asked her again to comply with the mask requirement and to please not polish her toenails as the fumes were offensive to those around her. She denied painting her toenails (with polish in an opened [bottle and] nail polish remover pad in hand). I explained to her once again that wearing a mask is a requirement that she had been made aware of prior to boarding and that it wasn't fair to the other passengers and crew on board as everyone else was diligent in complying. I also made her aware that she had been informed several times. As I started to walk forward to let FA A know what had transpired. We called the CA and let him know that we were doing and to be prepared in the event that the situation escalated. The guest in front of her Passenger Y asked if there was something more I could do or move her when suddenly her voice level became elevated and she said "There! I pulled the mask up and I have a headache so go away!" Subsequently we (FA A and myself) asked the Passenger Y if he would be more comfortable in another seat and he accepted. Passenger Y and several other guests commended us for how we handled the situation. Passenger Y gave his permission for this airline to contact him regarding the situation and events. Passenger X complied for the rest of the flight. Upon final compliance before landing, Passenger X was asked by both FA A and myself to again stow her bags which she finally did by tossing and kicking them under the seat. Upon landing she quickly stood, gathered her belongings and hurried off of the plane before rows in front of her stood. Although we understand the importance of wanting to retain customer loyalty, this kind of behavior should not be tolerated for the sake of one over an entire cabin of guests and employees.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with wearing a face mask during flight and exhibited other non-compliant behavior.
**ACN: 1754084**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202008

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1754084
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew

**Events**

Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Door closed, Captain announced "ramp loading bags while surrounded with thunder storms." Captain calls 1L to suggest to have the cockpit door open, and show me the iPad map. Captain gets out of his seat to use the first class bathroom with no face mask. As he is inside restroom, a coach passenger waits by door 1R to use the first class bathroom. Captain comes out and faces the passenger. When Captain shuts the cockpit door, I recall
the passenger comment, "No mask." In flight, when Captain open the cockpit door I said "mask, mask, mask."

Captain uses the lavatory 1R the second time with no mask on his face. Flight Attendant assists me with cockpit break. Captain third bathroom break, same flight attendant assisted me, Captain did not have his face mask on. When we landed in ZZZ, Captain opened the door without mask on with his suitcase and bags. I said, "Captain no face mask?" Captain said "Oh I forget." He reached into his pocket and pulled out the blue surgical mask and held it in his hand and took off with his bags with no mask on his face. I recall Captain exited onto the jet way where outbound crew were on the jet way. The First Officer, whenever he exited the cockpit or when I stepped into the cockpit, always had his face mask on.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported the Captain did not have a face mask on while exiting the cockpit numerous times.
ACN: 1754082

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754082
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
FA 1 blocked the jumpseat area with curtain and locked the lavatory. I told him that we can't do that, the only way we can is if we have wheelchair passenger using the lavatory. He replied that he feels uncomfortable being to close to passengers around his jumpseat. He called the Captain and told him that it was me who wants to keep it close.

I told Captain what was going on, FA 1 still refused to do right thing. He locked the back lavatory (put a sticker out of service) on the back lavatory door. It is so wrong. I could not fix this problem. He was very condescending. I told him if he doesn't feel safe with customers he shouldn't be here. We can't make the customers uncomfortable and stop them from using lavatory.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported another Flight Attendant locked the bathroom door and put an out of order sign on it, so he would not have to get close to people.
ACN: 1754081

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1754081
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result. General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Company Policy
Flight was understaffed by X flight attendants. When I asked Inflight (dual CSR) Supervisor [to] inquire about adding more FAs for our very full flight (with at least one being a [foreign language] speaker), he said that XX was the "new staffing". When I had time to check my staffing sheet again, I saw that [the supervisor] was incorrect. We should've had XY FA's working with this load instead of XX.

All FAs were extremely busy and task saturated. Only Y economy FAs scheduled. One FA must do required galley supply/security check (which encompasses 2 actual galleys--the Aft most at Location X and the auxiliary one at Location Y) and has little to no time to actually monitor in cabin. One is required for greeting at door X. That leaves only X FAs to monitor the space from row XX to XY, which on this flight was close to XXX passengers. FAs must assist with any questions passengers have (which are plentiful) assist with stowing baggage--direct them to stow baggage in compliance with FARs, assist with seating issues, and give special briefings and fulfill other requests. X FAs in an extremely busy economy cabin is woefully understaffed.

To compound matters, [the company] has, in their infinite wisdom, repeatedly failed to assign [foreign language] speakers to this ZZZ-ZZZZ1 flight. As a result, all FAs had an extremely hard time assisting passengers with their questions and directing them to stow baggage according to FARs before door closure.(amongst other things--like informing them of landing formalities/required forms)

There were multiple seating issues including too many lap children in a row for amount of O2 masks, customers requesting seat changes, customers unhappy with seat assignments, and multiple requests for FAs to [assist] customers--in other words, a normal full flight to Country X, however understaffed and without benefit of a [foreign language] speaker.

Everyone...was extremely busy, had multiple seat change requests, and had our usual duties of hanging coats, fulfilling drink requests (even without formal preflight beverage service, customers want drinks before leaving and we are required to give them upon request), meal order taking and also assisting/directing baggage stowage and any other requests/problems, also without benefit of a [foreign language] speaker.

As Purser I have to brief with the pilots (who most days including this one do not board aircraft until after passenger boarding begins), greet at door X until closure (since no FA # XX was scheduled), hand out hand wipes while greeting, interact with customers, make boarding announcements, answer questions and liaise with cockpit/customer service for any post boarding mechanical, seating or customer issues, of which there were many. Pursers are also to take meal orders on the X zone, which is almost impossible to complete before door closure as the company wants us to do for a timely inflight service. I couldn't even get halfway finished as I had to continually ask a passenger with a bit of English to translate my requests to the [foreign language] only speaking customers.

Inflight/CS supervisor did assist with a few seating issues when I informed [the supervisor] of them, including in economy and a very angry customer who wouldn't sit down or stow his bags in protest that he didn't get the bulkhead seat that he had requested. Economy seating issues were fixed, however [another] customer did not like the answers given to him by supervisor and continued to stand near his assigned (and unwanted) seat and refused to stow his bags.

Close to main door closure time, Captain informed me that we had maintenance issues
and that we wouldn't be closing on time, so I could continue to attempt taking meal orders without menus (which would've had a translation) and without benefit of speaking the language of the customers. Supervisor was visibly agitated at the delay and reminded me to do a final boarding announcement to try and get passengers to stow bags and sit down. There were probably XX people still trying to find places for their bags in economy and two FAs went back to assist.

No CSR did a final boarding announcement, as they usually do, and left it to me. I made the announcement, but saw that there were still probably XX-XY people still standing in economy and multiple bins open as far as I could see. All FAs not actively engaged in duties went to assist, but it was extremely difficult for them to get people to stow things and sit down. Again, we had no scheduled [foreign language] speaker and the customers (as usual with passengers who don't fly much) kept trying to leave bags at bulkheads or completely blocking aisles which we could not, for obvious reasons, allow.

I left boarding FA at door and went back to my other duty of attempting to take meal orders, then noticed that the door had been shut without my knowledge. There were still at least XX people standing and multiple bins open. [A] customer who didn't like his seat assignment was also still defiantly standing with bags in the aisle to protest his condition.

Everyone had multiple large bags and it had been difficult finding space for them all. Compounding this was the new policy of boarding pillows/blankets in large bags in OH bins, which takes away at least 4 large bins. To mitigate this, the Economy FAs, in addition to all their other duties, were forced to hand out the pillows/blankets during boarding, instead of after takeoff as we are told to by the company. That bin space was necessary, but handing out pillows/blankets was yet another task that the 2 FAs had to undertake by themselves in a crowded and busy boarding process.

I knocked on door window and motioned CSR to open, which she did. Supervisor reappeared and I showed the situation/explained that it is an FAR that we cannot close door with passengers standing and bins open. Especially considering the load and the fact that OH bin space was very tight. [The Supervisor] was again visibly agitated and yelled at me that "I told you to make a final boarding announcement to get them to sit down". I calmly told [the Supervisor] that yes, I did make that final boarding announcement, however the majority of the passengers most likely did not understand it. I made another announcement, but it still took a few minutes for passengers to comply and FAs to close all bins. [The Supervisor] closed the door with a customer still standing and refusing to stow bags. I protested but [the Supervisor] closed [it] again, anyway.

**Synopsis**

Purser reported multiple issues and difficulties during the boarding process and cited not having enough flight attendants to properly staff the flight as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1754079

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754079
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We arrived about 20 mins early at the gate, and right after a few of my passengers in first
class got off the cleaners were getting on the plane. This is unacceptable, I'm making
multiple announcements for passengers to stay seated to help with social distances during
this pandemic, all while the cleaners are on getting in the way of passengers getting off.
There was no social distance by the cleaners what so ever.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported aircraft cleaners got onboard before passengers deplaned affecting social distancing efforts.
ACN: 1754035

Time / Day
Date: 202008

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Taxi

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Ground Personnel: Ramp
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1754035
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter: Aircraft
Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
When Detected: Taxi
Result: General: Maintenance Action
Result: Aircraft: Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

During these irregular operations (COVID-19), aircraft are parked in places they normally would not be; congestion is the norm, where aircraft have to be maneuvered around obstacles, usually other aircraft. When dispatched to move Aircraft X that had Aircraft Y
behind it, despite an exceedingly cautious operation to ensure the safety of both aircraft and all personnel, an equipment failure led to Aircraft X being pushed into Aircraft Y.

**Synopsis**

Ground employee reported pushing an aircraft into a parked aircraft while maneuvering through a congested parking area.
I received a phone call from Person X...with HR. Person X called me to tell me that I could return to work the following day from my 14 day quarantine. However, I was never told to quarantine and my schedule was never adjusted accordingly. I was directly exposed to a coworker who tested positive for COVID-19 and [who had] told the company of the results and the people [the coworker had] worked with and was around. My name along with several others was provided to local management but they failed to take any action to pull us out of work. Only 14 days later did I find out that I was in fact supposed to be in quarantine, but instead management kept me at work for my regularly scheduled shifts. In fact, I even worked several extra shifts during that time period.

Synopsis

Ground employee reported being told to return to work after completing a 14-day quarantine. Reporter stated that they had not been previously told to self-quarantine nor
had they been notified they had been exposed to a co-worker who tested positive for COVID-19.
During push back Passenger started to vomit in his seat. Ran into lav continuing to vomit. Exited Lav sat in unassigned seat vomited again. Ran into different Lav and proceeded to vomit again. Returned to seat and then vomited in the aisle. Ran into a third Lav and

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a passenger vomited multiple times during push back. Captain elected to return to gate and have passenger removed.
ACN: 1754018

Time / Day
Date : 202008
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 40000

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class A : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 12468
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 88
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 9480
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1754018
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Attendant

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

100 NM prior to TOD, FO called FAs requesting a Lav break. Lead FA (Purser) stated that none of the FAs were comfortable coming up to the Cockpit unless the remaining pilot (in the cockpit) wore a face covering. As he really needed to use the Lav, the FO consented to the FA's request and then told me (the Captain) of the FA's request. This is the first time in my XX+ years at airline and XY+ years as a Captain, that I've had a FA hold me hostage to get a Lav break. The FA requested that the pilot remaining in the cockpit wear a face covering in the cockpit while the other pilot was absent from the cockpit on the Lav break. I never wear a face covering in the cockpit, while flying the aircraft, especially with the other pilot absent from the cockpit.

If it's not already obvious, let me restate that the FARs prohibit the use of a face covering (or the wearing of a beard) that would prevent a proper seal of the O2 mask. At FL400 and a TUC (Time of Useful Consciousness) of 15 seconds, with the other pilot absent from the cockpit, is NOT the time to find out that your O2 mask doesn't work with a face covering. As the FO left the cockpit, and me wearing a face covering, per the FA's request, ATC gave us a vector off course and a speed reduction for traffic. I replied to ATC, but they couldn't hear my boom mike through the face covering. At FL400, with the other pilot absent from the cockpit, is NOT the time to find out ATC can't hear your boom mike through the face covering. Before she left, I told the Lead FA that I would be writing a report and she said something through her face covering that I couldn't hear. At FL400, with the other pilot absent from the cockpit, is NOT the time to be unable to communicate with the only other person in the cockpit.

Face coverings are UN-SAFE while taxing, flying, or maneuvering the airplane. They fog up my glasses which I am required to wear, they prevent me from communicating clearly with ATC, the other pilot or with the FA when the other pilot is absent from the cockpit.

After the flight, we had a long debrief with the FAs. Company COVID-19 face covering information DOES NOT address the wearing of a face covering while operating an aircraft. The FAs on this flight, believed I was operating the aircraft in disregard of the Federal Aviation Regulations and in direct violation of Company Policy. It was unclear to these FAs, who gets to tell who must wear a face covering while operating an aircraft. None of these FAs seemed to understand who the Pilot-In-Command (PIC) is when operating an aircraft.

In the masked de-brief, they were argumentative and confrontational. They thought that the remaining pilot on the cockpit was required to wear an O2 mask anytime the other pilot is absent the cockpit. It is very difficult to discuss face coverings with a FA who's been told that everyone is required to wear a face covering at all times while on an aircraft or on company property. The FAs do not understand the problems caused by face coverings in the cockpit (the O2 mask, Pilot to Pilot or Pilot to ATC communications issues, or Eye Glass fogging). The FAs believe that they can tell the Captain how to operate an aircraft in direct violation of the FARs, safety procedures and common sense. This has to
stop. The Company must tell all employees, but especially FAs, that the Captain is in command, that face coverings cause safety issues in the cockpit and that pilots are NOT required (in fact, are discouraged from wearing) face coverings while operating an aircraft.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported that the flight attendants were not comfortable coming into the flight deck while the pilot was on a restroom break, until the remaining pilot was wearing a face mask. Reporter described safety concerns with having to wear a face mask in the cockpit.
Just prior to departure, purser advised me the passenger in seat X5 [was] coughing, unmasked, not sure if he was unable or unwilling to wear a mask, and had just thrown up on himself. I made the decision that the person was not suitable for a [long] flight and was to be removed. The two passengers traveling with him had elected to stay behind and the GSC (Ground Security Coordinator) coordinated the removal of the three passengers.
Air carrier Captain reported that an ill passenger boarded and was not wearing a face mask. Captain decided to have passenger removed from flight due to length of the flight and passenger's condition.
ACN: 1754009

Time / Day
   Date: 202008
   Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
   Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
   State Reference: US
   Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1000

Environment
   Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
   Reference: X
   ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
   Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
   Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
   Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
   Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
   Flight Plan: IFR
   Flight Phase: Final Approach
   Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
   Reference: 1
   Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
   Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
   Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
   Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
   Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
   Function.Ground Personnel: Airport Personnel
   Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
   Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
   Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
   Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 2032
   Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 0
   Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2032
   ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1754009
   Human Factors: Situational Awareness
   Human Factors: Training / Qualification
   Human Factors: Distraction

Events
   Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
   Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
   Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
   Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
   Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Flight was first flight back on line for PF after 4 1/2 months absence due to impacts of COVID-19 pandemic. PF had completed landing re-qualification training X days prior. Due to forecast/reported turbulence in the ZZZ area FAs had be seated early. Weather for the arrival was VMC with buildups and storms well to the south of ZZZ. During the arrival into ZZZ ATC assigns us higher than normal speed than the published arrival (280 KT vs 250 KT). Speed reduction to published (210 KT) is not assigned until reaching 11,000 feet. Aircraft is slowed to using SB and flaps extended to Flaps 1. Up to this point autoflight was fully engaged in SPD VNAV and LNAV/HDG. A subsequent vector (260 degrees) and descent to 8,000 feet with speed no greater than 200 is then assigned. FLCH mode was selected on the MCP with speed set to 180 KT while flaps were further extended to aid in speed reduction. Shortly thereafter ATC assigns a dogleg vector of 320 clears us for the Visual Approach Runway XXR. At that time PF selects APPR mode on the MCP and disengages the Autopilot. PM selects FAF Alt (7,000' feet) in the MCP. Although "field in sight," the PF initial aim point was to Runway XXL vs XXR (as cleared). The error was noted and corrected when approaching the extended centerline of XXR which resulted in a minor overshot and correction to align with XXR. Due to this and that the autopilot was disengaged, the PF's focus shifted to runway alignment and PAPI for glidepath (1 red/pink, 3 white) noting the aircraft approximately 1 dot above glidepath. Landing gear was extended and flaps lowered on profile to aid in speed reduction to target and getting back on both visual and ILS glidepath. During the approach with transition to outside references with autopilot off, the aircraft remained slightly high enough that G/S (Approach mode) did not engage. The PF was working to smoothly get back to glidepath, (on speed), but still remained slightly high through 1,000 feet AGL before it was noted by the PM that FLCH was still the designated autoflight pitch mode on the FMA. The approach was stable and on visual glidepath by 500 feet and continued for landing. The flight was debriefed in accordance with the Crew Debrief guide with emphasis on the approach, addressing specific threats, errors and corrections made as well as future ways to manage the approach to prevent deviation and increase situational awareness.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and lining up for the incorrect runway.
**Time / Day**

Date : 202007  
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON  
State Reference : US  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed  
Light : Daylight

**Aircraft**

Reference : X  
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Plan : IFR  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase : Descent  
Route In Use.STAR : ZZZZZ RNAV  
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

**Person**

Reference : 1  
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X  
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying  
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument  
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine  
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 75  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1753972  
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface  
Human Factors : Distraction  
Human Factors : Fatigue

**Events**

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot  
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance  
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control  
When Detected : In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Before the TOD, we briefed the arrival and programmed the FMC to descend via the ZZZZZ RNAV STAR correctly. When we got clearance from ATC to descend via the STAR, I selected 4,000 feet in the MCP window as previously briefed. Somewhere below 10,000 feet, ATC gave us vectors off the STAR and to descend and maintain 5,000 feet. We complied. I selected 5,000 feet in MCP window, HDG Select and LVL Change and informed the PM. Sometime later ATC gave us direct to ZZZZZ fix and descend via STAR. I programmed direct to ZZZZZ in the FMC, selected LNAV and set 4,000 feet in the MCP window as per the STAR. I informed the PM.

We had a frequency change and the PM got a new ATIS at the same time as that was taking place. As we are approaching ZZZZZ fix, ATC confirmed that we were descending to 4,000 feet instead of crossing ZZZZZ fix at 5,000 feet. That’s when I realized that we were in LVL Change pitch and not in VNAV. As I was communicating that to the PM, ATC gave us a further descend and vectors for the final approach. The rest of the flight was uneventful. There were no TCAS TA or RA at any time. We debriefed the incident at the gate. I realized that due to recent events regarding the future of my flying career and the constant uncertainty has hindered my rest. This may have been a factor for my distraction on missing such a small yet critical step.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported not descending via the STAR due to selecting LVL Change Pitch instead of VNAV on the MCP.
ACN: 1753867

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 3500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 7000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 780
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 65
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 650
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1753867
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Miss Distance.Vertical : 501
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I departed ZZZ and was enroute to ZZZ1 before direct LR at 2,500 to avoid Bravo airspace. I identified that a short tail of Bravo I could vector to the final course at 2,500 and remain below the shelf. The next step would be to 3,500 in a 4,000 shelf of Bravo. I was monitoring Center departure and several traffic calls were made about me at 2,500. I kept identified each target and stated clear. I considered identifying that I was on frequency, but he was very busy. I glanced at my iPad between traffic spots and saw a 4,000 shelf and mistakenly thought I was in the 4,000 shelf so I climbed to 3,500. The ZZZ2 traffic was held at 4,000. I only went 3,000-3,500 the final 1-2 mi of the shelf (1 minute at my speed) and when he identified me at 3,500, I realized, I wasn't where I thought I was and by then, I was crossing into the 4,000 shelf. Distraction by watching traffic diverted my attention so that a glance misidentified the shelf of Bravo. I have flown in Bravo for X yrs without violating it. Flight following would have prevented this, but with the controller cut backs, they are so overworked in Center, I did not think I needed it.

Synopsis
Pilot reported experiencing a Class B airspace violation.
**ACN: 1753847**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202007

**Place**
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude: AGL: Single Value: 200

**Environment**
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

**Aircraft : 1**
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: UNICOM: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Test Flight
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: None
Airspace: Class G: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 2**
Reference: Y
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Other
Route In Use: None
Airspace: Class G: ZZZ

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 12000
Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 60
Experience. Flight Crew. Type : 6000
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number : 1753847
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2 : Flight Crew

**Events**

Anomaly. Conflict : NMAC
Detector. Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance. Horizontal : 0
Miss Distance. Vertical : 400
When Detected : In-flight
Result. Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result. Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Staffing

**Narrative: 1**

I was doing an FAA check ride acting as a pilot examiner with the applicant on board for a Commercial Airplane Single Engine Land rating in Aircraft X on Right downwind for [Runway] XXL at ZZZ. The time was approximately XA:15PM. The Tower closed at XA:00 so the airspace was G.

There were approximately 6 planes in the pattern.

Aircraft Y reported he was on a VFR PRACTICE LDA approach for [Runway] YYR. Everyone in the traffic pattern was in Right traffic or left traffic for XXL (reciprocal of YYR).

Several planes in the pattern advised Aircraft Y that the runway in use was XX left/right traffic. Aircraft Y still continued inbound on the LDA approach for YYR again aircraft in the pattern advised Aircraft Y right traffic for XXL.

As I was turning from base to final for XXL Aircraft Y stated he would be making a climbing left turn at the threshold of YYR. I was now on short final doing a go-around climbing to 200 feet when I heard Aircraft Y now state he would be doing a straight out departure on YYR which was now flying opposite the traffic pattern. I looked down the runway and saw Aircraft Y flying head on right towards me. I descended and he flew directly over me approx 300 feet above me.

He then made a climbing right turn and in the process came within 100 feet of another aircraft, also in the pattern. The pilot of Aircraft Y stated over the radio what he did was correct and had tapes to prove it. He then flew Northbound against the traffic pattern leaving the area.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported an NMAC at a closed towered airport.
ACN: 1753819

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Taxi
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: FBO
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Private
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 80
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 5
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 70
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1753819
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Runway
- Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Gate
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I made several mistakes today when taxiing at ZZZ. First, I entered the taxiway from the flight school without contacting Ground. Where I trained, ZZZ2, you taxi to the ramp area to perform the run up then contact Ground for instructions to the runway. The flight school at ZZZ is immediately next to the ramp area, so I went there mistakenly without first contacting Ground. Secondly, when I was holding short of the runway I was given taxi instructions. I repeated back those instructions correctly, but I thought the Controller said cross after I repeated them, and I began crossing the runway. I was having a hard time hearing through the headset, but heard the Controller stating I was in the wrong and I immediately turned around and exited. I then taxied correctly to the other runway and back to the flight school.

I'm embarrassed by these errors. I have been trying not to fly as much in rented airplanes due to COVID, due to the risk of having so many people in and out of them, and have lost some proficiency being a newly minted pilot. The last time I flew at ZZZ it was under heavy construction and we were routed another direction. I went that same direction and repeated the instructions back correctly to ATC but was writing notes and accidentally made a mistake of crossing. The load of not flying in a while and a new airport was a too much. Next time, I will take a CFI with me and also do ground training to ensure I know the airport to avoid any future mistakes, and will also try to fly more consistently in the future to maintain proficiency.

I panicked after I made the error which caused me to not communicate correctly and efficiently. I'm fortunate I learned this lesson on the ground rather than in the air and will continuously train to ensure I maintain focus and calm in case an emergency situation ever does happen.

I'm deeply sorry for any trouble I may have caused today. I will work to correct these mistakes to be a better pilot.

Synopsis
Pilot reported a runway incursion and cited lack of flying and unfamiliarity with the airport as contributing factors.
Time / Day
Date : 202007
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Parked

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Cabin Jumpseat
Cabin Activity : Boarding
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1753812
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Attendant

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I was B position, while checking cabin I see a passenger seated in X6 next to the D Jump Seat which was [NAME]. I asked A FA and D FA what's up? D FA I believe [was] not aware of the rules to social distance us [by] blocking X4 and X5. D FA thought it was OK to offer that seat to a non-rev. I was not A so again repeated it is not OK, yet we were now pushing back. Later in flight I found out the agent was not the one to request from us but D FA offered it up so they assigned a non rev to X6. We had many open seats in main cabin. A FA, understanding where I was coming from and he too being here much longer than the two reserves understands we have rules we have a contract it is not up for debate. This is our jump seat. A FA informed us as a whole that he would report this situation and I thanked him and agreed. I want us all to learn from this. As I don't think either of them still understand and shouldn't put another crew or agent in jeopardy of getting in trouble. If I am incorrect and she was in the right and can continue going above and beyond accommodating passenger next to her jump seat in X6 for future flights then please reply. If I am correct, could you please address this to the entire flight attendant group for clarification.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported confusion whether a non-rev passenger could sit in a specific jump seat.
ACN: 1753811

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753811
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753815
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : In-flight
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Passenger X was non-compliant with face mask.

After door closure, F/A B informed me that a Passenger X would not keep his mask on. I called F/D and let them know of the situation and asked to hold pushback until aft FAs determined whether Passenger X should continue on the flight. Passenger X complied initially and we departed without further issue.

During cruise F/A B communicated to me that he had asked Passenger X several times to keep his mask on - as he was not eating or drinking. I went aft and asked Passenger X to wear his mask as well, which he had stuffed into his pocket. He was visibly annoyed and didn't initially comply.

As he was connecting on another flight, we also notified pilots of the situation. Passenger X, was non-compliant with face mask.

Better policy/procedure is needed between FA, Pilot, and station workgroups and their roles. It doesn't feel particularly safe to send someone who is knowingly non-compliant onto another crew or CSA.

Narrative: 2

During boarding I observed Passenger X, without his face mask on and asked him to please pull his mask up, which he did. After the demo as I walked to the back, I observed Passenger X with his face mask down again. I told him to put it up. And then I reminded him that he had agreed to wear a face mask is a condition of flying with us this evening. I told him I was not playing games. I told him, this could jeopardize his ability to fly with this airline in the future. I asked him if he understood and he said he did. Later on, after the service, I was going through the cabin picking up trash and observed Passenger X without a face mask. It was not on his face around his neck. It was nowhere to be seen. I looked him squarely in the face. He saw me looking at him and made no move to put his face mask on again. I called the A FA and told her about [the] issue. She came back and told Passenger X to put his face mask on and he did. We conferred and I explained that I had warned him twice earlier. He is connecting to ZZZ tonight or later on this morning. The flight deck has been apprised of his actions.

Synopsis

Flight attendants reported a passenger needed to be continuously reminded about having to wear a face mask.
In a position ZZZ-ZZZ1, several passengers approached me during deplaning to tell me that two passengers in seats XX5 and XX6 were spitting and wiping saliva, phlegm, and blood all over their seats, armrests, tray tables, window, and wall. They explained they...
were unable to call an FA because they saw this while standing in the aisle several rows behind these people as all passengers waited to deplane. The two passengers were able to exit the aircraft before the other passengers could notify me. I assured them the plane was terminated and would be sanitized for the evening and we agreed that the only thing remaining we could do about it was to notify Operations and request they inform the cleaners of the location to take extra precautions to protect themselves and to sanitize that area thoroughly. The blood [was] intentionally smeared into an X shape on the wall. I presumed the blood came from tearing open a scab or some other small wound. It was a clearly visible amount but didn't indicate heavy bleeding.

By the time [deplaning] was complete and I could go to row XX, most of the moisture from the saliva and nasal secretions had dried and was barely visible, only the blood stood out. Without their notification, and even with the easily visible blood, it would have been impossible to realize the extent to which they had contaminated every possible surface. It would have dried completely had we taken the time to tidy the aircraft first. In our PA about passenger compliance we emphasize seat belts and smoking and perhaps that is outdated and detracts from where the emphasis currently should lie. We state federal law prohibits tampering with a lav smoke detector, perhaps we have a law that prohibits passenger misconduct and could be stated in such a way that explains the criminality (if any) to such behavior. I do not believe those passengers believed they could face any consequence for these actions. Regardless of taking place during a pandemic, at any time this behavior poses a risk to other passengers, crew, and employees.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported that two passengers were observed spitting, and wiping their saliva and blood over their entire seating area.
ACN: 1753757

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2500

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 41
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 7500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753757
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753976
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
ATC initially cleared flight to 5,000 feet for the departure and this altitude was briefed for the departure. ATC changed the altitude to 2,500 feet on the taxi and the crew dialed the new altitude into the FMS. FO failed to level off at 2,500 feet and topped out at 3,000 feet before correcting back down to 2,500 feet. ATC gave us a vector away from traffic eight miles ahead of aircraft and gave us a climb up to 15,000 feet. Neither crew member remembers hearing the 1,000 foot prior altitude alert. It should not have been inhibited for a flaps 1 condition. Altitude alert functioned normally on next level off. Crew must have missed the alert due to flaps up call-out. The FO had only flown 10 times in the last 90 days with 10 landings.
The crew should have reviewed the field elevation versus the level off altitude and briefed that the level off would occur immediately after flap retraction. FO needs to be extra vigilant with flight performance during this time of low flight hours.

Narrative: 2
We were climbing out of ZZZ and were cleared to level at 2,500 feet. We had briefed accordingly so there was no change. As we climbed out I made the required 1000-foot call and as we were approaching 2,500 feet, I realized he's not leveling off. I stated we were cleared to 2,500 feet level off. He hesitated then realized his mistake and began to level off. We went approximately 300 feet high, so 2,800 feet. Before I could notify ATC we were told to turn 30 degrees left and continue our climb to 15,000 feet. The rest of the flight was fine.

We both have not flown as much as we would have at this point in time of the year. I believe he had six trips a month for the last three months. I should have been quicker to realize he was not going to level, and should have taken the aircraft when I realized the mistake and we would not have violated the assignment.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an altitude deviation during departure. Flight crew did not hear the 1,000 feet altitude alert.
I have a suggestion to increase COVID-19 related safety. How about we install hand sanitizer dispensers at the bottom of our jetbridges. Passengers and employees could get a squirt right there before they enter the aircraft or after they get off. Obviously there’s an expense involved but maybe it's a worth while expenditure.
ACN: 1753747

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 11000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Developmental
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753747
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Aircraft X was going to ZZZ via uncommon routing to avoid weather. The aircraft was filed ZZZ direct. The aircraft flew through the ZZZ1 arrival corridor. The aircraft entered within the correct altitude parameters, but exited the corridor 1,000 MSL above without a pointout to the ZZZ sector/XX. I believe the event happened because at the time I was taking Approach Control airspace with detailed info being passed to me and my attention was brought elsewhere. Another contributing factor would be the Controller on 3 months off prior and out of practice with normal procedures.

I recommend that there be more training on assuming Approach Control airspace for individuals who do not work mid-shifts. We do not normally have to take over the approach controls until later at night, but with the pandemic we've been assuming airspace sooner in the day. More information for those that aren't familiar with normal procedures may be helpful.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller reported an airspace violation and cited having to take approach control's airspace as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1753746

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function: Air Traffic Control: Other / Unknown
- Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience: Air Traffic Control: Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon): 11
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1753746
- Human Factors: Workload

**Events**
- Anomaly: Airspace Violation: All Types
- Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
FLM was working combined positions and was absolutely inundated with VFRs and IFR aircraft. FLM is a good Controller, but no one could have reasonably been expected to deal
with that number of aircraft safely. Numerous safety events happened during this session. The one I noticed in particular even though I had my own traffic. Aircraft X was told to follow freeway north which the pilot did. He just kept on going and probably went 10 miles north before anyone talked to him. He was out of our airspace in within TRACON airspace. He was also routed through numerous aircraft holding around ZZZ a satellite airport. The OM then seemed to blame the pilot for not calling. No way for the pilot to call if he can't get a word in edge wise.

1. No OT used and we are operating with 3 CPCs and an FLM when normal numbers are 8 and an FLM due to quarantine from a COVID positive. We also had the OM that can't plug in and help if he needs to.
2. The ATM WILL NOT USE TMI for staffing because of political pressure not because it isn't needed. TMI for staffing have been definitely needed especially this week with 15 ish controllers out of 25 on quarantine.
3. The OM knew this was an issue because he called the flight schools the day before to tell them not to fly during certain times the day before and failed to tell them the same thing for this day. The OM failed in very dramatic fashion and threw his own supervisor to the proverbial wolves.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller reported the Front Line Manager was inundated with VFR and IFR traffic while working a combined position.
ACN: 1753742

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Vectors

Aircraft: 2
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Other / Unknown
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 11
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753742
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

I put in a release for Aircraft X for Runway XXL. I called on the shout line right away to coordinate for the aircraft departing Runway XXL for winds since we were advertising Runway YYR. No other aircraft was in the airspace. The closest aircraft was outside of 20 miles and west of the airspace. Approach would not give me a release stating the aircraft was ODO [Opposite Direction Operation] with the IFR arrival. Our LOA and procedures state that this is not considered an ODO operation. The aircraft was delayed over 10 minutes for no reason. Upon the arrival landing, the Approach Controller wanted a landing verification before TRACON Controller would give me a release on the aircraft departing Runway XXL. Which is not a requirement from a Tower controlled airport. The Approach Controller also stated I needed to review LOA PROCEDURES for ODO on the shout line. This Controller unduly delayed an aircraft and was unprofessional on the shout line with me over an aircraft needing to depart a different runway. I also know that the TRACON has had a COVID schedule with several days off and then working again so I don't know if it is a proficiency issue.

The Approach Controller needs to review LOA procedures with ZZZ. I would also suggest Controller visit our Tower and try to understand the Tower side of the operation. Controller caused an aircraft to waste gas and prevent expeditious movement of aircraft.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller reported being delayed by the TRACON due to the TRACON not releasing an aircraft resulting in an airspace incursion.
ACN: 1753741

Time / Day
Date: 202008
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ. Tower
State Reference: US

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Facility: ZZZ. Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function: Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1753741
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working all locals combined and I launched the second aircraft a bit too close. I ended up having to give the 2nd guy a couple of turns to get 3 miles. As soon as I had it I shipped them both. The first guy didn't take the switch and then the 2nd guy sped up a little about 10 knots and the TRACON Controller wasn't able to talk to the first guy and I'm pretty sure we lost the 3. It was all around a bad call on my part and I should have just waited on the second guy or run him out on a different heading for longer or stopped his climb or anything like that.

In my defense, I was working all locals combined which I'm not super proficient with because while we were on COVID schedules. I will also note the following:

1. I was working LCW combined with other locals which is supposedly not safe per the district because we can't see the runway.
2. No OT used and we are operating with 3 CPCs and an FLM when normal numbers are 8 and an FLM due to quarantine from a COVID positive.
3. The ATM WILL NOT USE TMI [Traffic Management Initiative] for staffing because of political pressure not because it isn't needed. TMI for staffing have been definitely needed especially this week with 15 ish controllers out of 25 on quarantine.

Synopsis

Tower Controller working 3 Local positions reported an airborne conflict between two departures.
ACN: 1753735

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Trainee
Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Developmental
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753735
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Workload
Communication Breakdown.Party 1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party 2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
The traffic volume was very high for one Controller. I cleared Aircraft X for the visual approach and he didn’t start the descent as fast as I thought he would. Aircraft Y was headed north and I noticed it when they were too close, but know that they were not going to come together. I told them about each other and they were not concerned.

The traffic volume was extreme, but this is due to COVID.

Synopsis
TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict and cited traffic volume being very high for one Controller.
ACN: 1753682

Time / Day
Date : 202004

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase : Parked

Component
Aircraft Component : DC Battery
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Failed

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Company
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
Qualification.Maintenance : Airframe
Qualification.Maintenance : Powerplant
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1753682
Human Factors : Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Maintenance
When Detected : Routine Inspection
Result.General : Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X Battery was replaced due to the log book write up, low voltage, APU would not start with low battery voltage.

Storage procedure required battery disconnect not to drain down. Believe this would have
occurred sometime.

These aircraft were parked due to unusual circumstances. Procedures were changing often. I hope a job card is developed to eliminate any future confusion.

**Synopsis**

Technician reported an aircraft battery had to be replaced due to incorrect storage procedure.
ACN: 1753680

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753680
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Multiple crew members asked passenger to comply with mask policy during various phases of flight. After 3rd attempt, his demeanor, hostility, and inappropriate language, the
passenger was written up.

The guest had a flagrant disregard for authority from the moment we started the demo when the C FA told him to comply with an FAA policy, and the guest ignored him, when asked for compliance again, this guest just looked at FA and replied "I heard you the first time."

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with wearing a face mask.
Time / Day

Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1753676
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events

Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Detector. Person: Passenger
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While in flight there was a medical emergency. Aft FA had just finished with trash pick up, passenger pressed her FA call button. FWD FA went to check and passenger explained she can not breathe and she feels like she was going to pass out. I opened the air vents fully and asked if it was any better, passenger said no, she still can't breathe. I didn't offer water because there was a full bottle on passenger tray table, so I told the passenger to take a drink to see if would help. Passenger then stated she need O2. I told the passenger we have O2 on board, but I have to let the PIC know I’m using it. I called the flight deck told the PIC the situation and he stated I should let him know how the passenger feels after O2 was administered. I asked the passenger if she has emphysema, to which she said no. I also asked passenger if she would like for the aircraft to make an emergency
landing and get medics. Passenger said no she was feeling better with the O2. I secured the O2 bottle in the seat next to passenger and told her to press her FA button if she need anything else or if O2 runs out and she needed more. The AFT FA checked on the passenger on her trash run. PIC called to ensure passenger didn't need medical attention once we land which the passenger declined, as the O2 had her feeling better.

Passenger stated she was wearing her mask all morning in the airport and stated that could have been her reason for not being able to breathe.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger could not breathe, so oxygen was administered until passenger felt well.
**ACN: 1753673**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753673
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

For landing I sat in XR jumpseat instead of XR forward facing jumpseat. The passengers in the second to the last row were coughing and sneezing and I was concerned for my health and safety. I felt that I needed to social distance. I was unaware that moving to the XR jumpseat for health reasons violated an FAR.
In circumstances such [as] this, we should have provisions in place to protect not only ourselves, but our loved ones at home.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported moving to an unassigned jumpseat for social distancing purposes. The move conflicted with FAR regulations.
The crew was onboard the aircraft while the cleaners were cleaning, we were asked to deplane so 1 cleaner could spray the aircraft, 3 of us were in the first class cabin, not deplaned yet when we noticed the cleaner that was supposed to be spraying was using a misting gun that wasn’t misting and he was simply walking down the aisle doing nothing with the sprayer but spraying something from a spray bottle. When I approached the cleaners asking why the sprayer wasn't working, he attempted to show me that it was, the machine spewed everywhere and didn’t mist. I didn't want to get him in trouble I just
wanted to insure the equipment was working. After talking with the cleaner I informed company of the issues, company immediately was talking with, I am guessing, a cleaning supervisor at the same time. Cleaning supervisor was being told by the cleaners that the spraying is complete. Basically the cleaner went through the aisle with a mister not misting and reported it done, NOT OK!!!! When a new crew arrived with misting equipment that did work, it took them 2 minutes to mist a whole aircraft. They walked down the aisle only spraying the aisle, they didn't touch the overhead bins, seats or any other crucial areas. What happened to wiping down every tray table and every overhead bin after every flight? Are the cleaners not trained properly or are they just lazy. We also witnessed, not 1 tray table was lowered or wiped down. If we are telling our passengers of our safety procedures, we need to perform our safety procedures.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported concerns with aircraft cleaning and sanitizing procedures.
ACN: 1753653

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 7000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1753653
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was pilot flying on Aircraft X, XX passengers, the first flight of our day. While hand flying the departure on a 320 heading vector to 7,000 feet, past 5,000 feet and approaching 6,000 feet we received a traffic advisory from ZZZ departure control. Approaching 6,000 feet (approximately) on the way to 7,000 feet we received a TCAS annunciation for the aircraft that ATC reported, which was immediately followed with a TCAS resolution advisory ('Level OFF' commanded). I remember seeing the aircraft on the MFD when first reported at 11 o'clock and 1,400 feet above our altitude, which the Captain and I later discussed as likely being at 7,500 feet. The time that it took from receiving the first traffic advisory from ATC to complying with the TCAS RA and receiving 'clear of conflict' from memory appeared to be approximately less than 10 seconds. The Captain copied the next instructions from ATC and reported that we received a TCAS RA.

There were multiple errors that I failed to mitigate. I should have briefed that with a reduced passenger and cargo load, and a lower temperature than recent flights, performance would be substantially greater. I could have opted to engage the autopilot above 600 feet and allow myself more visibility to achieve a greater situational awareness. Looking back, I was fixated on airspeed to conform with the company profile of accelerating to 250 knots and I omitted the VSI which indicated an excessive rate of climb for that altitude and within the terminal area. Having a proper scan would have allowed me to recognize the rate of climb and reduce thrust out of climb detent appropriately since I was using the speed mode (climb) of the autopilot per company profile. The threat of reduced loads was already highlighted multiple times in company documentation and safety publications specifically related to the environment created by the COVID-19 pandemic and should have been trapped. Loads have been solid at YY passengers for the last month and all flights today were XX or less passengers, equivalent to March lows when the bulk of similar events were highlighted.

During debrief with the Captain (pilot monitoring), he said that he intended to call out the excessive rate of climb, but the traffic advisory, TCAS alert, altitude chime (1,000 feet prior to ALTS), and TCAS RA all came in at nearly the same time and didn't allow space to talk.

Synopsis

First Officer reported receiving an RA and overshooting the assigned altitude by 500 feet due to a light load.
ACN: 1753593

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 10000.60
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 74.57
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 6000
ASRS Report Number,Accession Number: 1753593
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Narrative: 1

A passenger refused to wear her mask. The aft Flight Attendant asked the customer to wear her mask, customer refused. The aft Flight Attendant was communicating via her electronic device to operations in ZZZ. A Supervisor came to the plane. Customer initially claimed to have a medical condition, customer then said, she purchased the ticket prior to our mandatory mask policy was put in place therefore she was exempt. The customer service Supervisor never communicated with the cockpit. We had to ask the gate agent what happened after the Supervisor left. The Supervisor decided to let the customer fly without wearing a mask.

Other customers were not pleased. I feel this set a terrible example to the other customers onboard and did not support us.

Synopsis

First Officer reported a passenger was not complying with wearing a face mask pre-departure and was ultimately allowed to fly without having to wear it.
ACN: 1753581

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude MSL Single Value: 34000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function: Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience: Air Traffic Control: Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 32
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1753581
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Communication Breakdown Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly: Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was working 3 sectors at ZZZ Center, owning FL350 and above. The only other sector open was ZZZ1 HI, who had all the other high and low altitude sectors in our area, FL340 and below. Traffic was extremely slow. I took the handoff on Aircraft x at FL350 going direct ZZZ2 landing at ZZZ3. The route of flight went through ZZZ4 HI and then into a different Center. I double checked the Centers LOA about altitudes for ZZZ3 arrivals. They are supposed to be at FL290. I thought about leaving the aircraft at FL350 with an appreq to the other Center, but then thought that I should follow the normal LOA, so I put in FL290 in the data block. Put the electronic point out to ZZZ4 HI, issued the altitude for FL290, and handed off the aircraft to the other Center. Other Center accepted the point out and then I frequency switched Aircraft X to other Center. ZZZ1 HI then asked me if I worked Aircraft X and said point out approved. I violated ZZZ1 HI.

After XX years of briefings about being extra cautious when traffic is very slow and being extra cautious during unusual situations, I made an error by not being extra cautious during a very slow session and unusual configuration. It sounds so simple to work minimal traffic at only FL350 and above. However, other sectors were also confused by this unusual configuration. This should have been a glaring clue to me to be extra cautious!

Around [Year], my old area had a floating area of FL330 shared between ZZZ4 HI and [the area the reporter is working]. The floating area would be assigned to a sector accordingly to balance traffic loads. I remember working [the area the reporter is working] back then and clearing an aircraft to FL330. The ZZZ4 HI sector heard my clearance (we were trained to speak loudly so others around us could hear what we were doing). ZZZ4 HI verbally reminded me that they had the floating area of FL330. I amended the altitude of the aircraft and handed the flight off to ZZZ4 HI. After that incident, I then used a grease pencil on my radar scope to write the altitudes I owned. I was utilizing a visual tool during an unusual situation. Later on, because of all the confusion to adjacent sectors, the floating area was discontinued. I then stopped the visual cue of writing the altitudes on my scope.

Back to 2020: With working an unusual schedule and working unusual sector configurations due to the coronavirus, I need to practice extra caution every time I sit at a sector. It would have helped me to have an extra visual cue on my radar scope last night. We normally work our area split north and south, with each of us working low to super high altitude sectors. I erroneously acted like I owned the southern half of my area. Drift occurred. From now on I will use a visual cue to help remind me of unusual sector configurations. Habits are so ingrained; extra caution must be used to prevent errors from occurring. I am embarrassed that I did this. I am thankful that no other aircraft were in conflict. I will use the extra visual cues like I did in [year].

Synopsis
Center Controller reported an airspace violation and cited an unusual sector airspace configuration contributed to the event.
**ACN: 1753572**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 4
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 900

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling. Single Value: 12000

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Training
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
- Flight Plan: None
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multigengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 3500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 200
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1753572
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Vertical : 500
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X was conducting IFR approach training in VFR conditions. I was the CFI and I was providing separation and sequencing for traffic while monitoring the student pilot (who was simulated IFR).

We were authorized and cleared by Approach to conduct the LDA-XXR approach into ZZZ. Approach vectored us onto several headings as well as advising us they were vectoring us through the final approach course for sequencing of additional aircraft at ZZZ. Approach had just cleared another aircraft ahead of us into ZZZ via the RNAV-XXR.

I obtained ATIS at ZZZ which reported Runway XX in use and wind 280 @10, 10 SM visibility.

Approach cleared us with a vector heading to intercept Final Approach course into ZZZ, while at the same time advising us ZZZ Tower was now closed and we should maintain VFR, and separation or advisory service was cancelled. We were instructed to switch to ZZZ CTAF.

When we switched to ZZZ CTAF, we noted that there were several aircraft in the VFR traffic pattern for Runway XXL. We made advisory traffic calls indicating we were inbound for a practice LDA-XXR approach and would be conducting the published missed approach with a right hand turn out back to the ZZZ VOR. We made at least (3) of these advisory
calls.

I told my student to expect us to sidestep to the right of Runway XXR when we reached the final approach fix (ZZZ-VOR) and we would not descend below 900 feet. (Final approach minimum descent for straight in approach is 780 feet.) My student misunderstood the "sidestep" instruction and during this confusion we were late to make the sidestep maneuver and we unintentionally descended to 800 feet.

Just as we crossed the (ZZZ-VOR) I saw an aircraft headed directly toward us (approximate same altitude) and directly over Runway XXR apparently on downwind in a right traffic pattern near the approach end of Runway YYL for Runway XXL at ZZZ.

I also heard an aircraft advising that they would yield to the inbound LDA traffic to assist in separation. I was perplexed that the existing traffic appeared to be conducting right hand traffic for XXL since the FAA Airports Directory advises left hand traffic for XXL.

I decided that any further pursuit to complete this LDA-XXR approach was no longer prudent and I instructed my student to immediately initiate the published missed approach (right hand turn) and simultaneously I heard an unknown aircraft angrily advising we overflew his aircraft with less than 200 feet separation. I assume that aircraft was turning on to right base for runway XXL. I did not see that aircraft. However, I could still see an aircraft directly in front of me and directly over Runway XXR about midfield and at approximate same altitude.

There were several heated exchanges of radio traffic and someone demanded ATC traffic tapes be pulled to review this event. Whoever reported the 200 feet near miss also concluded that we should never have even attempted the LDA-XX approach in the first place because sequencing could not be successfully accomplished.

In my opinion, this circumstance/event became dangerously compromised because of the unusual ZZZ closed Tower operations and the infrequent non-towered airport operations by VFR traffic during daylight conditions at ZZZ. I also believe the recent closure of the tower today (at XA00 local) caused some confusion by all who were conducting work in the traffic pattern.

I will not conduct any further IFR practice training approaches at ZZZ as long as the ZZZ Tower is closed and non-functional. I highly recommend that ATC advise no further practice approaches will be conducted at ZZZ during the closed tower hours.

**Synopsis**

Instructor pilot reported a NMAC with an aircraft on final at an airport with the Tower closed at the time of the event.
ACN: 1753517

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753517
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passengers in row XY did not comply with the mask rules on multiple occasions. Masks were present but not being worn properly. This also caused a separate passenger to
become uncomfortable and resulted in that passenger confronting crew in the galley. He was not happy and felt like we weren't being harsh enough with the mask rule. We ended up giving a final warning to the passengers about masks before the flight was over.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported two passengers were not compliant wearing face masks during the flight. Another passenger was uncomfortable with them not wearing the face masks and confronted the crew.
ACN: 1753516

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1753516
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Only served sealed beverages during service and no coffee. I did not feel safe serving coffee at this point in the COVID-19 pandemic and was advised by the A Flight Attendant that they fought against extending inflight service. No additional information. Will continue to own safety during these trying times.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported only serving sealed drinks and no coffee during flight. Flight Attendant did not feel safe serving coffee.
ACN: 1753514

Time / Day

Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1753514

Events

Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

During service, passengers removed their mask in order to answer what they would like, coffee orders extended length of time in aisle, passengers who asked for coffee or tea did not wear masks while waiting for beverage to cool down. Many passengers did not abide by waiting to remove mask until FA completed their row.

Remove added service, keep it simple. Remove coffee and tea at the very least. Water, coke, Diet Coke should be only offerings.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported passengers taking off their face masks to order coffee or tea and then waiting for it to cool off, without face masks on.
**ACN: 1753512**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753512
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
Non-rev seated in X3 came on board with his mask down to his chin, not covering his nose and mouth. Waited several minutes once he took his seat to see if he would place mask over his mouth and nose and he didn't. I then proceed to go over to him after making the mask policy announcement and state for him to put his mask up covering his nose and mouth. He does for the time being. Once I start my service, I notice his mask is not covering his nose. He didn't eat or drink anything throughout the entire flight. I feel as flight attendants we have enough to do in policing rev passengers and shouldn't have to police for passengers who work for the company and understand the mask policy and not want to comply. Employees trying to get away with not complying with the policy. It's getting out of hand.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a non-revenue passenger was not wearing a face mask and had to be told to comply with the policy.
Passengers in seats XYZ, during compliance check, they did not have masks on. Mother was told it is mandatory throughout the flight. She didn't know where she put it. She was informed that the X year old must also wear one. Again she didn't know what the child did
with it. The Y year old doesn't have to wear one. This FA obtained two for her from the galley. She had found hers. The Y year old yelled out he wants one so was given one.

During service, Passenger X was not wearing a mask. She was informed again that the masks must be worn through duration of flight as it is policy. She responded "How come nobody at the gate told me that. I have a medical condition. She was informed that when she booked the travel, a notice comes out saying that you must go to the gate over an hour before the flight and speak to a medical doctor that will determine if you can be excused. She did not respond. Her daughter was informed that she must wear the mask. The mother says she keeps breaking it. She was informed of the policy and lack of compliance on other flights have forced planes back to the gate and we don't want that to happen here so we need the masks on for the whole flight.

The FA checked and advised the mother that Y year olds must wear the mask. The X year old responded "He's Z [years old]!" Even more so I said. The mother was shown the mask policy and told that she has been told at least three times that this is mandatory. This FA walked away to give her time to read it. It was explained to the children that many people have gotten sick and this is important to keep everyone safe. We know it's hard but it is for everyone's safety. The mother got up to place mask on child saying good luck with that. She continued to get up several times to attend to the children. The CA was informed. He made an announcement regarding the mandatory use of masks on all flights. Dispatch was notified. At landing, her son stated it's fun wearing masks! The mother said loudly No it's not!

Compliance issue. Passenger refused to comply with wearing a mandatory mask giving excuses for not wearing masks as a family.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported having trouble with a mother and two young children wearing face masks on the flight.
ACN: 1753507

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753507
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passenger was coughing profusely with mouth open. Passenger, was not wearing a mask during flight. This FA told the parents it is mandatory. She was brought a mask from the galley. They were shown that it is mandatory for any child over 2 to wear a mask. The child struggled with the parents and kicked this FA. This FA asked if they had a mask for the child. The dad said they have masks. The child broke one mask given to her. They
were given another mask and suggestion made to tie the back so it would fit her better. The child continued to struggle. As trash was collected, it was noted that the father had a little pink mask in his hand. The mother tried to put the mask on but only tried to hold it in front of the child's mouth. It was explained that virus is spread through coughing and the child may be exposing these passengers to a virus. Before sitting for descent, the FA asked if she had it on and the mother said no. The child continued to scream. The parents said that in the previous flight, the FAs allowed them to have child NOT wear a mask.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that a child was not wearing a face mask and was coughing. Parents attempted to put mask on the child, but were not successful.
**ACN: 1753506**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Direct

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753506
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors
Narrative: 1

First Officer seated in the passenger section dressed in his uniform deadheading back to ZZZ, did not have his mask covering his nose and mouth the entire flight back to ZZZ. He did not eat or drink anything. I eventually had to tell him to pull up his mask and which he gave me a crazy look.

I feel as flight attendants we have enough to do in policing revenue passengers and shouldn't have to police for passengers who work for the company and understand the mask policy and not want to comply. Employees trying to get away with not complying with the policy. It's getting out of hand.

He gave me a look, but he put his mask on.

Make sure the First Officer understands, abide by the rules, and starts taking the policy serious or else lose flight benefits for not complying. It's not a good look for passengers seeing pilots dressed in uniform not complying with the policy.

Synopsis

Flight attendants reported that a deadheading pilot did not follow face mask policy during the flight.
ACN: 1753488

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Cabin Lighting: High

Component
Aircraft Component: Galley Furnishing
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753488
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I very infrequently fly A position, had an unaccompanied minor that was going to be a through passenger. Also concern with weather. Our FA-C had come through picking up disinfectant wipes from customers, and I had both doors. Due to COVID, FA-C was in first row for social distancing, thus only one set of eyes double checking all secure galley. Upon takeoff the trash door came open, but the trash bin did NOT move from stowage location. As soon as it was safe I secured the door, with NO EVENT OCCURRING. Basically human error.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that during takeoff the galley trash door opened but the trash bin did not move.
**ACN: 1753367**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007

**Place**
- Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function. Ground Personnel: Ramp
- Function. Ground Personnel: Airport Personnel
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1753367
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
  - Communication Breakdown. Party1: Ground Personnel
  - Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector. Person: Ground Personnel
- Result. General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Ambiguous

**Narrative: 1**
There have been numerous instances of the ramp break room running out of cleaning materials. I have asked management to provide these materials, but we continue to run out. As of now we have one bottle of soap that was found on a cleaning cart and a few napkins that will not last the next hour.

**Synopsis**
Ground employee reported there is a lack of cleaning supplies in the ramp break room.
ACN: 1753364

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Ramp
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753364
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
We have to check our temperature before coming into work. I have seen some personnel bypassing this procedure. I asked a team member, he was told not to worry about them. It’s a procedure management put out [and] it's mandatory for us. Why not the others? If none of that group gets their temperature checked, we can not work with them.

Synopsis
Ground employee reported that some personnel are allowed to bypass the temperature check.
**ACN: 1753361**

**Time / Day**

Date : 202007

**Place**

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

**Aircraft**

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase : Taxi

**Person**

Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel : Vehicle Driver
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1753361
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

**Events**

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Other / Unknown
Detector.Person : Ground Personnel
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related

**Narrative: 1**

The company needed to pull record numbers of aircraft out of service because of COVID-19 reduced loads by about XX%. Because of that the towing team has been inundated with work. We have planes parked in remote areas across the entire airport that were not designed for aircraft storage. I could almost justify it if these were one time moves for planes being parked long term, but as it turns out we seem to be rotating about YY% of them in and out of service a couple times a week. The places we are working in do not have lead in lines or stop marks for any of aircraft types so we are forced to use our best judgment on what safe distance is between aircraft, and where to stop them. There is no standard operating procedure on how much space there has to be between aircraft so we are winging it as best we can. Instead of following taxi [lines] or lead in lines that were orchestrated for the safe movement of aircraft, we are having to choose cracks in the
concrete to use as a reference in the hopes that it will give us the clearances that we need to reach our destination safely. We are working shorthanded about ZZ% of the time. I understand the company needs to cut costs. I do find it a bit odd that we do not even have a safety advocate in times like these when we probably need them most. We had one prior to COVID, but [the individual] has since been put back on the team numbers to move planes. We do have safety procedures in place that work really well in conventional times, but nothing we are doing now could be considered conventional. It would be nice to have an advocate we could turn to for advice and concerns.

The warning system is in place in all our tugs and are always used by the drivers and observers, but with our increased workloads we are using setup crews to help reduce the time it takes for each move and they don't have the warning systems at their disposal until the aircraft has arrived.

**Synopsis**

Ground employee reported large numbers of aircraft are being moved in and out of storage without proper procedures in place.
ACN: 1753360

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: GPS
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Parked
Route In Use: Direct

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 1280
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 22
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 1280
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1753360
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result. General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Two passengers were non-compliant with the face mask policy. When approached by one of my FA's, they verbally abused the FA and shouted obscenities. FA briefed me on the incident. I had a Supervisor get involved, and although the family promised they would be compliant with the face mask policy, the flight attendants were adamant that the verbal abuse would continue. I elected not to take [the] incident airborne, so I had them removed from the aircraft. The FA's informed me that several passengers in that area were thankful the issue was being addressed and that passengers were removed.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported two passengers became verbally abusive to the flight attendants when they were asked to follow face mask policy.
ACN: 1753326

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1753326
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Descending into ZZZ, the Controller was very difficult to understand. It sounded like he was wearing a mask while attempting to communicate. Every instruction we were given I had to verify. Some instructions were more or less difficult to decipher than others. Due to the divisiveness associated with the mask issue, I chose not to remark on the radio about not being able to clearly understand all of the instructions. I simply verified each instruction while clearly annunciating.

Inability to understand ATC instructions appears to be a Safety threat. I have no way of knowing if the Controller was wearing a mask or not, but all other transmissions from other aircraft and other Controllers were clear. I have heard that controllers may begin to wear them, but that is unverified. In the event that this is the case it presented a clear barrier to communication, which seems to pose a significant Safety threat.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported difficulty understanding ATC instructions possibly due to the Controller wearing a face mask.
ACN: 1753255

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi
Flight Phase: Parked
Route In Use: Direct

Component
Aircraft Component: Door Warning System
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753255
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
We waited over 35 minutes for an aircraft swap due to a broken lavatory. Once we got a new aircraft, the cabin was very hot. We took several minutes to let the aircraft cool with the APU. My first flight with the FO. I had been off for two weeks (due to COVID), so I took some time to get all set up and start with solid Crew Briefings for FAs and FO. During pushback, FA called to say the banner on the aft door snap was broken. She told me that it was no big deal right now and I assumed I could look at it upon arrival into ZZZ1.

The aircraft was terminating in ZZZ1. During the flight after thinking more about it, the item should have been resolved in ZZZ. I believe the long delay for Maintenance (swapping aircraft) led to the push to get the aircraft to ZZZ1. Upon arrival, after looking at the aft door, we noticed that the lower snap had been installed on the wrong side. I called Maintenance Control and we coordinated Contract Maintenance with ZZZ1 Ground operations.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported departing with an inoperative safety item that should have been inspected by maintenance prior to departure.
**ACN: 1753211**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 2300

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Other
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling: Single Value: 10000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Personal
- Route In Use: None
- Airspace: Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Other
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Flight Engineer
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 21711
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 8
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 480
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1753211
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
When Detected. Other
Result. General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
Due to pilot oversight, my VFR transponder certification went overdue. The aircraft was not operated within Class B airspace and never entered within the 30 NM veil surrounding any Class B airport. Additionally, non-towered airports were transited during this period. The oversight occurred during the Corona virus COVID-19 lock down. I have instituted a tracking system which will help me to better track future mandatory inspections.

Synopsis
Pilot reported VFR transponder certification went overdue due to COVID-19 lockdown.
ACN: 1753200

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1520
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 14
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 230
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753200
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

ZZZ airport is currently undergoing major construction, with numerous runway and taxiway closures. ZZZ has multiple intersecting runways and a high historical instance of runway incursions.

Additionally, Tower hours of operation and staffing are reduced due to COVID-19. Tower closes at XA:00 local time, fairly early for summer operations. With tower closed airspace reverts from Class D to Class G.

ZZZ has 4 runways XXL/R, YYL/R, ZZL/R and AAL/R. Runways XX which are the prevailing wind runways are right pattern for XXR and left pattern for XXL. There is a note in the Chart Supplement that closes all runways except YYL / XXR when Tower closed and changes the pattern direction from right traffic to left traffic for Runway XXR.

On the day of the flight I spent extra time reviewing NOTAMs for the airport given the construction and Tower closure (Class G operations were in effect during my flight a little after XA00). I was planning a short flight, but spent a good bit of time familiarizing myself with alternative taxi routes, self announce procedures, no-tower operations, etc.

The startup, taxi, runup and takeoff from XXR were normal. Unfortunately I had missed the note about the change of pattern direction and planned a right downwind departure more in line with my departure direction (vs. left pattern operations prescribed after Tower closure). There were no other aircraft in the pattern and the departure was normal otherwise.

Upon return for landing, there was one additional aircraft in the pattern using left traffic for XXR. I queried them about the pattern direction and they mentioned the left traffic for XXR after Tower closure. I made several landings in the pattern using left traffic on XXR and the remainder of the flight, landing and taxi back was normal.

After shut down, I pulled out the chart supplement and found the note about the left traffic after Tower closure.

Contributing to my error were the following:

*Complacency with home airport. I have been flying out of this airport and instructing for XY+years and thus felt familiar with all the notes about the airport.

*Lack of recency with non-towered operations at the home airport. It had been probably X+ years since conducting night operations at the field when the Tower was closed and the single runway and revised traffic pattern were in effect.

*Delays in my arrival to the airport before the flight and aircraft departure created an expectation bias that I was going to conduct the flight during tower operating hours and thus prevented me from thinking through all the implications of non-towered operations in the middle of the day.
Lessons learned.
* Conduct a periodic review of home airport chart supplement for any possible changes over the years or just as a refresher. This goes for airports that I often visit and feel comfortable.

* Add a thorough review of the chart supplement notes in addition to NOTAMS when operations are "out of the ordinary"

* Include chart supplement in the loop with foreflight review. The change of pattern direction note is either not in foreflight or not easily found.

Synopsis
Pilot reported flying the approach traffic pattern in the wrong direction after Tower had closed.
ACN: 1753198

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 4
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Turbulence
- Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling.Single Value: 12000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ
- Airspace.Special Use: XXXX

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 2
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 322
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753198
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While on climbout from ZZZ, I activated the autopilot at about 2.2 nm from ZZZ by pushing the reverse course and uploading it to the GNS-530. The autopilot engaged and then turned the plane from the runway heading of 260 to a heading of 217 to intercept the course at heading of 241. When the autopilot turned to course 241 I was at about 3,000 feet MSL and was entering R-XXXX. About 30 seconds later I realized my that I was in R-XXXX and took action to climbout of R-XXXX to the min altitude of 3,999 feel MSL. I was able to climb above 4,000 feet in about 30 seconds and climbed out the R-2XXXX. During this time I was still on ZZZ UNICOM. I was not able to communicate with ZZZ TRACON well past R-XXXX. I do not know if R-XXXX was active when I flew through it...and I did not ask ATC when I received flight following to ZZZ1 a few minutes later.

This violation of airspace was caused by two actions:
1- On my flight out, I used a feature of Foreflight to plot out the procedure to enter the traffic pattern on Runway XX. When Foreflight plotted this course out it went around R-XXXX. When I reversed the course to take me back to ZZZ1, Foreflight plotted me directly through R-XXXX. My failure to fully understand how the software works and making an assumption that it would take me back on the same course around R-XXXX was an error in my judgment.
2- My lack of situational awareness played a large part in this. During the climbout the air was turbulent and I was getting bumped around a bit. This in combination with trying to change the radio to ZZZ TRACON, I lost track of where I was at and made assumptions about where I was flying. I fell into the trap of trusting the autopilot but not verifying where it was going.

My lessons learned for this flight are as follows:
1- When plotting a return course, do not attempt to do it in the air, take 5 minutes and do it on the ground verifying that the course is what I expect and does not take me where I am not supposed to be. In other words, slow down for I was trying to get back to the airport at a certain time to meet someone...I should have kept them waiting 5 minutes as I did a proper flight plan home.
2- I have not been flying a lot in the last 6 month (COVID-19 has seen to that) and I was feeling a little behind the plane on this flight. I should have brought a CFI or a safety pilot with me to check me and help me regain my proficiency.

Synopsis
Pilot reported entering restricted airspace and referenced lack of flying as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1753148

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753148
Human Factors: Troubleshooting

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
A couple along with their lap child got on the plane toward the end of boarding. Their assigned seats were X1 and X3. They wanted to sit together and they asked the man in X4 if he would be willing to switch but he said no. I talked to the gate agent and asked if Y3
was still being blocked off for social distancing. The gate agent said that it was blocked off. The man in Y4 said he was willing to switch but I informed everyone about the seat being blocked and Passenger X got argumentative with me asking why they couldn't move. I apologized and told them that it was blocked for social distancing for the flight attendants. He got upset and asked me for my name. In flight he was busy with the lap child so I gave his wife my name and employee number. About halfway through the flight they both had their masks off and they were not eating or drinking anything. I had my B Flight Attendant tell them to put their masks on because they didn't have an issue with her. Passenger X informed her that his broke so she gave him a replacement.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger became argumentative when told they could not switch seats due to social distancing.
ACN: 1753103

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1753103
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
At level cruise we received a call from our #1 FA that we had an incident in the cabin with a non-compliant passenger. The passenger had a coach seat assignment but had taken a seat in a main cabin extra row. Our #1 FA asked him to move back into an unoccupied
seat a few rows back. The passenger got verbally abusive and made physical threats peppered with loud obscene language. Our FAs did not feel safe and specifically because of the physical threats.

Over the years I have learned to trust our FAs when it comes to passenger relations. Every time they've flagged a passenger as a potential problem they are almost always correct and the passenger becomes a worse problem airborne. Flying during the COVID pandemic has been stressful, and I believe that may have been a factor. Interacting with masked people is a barrier to clear communication and misunderstandings can easily flare up into confrontations. That being said, our co-workers deserve to be treated with respect and verbal/physical threats will not be tolerated.

We have a lot more new customers flying these days due to the decreased fare prices. Customers who have never flown before are unfamiliar with societal rules we crew members take for granted. This can lead to misunderstandings and inappropriate confrontations. Perhaps a simple video guide for new customers to watch before boarding would address passenger expectations? As a long time airline employee it can be difficult to remember how strange the airport/airline environment is to new customers. We should welcome new customers and accommodate their need for information to manage their expectations.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported having non-compliant passenger.
ACN: 1753101

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1753101
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
At the gate in ZZZ, a Flight Attendant comes up and tells me about a passenger issue regarding a passenger who wasn’t wearing a mask. Evidently this passenger had been flagged for noncompliance with the mask policy on a previous flight. The Supervisor came and told me that she had counseled the passenger and boarded her. I saw the passenger board without her mask and pointed it out to the Supervisor. The Supervisor turned and reminded the passenger again that her mask needs to be in place. The passenger complied. I asked the Supervisor what her gut level feeling was and she answered that she thought the passenger could be a problem. I asked why are we boarding her then? At that point, a Flight Attendant went back and had a discreet discussion with the passenger, advising her that we were ok with her flying, but only if she wore her mask. She complied and slept most of the way to ZZZ1. We did depart one minute late, and the delay message referenced our needing to deal with this passenger.

Two other people were also non compliant. A couple boarded with masks pulled down and while carrying coffee cups. The man asserted that he knew airline policy and if he was drinking, he was exempt from mask usage. The Flight Attendant told him that it’s only for active drinking, not just holding the cup. Initially, he was dismissive of her instructions, but eventually he and his companion did put their masks up. By the end of the flight, he and the Flight Attendant had a respectful discussion about the policy.

The Supervisor knew the first passenger had caused trouble yet boarded her anyway. Certainly the agent saw the other couple board while not complying with the mask policy. I feel there still isn’t enough specific guidance on mask usage.

The airline needs to be very specific with passenger expectations regarding mask usage. It’s a hot button issue and it creates division among the other (compliant) passengers which could lead to an inflight altercation and diversion. The mask policy is also creating a lot of chances for passengers’ noncompliance with crew member instructions. People look for loopholes. The airline needs to be very blunt and specific, vs leaving it to the cabin crew to play the role of babysitter. It distracts from their primary safety role.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier pilot reported being advised about a possible non-compliant passenger regarding mask wear.
ACN: 1753069

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 33000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Light Transport
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 4.5
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1753069
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X was given a descent to FL330. After switching the aircraft to sector XY I observed the datablock display altitudes below 330. Upon calling the Controller, they stated that they were unsure of what the aircraft was doing. Subsequently, I called sector YY that had previously approved a point out on the aircraft and received approval for control for lower. I believe the pilot gave me a good readback.

I am unsure of whether I was wearing a mask at the time or not as activity in the area fluctuates, and social distancing cannot be maintained, my mask comes and goes. It is plausible that I was wearing a mask at the time. Despite, what I felt was a good readback, I could foresee my words being muffled due to wearing a mask. Therefore, it is possible that a pilot could mishear what I said.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller reported an altitude excursion and referenced wearing a mask may have muffled the transmission.
**ACN: 1753022**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Check Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 16000
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 180
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 7850
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1753022
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
After transfer of control between Ramp and Ground, we were instructed to taxi Runway XXR via [X,Y,Z,] cross Runway XYR and hold short of Runway XXR. Aircraft Z was taxiing into the ramp at [XY] and behind him Aircraft Y was taxiing on [Y], neither we nor the Aircraft Y received instructions on who would be following who, and we had a converging course on the intersection of taxiways [X] and [Y]. After the Aircraft Y asked ATC if he was supposed to give way to us, the Controller stated "I didn't suppose it was going to be a factor." Both aircraft continued with our taxi without further inconvenience. The situation may have arisen because of the low level volume of operations due to the COVID-19 pandemics creating overconfidence, which might be a factor reducing the level of awareness of all people involved, further increased by multitasking (eg. ATC working as both Ground and Tower) at otherwise very busy airports.

Synopsis
Air carrier pilot reported experiencing a ground conflict and cited reduced level of awareness due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
**ACN: 1753000**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1753000

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Passenger
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

We had an Unaccompanied Minor (UM), on the descent, minor proceeds to tell FA B that Mom has COVID and that's why minor is on the way to ZZZ to stay with family. Both FA's were assisting minor plus a passenger sitting across. This child could possibly be a carrier.

**Synopsis**
Flight Attendant was told by an unaccompanied minor that the child's mother had COVID-19 and the child was on the way to stay with family.
ACN: 1752999

Time / Day

Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752999
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Passenger
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Half way through the flight passenger in XX stated loudly to me that she was high risk and upset with XY & XZ and YX & YY for not wearing their masks. I told XX that I am here to monitor and reiterate but they’re also allowed to have the mask off when they are eating and drinking. All 4 of them had just gotten their snacks and drinks and were eating/drinking, but she continued to loudly say that they weren’t actively doing so. I told her I’d reiterate it to them and as I was, she yelled at them to have it over their nose and mouth. I offered her to sit in ZX or row XX as those were the only open seats and she denied and also didn’t like my distance between her and I. Afterwards I offered her another mask which she didn't use, and several times she took her own mask off to do whatever she needed to do at the time. I apologized and the other passengers complied after I asked them to.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger complained because other passengers were not wearing a mask while they were eating a snack.
ACN: 1752991

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752991
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Passenger in XXY was not wearing a mask. After asking her to put a mask on, she told me she would not be wearing a mask due to medical issues. There was not any information on my records concerning her. When CSA agent came to the aircraft, I asked her if she had had a conversation with above mentioned passenger about wearing a mask. She said, "No." I told her about my conversation with passenger. She called her Supervisor who told her to enter the information in the computer. There was XX passengers on board. No social distancing. Back of plane was packed. So, here we were with no options and an unsafe situation. Policy is for crew and passengers to wear a mask. Why isn't it reinforced with passengers? I felt bad for everyone around her. Such a conflict of conviction! Either Airline wants to be safe or not. But, don't make a policy that effects people's health and then don't enforce it. The result could be staggering.

If policies are to keep people safe, then enforce it!

**Synopsis**

Flight attendants reported a passenger not wearing a mask due to a reported medical condition.
**ACN: 1752989**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752989
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: Pre-flight
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Guests in XX and XY and XZ [seats] were complaining about the seats they were assigned, due to social distancing and weight and balance purposes. I was unable to move them to accommodate the need to sit together. I compensated them for the seat change that occurred when their other flight was canceled but there was still an issue. I understood their frustration and explained why but the Guests were rude continually.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendants reported 3 guests were unhappy with seating arrangements.
**ACN: 1752986**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Takeoff
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Cabin Activity: Deplaning
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752986
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: In-flight
- When Detected: Pre-flight
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passenger in seat (4X) giving passengers in seat 5Y and 5Z a hard time, because they were trying to tell him that he had to keep his mask on. So he started giving them a hard time as I was doing my safety demo. Once I finished my demo I went to passenger and told him line by line airlines mask policy. He nodded and put his mask on. Then once we pushed back from the gate passenger 4X proceeded to get on his phone and start having a conversation. I walked over to him and stated he must comply with Airline and FAA’s policy or we will go back to the gate. He then got off the phone and proceeded to put his mask back on.
Then while inflight after finishing the snack service, while not eating or drinking passenger 4X takes his mask off and starts sneezing. There’s passengers seated across, behind, and in front of him just shaking their heads. I then inform the Captain and First Officer of the situation. So I then proceed to go over to passenger 4X and politely tell give him "This is a warning that if he doesn’t comply, I will have to inform my Captain and the Captain is going to inform the agents once we arrive into ZZZ1. So I ask him, "What's it going to be?" Passenger 4X states he'll put his mask back on. I inform the Captain and he states okay, keep me posted. Then about 25 minutes later as I'm doing another trash run through the cabin, passenger 4X is asleep without his mask on. I gently nudge him and tell him to put his mask back on and he does so. I inform the Captain on what just took place and the Captain states he'll talk to him as we deplane in ZZZ1. Once we land, I inform the gate agent in ZZZ1 about passenger 4X. Gate agent states she'll let her Supervisor know, also gave her (witness) his number if she needs to speak to someone. Also as we deplaned, passenger in 4Y, who sat across from passenger (4X), stated passenger 4X should not be flying since he can't comply with the mask policy.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported a passenger had to be continuously reminded to wear a mask.
ACN: 1752942

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 800

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752942
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1752956
Human Factors: Distraction

Events

Anomaly: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Result: Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1

On final approach for XXR into ZZZ, Tower advised of traffic off our left. The traffic could not be visually identified. The traffic appeared to be operating in Class B airspace but was not on frequency with Tower. As we descended on short final we received two traffic advisories. At approximately 800 feet AGL we received a resolution advisory instructing us to climb. The Captain was PF and I was PM. The Captain initiated a climb to resolve the conflict. After the climb was initiated a stabilized approach to a landing in the touchdown zone was no longer assured. At that point the safest course of action was to execute a missed approach and the Captain proceeded to do so. We executed the missed in compliance with ATC instruction and landed uneventfully on the next attempt. Lately I have noticed an increase in small single engine GA aircraft doing landings and pattern work at ZZZ and transiting the Class B airspace. With the drastic decrease in fuel prices and lower 121 traffic volume in and around ZZZ it seems there has been a corresponding increase in small aircraft.

Narrative: 2

I was the Captain on Aircraft X from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. We were on a visual approach to runway XXL. Descending through about 2,000 feet Tower gave us a traffic alert regarding Aircraft Y that was over the shoreline heading towards us but was not talking to Tower. Immediately following that statement from tower we got the "TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC" alert from the TCAS. We made the final step in configuring for landing, descended below 1,000 feet, got the 1,000 foot chime and almost immediately got another "TRAFFIC" alert from the TCAS. Shortly after, we received a Climb RA at about 800 feet, but neither me or my First Officer had had the traffic in sight so I elected to execute a missed approach instead of trying to salvage the visual following an RA. We got vectored around and landed safely with no further incident.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported being on final to a Class Bravo airport and having to go-around due to a small aircraft that was not talking to Tower, which caused the airborne conflict.
ACN: 1752939

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752939

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Maintenance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: Maintenance Action
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Aircraft: Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
Operated Aircraft X. During the preflight exterior inspection of the aircraft I noticed some temporary repairs were made to some delamination in the area of the ADG door. I noticed aluminum "speed tape" was applied to the area of the ADG door and the speed tape had been applied so that the door would not be unobstructed from opening. The door was taped over so that it may have been prevented from opening up successfully. I notified Maintenance Control. Contract maintenance was brought to the plane and reapplied the tape so that it wouldn't tape over the door. The Flight was then signed off and flown to ZZZ1 without issue.

Improper maintenance procedures were performed on this aircraft day(s) earlier that allowed the ADG door to be taped over. Not only was the aircraft returned to service and operated an unknown amount of flights with improper maintenance performed, it also went undetected by at least one flight crew who flew this aircraft to ZZZ the night before.

This situation was a safety issue that needed to be fixed before departure. Adding to the stress of managing this event in terms of coordination, making announcements, continuing to contact Dispatch and keep everyone informed, Duty Pilot and ZZZ2 Chief Pilot decided to try and intervene and force me to board the aircraft before Maintenance had arrived. I made the Pilot in Command decision to hold boarding the aircraft until Maintenance had arrived because I know it wouldn't take long to board, and COVID-19 concerns with keeping people confined to an aircraft longer than necessary. We knew we weren't departing immediately and there was no sense in boarding an aircraft in the middle of summer in the south with a pandemic going on until I knew when we would be able to depart. It was distracting to my duties as PIC to have management continuously interrupting my situation and duties with their concerns. That's not the time and place for those to be brought up. Pushing captains against their PIC decisions when they're making sound decisions in the interest of safety and health should be addressed as well as the maintenance repair issues.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported questionable maintenance procedures regarding the temporary repair of delamination in the area of the ADG door.
ACN: 1752858

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 615
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 77
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 615
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1752858

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Advised in cruise by flight attendant, that the passengers seated in XX A&B became abusive to flight attendants after they were advised to comply with face mask requirements. Upon arrival 3 CSR supervisors met aircraft.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported two passengers were abusive to flight attendants after they were reminded of mask requirements.
ACN: 1752839

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTC
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 30000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ. ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 9
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1752839
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Working sectors XX/YY/ZZ combined with D-side. Cleared Aircraft X to cross 30 miles west of ZZZ at FL310. Thought I had an accurate readback. I have not checked the recording yet. There was some frequency congestion with weather deviations and multiple frequencies. Aircraft X later descended below FL310, when I queried the pilot he thought he had been cleared to FL300, and thought that he had read that back. With the addition of a D-side, and the new requirement to wear a mask we are not able to social distance 6+ feet, I was required to in this case. I fully support the safety measures, and appreciate the effort. I don't know if wearing the mask also caused confusion in delivering the clearances (muffled sound, etc.)?

Staff a full time Supervisor (FLM) rather than a CIC. Open sector(s) more frequently if needed. With the new mask mandate, perhaps opening sector(s) as opposed to staffing D-sides may allow clear communication without a needed mask. On the other hand, one bad sneeze can really carry throughout the area, masks would most likely help reduce virus exposure under any of these circumstances, and a common mandate does help keep all under the same safety standard.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller reported an aircraft descended below what the Controller thought was the assigned altitude.
ACN: 1752803

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1800

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1.6
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 51
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 51
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752803
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken
**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

**Narrative: 1**

I conducted a demonstration flight leaving ZZZ (home base) northbound for a scenic tour.

I checked for TFRs on tfr.faa.gov and weather pertaining to my route of flight and timing, I did not notice anything unusual.

While above a field I noticed the lights were on but the field was empty. I was approximately 1,800 feet MSL.

Upon landing, I checked the field's website and noticed a game took place that evening. I am concerned that even though the venue did not have near 30,000 people present as a result of the COVID pandemic, the TFR was still in effect. I may have conflated a venue capacity of 30,000 people with 30,000 people present at the venue, a very distinct difference that could be a point of confusion for other pilots during the COVID pandemic.

My preflight action going forward will include a review of all major venues and scheduled events along my route of flight should I not be in contact with an Air Traffic Control Facility.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported flying over a sporting event during a game and wondered if they had violated a TFR.
ACN: 1752733

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Lead Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752733
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: MEL
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
I filed a report recently about this very same situation. The hangar is ignoring the pitot tube cover policy on aircraft that are on the ground for more than 48 hours. Today, aircraft came to the line for trip X. Aircraft had been here since [date]. My Supervisor
called the hangar at approximately XA:00 to inform the hangar that the pitot inspection was required since they failed to follow procedures. The aircraft was released for service anyway and sent to the line with a violation they were made aware of.

This keeps happening because the hangar managers keep failing to follow procedures. Have the hangar managers and supervisors ensure the pitot cover policy is being complied with.

Synopsis

Maintenance Technician reported problems with other technicians not following the correct company policy for aircraft checks.
Narrative: 1

Passenger was asked several times to wear the face mask that was hanging around his neck. He then showed me the back of his ears that were irritated by the elastic from the mask. I then asked him if he had a scarf. He said, "No." I asked him if he had a shield. He said, "No." I then told him that I would get him a mask that would not irritate the back of his ears. I brought him the N95/type mask and explained how to wear it. He still would not wear it. Two other crew members then went up to him and demonstrated how to wear the N95/type mask. He still would not wear it. He had a different story for any and everyone who asked him to wear the mask. He then puts on the original mask as he deplanes.
Synopsis

Flight attendant reported a passenger had to be continuously reminded to wear a mask.
**Time / Day**

Date: 202007  
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference: US  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat  
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752712  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant  
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

**Events**

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant  
When Detected: Pre-flight  
When Detected: In-flight  
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative:** 1
Flight Attendant refused to sit in assigned jumpseat, said she didn’t want to face passengers, chose to sit it in aft facing jumpseat for taxi takeoff and landing. I tried to explain that you have to sit in assigned seat and why. After landing I explained I’d have to do a report, she started screaming and talking over me that I should go home and if this bothered me I should see a doctor for help. Several times I tried to explain to no avail. Flight Attendant also wore headsets for takeoff and landing.

This Flight Attendant needs training to know why it’s important to sit in assigned jump seats.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported another flight attendant did not sit in the assigned jumpseat.
ACN: 1752706

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1752706
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
During boarding, FA B did not feel safe having a guest seated close to them in XXD. FA B asked guest to move across to XXC or B. Guest refused. FA informed the rest of the crew to the situation, and we called a CSA down to re-seat the guest. Guest refused to change seats, even for a free upgrade to premium, and started acting harshly toward FA B, and CSA. He sprawled out in his seat, and would not listen to any explanation given by the crew or CSA. At that point, his cooperation with the exit row duties came into question, and with guests behind him growing restless and more aware, the CSA made the decision to remove him from the flight. Unless the flight is full, please block seats XXDEF on the aircraft. It is not safe for either guest or crew member to sit directly across from each other, less than 6 feet apart.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendant reported they asked a passenger to move to an upgraded seat for social distancing purposes, but the passenger refused.
ACN: 1752705

Time / Day

Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752705
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy
**Narrative: 1**

Passenger came on the plane with mask but then when he was seated he took it off. I made an announcement about airline policy to wear a mask on the plane. Passenger didn't comply, I went over and asked him why he wasn't wearing a mask, he said that he had a medical condition and that he didn't have to. I looked at the manifest on my device, there was no notification about his medical condition. I asked him if he notified our gate agent and he said he talked to them about it, and they said it was OK. When the gate agent came on board I asked her to go talk to the passenger, because she said that no one talked to her about any medical conditions. After gate agent spoke to passenger, she got back to us and said that he claims that he has a medical condition, and that he might have talk to someone about it but it wasn't her. She said that she will make a note about this passengers situation.

Can we please make it clear to the passengers about providing medical documents to gate agents. This is frustrating for flight attendants because we can't force someone to wear a face masks, and we can't take them off flights because he claims he has a medical condition and he can claim discrimination. I don't know if this passenger has a medical condition or not but there needs to be something done to help flight attendants and gate agents to our job and help our passengers.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendant reported a passenger was not wearing a COVID-19 mask because he stated that he had a medical condition, but was unable to provide any documentation.
ACN: 1752691

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Other

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1752691
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1752695
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Repeatedly asked passenger seated in XX to wear mask during boarding process and in flight. Said he did not have to wear it during last couple reminders because he had a package of candy and a power aid bottle next to him and the "eating or drinking" rule applied, even though when asked to wear his mask he was neither eating or drinking. No action was taken because this was a short flight and did not feel comfortable since he was claiming to be eating and drinking the entire time.

Narrative: 2
Passenger walked on without a mask and continually had to be asked to put it on. This occurred during boarding, during flight and final approach. Both flight attendants asked him to comply, he stated he was eating. He was not eating at any time we asked him for compliance. No action was taken due to nature of short flight and he claimed to be eating and drinking.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported confusion about airline policy relating to the face mask policy.
ACN: 1752685

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752685
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
During boarding passengers (Seated in XXA and XXB) were not wearing masks, I advised them to please put their masks on. After the safety demonstration as I am doing compliance checks on the way to my aft jumpseat I notice that XXB has his mask pulled beneath his nose and mouth and resting on his chin. I advise him to please pull his mask up over his nose and mouth and he rolled his eyes and looked away without adjusting his mask. I tell him again, "Sir, please pull your mask over your nose and mouth." He gets very irritated and yells out "I can't breathe!" I apologize and stated that it is a requirement to fly and it is for the safety of everyone on board. He finally adjusts his mask. As we reach cruising altitude I am handing out the snack bags and the couple seated across from him in XX C,D, ask me if I could please move them. I tell them they are welcome to move up to row YY and they thank me profusely and told me that as soon as I walk away XXB removes his face mask and they do not feel comfortable sitting near him. For the remainder of the flight XXB held his face in his hands hunched over whenever I passed through in the aisle so I could not visually confirm that he kept his mask on properly.

Passengers XX B and XX A kept removing their face masks and became agitated when I informed them it was airline policy to keep them on.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported two passengers not wearing COVID-19 masks during the flight.
ACN: 1752679

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1752679
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown: Party 1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown: Party 2: Other

Events
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Other
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I am concerned that in previous report responses from airline, they said the policy to relay information and not enforce was not in any airline curriculum and in reviewing the mask policy I was reading the safety message and in this document [the] airline printed that your role is to relay the policy information, not enforce compliance. Why is this in a safety message if it isn't in the Airline's curriculum?

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported confusion about airline policy relating to the face mask policy.
### Narrative: 1

We were doing our pre-flight checks and an agent comes on and alerts us that there was a customer that was a problem on his last flight and was giving the agents a hard time about not wearing a mask. They said they were going to call the lead (not sure of title) I
asked that she call the X Department and let them deal with the customer. The X Department did deal with him and then came and talked to the crew. The entire crew including the cockpit were present. She let us know that he didn't want any trouble and his first reason for not wearing a mask were his beliefs, she let him know it wasn't about his beliefs but it was Company policy and then he claimed to have a medical issue, he said he would wear a mask as much as he could. We start boarding and towards the end of boarding a passenger stopped me to alert me that his son [person discussion above is about] left his passport on a previous flight and was being driven back to our flight. [Person] boards and we depart, after takeoff he takes his shoes and socks off and sticks them in the middle of the aisle and another passenger coming down the aisle almost tripped over them he finally moved them. His behavior was very odd and he didn't wear a mask most of the flight and we didn't approach him due to the issue with the X Department. The woman in XXA was not happy and bothered by the non masked customer. We talked to her after landing and we compensated her on the flight.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported being advised about a troublesome passenger before the flight and stated the passenger refused to wear a mask claiming a medical condition.
Found out that there were flights scheduled to depart in less than 2 hours that the flight releases had not been done because the flights had never been assigned to a Dispatcher. Turns out there were at least 6 flights that were never assigned to anyone. The 4 that I wound up with were all scheduled to depart at the same time (XC00z) found out about the first of four at XA13z and last of four at XA41z (less than required 1hr25min departure time to have issued a release). This is unacceptable, disruptive and a safety issue. Since we are now under added pressure, because the various ramps and flight crews are looking for a release which we haven't done since we did not know we had these flights. These were all ad hoc flights which evidently had been built at least two shifts prior. Fortunately there was no weather/ATC/MEL issues of great significance to contend with, otherwise this poor situation we were forced into could have been much worse.

This was caused by at least two people not following through on their job duties. It is my understanding that the managers are supposed to make sure all flights are assigned to the
appropriate dispatchers and also make sure work load is dispersed evenly. The flights in question were charter flights, since the onset of COVID day in and day out there have been charters added, today’s scenario is not new and is happening repeatedly with dispatchers being blindsided by extra flight releases to do that were never assigned to anyone.

Assign the flights when they are built. And each subsequent shift manager needs to make sure all flights have been assigned.

**Synopsis**
Dispatcher reported release issues relating to flights that are not assigned to Dispatcher in a timely manner. Reporter stated this has been a problem since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1752664

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: FWA.Airport
State Reference: IN
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC/Advisory.Tower: FWA
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752664
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

During the takeoff roll, ATC was issuing a full route clearance to another airplane on another frequency. This clearance was being read throughout the entire takeoff roll, rotation and bringing the gear up. It made communicating between the FO and I challenging and created an unsafe situation. FWA Tower has done this 3-4 times over the course of the month I have been flying out of FWA, it needs to stop. Had something gone wrong during the takeoff roll, it would have complicated the issue dramatically. Normal communications that occur during the takeoff roll are short and do not make communications in the cockpit challenging.

ATC issuing a full route clearance on the tower frequency when there is no need to do that. There is a specific Clearance Frequency at this airport as well as a Ground Frequency that can be used. They should be required to use one of those frequencies.

This could have been avoided by ATC not issuing a clearance on the Tower Frequency.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported that during their takeoff roll, FWA ATC Tower gave a full clearance routing to another aircraft. The Captain described concerns with the high level of distraction created during a critical phase.
**ACN: 1752590**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: AGL. Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Route In Use: Direct

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1752590
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Dispatch
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred: All Types
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**
I've noticed a trend the last few months of being dispatched with minimum fuel loads. This previous X policy disappeared but a recent conversation with a Dispatcher confirmed it's back. Calling Dispatch for "additional fuel" to meet safety margins has been rare the past few years, but it looks as though the need has returned. According to the Dispatcher I spoke with today, when asked if they (dispatchers) are being pressured to Dispatch with minimum release fuel, his response was; "...well, they don't pressure us, but they do mention it a lot 'cause we're losing money." Perhaps an email for those new captains who have yet to work under such policies might be appropriate.

Cause - Cost cutting pressure from management.

Suggestions - Return to policies based on safety, not earnings.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported a recent trend of being dispatched with minimum fuel loads.
**ACN: 1752579**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference
  - ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 10000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Nav In Use: Localizer/Glideslope/ILS: XXR
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Direct
- Route In Use: SID: ZZZZZ3
- Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1752579
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1752581
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were cleared direct ZZZZZ and the ZZZZZ3 STAR arrival at ZZZ. Quiet cockpit as we descended, Approach Control was very busy working two radios and had weather affecting departures. Passing 10,000 feet we got a call on guard asking us to contact Approach on a different frequency. The new Controller asked why we did not switch frequencies sooner. We replied that we had not heard our call sign previously and the other Controller was working two frequencies. Approach Control then asked which runway we expected. We told Controller XXL. Upon landing we were told to call TRACON. TRACON told me no traffic separation problem had occurred. TRACON asked me if we had been assigned Runway XX left or right. I told Controller I believe we were told to expect XXL but had not been assigned a runway by the first Controller. We landed uneventfully.

Cause - ATC was working departures around weather and arrivals on two frequencies. TRACON informed me they were short staffed because of COVID. We the aircrew failed to query ATC to get assigned a landing runway which would affect the STAR.

Suggestions - Increased involvement by ATC and aircrew is needed during manning shortfalls and a rapidly changing environment

Narrative: 2
[Report contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a communication issues with TRACON Control during arrival. TRACON was working departures and arrivals on two frequencies. ATC informed the crew they were short staffed due to COVID-19.
**ACN: 1752555**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: FO

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace.Class A: ZZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752555
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Diverted
- Result.Aircraft: Aircraft Damaged

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Chart Or Publication
Primary Problem: Aircraft

**Narrative: 1**

While inflight from ZZZ to ZZZZ, we experienced an aircraft issue. Luckily the issue didn't require an emergency descent with an immediate landing. The Captain and I quickly realized that we only had Jeppesen terminal charts for destination and alternate airports as the company took away all Jeppesen charts outside of the USA in the Jeppesen FD app in the company tablet after COVID-19 started in what we assume was to save money. This is a serious issue that could result in an aircraft accident in an emergency or non-emergency if the flight crew is unable to land the aircraft at the selected airports in Jeppesen before departure. We cannot make changes to the Jeppesen selections enroute.

The company needs to immediately restore Jeppesen FD app terminal chart subscriptions to all countries we fly to on a regular basis, so that we have all available information for safety of flight. We shouldn't ever have to fully rely on a foreign ATC to get us down safely because we could lose communications and thus would be flying blind. Flying without the required charts may be a violation of FAA, ICAO and foreign countries we are flying into or required by an overflight permit. This is a HUGE safety issue that could cause loss of life and loss of equipment resulting in litigation that would be more costly than paying for the subscriptions.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported an aircraft issue during cruise resulted in a diversion. First Officer stated they did not have the correct charts onboard the aircraft due to possible cost saving measures by the airline during the COVID-19 pandemic.
**ACN: 1752546**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Route In Use: Direct
- Route In Use.SID: YYYY
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752546
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: FLC complied w/ Automation / Advisory
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

**Assessments**

- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Departing flight had X passengers on board, very light on takeoff. No issues on departure but it is a fairly aggressive climb on RXXL to ensure altitude crossings are met. No issues on the initial climbout. Late handoff from ZZZ Tower to [Departure Control] while climbing through 4,000'. I began to level off for the initial assigned altitude of 5,000' but failed to adjust/reduce the power setting. This resulted in my inability to smoothly level off at 5,000'. When we contacted [Departure Control] they made a reference to our altitude (not level at 5,000') and told us to continue our climb to 15,000'. No other deviations or issues with the safe execution of the flight.

Cause: Not reducing the power setting with a very light aircraft on initial climb out to ensure a smooth level off at lower assigned altitudes.

Suggestions: Keep in mind aircraft performance given the weather conditions (e.g. heat, humidity, winds) coupled with the aircraft's weight and handling.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported overshooting the assigned altitude during climbout. The pilot described the aircraft's weight as very light due to the small passenger count.
ACN: 1752533

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: GPS
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Route In Use: Direct

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752533
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Taxi
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were in ZZZ. I don't Remember the gate. It was my leg to fly to ZZZ1. We had some weather approaching from the south. Me and the Captain knew it was going to be a quick taxi being we were going to takeoff XXR. So we did preflight check at the gate and then when the flight attendants were ready they closed the flight deck door and then locked it. When the ramp crew was ready we did the push checklist. We started both engines as me and the Captain talked about because of the short taxi. Then we did the taxi check before we moved the aircraft due to the short taxi. We then taxied towards Runway XXR and during that time we did the before takeoff checklist. I'm pretty sure I called the back and told the flight attendants and cabin we were next for takeoff. After going through the checklist and noticed that the flight attendants did not call us. So I called back there to see if they were ready and from what I heard they were. It was not as clear as normal because of the wearing of the mask for COVID. We then closed the before takeoff checklist before departure and was cleared to takeoff. We then arrived at ZZZ1 with no issues. Then we landed and passengers deplaned, someone getting off the plane said something to me but was not able to hear being she was walking and far away with her mask on. Then the forward Flight Attendant came to the front and spoke to the Captain saying they had a passenger was not listening to the rules with the mask compliance. That's all I heard about. We then continued the rest of the trip. Then yesterday, we went ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 had 2 hrs between the next flight so then I went to go get food before everything closed. As I was going back to the gate the Captain told me we were removed from the rest of the pairing because of the other day that the flight attendants were not seated for departure. That was what I heard for the first time and was a little confused because the flight attendants never said anything to me after that flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 the day before.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported taking off with the flight attendants not seated citing a possible misunderstanding because the FA was speaking through a protective mask.
ACN: 1752471

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: No Aircraft
Flight Phase: Other

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Ramp
Function.Ground Personnel: Gate Agent / CSR

ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1752471
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Physiological - Other
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
Detector.Person: Gate Agent / CSR
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
ZZZ break-room not being disinfected and sprayed on a daily basis, as we were told it was going to be. A fellow co-worker has tested positive for COVID and all employees working with this agent have not been properly advised of fellow employee we are working alongside being positive, with symptoms. We had to hear this through the grapevine. And even since agent being confirmed as positive our break-room and back offices have not been properly cleaned.
Synopsis

Airline Ground Agent reported the breakroom is not being sanitized properly for COVID-19.
ACN: 1752406

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 1
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 600

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10

Aircraft : 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Aircraft : 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Aircraft : 3
Reference: Z
ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Aircraft : 4
Reference: A
ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 530
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 70
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 11
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752406
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

**Events**
Anomaly.Conflict: NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal: 500
Miss Distance.Vertical: 200
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

**Narrative: 1**
I was operating in the traffic pattern with a student at the end of a local training flight. The Control Tower was closed and we were announcing our position on CTAF. There were 3 or 4 other aircraft operating in the pattern and we made an entry into the left downwind for XXL. While in the downwind, Aircraft Y called a 5 mile straight in final for XXL. As we began our base to follow Aircraft Y, approximately 2.5 miles out, Aircraft Z called a 6 mile final. We were descending from pattern altitude and made a call that we were on base and following Aircraft Y. We made a call as we were intercepting final, however, Aircraft Z continued and began to overtake us from 200 feet above as we were on an approximately
1 mile final and at 600 feet. I lost sight of Aircraft Z and began an evasive descending left turn which I announced on CTAF. At around the same time, Aircraft Z also made an evasive right 360. We reestablished in the downwind and announced that we would follow Aircraft Z. Once we established adequate separation from Aircraft Z, we began a left base and made an announcement on CTAF, at which point, Aircraft A in the left downwind announced and began base turn inside of us. We once again made an evasive maneuver and re-intercepted final after a 360 turn.

There are a few reasons the problem arose. Firstly, with no Control Tower and multiple airplanes in a closed pattern, the two straight in approaches caused a significant disruption to the flow of traffic. This was further exaggerated by the difference in performance/final approach speed of our aircraft compared to Aircraft Z. Secondly, the temporary shortening of ZZZ’s Tower hours poses a safety risk as the volume of traffic after XA:00 local time would still justify control tower operations. In addition, many of the aircraft that operate out of ZZZ are less familiar with uncontrolled pattern operations and fail to follow prescribed procedures/right of way rules or use good judgment when approaching a busy pattern with multiple aircraft already operating.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported a NMAC with another aircraft while attempting to land at an airport where the tower was closed due to COVID-19 staffing.
ACN: 1752391

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752391
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
Had issues with passenger sitting next to each other and a dirty seat. We were finished boarding so I moved a passenger to row XX, row XX got filled by the agents I told her she could have row XY. Row XY was also filled last minute. I moved her to XA. The seat that was to be blocked was YA. The agents tried saying it had to be moved on the computer
and they wouldn't. I used the service framework to try to make it easier on the guest who had already grabbed all her stuff. The passenger count was submitted correctly and allowed us to move her. This was the best solution to make everyone happy while leaving on time.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported moving a passenger due to a dirty seat and for social distancing.
During boarding for flight, Flight Attendant A called me and asked if I could come talk to the passenger in seat XB. She felt he was possibly intoxicated. I went to XB, he seemed upset and was yelling for another unknown passenger to come sit by him. I asked him if...
he was doing okay, he seemed agitated and upset. He was slurring his speech and had a slight smell of alcohol. He said he was fine but wanted his friend to come sit by him. I asked him if he had been drinking. He replied "I had a big beer but I don't drive so I'm fine." I asked him if he was intoxicated and he replied "I only had a beer." At that point I went to the front of the plane and asked Flight Attendant A if she believed he was intoxicated and she stated that she did feel he was intoxicated and that he had been rude to other guests and was upset he had to wear a mask. At that point with us both agreeing he was intoxicated she informed the Captain that he needed to be removed due to him being intoxicated.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a possibly intoxicated person was removed from flight.
Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752385
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passenger in XX boarded the plane with no mask, but complied once asked. He was rowdy at the beginning of the flight but did not cause any issues until he began throwing almonds at a passenger 2 seats away, when asked to stop he did. He was then asked multiple times through the flight by both FA A & B to put his mask on. He would comply when asked or when we were walking by but would take it off as soon as he thought we could no longer see. I reminded him that it was a policy, he then all at once told me he had some sort of test done and if that wouldn't work what about a medical condition so that he wouldn't haven't to wear the mask. I asked him if he had spoken to a gate agent about it which he threatened me, telling me that I didn't want to go there with him because I wouldn't win. I then decided to call the CA, and informed the passenger that this was not an argument, and that face masks are a policy and that he would be met at the gate.

After deplaning, the group of older and large men that were traveling with the disruptive passenger gathered in the terminal and I felt extremely uncomfortable and unsafe walking by them. They then also got on the same tram as I and were loudly making comments in regards to me asking them to put their face masks on during the flight. In the future I would like to feel safe while doing my job and feel that I am supported for enforcing the companies policies.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger being confrontational about wearing a face mask.
**ACN: 1752380**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752380

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752382

**Person: 3**
- Reference: 3
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752383
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Passenger
Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passenger in XX [seat] was not wearing mask. Every time I walked by to check he was snacking or sipping his water. Passenger in YX pulled me aside to tell me XX wasn't wearing a mask the whole time and was outraged at me for that. He didn't see XX eating or drinking. I got chewed out by YX but there was nothing I could do.

[Suggestion:] Limitations on how long you have to wear face mask.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Narrative: 3
Passenger in XX [seat] was not wearing a mask. Every time I walked by him he was snacking on mini chocolate pieces or sipping his water. I didn't feel like I had the right to tell him to put his mask on because he was snacking or drinking whenever I walked by. During final walk through the passenger in YX grabbed me and took his mask off to tell me how infuriated he was that I wasn't making sure the man in XX was wearing a mask. YX started getting outraged at me when I told him that when I had walked by he had been eating or drinking. YX couldn't see XX eating or drinking. YX told me he was immune compromised and had lung problems. (He took his mask off to talk to me).

Synopsis
Flight Attendants reported a passenger complained that another passenger did not wear a face mask during the flight.
ACN: 1752373

Time / Day
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752373
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Gate Agent / CSR
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: Pre-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We had a passenger come on board with his family. ZZZ CSA [Customer Service Agent] asked if he had a mask at the gate. When she said he needs to wear one. He said "I just
don't want to." CSA explained to the family that he can't fly then. He then said he will wear his mask. I was told all the above information from the CSA in ZZZ. He has not once put on his mask. When we tell him to put on a mask he says "I'm still snacking." As FA B I've been observing and I have yet to see him take a bite of food. He's made his intentions clear that he will not be wearing a mask by him pretending to continue snacking the entire flight. By the middle of the flight he stopped pretending to snack and made it clear he won't be wearing a mask.

I confronted the passenger for the last time. Passenger has been told at least 5 times at this point. I've also made many announcements about the mask policy as well.

I informed him he needs to put on a mask and that it is policy. Also told him that he was aware of the policy when he purchased the ticket. I had to repeat all that multiple times.

He would continue to argue. He said he will not be putting on a mask, that a mask does more harm than good. His wife interrupted and started to argue as well.

At this point I said it is policy and I will be informing the Captain.

I called the Captain and he contacted ZZZ1.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a face mask during the flight.
Gate agent put a passenger in seat XB. When the gate agent boarded the plane to confirm the cabin count with FA B, I discreetly asked her why there was a passenger in XB. She got very befuddled and confused and forgot that she was boarding a [type aircraft]. I told
her that at one time I wanted to put a deadheading pilot in XA, but the gate agent informed me that she would have to write me up for doing that so I politely asked passenger to move back to his assigned seat. Because we were ready to close the door I let the passenger sit in XB, but throughout the flight he lifted his mask above his mouth. He was sniffling and blowing his nose and his mask remained above his mouth.

I'm not sure what should be done. If gate agents have told me they will write me up moving someone to XA, then I suppose this gate agent should be reminded of our policies.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a gate agent put a passenger in a seat which they shouldn't have.
ACN: 1752204

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 34000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 6300
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 25
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752204
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR  
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control  
When Detected : In-flight  
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification  
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On our flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1, we were at a cruising altitude of FL340. With everything slowed down with the pandemic, it was the first flight I had with this particular co-worker in a few months. So naturally we had plenty to chat about enroute. I'm not for sure if we missed a call from ATC, or if we just got out of range before they tried to hand us off, but nonetheless we were unaware we were supposed to be on another frequency. About 100 miles from destination, I asked the SIC to request a lower altitude for our descent into the arrival airport. Upon transmission, we received no response and I immediately went to XYX.Z [frequency], which we had not been monitoring. About a minute after his initial attempt, I heard ATC on XYX.Z calling our tail number with a frequency. We called ATC on the new frequency and were given a lower altitude. Upon readback of the new altitude, ATC asked what was our last assigned frequency. When we gave the Controller the answer, the response was "You have been NORDO for about 150 miles." The remainder of the flight was uneventful with a normal descent and landing into our destination.

We fell into this situation for a few reasons:

-One, we weren't monitoring XYX.Z. If we had been, this most likely wouldn't have happened.

-Second, going out west sometimes there are longer periods of flight without a handoff then going east. Also, with the pandemic and the few flights I have done I have noticed less radio communications in general with fewer aircraft in the air. I let myself fall into the trap of thinking 'well I'm going west and not as many planes' so I didn't feel it to be that unusual that we hadn't directly corresponded with ATC in a while.

-Third, engaging in conversation without occasionally questioning "when was the last time we talked to someone."

I plan to be more aware of communications while enroute and to constantly monitor XYX.Z.

Synopsis

Pilot reported contacting ATC on guard and being advised they were NORDO for 150 miles.
ACN: 1752166

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi
Cabin Lighting: High

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752166
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Other / Unknown
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
When Detected: Routine Inspection
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: Taxi
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy
Narrative: 1

I have observed since the face coverings became mandatory that communication is hampered which presents a safety issue. Anytime an FA makes a PA while wearing the masks it makes it difficult to comprehend what they are saying. Same goes for briefing the OWWE (Overwing Window Exit) or whenever we are trying to communicate with passengers. Communication is an important part of our safety related interactions with passengers and I have seen that this is almost impossible with face coverings. This is not flight specific, but an observation I have made over the last month of regular flying.

Same goes for when the Captain is giving us a pre-flight briefing. If they are wearing a mask it is difficult to understand what they are saying. Not because they can't be heard but because the message comes out muffled.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported communication issues related to wearing a face mask.
ACN: 1752042

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiflengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1752042

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
Taxied onto runway after GA airplane landed, while waiting for them to exit runway our release void time expired. Had to exit runway to call for new release. There were probably
at least 5 GA airplanes in the pattern or on CTAF since Tower was closed. We couldn't reach center on radios so called on phone holding short. Gave us a short release time of about 2 minutes, 39 past the hour. After the last GA plane landed I thought we had time to takeoff so we took the runway to line up. They took a long time exiting runway and our release time passed. Takeoff power was never applied, we exited the runway, taxied back to hold short and called Dispatch and then Center for a new release time.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported missing the IFR release time due to general aviation traffic in the pattern and the Tower being closed.
**ACN: 1751993**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 800

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751993
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
First Officer (FO) Flying. Entered overcast at approximately 800 AFE [Above Field Elevation]. I reached up to turn on engine anti-ice. Received call to contact Departure. As I contacted Departure, I looked at airspeed and FO was rapidly accelerating through 200 KTS. He had not called "Flaps Up' (it was a Flaps 1 takeoff). I stated "Bring your nose up, flaps are coming up now." As I retracted flaps, I stated again, "Bring your nose up, you are still accelerating." Cleaned aircraft up, but shortly after flaps were retracted, got a short duration "Flap Overspeed" ECAM. Debriefed FO on Flap retraction SOPs and limitations. I was definitely distracted looking at anti-ice, temps, and contacting Departure. In that time, I should have been more aware of FO's profile and our airspeed. FO had recently received a company letter and seemed very distracted over the course of the whole 3-day trip. Overspeed max airspeed wasn't noted, but I expect it wasn't more than 5 knots. Entered into AML and ZZZ1 Maintenance performed an inspection and returned the aircraft to service. We flew the aircraft to ZZZ2 shortly after.

FO's distraction with possible furlough, I had just returned from 3 weeks off. 3rd leg of trip and I felt like I was single-pilot for a lot of our trip. I've got to pay more attention to my flying partner when I'm getting task saturated to ensure this doesn't happen again.

Should have discussed departure and cleanup procedure in more detail with FO.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a flap overspeed on departure climbout.
ACN: 1751804

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751804
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: MEL
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Upon checking AML and release it was determined our aircraft required a CAT 2 confidence check. It was also noticed that the aircraft was CAT 2 MEL. As Captain I advised the FO that we would, given the opportunity, perform our visual arrival into ZZZ as if it were a CAT 2 approach. We performed all the required procedures for the CAT 2. All went as planned and our aircraft passed all required pre-testing. The appropriate procedure was then followed to report completion of the required confidence check. It was then that I was advised that our confidence check was not authorized as the aircraft was still under a CAT 2 MEL. I was also advised that the CAT 2 MEL should not have been in place, but had not properly had that MEL removed.

As a result of no associated MEL which would require a CAT 2 MEL, it was believed that it was directly related to a required confidence check. Lots of our aircraft have needed confidence checks to regain currency due to time in storage. I made this assumption incorrectly.

Practicing advanced approaches in conditions not requiring them only helps to build proficiency and confidence. The fact that the plane was not CAT 2 authorized had no effect on our approach as we didn’t need to, nor did we, deviate from anything that would have occurred making any other ILS on Runway XL. In reality, the aircraft tested appropriately and if it hadn't that would have been noted and reported.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported executing a CAT II confidence check approach which was not authorized.
ACN: 1751800

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Ground Personnel: Vehicle Driver
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1751800
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Maintenance: Technician
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1751799
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Ground Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
Detector. Person: Ground Personnel
When Detected: Taxi
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
At approx. XA:09 while monitoring radios to assist if and where needed as ramp was closed due to lightning on or near the field I heard the crew operating PAATS (Park At Any Time System) Truck X declare malfunctioning lights and mis-park of and Aircraft X on Gate X-XX. As this has a protected overhang I proceeded to make my way to verify and assist as I have red tagged this vehicle several times in the past. En-route I verified it was Truck X. Upon arriving to the gate/breezeway/overhang, I observed the crew (super-tug crew also operating PAATS using my assigned equipment for that day repositioning an aircraft to the correct stop mark. One operating the super-tug, one marshaling (in the open) and directed by manager (in the open) or possibly counseling said crew while the ramp is still closed.

This event also exposes several crews to possible unintended COVID exposure. Super-tug X (PAATS X) Crew is X-X break room. Supertug Y (Me and my partner) are Y-XY [room].

Had I not observed the above I would not have known my equipment was used and to disinfect again.

PAATS lights on Truck X have been intermittent and is a known issue. Though [I] was told it was addressed and on my last user check it functioned it seems to have an issue again.

**Narrative: 2**

Approx. XA:10 ramp closed due to lightning. Thunderstorms called for and predicted. No plan to staff PAATS (Park At Any Time System). Call from Operations to close ramps and start parking aircraft. With several gate numbers and aircraft types but no flight numbers tails or relay of information to flight crews of parking assist frequency to make contact.

While Dispatch worked to get second parking assist / APU truck staffed. Management staffed second parking assist / APU with mixed break rooms (COVID precautions).

3 aircraft parked...4th unable due to equipment. Several others missed due to time staffing/communications issues with making contact to flight crews.

**Synopsis**

Ground employees reported supertug parking aircraft issues and combining separate parking crews, which undermines current COVID-19 policies.
Aircraft X was placed in short term storage on [date]. The step in Job Card XX to disconnect the main batteries was accomplished/stamped off, but not documented in the AML as required. The same day, 2hrs later, Job Card XY was issued to take Aircraft X out of short term storage. The step to reconnect the aircraft batteries was accomplished/stamped off, but once again it wasn't documented in the AML as required. Both groups of technicians failed to show compliance to document in the AML these steps. Paperwork audit found the discrepancy and it has been rectified on AML XX, to show it had
been accomplished. A message has also been sent to records to show correct date work was complied with.

Miscommunication between technicians assigned both job cards.

Technicians need to verify work accomplished on job cards before submitting finalized package. Better communication between technicians assigned to the tasks.

**Synopsis**

Technician reported problems with job cards not being signed off correctly.
ACN: 1751692

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751692
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Just after door closed, Passenger X came back and asked to use the restroom. He said that he was about to start coughing. Once inside the lav, we (myself and other passengers) could hear him coughing so hard that he was gagging. 2 passengers expressed concern. When he came out, I asked if he was feeling alright. He told me that it was just allergies and he didn't want to start coughing in front of everyone. Twice, during taxi, I had to ask him to put his mask back on. (Note: if someone is eating or drinking, I leave them alone. But he was reading and/or digging through his bags.) In flight, as soon as I went upfront, we went into the lav again after 2 more lav visits, I went back and asked him again if he was alright. He told me that he "Wasn't feeling well," but that it was because he hadn't eaten breakfast. We provided everyone with snack bags and I kept an eye on him. After several more lav trips, I called the PIC and informed him of what was going on. The PIC asked us if we had a way of taking his temp. We said no and suggested he call for a [customer service agent] to meet the flight. Throughout the flight, Passenger X came back to use the restroom a total of 5 times and had to be told 3 times to, please, put his mask back on. Just after we had taken our seats for landing, he came back for a 6th time and asked me to move so that he could use the restroom. I told him that we were about to land and that he needed to return to his seat. He wasn't happy, but complied. After arriving at the gate, he came back to use the lav again. The PIC called and asked if we (the FAs) would ask him to stay seated until everyone else had deplaned so someone to talk with him. I asked him and he was very unhappy and agreed while yanking off his mask. I must have looked surprised because, after looking back at my face, he quickly put his mask back on. He deplaned last and a [customer service agent] was there to meet him. The other FA informed me that, when he first boarded the plane, he had immediately used the forward restroom. That totaled 9 trips to the lav in 1.5-2 hrs and many requests to keep his mask on.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger using the restroom numerous times, coughing and having to constantly be reminded to wear a mask.
ACN: 1751668

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: LGA.Airport
State Reference: NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: LGA
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751668
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
With this pandemic situation many airports don't have Ramp Control open and when Tower instructed us to stay with them we assumed ramp was closed and never called them since it was almost mid night, also the airport page doesn't clarify Ramp Control has to be contacted to enter the gate just for pushback and since Tower never instructed to contact anybody it makes the situation a little confusing.

As we landed Tower told us to taxi to the ramp and remain on the frequency with them, we did as instructed and never changed to Ramp Control as we taxi to the gate, we stopped short of Gate XX at Spot XX noticing there wasn't any ground crew at the gate, we tried to contact operations, but they never answer the radio call, finally a Ground Agent showed up and instructed us to move over to the next terminal to Gate XXX. The Captain made a small turn and taxi to the gate with no issues.

Looking at the airport chart the labeling of the X terminal is unclear and somewhat hidden. On the ground the X terminal gates only have numbers and not labeled with X. Also I would suggest the ramp frequency be added to the ramp chart to make it clear.

On landing in LGA we told ground we are going to Gate XXX and Ground Control instructed us to taxi Bravo, Echo, Alpha to the ramp. We tried to call company operations numerous times and never got an answer. Given that it was almost midnight we assumed that the ramp was closed And we were to taxi in with ground. Looking at the ramp diagram the gates are quite confusing and we mistakenly taxied to the entrance of Gate XX but it was actually the X terminal not the Y terminal. A ramp worker came over and directed us to turn around and go to other gates. We contacted Ground Control to let them know and they advised us we should have called Ramp Control. Once back on Taxiway A we contacted Ramp Control and got clearance into the gate. Ramp Control informed us that they had been trying to get a hold of us.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported taxiing to the gate at LGA airport without contacting Ramp Control. The crew cited as contributing factors a confusing ramp diagram and the expectation that Ramp Control was closed due to the pandemic situation.
This is a fatigue report. For 4 months now our trips are seeing significant changes. When I bid, I bid based on how I prefer to fly, this includes fatigue mitigation measures that I set for myself from years of flying experience. Many of the specific characteristics of a trip that I bid away from are being imposed through last minute changes. Min rest overnights that were originally 30+ hrs specifically bid for, Deadheads, 4 legs in a day to airports I bid away from, operations during times I generally avoid like late at night and extended check out times that eliminate "commutability." The constant fight to receive correct pay after a trip changes is affecting all of us, it's a significant distraction amongst many right now. These all add fatigue to each trip and each pilot is different in their preferences.

Changes occasionally are part of the job and we all adapt as necessary. The continuous changes we are seeing every trip are building into chronic fatigue issues and little mistakes
are becoming more frequent. If changes are here to stay, then the personal protections we bid for to mitigate our own personal known fatigue areas need to be considered. Just because the changes fit the footprint, doesn't mean they fit the pilot. We bid for a reason! This report is associated with a gear overspeed also directly reported. I own that I let it happen, under normal circumstances I would have caught it. I ate my humble pie and moved on, but see more and more of these events happening if we don't protect our schedule changes. This was the 2nd to last leg of a 4 day that saw many changes and 3 min rest overnights in a row. The fatigue issues listed here are an important factor in understanding and preventing future little mistakes that ordinarily wouldn't happen.

The only option we have to avoid known fatigue issues imposed into a trip is to remove ourselves from that trip and those issues. Crew scheduling provides absolutely no flexibility when awarded trips are changed, yet we show up to find two Reserves put on our original awarded trip with a great overnight we cherry picked. A lot of us have pushed through for several months now, but our Certificate is more important than being overly flexible. We all appreciate having the work and the ability to do our jobs. But these constant changes are adding up and becoming very fatiguing. Comply with Section X.X of the procedure for schedule changes and honor Bid preferences and awards. Limit the number of min rest overnights to 1 per trip change. Allow pilots to work with Crew Scheduling and address fatigue issues and alternative legs to protect fatigue.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported that continual, significant changes in crew schedules over the past months are causing cumulative fatigue.
ACN: 1751661

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: EWR.Airport
State Reference: NJ
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: EWR
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751661
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Standardization from airport to airport and even ramp to ramp could be improved. Part of the conversation on the phone with Ramp Control included instruction we should contact ramp from the air, for at least, gate assignment in the event it changed. Only airport where I have heard this. EWR is not easy on most (pre-COVID) days, adding this to the approach only adds to the workload when we already receive a gate assignment via an ACARS printout. Further, the airport page contradicts ramps statement and reads GATE and RAMP entrance will be provided prior to landing. If that means ATC will provide, I have yet to receive either from them prior to landing or contacting ramp or operations. Maybe I am not understanding that statement.

During this time of COVID-19 everything is different. Where there was once a Ramp Control sometimes Ground or Tower now handles those responsibilities. Leaving ZZZ1 tonight, Tower handled Ramp, Ground and Tower responsibilities, simultaneously. This may have caused some complacency which lead me to interpret the instructions of Tower to both us and the preceding aircraft to mean Ramp was closed and we were cleared to the gate. Either way, with a mix of different ramps on the same field being open or closed, it would be helpful if Tower included "Contact ramp control" at the end of their taxi instructions if required.

Going forward radio calls will be attempted to Ramp prior to entry regardless of how vacant the ramp appears, what is heard told to another aircraft or what instructions are received from Tower.

Landed Runway 22R at XA:XX pm and on rollout we heard Tower give the aircraft landing just prior their taxi instructions. Part of those instructions were to taxi with Tower to the gate and Ramp was closed for the night. We exited the Runway at E, and were given instructions from Tower to taxi with him to the ramp. It was a short taxi. As we turned left onto RD for Spot XX we saw our ground crew in the middle of the ramp ready to hook us up to the tug and tow us into the gate. The Marshal was in front of the tug straddling the RD taxi line, lighted wands in hand, ready to guide us in while the wing walkers were to each side just as they are when we pull into a gate. There was no other ground activity in the ramp area nor were any lights lit of the other parked aircraft, it was otherwise vacant. We continued in with the assumption we were under Tower control, the ramp was safe and all Ramp Control was closed for the evening. The activity in the surrounding ramp area supported that belief. Concerned we possibly made an error, an attempt to contact Ramp was made after setting the parking brake. The Ramp Controller responded advising that particular ramp was indeed open.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported they taxied to the ramp as cleared by EWR Tower and did not contact Ramp Control because it appeared to be closed. First Officer stated that due to the changing responsibilities of controllers, it was difficult to know what the correct procedures were.
Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 5000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: None
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1751647
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Fatigue

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Regained Aircraft Control
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Departing ZZZ on the ZZZZZ2 [Departure]. FO flying. After TO he entered a 30 degree steep turn to the left. I told him no turns till past the [landmark] but he didn't respond. I took the aircraft away briefly and started a turn right to get in a more westerly heading. He said he was just following the command bars.

Departure control gave us a 210 heading subsequently. The ZZZZZ2 was not entered into the GPS. I'm positive it was entered pre-departure. We were never rushed or felt pressured. Did everything well in advance on the ground. Went over the route. The FO was flying LNAV back to the ZZZ VOR I think...no SA whatsoever. Very steep turn. The sudden bank and steepness startled me. I thought he was avoiding a bird or plane or something. I'm really sorry in not being sure what he was doing but I took the aircraft as fast as I could in that situation.

Also I didn't bank as steep back to the right to get back on course. Felt making steep turns wouldn't help. Pretty sure we flew out of Class B airspace. Just felt there was no hiding the deviation. Saw no other aircraft on TCAS and didn't want to throw passengers around in their seats doing steep turns. I don't know why the departure wasn't in the GPS. Nor why the FO would simply blindly follow command bars he should know were wrong. He was VERY tired on the flight up from ZZZ1 though. VERY tired. And he missed quite a bit of stuff. Lots of calls from ATC. I called for flaps three times before taxiing from our gate at ZZZ1. He said his flying experience had been almost nil. On deplaning at ZZZ1 he stated he should have informed me that he has not flown a takeoff or landing in an actual airplane in over a year. He is an extremely nice guy and I'm sure this virus had something to do with his being out of sync and not proficient.

I'm not sure what happened to the ZZZZZ2 departure in the GPS. We briefed it and then briefly mention it on the checklist when it calls for a brief as well. I was startled but don’t think I could take the plane any faster nor bank hard back to the right considering no traffic on TCAS. I didn't want to compound anything by making abrupt maneuvers. It’s pretty much the easiest departure to make. Almost straight out to 5,000 feet.

I don't know what can be done. But the changes because of COVID...I definitely think guys that don't fly much and just come for landings every 90 days are maybe losing a lot of proficiency. That it's non linear drop off after a few extra months of no landing or experience.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported the First Officer made a sudden steep turn on departure while following command bars. The Captain took control of the aircraft and noted that the FO was very tired and had not done a takeoff or landing in over a year.
ACN: 1751639

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility: Turbulence
Weather Elements / Visibility: Thunderstorm

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Check Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1751639
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Dispatch

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

**Narrative: 1**

WSI showed TRWs and MOD Turbulence near our route. Looked like we needed to deviate almost 200 nm east of course. Called Dispatch on SATCOM twice with no answer. Then sent free text ACARS message with no response. Coordinated with ATC for 150 nm deviation. Thirty minutes later [we] received message from Dispatch that he was called away from desk. I inquired about who was covering his desk and he said his "compadre" behind him. Also stated that "if he's busy or away, there is nobody else...last year we would have been thick as ticks...6 or 7 additional desks open...only 2 now due to COVID." This 30 minute delay is unacceptable! If we had an emergency and needed assistance, we would have gotten no help! We could have already landed somewhere without any coordination with Dispatch.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a 30 minute delay in response from Dispatch regarding a deviation for weather. Dispatcher cited reductions in staffing due to COVID-19 as contributing.
ACN: 1751611

Time / Day
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
- Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US

Environment
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 4500
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 75
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751611

Events
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Fuel Issue
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I'm writing this to highlight systemic issues with my airline's fuel planning policies that manifested itself on this particular flight. We were flying on a perfectly fine VFR day. I had realized prior to signing the release that our planned arrival fuel was lower than I like, but I accepted it because the company has been pushing for lower fuel quantities over and over. Had I asked Dispatch for more I am certain that I would not have been successful.

Once in cruise ATC asked us if we wanted to speed up to .78 to jump in front of another aircraft or take a short vector and slow to below .76 and follow. Knowing our fuel wasn't ideal I elected to slow and conserve fuel, 400 miles out. We monitored the fuel at every waypoint and the closer we got the more we realized we were going to be tight.

We continued and as we got vectored for the approach I considered declaring MIN fuel with ATC, but right as I was going to we were cleared for the approach. Any further vectors and we would have been fuel critical. Upon touchdown we had 1,700 lbs total on board. Our reserve fuel was 1,358. Going through training on this aircraft we were told explicitly that you never want to land with less than 2,000 lbs of fuel on board. Dispatch planned us to land with 1,954.

Let me be clear - this is not an issue I have with the individual Dispatcher involved but rather the system in place that is pushing Dispatchers to plan flights to land so extraordinarily low on fuel. Numerous phone calls with Dispatch have reinforced this. I sent an ACARS to our Dispatcher yesterday when we realized we had a problem and the response I got was "I'm just following protocol". The protocol is wrong and it needs to be addressed. We were 3 minutes of vectoring away from declaring an emergency, this on a perfectly clear VFR day. Weight was not an issue. Takeoff performance was not an issue. The only issue is the organizational pressure to dispatch flights with minimal fuel. Had we needed to go-around for any reason we would have landed with less than 1,000 lbs of fuel. The talk in the crew room these days is about how the company is dispatching our flights with so little fuel available and how the pilots are being pressured into accepting it whether they feel comfortable or not.

We noticed this in cruise when we began monitoring fuel burn. This issue was caused by operations pressure [on] Dispatch to load flights with minimal fuel. We accepted the reality, slowed the aircraft to conserve fuel, and contemplated alternative action.

Suggestions: stop this dangerous practice of dispatching flights with the bare minimum amount of fuel. It's a dangerous game to play and it's bound to backfire sooner or later.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported concern about the airline's policy of dispatching flights with very low fuel reserve.
ACN: 1751585

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Tablet

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 32
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4348
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751585

**Events**
- Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Pre-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Primary Problem: Aircraft

**Narrative: 1**
I recently transitioned from the X type aircraft to the Y type aircraft back to the X type aircraft Captain seat. During each transition, I updated my tablet to the appropriate Jeppesen charts for the fleet that I was on. I am now back on the X type aircraft. I realized before my flight that I did not have the appropriate approach plates. The day before the flight I spent approximately two hours with the IT division trying to rectify the problem. We went as far as resetting my entire tablet (“wiped clean) to try to download the correct Jeppesen charts for the X type aircraft.

We did not have any success. The IT department could not figure out why the automatic load did not have the appropriate charts. I then contacted the appropriate company resource to discuss the issue but that division was closed for the day. Prior to my flight I obtained a loaner tablet from operations that had all required publications. Because I obtained a loaner, there were no problems associated with the flight.

With the many fleet transitions at my airline, it seems likely that there is another pilot flying without the appropriate charts on their tablet. This might be caught in pre-flight when the flight is entered but what about possible divert airports that would not be available. As an example I looked up another airport on my old tablet to see if the charts were available. [They] were not available.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported noticing during preflight that electronic charts for his destination were not loaded in his tablet computer.
ACN: 1751573

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Rain

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Heavy Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 10948
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 28
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4107
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751573
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Compressed and reduced crew show times along with remote and unfamiliar locations with higher workloads from reduced staff along with airline uncertainties sets the stage of additional threats prior to aircraft boarding.

First Officer seat swap with Relief Pilot to maintain currency along with a reduced arrival time at the remote aircraft parking further complicates and influences unexpected changes to proven habit patterns that often catches mistakes or details that unintentionally fall through the cracks.

Crew situational awareness broke down. After all the extenuating circumstances, reasons and deflections of blame are reviewed and scrutinized I take full responsibility for an unintentional safe departure with missing printed takeoff data.

Had I followed my normal crosschecks including a simple marking of all pre-departure printed paperwork highlighted by green sharpie marker, I feel "THE CREW" would have easily caught this blunder and broken the chain of events that caused this error.

Through this extreme humbling experience learning has definitely occurred.

I hope other crews learn from this mistake for which I offer no excuses.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported departing without proper takeoff data, citing high workload and career uncertainties related to COVID-19 cutbacks as contributing.
**ACN: 1751568**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: AGL. Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Rain

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Heavy Transport
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Takeoff
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 13270
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 16
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 1396
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1751568
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Operating Flight ABC ZZZ to ZZZ1. Neither the Captain nor FO were very familiar with ZZZ and with steady rain, and as the FO, I was focused on providing taxi instructions to the Captain from the south ramp until cleared to cross XXC. While crossing XXC, the Tower initially cleared us to turn right on Taxiway X to YY. After turning onto X, I commenced the before takeoff checklist which was interrupted by a Tower transmission for us to turn right onto X, which we had already done. This created momentary confusion for the crew but I completed the checklist, briefing YYR full length. Just as I completed the before takeoff checklist, Tower cleared us onto the runway and cleared us for takeoff. A proper runway verification was not done, the expectation was for full length and as the flying pilot I did not have the situational awareness, nor did the entire crew, that the aircraft was at an intersection while accepting a clearance onto the runway for departure. We commenced a normal takeoff with the FO as the flying pilot and at V1 it appeared that we had used up more than the normal amount of runway, at rotate speed I commenced a normal rotation with roughly 2,000 feet of runway remaining. After initial climbout, the crew discussed the fact that the takeoff roll had used up too much runway. Upon further investigation we realized we had taken off from intersection YY/YYR with takeoff numbers for full length on Runway YYR. We had briefed full length YYR during the preflight taxi briefing and had selected full length YYR (wet runway) when requesting takeoff numbers.

The crew as a whole did not perceive the threat that we could be given an intersection takeoff nor did we catch the error that we had numbers for full length while accepting an intersection departure. This error was not repaired and the crew put themselves and the aircraft into an undesirable and improper state. Monitoring/crosschecking along with situational awareness were the major CRM skills that were lacking. As a crew we discussed this at length during the flight and the remainder of the flight proceeded normally.

As a crew we could have aided in averting this situation by using our CRM skills by discussing or realizing that we may be assigned an intersection departure in ZZZ, the flying pilots were both from ZZZ2 where intersection takeoffs are not relevant. The fact that very few of us on this type aircraft are flying normal schedules in the current environment and that we may be operating under abnormal personal stress or out of airports we normally don’t operate out of requires that we double our efforts to ensure we employ the very best of our CRM skills to ensure we all have the situational awareness to ensure continued safe operations.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported they had numbers for a full runway takeoff, but were given and executed an intersection takeoff.
ACN: 1751543

Time / Day
  Date: 202007

Place
  Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
  State Reference: US
  Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
  Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
  Reference: X
  ATC / Advisory: Ground: ZZZ
  Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
  Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
  Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
  Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
  Flight Plan: IFR
  Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
  Reference: 1
  Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
  Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
  Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
  Function.Flight Crew: Captain
  Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
  Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
  Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 14655
  Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 23
  Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2489
  ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751543
  Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
  Reference: 2
  Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
  Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
  Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
  Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
  Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
  Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
  Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 9970
  Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 18
  Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4018
  ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751563
  Human Factors: Situational Awareness
  Human Factors: Distraction
Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
First flight in over 6 weeks only second time in ZZZ in over 5 years. Have flown only 3 other legs since CQMV in March and those were in May. Missed the turn to [Taxiway] R from [Taxiway] B had to turn around and use new taxi route to get to runway. I was under the impression R was further down B. We also had a runway change from plan. I may have still had that route in mind when I missed the turn.

Narrative: 2
On taxi out we received [an] unexpected runway for departure. Taxi instructions were A, AX, B, R, [Runway] XR. The FMC was reprogrammed accordingly and we got our new takeoff data. As we were on B I asked the Captain if I could begin the before takeoff checklist. As I was doing the checklist we passed the right turn to R. Ground advised us of the error and gave us new taxi instructions. No other problems were noted and taxied out the rest of the way to XR.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a taxiway incursion. Captain cited lack of recent flying.
ACN: 1751531

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZAB.ARTCC
State Reference: NM

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZAB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751531

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
This issue involves time on position, lack of management and traffic management knowledge of airspace, and lack of social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. We've been using CIC's (Controller-In-Charge) every day. We had 3 CPC's, one partial R-side, one D-side, and one partial D-side. During this low traffic volume time I think we should have 6 CPC's available in order to be able to open 4 sectors (if needed) and still not allow controllers to go over 2 hours on position without being asked for a break.

We had three sectors open. So with 40 minute breaks we were already on position for over 2 hours each time. Traffic volume was getting high like it has been between XA:30 and XD:00. Sector 17’s number on the TSD were showing around 7 over their MAP number. A D-side was therefore assigned to the sector 17. Our CIC went to talk to TMU to ask what the plan was to bring that number down. They told him they’re doing nothing and are expecting us to just split sector 58. The CIC said sector 58 would then have too many planes in it because it was showing 31 planes when it's MAP number is 22. So 9 planes over their limit. TMU told the CIC that this number must be wrong. (We found out later
that CIC didn't really know where sector 58 was. CIC thought it was just an ultra high sector just above sector 17 only. It overlies sector 93 also.) The OMIC wasn't familiar with sector 58 [either]. The OMIC instructed our CIC to open 58. Of course when he did sector 58's numbers were way over what was allowed in the sector. This forced the CIC to call down the other D-side trainee from upstairs to help out. Also, TMU now had to scramble to figure out how to mitigate traffic out of sector 58 after realizing what the sector was. One of the D-side trainees was not wearing a mask nor social distancing himself. I was not comfortable with him working D-sides since he would be less than 6 feet from the R-sides and also touching the equipment.

The CPC they called back from break had only been on break for 15 minutes and that was after being on position for over 2 hours prior. After an only 15 minute break he was called back to work a sector way too busy for what it was meant for. All of this is unsafe in my opinion. There was no social distancing because sectors were not split in a smart manner. All of us went over 3+ hours on position during that time without being asked for a break. The whole situation was unsafe in many ways and it could’ve been handled better by TMU and management.

Training for TMCs and OMs on the airspace. Staff us better. I'd rather have better staffing and more R-sides to be able to split sectors than utilize D-sides during the pandemic.

**Synopsis**

ZAB ARTCC Controller reported staffing issues, TMU lack of airspace knowledge and social distancing concerns.
ACN: 1751509

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft: 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Aircraft: 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Small Transport
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 175
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 12
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 60
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751509
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown
  - Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
  - Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
I was taxiing to my parking area in Section X at ZZZ after landing. The Controller had approved me to taxi all the [way to] parking, and asked a larger twin to hold in Section X and let me pass first. Unfortunately, the twin aircraft was blocking the entry (he was not over the line though), but I couldn’t get by him into the parking area. Since Coronavirus hit, this was the most planes parked at Section X, and I had limited options to enter the area due to the many planes parked on site. I stopped, was thinking what to do and was about to radio to the Controller, but the twin pilot radioed first, telling the Tower I had stopped and probably wanted the twin to exit first. The Controller asked if I wanted to give way, which I agreed...as I basically had no choice if I was to park in Section X. The Controller then (politely) told me next time to park as that was the direction he had given me. I replied "Roger" and left it at that.

If I could do it again, I would have entered Section X earlier where there was a gap between parked planes, but that was quite a distance from my hanger, and I would have to maneuver between the many parked planes. Or, should I have radioed earlier that my pathway was blocked and requested the twin exit the area first? I am unclear on the proper procedure in this situation.

Synopsis
Pilot reported that during taxi another aircraft was blocking entry into the parking area and that parking options were limited due to many parked aircraft since COVID-19 started.
ACN: 1751433

**Time / Day**
- **Date**: 202007
- **Local Time Of Day**: 0601-1200

**Place**
- **Locale Reference.Airport**: ZZZ.Airport
- **State Reference**: US
- **Altitude.AGL.Single Value**: 0

**Environment**
- **Weather Elements / Visibility**: Rain
- **Visibility**: 5
- **Light**: Daylight
- **Ceiling.Single Value**: 1200

**Aircraft**
- **Reference**: X
- **Aircraft Operator**: Air Taxi
- **Make Model Name**: Medium Transport
- **Crew Size.Number Of Crew**: 2
- **Operating Under FAR Part**: Part 135
- **Flight Plan**: IFR
- **Mission**: Passenger
- **Flight Phase**: Landing

**Person : 1**
- **Reference**: 1
- **Location Of Person.Aircraft**: X
- **Location In Aircraft**: Flight Deck
- **Reporter Organization**: Air Taxi
- **Function.Flight Crew**: Captain
- **Function.Flight Crew**: Pilot Not Flying
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Instrument
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Flight Engineer
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Multiengine
- **Experience.Flight Crew.Total**: 28000
- **Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days**: 10
- **Experience.Flight Crew.Type**: 140
- **ASRS Report Number.Accession Number**: 1751433
- **Human Factors**: Communication Breakdown
- **Human Factors**: Situational Awareness
- **Communication Breakdown.Party1**: Flight Crew
- **Communication Breakdown.Party2**: ATC
- **Communication Breakdown.Party2**: Flight Crew

**Person : 2**
- **Reference**: 2
- **Location Of Person.Aircraft**: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1430
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 4
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 85
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741439
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Landing Without Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
FO hand flying ILS in clouds, we were cleared for the approach and told to contact Tower. I dialed the Tower frequency, but got distracted by correcting the flying of the FO and forgot to switch the frequency. We landed without a landing clearance and then realized we were not on the Tower frequency on vacating the runway. We contacted the Tower and apologized, and we were told to taxi to our gate. No further comments from the Tower Controller who was also handling Ground Control.

Narrative: 2
Because of COVID-19 I haven't flown at all. This was my second day on my rotation. On our second leg we were coming back to ZZZ from ZZZ1. I was the flying pilot, it was cloudy and there was a lot of turbulence. I was mainly focusing on staying at the glide slope and maintain safe airspeed. Captain was running the checklists and communicating with ATC. When we're almost 5 NM out ATC cleared us for ILS XX approach. I was so focused on flying the plane and I couldn't catch that Captain didn't switch to Tower frequency. He was doing suggestions and giving me instructions and he forgot to talk to the Tower frequency. When we passed the Final Approach Fix my main focus was on landing the airplane safely and smoothly. Which I did even though it was super windy and bumpy. After landing safely and slowed down the aircraft to a safe airspeed I gave the controls to Captain.

We safely cleared the active runway and I tried to talked to the Tower since they didn't give us any taxi instructions or frequency change and that's when we realized Captain never switched to Tower frequency. As soon as I realized what happened I contacted Tower, I apologized and wrote down the taxi instructions. We went to the main gate and parked the plane. After that me and Captain talked about what happened and we talked
about what we did wrong and we talked about how we will make sure that won't happen again. We were both agreed on that communication is really important and from this point on we will double check everything and always try to improve our communication skills. It's also proved [to] us that non-flying pilot's role is really important as well.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance.
On [date], on my last flight of the night I thought I may have experienced some very mild symptoms of being ill. In the past, I have experienced mild symptoms before and have felt 100 percent better the next day. The next day, I reported for a two day trip and felt absolutely fine to work. Again, I felt completely fine to work, and I would never deliberately go to work while feeling sick. After my trip was completed, I experienced symptoms of being ill, and decided to set up a COVID test. I took my COVID test and received a positive test result. I have been quarantining since I took the test.
I believe that not flying while possibly being ill would prevent this from happening again. If I could do things differently, I would not have flown with the possibility of being sick.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported having mild symptoms of being ill, but decided to take another two day trip. Flight Attendant continued to feel ill after the two day trip warranting a COVID test, which was positive.
ACN: 1751372

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751372
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
After takeoff I noticed the passengers had an infant car seat in between them during our simplified beverage service. I quickly apologized for our crew in missing this during boarding, but that the infant car seat that was rear facing had to be moved for taxi, takeoff and landing phases of flight to be at the window. I again apologized (infant was at
the time being held by mom and not in the car seat itself, but again it was in the middle) and he agreed to move it for landing and said he understood as I explained that if in an evacuation it was blocking his wife from exiting.

Fast forward to descent and 18,000 feet I again told the guest that we needed to move the car seat to the window, where his words soon became a bit more on the combative side. I continued to firmly stand my ground with moving the car seat for landing and was safest for all as well as a rule I was unwilling to budge on. He was upset that it wasn't said to him prior to takeoff and I agreed with him we should have caught the issue prior, but sometimes these things happen and we are required to fix them as we see them.

During this social distancing and mask wearing time in our country, there are a lot of emotions and scare while flying for some. During boarding a through flight with multiple little incidents adds up and human error can happen with missing individual situations. Again the car seat was something that should not have been missed but it does happen on occasion and once it was noticed airborne we mentioned it to the passenger and had him move it for landing.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight attendant reported a passenger was upset with being told to comply with regulations regarding their child seat. Flight Attendant suggested many passengers seem more stressed than usual because of COVID-19 pandemic procedures.
### ACN: 1751362

**Time / Day**
- **Date:** 202007
- **Local Time Of Day:** 0601-1200

**Place**
- **Locale Reference.Airport:** ZZZ.Airport
- **State Reference:** US
- **Altitude.AGL.Single Value:** 0

**Aircraft**
- **Reference:** X
- **Aircraft Operator:** Air Carrier
- **Make Model Name:** Commercial Fixed Wing
- **Crew Size.Number Of Crew:** 2
- **Operating Under FAR Part:** Part 121
- **Flight Plan:** IFR
- **Mission:** Passenger
- **Flight Phase:** Parked

**Person**
- **Reference:** 1
- **Location Of Person.Aircraft:** X
- **Location In Aircraft:** General Seating Area
- **Reporter Organization:** Air Carrier
- **Function.Flight Attendant:** Flight Attendant (On Duty)
- **Qualification.Flight Attendant:** Current
- **ASRS Report Number.Accession Number:** 1751362
- **Human Factors:** Other / Unknown
- **Human Factors:** Communication Breakdown
- **Communication Breakdown.Party1:** Flight Attendant
- **Communication Breakdown.Party2:** Other

**Events**
- **Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event:** Passenger Misconduct
- **Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural:** Published Material / Policy
- **Detector.Person:** Flight Attendant
- **When Detected:** In-flight
- **Result.General:** None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- **Contributing Factors / Situations:** Environment - Non Weather Related
- **Contributing Factors / Situations:** Human Factors
- **Primary Problem:** Human Factors

**Narrative:**
Passenger X row X was disappointed with the passenger in front of her because he had his mask down while drinking his coffee. We kindly explained to her that it's allowed. Passenger X then started griping about the fact she wasn't allowed to move. We
professionally explained to her that we are weight restricted in the front so we cannot accommodate that request at this time. She still was confused so we had the CS Supervisor on board talk with her. After we got in the air apparently the two gentlemen in row Y took their own seats and yet again Passenger X started right back up about why she cannot move and they can. Apparently the gate already moved the gentleman, so that they have their row.

I was just cornered in my galley by Passenger X. She began raising her voice at me about our guests in front of her for not wearing their masks while eating and drinking. I told her all guests are allowed to have their masks down while eating or drinking. She began raising her voice more about her dying father and she doesn't wanna get exposed to COVID. I told her I'm monitoring the whole situation and they aren't doing anything wrong and apologized. She then told me I was no help and she wants my name. Furthermore; explained I cannot enforce it when they're really doing nothing wrong.

Have more information at the gate regarding folks [being] allowed to eat or drink with their masks down.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was upset with the airline's COVID-19 policies when observing other passengers removing their masks to eat and drink.
Passenger X came on [and] complained of feeling motion sickness [and] asked for motion sickness med. I replied we don't carry [them]. She then asked for aspirin. I gave it to her. She went to the restroom several times during flight, at one time she stated that she
[soiled clothing item] and she needed to discard it. I gave her a sick bag to put [it] in. I also told her she needed to put a mask on while on plane. Every time she used [the] restroom she did not have a mask on or in her seat. She did not have a seat mate, [since] I had moved him during boarding. I also asked her 3 times to put her mask on in her seat. Halfway through flight she began to feel better but on landing asked for sick bag.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to comply with COVID-19 mask requirements in flight.
ACN: 1751330

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 24
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 12400
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751330
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was the Captain and the responsibility for the situation is entirely mine. Due to the COVID situation, I have not flown much in the last several months. This station requires a special noise abatement procedure to be flown by the Captain. I did an extensive briefing covering all aspects of the special procedure. The Before Start Checklist procedure was normal. The problem occurred when, with all the discussion surrounding the procedure, we pushed back without completing the Before Push Checklist. Once the pushback was complete and the Ground Crew cleared off, and the First Officer about to call for flaps, we both realized I had not called for and we had not completed the Before Push Checklist.

I then called for the Before Push Checklist and we completed it. I believe this put us in an expectation bias that, having completed a checklist, albeit not the Before Taxi Checklist, shortly after starting engines and clearing the Crew off, we called for taxi. We had, in effect, substituted one checklist (Before Push) for another (Before Taxi). We then taxied out to the runway without having completed the Before Taxi Checklist. As we approached the runway, I completed my Captain before takeoff flows, which includes a throttle slide / takeoff warning check. This resulted in a takeoff warning horn.

At that point, we realized the Before Taxi Checklist had not been completed and the flaps were still in the UP position. We advised the Tower we needed some extra time to complete some checks and were given taxi instructions to a location where we could stop the aircraft. At that point, I directed the First Officer to begin at the post engine start point and to call for flaps. He called for flaps, I responded with the takeoff flap selection and directed a control check. After the control check, I called for the Before Taxi Checklist. We completed the Before Taxi Checklist normally. I then apologized to the First Officer and asked if he was comfortable with our situation and that we were ready to continue. Upon a positive response, I accomplished a Before Takeoff Flow, and called for the Before Takeoff Checklist. The Before Takeoff Checklist was completed normally and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.

I am at a loss as to how I missed calling for the Before Push Checklist - which precipitated the subsequent problems. But, once we realized that checklist was missed, I should have added a comment (which I subsequently did shortly before takeoff) that we had an error (missing Before Push Checklist), and to take a moment to think about where we were (not in the Green) and was there possibly anything else we might be missing (like the Before Taxi Checklist) before we continued.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported failure to call for the Before Push checklist, then also failing to call for the Before Taxi checklist, citing lack of flying due to COVID-19 cutbacks as contributing.
**ACN: 1751324**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Night

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751324
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Fatigue
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Landing Without Clearance
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On a visual approach, ATC instructed us to contact Tower at the FAF. After touching down, I realized that I didn’t contact Tower. I quickly swapped to Tower and received Tower’s instructions to taxi to the ramp with him.

Threats
1. Long duty day (12+ hours)
2. Time of the day (X:XX a.m.)
3. No other aircraft on frequency, which is unusual. Usually, you are hearing all the other aircraft swapping frequencies. However, this was late at night during COVID-19 times with less traffic.
4. Previous Maintenance issues, Flight Attendant issues, return to gate event, and aircraft swap, which delayed flight three hours.

We could have discussed that we needed to be extra vigilant on arrival and approach due to the long duty day, time of day, and previous Maintenance issues. Another possibility is that since no one else was on Approach or Tower frequency, the Tower could have reached out to Approach to contact us.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported landing without a clearance, citing fatigue and scarcity of other aircraft operating due to COVID-19 reductions as contributing.
**ACN: 1751315**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience:Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 150
- Experience:Flight Crew: Type: 2200
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1751315
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: Ground Personnel

**Events**
- Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Company Policy
Narrative: 1
Tug Driver was wearing a mask due to COVID. His mask made his communication to us very muffled and difficult to understand. This is a safety concern. We could understand the basic and expected commands. Anything out of the ordinary would have been difficult, if not impossible, to understand. Tug Drivers alone on a tug and outside should not be wearing a mask covering their mouth to enable clear communication with the cockpit.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported difficulty communicating with the tug driver during pushback because the tug driver was wearing a mask in compliance with COVID-19 procedures. Reporter suggested the mask was not necessary when the driver was alone in the tug.
ACN: 1751299

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2650
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751299
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

The Captain and I realized our planned route was going to take us directly into a long front of thunderstorms. We called Dispatch to change the flight plan to circumvent the storm. Dispatch seemed lazy and uninterested in our request. The Captain was able to convince Dispatch to file an alternate route and asked Dispatch if they needed to call ATC to coordinate. Apparently, they did not.

It was night, with decreased flying from COVID-19. There's no congestion that would have prevented Company Dispatch and Clearance Delivery to plan us a safe route. We received a second Release with a revised flight plan. I called Clearance. Clearance said I had two flight plans filed and read back the route of the original Release. I told him that was the wrong one and Clearance Delivery replied with, "Read back correct." He didn't listen or care. I called again and asked for my new routing. Before I could finish speaking, clearance began talking, so I didn't hear the first part of what he said. It was basically, we can't do it.

My Captain called clearance and asked again. Clearance said we could contact our Dispatch to refile. Clearance Delivery was being extremely unhelpful, unprofessional, and began introducing confusion into our flight planning. We had to call again to confirm our legal routing (the one that takes us into the thunderstorm). Not long after we took off, ATC cleared us around the storm, basically along the path we had requested. As we flew, we could see our planned route would have taken us right into the storm.

Company Dispatch needs to file flight plans that do not needlessly take us into thunderstorms. We need to have a Release that plans for what we're going to fly. We need to begin on the right flight plan and not have to request and hope we'll get a safe routing later. Clearance Delivery needs to communicate with pilots.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported the difficulties experienced with Dispatch and Clearance Delivery as they requested an alternate route to avoid thunderstorms.
ACN: 1751290

Time / Day
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
- Locale Reference: ZZZ
- ATC Facility: ZZZ
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: 5000

Environment
- Light: Daylight

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace: Class B

Component
- Aircraft Component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
- Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Pilot Flying
- Function: First Officer
- Qualification: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience: Last 90 Days: 65
- Experience: Type: 4000
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1751290
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Communication Breakdown Party 1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown Party 2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Departure Airport

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
As we were climbing through about 5,000 feet MSL, I told the Captain that I was turning the packs on HIGH to cool the cabin, as it was very hot. I looked up at the pack switches and unintentionally moved them in the wrong direction to the OFF position instead of HIGH. Contrary to what I normally do, I did not verify my action. Climbing through 10,000 feet I called for the Climb Checklist; the Fuel Caution illuminated (due to the center tank being empty) and ATC gave us "direct ZZZZZ" intersection and "climb to FL 210" which added to the workload and distracted me.

As the Captain read "Pressurization" from the checklist, I did look up at the Cabin Altitude Differential Pressure, and rate gauges and the position of the needles looked normal, so I replied: "checked." In hindsight, I realize that I missed the first point of my usual Pressurization Check Flow, which includes checking the two needles on the Duct Pressure gauge, and the packs switches position. Shortly above 20,000 feet the Cabin Altitude Warning light illuminated and the horn sounded. In short order we donned the oxygen masks and established communication, leveled off and silenced the horn. The Captain ran the QRC, QRH, and requested a lower altitude to ATC.

We agreed that we were going back to ZZZ. Sometimes in this time frame, I realized that the packs were OFF due to my error in positioning the pack switches. I told the Captain and reached up to move them back to HIGH. I did not realize that the Captain had not heard me and did not see me. With the noise of the masks and the various tasks of running the QRC, QRH, the flight attendant calling us, and the return to ZZZ, I should have communicated much more effectively and assertively with the Captain to make sure he had heard me and that we were on the same page.

When we leveled off at 10,000 feet and took the oxygen masks off is when I told him again that I inadvertently turned OFF the pack switches and that there was no issue with the aircraft. We agreed that the safest course of action was to run the appropriate checklists and return to ZZZ.

Cause - I am usually pretty consistent and methodical in double and triple checking what I do, but I did not realize that this morning the combination of a number of risk factors could lead me to let my guard down and become more distracted.

The heat made me rush and I reverted to muscle memory by moving the pack switches up (like when I start the engines or transfer to APU bleed). The only other couple of times in six years that I needed to move the packs to HIGH I remember thinking how easy it could be to make the error of moving the switch in the wrong direction as this is what we normally do with each engine start.
AM trip against my preferred PM circadian rhythm. Busy four-day with the ETOPS check out and with earlier show times than scheduled due to reroutes for ZZZ1 cancellations.

General uncertainty of COVID-19 and preoccupation of being furloughed (for both myself and my husband who is junior to me).

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported inadvertently moving the pack switches to off instead of high flow causing a cabin depressurization during climbout.
ACN: 1751272

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 25000

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 20
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 5000
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1751272
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Undershoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Given crossing restriction of ZZZZZ at 280 knots at FL250. Captain had difficulty getting 280 knots at fix in ZZZZZ1. Finally glad to put the speed into the Descent page because FMS would not allow it on flat Plan page. Yet aircraft was in LNAV/VNAV PATH. The next clue was ZZZ Approach asking us if we had a crossing restriction and we fessed up. He gave us a descent to FL190 and did not sound concerned and didn't have to vector any other aircraft. We are both retiring in a few weeks and that is proving to be a bigger distraction than anticipated.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported missing an altitude crossing restriction while on arrival.
**ACN: 1751266**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 1
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 200

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: IMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Rain
- Weather Elements / Visibility Visibility: 1.5
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 70
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 70
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751266
- Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

**Events**
Before we left ZZZ1, the weather at ZZZ was partly cloudy, calm winds. Our first check of their ATIS said the same and I briefed a visual approach. A bit later we received a message from Dispatch about approaching storms providing new routing to avoid them. As PF (Pilot Flying), I primarily concerned myself with working my way around the weather. A new ATIS came in, and the Captain mentioned rain on the field. Honestly, I didn't look at it that closely because I was dealing with the enroute weather at the time. It wasn't until we were about 20 miles out that I realized that the weather wouldn't permit a visual approach. I quickly debriefed the approach as an ILS, reset the minimums and continued.

As we continued inbound in heavy rain, things started to deteriorate. The Captain did not call 500 feet, then called "approaching minimums" 100 feet early. I saw the lights and continued, but with the heavy rain and an unexpected crosswind (the latest winds had had 5-knot winds down the runway), I elected to go-around. I pushed the power up, pressed TO/GA (Takeoff/Go-Around) (or so I thought at the time), and called for "go around power, flaps 15." I was concentrating on flying the aircraft but saw the Captain reach over and move something as he was talking on the Tower calling our go-around. I was pushing forward while trimming nose-down to counter the pitch up caused by the power increase and called "landing gear up," and received a response of "it's already up." Instead of putting the flaps to 15, he had raise the gear. I had him raise the gear and I again asked him to recheck the go-around power. While I was pushing and trimming, the airspeed significantly decreased and we got an "AIRSPEED LOW" warning (at the time we were about 5-10 knots below VRef (Threshold Crossing Speed)). Eventually I got the pitch trim situation under control and was able to continue the go-around.

Numerous factors led to this event. First of all, the recent reduction in flight hours has definitely affected our proficiency, particularly mine. This was only my fourth day flying since the beginning of June, and I was definitely rusty. I made an error by not updating myself on the weather and setting up earlier for an instrument approach. Secondly, Crew coordination was lacking. The Captain was talking on the radio rather than helping with the go-around. Afterward, he told me the go-around caught him completely by surprise, and commented that he hated go-arounds and that he had struggled with one on a recent check-ride.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported a "Slow Airspeed Warning" situation during a weather related go-around event and cited lack of flying time as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1751209

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751209
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
There was no PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) on the flight deck. No Clorox or similar wipes on the flight, I called operations and asked for some to be brought out to the
airplane. Non arrived prior to departure, so I used my own disinfectant wipes I brought from home. The proper disinfectant wipes are not being provided to the flight deck. When we check in at the gate, the agents there should hand wipes to the crew! Which in turn, keeps less people coming and going from the flight deck.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported company policy was not followed regarding Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) when the pilot crew arrived at the gate.
**ACN: 1751150**

**Time / Day**
- Date : 202007
- Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference : US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 15500

**Aircraft**
- Reference : X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
- Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
- Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
- Flight Plan : IFR
- Mission : Passenger
- Flight Phase : Descent
- Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference : 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
- Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew : Captain
- Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1751150
- Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
- Human Factors : Situational Awareness
- Human Factors : Other / Unknown

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
- Detector.Person : Flight Crew
- When Detected : In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
- Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
- Primary Problem : Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

We were assigned a descent to 17,000 feet then given a descend via clearance for the ZZZZZ arrival into ZZZ. The hard altitude was selected in the altitude preselect before altitude was captured. This allowed the aircraft to descend below the bottom of ZZZZZ at 17,000 [feet]. The First Officer noticed the deviation moments before ATC queried us to ensure the proper clearance was issued. We were at 15,500 feet so the First Officer, Pilot Flying (PF), leveled off and held the altitude until ZZZZZ, as we were only a few miles from ZZZZZ at the time.

Cause - I, Pilot Monitoring (PM), was distracted doing other tasks in preparation for landing and neglected my PM duties. An additional factor was this was my first trip working since the end of April. My PM and scanning skills had been a little rusty.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported an altitude deviation citing distraction and not working for several months as contributing factors.
ACN: 1751143

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Radio Altimeter
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751143
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was the First Officer and pilot flying on this leg, my first on a trip assigned to me to keep my landing currency. We were set up for a straight in visual approach. The radio altimeter was inoperative on my side, but was working fine on the Captain's side and was MELed appropriately. On final approach, I called for "check spoilers, flaps 45, before landing check." Shortly after these were completed, the "500" annunciation played. It came sooner than I expected, but I wasn't checking the radio altimeter as often as I regularly do, since I had to look at the Captain's side to do so. At that point the approach was stable and we continued to land. Afterwards on the taxi to the gate, I realized that with the short time between us becoming fully configured for landing, and the 500 feet call, we were probably not fully configured at 1,000 feet above the threshold and should have executed a go-around. During the debrief discussion, the Captain agreed.

Cause - My lapse in situational awareness, allowing a descent through 1,000 feet without being fully configured to land. Contributing factor: over-reliance on using my radio altimeter to stay aware of my height AGL during approaches, and not briefing my inoperative radio altimeter as a threat during my arrival briefing.

Recognizing my inoperative radio altimeter was a threat and briefing a mitigation strategy, even though we were flying a visual approach and the Captain's side was working. Perhaps a callout at 1,000 feet similar to the "500 to go" call, but i understand there are exceptions and reasons why it isn't required in the procedure.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported an unstable approach while on flight to maintain landing currency.
ACN: 1751136

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1751136
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1751137
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Workload

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew: FLC complied w/ Automation / Advisory
Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On approach into ZZZ we called the field in sight as we were descending through probably 5,000 feet on a vector to ZZZZZ intersection from the Southwest. We were cleared to cross ZZZZZ at 3,000 feet after which we could fly the visual approach. I was working to slow down and get down because I had too much energy on the airplane. As we approached ZZZZZ at 3,000 feet, the glideslope indicator show that we were high. I forgot that we had to cross the intersection at 3,000 feet and started to descend to the glideslope. The autopilot was off and I started to make a left turn to intercept the localizer. As we approach 2,700 feet Approach reminded us that we were supposed to be at 3,000 feet until crossing ZZZZZ. I began a climb back to 3,000 feet and we informed them we were correcting back to 3,000.

In my effort to get the airplane slowed down I let myself forget the clearance we were given. I was thinking visual approach, saw the runway, saw the glideslope below us and just completely let go of the requirement to cross the intersection at 3,000 feet. I lost situational awareness at a very bad time.

If I had gotten slower sooner I would not have been preoccupied with dissipating the extra energy. I don't feel I was rushing necessarily, but I did not give myself the chance to recover situational awareness at a critical moment. It was only a small amount of time that my SA was lost, but that was all it took to make a stupid mistake.

Narrative: 2

On a dogleg to final, we were given direct ZZZZZ. We called the field and were further assigned Direct ZZZZZ, maintain 3,000, cross ZZZZZ at or above 3,000 and then cleared visual approach Runway XXL. 3 nm from ZZZZZ the Captain and PF decided to de-automate the airplane by disconnecting the autopilot and auto throttles at or around 240 kts and a clean airplane. We started to dirty up and speed to follow. Making the turn onto the LOC about 1 nm to ZZZZZ, Captain asked for gear down and an additional flap setting. My focus was flight path management to ensure we stayed on our vertical path while simultaneously ensuring that we did not have an upward speed trend that would put the flaps outside their higher speed setting. at the same time, the aircraft dipped below the flight director. The FMS was programmed correctly for ZZZZZ 3,000 [feet]. As PM, I failed
to monitor the flight path and allowed my PF to unknowingly deviate from the assigned altitude. Approach called us out on our deviation and I responded with "correcting," (and added a short but sincere apology). The rest of the approach was uneventful. I saw 2,750 at the time of approach control notification.

High workload coupled with a PF that hasn't flown much in the previous 90 days. PM should have asked PF to re-automate until a lower workload time (such as established on final) was appropriate.

Keep the airplane automated until more proficient in the previous 90 days. PF had admitted he hadn't flown much...so de-automating probably wasn't the best idea in hindsight. As PM, I needed to give him more back-up.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew experienced an altitude deviation while descending on approach and attempting to slow the aircraft. Crew stated that loss of situational awareness and Captain's lack of recent flying contributed to the event.
**ACN: 1751123**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Takeoff

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751123
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751124
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Captain's takeoff. We were cleared to taxi to Runway XXR via Bravo. We ran our checklist "to the line." We were pushed to Tower frequency. Tower contacted us and gave us the option for an intersection takeoff at Foxtrot or full length, Runway XXR, lineup and wait. We still had a long taxi to get the hold short of Runway XXR. We continued to taxi, we ran the "below the line" items remaining on the Before Takeoff checklist. We entered Runway XXR at the full length. The Captain pushed up the throttles and started our takeoff roll. We went through our normal callouts and rotated. A short time after we were airborne, the Tower Controller contacted us that we had not been given clearance for takeoff. I thought we had been given clearance for takeoff on our taxi which was not the case.

[Cause was] complacency. Expectation bias (at some moment, we were going to be given clearance to takeoff on our long taxi?). Mounds of external stressors that are distracting (COVID-19, upcoming furloughs, possibly being displaced to a new base due to company downsizing). Those external stressors seemed to be at the forefront due to the long quiet taxi to XXR and inactivity and lack of operations at ZZZ due to decimation of the industry. When I am busy, I am acutely more aware of my SA.

To combat complacency, I will make a concerted effort to tune into my SA and strict adherence to SOPs. One thing I believe in and live by is to NOT worry about things out of my control. I let that slip for a few seconds and it cost us severely. All the external factors I mentioned above are out of my control therefore I will get back to compartmentalizing them. There is nothing I can do about them. The only thing that is within my control at that moment in time is the operation of that aircraft. To help combat Expectation Bias, I have already made a mechanical change to ensure we receive takeoff clearance. I have started to press the chrono button on the panel that starts the clock when takeoff or landing clearance is received. If that clock is not started, I will be asking the CA and tower for clearance or to verify clearance. I have also written on my checklist, on the bottom of the "Before Takeoff" "takeoff clearance?" I believe these changes will prevent any further miscues.

Narrative: 2
Cleared to taxi out to Runway XXR. On taxi out completed taxi check list to the line. Switched to Tower and given the option for an intersection or full length departure. We took full length. Was given clearance onto the runway very early on the taxi. Completed below the line check list. Took the runway and departed. On climb out was informed that
we had taken off without a takeoff clearance.

[Causes include] being cleared onto the runway very early, very quiet day. Being somewhat distracted by COVID and the state of the Airline. Assumptions. We thought we were cleared for takeoff.

Be more vigilant, block outside distractions, don't assume.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported taking off without a clearance and stated that being distracted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the state of the airline contributed to the event.
Time / Day

Date : 202007
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Component

Aircraft Component : PFD
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Design

Person : 1

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1751121
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Person : 2

Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1751127
Human Factors: Fatigue
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

Events

- Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Regained Aircraft Control
- Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Assessments

- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

After departing ZZZ I was the pilot monitoring on climb the flaps were retracted before appropriate speed. After noticing I told the Captain and he lowered to nose about 5 degrees and the plane accelerated normally.

We had come from ZZZ1 with a show time of XA10. This flight had no crew meals. We landed in ZZZ and had 1 1/2 hrs till this flight. Neither the Captain or myself could get anything to eat because nothing was open in the terminal. We were both hungry and HOT.
On taxi out we both made the comment how hot the plane was and the COVID mask didn't help that. There were several airplanes taking off with similar call signs and it was busy. I personally felt a little Task saturated after takeoff. The Captain called for flaps up right at radio call and frequency change. I never looked up and retracted the flaps.

I feel that I should have been offered at least a snack. The airplanes should have the APU left on in the ZZZ heat. I find the COVID mask to be a distraction. Somehow we need to address similar call signs. Turn the autopilot on ASAP at busy airports.

Narrative: 2

Flaps were retracted prior to appropriate speed.

Fatigue from excessive heat in receiving aircraft, wearing a mask, and no food easily obtainable. Obstructed view of PFD due to bright ambient light, dim PFD illumination, mask and associated fogging from breath. Lack of recent flight experience. As I looked at the PFD I was unable to see S speed. I did not recall what it was in knots. The aircraft was light. I assumed we had flown through it and requested "flaps up." The FO, who was also having fatigue issues, who was also distracted by many similar call signs, selected flaps up. Airspeed immediately came into view, I lowered the nose and, due to a high density altitude, the aircraft slowed then slowly began to accelerate. We proceeded on to ZZZZ1 without further event. I was hand flying attempting to regain proficiency after a long period of little flying activity.
Acknowledge fatigue and call off the trip. Acknowledge fatigue and use the auto-flight systems. Replace screens so that their content is more visible. Change ATC call signs so that they sound different and our call sign is more easily distinguishable. Make sure food is available. Provide de-fogger for glasses. Keep aircraft cool.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported retracting the flaps during climb before the appropriate airspeed and stated that fatigue, hunger, and excessive heat in the aircraft contributed to the event, and the COVID-19 mask was a distraction.
**ACN: 1751102**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type: Scheduled Maintenance
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Inspection

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Maintenance: Technician
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751102

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Maintenance
- When Detected: Routine Inspection
- Result.General: Maintenance Action

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

Doing a scheduled check for Aircraft X in long term storage on the ramp, and closing everything up upon completion I noticed speed tape torn around Pack 1 and 2 inlets and exhaust. Confused, I checked both inlets with a light to see if any tape was sucked in. But because the duct bends I am not 100% sure if any of the speed tape ripped and entered the system. Checked all the planes on the ramp. There is one other plane out of XX with speed tape on the pack intakes. I am unsure if it is required, applied new speed tape to both Pack 1 and 2 intake and exhaust and hung streamers to help prevent this in the future.

**Synopsis**
Technician completing a routine check on stored aircraft reported finding torn speed tape in the Pack 1 and 2 inlets and exhaust. Reporter could not visually verify if the tape had entered the system due to the duct bends.
ACN: 1751096

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751096
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Fatigue
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number : 1751212
Human Factors : Fatigue
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

**Events**

Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Landing Without Clearance
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector. Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result. Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

After being cleared for a close in visual approach to [Runway] XR in ZZZ we got switched to Tower. We were high but descending at a good rate to get on to the glide slope. We were switched to Tower while we were configuring for landing. After I dialed the frequency but before I made the switch I moved to extend the next flap setting. I didn't come back to flip the switch and was distracted by ensuring proper configuration and getting stable. We were configured and stable at 1,000 feet, but we missed the 500 foot call which is when I also double check we're cleared to land. We landed and pulled off the runway uneventfully. I recognized the error and flipped the switch. I said only our call sign and Tower just told us to cross [Runway] XL and taxi to the gate. We called the tower to apologize and he told us it was no issue and that he gave us the green light.

It was late. I was tired. I was too focused on monitoring the flight path and not on doing my other core duties. Proficiency may have played a role as I haven't been flying super frequently. I didn't trap the error using my other reminders.

**Narrative: 2**

Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Uneventful flight, descent, and approach. However we landed [Runway] XR without Tower radio transmitted landing clearance. Spoke with ZZZ Tower via telephone after arriving [at] gate. Tower had given us a green light to land.

Our day started with a XA45 local push out of ZZZ2 to ZZZ with a 2.5 hour sit in ZZZ then flight to ZZZ1. At each briefing we talked about the threat of a long day and the later than normal hours of operation for both of us. Both of us had been up early in the day. Approach into ZZZ1 was a visual (backup using ILS). The approach was stable by 1,000 feet AGL, but high and fast prior to this. VFR conditions and it was still daylight at ZZZ. I believe fatigue and the concern about fatigue effecting performance were our biggest threats. PF was focusing on flying the approach and I believe got tunnel vision about the task of flying a stable approach and landing. The PM was backing up the PF concerning the approach, etc. Not contacting the Tower was a mistake, obviously. Believe both got too focused on the specific task vs. the overall situation. What I would do differently: fly a longer downwind with a stable approach being reached at a higher altitude.
Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance from Tower and stated that fatigue and lack of recent flying contributed to the event.
ACN: 1751094

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751094
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I arrived at the airplane to clean it with disinfectant wipes, there were none on the aircraft. I used my own personal stash to clean the flight deck. This has happened two days in a row, at two different stations. Both times they were aircraft that RONed at the station. There is zero PPE being provided for the flight deck during operations. I had to use my own personal disinfectant wipes that I carry with me. There should be disinfectant wipes placed in the flight deck every RON. This should be a go/no go item.
Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported they are not being provided with proper disinfectant wipes and PPE.
ACN: 1751065

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Navigational Equipment and Processing
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1751065
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function: Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number : 1751119
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown. Party 1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly. ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector. Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result. Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Result. Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result. Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

On the ZZZZZ5 arrival into ZZZ, ZZZ Center left us approximately 5,000 feet above our VNAV profile. The last clearance received from center was to descend and maintain 13,000. I checked in with approach descending to 13,000; NOT via the arrival. Upon arrival at ZZZZZZ [fix], I requested lower twice from approach. Based on the altitude indicated on the arrival, we were approximately 5,000 feet high at that fix. After the second request for lower, the Approach Controller responded with "weren't you cleared to descend via?" I responded "no." He immediately issued us a descent to 4,000 and cleared us for the ILS approach. At this point we were still trying to "catch up" with altitudes. The Controller came back and issued us descent to 2,500. The Captain queried the controller if we were cleared for the ILS and he responded affirmatively. The Captain had us in LNAV/VNAV and selected 1,600 feet for the FAF. I was configuring the aircraft when we leveled off at 1,600 feet. I looked outside, saw we were looking "flat" for the approach and then the Controller issued us a low altitude alert. I responded that we had the field in sight. We maintained altitude until crossing the FAF, continued on the visual approach and landed without incident. We were confused that the aircraft did not descend to the proper altitude on the approach and after discussion concluded that the VNAV PATH did not capture. We also discussed that the VNAV had been written up recently, but it is unclear if it was related.

[Causes were] ZZZ Center leaving us high on the arrival and not clearing us to descend via the arrival. ZZZ1 approach control not listening to the check in and assuming we were cleared to descend via. Our decision to continue knowing we were behind the descent profile. I have had ZZZ Center leave me high on this arrival every time I have flown it.
Controllers are task saturated right now with operating multiple sectors. This may account for leaving us high and also the approach controller not comprehending the information given on check in. We were left high and instead of asking for vectors to lose altitude, we continued.

**Narrative: 2**

ZZZ Center began limiting our altitudes while we descended on the ZZZZZ5 arrival to ZZZ resulting in us being 4-5,000 feet high 25 miles from the field. We were switched to Approach and had to ask for lower because the approach controller didn't realize we were not "descending via." We descended in level change at 220 knots from 13,000 feet to 5,000 starting 20-some miles from the field trying to regain the VNAV path. Approach cleared us to 4,000 feet and then cleared us for the ILS XXR from ZZZZZ. I fumbled around in the box to join the arrival to the approach, and then approach cleared us to descend to 2,500 causing more confusion. "Aren't we cleared for the approach?" "Yes." I dialed 1,600 feet for the FAF into the altitude window satisfied we had captured the path, and I armed Approach thinking we were still above the glideslope. As we broke out of the scattered layer around 2,000 feet we got a "low altitude alert" from approach control while the autopilot leveled us at 1,600 feet. I thought we had gotten a brief GPWS "Terrain" closure warning at the same time, although the FO does not recall that. We told the controller we had the field in sight and continued visually for a stable VMC approach and landing.

On debrief the FO and I concluded the most logical explanation was that we had never captured the path and had blown through the step-down altitudes of 2,500 and 2,200 in level change while thinking we were on the VNAV path. The following day the FO reminded me that the aircraft we had flown during the event, XXX, had had a previous write-up that VNAV would not engage on takeoff. That knowledge left us wondering what was the actual cause of the busted altitudes.

[Caused by] a series of events had led to leaving us high and time-compressed on the approach.

The FO had experienced this a few times before when on the arrival to ZZZ, and we had discussed it in our arrival brief. ATC could have handled the center to approach handoff and our approach clearance better. I should have asked for random vectors when I realized we were being rushed.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported the flight was left high by ATC on arrival which contributed to missing step down altitudes and receiving a low altitude alert as the flight descended.
ACN: 1751042

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1751042
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience: Flight Crew. Total: 4
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1751043
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Ground Incursion: Taxiway
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Pilot-induced deviation from ATC taxi clearance at ZZZ.

While leaving Spot XX our taxi clearance was B K Z for Runway XXL. I inadvertently turned right onto B instead of turning left. We realized our mistake once we were approaching G and Ground advised us to turn right on F, right GX to hold short of G.

There was no traffic conflict or safety of flight issues during our taxi. We should have contacted ground a bit sooner once we realized the mistake. Ground advised us to phone them due to a possible pilot deviation. Upon block in at ZZZ1 I phoned them and spoke with Person X. He advised us to not worry about this event and nothing will come of it. I apologized and thanked him.

Contributing factors:

We were stuck at the ramp for an excessive amount of time due to other departing traffic. This created a time constraint for us as we wanted to complete the turn flight on time. I was in a hurry to get to the west side of ZZZ and didn't follow the correct taxi route.

Ground Control will often say turn left or right when we are initially cleared from a spot. They didn't do this today. They seem like they are now overworked, often covering both sides of the airport and sometimes with both Ground and Tower being worked by one Controller.

We are all concerned about the current depressed state of the aviation industry and this also causes a distraction on the job.

Narrative: 2
Pilot induced deviation from ATC taxi clearance at ZZZ. While leaving Spot XX our taxi clearance was RXXL B K Z. The Captain inadvertently turned right onto B instead of Left. We realized the mistake once approaching G and Ground ATC advised turn right F right GX hold short G. There was no traffic conflict or safety of flight issues during taxi. Told to call ATC in which they advised us not to worry about the event and nothing further to come from it.

Wrongly interpreted the taxi instructions. Contributing factors including excessive amount of time at gate before push due to traffic behind us. Made induced stress trying to rush to make up time. Next, ATC gave no turn instructions onto B like usual and seemed over worked and busy at the time.

Once on B bridge it didn't seem right to both of us and should of immediately questioned ATC and got further instructions from there. We also should not of rushed and reviewed clearance before taxiing.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a taxiway incursion and stated that Ground Control did not issue direction of turn instructions as they typically do and appeared to be overworked.
ACN: 1751027

**Time / Day**

Date: 202007  
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**

Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference: US  
Altitude AGL: Single Value: 0

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing  
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Parked

**Person: 1**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying  
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 18000  
Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 36  
Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 2435  
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1751027  
Human Factors: Distraction  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness  
Communication Breakdown:  
Communication Breakdown: Party 1: Flight Crew  
Communication Breakdown: Party 2: Ground Personnel  
Communication Breakdown: Party 2: Flight Crew

**Person: 2**

Reference: 2  
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function: Flight Crew: Captain
Function: Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification: Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience: Flight Crew, Total : 1963.82
Experience: Flight Crew, Last 90 Days : 9.57
Experience: Flight Crew, Type : 1963.82
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number : 1751028
Human Factors : Confusion

Events
Anomaly, Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly, Ground Event / Encounter : Other / Unknown
Detector, Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result, Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was assigned to Flight ABCD on Day 4 as a line check airman and was scheduled to give X line-checks over X days. Prior to this assignment, I was scheduled on Day 3 to give a first officer requal which was a one day trip. This assignment was canceled on Day 1 due to an aircraft substitution. On Day 2 training scheduling called and asked if I could train the same first officer on a different assignment. Even though this assignment was longer, I agreed to do the trip. ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ on Day 3.

First day Requal ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ

Second day I started pairing Flight ABCD. First leg was line-check ZZZ-ZZZ2, then sit for 5:30 hours, then another line-check ZZZ2-ZZZ3. Since this was mid-trip, I was not able to get any rest and had a long lunch off-site from the airport with a friend. After lunch I did a line-check ZZZ2-ZZZ3. By the time I reached my hotel, I was tired, ate dinner and went to bed early.

Third day started with a scheduled deadhead to ZZZ3-ZZZ4. When arriving in ZZZ4 and showed up for my next leg, a line-check ZZZ4-ZZZ5, I learned the original Captain had called in sick and the new Captain did not need a line-check. I informed training scheduling that the scheduled Captain was no longer on the trip and I was told to deadhead in the back of the aircraft to ZZZ5. At some point on day 2 or 3, crew scheduling called to inform me there was an issue with First Officer on the last day of my pairing for Flight EFGH, and asked if I could do the line check from the first officer seat. In the interest of the operation, I agreed.

Fourth day started with a late hotel shuttle. By the time I got my required [COVID] temperature check and took the train to gate it was 25 minutes prior to departure. There were issues with the gate agents in issuing the required jumpseat access card. This flight was a line-check ZZZ5-ZZZ6.
When I arrived in ZZZ6, I received an email from training scheduling, telling me that the Captain for Flight EFGH had called in sick and they were looking for a new Captain who needed a line check. I then called training scheduling and told them, if they could not find a Captain who needed a line check, I would prefer to go back to ZZZ when I arrived in ZZZ3. I told them it had been a long few days and I was tired and wanted to get home. The scheduler told me they did not have a first officer and they would have to leave me on the trip as the flying first officer. She also stated whoever the Captain was on this leg, I would be giving them a line-check from the right seat.

ZZZ6-ZZZ3 the Captain on this leg had not flown in several months and just came out of a landings class. While this crew did a good job and had a satisfactory line-check, I spent most of the flight and debrief going over new procedures and techniques. When I landed in ZZZ3, I called Captain X and left a voice mail and followed up with a text regarding our roles and duties for Flight EFGH. I informed him, who I was and that I would be giving him a line check the next morning while sitting in the right seat doing first officer duties. I went to the hotel and had a normal night’s sleep.

Fifth day Flight in question.
I went to the airport early so I would have extra time reviewing first officer flows and preparing the flight deck. When I started to preflight on the [tablet], the flight plan never pushed to my [tablet] and I had to call dispatch twice. It never pushed and I had to get the dispatcher to mark me fit for duty and manually download the flight plan. I was at the gate an hour prior to the flight.

Captain X showed up about 15 mins later. We briefed and I explained my role as an LCA and I would be giving him a line check from the right seat and we agreed I would fly the leg.
The flight was uneventful, Captain X did a good job and I gave him high marks for his line-check. His performance was better than most other captains I have observed on prior line-checks.

After we landed in ZZZ, we arrived at Gate XXX and stopped the aircraft, I did my parking flow. I cannot remember whether or not I heard Captain X call to shut down engine #1. Engine #2 was shut down during the single engine taxi to the gate.

We ran the parking check list. During the check list the Captain said several times that one of the rampers was signaling to him and he could not understand what the rramer was trying to communicate. This was a distraction that pulled us away from or normal duties and interrupted the checklist. After the check list, I had to complete the line check form on the [tablet], which is cumbersome to use. I did notice a noise coming from the cabin and my first thought was it was the new cleaning system and thought it was odd because the passenger door just opened. I looked at the engine gauges and I could not see them because the screens were already set low for the termination. The Captain had gotten up out of his seat and immediately heard the noise from the engine and saw the ramp supervisor. He told me the #1 engine was still running. I immediately shut is down and reran the entire parking check list, visually confirmed the fuel flow was zero. Captain X and I debriefed this. I am unsure of the amount of time from setting the parking brake to shutting down the engine but estimate is was 2 mins. It should also be noted that this aircraft has a different style of fuel cutoff levers. They are not levers but knobs and visually are not a prominent in the off and on positions.

From the time the parking brake was set, to discovering the engine running, I never left my seat. During this time, I was still performing my LCA duties and was double checking
all my first officer duties were completed. I believe that even if Captain X had not caught our mistake, I would have caught it before I left my seat.

There were numerous distractions. I have only flown 36 hours in 90 days and have not flown in the first officer’s seat in over four months. The numerous scheduling changes added to the confusion. Furthermore, it was difficult to evaluate a Captain from the right seat while managing my first officer and line check airman duties.

I’m certainly not trying to make excuses because the errors were definitely made between the both of us. Regardless of the distractions, I need to remain vigilant and strictly adhere to SOP. Proper checklist discipline is one of the most important tools we have to avoid threats which ultimately lead to an overall reduction of errors. I will use this event as a discussion point about the importance of checklist discipline as well as other procedural threats we face in our operation, especially in the current environment where so many pilots are changing seats and aircraft.

**Narrative: 2**

After parking at the gate the number one engine was left running due to procedure, distractions, and checklist non compliance.

The flight was conducted as a line check for myself. The FO position was flown by an LCA. The LCA was on his last day of 5 and I was flying a one day trip. (deadhead ZZZ ZZZ1 operate ZZZ1 ZZZ2)

I got to sleep at approximately XA:30 pm and I woke at XG:00 am at home and was unable to get back to sleep. I drove to ZZZ, deadheaded to ZZZ1 and operated the ZZZ1 ZZZ2 leg of my trip. I did not feel fatigued when I arrived in ZZZ1.

The flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 was uneventful. After arriving at the gate, I set the parking brake, verified brake pressure normal, and called for the number one engine to be shutdown. I started my after landing flow when I noticed a ground personnel giving me the external power signal. I was confused as the jet-bridge was the not yet at the aircraft. I returned the signal thinking he wanted to know if we wanted ground power. I finished my after landing flow and called for the parking checklist. The checklist was started, and again, I noticed the ground personnel signaling. I noticed the ground power was plugged in. I switch the aircraft over to ground power and shutdown the APU. We finish the parking checklist. During the checklist, I verbalized, but did not verify Engine Start Levers....Cutoff. We did a quick flight debrief and I headed toward the cockpit exit to thank the passengers. I heard the engine and saw a ground personnel in the jetway. I immediately realized what had happened and turned back to the cockpit and called for the engine to be shutdown. We ran the parking checklist again and debriefed our mishap. I allowed myself to be distracted during a checklist and did not call for the checklist to be started from the beginning. A mistake in checklist discipline.

I have flown approximately 9 hours over the past 4 months due to the COVID-19 epidemic. during my deadhead flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 I reviewed the emergency and normal procedures in my flight manual. I should have put more emphasis on the checklist section. The Captain is responsible for all checklists being completed!

In over XX years of flying I have never been so disappointed in my performance as a pilot. I pride myself in being professional and SAFE. As the current state of the airline industry and our Country as a whole is a huge distraction to everyday life, I must be more disciplined than ever...Verbalize, Verify, Crosscheck!
I will try to be a better pilot and strive to achieve perfect checklist compliance. I will also brief other pilots on my error to increase the safety of our airline.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported they left an engine running after parking at the gate. They cited as contributing factors the failure to complete a checklist due to distraction.
ACN: 1750965

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked
Maintenance Status.Released For Service: Y
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type: Unscheduled Maintenance
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Installation

Component
Aircraft Component: Oxygen System/Portable
Aircraft Reference: X

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Apprentice
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750965
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was informed [of] a P/N XX-XXX-XX PBE being installed on Aircraft X and inflight [crew] not being trained how to use it.

Mr. X requested that I look into the PBE's. I activated PBE P/N XX-XXX-XX which was already setup in the system so that purchasing could procure the parts as replacements for the discontinued PBE XX-XXX-YY's that expire late July. PBE XX-XXX-XX had previously been an alternate part in the IPC. During a routine check, maintenance replaced P/N XX-XXX-YY on WO XXXXXXXXX due to it expiring in less than 45 days. This replacement included ordering the XX-XXX-XX from the IPC with bracket XXXXXXXX and mounting hardware. A system-generated, scheduled WO YYYYYYYYY due for replacement by the end of July had a new P/N XX-XXX-YY PBE request attached.

In response to Mr. X request and in accordance with the IPC, I activated PBE P/N XX-XXX-XX. The part must be active to purchase and to save any changes to remarks and links in the system. In this instance, there are processes that could have been improved. Had the X form been used, I would have been triggered to get with inflight [crew]. The P/N XX-XXX-XX was already set up in the system as a rotable with the life limit.

When we parked the aircraft and moved them to storage, I suggested that the PBE's be removed and returned to stores to get the most yield out of the current XX-XXX-YY PBE's.

**Synopsis**

Technician reported installing a new PBE on an aircraft without informing, nor training the flight crew on how to use it.
ACN: 1750962

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Galley
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750962
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On taxi, final walk-through, as the #2 FA, I noted a passenger who would not wear his mask. The passenger stated that he had asthma. I asked if he had noted that to the gate agent and was he on the list for medical exemption. I walked to first class, reviewed paperwork and had borrowed the #3's tablet as it was closer to me. After speaking to the passenger, I went back up to first class to return #3's tablet. Clearly, I didn't process that the Captain had made the prepare for takeoff PA and found myself in the FWD galley for takeoff. In over 20 years, I have never had this happen to me, I was positively stunned that I wasn't in my jumpseat for takeoff. The #1 and #3 stated that I should stay where I
was as an attempt to run to my jumpseat during takeoff could injure myself or our passengers.

The personal sense [of] fear, shock and embarrassment I am experiencing over not being in my jumpseat for takeoff will more than likely make me hyper vigilant to this issue. In addition, I will place more emphasis on situational awareness and pay greater attention to PAs being made, stopping what I am doing to pay attention to what is being communicated. Recent global events (COVID-19 pandemic) policy and procedural changes in concert with related stressors involved have been dis-regulating, thus placing a greater emphasis on being present and aware in the moment, the gradual adjusting to new procedures (mask wearing) should also prevent re-occurrence of this FAR violation.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported being distracted with having to verify that a passenger had a medical condition and therefore did not have to wear a mask. During the distraction the Flight Attendant missed the Captain's PA "prepare for takeoff" and was not seated as the flight departed.
ACN: 1750943

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750943
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750958
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result: Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
While flying on a star (ZZZZZ X arrival) into ZZZ and inside the fix ZZZZZ1 transitioning to fix ZZZ VOR, we were unconfigured and at 250 kts. This is because the assumed traffic norm in the ZZZ radar pattern (based on past experience) is not to slow until slowed by approach, due to sequencing. However, inside of ZZZZZ1 250 kts unconfigured and believing we were transitioning to the ZZZ VOR on the Star, Approach Control cleared us for the Visual XX (ILS XX was advertised on ATIS). We were approximately over ZZZZZ2. I advised my FO to activate the XX ILS IF fix ZZZZZ2, to activate back-up guidance, while simultaneously slowing, configuring, and calling for appropriate check-list. I disconnected the autopilot, we configured and simultaneously intercepted the visual glide slope, but just inside 1,000 feet our descent rate was roughly 1,300 FPM (which is well outside of the stabilized approach criteria). I called the go-around and was giving runway heading and 2,000 feet. Due to our high energy state, and irregular go-around I overshot my altitude by roughly +150 feet. I quickly corrected to the assigned altitude 2,000 feet MSL.

Narrative: 2
We operated a flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. The Captain was pilot flying, I was pilot Monitoring. On the arrival we were cleared for the visual for Runway XX, but we were too high on approach and still at 250 knots when clearance was given. At that point we had to quickly react to get down and configure while maintaining a stable approach. We almost were able to make it, but due to an excessive descent rate the Captain called a go-around. Tower assigned us runway heading and 2,000 feet. Due to task saturation and a fast climb rate we broke through 2,000 between 2-300 feet high. We corrected and were vectored back for an expressway visual [Runway] YY for a safe and stable approach. The go-around could have been avoided had we been cleared and slowed down earlier. We could have prompted ATC to do it as well, although due to habit we were expecting to be slowed down. A similar event happened to me and the Captain the day before going to ZZZ1 for the visual [Runway] XX. We were vectored high turning base still at 250 knots. While we were able to get down and slow down while maintaining a stable approach but it was a lot to manage being that close to the airport. One thing of note is that pilots as well as Air Traffic Control are not working as often, so I can see that being a big impact on this particular situation, that we can operate and work at optimal performance levels.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around. The crew also stated they overshot their altitude during the go-around.
ACN: 1750923

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude: MSL: Single Value: 6800

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1750923
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

While climbing out of ZZZ, initially we were assigned to climb and level at 4,000 feet which changed to 7,000 feet. I engaged the autopilot at 5,000 feet and maintained 250 kts per the SID. Approximately 6,800 feet ATC assigned to climb and maintain 19,000. The power setting and speed I had was maintaining 250 kts. The aircraft Alts Capped and the speed shot up to approximately 285 kts since the power was reduced but not enough. I disengaged the autopilot, reduced the power, corrected the airspeed deviation and continued to climb as assigned.

Cause of this event was due to me being behind the aircraft in climb and getting too behind the automation. Another contributing factor was due to me not flying approximately 80 days leading to a lack of proficiency.

[I] suggest pilots who have not flown recently to slow down and make sure they stay ahead of the aircraft to minimize errors and deviations.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing a speed deviation during departure and stated lack of flying contributed to the event.
Events

Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred : All Types
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

I recently completed my CQMV after having it rescheduled twice due to the Coronavirus precautions. I have not flown since mid April and am now on reserve. Since there are so many reserves and so little open flying on my fleet, I don't expect to receive a flying assignment for some time.

I am concerned about the possibility of being paired with a First Officer who has been displaced from the left seat, receives one simulator session and two legs with an LCA and is then put on reserve with no requirement to consolidate the training. The very real possibility that both the Captain and the newly minted First Officer will have gone months without flying prior to their trip together. This situation gets even worse when the Captain has been bumped back to the type X Aircraft (which he has flown previously) from another Manufacturer X aircraft, received an abbreviated training event and very little, if any, time in the airplane with a LCA with no requirement to consolidate.

It would seem that these scenarios would ring alarm bells on safety management model.

How is a flight crew to mitigate the threat that this presents in the very likely event that they are assigned a trip where one or both pilots receive abbreviated training to their displaced position and subsequently go months without flying?
Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported concerns with lack of flying and the possibility of being paired with a First Officer who has also not flown in months.
ACN: 1750882

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1000

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Rain

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 18000
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 10
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 11000
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750882
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Ground Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Airport

**Narrative: 1**

Just reporting the PAPI lights for Runway X are out of service in ZZZZ. Due to the low visibility in rain showers, at night, we chose to land on Runway YY with a slight tailwind, with operable PAPI lights, only because we were in an empty type X Aircraft. If we were in a heavy type Y Aircraft we would be forced to use Runway X with no PAPI lights at night in the weather.

Especially due to COVID, pilots are not as proficient flying, we should have all resources available to conduct a safe operation. And just because ZZZZ airport has so few flights (we were the first flight in 2 months), does not mean they can allow those items to slide.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported non functional PAPI lights at airport for a specific runway and the safety hazards it could pose in weather conditions, especially when crews are not flying as often due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1750876

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Ramp: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 2559
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 33
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 2559
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750876
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Arrived at Gate XX ready for Flight ABC to ZZZ1. Preflight setup and pushback seemed to go correctly in accordance with "COVID normal" protocols of flight deck sanitation, mask wear, and external threat awareness (recency of experience, industry impact, employee distraction, etc.). I recall coordinating with push crew and FO for ramp push clearance to Spot XX, with subsequent engine start clearance prior to setting brakes and release at Spot XX. I do not recall missing the required coordination from Ramp Control to metering and Ground prior to taxing from Spot XX, but have been advised that we did fail to obtain release/clearance from Ramp Control prior to subsequent taxi clearance with Ground. Perhaps the external distractions I had been so concerned about finally caught up to me. It is never my intention to disregard procedure and can only promise to be more diligent on internal threats (my own, included) in this new threat environment. Speak louder through the mask and ensure all communication and associated procedures are complete in step by step manner through verbalization, verification and monitoring to preclude error.

We called for push and were pushed to the top of the alley. The taxiway was directly in front of the aircraft and we switched to Ground after engine start to commence taxi. Have been informed ZZZ Ramp would like a call to switch us to Ground themselves.

Air carrier flight crew reported a taxiway incursion and stated distraction from COVID-19 pre-flight related procedures contributed to the event.
ACN: 1750804

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase. Other

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Deplaning
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750804

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
I wanted to report an incident involving a COVID positive passenger on Flight ABC ZZZ-ZZZZ.

Upon arrival in ZZZZ flight attendants were made aware of a COVID positive passenger. The rep announced over the PA the passenger's name, and seat number - and said multiple times for the passenger to remain on the plane and not to deplane.

After all the passengers have deplaned. The flight attendants and pilots stayed on the aircraft as the medic was assessing the affected passenger.
Shortly after the medic left, he returned and checked our temperatures. We were told we could clear customs and go to the hotel.

We were later told, that a minimum crew of 3 needed to stay behind on the plane until the COVID positive passenger had deplaned. 3 FAs stayed behind until the passenger deplaned and the rest went to the hotel.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that upon arrival at destination, a COVID-19 positive passenger on board as well as the crew, had to be medically assessed before being allowed to leave the aircraft.
I believe an unsafe situation exists at ZZZ ARTCC. Management has had supervisors in the building daily even though the COVID-19 pandemic continues. One of the supervisors tested positive and had interaction with controllers and been in the same working and break areas. We have since had a Controller test positive. I believe much of our risk could have been mitigated with better restrictions on who was and was not allowed to enter the building. I understand it's not entirely possible to eliminate all risks but I feel more thought and care should have gone into the way plans were laid out.

Stop having ANYONE non essential to the operation enter the building. Including the highest levels of management. Especially if their work could be done from home.

Synopsis
Center Controller reported a Supervisor who had tested positive for COVID-19 had interacted with controllers. Controller suggested allowing only essential workers in the building.
ACN: 1750709

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Light Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Vectors
Route In Use.STAR: ZZZZZ
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 17500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 20
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 90
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750709
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Staffing

Narrative: 1
While conducting an arrival on the ZZZZZ arrival into ZZZ, we were given 2,000 feet and direct ZZZZZ for ZZZ ILS XX approach and to expect the visual approach upon reaching ZZZZZ. We had the airport in sight and reported the airport several times to the Controller (he was very busy operating several approach frequencies at the same time which was unknown to us) he finally told everyone to stand by and he would call each aircraft back, as we crossed ZZZZZ while maintaining our last altitude (glide path was pegged at the bottom), we again called him with airport, he finally responded with cleared the visual and contact the Tower. We started down, by 800 feet AGL, we knew there was no way to stabilize our approach, we called "miss approach" to tower, then started the missed approach procedure, we reported our miss as an unstable approach, Tower was great in vectoring us around the pattern in his airspace and bringing us for another approach. Our next approach and landing was uneventful, thanks to the great Tower Controller. With the COVID-19 virus roaring its ugly head and aviation industry trying to come back to life, there is no easy solution, ATC is short handed, controllers and pilots alike are overworked.

Synopsis
Corporate pilot reported having to execute a missed approach after a delayed approach clearance left the flight too high to conduct a stabilized approach. The pilot stated that the Controller was very busy working multiple frequencies and asked flights to stand by for call backs.
ACN: 1750708

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 3000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 3200

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Electrical Power
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
 Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 2200
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 120
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 1591
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750708
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Landed in Emergency Condition
Result.Flight Crew : Diverted

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

During dual flight with Instrument student, we had a total electric/avionics failure. The failure we suspect stems from a short in the right seat's headset jacks (possibly due to the Push-to-talk). There was loud static sound on the intercom, exacerbated when trying to adjust right seat's headset jacks.

Soon after leaving hold at ZZZZZ, on vector 360 at 3,000 feet, Com1 flashed and went dark. Student set approach frequency in Com2. Then Com2 went dark also. When student was about to squawk 7600, transponder turned off. Then GPS and entire Avionics Stack turned off. Ammeter appeared to be stable zero. We checked circuit breakers, none popped. Com 1, Com 2, Transponder flashed on and off intermittent. Tried to restart Transponder, it read Transponder failure when on. Turned Avionics Master off and on. Still on vector 360, I decided to continue VFR straight ahead to ZZZ and descended to be 500 feet below broken cloud layer. We could hear ATC trying to contact us, even when the entire stack was dark. Both the Student and I tried transmitting that we had full electrical failure and going to ZZZ, with no recognition.

We circled to enter 45 to the left downwind XX, with extreme caution scanning for traffic. At that moment I decided to take my headset jacks out. When I did, Com1, 2, and transponder turned on. I'm trying to communicate vocally with Student in loud cockpit. I tell him to tell ATC we are landing at ZZZ. I dial in CTAF on standby. I tell student to announce our position. Windsock Shows direct crosswind. Abeam the numbers I see an aircraft departing Runway XY. I point out the aircraft and tell student to turn right, to depart the pattern. With no indication that he understood, I yell and gesture "My Controls." Turn right to the East then South and see the other aircraft turning right downwind XY. I turn left to reenter 45 to the right downwind, cautiously scanning for traffic. Reenter pattern right downwind XY. I give controls back to student. Student lands. We are greeted at the FBO by 2 staff members. I learned that my student was successful on last transmission with ATC. They inform us that they called ATC back when we were on the ground. Student called national hotline to close the flight plan.

After a moment to reflect, I did not try removing the Push-to-talk, and reinserting my headphones. So the malfunction could have been due to the Push-to-talk. After reflection
on the difficulty of vocal communication, I realized that I was wearing a mask due to COVID-19. When I was trying to communicate the student could not see my lips moving and my voice was muffled, which probably led to the student's confusion. My reason for diverting to ZZZ, was because ZZZ1 is frequented by corporate jets and many GA aircraft; to avoid high traffic and interference. And because when we couldn't figure out what had happened, we were just to the south of ZZZ and landing was the priority.

**Synopsis**

Flight Instructor reported experiencing an electrical and avionics failure while conducting a training flight. While attempting to speak to the student without using a headset, the instructor noted it was difficult to communicate because the COVID-19 mask muffled the voice.
**Time / Day**
Date: 202007

**Place**
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type: Scheduled Maintenance

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Rudder
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Maintenance: Technician
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750671
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Maintenance: Technician
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750673
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Person: 3**
- Reference: 3
- Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Maintenance: Technician
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750674
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Maintenance
- When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
While performing rudder lube tasks for aircraft [coming out of] storage, the aircraft rudder was inadvertently damaged during the removal of the flight control lock.

During restoring the aircraft to normal condition after completion of rudder Lube AMM XX-XX-XX/XXX, AMM YY-YY-YY-YYY-YYY an additional lift/personnel should have been in place to remove pressure off lock rather than move rudder hydraulically to enable removing rudder lock.

Narrative: 2
We were assigned the rudder lube for aircraft [coming out of] storage. The rudder was damaged while trying to remove the actuator locks.

The rudder could not be moved from the leading edge and pulling the lock at the same time. When trying to use hydraulic systems to move rudder full right to overcome the weight, the damage occurred. We should have used an additional person to move the trailing edge of the rudder manually as per AMM XX-XX-XX/XXX.

Narrative: 3
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
Air carrier maintenance technicians reported that the rudder was inadvertently damaged while preparing to perform rudder lube on an aircraft that was being returned to service from storage.
Flight attendant actions regarding CPR in a COVID environment.

Currently, flight attendants are only qualified in one person CPR. The environment in which we operate in now requires everyone to wear an appropriate PPE covering their mouth and face.

Onboard we have two (2) items to assist us with delivering breathes to a passenger in need.

*Pocket Mask
*Bag Valve Mask (BVM)

However, flight attendants are only allowed to use one of these resources; the pocket mask. Getting oxygenated blood throughout the body is key to anyone's survival. Delaying
such treatment could lead to lifelong complications and/or death. In the event of the need for CPR a flight attendant will need to remove their PPE to operate the pocket mask effectively. Whereas if they were trained on the usage of the BVM it would keep the flight attendant, passenger and bystanders safe.

Chest Compression Only CPR will not be effective in our environment as we have a major delay time of Advance Life Support (ALS) to arrive on scene.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendant reported that there are two types of CPR devices available on board, however flight attendants are qualified to use only one, which requires removal of the personal protective mask in order to use. Reporter requests training on the other device to keep everyone safe in a COVID-19 environment.
**ACN: 1750656**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Aircraft : 3**
- Reference: Z
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750656
- Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1750660
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
While preparing to depart Runway XXR out of ZZZ, [on] Flight ABCD, [we] experienced an inadvertent miscommunication with Tower Control. Being the only aircraft holding short of XXR, our crew misheard the call sign as Tower cleared for takeoff the only departing traffic on XXR. In this miscommunication, Flight ABCD repeated the instruction "Flight ABCD, cleared for takeoff, Runway XXR". No contrary command was then given by Tower. While aligned on the runway and preparing to depart, Tower requested a radio check, followed by instructions to hold short of XXR. Our crew responded in kind, notifying Tower that we were on the runway. At this time we also queried if Tower would like us to exit the runway. Tower then cleared us for takeoff with no further issue before handing us off to Departure.

Miscommunication was likely due to both our misunderstanding the initial call sign and Tower Control operating numerous frequencies with multiple departing runways. Extra vigilance on our part in verifying ALL call signs/instructions. Awareness of ATC threats through reduced staffing and managing multiple frequencies.
We understand the breakdown in communication that occurred and the need for vigilance in clarifying any future instructions or questions.

**Narrative: 2**

Taxiing out to Runway XXR we hear a radio call from Aircraft Z on several mile final for XXR. We then hear a takeoff clearance for Runway XXR that we believed to be for us. ".... cleared for takeoff Runway XXR, Aircraft Z on a 3 mile final." Our response "Cleared for takeoff Runway XXR, Flight ABCD." (I listened to the audio after the flight and it turned out the Tower Controller initially said "Flight EFGC cleared for takeoff Runway XXR Aircraft Z on a 3 mile final.") We obviously did not know that in the moment. The problem with that was we knew Flight EFGC was holding short of Runway XXL at B5 awaiting takeoff clearance. We were number one for departure off Runway XXR and all instructions from Tower were directed towards our situation as we saw Aircraft Z on a 3 mile final for Runway XXR. Once we were on the runway aligned with the centerline, Tower asked for a radio check. We responded. Then we hear "Flight ABCD hold short of XXR". We queried Tower that we had been cleared for takeoff and already positioning on XXR. Tower cleared us for takeoff XXR with no further incident.

I think Tower was having some miscommunication on multiple Tower frequencies or multiple aircraft on multiple runways. Tower had no further comments or questions when handing us off to Departure and nothing indicated there was any sort of problem other than a brief miscommunication that was quickly resolved. Safety was never compromised. Seems as if Tower just used the wrong call sign when clearing the aircraft holding short of XXR (which was us) for takeoff that we inadvertently missed initially, but was quickly resolved with a query back and forth with ATC.

Always a good idea to verify and be fully aware of call sign and instructions. We know going forward with staff reductions ATC can be a threat. We understand the breakdown in communication and know what we would do differently next time.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported a runway incursion which resulted from a call sign misunderstanding. A contributing factor was that the Tower Controller was managing multiple frequencies and runways.
ACN: 1750649

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 15000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750649
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Undershoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was the FO and Pilot Monitoring on this flight, and the Captain was the pilot flying. He is highly experienced but had not flown much in the last couple months. We have both flown this route dozens of times or more, and the flight was non-eventful until the approach. We were given a standard descent clearance that left us ample time to descend for the visual to Runway XX. The Captain previously did not brief or plan any specifics for how he was just going to descend, we briefed just the approach and the taxi in and airport details. After our descent clearance, the Captain selected a very shallow descent than left us 20 miles out at around 15,000 feet on a straight in approach, much higher than our typical 3 degrees. The descent rate was then increased but by then it was too late to salvage the approach, but he continued towards the runway. Approximately 7 miles out and on a 30 degree angle to intercept the localizer course we were flaps 20, gear down and around two thousand feet high by my best guess. At this point the Captain abruptly turned off the autopilot and quickly banked to the right in what was a poor attempt to lose altitude, which quickly exceeded 30 degrees of bank. I called "watch the bank" just before we exceeded 45 degrees of bank and the aural BANK ANGLE was heard. The Captain corrected back to the left but rapidly over corrected and I believe we had a bank angle aural that direction too. I believe we experienced a flap over speed briefly as well. We were rapidly approaching 1,000 feet at this point still over 200 knots and I called a go-around and notified ATC. On the go-around the Captain was hesitant to employ any automation which led to another flap over speed as they retracted, despite numerous calls by me to monitor the speed. After we cleaned up we ran all the appropriate checklists and made a traffic pattern for a normal landing. I don't believe the Captain made appropriate entries into the maintenance log for the flap over speeds or the go-around. Both overspeeds were less than 10 knots over the placarded speed.

Fundamentally this was caused by poor planning. No descent plan was briefed or employed, and the initial descent rate was inadequate for us to fly a stable approach. I believe the Captain had tunnel vision, and was hesitant to use me or ATC to help remedy the situation. The bank issues after disconnecting the autopilot were caused by faulty airplane handling skills and made it more difficult for me to assist or provide direction as the demand of hand flying further increased the tunnel vision effect, this tunnel vision and lack of automation use continued into the go-around and led to our flap over speed there. In addition I believe pride led to improper maintenance procedures being followed after the flight.

All of this could have been avoided with proper planning, and good communication with me as the PM and ATC to help us descend. With just a few minutes of delay vector we could have easily flown a stable approach the first time, even with the late descent. I should have been more forceful when I noticed the descent planning, and I should questioned the Captain's plan even though he was highly experienced.
Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported that while attempting to lose altitude on an unstable approach the Captain exceeded a 45-degree bank angle and a flap overspeed occurred. A second overspeed occurred during the subsequent go-around.
ACN: 1750645

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference
  ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1000

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750645
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Advised after the fact that I was not configured prior to 1,000 feet. I'd mistakenly thought that was to be done by 500 feet. Reviewed FOM and discussed Captain not calling the go-around at the gate.

I turned too close to the FAF and was trying to keep my speed up thinking someone was right behind us. There wasn't. I also inadvertently left power in on glideslope capture, so was behind and trying to catch up.

Fly your reserves more. I have been picking up trips to try to stay proficient, being new to company procedures. I won't make this mistake again, but am missing flying to stay at the 110% needed to do this job.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported the aircraft was not properly configured for approach per company procedures. Reporter cited the need to fly more frequently.
ACN: 1750637

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace-Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750637
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Before arrival ATIS wind XXXXGXX, pilots briefed Runway X and executed ILS X, during final Tower reported wind changed to YYYYGYY, pilot went around and request visual [Runway] XX. Went around second time due to unstabilized approach. Performed visual XX again, during right base to final turn, pilot looking out for the runway, did not maintain speed and stick shaker activated, then performed go-around. Landed Runway XY without further issue.

Pilot flying first flight in 83 days, not proficient on the flying skill. First time flying to ZZZ, unfamiliar airport. And after the second go-around, getting stressful, terrain around the airport making the approach more stressful, and right traffic not easy to look at the runway.

Will focus on flying the airplane carefully and monitor the speed constantly during fly.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported they executed three go-arounds before successfully landing on the fourth attempt. Captain cited gusty conditions, lack of recent flying and unfamiliarity with airport as contributing factors.
ACN: 1750618

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ. TRACON
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace. Class C: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750618
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1752582
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

**Events**

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

FO was PF on first leg of 3-day sequence (I assigned him the first leg since he was senior on the aircraft, I was just off OE as CA, and had not flown in 5 weeks). Cleared direct to ZZZZZZ fix for visual approach to Runway XX. Noticed FO was a bit high and fast, but given his experience flying the airplane, [I] felt he could adjust accordingly. When checked in with Tower, they cleared us to land. FO continued going direct to ZZZZZ fix, and was in a high energy state. Although my attention was diverted momentarily, I thought I saw him pull HDG to establish himself on a downwind leg outside of ZZZZZ; a false assumption. I mentioned that we were high and pretty fast, but he said he thought he could get it within stable approach parameters by 1,000 feet. I monitored sink rate and airspeed. At 1,000 feet, I recall that he was within parameters, but I overlooked that fact that flaps were not at final setting. At the time I completed the final flap setting and checklist, I believe we were within stable approach parameters, but I overlooked the requirement for final flap configuration no later than 1,000 feet AGL. Normal landing made within landing zone with no adverse consequences. Once at the gate, FO was very apologetic and angry at himself for not going around. I told him it was a crew failure, not just his; I should have commanded a go-around.

**Cause -**

1. Lack of currency. This was my first post-OE flight. My last OE flight was early June. I had been practicing flows and callouts during this down time, but recall feeling very clumsy and "behind the curve" on this flight.
2. I should have been more assertive in calling a go-around early on in an approach that didn't look like it was going to end well. I vow to be much more assertive in the future to avoid another similar occurrence.
3. FO wore his COVID cloth face mask the entire flight; his communications were very difficult to decipher at times due to the muffling effect on his voice.
4. I made a false assumption that because the FO was senior and experienced, he was less fallible to getting too far behind the aircraft

**Suggestions -**

1. I should have called a "go-around" farther out on the approach when I saw that he wasn't "catching up" to a comfortable point in his aircraft stabilization.
2. After the lengthy gap since my OE, I wish I had requested a check airman in order to
get my skills back up to speed.
4. Don't hesitate: if it doesn't look right, go-around!

**Narrative: 2**

As a returning First Officer from a two month leave and a new Captain, our first approach into ZZZ we turned final a bit early and were caught high on approach. Then as we recovered on the approach with setting the aircraft for landing configuration I noticed around 1,200 feet that our flaps were not in the full position yet, so I called for flaps but at that point I believe we were passing through the 1,000 feet mark. We were able to stabilize at the 500 feet gate and make a safe landing but in hindsight we should have performed a go-around and completed another approach.

Some factors involved were crew communications and proficiency in the aircraft. I could have briefed my Captain better as to how I was going to transition to the approach from radar vectors that we had received. With him more aware of the exact plan we probably would have circumvented the situation. A recent leave of absence could have also been a contributing factor, though we both were experienced on the aircraft we seemed to be playing catch up on the approach.

**Suggestion:** Better planning and communication for the approach or simply perform a go-around and reestablish a stable approach.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and flaps not at final setting before 1,000 feet AGL. Captain stated he should have commanded the First Officer to go-around and cited lack of recent flying as a contributing factor.
**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750617
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative:** 1
The Captain asked me to secure the number two engine for a single engine taxi into the gate at ZZZ. I wrapped my fingers around the no 2 engine cut off lever and brought the lever to cutoff. I guess with my pinkie finger I accidentally also pulled the no 1 engine start lever out of the indent. I proceeded to secure the overhead panel after I did this I glanced back down at the start levers and first saw the no 1 engine start lever off the indent and in a panic I thought the Captain wanted me to shut off the no 1 engine and I thought I had started the procedure but didn't complete the task fully. So I started to bring the no 1 engine start lever to cutoff, realized the error of my ways and put it back up into the indent. The number one engine then shut down also. We then stopped the plane and started the number one engine back up and taxied to the gate without further incident.

It is something I have never done before, I needed to be more careful with my finger placement on the levers. I needed to slowdown. I was coming off of a two month leave and was just trying to show the Captain I was not rusty with any of the procedures. Single engine taxi is a somewhat unusual procedure for me and I should have slowed down and thought about each task before I accomplished the task.

**Synopsis**

First Officer reported being instructed to secure the number two engine for a single engine taxi to the gate, but accidentally shut off both engines.
ACN: 1750436

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: N90.TRACON
State Reference: NY

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: N90
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B: LGA

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750436
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
I was PF on this leg, first flight in 40 days. During approach prep for LGA ILS 4, review of briefing strip indicated "Autopilot Coupled approach not authorized." Review of other available approaches with similar 3.1 degree glideslopes and initial approach fixes have no restrictions. Since weather was rain with low ceilings, the ILS was the approach with the best capability. Trying to hand-fly an ILS in bad weather didn’t seem to be a viable option or the safest, and ceilings were low enough to require an ILS approach. I shot the approach with both APs engaged, monitored flight path compliance, and was able to take over visually around 400 feet AGL, landing in the first 1,200 feet of runway. This breakout point is similar to the DH for the RNAV GPS to Runway 4, which is allowed to be coupled. After returning home I inquired about why this restriction was listed, and what we are expected to do when bad weather requires approach to LGA Runway 4.

New to aircraft, had not flown in 40 days. Had not been in situation where a published ILS approach could not be used with an autopilot.

1. Provide a precision approach into LGA Runway 4 suitable for low ceiling/bad weather.
2. Provide some insight into why the coupled ILS is not as safe as a hand-flown ILS along the exact same flight path.
3. Provide some insight into why the RNAV GPS 4 can be coupled and flies the same flight path. (If the coupled ILS can only go down to 400-500 AGL, that seems like a more correct limitation than to completely limit AP use for an entire approach.)
4. Make this a review item in the company pages and provide some guidance on how best to handle this.
5. ATIS should not advertise ILS 4 as the active approach in bad weather when the approach is not authorized to be coupled. Should advertise "ILS and RNAV Runway 4."

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported concerns with the LGA ILS 4 approach identified as "Autopilot Coupled approach not authorized."
ACN: 1750396

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 5
Light: Night
Ceiling: Single Value: 5000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 12500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 150
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750396
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This was my first trip into ZZZZ. It was the first trip into ZZZZ for the entire crew. I do not feel like fatigue was a factor in this incident. However, I feel the constant new events from the COVID procedures and foreign country operations had me guessing what would happen next and certainly lowered my situational awareness. As a crew we were well aware of all the taxiway issues with ZZZZ and briefed thoroughly on this threat and how to avoid it. I did not want to be writing this report. From the start there was a lot of confusion understanding the Controller in ZZZZ from our ATC clearance to our taxi clearance there where multiple back and forth radio calls and discussion among the crew on what was said and to where we were cleared. We pushed back out of spot XYZ, cleared to taxi to Runway XX via L AXX A A1 holding point Runway XX hold short of B on AXX. This clearance alone took 3 or 4 radio calls and a discussion amongst us. While holding short of B on AXX I had the 10-9 ZZZZ taxi page called up. When I referenced this I noticed it was a hotspot and that it appeared to me that Taxiway A was the first available right turn from my current position. This was a mistake and I created a mental image that was not correct.

Tower, which was controlling taxi ops cleared us onto Taxiway A taxi to Runway XX. I called out turning right on Taxiway A. This was correct per our clearance and the crew agreed. However, I turned right onto Taxiway B instead of the second right turn onto Taxiway A. My mental model had me making the first right turn and I was concerned about taxing out to far and getting onto Runway YY. The First Officer called out my error. I set the parking brake and we as a crew confirmed I had made a error. We notified Tower that we were on B not A. We suggested a new clearance route of B L2 A to Runway XX. Tower seemed unconcerned and cleared us as requested. So there is my first taxiway incursion. I had developed a certain level of comfort with not knowing what to expect for the last 4 hours of constant new developments. The rest of the crew probably felt the same and relied on me to be correct. Normally I call out the turns and point which way I am turning and did the same time. The crew agreed because it was the correct thing to say, however; I didn't do the correct thing. The dark and lack of familiarity caught me. I should have stated that I was making the first right turn onto A which would have possibly clued in the crew that I had the wrong mental model. I didn't feel rushed at the time but looking back I was frustrated with the language issue and just wanted it to be over.

How will I avoid this in the future? I'll verbalize if I'm making the first of second turn that is available, I'll do my best to keep the crew in the loop, and more currency in foreign country operations will certainly help also.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported a taxiway incursion in a foreign country citing language barrier and unfamiliarity with the airport as contributing factors.
ACN: 1750367

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Throttle/Power Lever
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew: Total: 565.18
Experience.Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 3.9
Experience.Flight Crew: Type: 565.18
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750367
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: MEL
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Maintenance release form noted throttles failed to fully advance on takeoff by a previous crew. Maintenance believed it was due to worn servo gears that were not in stock, so write up was deferred with autothrottle switch off. The maintenance release form gave no direction to the flight crew.
I knew from previous experience and similar write ups that we should look up our climb EPR settings. I thought of it, but I failed to mention it to the FO, nor did I write it down, as I often do to avoid forgetting or becoming distracted.

We knew our takeoff power setting, but at the initial power reduction we both realized we did not know what EPR setting we should use for climb. This caused distraction during the climb phase. We initially simply set less EPR that still gave good climb performance. Then we referenced the appropriate climb performance charts in the FM. Later, I read in the FM about inoperative TMC, which I determined was essentially our situation due to autothrottle arm switch being in OFF position.
That discussion reminded us to also know our missed approach EPR. The FO said he had not experienced such a situation before. I told him I have and I shared some of that with him.

Both of us have flown very little due to COVID-19. I have flown only less than five hours plus landings requal in the sim in the last 90 days.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported taking off with a deferred item resulting in the autothrottle arm switch to be in the "OFF" position. The deferral requires the crew to look up the EPR climb settings before takeoff, which they failed to do.
Again this morning, as has happened on many, many occasions the past few months, there were numerous crews in briefing rooms without masks...no food or drinks in sight. The meaning of "should" in the FOM indicates "an action that is expected; a compelling reason must exist if the expectation cannot be met."

In accordance with State X Public Health Order, and current company documentation, employees must wear a face mask that covers the nose and mouth whenever training in a flight simulator training device with others, should wear a face mask while in hallways, briefing rooms and common areas.
This is not just a chance "error". I have repeatedly observed both instructors and evaluators not in compliance with the bulletin concerning mask wear.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported crews are not wearing COVID-19 mask in briefing rooms.
ACN: 1750335

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Component
Aircraft Component: Airspeed Indicator
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750335
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
I was the First Officer operating Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I reported for duty on time after a restful overnight stay at the hotel. Preflight planning was unremarkable.

After completing normal preflight, briefings, checklists, pushback, engine start, and taxi, we were cleared for takeoff in ZZZ on Runway XXR. Captain was the PF and advanced engine power smoothly as he called "check thrust." Thrust was normal. The yellow master caution illuminated ENG and I looked up to the overhead for further details finding the EEC's were in ALTN mode. At that point the autothrottles disconnected. As I looked down to my PFD I noted my airspeed was still resting at 45 kts and announced to Captain that my airspeed was dead.

Captain made the decision to reject the takeoff. I notified the Tower we were rejecting the takeoff on Runway XXR. As we slowed I made the remain seated announcement to the cabin. We cleared the runway at [Taxiway] XY and completed the rejected takeoff checklist. There was no need to evacuate and normal after landing flows were completed.

We requested taxi back to the gate and consulted the brake cooling charts. The reject occurred at approximately 120 kts and a gross weight of 154.2 placing us in the cautionary zone for fuse plug melting. ZZZ operations was contacted for return gate assignment (gate XX) and we advised them of the safety hazard for hot brakes and potential fuse plug melting.

After parking at the gate and accomplishing normal shutdown flows and checklists, we notified Dispatch we had RTBL due to a rejected takeoff and were back at the gate. We submitted two entries for 1. rejected takeoff and 2. FO airspeed/engine EEC lights. Crew and flight attendant debriefings were conducted. Tech Operations met us and discussed the details of the rejected takeoff. We learned the aircraft had come from the hanger and had not been flown in a while. They were unsure if the aircraft was 'extra' or 'one that
had been sitting for a while]' but they commented that the pitot static systems had been a source of problems as aircraft were brought back to revenue service.

Flight operations contacted us to determine fitness for continued duty followed by Asst Chief Pilot approving continued flight. A new aircraft was assigned and we completed the flight to ZZZ1 uneventfully.

**Narrative: 2**

I was operating Aircraft X ZZZ-ZZZ1. Cockpit setup and taxi out to Runway XXR was normal. As we approached the runway we were cleared for takeoff. As the pilot flying I set takeoff thrust and called "check thrust." Several seconds later the yellow master caution illuminated and I asked First Officer what is that? First Officer looked up and said the EEC lights were on, on the overhead panel. The autothrottle then disconnected. First Officer then announced he had no airspeed indication on his instruments. The 100 knot call out was not made so I initiated a rejected takeoff. After I accomplished the rejected takeoff procedure I noted that the indicated speed on my airspeed tape was approximately 120 knots. We advised the control Tower that we were rejecting and required no assistance from ARFF. As we were slowing down we made a Flight Attendant remain seated PA. We exited the runway at intersection X. As I held the brakes I asked First Officer for the rejected takeoff checklist. The rejected takeoff checklist was accomplished. We called ZZZ operations and advised we were returning to the gate and they assigned us gate XX. As we taxied in we reviewed the brake cooling chart and were in the cautionary range. Ground staff was notified of the hot brakes and the potential for fuse plug release. After we parked at the gate and shut down we accomplish the shutdown check list. I then contacted Dispatch and advised we had just done a rejected takeoff and were back at the gate. Two write ups were made for the EEC lights and no airspeed on the FO's instruments as well as for the rejected takeoff. First Officer and I then conducted a debrief of the events that had just occurred. I then conducted a debrief with the flight attendants. I then received a phone call from the flight operations who advised us to file a report as well as going through the checklist to determine if First Officer and I were fit to continue our duty day. We were found to be fit, switched to a new aircraft and completed flight to ZZZ1 uneventfully.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported a rejected takeoff after the master caution illuminated and subsequently noticing a non functional airspeed indication on the First Officer's Primary Flight Display.
ACN: 1750245

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 23000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Small Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 4500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 75
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750245
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Fatigue

Events
Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred: All Types
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
About 1.5 hours into my flight at FL230, and into my descent, I started feeling an urge to sleep. I was amusing myself texting and communicating and flying but nonetheless, I started to feel very, very tired. Prior to the flight, I felt fine. I think I slept my usual 7 hours of sleep the night before. I moved my COVID-19 face mask aside and drank some water. That helped a little bit. But upon putting the face mask back on my face, the feeling came back and I caught myself drifting. Then I realized...it was my COVID-19 MASK! I removed the mask and felt fine the rest of the flight. I didn't have a pulse oximeter handy but I wish I did. I think I was inhaling CO2 instead of oxygen. COVID strikes again!

Synopsis
Pilot reported feeling sleepy while flying and suspected that it was the COVID-19 mask that was causing the problem. The pilot removed the mask and felt fine afterward.
**ACN: 1750203**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202007

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1750203
Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**

Anomaly Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

The Captain on this flight did not wear a mask during the flight. He gave a briefing to the flight attendants and also did not maintain 6 feet spacing. He willingly and knowingly put me and my family and the families of my flying partners in jeopardy. Company is required to provide a safe and healthy work environment for their employees, but they are not enforcing their own policy when it comes to pilots. People like this are slowing the recovery of the virus and are causing more furloughs than necessary. Flight attendants tell passengers all the time to put their mask on but then they see some pilots come on board without one. This puts the crews in a very awkward position. On this flight, there was not a bathroom break however if there was, I would not have gone into the cockpit without both pilots having a mask. This is not an isolated incident. This happens quite frequently. This issue is causing a breakdown in communication between the cockpit and cabin.
Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported the Captain did not wear a COVID-19 type mask during the flight.
ACN: 1750171

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRAYON
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRAYON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace. Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750171
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly. Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Flight was the first leg of a three day pairing. It was my first trip back at work after being off for two months. I briefed the First Officer to this fact, and told him to watch me. We would take our time. He told me he was just off OE and not flown much after that. the weather was VFR in ZZZ but we briefed just like we would for an instrument approach, Arrival, Approach Plate, terrain issues and single engine go arounds. I also briefed that Runway XXR was closed so we planned on a visual approach backed up by the RNAV (GPS) XXL. Approach cleared us for the visual approach when we were abeam the airport and I called for flaps 1 on speed. As we slowed to Vfe Next, and the trend arrow showed we were slowing I called for flaps 2. The First Officer called "Check Speed", because we were still a little above Vfe Next. I referenced my airspeed and saw we were slowing and thought I would be on speed by the time I called Flaps 2 and he selected flaps 2. I called for flaps 2 and he selected flaps 2, I saw the red overspeed tape start to drop down and immediately called for flaps 1 which the First Officer did. I thought we had caught it but we got the flap overspeed warning for about 1 to two seconds, the airspeed was between 200 to 205 kts. I then slowed the aircraft and configured for landing on speed. After landing we taxied to the gate, and after shutdown I debriefed what had happened. I called Dispatch/Maintenance and made an entry into the AML. Maintenance called out Contract Maintenance and an aircraft inspection was done and cleared.

My not having flown in a while. Pairing up a Captain that just returned from a leave of absence with a pilot fresh off OE.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported a speed deviation and flap overspeed on final.
ACN: 1750150

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750150
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Amendment to the routing was missed by the flight crew on PDC. One fix was removed from the routing. ATC queried us during our turn from ZZZZZ to ZZZ. Prior to that we were unaware of the deviation. ATC's stated that we were 30 deg off course. I figured it was a data entry problem as our HSI showed us directly on course. After reviewing the PDC we realized that we forgot to delete a fix that was originally on the filed flight plan but not in the cleared clearance. Air Traffic Control also made a unwarranted sarcastic comment "You are always right sir" when we queried to see if they still showed us off course when we provided the explanation that we were currently in a turn towards ZZZ.

Complacency and lack of recent flying experience This was my first leg in nearly 2 months. We read the clearance and completely missed the removal of one fix ZZZZZ from routing.

We asked Air Traffic Control where they thought we should have been, by the time that ATC found the error we were already in the turn towards a fix on the flight plan no further correction as needed.

I will be more alert when transcribing PDC clearances particularly with reroutes. I believe that PDC could be less ambiguously formatted. Even though the captain did review my programming I believe it would be wise to reference the actual PDC clearance instead of the first officers transcription of the PDC clearance. When referencing the transcription of the PDC Clearance it adds more layers of possible errors in transcription and data entry.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing a track heading deviation after missing an intersection on the routing received from the PDC.
ACN: 1750118

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750118
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Fatigue

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750904

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was the Captain and flying the aircraft and was going directly to ZZZZZ on the ILS Runway XXR approach. We were hoping for the ILS YYL approach because we were parking on the west side. They said we could have XXR and we accepted. I was probably a little tired and I was fast on speed approaching the glideslope. I tried to slow, got configured, but was too high on the glideslope and did a go-around. During the go-around, because we were already high, a little fast, and flying a light aircraft, I failed to get the flaps up on time. We oversped the flaps and exceeded 250 knots below 10,000 feet. We momentarily reached 263 knots before cleaning up and slowing. I wrote up the overspeed in the AML. All else was uneventful.

No excuses, but maybe a factor is that I have been flying 5 days in a row after being off for 2 months. I felt things were coming back to me, and then this happened. It was a somewhat long day, ZZZ - ZZZ1 - ZZZ2 - ZZZ1, but not terrible.

I will review the go-around procedures before every approach. Also, in this case, I believe I lacked a little situation awareness because when we changed to the ILS for XXR, we were much closer on the approach and I should have started slowing the aircraft sooner.

Narrative: 2
CA was PF. FO was PM. While executing a go-around from XXR at ZZZ, we momentarily exceeded 250 kts IAS. The PM told the PF and he immediately adjusted thrust to reduce the airspeed. We received vectors from ATC, landed on YYL at ZZZ, and went to the assigned gate without further incident. There were no aircraft alarms or comment from ATC.

We decided to go-around because we were high and fast on the approach.

PM might have anticipated an airspeed issue because it was one of the reasons for the go-around.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a speed deviation and flap overspeed while executing a go-around.
ACN: 1750112

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 4000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace. Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750112
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Upon reviewing the ATIS prior to the TOD, ZZZ was calling winds 230/07 and Arrival ILS Runway XXL/XXR. The changeover report advised of gate XY, therefore, the crew elected to fly a visual approach backed up by the ILS XXL and briefed the approach. While on the descent via the ZZZZZX arrival, Approach advised of weather along the route of flight and authorized deviation right of course and to fly direct ZZZZZ1 (IAF For ILS XXL) when able and to descend to 4,000 feet.

At approximately 8-10 miles from ZZZZZ1 (IAF), Approach advised to now expect XXR at ZZZ. The CA changed the approach from ILS XXL to XXR while the FO briefed the approach plate, landing runway and expected taxi route to the gate. Roughly one minute after the ILS XXR brief, Approach then changed the landing Runway to XXL. The CA quickly re-inserted ILS XXL and the FO (PF) gave him the ILS BARO minimums and the CA activated the new approach. The FO briefed XXL approach, slowed to 210, asked for flaps 1, and coming up on ZZZZZ1 (IAF) queried the CA to ask approach for lower due to the aircrafts position at 4,000 (when it should have been descending to 2,500). Approach apologized for their delay and asked if we wanted to continue the approach for XXL.

The CA advised Approach that the aircraft would be able to get down and were then swapped over to ZZZ Tower. The FO immediately requested gear down, which the CA promptly did. As it became apparent that the aircraft was too high on the approach, the FO queried the CA that the aircraft was too high on the glide slope and discussed the possibility of a go-around at that time. The CA noted the concern and advised to continue as is. As it became apparent that the aircraft was too high for normal bracketing maneuvers the CA then agreed that a go-around was necessary. The FO immediately executed go-around procedures and the CA advised tower of missed approach. Following the missed approach, ZZZ Tower directed the aircraft to turn to a heading of 095, climb to 2,000 and to contact Approach Control. The FO responded to the radio transmission, as the CA was making a PA announcement to the passengers. After the frequency change, approach gave a heading of 360 and then a downwind heading of 260. The CA quickly re-inserted ILS XXL back into the FMS and initiated the Descent Checklist. On downwind, the FO set speed 210 and requested flaps 1 again, which the PM did. Due to sequencing of company traffic, approach directed a left-hand turn to a heading of 180 and cleared the aircraft for a visual approach to Runway XXL. The FO pressed the APR pb and AP1 and called for gear down and slowed to 180 kts. The FO also pressed for managed speed, but quickly returned to selected speed when speed began to increase. The FO then disconnected the AP after the CA noted the angle to intercept the LOC was insufficient for the dogleg, so the PF hand flew the LOC to XXL. At this time, the FO advised the CA that the new approach had not been activated and attempted to slow the aircraft with the speed brake as FLAPs 3 and 4 were already out with an upward trend vector on the airspeed indicator. However, the PF never requested flaps 3 or 4, which created ambiguity in the cockpit during an already task saturated time. Additionally, the AP Disconnect was present on the ECAM which created a challenge to finish the Before Landing checklist. Therefore, the aircraft was momentarily high on the approach. However, at no time do I feel that the passengers, crew or aircraft were at risk from a safety perspective and ultimately, we ended with a safe and stable landing. Upon reflection, if I find myself in the exact situation again, I would slow everything down from the initial descent of 4,000 feet. I would also call for the go-around early and not discuss it. To increase situational
awareness and decrease task saturation I would have advised approach that we needed an extended downwind or vectors.

I believe the main contributing factors were 1) combined total hours of less than 140 between the FO/CA and 2) lack of proficiency due to the current COVID-climate flight scheduling and 3) large gaps between flights (i.e., not flying for 45 consecutive days despite proffering, calling scheduling to flight time, etc) 4) we were held high on descent due to the Tower forgetting about us.

1) Not placing two "new to that aircraft" pilots in the same cockpit 2) Force scheduling for reserve pilots to fly every 2 weeks for proficiency. 3) most importantly, requiring that all new captains changing over from an X type aircraft be required to have the minimum 100 hours if flying with a new FO.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported they were given multiple runway changes resulting in an unstabilized approach and go-around.
ACN: 1750102

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750102
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

After 3 runway changes, we departed from Runway XXR at ZZZ on the ZZZZZZ departure. Takeoff and climb out was normal as I hand flew. I was following the flight director yet I was notified by ATC that we exceeded the 10,000 restriction at ZZZZZZ1. ATC said that there was no issue but to be "more careful next time." The FO was PM and responded that we were sorry.

After being off for 3 months due to not being called on reserve and being paired with a FO who was having his first trip off IOE, we both talked about the imposing threat of the combination of a Captain not flying the line for 3 months plus the threat of a new freshly minted aircraft. We decided to take things slow as much as possible and speak up if somebody is in the yellow. Upon taxing out from ZZZ, we received 3 runway changes. The FMS was a very challenging issue for my First Officer with respect to TPS/Takeoff performance changes. It seemed I had to teach him how to use the "box". I sensed that the First Officer was quite eager and willing to learn to reinforce what he already knew. He told me he came from the aircraft and the box operation is completely different. He mentioned how the schoolhouse teaches the box "one way" and he is taught it differently "another" way when he got to IOE. After takeoff, I was hand flying the aircraft, yet I was following the flight director and I never received any indication to level off at 10,000 before ZZZZZZ1.

The combination of a Captain with no recent line experience within 90 days and a newly minted FO is an unsafe combination that may be more prevalent given the new "normal" of reduced flying, short term leaves, and lackluster reserve usage. This is an unsafe environment. Despite briefing this issue and taking our time, we still found a way to circumvent some layers of procedural safety through human ignorance. This has given me great pause on how to conduct operations in the cockpit in the future. I have no idea why the flight director didn't keep me from busting that altitude, it was in VNAV PATH.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported missing a crossing restriction during departure and referenced lack of flying as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1750062

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Cockpit/Cabin Communication
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750062

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: MEL
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Maintenance in ZZZ onboard aircraft prior to departure. Maintenance applied MEL 23-XXY (Flight attendant call chimes) at gate prior to departure. We as the crew complied with MEL operational requirements prior to leaving gate. Once airborne, we as the crew, realized that Dispatch did not add MEL to dispatch release. Continued enroute to ZZZ1.

Cause: Running late off of gate due to maintenance in flight deck during preflight. First Officer first trip back after 6 weeks off.

Suggestion: Call Dispatch and Maintenance Control on phone when MEL being applied to aircraft.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported not realizing that Dispatch did not add an MEL to the dispatch release until they were airborne.
ACN: 1750056

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Check Pilot
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750056

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Maintenance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
We planned 26K Bleeds Off Takeoff due to Right Pack Inop and per MEL we applied Engine Bleed Off Takeoff or Landing with the APU Operating procedure. Cleared for takeoff on XXR. At 40% N1 CA TOGA. Both Engines advanced. Engine #2 achieved takeoff thrust of 100.8 N1. Engine #1 stagnated at 85.0 N1. Auto-throttles were on. I pushed on the #1 throttle lever to get a response, but engine stayed stagnated. I was not sure if it was an engine failure or bird strike, so I commanded PF to Reject. We Rejected below 80 knots. Announced Reject with Tower and they directed us to exit first available taxiway. We decided since we were not sure of the nature of the problem, it would be prudent to taxi back to gate and let maintenance troubleshoot the problem.

A cascading effect of maintenance issues: During pre-flight the ground crew pulled the external power without our concurrence which caused a power interruption. Had to rebuild/recover several pre-flight items. Five minutes prior to pushback right PACK light illuminated. Could not reset. Maintenance MELed right pack. During pushback/engine start we could not get N2 rotation on #2 engine with Engine Start switch in GND and Start Valve Open light illuminated. Isolation Valve switch was in the Open position. We made several attempts, but each time we moved the Engine Start switch to GND the Isolation Valve would close, and we would lose right duct pressure. We decided to return to the gate via tug and made a logbook write-up. Maintenance fixed the problem and we pushed off the gate for a second time. The low speed reject was the subsequent event.

First, more vigilance/coordination from ground crew prior to pulling external power. Second, local ZZZ maintenance mentioned the plane had been sitting idle for more than 60 days. I cannot verify this information. Maybe more Maintenance pre-flight or systems tests if aircraft has been sitting idle for an extended period?

**Synopsis**

Air Carrier Captain reported a rejected takeoff due to mechanical issues with an aircraft that had been sitting for a couple of months.
ACN: 1750049

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750049
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750183
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On departure out of ZZZ we were notified our aircraft was off course. ATC then asked us if our clearance was to ZZZZZ we agreed ZZZZZ was our clearance however this was when we noticed the aircraft was improperly navigating on the ZZZZZ1 transition. ATC told us to fly heading 071 and then re-cleared us direct to ZZZZ.

Once ATC notified us of our error, it was immediately clear I had loaded the incorrect transition and we both missed this error during the route review. This is a common "gotcha" out of ZZZ that I am normally very vigilant of, because both ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 have similar names and departure directions. Expectation bias was the casual factor in my case, as I had the clearance in my hand and checked the route points as they were read aloud but as ZZZZZ1 was stated and I crossed checked the printed clearance I now realize that I likely saw and read back ZZZZZ1 on the printout even though ZZZZZ was printed on the actual clearance. Lastly our lack of recency due to the flying draw down was a contributing factor in committing this error. Neither Captain or myself had flown much at all in the last 70+ days. This was also the first east bound flight on the ZZZZZ3 [departure] for both of us in about 2-3 months.

While the error clearly rests within the cockpit in this instance, I do believe the similarities in names of both fixes creates an additional challenge. I think all established company procedures are designed to trap this very type of error so nothing else should be added/changed with SOP. We followed company procedure in our route verification however, the execution of that procedure was in error.

Narrative: 2

At the gate we checked the route and didn't catch the error loading the flight plan. I read the box and the FO checked it against the clearance/flight plan. Similar sounding transitions on the ZZZZZZ departure were verified. Total mileage didn't vary enough to trap any errors either. We were cleared the ZZZZZ transition but started to fly the ZZZZZ1 transition. After passing ATC verified our clearance a few miles after ZZZZZZ and gave us a heading then cleared us to a fix down line.

Been off for 2 months I'm sure had a bearing on the event both the FO and I had been off
for a long time due to COVID-19 reductions.

Verify the clearance. Go slower to make sure all points are verified in the box. Especially after being off for such a lengthy time.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported flying an incorrect departure transition that had a similar sounding name as the clearance transition. The crew stated that lack of recent flying was a contributing factor.
ACN: 1750044

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 38000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Hydraulic System
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750044
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Detector.Automation: Aircraft Other Automation
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Landed in Emergency Condition

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
I was PM, and approximately an hour into the flight at cruise FL 380, I performed my systems check and discovered that Green System Hydraulic fluid quantity gauge was indicating just above minimum level. Approximately hour later, we got an ECAM directing us to turn off the Green Engine 1 Driven Hydraulic pump and to also, turn off the PTU which resulted in a loss of the Green System. At this point, we were on the Arrival and within 20 minutes from landing at our destination ZZZ. We decided that the safest course of action was to [request priority handling] due to the fact that I was flying with a new Captain with less than 100 hours. I performed a non normal landing assessment and reviewed the manual gear extension procedure. We had an uneventful landing, with emergency equipment standing by. The Captain managed to use asymmetrical thrust to clear the active runway because, we had no nose wheel steering. He then set the parking brake [and] shut the engines down.

Synopsis

Air carrier pilot reported losing the green hydraulic system while on arrival.
ACN: 1750016

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 3200
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1750016
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Narrative: 1

Taxiing out we were given a taxi clearance to Runway XXR intersection XX [taxiway]. The FO and I both heard a non standard taxi route "XXR XX, A, XXX" and the FO read it back and wrote it down. My experience at ZZZ gave me the impression this was a non standard route. Due to the non standard nature of our airports at this time, it wasn't out of the ordinary to get alternate taxi routes. I turned left on XXX [taxiway] and the Controller then issued a right turn ZYZ [taxiway] and a left turn Z [taxiway] to continue to XXX then Y [taxiway].

I have flown very little in the past 45 days and heard an incorrect taxi clearance. I also didn't question the "odd" taxi instructions we copied because of getting similar "unfamiliar" taxi instructions the past 3 months at ZZZ. The FO was ZZZ1 based and was also relying on my judgment for this taxi route. The busy frequency made the instructions unclear and we were not corrected when the FO read back the incorrect taxi instructions.

I should have queried the Controller for clarification when I was given a "non-standard" taxi route.

Narrative: 2

Captain and First Officer misheard taxi call. We were departing and Ground told us to take a right on A [taxiway], then follow company traffic at XXX, then left on XXY to Z. We both heard Right on A, left at XXX, then right on Z. That's what I read back and ATC didn't correct us. Once on Z, ATC told us to take a right to follow company traffic. No issues were noted and there were no threats. We corrected the mistake as soon as ATC notified us of the error.
Cause - Busy airport. We misheard the call, read back what we heard and weren't corrected at the time by ATC.

Suggestions - Clear, concise communications and if there's a mistake in the read back, ATC should identify it.

**Synopsis**
Air carrier flight crew reported a taxiway incursion after receiving a non-standard taxi instruction.
ACN: 1750008

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 1
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 5
- Light: Dawn
- Ceiling.Single Value: 5000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3938
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 144
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1750008

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly: In-flight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Result: Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
On visual final to [Runway] XX at ZZZ, backed up with an ILS, I was pilot monitoring. Vectors and descent from Center and ZZZ Approach brought the aircraft in steep, relatively high energy, and on a short turn to final. At the time, the aircraft was very light on payload and fuel (I believe a Vref of about 118 with flaps 25), so the aircraft was slow to decelerate, but significantly overpowered with high thrust settings. The geometry that Approach was using was greater than 90 degrees to final, which led us to assume we were being vectored through the approach course for a longer final. Approach then cleared us for the visual to XX. The CA executed a turn to final and descended to 5,100 feet MSL, but due to energy state and angle-off of final elected to go-around, which was the conservative call. He directed me to ask for, and I asked for a left visual 360, which Tower denied. ZZZ Tower then directed the aircraft to climb to 6,500 feet MSL and fly a heading. 6,500 feet was set in the MCP window. With the aircraft going around, I called the altitude as the aircraft approached 6,500. Simultaneous to this I was deconfiguring flaps as the CA turned toward the assigned heading. I observed the altitude high and said "Altitude High" or something similar twice. The CA disengaged the autopilot and hand-flew returning to 6,500 feet. No mention of altitude was made by either ZZZ Tower, or ZZZ Approach when we returned to their frequency. The subsequent approach was uneventful. An aggravating factor to this was the short final and high energy state that approach was attempting to set up for us. If I were to do this again I would either ask for extended vectors or an instrument approach to better manage energy. For the go-around itself, because it was initiated before the aircraft started descending on glide slope, managing altitude, heading, and thrust independently similar to an RNAV/RNP go-around would have helped mitigate the altitude issue. I believe I was proactive in calling the approach to the assigned altitude, as well as making calls when the aircraft climbed above that. The PF was doing a good job of flying the aircraft through a non-standard missed approach (the assigned altitude and heading were not what the instrument approach go-around are), but the performance impacts of a very light aircraft under go-around thrust made it difficult to immediately arrest the climb rate.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and electing to go-around.
ACN: 1749997

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Other / Unknown
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749997

Events
Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred: All Types
Detector.Person: Other Person
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Since last week there is not enough alcohol gel available at office for employees (everyone has to bring it from home) to keep us safe. Also, there is no water bottles available for employee's hydration in every operation. We are working X type flights and since COVID-19 situation is getting worst we need to have safety tools like alcohol gels or liquid alcohol to sanitize the work areas to give a good customer service and provided customers a safety area.

Synopsis
Ground employee reported there is not enough alcohol gel available in the office for employees to use during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1749983

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2400

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: VFR
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: VFR
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Ground
Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
Function.Air Traffic Control: Supervisor / CIC
Function.Air Traffic Control: Flight Data / Clearance Delivery
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 6
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749983
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I had so many departures that at one point I couldn't keep track of the targets on the radar. I had two aircraft that nearly hit because I was so distracted with inbounds, outbounds, aircraft talking on multiple frequencies.

I was forced to work ZZZ Tower a level X VFR Tower combined to one position during peak hours on a weekday. I had 7-8 inbound aircraft, 2-3 I told to hold outside the airspace and 5-6 aircraft holding short of the runway. I was working GC, FD, LC1, LC2, and CIC. It was pretty much the most unsafe thing I've done in my career.

I would personally like to know who the individual is that feels keeping a Tower open in this situation is more important than people's lives. Clearly they have lost perspective and are out of touch.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller reported an operational error while working five positions at once.
ACN: 1749931

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Make Model Name: Light Transport
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 6500
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 55
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 490
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749931
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected.Other
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I flew a trip ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ in which the aircraft was past the due date for the weighing requirement in 14 CFR 135.185. While doing preflight planning I happened to overlook the due date, which was documented by an aircraft status sheet in the aircraft's logbook folder as well as in the aircraft's AFM. I believe the oversight was due to distraction from saturation associated with additional COVID-19 guidelines, limited recency of experience also due to COVID-19, as well as mental saturation due to the additional considerations and extra planning that goes alongside flying into a complicated mountainous terrain airport like ZZZ1.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported flying a trip with the aircraft being over due on the CFR 135.185 weighing requirement.
ACN: 1749915

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Lead Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749915
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Maintenance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Other Person
When Detected.Other
Result.General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were working a return from storage work card on Aircraft X, we were working off paper because the task card was going to be revised and it would have cleared all completed work if worked on iPad. The task card was revised and steps had to be transferred to a new task card. There were several technicians working the job so there were also working task cards for reference. So there was the original task card - the revised task card and working copies to go through.

I was the supervisor and assigned the upgrade [to the] Radios and Electronics Lead,
xxxxxx step X electrical/electronics on task card, that step included de-preservation of emergency lights, aircraft battery, EPAS batteries and "any other batteries" including flight attendant station emergency flash lights.

At almost going home time for the technicians which is earlier than normal due COVID work hours nothing was signed off by the Lead, when I asked xxxxxxx he stated "it was all done" and they would sign it off. When I was auditing the master paperwork step x.9 "any other batteries" was not signed, and all technicians had already left. I signed for the step as Supervisor since I was told it was done, I was going to verify that it was done but then got side tracked with other aircraft issues.

The aircraft then position ferried with no flight attendants or passengers to ZZZ for a dead "A" check where they found the flight attendant station emergency flash lights did not have batteries in them.

No suggestion for resolution as I should have not signed it off without verification, I never have signed steps before without verification and will not again, however it could have been worse if it had been a revenue flight so the task card should include a flag, not serviceable tape, or some other way of visually seeing the flashlights did not have a battery in them, these return to service cards are something we have never done, the paperwork is extensive and made worse by the revision. I have used this as a reminder not to get complacent.

**Synopsis**

Supervising Maintenance Technician reported signing off work without verifying it had been completed.
ACN: 1749913

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749913
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X landed in ZZZ. The aircraft went to remote parking and pitot covers were installed.

No write up was generated.

The aircraft was on a scheduled departure three days later. The flight crew generated a write up when they found the circuit breakers for the pitot system with CB collars installed.

Synopsis
Maintenance Technician reported flight crew generated a write up when they found the circuit breakers for the pitot system with CB collars installed. The aircraft had been sitting for three days.
ACN: 1749902

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749902
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I had begun to do the brief and was interrupted by customer [who was] uncomfortable about the seating arrangement and COVID-19.
Can't remember if I finished or not but just thought I'd self report in case I didn't.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant was interrupted during the briefing by a passenger who was concerned about the seating arrangement due to COVID-19 reasons. Flight Attendant was not sure if the briefing was completed.
Passenger was refusing to wear face mask on flight. He harassed me several times throughout the flight because he did not want to wear a mask. The ground agents talked with him before door closure. They explained that its policy to wear a face mask. He was argumentative and said he had a disability. He said he called [the] airline before the flight and told them of his problem. He also said that [the] airline put the information in his profile. However, it was not in passenger profile. So I requested that he comply with airline policy and wear a facial mask. Also, Captain said that the passenger must comply with policy.
Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a mask during the flight.
Aircraft X was a red eye flight ZZZ-ZZZ1. I came in and got my pass down from the night Dispatcher as usual. While briefing myself on the weather I noticed ZZZ Center was ATC zero for the night from XA00z-XD00z per the Flow Constrained Area (FCA) and NOTAMs. When I took my pass down I sat down and immediately got a ACARS for Aircraft X holding...
for ZZZ1 due to the ATC zero. I then called the Dispatcher that passed the flight to me, and said, hey why did we let this plane go when ZZZ1 is ATC zero, which was approximately 50 minutes from the time I received the ACARS for holding. That Dispatcher said Operations told them it was only valid until XC30z. My issue with this is first off how and why was the flight able to push 20 minutes early? Pushing early pushed them even more into the FCA. With the Center being closed that makes this an illegal Dispatch because per the FCA we knew we were not able to enter ZZZ Center until XD00z, when we had an ETA of entering the Center about 50 minutes before that. My second issue is why did the Dispatcher let the flight depart early? Was this FCA not communicated to the flight crew? Why is the Dispatcher listening to Operations manager pressure rather than looking at the published NOTAMs and FCAs for times. The Operations manager has zero operational control and say in how and when we dispatch our flights. Operations often will tell us things to make their job easier and to get on time performance numbers not based off anything to do with legal dispatching of a flight. Just fueling the flight up for holding due to entering the airspace while it is closed is neglectful.

While we were able to get through [it] this time with no diversions, if the Center is going to close for cleaning on a regular basis overnight, we as a company and in Dispatch and Operations need to have better communication about this, We need to establish a better plan of attack for this if it is to be a regular thing. We also need to plan for what is published based off NOTAMs and FCA’s not what Operations says. We need to as a group communicate better with each other, with Operations, and to our flight crews to help stop these things from happening in the future. Just because it went off without a diversion this morning does not mean that we can do the same thing in future. I would hope we can learn from this as a group and come up with better ways to handle it.

**Synopsis**

Dispatcher reported a flight departed early into a Flow Constrained Area (FCA) and questioned company procedures that allowed this to occur.
**ACN: 1749775**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 24000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749775
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

We took off from ZZZ as usual. We were on the departure and ATC queried us saying we were off course about 10 degrees. I immediately looked to see if I may have left autopilot in heading mode but FMS 1 was displayed. I asked Person X to tell him we are showing we are on course. Again, ATC said he was showing 10 degrees off. I went to received messages in the FMS and saw that ATC had given us a reroute adding ZZZZZ to our fixes on the departure. I went to the fix page and brought the fix we were missing and we were almost a beam the fix. I asked the FO to ask ATC if he wanted us to turn there. ATC gave us a switch to next sector frequency and we asked him if he wanted us to turn there. He advised us "out of FL240 direct ZZZ." We maintained our course and at FL240 initiated the turn to ZZZ.

I honestly don't have a reason why I didn't check the clearance on ACARS as I do every-time to verify what the FO wrote down. I hadn't flown in about a month and I guess I was just out of my groove to not check the received messages. The FO put AF "as filed" down on the card and I went with it. Mistake on my part for not checking the PDC to verify.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported an ATC reroute was received via ACARS, however it went unnoticed, resulting in a course deviation. Captain cited not having flown recently as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1749747

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Ground Personnel: Other / Unknown
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1749747
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Ground Personnel: Other / Unknown
Function: Maintenance: Other / Unknown
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1749753
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter: Aircraft
Detector: Person: Ground Personnel
When Detected: Other
Result: Aircraft: Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
Myself and my partner were dispatched to tow Aircraft X from Gate X to the hangar. We followed SOP for removing Aircraft X off of the gate. As we entered Location Y at the hangar we had to go wide around another aircraft that was parked on spot X1 which due to the COVID pandemic is a made up spot sitting east of Taxiway X, we were to park our aircraft on [spot] X2. After passing that aircraft I positioned my supertug and the aircraft east of the taxi line. I was following a seam in the hangar concrete in an attempt to position my supertug to the right side of another aircraft that was parked on spot X1 in order to back my aircraft into the X2 spot, also not a normal parking spot. As I swung the aircraft to the east my partner asked if I was okay with where the mobile stairs were located and I confirmed that I was fine with their location. I was following my guide man’s directions who was located to my left, as I approached the spot I looked away from the guide man to see where the front of my supertug was because I knew I was approaching the end of the concrete. When I looked back the guide man had given the stop sign and my partner was telling me to stop. My partner told me we had made contact with the mobile stairs, I placed the supertug in park and set the emergency brake. Upon inspection we confirmed that I had hit the mobile stairs with the wingtip which resulted in the edge being bent. SOP was followed removing the aircraft from the gate but there is no SOP parking the aircraft in made up spots due to the COVID pandemic.

**Narrative: 2**

We were involved in an incident which occurred at the ZZZ Company Hanger. With COVID-19 now affecting aircraft movements, we are moving aircraft in unsafe manners. With no safety advocate. We as a team are moving aircraft in manners that were not trained to do. In the area this aircraft, Aircraft X, was being parked, there are no guide marks, no lead in lines, and no stop markings. It has been set up as a "point of reference." This lead to Aircraft X to being damaged. The wing tip was slightly damaged. In the past 5 months since COVID-19 the ZZZ team has been moving aircraft with no clear guidelines, and no safety advocate to speak for us.

**Synopsis**

Ground crew reported a wing-tip collision occurred while they were towing an aircraft to a made-up parking spot that was created due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The crew stated there were no markings to guide the aircraft to the spot.
**ACN: 1749727**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: MSL Single Value: 7450

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 2495
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 26
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 1206
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1749727
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 531
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 18
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 531
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1749740
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Undershoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On a beautiful VMC day was on the ZZZZZ arrival for the FMS Visual Approach X XXR. LNAV/VNAV path. Approaching ZZZZZ was given the third of three large speed reductions. Slowed prior to ZZZZZ1 to 230 then slowed to 210. Still able to remain on path. Inside of ZZZZZ2 told to further slow to 180 cleared for the FMS. The last speed change was too close to ZZZZZ to cross at 7,000 and 180. The pilot flying had not flown in 85 days and was slow to recognize I was slow at requesting relief for altitude at ZZZZZ and slow advocating max allowable flaps. The PF had flaps 5 set and max speed brakes applied trying to slow and go down. We crossed ZZZZZ at 180 but at approximately 7,400.

Narrative: 2
While on descent into ZZZ on ZZZZZZ arrival we were ask several times to slow and descend at same time which left us high crossing ZZZZZZ. We were in VNAV path and everything was working fine. About 5 miles before ZZZZZZ we were asked to slow to 210 knots and that made us high crossing ZZZZZZ.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an altitude deviation while crossing an arrival fix.
ACN: 1749718

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZMP.ARTCC
State Reference: NM
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 17000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZMP
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class E: ZMP

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZMP.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Trainee
Function. Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Developmental
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1749718
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X was climbing southbound after departing, I initiated a handoff to Sector XY, anticipating a flash-through to Sector YX. I anticipated watching for the handoff to be
made, and made a pointout to OMA approach. While this was going on, I had multiple aircraft needing weather calls in other parts of the airspace, as well as at least two calls from flight data and flight service, as well as two calls from aircraft airborne off of airports beginning IFR flights. By the time all these had been dealt with, I had failed to get back quickly enough to Aircraft X, and he had entered Sector XY's airspace without them accepting the handoff. I then called them with a verbal handoff and they accepted the automated handoff.

Given the weather situation, I think having all three low sectors open with the need to provide weather reports in the northeast part of the airspace, given the volume, was probably not appropriate. We have been running thin crews do to COVID-19, and thus have been keeping sectors combined when they likely would have been split during normal operations. I think this added volume and complexity contributed to this airspace violation. In the future, as more controllers return, I think it would be better to split sectors off more quickly to reduce workload.

**Synopsis**

ZMP Center Controller reported an airspace deviation while working combined sectors. COVID-19 staffing levels contributed to the event.
ACN: 1749683

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 700

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 5000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Communication Systems
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person: 1
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Student
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 59
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 12
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 56
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1749683
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Person : 2
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : Y
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : FBO
Function.Flight Crew : Instructor
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 2500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 15
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 400
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1749711

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 100
Miss Distance.Vertical : 50
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Person X and I went to the airport to solo together in separate planes. We checked out the airplanes, and flew around the pattern for a while before the encounter. Comm 2 wasn't working in the plane I was flying so I was using ForeFlight on my phone for ATIS. There were around 5-6 aircraft in the pattern at the time I was flying, and I found that a little stressful. Especially because I was Aircraft X, and there was a similar sounding call sign also in the pattern. In left downwind, the tower stated that information India was now current. Because Comm 2 wasn't working in the plane I was flying, I used my phone to call ATIS so I could hear what the altimeter and winds were. While I was listening to that, the Tower called me and cleared me to land Runway XX, number 3 in the pattern sequence. Due to the confusion of trying to turn off ATIS and listening to Tower at the same time, I misheard number 3, and radioed back number 2. The Tower did not call back and correct me. I saw the first aircraft land and proceeded to turn base and then final as if I was the next plane in the sequence (which I thought I was). Before I turned final, another plane announced that they had seen several large birds in front of Runway XX and possibly in the way of aircraft on final approach. Since I was preparing to turn final, I looked out my window to the left to search for the birds. Before I was wings level on final, another aircraft called Tower saying that they had been almost hit by another aircraft (they said they had no idea where it came from), and they were going to go-around. It took me a minute to realize that "the other plane" was me. Once I did, I finished my touch and go, then continued upwind. Tower called me and informed me that I had cut off another aircraft. I apologized, and completed a full stop landing shortly afterwards.

After Person X and I got home, we listened to the ATC calls and responses to see if we could figure out what went wrong. We learned that I had misheard Tower when he said number 3. Later, I was called by the lead CFI at flight training school X to get my take on the encounter. I told him what I knew, and I was able to learn from him that the other plane was a high wing [aircraft] that was on an extended left downwind when this happened, and he was below and behind me. Since I was a low wing [aircraft], we were both in each other's blindspot. I also learned that normally there are two people in the tower, one operates ground, the other operates tower, but due to COVID, there was only one person operating ATC, and he was operating both tower and ground with 6 aircraft in the pattern and 3 on the ground at the time of the encounter and one of the aircraft on the ground wasn't reading back their hold short instructions properly.

Two things could have helped with this situation: 1) When the tower reported that the current information had changed to India, had the altimeter, winds and visibility also been reported, I wouldn't have needed to listen to ATIS. 2) When multiple aircraft are cleared for landing in sequence (number 2, number 3, etc.) if the tower indicated to each aircraft when it moved up in position, I would have been informed that I had moved from position number 3 to position number 2 and realized I had incorrectly heard the first position.

**Narrative: 2**

Incident happened on final approach on a training flight with a student who has accomplished approximately XX hours of training for a private pilot license. We were cleared for the option on Runway XX at ZZZ. At approximately 600 feet and 1 mile from the approach end of the runway the student exclaimed about an airplane very close. I looked to the left to see Aircraft X in wings up left turn approximately 100 feet above and slightly ahead of us.

Immediately took control from the student and turned away from the other aircraft and began a climb since landing was certainly not possible. Called the Tower to report and was told to fly to the right of the runway and later to fly a right pattern. And of course we complained to the Tower about the other aircraft turning in front of us. We continued the
lesson and completed several more landings.

Upon later listening to the recording of the incident it was discovered that the Controller cleared Aircraft X to land "#3" but Aircraft X acknowledged as "#2". The Controller did not correct Aircraft X as to the sequence of landing aircraft. I have contacted the Tower manager and he confirmed that because of COVID-19 operation, there is only one Controller in the cab at any one time. The Controller was handling at least 5 aircraft in the pattern and another 3 aircraft the ground. Between conflicting radio calls and the number of aircraft, the Controller was overwhelmed with traffic and did not hear the incorrect acknowledgment.

Corrective actions should include a plan to have at least two controllers in the cab when traffic increases to the level that challenges the ability of one Controller to maintain situational awareness.

We have spoken to the Chief Flight Instructor of the flight school. He has spoken to the student who was flying and has determined that the student was listening to the ATIS on downwind and perhaps was not maintaining adequate situational awareness.

I have examined my own attitudes toward situational awareness in Class D airspace and have realized that I need to pay closer attention to the location of other aircraft in the pattern, particularly when the airport is busy. It is possible that I could have realized that the other aircraft had mistakenly acknowledged his place in the traffic flow. Additionally, it might be advisable to depart the pattern when is gets too busy and find another airport at which to practice touch and goes.

Synopsis

Pilot reported incorrectly reading back their landing sequence number and turning in front of another aircraft on final approach. The pilot of the other aircraft reported taking immediate evasive action to avoid a collision. Both pilots reported the traffic pattern was busy and the Controller was handling both Ground and Tower operations.
On Day 1, I was working with Person X to give him a pass-down from the day shift workload. We were in a 6 feet by 6 feet office for about 15 minutes. Later that evening, after my shift was done, Person X went to the hospital and was positive for COVID-19. I was never contacted by anyone from Management or the CDC about being exposed to COVID-19 positive person. I also worked on Day 2. I then started time off on Day 3. While on time off a coworker told me about how Person X was in the hospital and positive for COVID-19, which occurred on Day 1. I used time off for 14 days before I returned to work. Luckily I never showed symptoms or infected any other person. I took it upon myself to stay away from work for 14 days to protect my coworkers.

Synopsis
Mechanic reported being unknowingly exposed to a COVID-19 positive employee and not being notified of the exposure by company management.
ACN: 1749667

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749667
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Security
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Taxi
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Gate

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Before handing Passenger X a hand sanitizing wipe I gently reminded him that wearing a face mask is a requirement during boarding and throughout the duration of our flight. He complied and took his seat. Once the boarding door was closed I made the required announcement and completed a compliance check noticing that Passenger X had placed his face mask under his chin again. I kindly asked him to place his face mask on and reminded him of the required policy. He complied saying "ok no problem." I then made our departure announcement which included an introduction as well as the audio safety briefing. During the safety demonstration Passenger X stuck his head out into the aisle making a total mockery out of me (laughing/teasing) once again visibly displaying that he was not wearing a mask. I completed my final compliance check before takeoff and I explained to him that wearing a mask is for his safety, passengers, and crew. I also explained that if he continued to refuse to wear it I'd contact the Captain to have us taxi back to the gate.

The FO made an announcement stating that we were fourth in line to takeoff and we continued to slowly taxi to the runway. I was strapped in my jumpseat and noticed that Passenger X stuck his head out in the aisle again with his face mask off. I immediately called the flight deck apologizing for breaking an FAR; but it was my duty to let them know that a customer was being non compliant regarding a safety policy. The flight deck said, "no worries at all. We'll call Operations Control and determine next steps. stay tuned." Shortly after I received a call back stating we were taxing back to the gate. There were two customer service managers that met us at the gate. Company representative stepped off to explain what took place. I was asked to step off the aircraft to explain. Customer service personnel stepped on the aircraft and asked which passenger I was referring to because Passenger X's seat was empty. He stepped into the restroom when I stepped off the aircraft. He came out of the restroom and was escorted off of the plane. Company representative thoroughly apologized to our remaining passengers and emphasized the importance of wearing mask. We resumed our flight and had an amazing smooth flight to ZZZ.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that during taxi out a passenger refused several times to wear a COVID-19 protective mask and also mocked the flight attendant when he was reminded to wear the mask. The flight taxied back to the gate and the passenger was removed from the flight.
ACN: 1749615

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Takeoff
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749615
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

**Assessments**
Narrative: 1

Shortly after takeoff after acceleration altitude on a Flaps 1 takeoff Runway XR ZZZ. As we were accelerating to Flaps Up speed (approximately 210 knots), I contacted Departure Control and received a somewhat wordy response. I allowed myself to be distracted as the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and missed the fact that we accelerated through our Flaps Up speed. We got a Master Warning Flap Overspeed indication. The Pilot Flying (PF) immediately decelerated and commanded Flaps Up. The Flaps automatically retract at 210 knots, but we received a Flap Overspeed ECAM message. We continued the flight to destination, wrote up the incident in the Log Book and discussed with maintenance at ZZZ1.

Distraction talking to ATC during acceleration phase of takeoff. Recency of experience may have played a role here as well.

I as the PM, should have either contacted ATC earlier in the acceleration phase of the takeoff or waited until we were flaps up before calling ATC. This was a relatively heavy aircraft with a big speed (and time) gap between acceleration altitude and flaps up speed. The PF should have pitched up to avoid accelerating through flaps up speed as the PM was responding to an unusually long ATC transmission. Either one of the recommended PM or PF actions would have trapped this error. The aircraft was inspected and is in service today.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing a flap overspeed during initial climb and cited distraction while talking to ATC and recency of experience as contributing factors.
ACN: 1749607

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749607
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749602
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Cleared for visual to Runway X and turned inside ZZZZZ from 4,000. I knew we were high but we had slowed and got gear out early. Squared the base to final turn outside ZZZZZ1 and continued to configure. Fully configured at 1,100, but still high on the VASI, so we decided to continue to 500 to meet stable approach criteria. Passing 500 we were on VASI and engines coming up we landed at the 1,200 mark, 8 seconds from 50 feet, and taxied in uneventfully. Upon gate arrival I pulled an approach report and noticed that we had a -1,750 vertical speed which I think happened between 2,000 and 1,000 feet. There was some ground thermal bouncing and it could have momentarily exceeded -1000 below 1,000.

This was my first trip back since April and I should have given myself more room to get down and configure.

Hindsight being 20/20 I think a go-around would have been a more appropriate choice, in order to give us more room to set up for the approach.

Narrative: 2
Close vectors, base to final Runway X. At 4,000 (higher than normal) we were cleared for a visual approach. PF started to configure, descend and intercept the LOC Runway X. We were configured prior to 1,000 feet however we were still a little high, reducing our airspeed with higher than normal descent rate, was tough but we continued to 500 feet. To me the aim point looked good with the airspeed and vertical speed returning to normal, with the engines spooled up. Short final to touchdown appeared normal. We crossed the threshold and touched in 8 sec, with normal rollout and taxi to the gate. When we shutdown at the gate, we pulled up the APRCH RPT and saw a max vert speed of 1700+ descent rate.

Causal factors was accepting an approach clearance when we were higher than normal on base to final, while also being closer than normal to the field. This caused a higher descent rate on final, challenging our stable approach criteria.
If necessary, configure early! In our specific situation, even lowering the landing gear earlier would have helped get us to "stable approach criteria" sooner.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported an uneventful landing from an unstable approach instead of executing go-around per standard procedures.
Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1749603
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Maintenance

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1749614
All the pilots met in operations. The FOs all went to the aircraft. I remained in operations to call Dispatch to add fuel. I called several times and could not get anyone to pick up the phone. I gathered my things and walked to the aircraft. On arrival at the aircraft, the Relief was doing a great job of preparing the galley of aircraft with the catered amenities. He discovered an issue with catering. It was past the expiry date. He was working diligently to problem solve and find out when the food was made. We proceeded to get the aircraft ready for the flight. I had to stop my efforts, and go back to assist with the issue of the catering, as well as, made additional calls to Dispatch. I was finally able to reach the Dispatcher, and requested an additional 7,000 lbs of fuel. I was extensively questioned about my decision to add fuel and insisted the weather was fine along the route. The Dispatcher was consuming significant time and pulled me away from the other pressing issues that needed my attention, so I did not have time to explain all the issues with the fuel load. We had a placard in the log book that needed to be addressed. I contacted maintenance and the MEL tracking and control item list (item XXXXX.Y) requires written permission from the station, and was unable to establish that written permission. Due to the abundance of issues, we were delayed in our pushback. Approximately several hours into the flight, we received a message from Dispatch stating ZZZZ requires COVID-19
testing for all crew members.

We tried to ascertain further information about hotels and new procedures that were not applicable to us and were unable to get any information. As a crew we made the decision to divert. We contacted Dispatch and were told to return to ZZZ. I went back on my break, and was informed upon my return that the flying pilots had attempted to contact Dispatch with no response for the entire return leg home. Landing was normal.

Unable to get information about procedures in Country X. Unable to get location of quarantine. Unable to get procedures on leaving Country X. All crew felt it best to not land at ZZZZ until all details are known.

The color codes that the caterers use needs to be in briefing guide to determine freshness of meals. Required station signature from tack needs to be available in guide.

**Narrative: 2**

Several hours after takeoff the Relief Pilot and I came off our break. The Captain and FO told us about a message received over ACARS detailing COVID-19 testing we can expect upon arrival in ZZZZ.

We seriously considered the implications of the message and decided rather than risk being compelled into having medical procedures performed on us and possibly being held for an indeterminate amount of time; we diverted back to ZZZ.

An ancillary point worth noting in this report is that on our return Dispatch went dark. We requested multiple times for them to update the system with our divert. But we didn't get a response nor were we able to obtain an updated Flight Progress strip.

**Narrative: 3**

Received an ACARS message [advising] ZZZZ now requires COVID-19 test for all crewmembers arriving ZZZZ. We were instructed that we would have to go straight to the hotel after testing and would be notified within X days of the test results. All four crewmembers agreed not to test and be quarantined in a foreign country for a minimum of 3 to 14 days. This event happened at cruise several hours into flight before divert occurred.

After receiving the message that COVID-19 test would be administered upon landing we all agreed as a crew that we would not let the Country X government administer such a test. There is a history of false positives that could have landed us in a Country X hospital indefinitely. We did not think that was a good idea. We contacted Dispatch and asked them where they would like us to go. They said return to ZZZ.

The company needs to reevaluate if they expect us to continue our service to foreign countries that have mandatory testing for COVID-19. The temperature checks that we receive currently for our ZZZZ service should be enough to let us into the country but that's not a decision that I can make. I could go for a "far reach" and say maybe have some kind of COVID test done 24 hours before check-in and keep the results with you but like I say that's a far reach I also would like to add that we prompted Dispatch twice for fuel burn and numbers going back to ZZZ. All we heard was crickets. Six hours with no contact from the company. I guess they didn't like the fact that we were diverting.

**Synopsis**
Air carrier flight crew reported being notified in flight that the destination city required a COVID-19 test upon arrival. Based on multiple concerns with the testing process, the crew elected to return to their departure airport.
ACN: 1749509

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749509
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
After watching a demo of fogging the aircraft for possible viruses with a new procedure I had noticed that the fog would enter into the forward and aft cabin temp sensor module. The fog is a wet fog that coats the surfaces to disinfect. The fog will easily enter the module that are in the PSUs. The power for these comes from your P6-4 power panel and controlled from your 115v AC bus that is still powered with your ground service bus. These Temp sensors have had issues in the past on all fleets with dirt and dust coating the sensor and giving false reading of cabin temp. Example, the pilot write up might say Aft cabin temp hot or cold this is due to the temp bulb dirty in most cases.

This is a procedure we are doing and we had talked about this to the others that were giving the demo of our concerns. Also with the smoke detectors in the cabin and cargo. There are similar systems on several aircraft types that operate in the same manner.
Either pull the circuit breaker in the systems before you spray the cargo or cabin or clean the sensors after spraying the cabin and or cargo in accordance with the manuals. This would avoid any delays to the aircraft departure and discomfort to our passengers and cabin crew members due to any delays or hot or cold cabin temps or false smoke warnings.

**Synopsis**

Technician reported that the residue film left from fogging the aircraft for COVID-19 may affect temperature sensors.
At least 3 passengers boarded the aircraft without wearing masks, when reminded of the mask policy they were cooperative, but had to get masks out of carry on luggage meaning that they were not wearing them or even in immediate possession of them prior to and during the boarding process.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that several passengers boarded without wearing COVID-19 protective masks and had to retrieve them from carry-on luggage.
ACN: 1749479

Time / Day
Date: 202007

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked
Cabin Lighting: High

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749479
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passenger boarding and removed mask at row 3 asked passenger to replace mask at the exit row. Passenger then sits in the exit row and still refuses to replace mask. Ask passenger again to replace mask she then informed me that she was drinking coffee, which she was not. I asked her to step out of the emergency exit row as she could not comply with my instructions. She informed me she was drinking coffee and was not in the exit row. I informed her she was and again asked her to move out of the exit row and replace her mask. After the fifth request she moved out of the exit and replaced her mask.

Preventive measures - a federal mandate for mask and enforceability with consequences if passengers don't comply; significant penalties.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported asking a passenger multiple times to wear a COVID-19 protective mask and to not sit in the emergency exit row before the passenger complied.
ACN: 1749470

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2500

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Autopilot
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749470
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were cleared for takeoff, radar vectors to 5,000 feet. Shortly after takeoff and at acceleration altitude, as pilot flying, I called for VNAV. Departing ZZZ there were many thunderstorm cells and we were told to expect multiple vectors. Those started early and we complied as the airplane climbed. I was also instructing my pilot monitoring to clean up flaps on schedule as he spoke to ATC.

It was just above 2,000 feet shortly after my call for autopilot on, I notice the airplane attempting to level and the throttles retarding. My first inclination was to immediately verify that we had the proper altitude of 5,000 feet set and it was. In a moment of confusion I disengaged the autopilot to continue what was then a turning climb. With the throttles now not going back into the TOGA detents, I also disengaged the autothrottles and manually pushed them forward. I verbalized "What is going on" to my FO.

It was shortly after this I realized our vertical mode: green ALT. I instructed the FO for FLCH speed 250 (we were nearing around 2,500 by this time). In the short period of this trouble shooting, I dipped the nose enough to break the 250 kts limit. When I noticed it, the speed was a little shy of 270 kts. I immediately brought the speed back to 250 kts and continued the remainder of the flight without incident.

This was my first leg back after 3 months. Immediate vigilance is required and complacency is never an option. I still am unclear as to what sequence drove that airplane into green ALT (it is possible the task saturated FO hit ALT multiple times looking for AP, but he was unable to offer any clarifying information). The point is I should have included a verification of magenta FLCH on the FMA when I verified the altitude set. I cannot assume either the airplane or my First Officer will always deliver what I ask for.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported the aircraft started to level off at the incorrect altitude resulting in a speed deviation while trouble shooting.
ACN: 1749437

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749437
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Taxiway
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

**Narrative: 1**

After landing on XXR, the rollout was extended to pass an aircraft that landed in front of us taxiing on A. We exited E and contacted Ground. I have been told we were given E, B, K, which I read back and our stand, which we could not understand the stand number. We exited at E and I was trying to get a confirmation of the stand as the taxi would be rather complicated due to the new terminal XX and all the construction at terminal XX. We turned to follow the aircraft on A, thinking it was B where Ground wanted us, and the 3 or 4 other aircraft on A taxiing to the terminals. I was still trying to confirm our stand number. Taxiing on the other taxiway did not make logical sense as all other aircraft were on what we must have assumed was B. Nothing was said at the time by the Ground Controller about being on A instead of B as we were in line with all the other aircraft which landed before us. We were the last aircraft on A and there were no conflicts with any other aircraft and we followed all further instructions to the stand XXX or XXY without event.

As FO my last line operational flight was in March. I have not been to ZZZZ for several years. I also found it very difficult to change between 3 taxi charts to try to find the taxiways being assigned, confirm all the construction and the stand number. The Jeppesen aircraft symbol of course was not working on my 10-9.

Consolidate all important taxi information on one Jeppesen page, especially with the considerable construction and closed taxiways.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing a taxiway incursion after receiving complex taxi instructions. The FO cited as contributing factors a lack of recent flight experience and having not been to the airport in several years.
**ACN: 1749435**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202007  
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**

Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON  
State Reference: US  
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 9000

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing  
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Descent  
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

**Person**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying  
Function. Flight Crew: Captain  
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine  
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument  
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1749435  
Human Factors: Training / Qualification  
Human Factors: Fatigue

**Events**

Anomaly. Deviation - Speed: All Types  
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR  
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Detector. Person: Flight Crew  
When Detected: In-flight  
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
Getting vectors into ZZZ at night at 10,000 feet, and 290 KIAS. Given a descent to 4,000 feet and a heading. Descended below 10,000 while still at 290 KIAS. I caught it at 9,000 feet, and immediately slowed to 250 KIAS using speed brakes. Controller did not say anything and we were not in proximity to other aircraft.

Five hour ground stop in ZZZ1. Longer than usual flight plan with minor weather deviations. Was very tired, and this was only my second flight in three months. No Excuse! I think for sure fatigue and currency played a role, but I should not have made this mistake.

Pay closer attention.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing an airspeed deviation and cited fatigue and lack of recent flying experience as contributing factors.
Management is not enforcing the face mask policy. Agents continue to walk around public areas exposing themselves and others.

Synopsis
Customer Service Representative reported that management is not enforcing the COVID-19 mask policy.
ACN: 1749386

Time / Day
Date : 202007

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft
Reference : X
Make Model Name : No Aircraft

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Company
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel : Ramp
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1749386
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Ground Personnel
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1
State X has issued a 14 day quarantine for anyone entering the state from certain locations. We have had several co workers who have traveled out of the state. It has been brought to management’s attention that these employees are in the breakroom without masks and are not adhering to the quarantine rules. These agents are putting other co workers and our customers in jeopardy by being on property. The supervisors, leads and the travelers themselves all said that it was approved by our upper management. Per the state websites essential workers must get prior written approval from the state before travel. Upper management told select people and never put this policy in writing. They say we are essential workers, which is true but our job does not require travel. The essential worker status is just to come to work when we were on the stay at home order.

Synopsis
Ground employee reported that co-workers are not adhering to quarantine rules and are not wearing COVID-19 protective masks.
Several agents continue to work and hang around common areas without face mask. Agents are working in the lobby and in breakrooms without masks. Potentially exposing us to the virus.

Ground employee reported that gate agents are not wearing COVID-19 protective masks in the work and common areas.
Many of our employees working inside the pits are exposed to COVID-19 as everywhere else in the airport is being sanitized except for the aircraft pits. Aircraft came in and no one came to sanitize the pits before, during, or after the flight came and left. Handling baggage, freight and other commodities.

Ground employee expressed concern that the aircraft pits are not being sanitized, potentially exposing workers to COVID-19.
ACN: 1749369

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use.STAR: ZZZZZ 4
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 6407
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 220
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2944
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749369
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While on the ZZZZZ 4 arrival, about 5 miles prior to ZZZZZ, we checked in with ZZZ approach who assigned us Runway XXR RNAV visual approach. We normally get ILS XYL, and were briefed for this. There was some confusion about the assignment, so I confirmed, at which point ATC gave us RNAV Visual XXL. I loaded the RNAV XXL into the FMC, but shortly after realized there was an RNAV Visual, like we would use in ZZZ1. There was a short discussion about how to get the waypoint sequenced correctly, due to the multiple FMC changes, but we got it sorted. At some point prior to ZZZZZ1, the Captain asked about it being a hard 6,000 feet crossing (not "at or above"), then he turned off the autopilot. I was not prepared for all the cross-checking challenges that I was now responsible for. This was my first leg in 2.5 months, but felt "up to speed" for the flight up until this point. As we approached 6,000 feet, the Captain did not arrest his descent rate and flew through the altitude. I announced that he was 300 feet low. After a few seconds, I couldn’t recognize him correcting, so I announced it again. He called for additional flaps and began to recover to 6,000 feet.

There was no terrain warnings, nor ATC involvement. We landed normally.

ATC said the runway change was due to winds, but winds were reported as calm upon arrival.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported the crew experienced an altitude deviation while the Captain was hand-flying the approach.
ACN: 1749269

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Angle.Radial: 090
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 3
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Ceiling: CLR

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Cowl Flap Control
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 12537
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 52
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 952
ASRS Report Number.Acquisition Number: 1749269
This was a morning IFR flight to pick-up 2 passengers and return before weather declined. I delayed departure for a few minutes because of nearby lightning activity to the South. I took off at XA:50 local, from ZZZ airport, in VMC, under Class B airspace, and contacted ZZZZZZ Departure Control on frequency XXY.Y. Controller cleared me immediately through Bravo (before I even reached the 1200-feet MSL base of Bravo airspace) and assigned a squawk code. During initial climb (1,300 feet) I noticed slightly higher cylinder head temperature readings, but I attributed that to the relatively hot/humid weather conditions. I reached down to ensure the cowl flaps were fully open, which had been confirmed twice before via the checklist and I discovered that during the initial climb the manual lever had crept half-way to the closed position, instead of remaining to the set "fully open." I reopened, but I noticed the lever wouldn't stay in the dedicated detent.

Around 1,400 feet ATC came back with the clearance (as filed) and instructed direct ZZZ VOR after reaching 1,600 feet and "climb to 6 thousand" which I believe I acknowledged. Airplane was put on autopilot (HDG and FLC modes). I reset the altitude preselect, hit direct NAV to ZZZ VOR as I was going through 1,600 feet and I proceeded to fold a piece of paper and use it to jam the lever in the open position. Around XB:01 I leveled-off, removed the paper "jammer," closed the cowl flaps, and confirmed cruise power (except for finalizing mixture leaning until TAS would be near 168 knots). The Controller seemed not very busy and there was no nearby traffic on my Garmin 1000 display, which I had set to Normal scan and a 12 NM range. I was satisfied that the air was smooth and completed the cruise checklist, set a VNAV reminder, pending mixture fine tuning. About 2 minutes later Controller asked me to confirm altitude. I replied that I was level at 7 thousand (my "filed" altitude) and he mentioned that I was given 6 (which I believe I had also acknowledged) and proceeded to say that he needed to hand me off to ZZZ approach at 6 or 8 thousand and he offered me the choice. I apologized for the occurrence, I accepted 8 thousand and proceeded with the flight without any further incident.

There were a few caveats that led to this event. Although I try to stay current my level of
activity (as a contract pilot) has diminished to about 54% as compared to last year's similar quarter, thanks to COVID-19, which has affected how "sharp" one can be/stay. Departing under Class B in VMC requires looking outside for traffic while establishing 2-way communication with ATC; this is routine out of ZZZ, but if combined with a distraction (cowl flaps) had made it very easy for me to "inadvertently and unconsciously" scroll the altitude preselect button one more "click" (to 7 thousand) while acknowledging 6 with ATC. Perhaps the early morning wake-up had taken its toll upon me, or maybe an anticipation of establishing cruise at the filed altitude of 7 thousand, numbed my brain to the point that even when the altitude buzzer went off while going through 6 thousand (for 7), no red flags were raised. I constantly read all kinds of available aviation reports, including those with scenarios that lead to altitude excursions, hoping that I would become a better pilot and more aware to avoid similar sets of circumstances, yet here I am having failed my own ongoing efforts.

Synopsis

Corporate pilot reported leveling off at the wrong altitude while being distracted with the cowl flaps.
ACN: 1749195

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202007
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1749195
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: Flight Crew

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
- Result: Flight Crew: FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

The Captain was the pilot flying and I was the pilot monitoring. During our visual approach into ZZZ the crew momentarily over sped the flaps going from flaps up to flaps 1. I was the pilot monitoring and when the pilot flying called for Flaps 1 I queried him that the speed was too fast. The pilot flying ensured me it was OK to select flaps 1. From there I selected flaps 1, the pilot flying and I both realized we should not have selected flaps 1 at that speed and I quickly retracted them. However, the master caution light did illuminate. Maintenance was notified, a write up in the book was performed and signed off after a visual inspection.

Both the Captain and I had not flown in over a month. Although we discussed this in our threats brief, our recency of experience was a contributing factor.

I needed to be more assertive when I saw we were too fast for the requested configuration. Rather than using an informal query, I should have used a hard "check speed" call and waited for us to agree on the speed before I moved the handle.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported momentarily overspeeding the flaps while configuring for approach.
Fuel imbalance alert during cruise flight. The #1 main fuel tank was low and the imbalance was approximately 1,450 lbs. Executed the QRH procedure as a crew to correct the imbalance. The fuel cross feed valve had to be cycled twice before the balancing took
Initially, the fuel crossfeed valve did not appear to be working properly due to having to cycle the switch two times for it to activate. The aircraft had been in storage since April. This was the first passenger revenue flight since April.

Recommend testing of crossfeed valves by maintenance prior to returning aircraft stored long term to service.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported a fuel imbalance in flight required the fuel crossfeed valve to be cycled twice before balancing took place. FO noted that aircraft had been in storage for several months.
ACN: 1749124

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 100

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Light Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Ground
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 8.9
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749124
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

I cleared Aircraft X to land on XXL he was 10 or so miles out and some time went by and Aircraft X said he was going around because there was a vehicle on the runway. I don't remember giving the runway to ground and didn't put the vehicle patch up. The operations vehicle had just been on XY and I used the truck patch and I remember him getting off and I removed the patch. The vehicle patch is required and a habit for me. Ground was answering the phone and letting someone in the gate at the time. The vehicle was south bound and got off at Taxiway X when he saw the aircraft. I failed to scan the runway, I failed to use the truck patch, and I failed to remember I allowed a vehicle on the runway.

Because of COVID this is the first time I have worked with ground open in almost 3 months. I guess I wasn't used to someone else talking to vehicles and putting them on the runway even though I approved it. I don't have any recommendations this was pure error on my part I should have had my patch up, I should have known what I was approving.

**Synopsis**

Controller reported an operations vehicle that was allowed onto a runway caused landing traffic to go-around.
ACN: 1749032

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 3
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1600

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling.Single Value: 10000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Corporate
- Make Model Name: Medium Transport
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Corporate
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 7300
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 7
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 4000
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749032
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
The event was an improper traffic pattern into ZZZ which was uncontrolled Class G airspace at the time.

We were on an IFR re-positioning flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and I was the non-flying pilot. The weather conditions were VFR with clear clouds and unrestricted visibility. The winds were approximately 300 degrees at 10 kts. The flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ would be quick, approximately 15 minutes flying time, so prior to takeoff from ZZZ1 the flying pilot and I briefed the flight as much as we could. We reviewed the weather, NOTAMs, and airport procedures at ZZZ knowing the Tower would be closed at the time of our arrival. Given the forecast weather at ZZZ we initially planned to land on Runway XX. While enroute and approximately 10 miles from the airport we heard other traffic operating at ZZZ and they were using Runway YYL. We decided to change runways and land on Runway YYL as well so as to not conflict with the other traffic. We reported the airport in sight and Approach cleared us for the visual approach and we entered the pattern from the North. At that point we changed to the advisory frequency and prepared for a right downwind entry for Runway YYL. We heard one other aircraft in the traffic pattern who just departed YYL and reported entering the left crosswind. After hearing that, I asked the flying pilot if he was sure that the traffic pattern for YYL was right traffic and we both felt that it was. I remembered during our pre-departure brief seeing on the airport diagram Runway XX right traffic pattern, as well as right pattern for Runway YY, but I later found out that it is right pattern for the parallel Runway YYR only. At this point we were entering the right downwind at 1,600 feet and we had the other traffic in sight which was entering the left downwind for YYL. We continued our approach and landing using a right traffic pattern and maintained communication and a constant visual with the other aircraft in the pattern and landed uneventfully. After landing we reviewed the airport information again and realized that it should have been standard pattern for Runway YYL and we mistakenly thought the right traffic pattern for YYR to be for both.
Even though we reviewed the traffic pattern direction prior to departure from ZZZ1 we should have reviewed it again and verified it once the decision was made to change from Runway XX to YYL. We thought we were on the correct entry, but we questioned it after hearing the departing traffic was entering a left crosswind for YYL. We were established in the traffic pattern already and working on configuring the airplane for landing. Since we had a constant visual of the other aircraft and was announcing our position and intentions to the other traffic, we decided to continue with the approach and land. They had us in sight as well and announced they would be extending their downwind and would be following behind us.

To prevent a recurrence of this I will be sure to be more vigilant of traffic pattern direction while approaching an airport especially an uncontrolled airport and as well, I will not be so focused on landing on one runway that I miss important information about other runways. Also, anytime there is a change of the runway in use we should review the airport information again. I should have spoken up once I had doubt about the traffic pattern and we should not of continued our approach until the correct pattern could be confirmed. We preferred to land runway XX since it was the longer runway, but we should have better anticipated that other traffic would be using YYL since it was preferential with the direction of the wind.

This is not an excuse, but this was our first trip in several months due to the pandemic that is affecting our country. I believe a factor affecting the quality of my performance in this event was the lack of sharpness due to the slowdown in flying. This was also the last leg to a relatively long duty day, 11 hours. I believe a contributing operating factor was that we are used to arriving straight-in at this airport because it is normally a controlled Class C airport.

**Narrative: 2**

[Narrative contained no additional information.]

**Synopsis**

Corporate flight crew reported flying the incorrect pattern to a landing.
ACN: 1749024

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
Light: Dawn
Ceiling: Single Value: 10000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. CTAF: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Taxi
Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Radar: 5
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Non Radar: 2
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 6500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 75
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 700
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1749024
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel
**Person : 2**

Reference : 2  
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X  
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization : Air Taxi  
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying  
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument  
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1749029  
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown  
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew  
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

**Events**

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance  
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway  
Detector.Person : Observer  
When Detected : Taxi  
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Primary Problem : Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

I was on an IFR flight to ZZZ to pick up passengers for a Part 135 flight. I received vectors to ZZZ and Approach Control asked what approach I would like at ZZZ. I requested a visual to Runway XL at ZZZ. I reported the airport in sight and canceled IFR. I do not recall whether or not we were cleared for the visual approach to XL or not. Change to advisory frequency was approved. (ZZZ Tower does not open for another 20 minutes). I switched to the CTAF frequency and announced left base to Runway XL. There were no other aircraft in the pattern. Shortly after my radio transmission I heard a very muffled and unreadable transmission only being able to make out [Number sequence] "XYZA." A few minutes later I announced turning final to Runway XL. A moment later the same unreadable transmission was received again only able to make out [number sequence] "XYZA." I thought this was someone on the wrong advisory frequency of XYZ.A. We landed uneventful on Runway XL and taxied to the FBO.

After I shutdown and was exiting the aircraft, an Airport Authority truck pulled up. Person X wearing a COVID-19 face mask began yelling at me. Person X stated that "Runway XL is closed and I told you twice" "Runway XL is closed use Runway YY or ZZ"

I apologized and told Person X that there was no NOTAM for XL being closed and approach said nothing about it, nor did the AWOS.

Person X again repeated herself saying "I told you twice that XL was closed. I said we heard two transmissions and that I only heard XYZA both times."
After the incident I reexamined the NOTAMs for ZZZ and there were none mentioning Runway XL. ATC did not mention it. The AWOS did not mention it. The AF/D does state that when the Tower is closed, Runway XL is Available with PPR.

Contributing factors to this incident:
Person X with Airport Authority trying to give instructions on a hand held radio while wearing a very heavy COVID-19 Mask making transmission unreadable. Had this transmission been received, a slight turn to final to Runway YY would have been made. Better review of the AF/D or getting the PPR.

**Narrative: 2**

Me and my Captain were on an IFR flight plan ZZZ to pick up passengers for a Part 135 flight. We received vectors for ZZZ and Approach Control asked what approach I would like at ZZZ. I requested a visual to Runway XL at ZZZ and we received vectors for final. I reported the airport in sight and canceled IFR. I do not recall if we were cleared for the visual to Runway XL or not. We switched to advisory frequency after being approved by ATC. ZZZ Tower was closed at this moment and will not open for another 20 minutes or so. My Captain switched to CTAF frequency and announced a left base for Runway XL. There were no other aircraft inbound to ZZZ at this time. I was focused on flying but could hear someone speaking on the frequency, but it was not clear what they were saying. My Captain says he believed he understood someone say [number sequence] "XYZA". We announced our positions "Turning final Runway XL", "Short final Runway XL" "Clear runway XL", and so on. We then taxied to the FBO. After shutting down the plane, an Airport Authority truck pulled up. Person X wearing a COVID-19 face mask began yelling at us. Person X said that Runway XL was closed.

We apologized for landing on Runway XL, but there was no NOTAM about it, approach said nothing about it, and AWOS didn't mention it either. We told Person X we couldn't understand the transmissions over the radio as they were not coming in clearly, and my Captain told Person X he could just barely understand the words [Number sequence] XYZA.

After the incident we re-examined the NOTAMs for ZZZ and there were none mentioning Runway XL. The AWOS did not mention it. The AFD does not state that when the tower is closed, Runway XL is available with PPR.

Contributing factors to this incident:

Person X working for Airport Authority trying to give instructions over the radio on a hand held radio while wearing heavy face mask had unreadable transmissions. If we received a clear transmission of Runway XL being closed a slight turn to Runway YY would have been made with no problems.

**Synopsis**

Air taxi flight crew reported landing at an airport and being advised that the runway was closed.
Passenger X was informed by several crew members that he and his family would have to have their mask on if they are not drinking and eating. Passenger X continued to remove his mask throughout the flight after being told by FA B and C. I approached Passenger X and he quickly put on his mask and I informed him that I was aware that my crew informed him several times to keep his mask on. I asked if he was continuing on to ZZZZ and he replied yes. I informed him that I was going to have a Supervisor talk to him when he deplaned the
aircraft. I notified the pilots to contact the Supervisor and have them meet the aircraft to talk to Passenger X so that this behavior does not continue on the next flight.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with COVID-19 mask wearing requirements during the flight.
ACN: 1748941

Time / Day

Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748941
Human Factors: Physiological - Other

Events

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
After takeoff out of ZZZ while wearing my mask I got hot and sweaty and nearly fainted. I was on the forward jump seat. I had to remove my mask and fan myself and the D Flight Attendant was so concerned that she was going to grab oxygen. Fortunately, I was able to cool off and regain composure. The D Flight Attendant had mint essential oil in her suit case and had me put a drop behind my neck and ears. This helped tremendously, but this was incredibly embarrassing. I know passengers took notice that I was having a difficult time getting oxygen. A few have pulled me aside and asked if I was OK. This is not a good look for any airline, in that we are forcing our crew members and our passengers to comply with the mask rule when they could he creating a more serious medical situation.

We have a mask policy in place that has absolutely no wiggle room for passengers and crew who have underlying medical issues that prevent them from being completely compliant. This is unacceptable!! I assume that the general public knows that masks should be on and I assume also that everyone has a mask with them, what I'm concerned about is having a guest (or a crew member) pass out from lack of oxygen and of course the worst case scenario of having a death on board. I've seen flight attendants become aggressive with this policy and I am fully convinced that it will get worse. Please re-evaluate this policy and put specific limits as to how crew members are supposed to handle it.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported feeling hot, sweaty and nearly fainting while having to wear a COVID-19 mask during flight.
**ACN: 1748940**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748940
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Passenger
When Detected: In-flight

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**
I took the forward outboard jumpseat in order to allow D FA take forward inboard jumpseat. Passenger brought to our attention [once] inflight he was uncomfortable [being] seated next to two other passengers in his row. Passenger [stated] the social distancing guidelines were not being followed. FA D and B agreed to allow passenger [to] take row XDF to create a safer environment for passenger. Took forward outboard jumpseat for
landing. Flight was full, asked for volunteers to swap, no one volunteered. Flights are becoming more full, no other options for rearranging seats.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported a passenger was feeling uncomfortable sitting so close to two other passengers and was allowed to move to a different seat.
I was a DH sitting next to Passenger X. [He] had his mask off the whole flight. When asked by working crew during cart service, he did comply, then soon took it off again. I had to ask him 3 times again. (He was sniffling and coughing). Had 2 beers.
After landing he got up to deplane took off his masks then exhaled really big and loud right down to the guests sitting under him.

I asked again and he did comply. Offered me to bring my luggage down I said politely "I'll get it thank you." He stands extremely close to a passenger standing behind him and says loudly "She doesn't want me to touch it."

As an employee, this type of behavior is very challenging.

Remind guests face mask must be worn, not complying may result in reject of boarding next time.

**Synopsis**

Dead heading Flight Attendant reported issues with a passenger who was not wearing a COVID-19 mask at all times on the flight.
ACN: 1748927

Time / Day

Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748927
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Dispatch

Person: 2

Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748932
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2 : Dispatch
Communication Breakdown. Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person : Flight Attendant
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result. General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I was the D FA. As we started to board I was standing at seat 1X/Y. A gentleman boarded and said he was in 1Y. (Due to COVID these seats are blocked for the FA jump seat.) We sent a text to the agent(s) requesting them to re-seat passenger. There was a back and forth via text then we requested a Supervisor. Two supervisors came down and said they had talked to Dispatch. Dispatch told them for weight and balance passenger needed to be seated in 1Y. We showed them the document stating these seats were blocked but he said Dispatch required passenger to sit in 1Y. We explained weight and balance is a zone not a specific seat. After the supervisors argued with the Captain and the FAs one of the supervisors said "if you won't let him sit in 1Y then I'll have to ask customers if they are ok with being seated next to someone else." Which I believe is what they are supposed to do. I explained that passenger could be seated in 1Z if [Flight Attendant] 1A was comfortable. The Supervisor then went to our First Class passenger in XX who was on the phone. The Supervisor rudely interrupted the passenger saying "I need to talk to you" over and over. I stopped him and told him to either ask someone else or at least wait until he was off the phone. The Supervisor then asked [Flight Attendant] 1A and she agreed to have passenger sit next to her. After we closed the door passenger told me that an agent had told them once we got up in the air he could just sit in my seat in 1X for the entire flight.

Please make it clear to the ZZZ Station that seats 1X & 1Y are currently FA jumpseats.

Narrative: 2
Agents in ZZZ seated a passenger in 1Y. They claimed it was due to weight and balance at the direction of Dispatch. They were specifically saying the passenger had to be sitting over there even though we told them those seats were blocked due to social distancing for the D Flight Attendant per our policy. They (a customer service Supervisor and a couple of agents) did not want to follow procedures to ask passengers if they were willing to sit together. They kept insisting this was required for weight and balance that the passenger sit in 1Y. They said they'd have to ask another passenger in First Class if they would be willing to sit next to another passenger. And I asked "Isn't that procedure?" Then they asked if after takeoff the gentleman could move over into 1XY. I said no. So the agents did not want to follow our new social distancing procedure and wanted to displace a flight attendant. Meanwhile, they put a non-rev in the seat previously occupied by their upgraded passenger.

Synopsis
Flight Attendants reported COVID-19 seating related issues involving flight attendant pre-assigned seats.
ACN: 1748889

Time / Day
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
- Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5000

Environment
- Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Check Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748889
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Assessments
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

**Narrative: 1**

I am not sure if ZZZ Departure is short staffed with COVID flight reductions, and controllers are being over worked so stress levels are higher, but I really can't believe the reaction and unprofessional attitude that was demonstrated on ATC's part. If flight numbers are starting to be increased, Controller staffing needs to be increased back to normal. I can't see any other reason that would stress a Controller to the point of reacting this way to a very normal situation when radios get busy and a clearance isn't given right. Taking off from ZZZ, Tower handed us off to Departure. After switching to Departure frequency, I heard an Air Carrier Y flight check on with Departure. ATC responded to Air Carrier Y's check in with a clearance for our call sign. Given the incorrect response to Air Carrier Y, I checked on with Departure as I normally would and remained on my original PDC departure clearance until receiving further instructions. I did not receive a response. I then tried to check on two to three more times, but never received a response from ATC. At that point I requested "radio check." After two "radio check" attempts I finally received a response from ATC. It was the most unprofessional reaction I have ever experienced in XX years of flying. The Controller was basically yelling and said "Air Carrier X, DO WHATEVER YOU WANT!" I responded by saying we were "looking for a clearance." At this point we were level at 5,000 feet flying the ZZZZZ Y Departure. Without a fairly prompt continued climb clearance, it would be very hard to meet further climb restrictions on the departure of ZZZZZ at or above 15,000. After two attempts asking for a clearance, ATC responded by saying "Roger." After several minutes, the Controller issued us a climb clearance and the flight continued as normal.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported communication issues with Departure Control and made reference to Controller possibly being overworked or stressed out due to COVID-19 staffing levels.
ACN: 1748818

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 15000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748818
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1

Departed ZZZ's XXR on the SID. ZZZ Departure gave us a climb to 15,000 feet, and handed us off to Center. We attempted to check in with no success. Other aircraft on frequency, were also not able to communicate with this frequency. After several minutes of cruising at 15,000 feet another aircraft on frequency said he was able to contact Center further east, and that they were at FL190. We continued on our route at 15,000 feet. More aircraft handed off from ZZZ Approach began to attempt to check in unsuccessfully. Two or three times we returned to ZZZ Approach to try and get another frequency to no avail. ZZZ Approach was saturated with radio traffic and was confused as to why we kept coming back to him. For approximately 15-20 minutes we flew on the route at 15,000 feet attempting to check in. Gradually, we could hear the Controller as we continued eastbound. Finally we had the Controller loud and clear and attempted to check in. The Controller was saturated with traffic working on multiple frequencies. For another 5-10 minutes we attempted to check in but were unable. The aircraft continuing to come onto the frequency made most calls blocked. As we continued on the route, a large line of weather running north/south of our course with tops over FL650 had solidified making any chance of flying through the line impossible. We needed a deviation to the north to end-run the line of severe storms by fling north, from our easterly course. We were unable to check in with Center as we approached 60 miles to the line of weather. I instructed the FO that when we got to forty miles from the line, we would PAN PAN the frequency, and turn north parallel to the weather. There were several aircraft to our 8 to 9 o'clock position that we were concerned about in the case of turning north. Turning south was not an option. Right at 40 miles, we were able to check in, and get a turn north. The Controller was doing the best he could. The volume of radio traffic on this frequency cannot be understated. Luckily, our dispatcher had included two alternates for our destination and we had the fuel to be able to continue for an extended time at 15,000 feet and FL190 which consumed far more fuel than planned. I managed the flight to reduce fuel consumption, monitored the destination weather closely and landed with plenty of fuel reserves. I give the event a "serious" risk rating due to the surrounding aircraft that would have been involved in case of an unplanned turn by us in order to avoid severe thunderstorm penetration.

The main causal factor is ATC's under-staffing due to COVID-19. Having flown during the last week of June, into the first week of July, I have noted ARTCC facilities being overworked. Calls are being missed, check-ins taking longer, and confusion caused by controllers assigned multiple frequencies. The level of air traffic has gone up dramatically over the last two weeks, especially starting in July. A possible contributing causal factor is the airline industry adding flights faster than ATC can handle them and a possible lack of coordination between the airline industry and the FAA's ATC.

Airline should work with ATC management to discuss the added flights and the capabilities of ARTCC's. Perhaps there is a way to better coordinate with vulnerable ARTCC's to alternate departures/arrivals to set a more manageable pace for controllers in their sectors.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported communication issues with Center and attributed it to COVID-19 ATC staffing of facilities.
ACN: 1748780

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748780
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748821
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
Landing Runway XXL in ZZZ. FO flying. It was a stable approach. He flared slightly high and we floated and may have landed passed the touchdown zone. I was about to say Go-Around just as we touched down.

I contribute my late call out due to flying the red-eye from ZZZZ.

I haven't flown in a couple of months. The First Officer hasn't flown much as well. Even during a stable approach in good weather, be prepared for a go around, and always be ready to call it out, if warranted.

Narrative: 2
I was landing Runway XXL in ZZZ. I had a stable approach. I started the flare at 20 feet and I floated. I may have landed just past the touchdown zone.

It was late after an all night rocket trip from ZZZZ-ZZZ.

I will be going to ZZZ1 for landing currency sim, since I haven't had enough currency in the right seat in 3 months. Some of this can be attributed to lack of flying during the COVID-19 crisis.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported they may have landed passed the touchdown zone. First Officer stated lack of flying contributed to the event.
ACN: 1748771

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748771
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On final approach to ILS XX, ZZZ, VMC conditions, I (FO, PM) omitted to contact Tower at ZZZZZZ Intersection.

Contributing to this omission might be my absence from flying for over 4 months, outside of simulator sessions.

Narrative: 2

On landing I noticed that we were not in contact with ZZZ Tower. Contact was made and we taxied to parking without incident. I later determined that Tower issued a landing clearance.

Contributing factors included configuration change at the point we were to contact Tower, my focus on performing the landing, and insufficient monitoring of the FO's actions.

Return "Landing Clearance- Received" to the Before Landing Checklist.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported landing without contacting Tower.
ACN: 1748726

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 31000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use.STAR: ZZZZZX
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748726
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Undershoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was the PM on Aircraft X from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. Our arrival was as planned per the PDC. As we approached ZZZZZ (the transition fix), the ATC controller said, "Aircraft X, cleared the ZZZZZX arrival for the ZZZZZY VISUAL RWY XX". I acknowledged ATC and then asked the CA if he heard "descend via"? The CA and I agreed that we did not hear "descend via" and therefore stayed at FL310 until I could query the Controller. We had 27.6 NM to the next altitude constraint (approximately four minutes) and the radios were busy with constant chatter. I was finally able to query the Controller approximately 7 NM prior to ZZZZZ2 with an altitude constraint of FL280-240. ATC said that he expected us to have descended, then cleared us direct to ZZZZZ3 to resume the arrival with published altitudes and speeds. The CA started to descend, there were no further questions or issues with the clearance, and we had an uneventful arrival/approach/landing. The Controller was not mad, nor did he ask us to call him after we landed. Lastly, there were no traffic concerns, nor was safety an issue.

Both the CA and I had not flown in two or more months so we were being extra vigilant with a heightened awareness. A definite causal factor was the busy radio which made it hard to communicate with ATC in a timely fashion before losing a 3:1 descent profile and causing a more aggressive descent to meet the published altitudes on the ZZZZZX RNAV Arrival. More importantly, the #1 causal factor was the lack of proper vertical clearance verbiage by ATC. Both the CA and I expected to hear, "descend via" but that was not stated. There was no clearance to descend out of FL310, only "cleared the ZZZZZX ARRIVAL". After reviewing the FOM Section XXXX, we executed correctly.

FOM Section XXXX Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) Clearances
Source: AIM & INFO 12003
An ATC arrival clearance using the phraseology "Cleared arrival <name>." (i.e., "Cleared PULLMAN FOUR ARRIVAL.") authorizes a pilot to navigate laterally on the STAR; however, the pilot must maintain the last assigned altitude until receiving authorization to descend. See also paragraph XXXY Climb/Descend Via for additional guidance on STAR clearances.

I would say that if there are ATC sectors that have trends of reports filed for STARs related to issues meeting vertical clearances due to the clearance verbiage by the ATC controllers, then I'd recommend a message go out to ATC controllers for review of the proper clearance verbiage so as not to confuse/question pilots. This could also be a quarterly review for both pilots and controllers.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported being unsure if they were supposed to descend on the approach clearance received from ATC resulting in an altitude deviation.
I went to the office in ZZZ to get PPE. No one was there. A sign on the door said they were in the gate area distributing supplies, but no one came to our aircraft, so this meant that they left for the day, most probably. This information should be sent to Person X to let him know that his directives are not being followed.
Put the supplies in the crew room as previously stated in memo, or have the office manned appropriately, or put masks at each gate for crew access.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported being unable to obtain PPE (Personal Protective Equipment).
ACN: 1748709

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace. Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748709

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
On vector to visual approach Runway XX, ZZZ, Approach provided traffic outbound to south at 3,500 feet. Approach and Tower were combined and appear to underestimate our closure rate on the vector to join final as visual backed by ILS Runway XX. Other traffic (Aircraft Y) was monitored through all stages by PM TCAS display which was active the entire flight. PM and PF visually sighted traffic and paused descent whilst turning inbound for final. After this action first TA then RA triggered with monitor VS and arc guidance to maintain alt, which was action already active. Normal approach and landing once visually clear of traffic.

Cause - Poor vector and then visual approach clearance whilst traffic outbound in approach display and conflicting altitude.

More ATC resources, combined approach and tower may have been a factor.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported an airborne conflict attributed to the Local Controller working more than one combined position.
### ACN: 1748675

#### Time / Day
- **Date**: 202007
- **Local Time Of Day**: 1201-1800

#### Place
- **Locale Reference.Airport**: ZZZ.Tower
- **State Reference**: US
- **Altitude.AGL.Single Value**: 0

#### Aircraft : 1
- **Reference**: X
- **ATC / Advisory.Tower**: ZZZ
- **Make Model Name**: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- **Crew Size.Number Of Crew**: 1
- **Flight Plan**: VFR
- **Flight Phase**: Taxi
- **Route In Use**: None

#### Aircraft : 2
- **Reference**: Y
- **ATC / Advisory.Tower**: ZZZ
- **Make Model Name**: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
- **Mission.Other**: Taxi

#### Person : 1
- **Reference**: 1
- **Location Of Person.Facility**: ZZZ.Tower
- **Reporter Organization**: Government
- **Function.Air Traffic Control**: Supervisor / CIC
- **Qualification.Air Traffic Control**: Fully Certified
- **Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs)**: 3.5
- **ASRS Report Number.Accession Number**: 1748675
- **Human Factors**: Situational Awareness
- **Human Factors**: Workload
- **Human Factors**: Distraction

#### Person : 2
- **Reference**: 2
- **Location Of Person.Aircraft**: X
- **Location In Aircraft**: Flight Deck
- **Reporter Organization**: Personal
- **Function.Flight Crew**: Pilot Flying
- **Function.Flight Crew**: Single Pilot
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Private
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Instrument
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Multiengine
- **Experience.Flight Crew.Total**: 1700
- **Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days**: .3
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1749520

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was working all positions combined. Aircraft X called ready for departure on Runway XX. I knew that prior to the clearance that a maintenance aircraft had previously been taxiing on it but I assumed that he was long gone as plenty of time had passed. After clearing the aircraft for departure, I saw that the taxiing aircraft had stopped and was still on the runway and it would seem Aircraft X noticed it also as we stepped on each other. Departure roll never occurred. I canceled his takeoff clearance and re-cleared him once the taxiing aircraft was off the runway. In my opinion, there were several causes for this mistake:

1. First and foremost, I was distracted by other duties and my scan failed. I also was the victim of my own expectation bias as plenty of time had passed that most of the other maintenance aircraft would have been off the runway at the time.

2. The ramp construction has gone on for an incredible length of time and the only way that maintenance aircraft have to get from one area to the next is on the runway. Taxiing on the runway is a standard operation and is a safety issue in and of itself.

3. I was distracted by updating the binders in the Tower Cab and other FLM duties.

4. The FLMs are required to be in the Cab for 5 hours a shift. Due to the social distancing requirements associated with COVID-19, the only way to accomplish all duties and meet all requirements is for the FLMs to work 5 hours a shift while the staffing only works 3.

I don't know if there's anything that can be done on a facility level but I can speak for myself. No amount of paperwork nor organizational rules will ever pre-empt providing a safe environment for aircraft. I may have lost sight of that and I know now that there's nothing that cannot wait to be done. Paperwork can always be done later.

Narrative: 2
I conducted a local flight at ZZZ. I obtained the ATIS info and contacted Clearance Delivery with my request to conduct 3 practice approaches at ZZZ. I obtained a clearance with squawk code and altitude, with correct read back.
I contacted Ground for taxi, the Controller initially said taxi to [Runway] XR via delta, then corrected himself and changed it to Runway XX via Hotel. From my FBO position on the airport, taxi to XX via Hotel is the usual procedure. I did notice the Controller was the same voice as Clearance, and I also noticed Controller was simultaneously working the Tower frequency.

I taxied to [Runway] XX hotel intersection and called Tower notifying them Aircraft X ready at Hotel for XX. Tower cleared me for takeoff, heading 310, and gave the current wind, which was a light right crosswind. I taxied to position and was about to apply takeoff power, but looked down the runway and I see a commercial jet sitting abeam at the other end of the runway!

I was only at taxi speed and stopped. I called the Tower saying "I was aborting takeoff, there [is] a Jet sitting on the runway." Tower said "sorry about that, and hold position."

I held position, and confirmed I was on the runway and holding there. The jet then turned directly down the runway and taxied toward me, and subsequently exited the runway to my left towards the main terminal ramp. When clear, Tower then cleared me for takeoff, the remainder of flight with my 3 approaches was uneventful.

Why the commercial jet was sitting there is not apparent to me. If it arrived on XL it would not need to taxi on [Runway] XX to get to the airport terminal.

Chain of events, Controller simultaneously operating Clearance Delivery, Ground and Tower operations at a Class C facility. Controller changing my instructions, and perhaps distracted by other operations.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller and pilot reported a runway incursion due to expectation bias. Pilot stated the Controller was working multiple positions at the time of the event.
ACN: 1748670

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude, AGL, Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person, Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization: Government
Function, Air Traffic Control: Other / Unknown
Qualification, Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience, Air Traffic Control, Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 1
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1748670
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly, ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly, Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector, Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected, Other
Result, General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
My crew was informed that there was a confirmed positive case of COVID-19. There was nothing done until the shift ended, just teleconferences and meetings, facility management and the district and whoever else was involved. They had our crew continue to work in the contaminated facility along with the day crew who had been here from XAam to XI:15pm without any cleaning or closing of the facility. So after working our entire shift, the district, facility management and NATCA decided the best plan was to have a cleaning crew come in at night to clean the Tower and facility only not including the TRACON. The person who is believed to have tested positive for COVID-19 works the mid shifts. They enter the TRACON before their shift starts to get the briefing and enter the TRACON after their shift ends to brief the oncoming day shift Supervisor. So with this being said and COVID-19
being able to live on surfaces for hours to days, no one really knows, the TRACON was contaminated. So after all that being said, they are having my crew, the same crew who was here in the facility before the cleaning along with the day shift crew to come back to work tomorrow the very next day and re-contaminate the entire facility. None of us know if we have contracted COVID-19 because they are not quarantining us.

Both of the crews working should be mandatory quarantined and the entire facility along with the TRACON should be cleaned. We are on this special COVID-19 schedule for this specific reason. 5 days on and 5 days off. The other crews that are on their 5 days off should be coming in after the facility has been cleaned.

**Synopsis**

Controller reported that someone in the facility had tested positive for COVID-19. Controller was concerned about the decontamination process.
ACN: 1748666

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: MRI.Tower
State Reference: AK
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: MRI
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: VFR
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace.Class C: ANC

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory. Tower: MRI
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class C: ANC

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ..Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Other / Unknown
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748666
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1
ANC coordinated the departure of Aircraft Y from Runway 33 (ANC) to Runway 6 (EDF) which was approved. Then they requested a point out through MRI. GC/CIC was combined and the Controller unable the transition through MRI's Class D. Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff with the deviation. 40 seconds later, A11 TRACON called us to give us a red light in order for Aircraft Y to transition through the FAR Part 93 corridor inside the MRI Class D. GC/CIC told them behind the guy that was airborne and A11 TRACON argued and said no he's coming into your airspace. GC/CIC told them unable red light. A11 TRACON Controller hung up without acknowledging. There was an aircraft on visual approach to ANC Runway 33 and Aircraft Y was not rolling. Aircraft X kept the Part 93 altitude deviation and flew through the corridor at 010. GC/CIC called back and told them behind the 010 target mid-channel, red light. A11 TRACON did not acknowledge and hung up the line. A11 TRACON Controller refused to call us back and release the FAR 93 corridor back to us after Aircraft Y landed and there were no other pertinent IFR arrivals on the radar for 64 miles out. We are not allowed to call and remind them so a manager had to call their manager and remind them that they can't leave us "penalty red light" because they are mad at us. (Because it is still our airspace when we are open.)

The intention of this situation was that Aircraft Y wanted to depart ANC Runway 33 then intercept the EDF Runway 6 final instead of flying an extra 4 minutes of flight time to depart and loop around to fly the 10 mile final into EDF. It normally would not be an issue, except ANC doesn't give a heads up until they're about clear Aircraft Y. The majority of our aircraft are single engine fixed-wings flown by student pilots, bush pilots, and weekend pilots. Also of note is the fact that the majority of these aircraft don't have the performance characteristics to make the climb to 020 at a moment's notice to avoid the Far Part 93 corridor so they are forced to descend to 006 or below and fly across the inlet. If they lose their only engine, they will land in the water and most likely become hypothermic during the swim to one of the shores and/or be swept out to sea with the very strong current. Our pilots should not be forced to change their flight paths because Aircraft Y wants to yank and bank it from Tower to Tower for their convenience.

This FAR 93 corridor has been an ongoing issue for the entire time that I have worked at MRI and previously mitigated through reports multiple times. Previous guidance and agreed upon steps from prior mitigations is that this is our airspace; A11 TRACON is not allowed to take the airspace from us and must ask; pilots already given the altitude deviation and cleared for takeoff will retain the deviation; MRI must sterilize the airspace or resolve the conflicts prior to releasing the airspace. A11 TRACON has stated on paper that they will follow this guidance, however their actions speak louder than their words. They have told us that by answering the landline, we are acknowledging the red light and
there is a specific crew that denies the altitude deviation on an airborne aircraft when they give us a red light. We have the right to approve or deny the use or release of our airspace when we are open. This continued practice is unsafe and will cause a collision over a notoriously busy chunk of terminal airspace in close proximity with terminal airports.

Not sure if it's pertinent: A11 TRACON and ANC are still working the COVID 5/5 schedules. MRI has reintegrated the crews, but does not have the staffing to support working our normal operations. MRI is still operating winter hours of 0700-2200 local when normally we would be operating 0700-0000 local.

LOA change needs to happen. The language is ambiguous and vague. We do not release the airspace to EDF just because they ask for it and we are also required to sterilize that chunk of airspace prior to its release. The LOA language needs to be updated to reflect that A11 TRACON is APREQ-ing the airspace for an IFR arrival and allow us enough time to sterilize it. The lack of safety culture and expectation bias at A11 TRACON is going to continue to create unsafe situations and potentially a future collision.

Also, an airspace study should be conducted. This is very congested terminal airspace and the Class C should probably be extended to be a full circle around ANC. This would prevent 90% of the other issues that A11 TRACON complains about reference the VFR aircraft flying in/out of LHD, MRI, and surrounding uncontrolled aerodromes.

**Synopsis**

MRI Tower Controller reported LOA problems with the overlying A11 TRACON.
ACN: 1748648

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: VFR
Flight Phase: Taxi
Route In Use: None

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Flight Phase: Landing
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 4
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748648
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was holding short Runway XX for departure. He had an IFR flight plan on file and issued to him but wanted to go VFR. I the Local Controller issued him a VFR advisory clearance. Aircraft X read it back and must have proceeded to line up and wait on Runway XX. I must have noticed him on the runway at about the time he asked for a takeoff clearance. I told him to exit Runway XX and it appeared he started his taxi down the runway to exit at Taxiway Kilo. I sent Aircraft Y around on Runway XY. Aircraft X exited at Taxiway Kilo and I re-cleared Aircraft Z to land Runway XX and that the runway was clear.

It's a pandemic. I'm wearing a mask and gloves while working. It's exhausting and stressful. Air traffic around the country has reduced hours we have split up in groups so if one group gets sick the others can still come in after the Tower/facilities are cleaned. Things are not normal but these bored people that want to joyride around in their private aircraft can do that at their will and they have been doing it for a long time even flight training has been ongoing. Flying right now should be with a purpose of going for point a to point b, I don't see why we tolerate people to joyride/flight train during this time. Why can't everyone be IFR and fly with a purpose of moving people/doctors/equipment or whatever from point a to point b. If we banned VFR flights I'm sure the joyriding will stop.

Narrative: 2

I was at hold line for Runway XX, decided not to go IFR told Tower I wanted to depart VFR.

With VFR advise, Tower said he would have to cancel my intended flight plan -- and give
me a squawk. As I was waiting for a plane to land and clear runway, Tower came back to me and said "squawk XXXX and in turn east remain below 2,500 feet and contact departure on XYZ.A." I then waited for plane to exit runway.

Then taxied onto runway thinking I had been cleared for takeoff. [I] realized that I had not been cleared for takeoff and Tower was open (right now Tower [is] on limited hours and have been flying a lot with no Tower).

Realized error that tower was open "called Tower and they asked me to exit the runway immediately," there was no conflict.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller and small aircraft pilot reported a runway incursion resulting in an aircraft having to go-around.
The flight crew is concerned when they get an aircraft that has sat for a few days the switches are out of place. Examples: hyd flight control switches, alternate flap switch, etc.

I joined a call for flight Operations and discussed this matter, I requested they send me
the reports, so we can address with other reports, also asked if they can get pictures or an accurate description on which switch was out of order.

Safety is aware they have a pre-flight checklist, but they wanted to make sure maintenance operations [are] aware.

This is a hazard report to start a possible trend.

Synopsis

Technician reported flight crews are concerned that when they receive an aircraft that has sat for a few days some switches are in the wrong position.
ACN: 1748591

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Inspection
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Testing

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Repair Facility
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748591
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result.General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
As aircraft come out of storage, Circuit Breakers and systems have not been reactivated correctly causing numerous rejected takeoffs or return to airfields.

I suggest a task card or work assignment on an aircraft coming out of storage as a last item before aircraft release depicting a graphic of that fleet specific circuit breaker panels and an instruction to visually check all CB's to be pushed in except those that are deferred etc. Also a CAT 3 check should be assigned which could capture most system failures due to improper reactivation. Best prevention would include a high power runup.

Synopsis
Maintenance Technician reported that aircraft are coming out of storage with circuit breakers and other systems in the incorrect setting/position.
ACN: 1748585

Time / Day
Date: 2020-06

Place
Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748585
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Hazardous Material Violation
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result.General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I called Maintenance Control to have cabin service clean the lavatory and the lead stated that they don't do that type of work. I then asked him if he had anyone that was qualified to do bio-hazard and he stated that I should be the one doing the cleaning and not the cabin provisioning crew. This has been an ongoing problem here and probably system wide getting people qualified with proper equipment for bio-hazard. I thought that by bringing this back in-house it would be better but this cleaning staff here in ZZZ do a below par job cleaning airplanes. With COVID-19 you would have thought that they had down time to get these people up to speed. The cabin and provisioning manual states what their responsibilities are and we are lucky if they do half of the tasks. They should be available to all aircraft appearance cleaning. The flight attendants took the time to put a note in the lavatory door but didn't create a write up or notify anyone about issue and they are also part to blame. I ended taking the entire lavatory away because the cabin crew
lead/manager refused to do his job and causing an inconvenience and a bio-hazard safety concern for our paying passengers and outbound crew.

**Synopsis**

Maintenance Technician reported confusion on who is responsible for cleaning bio-hazards in the interior of the aircraft cabin.
ACN: 1748574

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification. Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748574
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector. Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: FLC complied w/ Automation / Advisory

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was assisting [the] purser during boarding by welcoming customers and distributing small hand wipes sanitizer. I was there until only [a] few customers were left to be boarded and I told [the] purser that I'm going to do my exit row verification-briefing. As I walked there a passenger that was standing on the isle row 10 approached me and asked if she can have one of these open seats on row 10 D, E, F instead of sitting between two people. I told her to sit on her assigned seat while I go check on CSR at the front if we can accommodate her request. I proceed to the front door, CSR wasn't there so I spoke to purser about the customer request and went ahead and accommodated her request. After talking to her, I walked past by my exit row without briefing my passenger. As I was sitting on my jump-seat doing my silent review, I realized that I was supposed to do my exit row-briefing. As soon as we reach 10,000 feet and were cleared to get up, I went straight to my exit row and apologize to our customer and did my exit row verification-briefing and informed purser and other crew member. I know it is not an excuse [but] we were busy and it slipped my mind. I promise to do my best and to be extra careful.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported not completing the exit row briefing until airborne because of distraction caused by moving a passenger to a different seat.
ACN: 1748573

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748573
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I moved passengers around and resolved a passenger conflict to maintain COVID-19 guidelines. One passenger was really upset with the process and their seat. Everything happened so fast. FA C even said get the Emergency Exit row briefing done and I'll finish up in the cabin. The main cabin door was closed already and I realized I didn’t brief the emergency exits. It was accomplished before the safety demo but after the main cabin door closed.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported moving passengers around due to COVID-19, but didn't brief the emergency row until after the main cabin door was closed.
**ACN: 1748566**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Passengers On Board.Number: 350

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Deplaning
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748566
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Pre-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**
For as long as I can remember I've been sending concerns about using small gate rooms with single jetways for the amount of customers. Boarding is organized chaos! Not enough room for over 350 passengers, overlapping gate room announcements, customers having difficulty finding the right place to stand in line without accidentally or intentionally "cutting" in line to board. Now COVID has reduced the amount of customers but maintaining safe distancing especially deplaning is very challenging. With single jetway and wheelchairs waiting and gate checked strollers, it's not uncommon for disembarkation to come to a stop preventing smooth flow and passengers standing right next to each other and next to FA's standing at each exit door. Having an orderly disembarkation despite announcements (wheelchairs, passengers remain seated, deplaning by rows) doesn't work. Most customers can't wait to get off, especially on longer flights.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported social distancing concerns during boarding and deplaning the aircraft.
ACN: 1748559

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748559
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
Currently we are required to report X time before departure when out of base for type X Aircraft. Ten minutes later, customer boarding commences. Ten minutes was barely enough under normal circumstances to stow our gear, prep with what we need for flight, check necessary supplies (paperwork, galley needs, etc). Briefing is impossible. Luckily my crew originated couple days ago so no briefing needed. However, if a "new" FA joins us,
they need to be briefed. Now with COVID, it takes me at least 5 minutes to thoroughly clean my area, 10 minutes is not doable.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported the time allotted for the required checks and briefings is not enough.
Passenger sitting in 1X was asked several times by myself and two other flight attendants to please wear his mask. Passenger refused to comply and was given a reminder form from the mask kit which he proceeded to throw into my jumpseat at 1Y.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a mask.
ACN: 1748543

Time / Day
  Date: 202006
  Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
  Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
  State Reference: US
  Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
  Reference: X
  ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
  Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
  Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
  Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
  Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
  Flight Plan: IFR
  Mission: Passenger
  Flight Phase: Parked

Person
  Reference: 1
  Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
  Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
  Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
  Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
  Function.Flight Crew: Captain
  Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
  Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
  Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
  ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748543
  Human Factors: Time Pressure

Events
  Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
  Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
  Detector.Person: Flight Crew
  When Detected: In-flight
  Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
  Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
  Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
  Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
  Assigned an additional day at the end of my 4 day pairing. This was after very short
  layovers with days approaching maximum FAR flying time. Pairing had layovers in ZZZ1,
ZZZ2 and ZZZ3, touching ZZZ every day. Upon arrival in ZZZ from ZZZ3 I realized that I would violate (airline's) policy of not knowingly flying fatigued if I continued to ZZZ1. This was cumulative fatigue with at least two contributing factors; arriving at the ZZZ3 hotel at XA00 and being unable to procure food form the hotel or local businesses due to COVID closures; long days and short nights with multiple mid-continent flights. In the morning at ZZZ3 we realized the airplane was through catered and a snack pack was our only nutritional option.

My attention as PM [during] the flight was not up to my normal standards. Then as PM in the terminal area in ZZZ I missed the dog leg to final radio call from approach and had to be called again to receive approach clearance.

Stop building reserve pairings that could not be built as a normal pairing. Reserve pilots deserve the same consideration for rest and fatigue that are afforded to line holders. These are strange time with COVID, but hotels should still be able to provide meals for crew.

**Synopsis**

Air Carrier Captain reported fatigue issues while flying as a reserve pilot for a 4 day pairing during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1748516

**Time / Day**

Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**

Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

**Person: 1**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748516
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

**Person: 2**

Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748520
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events

Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Fuel Issue
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1

East of ZZZ received a reroute to ZZZ1 to pick up the ZZZZZ 1 arrival over ZZZZZ1. We questioned the reason and were told due to staffing issues related to COVID. We tried unsuccessfully to get a more direct route. The new route had us landing at ZZZ2 at 4.5 and we felt this not to be a safe reserve given the circumstances. Captain and I agreed the safe choice was to divert to ZZZ3. I flew and he coordinated with Dispatch for the diversion. At no time did I feel unsafe or knowingly violate any FAR or policy.

I feel that we worked well as a crew to make a safe choice for our passengers.

I feel that if there was knowledge of ZZZ Center having closures there should have been an added amount of fuel.

Narrative: 2

We departed with a fuel load of 18.8, with an expected landing fuel of 6.3 which included 0:45 reserve, alternate of ZZZ7 0:09, hold of 0:18, andDispatch added of 0:10. A line of thunderstorms near ZZZ would need to be navigated. Actual landing fuel showed 5.8 as we neared ZZZ. We had begun deviating East of ZZZ when Center issued a new routing from TMU (Traffic Management Unit) of left turn, still landing south. Landing fuel now showed 4.8, I made several requests for a worthwhile shortcut to no avail, and we were told that the delay was due to "staffing shortages". We were still hundreds of miles from destination, incurring a delay that I have never heard of, and am certain that if we are getting delayed this far out there is more to come; Staffing shortages where, ZZZ Center, ZZZ TRACON? I sure didn't know, but was confident the 4.8 fuel number, although might look okay on paper certainly wouldn't hold up. I did not want to get lower on fuel only to find out that the "staffing shortages" had us further delayed and with far fewer options. And it made no sense to get well beyond ZZZ1 airport or ZZZ2 airport just to turn around and land with a similar fuel problem. With a light fuel load and a delay of unknown definition, I contacted Dispatch via crew phone and advised that I did not like this scenario
and would like to stop short for fuel before this develops into a real problem. We agreed on ZZZ3 airport, amended the release, landed, fueled, and went to ZZZ4 airport.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight reported due to ATC staffing issues the flight would have to be delay vectored. They opted to land at an alternate airport and receive more fuel, then continued on to destination.
ACN: 1748506

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748506
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1748507
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was pilot flying on Aircraft X from ZZZZ-ZZZ. The whole flight was uneventful and well within standards until the end of arrival/beginning of approach into ZZZ. There was a TFR that was lifted immediately before our arrival which I suspect complicated sequencing for ATC. We were instructed to expect a visual approach to XXL and to remain at 8,000 feet on a 290 heading over the southern foothills. This was expected to be a double-downwind type vector to aid in sequencing due to the VIP departure minutes ago. On this heading, abeam the airport at 8,000 feet we were suddenly instructed to fly a heading of 030 and shortly thereafter were offered Runway XY. As part of the in range briefing the Captain and I decided that we would be willing and able to accept a late runway change as long as we could dial up the localizer in time and the conditions were generously VMC. This being the case, we accepted a clearance for a visual approach to Runway XY. Being so high in such tight proximity to the airfield, I immediately selected 3,000 feet for the final approach fix, began a rapid descent and began vectoring us for a stable visual approach. It suddenly became clear that I would need to deploy the flight spoilers to aid in the descent and I did so. This was shortly followed by IB and OB Spoilerons caution message. At this time we were on a roughly a 10 mile left base for Runway XY and the Captain was programming the FMS for the ILS XY. I had the XY localizer tuned and verified, so additional guidance from the FMS would serve as an aid to situational awareness. As we recall, we were on approach frequency (XYZ.A) at the time, and were told to contact north Tower on XXB.C. In the task saturated environment, XXB.BC was tuned in error. I managed to get us set up for a stable approach well outside the final approach fix, but being so occupied in this task, I failed to recognize that the incorrect Tower frequency was tuned. I disconnected the autopilot well outside the final approach fix as I deemed it necessary to practice hand flying skills. We continued with a stable approach to an uneventful landing. As we were vacating the runway I realized the frequency error and immediately tuned to XXB.C and notified the Tower Controller that we were vacating the runway. The Controller replied...
with "How do you hear this transmitter?" to which I replied "Loud and clear." This error would have made the receipt of a landing clearance impossible, although we unanimously recalled that we were cleared to land. A classic example of expectation bias. We were then issued taxi instructions to the ramp. No phone number was issued and nothing was mentioned about any failure to receive a landing clearance or other inconveniences resulting thereof. We then taxied to the gate and shut down uneventfully.

During these current times we (reserve pilots) are somewhat rusty and, as a result, less able to manage such a high level of task saturation that would otherwise be easily conquered. The factors that contributed to task saturation were: Being left high and close to the airport with tight vectors, the runway change and subsequent FMS programming, IB/OB Spoilerons Caution message, and turbulent/windy surface conditions requiring a high degree of focus on hand flying a stable approach. I struggle to see a viable remedy for this problem besides just flying more, which the current situation may or may not allow soon. The only thing we could have done differently would be to refuse the visual approach to XY and rather continue to XXL as was programmed and briefed. However we both felt comfortable with and briefed that we would be willing to accept a late change to XY. Furthermore, an approach to XXL would have been even shorter, possibly even acting to worsen the task saturated condition. Expectation bias contributed to the possibility of landing without a clearance, it's as simple as that. We both agreed that we were cleared to land, so a review of the tapes would be required to determine the exact nature of the exchange. It seems to me that those of us who haven't been flying recently simply need to re-acquaint ourselves with a newly degraded level of proficiency, and should be increasingly alert of events that could lead to task saturation and the errors that can result.

**Narrative: 2**

First Officer was the pilot flying and I was the pilot monitoring. We were flying Aircraft X from ZZZZ-ZZZ. The flight went smoothly until the approach into ZZZ. ATC was busy due to VIP movement. We were initially expecting a visual approach to Runway XXL and to remain at 8,000 feet on heading 290. ATC needed to sequence us due to VIP movement departing the airport. We then were instructed to fly heading 030 to put us on the left downwind for Runway XXL. After this, it became apparent that there was spacing for us for Runway XY so ATC asked us if we wanted Runway XY. I questioned the First Officer during the In-Range Checklist about if he would feel comfortable with a sudden change in runway from XXL to Runway XY. He stated, "Yes." I accepted the clearance from XYZ.DZ for a visual approach to Runway XY, which was close proximity to the runway, but there was adequate spacing to make sure the approach was stable and safe. Tower told us to switch to XXB.CZ. The First Officer selected 3,000 feet in the altitude preselect and we started to get configured to land. He was slightly fast and high, so he decided to use the flight spoilers. Shortly thereafter, the IB Spoilers and IB Spoilerons Caution message appear. We ran the QRH and continued to land. The landing was within standards with no issues. After vacating the runway, the First Officer noticed that we were on frequency XXB.BC and not on XXB.CZ. During the high task saturated environment, the wrong frequency was tuned in error. First Officer selected XXB.CZ and Tower asks us, "How do you hear this transmission?" The First Officer replied, "Loud and Clear." We then were issued taxi instructions to the ramp. Tower and Ground did not provide a phone number for us to call and nothing was mentioned about any failure to receive a landing clearance. We taxied to the ramp to the gate with no issues.

During the current state that we are facing, many pilots including reserve pilots are a little rusty due to not flying. The last time I flew before this flight was two months ago. The First Officer told me in our initial meeting that he hadn't flown for 6 weeks. We were/are
aware that our proficiency level decreases as we are not flying as much. Factors including task saturation, IB Spoilers and IB Spoilerons Caution message, FMS programming, turbulent, windy conditions. I truly believe that if we were flying more, this normal approach would not have been an issue. In my initial briefing with the First Officer I even discussed this and made a point to let him know that I was a newer Captain and hadn’t flown for two months. I did complete 90 day currency on [date] in the simulator. Maybe during these times, it would have been better to stay on Runway XXL to decrease workload until a time that we feel more proficient and are flying more. We definitely need to be more aware of how much our proficiency decreases as we are flying less.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance after dialing in the incorrect frequency.
ACN: 1748482

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Ground Personnel: Ramp
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1748482

Events
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Ground Personnel
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Dealing with COVID for 3 months now and platooning was helping. However, since platooning has ended social distancing has become very difficult and certain people are more cautious than others. I recently found out I have been in contact with someone who was positive (yet I wasn't named) when I went to management I was advised I would hear from HR if I came up in the investigation. The problem is who can remember who exactly and for how long they've come in contact with for 14 days? I am concerned about my health, my family's health and potentially causing harm to those around me. Tables have signage, temperatures are being checked, but at the end of the day we all have to work in close proximity to others. We don't have the tools readily available to prevent spreading the virus. There are no Clorox wipes anywhere, we share room computers, we all touch the same door knobs, we all use the same fridge for our lunch, etc. If Person A tests positive for it, the company is only investigating and notifying people Person A remembers they came into contact with. Then they contact Person B, C, D that were named, However, they don't speak to the people B, C or D came into contact with until B, C and D test positive. So all of the days in between we are constantly out in the open potentially spreading to everyone.

Synopsis
Ground employee reported concerns with being notified that someone he had contact with tested positive for COVID-19.
After several tows ramp closed due to lightning. Myself and my partner moved from SuperTug to PAATS (Park At Anytime) due to lightning closing the field. Upon being assigned to PAATS I promptly noticed [aircraft] red tags due to PAATS lights (stop lights on top of truck). I also noticed that the flag pole was damaged and would not allow for me to fly the flag. Upon doing the user check which was not previously done even though it was used to park an aircraft previously. I did confirm that the PAATS lights did in fact freeze up intermittently.

After starting the rotation around the terminal with strobes siren and frozen amber light clearing the rest of the personnel from the ramp (did not get the all call over radio). While doing so I notified Supervisor on duty of the issue and declined parking until I could ensure ramp was clear of personnel. Additionally, I voiced my concern with the lights and was instructed to verbally park via air to ground. This is not a standard procedure. Once I picked up my partner and declared ready to park I reset the lights for the 3rd time I attempted to make contact and was unable. Operations still does not seem to be on the same page and give holding aircraft our frequency. Once contact established PIC was notified of light issues would be parked short and verbal would be the fall back and if any steady light for more than 2 seconds should be questioned.

Additionally, due to COVID the team is staffed short and split between two break rooms. Giving little time to disinfect the cab as previous crew was from a separate break room.

In summary. Ground Support Equipment only one of two PAATS available at this time. Neither fully equipped with lights or sirens. COVID precautions not adhered to (mixing break rooms). Lighter schedule necessitating more tows forcing crews to perform multiple tasks working light due to COVID precautions. Training of back up procedures in the event of inop lights/sirens/radio.

Synopsis

Ground employee reported problems associated with clearing the ramp during a lightning storm and while parking aircraft.
**ACN: 1748455**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202006

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Ground Personnel: Other / Unknown
Qualification: Other
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1748455
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Ground Personnel
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**
Due to this pandemic I'm concerned about me and my fellow co-workers safety due to the fact that we are handling these bags on a daily basis. I understand that it might take time, but our safety comes first cause we all do have families to go back home too. What I like to see is that they spray and wipe down everything including straps.

**Synopsis**
Ground employee reported concerns with touching bags on a daily basis and would like the bags to be sprayed to prevent infection.
ACN: 1748443

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Gate Agent / CSR
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748443
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred: All Types
Detector.Person: Gate Agent / CSR
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Airport

Narrative: 1
Airport authority turned off the lighting in the area for cost cutting measure due to COVID-19 but with our operation needing to use the oversized TC1 for oversized and odd size such as golf bag and such according to established baggage handling equipment and direction from same equipment vendor. Also the oversized baggage belt is used to transport baggage tubs and other inbound transit baggage back to counter to be reintroduce to other baggage belts for induction into the system for TSA inspections and then forwarded to the designated outbound flight pier. I have verbally reported the issue to our local safety committee chairman and he acknowledged that he informed others.

Synopsis
Customer service employee reported the Airport Authority had turned off the lights in the over-sized baggage for cost cutting purposes during the COVID-19 pandemic.
I understand trying to keep people safe though COVID-19. Has the company looked into the health effects of having employees and customers wear masks for long periods of time including long hours on aircrafts and working in public? Someone would be breathing in their own CO2 for extended periods of time that the body isn't really able to handle. This could drop O2 levels along with other side effects. If someone is practicing social distancing why would they need a mask too. We could be doing harm with this policy even though the company takes advice from CDC and WHO.

Ground employee raised concerns with the health effects of people wearing a COVID-19 type mask for long durations of time.
**ACN: 1748405**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202006

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748405
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Dispatch
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

**Narrative: 1**

Inbound voice calls coming from aircraft SATCOM systems ring to several dedicated inbound extensions. These lines are divided up among several international desks so that one extension will ring at its assigned desk by default. While these are the default settings, any Dispatcher can modify their phone's settings to make any number of the extensions ring to that phone. These modifications will be restored to the default anytime the phone is logged out.

While working the charter desk, I set up my phone to monitor all of the inbound SATCOM lines. Throughout the shift I noticed multiple inbound calls ringing with nobody picking them up. Each time I would pick up the call and transfer it to the appropriate Dispatcher.

The reason the calls were going unanswered was that no other dispatchers were monitoring these extensions. Many of the desks that have been closed due to COVID-19 are desks that normally monitor a SATCOM line. I advised the Chief Dispatcher that the
SATCOM lines need to be reallocated to the desks that remain open so that they can be continuously monitored. He advised me that this would have to be done by a Person X via coordination with the phone support specialists. The chief advised Person X that this needs to be done. In the meantime we have no official procedure to monitor these phone lines. I continue to monitor the lines during my shift and advise others to do the same.

The Chief Dispatcher did advise me that when calls go unanswered, they eventually forward to the Chief desk. While this is a good fallback option, it causes unneeded delay for crews that could be calling with urgent needs.

**Synopsis**
Dispatcher reported problems with the SATCOM lines going unanswered due to COVID-19 staffing levels.


**ACN: 1748404**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202006

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference: US  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing

**Person: 1**
Reference: 1  
Location Of Person: Company  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher  
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748404  
Human Factors: Confusion  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness  
Human Factors: Workload  
Human Factors: Distraction

**Person: 2**
Reference: 2  
Location Of Person: Company  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher  
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748418  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Dispatch  
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

**Events**
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: MEL  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR  
Detector.Person: Other Person  
Result.General: Maintenance Action

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

I received an email from my relief [name omitted] that MEL XYYYZ was added to Aircraft X. I was not aware of this MEL was added to the leg ZZZ/ZZZ1 or subsequent legs and do not recall a call for it's deferral however it was a cluster for the first hour of my shift!

Upon signing into position, I called Mids Dispatcher to get a brief for my AM shift and had 3 leg charter to flight follow also a 2 leg with only 1 release that needed to be sent.

Originally I signed to work [position 1] however was advised that [another positions] desk was the only one that works for [position 1] flights so I proceeded to sign out of [other position] and re-sign into [position 1]. Upon signing in, I had problems with all my applications including my email, applications not working, system kicking offline, and phone issues. (ringing but no one on other line). I had an IT Rep at my desk for at least an hour to help me spool up the desk.

I flight followed [three flights] to their station and did receive a call from Crew of [flight] ZZZ1-ZZZ2 to possibly leave early. (which I set up with FBO in ZZZ2 and advised manager). I do not recall MEL XYYY was added for aircraft. I did again have system kick offline a few times throughout my shift and the manager even walked over to my desk to ask if I was having issues with the system.

I found out (from my afternoon relief) that Captain called and was conferenced with Maintenance Control. They found that MEL XYYYY had been automatically added to the maintenance release after aircraft landed in ZZZ1. (due to the aircraft coming out of storage and limited to Autoland limit land II) The Captain said he overlooked the carry forward items and missed that this MEL was added. I myself did not re-release the subsequent flights and both flights took off without the correct MELs XYYYY on release. (had I received a call from Maintenance Control, I could have verbally added MEL to release, added a note, brief my relief upon shift change and/or amend the releases).

This is an unusual situation because we typically do not bring planes out of storage and MELS are not usually automatically applied after a landing.

**Narrative: 2**

This is a series of charter flights starting with:
Flight ZZZ ZZZ1
Flight ZZZ1 ZZZ2
Flight ZZZ3 ZZZ

Shortly after signing in, Flight ZZZ3-ZZZ blocks out of and I get an alert stating "no new release since MEL change. I investigated the MELs and found that MEL XYYYY was added after release 1. I tried to stop the crew but could not reach them in time before takeoff. After takeoff I re-released the flight and informed the crew.

After landing the Captain called me, we conferenced with Maintenance Control and found that MEL XYYYY had been automatically added to the maintenance release after Flight X landed in ZZZ1 due to the aircraft coming out of storage and limited to Autoland limit land II. The Captain said he overlooked the carry forward items and missed that this MEL was
added. The Dispatcher did not re-release the subsequent flights Y or Z and both flights took off without the correct MELs on release.

**Synopsis**

Dispatchers reported problems with taking an aircraft out of storage and an associated MEL that was not applied before takeoff.
A pilot report was sent to the company concurrently with this report concerning the non-compliance of passenger seat 1B xxx for refusal to wear a facial covering. Numerous announcements were made, however; neither passenger removal or Security Level threats were made given the "non compliance." The flight attendants correctly initiated a report after numerous warnings and announcements, however; no further action was taken other than to inform Dispatch.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was non-compliant with wearing a face mask during the flight.
ACN: 1748376

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry
Flight Phase: Taxi

Component
Aircraft Component: Generator Drive
Aircraft Reference: X

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 4410
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 28
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1970
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748376
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1
We were scheduled for a ferry flight from ZZZ - ZZZ1 at XA00 local. Due to our current situation, I have not flown a lot lately, and as a new Captain, have not done a ferry flight. I showed up early, as there are extra things to do on a ferry, and my FO was DH and not scheduled to land until 40 minutes prior to our scheduled departure. I had contacted him the day before to say we would meet at the aircraft.

I called Dispatch to check whether this was a repositioning ferry or a maintenance ferry, because the release just said ferry and there was a log entry saying it required a maintenance action. Dispatcher told me that it was just a repositioning flight. I went to the aircraft and cleaned, performed the initial preflight and checked all the switches (finding several things out of place) and circuit breakers. I initialized the ACARS and started my preflight flow. When I checked the last maintenance release form it was dated [date].

While I was loading the FMC the printer started sending a quite lengthy maintenance ferry document, and at some point after that a mechanic came in. He talked about the lengthy maintenance ferry document and I asked to verify it was a maintenance ferry and he said yes because the aircraft had 2 checks that were overdue. He discussed with me that there were no maintenance items that would affect the operation of the aircraft. He also let me know the aircraft had been in storage since the last flight. I called Dispatch back to let her know we were a maintenance ferry, and asked if it needed to be on the release as such. Dispatcher thanked me for keeping her in the loop and said no it didn't, and we were good with the release as is.

As I started through the maintenance ferry document my FO showed up. I told him to get settled and I would catch him up on where we were. I said I had just started to go through the maintenance ferry document and it was going to take some time; it was 1X pages, out of sequence, and interspersed with things I had printed. I thought the ACARS copy had to be in the book also. There were a lot of major systems that had been disabled and circuit breakers pulled and reset, and I didn't want to rush through, needed to make sure everything had been signed off.

He expressed concern that we were not going to get out on time and that his DH ZZZ1-ZZZ2 was the last flight that day. He was a little upset that they had called him to fly all the way from ZZZ2 to fly a 1 hour flight on his last day of reserve. I said we would try our best, but the aircraft had just come out of storage and we needed to be thorough; this and the flight being a ferry flight were operational threats. He went back to check the cabin for ferry items. The agent closed us up and the FO armed the doors, and I went to check them as well. We got all our tasks completed and did push late. Pushback and start were normal, we did the after start and I asked for taxi clearance. Then the R Gen Off EICAS message came on. I asked him to tell Ground Control that we had a maintenance item and
needed to run a checklist, and to run the Gen Off checklist. He talked to Ground as he got the checklist, and just then we lost all electrics. I tried to start the APU but it would not start.

Both engines were running, both generator switches were on, but we had only battery power. We decided to return to the gate, and the FO told Ground. He asked Ground if we were ok there for a few minutes, they said yes. Then he called operations to tell them we were returning to the gate.

We also noticed the aircraft shaking, but only had backup engine instruments and could not check the vibration indications as all screens had gone blank. I had thought it was wind but looking outside, there really wasn't much. Standby instruments looked good. There was a delay while operations said they were deciding where to put us, and I heard him say we wanted to go back. After that he told Operations something along the lines of, "well then, we are a priority handling aircraft." I did not ask to get priority, nor was I asked if that was what we should do. I didn't feel we were ever in danger, and the FO subsequently told me that he said that he did it, so we could get our gate back because our screens had failed. I believe part of the issue was time pressure to get home.

Not being sure what was going on with the aircraft, we chose to shut down the engines to be on the safe side. It may not have been necessary at the time, but we were right by the gate and there was no traffic that we were blocking. I thought about running the checklist and getting a gen back, but with the aircraft shaking also, decided against it. I told ground what we were doing, and called operations for a tow in. Ground asked if we needed anything and we declined. No equipment was requested, no assistance received.

Maintenance subsequently replaced the right GCU but could not find a reason why the left gen dropped off also. They said the APU had a fault, which they cleared. They said the shaking was simply due to the aircraft being so light, no cargo, passengers, galleys, and not a lot of fuel, with the engines running. It was unlike anything I had felt before, but we were only 153,000 lbs, and I have never been that light, but they said that is what happens when they run engines with empty aircraft.

They started both engines to see everything was normal and test the electrics and power transferring. APU started normally, engines were fine, and electrics fine except that the right gen needed to be cycled to get it to come online. As I was asking one mechanic about that, as it was not normal, they were shutting down. They restarted the right engine to check it again, and this time the gen came online normally. They said sitting for a while may have been the cause of some of these issues, but all was operating normally now.

We got the aircraft ready to go, waited a while for a new release form, and flew to ZZZ1 uneventfully.

I'm concerned about the priority handling, and to Operations, not ATC. It was busy but I feel I should have rescinded that.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing mechanical problems after pushback resulting in a return to gate.
ACN: 1748340

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US
- Altitude MSL, Single Value: 22000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Widebody, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
- Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 1284.98
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 40.07
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 55.75
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1748340
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown, Party 1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown, Party 2: Maintenance
- Communication Breakdown, Party 2: Dispatch

**Events**
- Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: MEL
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

We apparently flew 3 flights with this aircraft where both the pilots and Dispatch were unaware that the aircraft’s CAT 3 status had expired. Aircraft was taken out of storage for this trip. Releases for all three segments were signed before the first flight, and there was no indication in the log history or the first maintenance release that CAT 3 had expired. On touchdown at ZZZ, the maintenance system "auto-generated" a fault record, and then automatically issued a deferral. We were unaware that this had been entered into the electronic logbook, and must have missed it in the review of the maintenance release for the next (ZZZ-ZZZ1) segment. Dispatch discovered this after we pushed on the last segment (ZZZ1-ZZZ2), but was not able to contact us via ACARS, until after we were airborne. I called dispatcher after landing ZZZ2 to try to figure out what happened, and he looped Maintenance Control in for additional information. Weather was severe clear at all stations, and I am high minimums anyway, so safety was not compromised by not having CAT 3. The phase of flight/occurrence information above was where we were first informed of the issue by Dispatch.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported flying three flights in an aircraft with an expired CAT III status.
ACN: 1748315

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Landing

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 12249
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 86
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 12249
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748315
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
The covid crisis and schedule reduction has caused many pilots to become non-current. In the previous six weeks I have flown with numerous FOs who have not flown in more than 75 days. Two were current because their 9 month recurrent training counted as the 3 required landings in 90 days.

The additional workload that this places on the other pilot due to increased awareness and vigilance is unsustainable. Landings in particular are mostly unsatisfactory and in one instance unsafe. I recommend that every pilot that has not made a landing in the actual aircraft in more than 75 days be required to fly with a line check airmen. The lack of proficiency is not the pilot's fault, but due to the current environment of reduced flight time.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported that many of the first officers he flies with are not current, especially in the landing environment.
ACN: 1748311

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3225
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 39
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3225
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748311
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 104
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 13
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 104
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748365
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
While briefing the PDC neither of us saw the change to the departure procedure. The Captain was the flying pilot and briefed the procedure and I was monitoring and also missed the change. While on departure ATC gave us a "direct to" which we didn't see the waypoint in the FMC and told ATC that we didn't have it on our plan. They gave us a reroute and everything was fixed as far as they were concerned. We discussed the occurrence in our debrief of the departure and realized that we had both missed the change.

Narrative: 2
I'm writing this to report that I unintentionally missed the revised segment that was given on our PDC. The revised segment changed the transition point and initial routing. I briefed the departure and missed the revised segment. It's totally my fault. I attribute it to being rusty. This was my first time flying since April and was out of my normal routine.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported they unintentionally missed the revised route segment given in their PDC.
**Time / Day**
Date: 202006

**Place**
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748303

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**
The current schedule reduction and reserve staffing levels have increased the number of pilots who are non current or are within several days of non currency, due to landings.

Most of my one day pairings have been with pilots who have not flown in over 75 days. The additional workload that this places on the other pilot is very high and at times unsafe. When flying 3-4, one day pairings in a row, the increase in fatigue and stress due to the required additional awareness and vigilance is unsustainable.

This issue is not the fault of any pilot, but by the rules and operating environment we are currently in. Most of the reserves are proficient in procedures and systems knowledge, it is the approach and landing phase where their lack of proficiency is evident.

I recommend that any pilot who has not flown in more than 75 days be required to fly the first leg with a line check airmen.
Synopsis
Pilot reported an increase in the number of pilots who are non current due to the current schedule reduction and reserve staffing levels.
ACN: 1748283

Time / Day
  Date: 202007  
  Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
  Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower  
  State Reference: US

Aircraft: 1
  Reference: X  
  ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ  
  Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
  Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing  
  Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2  
  Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
  Flight Plan: IFR  
  Mission: Passenger  
  Flight Phase: Initial Climb  
  Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
  ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ  
  Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer  
  Flight Plan: IFR  
  Mission: Passenger  
  Flight Phase: Landing  
  Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
  Reference: 1  
  Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower  
  Reporter Organization: Government  
  Function.Air Traffic Control: Local  
  Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified  
  Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 10  
  ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748283  
  Human Factors: Situational Awareness  
  Human Factors: Workload  
  Human Factors: Distraction

Events
  Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types  
  Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Conflict, Less Severe  
  Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance  
  Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control  
  When Detected: In-flight  
  Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

**Narrative: 1**

I’m working LC-X Runway XXR, XXL (closed), XY. Arrivals to Runway XXR only. At some point I was told I would be getting departures and a normal split (meaning I would be departing all south and east bound departures). This seemed like a bad idea as they were light departures for YYL, the departure only that doesn't ever have to be crossed. This next part is not operationally significant but relevant. Because of the fear of COVID-19 I responsibly self distance and work as far from anyone else as I can. I moved to work from the LC-XX position to lessen my distraction for fear of infection and as this was about to get complex I needed to. I was then instructed to depart and arrive Runway XXR at this time there are no longer any departures for YYL the departure only Runway. The space between my Runway XXR arrivals is too small to get but one departure out. I told my departing aircraft to expect a 10 minute delay (ended up being 18 minutes.) I felt pressure to depart in the small gaps to try to save this mistake however it simply couldn't be done without having a plethora of deals. In addition working the position from LC-XX was a different prospective then I’m used to working LC-X from and didn't make this any easier even though moving to LC-XX was my decision.

These are strange times no doubt and complexity to operations because of the Coronavirus is just going to be a new thing that reporting is going to get whether its your responsibility to hear such complaints or not. As the airlines attempt to increase operations more positions will have to be opened and it’s our mission to put the operation first but we shouldn't open them just because you don't want to have to many people on break.

Short answer: Runway YYL should have remained the only departure Runway.

**Synopsis**

Tower Controller reported a "plethora of deals" due to working with small arrival holes and not using the designated departure runway.
ACN: 1748282

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 17000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 16
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748282
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Workload
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Staffing

Narrative: 1

I was the R-side Controller. There were no other controllers available to assist at the sector due to COVID staffing levels. I was told that my sector was yellow on the board that at one point I was RED.

There were many diverts from ZZZ to ZZZ1 (due to weather) that were handed off vertically separated all going to the same fix. Meanwhile there were more than 10 aircraft already going into ZZZ1. There were at least 3 aircraft coming into ZZZ1 from the west and automatic releases were ON at ZZZ1. ZZZ1 Tower was sending ATIS information through on GI (General Information) messages instead of calling, so I did not have current ATIS information. Additionally, I was working the ZZZ departures out the west gate, while creating a sequence for the ZZZ1 arrivals. At one point I told an aircraft they were number 9 in the sequence of the aircraft I had, with more coming.

Aircraft Y had departed ZZZ1, cleared ZZZ's airspace and I climbed the aircraft to 170 for overhead traffic inbound to ZZZ1. To pull the aircraft away from the arriving ZZZ1 traffic I put Aircraft Y on a heading of 090. As the aircraft made the turn, they started flashing with the aircraft diverting from ZZZ to ZZZ1, Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was already out of 159 when the flashing started. I had a 3 mile bubble up and tried to turn Aircraft X to a heading of 270. He questioned me because I inadvertently told him the turn was for his climb. Once I clarified it was for traffic, he read it back and turned. It was not enough to keep them 3 miles separated. At that time, I was trying to call the traffic, but the aircraft were calling it instead. In hindsight, I should have given Aircraft Y a heading of 070 to send him more northeast bound and only climbed him to 160.

Additionally, I violated ZZZ's airspace. But called with a late point out, putting me further behind the power curve.

There was so much going on and so many aircraft, I was unable to see the traffic prior to the conflict alert going off.

Shoving the diverting aircraft out into an already congested area was horrific. I could not communicate to anyone in the area to let them know what I needed or what might help due to the fact that I did not have a break in transmissions to convey any concerns. With the help of a D-side we could have called ZZZ to coordinate something different.
This was in the last hour and a half of my shift on the last day of rotations.

As the aircraft were diverting from ZZZ to ZZZ1, with the volume, they could have been taken out to the west to be sequenced with the aircraft already inbound to ZZZ1. They could also have been taken out of ZZZ to the east to be sequenced with aircraft already inbound from the east.

At one point I had to put an aircraft in holding.

During "normal" operations, we are directed (Supervisors and CIC's) to staff a RED sector with a D-side. The fact that everyone in Area 1 has worked RED sectors many, many times since the COVID staffing has been in effect, is ridiculous. When did compromising the safety of the NAS become second priority?

The amount and complexity of the traffic warranted having a D-side for a second set of eyes. There was no one available to step in to help. We were staffed with 6 people, during one of the top 5 busiest weeks in Area 1. I know there were 5 sectors open and that people had been on sectors for more than 2 hours throughout the day. 5 sectors and 1 person on break. That's just math as to how often you would be offered a break.

I had spoken to our supervisor and our union rep letting them know that the amount of traffic and the staffing were not appropriate and it was unsafe.

I expressed my concerns about the lack of staffing with our union rep. He dismissed my concerns.

Synopsis

Center Controller reported being overloaded with traffic, MAP [Monitor Alert Parameter] was in the red, having a loss of separation, and an airspace violation due to COVID-19 staffing.
ACN: 1748275

Time / Day
Date: 202007
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZDC.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 14500

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZDC
Make Model Name: Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: VFR
Flight Phase: Other
Airspace.Class E: ZDC

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZDC
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class E: ZDC

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZDC.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function: Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience: Air Traffic Control:Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 16
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1748275
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action
Result: Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X was doing VFR air work in the vicinity of MOL VOR at FL145. He was
maneuvering in the area of Aircraft Y who was climbing out of FL140 to FL190 direct LDN.
I attempted to reach Aircraft X a few minutes prior to the event occurring with no
response.

When it became apparent that the traffic was [now] head on, I gave a 30L turn to Aircraft
Y. After giving that turn Aircraft X reported he was responding to an RA and I saw him
descend. Standard separation was quickly attained by the actions of Aircraft X.

Workload and frequency congestion was a factor at the time. I was working 6 sectors. The
sectors should have been split or a D-side would have been helpful.

Synopsis
ZDC Center Controller reported a loss of separation between two aircraft while working 6
sectors.
**ACN: 1748229**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type: Scheduled Maintenance
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Testing
- Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Inspection

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Transponder
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Maintenance: Technician
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748229

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Maintenance: Lead Technician
- Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
- Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748230

**Person: 3**
- Reference: 3
- Function.Maintenance: Technician
- Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
- Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748231

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Maintenance
When Detected : Routine Inspection
Result.General : Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Chart Or Publication

Narrative: 1
I was assigned the task of "Drain Flush and Test Pitot/Static circuits" on Aircraft X as outlined in Job Card #XXXX. I accomplished this task while working with Technician B and Lead Technician at Hangar X in ZZZ. We accomplished this task in accordance with the procedures found in the Job Card #XXXX.

The Job Card failed to ensure that the Mode S Transponders were disabled preventing test altitudes from being transmitted.

Revise the Job Card procedures to include steps to prevent Mode S Transponders from transmitting test altitudes.

[Task was related to aircraft] storage [related procedures].

Narrative: 2
[Narrative contained no additional information.]

Narrative: 3
[Narrative contained no additional information.]

Synopsis
Maintenance technicians reported that while performing a test of the pitot/static system on an aircraft, the job card failed to ensure the Mode S transponders were disabled.
ACN: 1748223

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748223
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
As I was securing up the aft galley, the smoke detector started to sound. I knocked on the aft lavatory, as there was a passenger using it. "Are you ok?" I asked. "Yes. But what's that sound?" She replied as a big plume of smoke/vapor came toward me when she opened the door.

[I pointed out that] smoking on an aircraft is a federal offense. So you really don't want to do that. I checked the waste receptacle and the shelves above it. As well as the toilet bowl, sink, and the little cupboard that holds the toilet paper and Kleenex. All clear. It
didn't smell like tobacco.

I asked the passenger if it was an e-cigarette, she said yes. I let the CA know what happened so he could handle it on his end. The passenger seemed totally taken aback that smoking wasn't allowed on planes and kept repeating that she didn't know it wasn't allowed.

Also wearing the personal, disposable face mask made it hard to smell the smoke/vapor plumage that came out of the bathroom. That's why I asked her if it was an e-cigarette. Since I didn't see any smoking device/paraphernalia.

As helpful as the personal face masks are for filtering out bacteria and viruses, it's difficult to make out scents fully. But since it was an exhalation of vapor from an e-cigarette it's not like I want to take off the mask to be able to identify the smell due to COVID concerns. That's why a thorough search for any burning or foreign material was done along with asking what she was using.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that the smoke detector alarm was triggered by a passenger smoking an e-cigarette in a lavatory. Flight Attendant stated that wearing a personal face mask made it hard to smell the smoke/vapor plumage to determine whether the smell was due to an e-cigarette or other burning material.
The company currently requires Flight Attendants to wear masks on the jumpseat for taxi, takeoff, and landing. It is unsafe. I was sitting on the jumpseat doing my 30 sec review on taxi-out. The cabin was hot and I realized that if I had to suddenly start shouting commands that I probably would have hyperventilated and passed out. The passengers are having enough trouble hearing and understanding us during regular conversation. I
may not have the opportunity to remove the mask while trying to do my job in an emergency situation. Flight attendants are constantly complaining that their glasses are fogging up or the mask is hindering their vision. Depending on the type of mask being worn and how secure it is to the face it could get pushed up over the eyes, sucked into the mouth, or slip down and tighten around the neck. We are not currently sitting 2 on a jumpseat which means the flight attendant in the front row is already shouting at a wall. We are already physically separated during taxi, takeoff, and landing. We should not be required to wear the mask when we are secured at these times.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported problems associated with wearing the required COVID-19 type mask while performing duties.
ACN: 1748186

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748186
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Dispatch
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Chart Or Publication
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
For all of the ZZZ crossing flights Continent X to US on this date, I used ZZZZ as an ETP and ETOPS airport...there was a NOTAM pertaining to COVID which limited the hours of operations. I simply missed this fact. It was buried within the NOTAM and the NOTAM talks about ARFF status, so I scanned over the operational hours part of the NOTAM. The operational hours which the NOTAM referred to were buried within the NOTAM about ARFF CAT status. I simply missed it.

Suggestions: Fully reading through all pertinent NOTAMs prior to dispatch.

Synopsis
Dispatcher reported not reading a NOTAM completely caused problems relating to limiting the hours of operations at a foreign airport.
ACN: 1748156

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person : 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748156
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Fatigue
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person : 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function: Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification: Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number : 1748157
Human Factors : Workload
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Fatigue
Communication Breakdown. Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2 : ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party2 : Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly. Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Anomaly. Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector. Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result. Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were on the ramp, ready to depart and I asked for taxi clearance. We received taxi instructions to Runway XX via [Taxiway] X, Runway XR approach, [Taxiway] Y. It was not clear to me how this pathway would look like as the taxiways and runways are intertwined in that area. The Captain copied the clearance and proceeded to taxi. We had Runway XYL set in the FMS and therefore, the Captain asked for runway change checklist. I set the new heading and was programming the FMS when I heard Tower asking us if we were taking Y. I realized the Controller was prompting us of a wrong turn or position on the airport. We stopped, I looked up and saw we were very close to the edge of Runway XX, I could not see the hold short lines and I assumed they were behind us. At that point, we both acknowledged we were on the Runway XX instead of Taxiway X. The Controller gave us new taxi instructions to back taxi on Runway XX, Z, Y to Runway XX at X. We continued on and had an uneventful flight.

In retrospective, I should have asked for clarifications about our taxi path and pay attention outside the plane when crossing complicated intersections and runways.

Narrative: 2
I was the Captain on Flight ABCD from ZZZ to ZZZ1. We were already delayed by about one hour while Maintenance was working on writing up an MEL for a Wing A/I Fault message. Once that was complete we pushed and had to go through a long MEL procedure after start before we could taxi. We then called for taxi and ATC gave us instructions to Runway XX at X via Y XYR approach Z. We had originally planned for Runway XZL so we had to do a runway change. I proceeded to taxi onto Y and cross the XYR approach instead of turning right on XYR approach, and had misinterpreted the taxi chart. At the time the FO was extremely busy working on setting up the aircraft for the runway change. As soon as I crossed the XXR approach and cleared I had realized I had made a mistake and had inadvertently crossed the hold bars for Runway XX as well and stopped the aircraft short of the actual runway. At the same time ATC asked if we were on Taxiway X. I immediately responded and said we had taken a wrong turn and apologized. ATC then gave us a new taxi clearance to back taxi on Runway XX then taxi M to Z to Runway XX at X. We continued taxiing and completed the flight with no other issues.

There were many factors at play as both I and the FO were on our second leg of the trip and had not flown for a couple of months. We were delayed with maintenance and had the long MEL procedure to do after we pushed, we then got distracted with the runway change, so we were extremely busy. This is no excuse but a reminder that I need to make sure to slow down and make sure everything is done correctly. There was also a lack of communication between I and the FO as I should have made sure the FO understood our taxi clearance before proceeding. I have included a satellite view of the area on taxiway Y where the XYR approach clear bars and Runway XX Hold bars are (which are very close together) which is where the incursion took place. Airport signage and/or marking improvement may help prevent other events like this in the future. Ultimately I made the mistake and will definitely slow down and not rush and make sure everyone is on the same page in the future.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a runway incursion during taxi and cited several factors including a runway change and communication issues.
ACN: 1748126

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 21
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1452
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748126
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

After pushback and engine start, my before taxi was interrupted when I noticed the squawk was not inputted. I left the flow to enter the PDC and retrieve the code. I had some difficulty with the box, and it took longer than expected. Once the code was retrieved and entered, my concentration was interrupted by ground movement off our right wing that I was monitoring. Then Ground asked us if we were ready to taxi and I said yes. Once taxiing, we saw that the flaps were up. We stopped short of the runway and accomplished the flow checklist and looked for other errors we could have missed. I was definitely rusty having not flown much in the previous 30-90 days. So, finish a flow, accomplish the checklist, and slow down when things are busy.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported taxiing out to the runway and finding items were missed during their before taxi flow checklist.
ACN: 1748102

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Light Transport
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace. Class D: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Airspace. Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1748102
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Automation: Aircraft TA
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
Did not turn right over the ZZZ VOR as SID required due to traffic conflict on TCAS. Was having difficulty climbing at ISA +19 (weight and temp). Communication difficulty due to wearing mask (COVID-19). Traffic appeared to preclude turn on SID cause of inability to climb due to ISA + 19.

Synopsis
Pilot reported not being able to turn as required by the SID because of traffic.
ACN: 1748019

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748019
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748022
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight  
Result. Flight Crew : Rejected Takeoff

Assessments  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1  
While beginning the initial takeoff roll the FO pressed TOGA and we quickly realized the autothrottles had not been armed. We had a very quick discussion of whether or not the before takeoff checklist had been accomplished. Since I always arm the autothrottles during the before takeoff checklist and there was doubt on the checklist being accomplished I made the decision to reject the takeoff and taxi back. We were at taxi speed when this occurred and normal braking was used to exit the runway. We taxied clear, accomplished the checklist and continued the flight as normal. Contributing factors were thunderstorms in the area, a new ATIS and two runway crossings during the taxi.

The decision to reject the takeoff and make sure the checklist was completed was the safest course of action. I usually check the autothrottles are armed when we receive the takeoff clearance, but didn't this time due to the distractions previously listed. One of the things that always gets covered during the brief these days is the lack of proficiency and the need to be extra vigilant. This event is a good example of that.

Narrative: 2  
As we took to Runway XXR for takeoff in ZZZ, we noticed that the autothrottle was not armed. We questioned whether we had completed the before takeoff checklist. Since it was the safest thing to do, we decided to discontinue the takeoff to run the before takeoff check. It was technically an aborted takeoff, but we never brought the power above 40 ish percent and we never got over a brisk taxi speed, maybe 20 knots. We had to taxi up to Runway YYL to exit so we didn't apply any brakes.

We had several distractions. We were watching thunderstorms on the radar. We crossed two runways and we had a last minute ATIS. Also with the reduced schedules, we don't fly as much any thus tend to carry a little more rust. The antidote is to slow down and take your time.

Synopsis  
Air carrier flight crew reported being distracted and not arming the autothrottle prior to departure resulting in a rejected takeoff.
ACN: 1748014

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 15000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748014
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
There were numerous abnormalities prior to takeoff. COVID-19 procedures were in progress. Crew and passengers were required to wear masks. I had a line check scheduled for the ZZZ1 - ZZZ return flight and the Check Airman was deadheading on the ZZZ - ZZZ1 flight. The First Officer had under 100 hours and was assigned to this trip to progress toward consolidation. Upon arrival at the aircraft at the start of the day, I noticed one of the windshield wipers was not parked correctly. It was angled onto the right windshield. I turned the windshield wipers on, then off to get them to park. The left wiper parked but the right wiper would not turn off. It ran continuously though the wiper switch was selected off. I called maintenance, made a maintenance write-up in the electronic maintenance log, and a mechanic came to address that issue. Just as the mechanic completed his work and the wipers were working properly, I went to the gate Agent to tell her we were ready to begin boarding. She told me that she had just made a gate change announcement. That is when I found out that we were going to switch to another aircraft. I called the Dispatcher and asked if we could keep then first aircraft. The Dispatcher called the system controller and that request was denied. The other crew members and I relocated to the new aircraft. The replacement aircraft had no APU, no external air hooked up, and was heat-soaked. The outside air temperature was in the mid 80s. The temperature inside the aircraft was 100 deg F. The aircraft also needed to be fueled. In addition to the normal workload, I was busy with managing the cabin temperature, requesting fuel, briefing the First Officer on how to do an external air start and cross-bleed start, briefing the ground crew on the abnormal start procedure which would be conducted with the jet bridge attached and the main cabin door open, and making passenger announcements at the gate and in the aircraft to apologize for hot cabin, the delay and to provide an updated arrival time.

After over an hour delay, we were pushed back from the gate. We performed a cross-bleed start and a taxi checklist. Then a PITCH FEEL FAULT status message appeared not the CAS stack. I called maintenance and they guided me through a reset procedure that involved pulling 4 circuit breakers, waiting, and then resetting them within 5 seconds to make the aircraft perform an enhanced self-test of the flight spoilers control unit. That procedure cleared the message and we began to taxi. We were assigned a different runway than the one we planned so we completed a full Runway and Performance Change Checklist after updating the FMS and performance data. The rest of the taxi and takeoff were normal. While climbing out of ZZZ airport, we were restricted to 250 kt by the ZZZZZZ departure. We were passed from ZZZ departure to ZZZ Center as we passed 10,000 feet on the way to 15,000 feet. I changed radio frequencies, as I was pilot monitoring, and made the 10,000 feet sterile cockpit ending chimes.

The Center frequency was congested with the Controller giving instructions to other aircraft. I commented to the FO that "the hard work was over." By that, I meant that the numerous abnormalities were behind us and we could now perform a normal flight. Then
my attention went to trying to get my radio check in on the center frequency. The autopilot was engaged climbing through 12,000 feet. I wanted to check in on the radio and receive a higher climb clearance before we reached 15,000 feet so the autopilot would not capture 15,000 feet but I was not able to because of frequency congestion. As the autopilot began to capture 15,000 feet, the First Officer changed the speed bug from 250 kt to 290 kt and I acknowledged it. This speed increase is in accordance with our SOP; however; we were still speed restricted by the SID. The aircraft accelerated. I was still listening to the radio with my finger ready on the transmit button. As the speed reached 280 kt I recognized that we should still be at 250 and I told the FO. He began reducing speed and he bugged 250. At that time I was able to check in on the radio and requested normal speed. We were given normal speed by the Controller. The speed was still around 280 and the FO bugged 290 and accelerated to 290. There was about 30 seconds between when our speed exceeded the restriction and when the restriction was lifted. The Controller did not acknowledge that we had exceeded 250. No other outcome arose from the momentary speed excursion. During the debrief, the FO stated that he had heard the controller assign normal speed to another aircraft and thought that we had received the normal speed clearance already.

The cause of the event was distraction. I was focused on communication and did not put enough attention on monitoring the PF. Though the acceleration would be normal on any other flight, we were speed restricted by the SID, so it was not appropriate. The FO having low time in the aircraft and at ZZZ may have been a contributing factor. The numerous abnormalities that we experienced prior to takeoff may have been a distraction as well. I was thinking about all the unusual things that happened prior to takeoff and beginning to analyze what we could have done differently.

Aviate, navigate, communicate prioritization for the pilot monitoring would mitigate this problem. The last 1,000 feet of climb or descent before a level off is a critical phase of flight and an area of vulnerability. It is appropriate to delay communication with ATC during that part of the flight. There is a desire to make the flight smooth, limit the level-off and thrust changes for passenger comfort. That should not be allowed to create a distraction that can lead to a SID-assigned speed deviation.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported after a mechanical issue, switching planes and a lengthy delay; they had a speed deviation on the departure SID.
ACN: 1747998

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747998
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person: Repair Facility
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Lead Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1748042
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Person: 3
Reference: 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Person : 4

Reference : 4
Location Of Person : Repair Facility
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician
Qualification.Maintenance : Airframe
Qualification.Maintenance : Powerplant
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1748039
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Maintenance

Person : 5

Reference : 5
Location Of Person : Repair Facility
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician
Qualification.Maintenance : Airframe
Qualification.Maintenance : Powerplant
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1748043
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Maintenance

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : MEL
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Maintenance
Detector.Person : Other Person
When Detected.Other
Result.General : Maintenance Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

The Chief Pilot notified me that we departed without an ETOPS Pre-Departure Check and an open AML write-up for the same issue.
The logbook had all the ETOPS Pre-Departure Work Cards for the mechanics in it that made it appear that the check was completed and that caused confusion.

The logbook was on the airplane in the normal location, when there is an open write-up they could remove the logbook from the storage bin and return it when the write-up has a corrective action.

**Narrative: 2**

Aircraft X left our station at XA:45 local for a scheduled XB:00 departure with an open logbook entry for the ETOPS pre-departure check completed steps 1-8 and the final steps not accomplished.

The aircraft was towed to the gate at 1X:49 local and was never assigned to anyone to accomplish the final ETOPS steps of the pre-departure check. We have been splitting workload between Terminal Y and Terminal X maintenance personnel. Terminal Y AMT's had been accomplishing all [State] ETOPS PDC's since most of the Terminal X AMT's were out on pandemic leave. Terminal Y AMT's have primarily covered gates [4 named gates] and the [State] ETOPS. Terminal Y personnel did not have a crew chief yesterday and assumed Terminal X AMT's were accomplishing trip ABC ETOPS, since it was leaving from gate YYY as the Supervisor, I was consumed with a problem on [two other aircraft] scheduled for a flight to ZZZZ and did not follow up on trip ABC ETOPS prior to shift change and trip ABC was departing on the evening shift. I did not give a detailed enough turn over to the oncoming crew about its status.

Going forward Terminal X AMT's will be accomplishing all of the ETOPS PDC's leaving from Terminal X. We will be assigning AMT's to meet and greet every arriving aircraft upon arrival at the gate regardless of inbound flight or a taxi/tow up from remote or hangar, to debrief the flight crew and get eyes on the logbook. As the Supervisor on shift, I will be backstopping and double checking/verifying compliance with this policy. I will be briefing the crew daily to make sure these expectations are clear and understood. We will be giving a detailed written and verbal turn over to the oncoming crew chiefs and management team members about the status of work that is in progress and yet to be accomplished. We will be giving parking locations and taxi/tow up times for the ETOPS flights that are departing on the evening shift.

**Narrative: 3**

ETOPS pre-departure check appearing to be completed, but was only partially done and not signed off. A stack of maintenance paperwork was left in the logbook and was very distracting. Everything checked normal as if ETOPS check had been completed except maintenance forms in logbook.

If ETOPS check is in progress or not complete, logbook could be kept with maintenance or flagged/tagged, especially if moving from the hanger.

**Narrative: 4**

Aircraft X left from Gate XYZ with an uncompleted ETOPS PDC, and a open item in the logbook for a ETOPS PDC required completion.

**Narrative: 5**

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
Synopsis

Flight crew reported they departed without an ETOPS Pre-Departure Check and an open AML write-up for the same issue. Maintenance personnel reported the aircraft was not assigned to anyone, therefore the work was not accomplished.
ACN: 1747988

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Fractional
Make Model Name: Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Fractional
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747988
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Fractional
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747989
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Upon takeoff on XXR at ZZZ, we were flying the ZZZZZ’s 3 departure procedure. Usually Tower promptly switches us to Departure but there was a delay and the PM queried the Tower Controller for a switch. Tower did not immediately respond, roughly 10 seconds later Tower issues us a change to a departure frequency that was not what was in our clearance. The PM switched to that frequency but it turned out to be a Local Tower, we then immediately switched to what was issued in our clearance which turned out to be the correct one. Approach asked us why it took so long for us to switch and that they were looking for us on guard as well. Nothing else was asked and the flight continued uneventfully.

The ZZZ Controller was working both Tower and Ground at the time of our departure and it was moderately busy. I think Controller became confused and issued us the wrong frequency. I assumed it was a last minute change by Approach.

Make sure local towers have 2 controllers on duty to split up Tower and Ground frequencies. The return of air traffic is happening quicker than the FAA realizes and they need to staff accordingly. We should have asked Controller to confirm the new frequency but the Tower frequency was quickly becoming congested and hard to get a word in without delaying our switch to Approach even longer.

Narrative: 2

After takeoff, there was a delay in Tower sending us to departure frequency. It was clear Tower was working more than one frequency. When I could, I queried Tower if they wanted us to contact Departure, but received no reply. Approaching 4,000 feet (our initial level off), Tower directed us to contact Departure on XYZ.A, rather than the XYB.CD on our PDC. While I was inputting the frequency, I heard someone calling us on guard and I missed the last digit of the frequency. I checked in on XYZ.E, then immediately switched to XYZ.A and checked in. It was approximately 5-10 seconds after Tower giving us the switch until the check in.

Two issues: 1) ATCT was working more than one frequency causing delays and
distractions; 2) The departure frequency in our PDC was different than that depicted on our assigned departure.

While in cruise I reviewed the ZZZZZ3 departure (which we were assigned) and noticed that frequency is reflected as the departure frequency. If I had noted the discrepancy prior to departure, I could have verified which ATC was expecting (depicted or cleared via PDC).

**Synopsis**

Flight crew reported that during takeoff they dialed in an incorrect frequency while trying to contact Departure. The crew attributed the error in part, to the Tower Controller working both Local and Ground positions.
ACN: 1747955

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ. Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 1000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: VFR
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use. Other
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ. Tower
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Local
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 2.5
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1747955
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : VFR In IMC
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Weather

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X departed Runway XL at ZZZ VFR. I heard him request clearance from ground prior to assuming the Local Control position. My understanding is that he requested a VFR clearance to the west. When the Ground Controller advised him that the ceiling was 011, he said he would stay at 010 and continue 20-30 miles to the west where it would improve and he could climb VFR to 045. There was some discussion about his VFR abilities on the inbound leg from the prior controllers, but I had just started my shift. When he called ready for departure, I cleared Aircraft X on course, because I didn't want to assign a heading in the marginal weather. As I observed Aircraft X continue to turn to the south towards inbound traffic landing Runway XR (Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z), I asked Aircraft X if he could maintain VFR on a westbound heading. He was near the taller buildings of ZZZ and I should have restricted him north of them from the onset, but he said he could. I had him in sight as Aircraft Y landed. He was almost in a XL downwind position. Shortly thereafter, he said he was unable to maintain VFR and wanted an IFR clearance. I told him I was unable to provide one at the moment and he said he was climbing. He continued to want to track SSW bound toward the aircraft on final. I tried to get him to turn away from TRACON final airspace, but he was climbing above his clearance limit into it. The CIC had advised TRACON before he departed that he might have issues. Lateral separation was maintained with Aircraft Z as Aircraft X exited the airspace to the WNW when asked, he replied he was not certified or capable of IFR flight. Later, he changed his answer. I tried to coordinate with TRACON for the IFR clearance, but the ear-piece in my headset has been having intermittent issues so I couldn't hear what they were saying, and while using the speaker, the feedback was causing too much distortion to be usable. After reviewing the incident, Aircraft X said they were back VFR but I was still stuck on trying to get them an IFR clearance. I coordinated again with TRACON as he was leaving my airspace and entering the shelf below the Bravo, telling the Controller that I couldn't figure out what Aircraft X wanted. They told me to switch him to them, so I did. Aircraft X landed at ZZZ1 shortly thereafter.

I was aware that this aircraft may encounter difficulty, yet I wasn't fully prepared for how I would process it. I should have asked more questions before he departed instead of making the assumptions I did. I assumed he would stay north and/or below final airspace based on his request to depart to the west at 010. He did neither. I should have had a better understanding of where he wanted to go, and then assisted him in getting there with my knowledge of local procedures. I should have restricted him with "no further south than 270 heading" or similar. If he had been on a heading that direction away from other traffic and still had trouble maintaining VFR, at least there would have been more options to help. Once he encountered difficulty, I tried to be helpful and safe, but the accent and use of English made it challenging to fully understand what was being asked or answered.
I should get my headset looked at - though I've honestly been putting it off because of the COVID-19 restrictions. As far as I know, they're locked away. But hopefully there are some elsewhere or someone has safe access to them. As a bit of an aside, this is the third headset malfunction in a matter of months, so the re-manufactured headsets are really not holding up well and I think it should be noted.

Synopsis

Local Controller reported an aircraft departed wanting to fly just under the clouds, but encountered IFR and the pilot was not certified for IFR flight.
**ACN: 1747951**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 7
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2800

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
- Ceiling. Single Value: 3500

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: FBO
- Make Model Name: Light Transport
- Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Training
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace. Class C: ZZZ

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: FBO
- Function. Flight Crew: Instructor
- Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 36000
- Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 10
- Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 1500
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1747951
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Events

- Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
- Detector.Person : Flight Crew
- When Detected : In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace

Assessments

- Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
- Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This was a training flight to return the student (a 1,500 hour pilot) to flight status after a long layoff due to the COVID virus. We had flown under Instrument Flight Rules from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 to ZZZ4 instrument approaches at each airport and a full stop landing at ZZZ4.

The trainee indicated that he would like to view from the air some property that he operated northwest of ZZZ4. I briefed the trainee on the procedures that we would need to follow to transit under VFR including the necessity to communicate with Air Traffic Control.

On departure we were cleared "on course" and I requested that the trainee to turn to a northerly heading to avoid the traffic at the nearby airport (ZZZ5). The student was, in my opinion, somewhat confused with trying to orient himself using an iPad device while I kept watch for traffic. We were also concerned with cloud ceiling that was lower than expected. Maintaining 500 feet below the clouds put the flight at 2,800 feet. Subsequently, we inadvertently entered the outer area of the Class C airspace at ZZZ. As soon as I realized the error I directed the trainee to immediately take up a heading that would expeditiously clear the Class C area. After clearing the area we were able to climb and proceed to our destination ZZZ1.

The error that led to this deviation was my belief that the trainee understood the factors...
involved in VFR flight in the area. He did not. We have since reviewed the flight several times. A simple communication to ATC would have mitigated the error. A factor to consider was the trainee's use of the iPad in what should have been a total "heads up" situation. A more complete pre-flight briefing would have kept this from happening. Additionally, these kinds of transgressions might be minimized if the entire area were to be one Class B. All aircraft would be under positive control. Risk would be minimized.

**Narrative:** 2

This was a training flight after a long lapse due to the COVID virus shutdown. We had done approaches at ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 and ZZZ3 with a full stop landing at ZZZ3. On taxi out for departure for ZZZ4 we discussed the Class C airspace at the ZZZ airport. We agreed that we would climb above the airspace. During the climbout, the pilot not flying was monitoring outside for traffic while I navigated using primarily an iPad. I observed some lower clouds in front of us and in my desire to remain 500 feet below the clouds, we inadvertently entered the outer area of the Class C airspace which went from 1,500 feet to 4,100 feet. My instructor, upon seeing the error, gave me a heading to expeditiously exit the airspace. The flight continued in VFR conditions to our destination ZZZ4.

This incident would not have occurred if I had better prepared for the flight and if I had communicated with ATC upon departure from ZZZ. An additional factor was the "head down" aspect of using the iPad.

My instructor and I discussed the deviation on the ground and the factors leading up to it with emphasis on the rules and procedures for flight in Class C airspace.

**Synopsis**

Instructor and trainee pilots reported experiencing an airspace incursion into Class C airspace.
**ACN: 1747907**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 15
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: IMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 20
- Ceiling.Single Value: 12000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Training
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 18200
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 30
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 820
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747907
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were training and went to ZZZ to use their ILS (in VFR conditions- no flight plan). After the approach, we did a few patterns and departed for ZZZ1 (about 18 miles). ZZZ asked if we wanted flight following and we agreed and entered a code. We departed north east to ZZZ1 and told them we would be operating west of ZZZ1 in our approved practice area. There was no further communication with ZZZ and due to the lack of activity with COVID there was absolutely no communication on the frequency. We forgot about them entirely and headed back into ZZZ1, forgetting to "cancel" flight following. (There was no call from ZZZ to terminate either). On the ground Tower asked us to call and informed us of a "possible pilot violation" and upon talking with ZZZ we were told we forgot to cancel radar services. There was, in fact, no traffic at ZZZ or at ZZZ1 at the time and no separation was lost or diverted.

I think the primary cause was the complete *lack* of traffic. We never heard a call on frequency for a half an hour and while conducting our maneuvers (a busy time) we forgot entirely that we were being monitored by radar. Our last maneuver was an "emergency descent" and we were pretty quickly in ZZZ1's airspace and never "canceled" flight following with ZZZ.

Synopsis
Pilot reported they were advised by ATC they forgot to cancel VFR flight following.
ACN: 1747902

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Recip Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Taxi
Route In Use.Other

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 8000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747902
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Taxiway
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Since COVID-19 ZZZ has no Tower services from XA:00 hr to XJ:00 hr local time. I had taxied out for departures several times before XJ:00 with no need to ask for ground services because they were closed. I was delayed and in tight quarters to taxi out of FBO, then taxi out at XJ:15 and I forgot the time had lapsed and taxied out without taxi clearance.

There is no excuse, just a timing issue on my part. There was no issues with other aircraft and everything went fine then I recognized what I had done and contacted the Tower for departure and all was a non event. I'll be sure of the time before I taxi in the future.

Synopsis
Pilot taxied without clearance because he thought Tower was still closed, but it was actually 15 minutes after the Tower had opened.
ACN: 1747863

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Angle.Radial: 165
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 20
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 25000
RVR.Single Value: 10000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Route In Use.SID: XXXXX
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
Experience.Flight Crew>Total: 496
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 114
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 81
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747863
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
I filed my flight Plan from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and received the XXXXX departure procedure. I tried to reach the ZZZ Tower for clearance and they were still closed. Then I tried to reach ZZZ Clearance Delivery on XYZ.ZA while on the ground, no answer. Since ZZZ was VMC conditions, I chose to take off and get my clearance in the air like I often do from my home airport ZZZ2. Once airborne and on my departure procedure with auto pilot, I reached XYZ.ZA and was told to wait a minute. After a minute, I restated I am airborne and need clearance. I was told again to wait a minute. After a minute or so, I told XYZ.ZA I was approaching ZZZ3 airspace and needed clearance. I received a squawk code and was told to wait, again. While waiting, I inadvertently continued into the airspace, unfortunately.

Once in the airspace I was asked to switch to Approach frequency. Which I did immediately. Approach vectored me north out of the airspace, and asked if I received clearance from ZZZ. I told them I did not, but was in communication with ZZZ Clearance Delivery and told to wait. He told me I can't do that and gave me clearance to ZZZ1 and a phone number to call upon landing. Which I called immediately upon landing in ZZZ1 and explained my mistake to stay on the XXXXX Departure Procedure and wait on ATC, instead of doing a u-turn and remain clear of the airspace, then wait on ATC.

On a side note, upon entering ZZZ4 airspace and requesting RNAV XX into ZZZ1, ATC had me descend to 3,000 in preparation to land RNAV XX AT ZZZ4! I restated I need ZZZ1 as indicated in my flight plan and they had me immediately climb back up to 5,000. Then vectored me to the initial approach fix for RNAV XX ZZZ1 which I flew on autopilot without any further incident, landing safely and very happy to be on the ground.

Synopsis
Pilot reported encountering multiple delays from ATC while on an IFR flight and was given an approach clearance into the wrong airport.
ACN: 1747854

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Communication Systems
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 16000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 70
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 100
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747854
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Ground Incursion: Runway
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
I arrived at the ZZZ around XA:30. The flight was going to be a VFR flight back to ZZZ1. I listened to ATIS on comm 2. There was has no letter present on the information. I selected to comm 1 and called Ground for taxi. There was no response. I switched to Tower frequency and had no response. There was no traffic on the airport that I observed. I wrongly assumed the Tower was not operating. I assumed it was closed or opening late for COVID-19. There was no NOTAM filed. This was a faulty and bad assumption. I checked again for traffic and called on CTAF frequency that I was taxiing out to Runway XX. I taxied and completed my run up. The radio was still quiet. I checked for traffic and announced I was taking the runway and departing for a left crosswind departure. I took off and climbed out. About 20 minutes after departing the area, I tuned in ZZZ2 ATIS on comm 1. There was no ATIS. I tried comm 2 and got the ATIS. I immediately realized there was a problem with comm 1. I immediately was concerned I had left ZZZ without clearance. I asked ZZZZ for the phone number to ZZZ Tower. I landed immediately and called ZZZ Tower. ZZZ Tower said that my radio transmissions were not received and they had seen me taxi and takeoff without clearance. They said there was no traffic conflict. ZZZ said they were concerned I was NORDO and didn't know it. ZZZ Tower said they were glad I called and figured it out. I immediately had my comm system checked by an A&P. The comm panel was found to be sticking and comm 1 would not engage. The comm panel was removed, cleaned, checked and reinstalled in proper working order. COVID-19 has caused many disruptions to the aviation system. I was flying the night that ZZZ2 Tower was closed for COVID. I assumed this was the probable cause of not being able to contact the Tower. I had checked the NOTAMs and Tower operation times for ZZZ before my flight. My assumption was incorrect that due to a lack of traffic and radio chatter that the Tower was closed. I should have investigated my radio system further for a failure. I should not have assumed the tower was closed.

Synopsis
Pilot reported thinking the Tower was closed due to no response on the radio and departed airport. While airborne pilot realized the radio was not functioning correctly therefore had taken off without a clearance.
ACN: 1747851

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 900

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Parked
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 22
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 321
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747851
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result: Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was departing ZZZ for ZZZ1 at approximately XA:15. I had filed an IFR flight plan. ZZZ
Tower was closed due shortened hours related to COVID. In the XXL run-up, I picked up
my IFR flight plan clearance from Approach. Approach gave me my clearance and I wrote
it down. I plugged it into my FMS but failed to put in the squawk code in the transponder
(I was squawking 1200). This may have been because I usually receive my clearance by
CD at ZZZ on the ramp and this was the first time I had to call Approach from the run-up.
Or maybe I just missed it when inputting due to the fact it is in my checklist to be done
prior to leaving the ramp.

Once the airspace was clear and I was ready to depart, I called back Approach for release
and departed after calling my position on CTAF. There was no traffic within 10 miles of the
airport at departure time. About 30 seconds after departure, I called the given Approach
frequency in my clearance to check in. I was acknowledged, and asked to squawk my code
and was given a direct heading to my IAP. It was then I realized I hadn't put in my code
on the ground. I imputed it and confirmed my position with ATC. The flight was uneventful
and landed XX minutes later at ZZZ1.

I recognize my oversight in failing to input my squawk code was in part due to my reliance
on always receiving my clearance while on the ramp, rather than in this case at my usual
airport, but one where I had not departed with the Tower closed, so my checklist SOP was
not reliable.

After the flight, I contacted my regular flight instructor to discuss how best to verify inputs
in this situation as my own checklist is clearly insufficient when CD is closed. We are going
to go over such during my next lesson in two weeks. I have updated my SOP and will now
triple check my clearance has been imputed with the squawk code before leaving any
given run-up.

Synopsis
Pilot reported forgetting to set the correct code in the transponder due to not talking to
Clearance Delivery, but rather the overlying TRACON since the Tower was closed due to
COVID-19.
Various agencies (FAA and NTSB) are ignoring the consequences of and some dangers of face coverings. Face coverings (medical masks) are dangerous in the cockpit of pressurized airplanes due to the extra time it takes to remove them (in addition to glasses and headsets) in the event of a depressurization event in flight. The masks also reduce the amount of oxygen intake due to rebreathing one's own breath. These effects can be magnified at altitude, just as smoking does. Fortunately my full time company has left the decision to wear masks in the cockpit up to individual crews. Any mask that I may be wearing comes off in the airplane.

Wearing a face covering in the classroom during recurrent training is an unneeded distraction that makes any learning that much more difficult. If I had to go through an initial course for a new airplane I would probably turn down that opportunity as long as
masks are required in classroom. The training provider my company uses required masks not only in the classroom but in the simulator also. I had to ignore that requirement in the sim because my glasses would fog up to the point that I had difficulty seeing.

NTSB has been surprisingly quiet during all these virus issues. What ever happened to "train as you do, do as you train"? The FAA administrator is correct in not getting involved in mandating mask use, just surprised the NTSB has not commented on this issue and the safety of flight issues mask usage by crews creates.

**Synopsis**

Captain reported various issues with having to wear a mask during the COVID-19 pandemic.
**ACN: 1747810**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Cabin Jumpseat
- Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747810
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was the D Flight Attendant. My jumpseat is 1D. Both 1A & 1C were occupied. There was also a pet at their feet. The passenger in 1C would not wear a mask. He was coughing. I politely offered him one of our disposable masks but he refused. All other rows in FC had 2 people in each row, so we could not move him and his pet to another seat. For future reference I am wondering if 1C is occupied and the person won't wear a mask could I as the D FA occupy 1F so they don't cough on me again?

**Synopsis**
Flight Attendant reported a passenger seated next to her was coughing and not wearing a mask. Flight attendant posed the question as to whether or not she could move to other non-assigned seats.
Narrative: 1

During pre-flight we found multiple system switches in the wrong position.

1. Aircraft sat for X days prior to this flight.
2. Two mechanics stated they place these switches in these positions after X days without flying.

Can we change the storage maintenance procedure when the aircraft is prepared for flight to place all switches in the expected position. This will greatly reduce the possibility of pilot error. This is far from the first time during pre-flight after maintenance we have found switches in what pilots would consider the wrong/unsafe position. Yes, it's the pilot's pre-flight responsibility, but we are all on the same team; no one is out there to enable grave pilot errors on purpose.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported multiple system switches are set in the wrong position on aircraft coming out of storage.
ACN: 1747685

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747685
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation-Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Forgot to arm thrust reversers on landing. Was very distracted. We got vector super high onto the approach. My FO was getting the glideslope back for a stable approach and once everything was good my FO recalls right when we called for the landing checklist Tower asked for bases. Just got very distracted. Also, this is my first trip after 85 days off.

We got triggers and checklist. Just need to follow them and learn from this silly mistake!

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported forgetting to arm the thrust reversers upon landing and cited distraction and lack of flying as contributing factors.
ACN: 1747656

Time / Day
Date : 202006
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment
Light : Night

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 3
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Parked

Component
Aircraft Component : Flight Crew Harness
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Failed

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1747656
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Troubleshooting
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations:
- Aircraft
- Human Factors
- Procedure

Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1

What was scheduled to be a challenging day, ZZZZ1-ZZZZ-ZZZZ2-ZZZZ3, 17+35 hours of duty out of a possible 18 hour duty day. 2+30 hour turn in ZZZZ and a 2+00 hour turn in ZZZZ2.

ZZZZ is a COVID closed country and entry into the country requires an automatic 14 day quarantine. ZZZZ2 with similar restrictions, however an easier country to work with and good accommodations on the field once permissions where obtained. I personally made it a point to insure accommodations where available in ZZZZ2 in the event we had a duty problem.

Unfortunately we didn't make it that far. As we prepared to push out of ZZZZ and the FO was strapping in, the FO's seat belt (waist strap tensioner) fell apart. Maintenance was called up and after approximately 1.5 hours after our proposed block out no repair was available and we were AOG.

For the next 4 hours calls between the Maintenance Control, Dispatch and Scheduling where occurring. Nobody in Operations wanted to make a decision regarding the flight. But without parts we were not going anywhere. The Crew was sitting in the airplane in the heat in limbo. In the meantime there were restrictions in ZZZZ. You had to get a medical check to leave the airplane in order to stay at the airport hotel. This is outside of immigration and not subject to the 14 day quarantine. It was not made clear to me at the time that the ZZZZ medical personnel left at or near XA00 local. After repeated attempts to get someone to make a decision and our situation not improving I requested senior flight Operations Management be contacted. Once they were made aware of the situation a decision finely was made, we were AOG. However, at this late hour ZZZZ airport medical personnel had gone home for the evening and not expected back till the following morning.

I informed the crew we were spending the night on the plane. They were told the earliest we could expect to move to the hotel was in the morning. Unexpectedly a crew bus appeared. 30 minutes later were we heading to the terminal for our medical check. Our ground handlers in ZZZZ made this possible. 12+20 hours on the plane from when we blocked in. 90 minutes later in the hotel at rest.

Synopsis

Captain reported the First Officer's seat belt broke delaying the flight until the next day due in part to operational issues caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1747597

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZID. ARTCC
State Reference: IN
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 14000

Aircraft : 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZID
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class A: ZID

Aircraft : 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZID
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class A: ZID

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZID. ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 10
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747597
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X called me having just departed ZZZ airport. I gave him the standard departure clearance, climb to flight level 230, and leaving 140 normal speed. He had a really hard time reading back the clearance, so I knew I would have to keep an eye on him. Because we are working COVID schedules, I was working all of my area's sectors, so I had other things to do, and moved on to other clearances. I had already taken a point out on Aircraft Y, who was being worked by Area Y, landing ZZZ1. I knew that the two were potential traffic, so I issued Aircraft X a clearance to go direct ZZZ2 which was the second fix on his route; he read back ZZZ2. I went back to other clearances. A short time later, Aircraft X keyed up and asked if ZZZ2 was ZXZ2. I corrected him and told him that ZZZ2 was ZZZ2. (ZXZ2 is a fix in [different state].) Aircraft X had already started to go towards ZXZ2, which put him head on with Aircraft Y descending into ZZZ1. In order to get Aircraft X out of the way at this point, I issued him a 360 degree heading. I had no idea which way he was turning at this point, so I just wanted to get him somewhere that I knew Aircraft Y was not going to be. I called Area Y and tried to get them to stop the Aircraft Y and give me radar contact, but they had already switched the aircraft to ZZZ approach. I had the Aircraft X stop his climb to buy myself a few more seconds. I called ZZZ Approach to try to get them to turn the Aircraft Y south, but they informed me that they had just put the Aircraft Y on a 360 heading as well, and he was much faster than my Aircraft X. I asked them if they could turn the Aircraft Y back to the south, and they said no. At that point, I turned my Aircraft X another 30 degrees to the right. Because the Aircraft Y was still descending, I climbed the Aircraft X, hoping to achieve vertical separation. Vertical separation was achieved soon after. I issued a turn to Aircraft X's next fix, and then a climb to his requested final altitude.

The pilot put in ZXZ2 instead of ZZZ2. The [letter] and [letter] are next to each other on a QWERTY keyboard. This was probably an example of a slipped finger starting a domino effect of mishaps.

Synopsis
ZID Center Controller reported an airborne conflict while working all sectors in Controller's area during COVID-19 scheduling.
ACN: 1747418

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Fog
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 7
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 1700

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace. Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Commercial
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 1600
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 28
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 800
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1747418
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

First flight back after COVID reopening, local flight in the pattern with a private-rated student. I believe the Controller instructed us to turn right and enter the Runway XX upwind from the XX left downwind. We were then instructed to return to the downwind, but there was confusion as to whether that meant the Runway YY or Runway XX left downwind. I asked for clarification on frequency, but the transmission was blocked. On a left base to Runway YY, we were cleared to land Runway YY.

Upon reflection, I am not sure if we were intended to enter the left pattern for Runway YY or Runway XX.

With all three frequencies (local, ground, and clearance delivery) combined on Tower, there was some radio confusion. Additionally, aircraft were being directed to both XX and YY due to practice approaches being conducted to YY.

I believe these confusing situational factors adversely affect safety, particularly due to the staffing/currency challenges as a result of COVID-19.

Synopsis

Pilot reported radio communication confusion as to which runway they had been cleared to land.
ACN: 1747416

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 3500

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. CTAF: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory. CTAF: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3200
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 10
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 15
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1747416
Human Factors : Other / Unknown
Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On approach to and in entering the pattern for ZZZ, the wrong frequency was entered for the CTAF after listening to the AWOS. The numbers were input in the wrong order. Although the airport was familiar to myself and the private pilot I missed it while looking for traffic upon the 45 for entering the downwind. It became apparent that there was a radio issue as we started to turn base to final and another aircraft took the runway for takeoff. There was no conflict, but we then turned off of the runway and stopped to check the headset connections and checked the frequency. It was clear that the frequency was incorrect. Frequency was changed and we continued with the flight training. Perhaps the biggest issue was the lack of frequent flying of the due to the stay at home request in dealing with COVID-19. I missed the incorrect frequency because of the difficulty in seeing the entire frequency from the right seat and while looking for traffic. The issue could have been avoided by double checking the frequency and moving to a position in the cockpit to clearly see the frequency on the pilot's side of the display.

Synopsis
Instructor pilot reported dialing the incorrect CTAF frequency and landed while an aircraft was lining up to takeoff on the same runway.
ACN: 1747388

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747388

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747389
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Coming into ZZZ ATIS was reporting ILS XXL. As we checked into the final Controller, we were assigned VOR XXL. We quickly, but thoroughly re-briefed the new assignment. As we came in, we were white needles and given a vector and altitude to intercept. The FO was flying pilot and was having trouble with selecting vertical speed and then we became high on the approach. After it became time sensitive, I said that we have the runway and PAPIs in sight, so we should get rid of the automation and shoot the visual. We stayed a little high and then assertively descended to meet up with the glide path. At this point I was trying to get switched over from approach to Tower so we can get landing clearance. We were in the last second of stabilizing at the 1,000 alert. Unfortunately, the flight spoilers were still out beyond our company 1,000 feet limitation.

The cause of this occurrence is multi-fold. The FO has three flight hours after IOE and those were his only hours in the last seven weeks. He stated this at the beginning of the trip. This was his first flying leg flight. The change in the approach also contributed to the complexity as well as not getting landing clearance. On top of that, the VS button required mashing and multiple attempts to get it pressed and engaged.

Unfortunately the flying situation during the pandemic is affecting both the currency of the pilot group as well as the performance of the controllers. Flying currency is the solution.

Narrative: 2
After setting up and briefing the ILS XXL approach while on the arrival, ATC contacted us and told us to expect the VOR XXL approach. The Captain and I set up the new approach in the FMS and I briefer the new approach. We were vectored in close to the final approach fix and I was still trying to slow the aircraft. Once cleared for the approach I put the autopilot in nav mode and once established Short of the FAF I put the aircraft in VS mode, once selecting VS mode the FMA showed pitch mode and didn’t start a descent. Noticing I was not descending the Captain said I was high and I disconnected the autopilot and started to hand fly the approach visually, while trying to stay on the visual decent and align with the runway I exceeded the stable approach criteria. Also after getting the airplane back stabilized on the approach we both noticed I had left the flight spoiler partially deployed.

The cause of the unstable approach was caused by several factors, I believe task
saturation with the last minute change of the approach and the autopilot entering pitch mode instead of VS was a contributing factor as well as my lack of recent flying experience due to the pandemic. This was my second flight after the completion of IOE. Overall, I think flying more often would help with making mistakes and getting task saturated.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported an unstabilized approach, citing FO’s lack of flying and a late change by Approach Control as contributing factors.
ACN: 1747387

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747387

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors
Narrative: 1

On the ground in ZZZ during the quick turn my forward Flight Attendant reported that at altitude the wearing of the mask makes her feel terrible. I asked her to describe her symptoms and she described some symptoms similar to hypoxia (dizziness, nausea, headache, etc.). When she does not wear the mask she is fine. I have also heard anecdotally similar complaints from passengers and other FAs in the recent past. While I realize that there is a lot of controversy over wearing the mask I am not sure that we should be ignoring the studies that have shown drops in spO2 (blood oxygen saturation) from prolonged mask wearing (assuming these studies were performed close to sea level). The big concern is that our cabins are at 7-8,000 PA and we are asking our FA's to perform the duties of a required flight deck crew member while impaired by hypoxia. In my opinion they would not be fit for duty in this state. We also should be very concerned about the fact that some of these FA's could have either diagnosed or undiagnosed health conditions like asthma that could create a perfect storm of health issues causing an inflight medical emergency. So we have a perfect storm of restricted breathing, high cabin altitudes and possible underlying health conditions that may cause problems for them.

Suggestion: Allow FAs to be able to remove the face mask during flight operations. Better yet remove the policy altogether.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported being advised by a Flight Attendant that while wearing the COVID-19 type mask Flight Attendant felt hypoxia like symptoms.
ACN: 1747359

**Time / Day**

Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZ
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

**Component**

Aircraft Component: RPM/N1/N2/Etc Indication
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747359
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Taxiway
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

As we were taxiing out to the runway for departure the FO was getting the data ready and starting the takeoff data brief. He noticed that the engine N1 indications for engine one was quite a bit higher than the engine indications for engine 2. He immediately tried to diagnose why this was happening and we noticed that there was no air going through the packs. In the meantime I was taxiing and waiting for the aircraft in front of us to proceed. As they started to proceed forward, we followed and during which time I was trying to decide our next plan of attack and getting ready to see if we could go somewhere to take a look at the situation. During this time the Ramp Controller told us to hold short at the next spot and contact ground. As we continued toward the spot unknowingly missed the spot we were supposed to hold at and crossed onto the taxiway slightly. I noticed it immediately and put on the brakes and called ground who gave us taxi instructions to the runway. In the meantime the FO did recycle the pack switches and that solved the issue, so we continued with no further problems.

First this was our first trip flown in 2 1/2 months since ZZZ reopened its base. Second we were operating in an airport that was unfamiliar to us. The next time I will let ramp/ground know we need to go somewhere and deal with the issue.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported a taxiway incursion due to distraction from dealing with Engine 1 indications being higher than Engine 2.
ACN: 1747234

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 15400

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747234
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Climbed out and got task saturated while in a turn hand flying because I needed the practice, when I realized I had reached 15,000 feet I corrected the situation but overshot the altitude. Captain pointed out the deviation and I smoothly reduced power and established a descent to assigned altitude. ATC queried and gave us a higher altitude 17,000.

The cause was focusing on the procedure while hand flying. Didn't notice the altitude until Captain called it out.

I'm a little rusty from lack of flying and have little experience hand flying the plane. I was trying to acquire some more experience, but perhaps this wasn't the best time to do it. Would have been better to use more automation.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing an altitude overshoot during climbout while hand flying and attributed it to lack of flying.
I was the first to arrive at the airplane. When I entered the cockpit, I immediately noticed the FO seat was positioned full aft with full recline rearward. This is not uncommon in ZZZ when an aircraft has been at the gate for an extended period (apparently it is a good place to sleep, I’ve awakened someone more than once). I reviewed the AML and noticed that the aircraft had been in storage for an extended period. I conducted my power up and origination flow and noticed a gooey substance on the MCDU keypad and the Radio...
Management Panel. Due to my reclined seat position my initial thought was the gooey substance had come from someone's shoe as they were reclining in the cockpit. This turned out to be incorrect. Maintenance arrived, I exited the cockpit to make space, boarding had begun. The Captain informed me that maintenance said the gooey substance was bird droppings. We started to discover bird droppings in numerous locations throughout the cockpit to include; glareshield, Flight Control Unit (FCU), side panels, sliding window control handle, headrest, storage compartments, and floor/carpet. Maintenance finished the cleanup, boarding was complete. We had to call maintenance back to the aircraft because we had another 2nd discrepancy; Uplink INIT REQUEST not working. I had to make space for maintenance again, it was then that I started to notice areas around the forward galley and entryway with bird droppings to include: FA jumpseat, panels near the main cabin entry door, and floor. The 2nd discrepancy was taking a significant amount of time so it was determined that passenger would be deplaned. I was talking with the flight attendants when we noticed significant bird droppings throughout the cabin to include: at least 5 passenger seats and seatbacks, headrests, and especially on several locations on cabin flooring/carpet. It was eventually determined that we would swap aircraft.

Company needs to develop a more detailed plan in how to bring aircraft back into service. This obviously needs to include a comprehensive inspection of the aircraft.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported finding bird droppings in the cockpit and throughout the aircraft after aircraft had come out of long-term storage.
**ACN: 1747165**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.Tower
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function.Air Traffic Control: Ground
- Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 30
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747165
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Taxiway
- Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

The flight was exiting Runway XX Left at Taxiway XX, and had not yet called. I reached out to give them taxi instructions and they asked if the instructions were for them. I assumed I either blocked them or they were transferring frequencies mid sentence, so I reissued the instructions - Taxi via XY to the ramp - as though it was their first call-up. The acknowledged and said they had not received a hand off from the Tower Controller. I told them all was good.

A minute or two later, I observed the aircraft turning eastbound on Taxiway XY3 to join Taxiway XZ southbound. I reached out to them by call sign only, and they responded. I followed up with asking them where they were going. The pilot said they were going to the "north line", which is on the Ramp Tower apron. I advised them that Taxiway XY4 is the delineation of where the ramp begins and that is where I would have expected them to go to. They apologized and said they were looking for the north line and headed in there. We left it at that.

During the slowdown, some crews are probably going to places they either have never been, or have not been to in some time. The only recommendation I can make is to ask, it is not like the frequency congestion would make asking a bad thing.

Synopsis

Ground Controller reported an airliner taxied in the wrong direction toward the ramp.
ACN: 1747136

**Time / Day**

Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Ceiling.Single Value: 10000

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Takeoff

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew: Total: 387
Experience.Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 8
Experience.Flight Crew: Type: 216
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747136
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Runway
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I accidentally took off on Runway XY instead of Runway YX. I was holding short of XX/XY at intersection B. I was cleared to take off, and thought I need to double check the runway because this takeoff intersection is unusual as my plane is stored at the FBO on the other side of the runway. When I was cleared to takeoff, ZZZ also had a much larger plane cleared to taxi to YX. I usually try to be curious to the larger aircraft at ZZZ because we have a large diversity of operators and types at this airport. I didn't double check my heading with the runway as I normally do because I "self-rushed" even though there was no need to have hurried. I think I subconsciously took the clue from the YX-XY runway identifier sign and turned towards the YX numbers which instruct the pilot what direction to turn to get to the YX approach end. This had me turned around. I caught my own mistake once airborne. At that time I apologized to the Tower Controller and asked how I should maneuver to fix my mistake.

I will also say that currency and proficiency may be an issue here. Normally by this time of year I would have had over to 20 hours under my belt, Because of COVID-19, I only had 8.

Synopsis
Pilot reported taking off in the wrong runway direction.
**ACN: 1747125**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Make Model Name: Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
- Reporter Organization: Fractional
- Function.Maintenance: Technician
- Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
- Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747125
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Other Person
- When Detected: Routine Inspection
- Result.General: Maintenance Action

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

It was brought to my attention that, a digital message in reference to adding a work order for LED light installation was not applied. I do not remember my work load for the day, but I do know it was my second day on duty by myself with over 150 flights. Unless someone else had opened the digital message I can only assume it was me that read the message and did not apply the work order.

Suggest that the desk be staffed in a manner that we can safely do our work, even in the financial times the company is in now. During the lack of manpower I need to tell myself to not to take on more of a workload than I can handle.
Synopsis

Technician reported a work order was missed and not completed.
ACN: 1747061

Time / Day
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 12500

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Component
- Aircraft Component: Pressurization System
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747061
- Human Factors: Confusion

Events
- Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Landed in Emergency Condition
- Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Departure Airport

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

We were climbing out of ZZZ on our way to ZZZ1. Passing through 12,500 feet we received a Master Warning-Cabin Press. I immediately looked up thinking either the bleeds or packs were off, but the bleeds were both on and the packs in auto. We donned our masks. Once our masks were on we accomplished the Cabin Press Warning checklist (IAC) and asked to level off. The First Officer was flying and I asked him to also take over the radios while I moved on to the Pressurization Failure checklist in the EAC. We started back towards ZZZ during this checklist and started down to a lower altitude, setting up for the RNAV approach to Runway X which was in use. I called back to the flight attendants and explained what was going on and also asked them to give the passengers a brief of the return as I didn't want to make them uncomfortable hearing me try to talk with the oxygen mask on. The First Officer called ops and let them know we were coming back. We flew the approach, landed and taxied to the gate with no further issues. When we pulled into the gate I made a PA explaining to the passengers why we returned and asking them to go back to the terminal while we figured out the plan. On the ground I called Maintenance, Dispatch, and a duty officer. Maintenance confirmed with us if any CBs were popped, they weren’t. They asked about the position of the bleeds, and packs which I said were on. All in all everything went smoothly and safely and we agreed to continue on, got swapped into a new plane in ZZZ and continued to ZZZ1. The only thing I can think of is that looking back I wasn't 100 percent sure if on the EAC checklist when it says to go into manual mode if it was originally in auto or manual. I remember on my flows thinking it looked like it was in auto but when I did the checklist I can't remember physically switching it to manual. I mentioned that to Maintenance on the phone. They asked if it was in dump mode because it was acting like the aft outflow valve was wide open as the cabin was at the same altitude as outside. It definitely was never in dump mode, but I just can't remember switching it from auto to manual so there was a chance the cause was because it was in manual all a long but I can't say for sure either way.

That plane had been sitting for a while and wasn't quite taken out of storage as on that same flight we discovered the pitot 1+2 heat CBs were popped and was told on the phone by Maintenance that this was part of their storage procedure and that they had forgotten to push them back in. I'm wondering if the pressurization issue was also something similar that got forgotten when the plane was taken out of storage. All in all I felt we worked good as a crew and my first officer who is very close to upgrading did a fantastic job and I can tell he will make a great Captain. This was my first time flying in two months due to the coronavirus slow down but he was on the ball and I'm definitely thankful I did some chair flying or else I would have been way rustier. If I were to do it over again I might have tried to contact Dispatch in the air instead of once we got on the ground. I could have done a better job at keeping them in the loop, it just all happened so fast. I could have asked for some delay vectors or something.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a cabin pressure master warning during departure and executed a return to departure airport.
ACN: 1747020

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 22800

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747020
Human Factors: Confusion

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747021
Human Factors: Confusion

Person: 3
Reference: 3
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Narrative: 1

I was the FO flying the ZZZZZY arrival at ZZZZZ intersection. The proper arrival was put into the FMS and all waypoints were checked for accuracy. As a new descent speed was input to the FMC, the plane increased descent to accelerate to that speed and did not level at FL240 at ZZZZZ intersection as desired on the VNAV profile. By the time I noticed and corrected, we had descended about 1,200 feet too low. Somehow, the crossing altitude at ZZZZZ had dropped out of the FMS. The Captain immediately called ATC and informed them and they indicated no worries just go direct ZZZZZ1. Remainder of arrival and landing was uneventful.

This was my first flight leg as pilot flying in about 3 months and the end of a long trip, so my crosscheck may not have been as sharp as I would have preferred. I'm not sure when or why the altitude at ZZZZZ was dropped from the FMC unless I inadvertently pushed the altitude selector knob when entering the 6,000 foot final altitude on the arrival into the altitude window.

I will have to be more careful in the future about setting and double checking all altitudes at each waypoint during departure and arrival and making any needed corrections in a more timely manner.

Narrative: 2

As I came back from break, the FO and Relief Pilot said that they had the correct arrival in the FMS and that they checked the points. I also went through all the points, speeds and altitudes, which were correct. As we approached ZZZZZ intersection, the speed started to come back prematurely. The FO entered 290 and the three of us verified all was correct prior to executing. The aircraft started to pitch down. We noticed right away it wasn’t stopping at FL240. The FO who was flying immediately started to correct. Not sure just how low we got. I quickly checked the legs page and sure enough, the crossing had dropped out. I immediately notified ATC who was not concerned and cleared us to ZZZZZ1 intersection for the uneventful remainder of the arrival and landing.
Even though we were ending a long flight we did not feel fatigued and the three of us were following all the procedures. Not sure what caused the altitude restriction to drop out by simply updating the descent speed. As I stated above, we caught it, but not before it went below FL240. Even though we haven't flown much recently, we all felt comfortable and we were day VFR and not rushed.

I am struggling to determine what we could have done differently. As I stated above, we were not rushed and were following all the FMS procedures. The only thing that was changed, was the speed. There was no re-sequencing of waypoints that could have caused the restriction to drop off.

**Narrative: 3**

I was flying as Relief Pilot and at the event was in the observation seat. Arrival checked on Box. Same Arrival in box was formally assigned and cleared to descend via by Center. On descent aircraft decelerated and FO (Pilot Flying) set 290 in MCP, then on VNAV and then reselected VNAV. Aircraft corrected Descent path for new speed. FO then recognized aircraft descending through F240 which was restriction at ZZZZZ. He established level off and rechecked Box for navigation data. ATC was notified and Controller immediately assigned direct ZZZZZ1 which removed altitude restrictions to between 13k and 16k at ZZZZZ1.

Cause: Slow/late crosscheck during VNAV adjustment of speed.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported a waypoint crossing altitude dropping out of the FMS and not knowing why resulting in an altitude deviation.
ACN: 1746999

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZJX.ARTCC
- State Reference: FL

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: IMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZJX
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Airspace.Class A: ZJX

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746999
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747001
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation: Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather
Primary Problem: Weather

Narrative: 1
While enroute, were given multiple reroutes due to enroute weather etc. Multiple fixes we were given were not in FMS Database or Jepp EFB app. We entered incorrect fix spelling and had a valid fix that was not correct. Multiple times on this trip and in the past ATC tries to issue direct to routing that would take us beyond 50 NM. I was monitoring with terrain map on MFD, 1/PM could not reference Jepp FD PRO on EFB due to no current position being displayed. FO was PF, we were given a new clearance due to weather. While trying to build reroute we encountered multiple fixes that we were unable to locate on FMS database or Jeppesen charts. This caused much confusion and re-query to ATC asking for spelling and clarification. We also queried ATC reminding them of our need to stay within 50 NM. While trying to work through the problems and update Dispatch through ACARS of routing, we received dispatch message telling us of ATC routing changes could take us too far off shore.

After entering direct to BAAKE to start our turn to the first fix, while trying to sort out the error fixes we alerted ZJX Center of an incorrect route. We were corrected and given correct routing. BAKKE and ROZIE I believe were old fixes removed by newest cycle.

What was the cause of the discrepancy? Were these fixes removed and ATC did not have the update? FD Pro seems to be our best reference for 50 NM limit information. It is not helpful if lacking ownship position to reference when given a direct to, over water. The terrain display function is limited in its display of information. Suggestion not to enter direct to first fix as it could be incorrect as in this case, since the correct fix is not in our charts. I have made this trip multiple times, this is the first time it has been this difficult. I can only wonder if ATC staffing levels were a factor? I think nearly every trip to SRQ, TPA, EYW and back ATC tries to give us routing > 50 NM from shore.

Narrative: 2
While enroute from EYW to ZZZ we were given multiple reroutes due to enroute weather. Multiple fixes we were given were not in the Jepp or database. We asked for clarification on spelling about 3 times and still given wrong info. They tried to give us direct routing to fixes multiple times that would exceed the 50 mile mark off shore even [though] we had told them 2 times already we need to comply. We ended up turning towards waypoint
BAAKE instead of BAKKE, which was an active waypoint in the direction he wanted us going and asked for clarification for the 4th time. He then wanted to send us to ROZIE, also an old point that wasn't in our database. They then sent us direct to TKNIQ I believe for the time being while he figured out what he was doing wrong. We finally switched to ZHU Center and Controller actually fixed our routing. We believe ZJX Center had old fixes that weren't in the newest cycle. But ZZZ was also switching from north flow to south flow at the time. So I believe that was confusing to previous Center as well.

Cause: ATC having old database, ZZZ switching from north flow to south flow was not smoothly coordinated.

ATC needs to have the updated chart info ASAP.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported getting confusing intersections and routings they were not familiar with and were also concerned about being routed more than 50 miles off shore by ZJX Center, which reportedly does this often.
ACN: 1746974

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Taxi
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 100
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1000
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746974
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 10800
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1746975
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Ground Personnel
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
The Captain started taxiing before we had clearance to do so. There were many other Company aircraft requesting taxi and push clearance. I knew he shouldn't have been taxiing, but didn't respond quick enough to question, to stop him, before Ramp Control asked what we were doing.

Narrative: 2
Getting ready to taxi to Runway XX from Gate YY in ZZZ. Several aircraft were pushing and getting ready to taxi at the same time, the radios were congested. Captain thought my FO had called for taxi clearance, and that Ramp had cleared us to taxi to follow an aircraft on the right that was passing behind. Captain initiated a turn and was called by Ramp that we had not been issued a taxi clearance. We were subsequently cleared to taxi and the rest of the flight was uneventful.

I will listen more carefully to clearances in the future. As a general note, with the greatly reduced flying due to COVID-19, this was my first trip (second day) in over a month. Long layoffs and infrequent flying are causing my proficiency to be lower than normal and little things are occasionally slipping through the cracks. I am sure that I am not the only one.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported they began taxiing out without clearance. Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.
ACN: 1746929

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 5000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Taxi
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Cockpit/Cabin Communication
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multigene
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1205
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 14
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1109
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746929
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
While attempting to talk to Ground and Tower while parked on the north ramp I did not receive any responses back. Listened to ATIS again and heard that the Tower closed each day at XA00. Checked the time and it was after XA00 Z and continued on as I would with a closed Tower. I taxied to get fuel and continued to make radio calls and then took off. While in cruise I realized that the radio was not working correctly. After fixing the radio I continued the flight. While coming back to land at ZZZ I listened to ATIS 8 miles out and noticed that the time now said the tower closes at XA00 local time. I then called the Tower and let them know that I had ATIS and requested to land and was cleared to land and landed with no incident. Contributing factors are a Tower closure during this pandemic times, a radio that was not working correctly, and the XA00 local time vs Zulu time and possibly not identified on ATIS as local time vs. Zulu time on the initial ATIS weather.

Synopsis
Pilot departed airport without communication with Tower. Pilot mistook LOCAL time for ZULU time, and departed the airport when Tower was open.
ACN: 1746913

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Taxi
- Route In Use: None
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Engineer
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 25000
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 75
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1000
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746913
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Listened to ATIS prior to taxi. It included a note that Tower had ceased operations, along with the automated 1-minute weather data. I tuned and monitored CTAF frequency and began taxi toward the runway in use. Shortly after I entered the movement area and joined the parallel taxiway, Ground Control asked if I was on frequency and said the Tower was still open. I advised that I had just listened to the ATIS which stated the Tower was closed. He said he puts that up a few minutes prior to the actual closure so that he doesn't forget, and issued a taxi clearance to the active runway. Tower closed for real shortly after my takeoff.

Many local towers are operating during unusual hours due to the pandemic, and this is one of them. Still, maybe wait until the Tower is actually closed prior to posting the ATIS which says it's closed.

Synopsis
Pilot reported listening to the ATIS which stated the Tower was closed, and started a taxi towards the runway when Ground called the pilot and advised Tower was still open.
ACN: 1746906

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling: Single Value: 10000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Visual Approach

Component
Aircraft Component: Communication Systems
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 14000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 75
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746906
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.

Party 1: Flight Crew

Communication Breakdown.

Party 2: ATC

**Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Landing Without Clearance
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Due to a radio/intercom switch issue, coupled with expectation bias with which I made the assumption that the ZZZ Tower was closed, I ended up landing at ZZZ without radio contact with the Tower.

The flight was VFR from ZZZ1 to ZZZ routing over ZZZ2. Flying over ZZZ2, I listened on the ATIS frequency and heard no letter identifier with the weather information because the Tower closed early (XA00L from NOTAM versus XF00L from airport directory). I made my area report on the Tower frequency as I flew over, using it as a CTAF. There was another aircraft that was working in the pattern, making reports on the CTAF, as well. I recall thinking that the COVID-19 crisis had even reached State X, where the Tower was closed early.

Approaching ZZZ, I monitored on COMM2 what I thought was an ATIS frequency (only to realize later that it was an ASOS frequency) and of course, got no letter identifier with the weather information. This started me down the path to assuming that perhaps ZZZ Tower had closed early, like ZZZ2. With all the irregularities occurring around the world due to the COVID-19 crisis, it seemed reasonable.

I then switched to COMM1 and made a radio call to Tower on Tower frequency, receiving no answer. Because there was no letter identifier on what I had thought was an ATIS frequency and no apparent answer after repeated queries to Tower, I assumed the Tower was closed and made my normal position reports, entering the pattern as if it was an uncontrolled field, using the CTAF frequency. What I did not realize is that I was neither receiving or transmitting on COMM1. The switches on the intercom panel were sticking and I failed to verify the transmit light, relying merely on the tactile touch of the button.

There was no other traffic at ZZZ and I landed uneventfully. The airport appeared deserted, which only seemed to confirm my impression that the tower must have closed early due to the COVID-19 crisis. I parked the aircraft and it was not until two days later when departing did I realize that I had not been transmitting over COMM1 due to a switch problem and that the Tower had not been closed, but had still been in operation the night I landed.
What contributed to this incident was my bias to assume the Tower had closed early like the Tower at ZZZ2. The fact that I did not hear the expected letter identifier that I am accustomed to at a Tower airport when I listened to ASOS--thinking it was ATIS--kept me going down this path of assumption. And then when I could not raise Tower, that seemed to only verify my assumptions. These assumptions prevented me from checking the radio switches when I did not receive a reply from the Tower and I instead continued to transmit as if at an uncontrolled field, not realizing that I was neither transmitting nor receiving.

If I had not been operating under my false assumption, for example, if I was at my home field where I knew the tower was open and I was not getting a reply to my queries, I would have checked the intercom switches more carefully, tried a different frequency, or otherwise worked a potential radio issue. Instead, I attributed what was actually a radio issue to, "Oh, Tower must be closed due to COVID."

As far as the switch issue, a qualified A&P mechanic has addressed it and the same issue should not happen again.

This was a wake-up call for me. As a professional pilot, I fly around the world. In this new COVID-19 world, it was easy to chalk up irregularities to the "new normal." As aviators, we cannot ever allow ourselves to stray from our normal procedures and protocols. This incident painfully reminded me of the need to constantly check my assumptions.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported landing without clearance due to a sticky radio switch and lack of incoming radio transmission, and thinking the Tower was closed due to COVID-19.
ACN: 1746796

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746796
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1747230
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
FO was pilot flying and CA PM. Took off XXR at ZZZ on the ZZZZZ X SID. After passing ZZZZZ1, Center inquired which fix we were navigating to next. PM replied with the next fix on the SID. The Controller sounded confused and verified our routing. Both pilots at this point reviewed the clearance versus the filed route and saw the FMS was set up for the ZZZZZ2 departure instead of the amended ZZZZZZ2 departure. The cleared departure has the same 3 initial fixes before heading slightly more southerly to a different transition than the filed departure. The PM queried ATC if a change in course was needed or if additional information would be needed later and ATC said no. ATC then cleared us to a VOR which was on both the filed and cleared flight plan and the flight continued to the destination.

CA loaded the FMS while FO was preflighting the aircraft. FO was pilot flying and therefore conducted the pre-start briefing. Neither pilot noticed the amendment on the PDC or corrected the FMS when the briefing was conducted. It was the first leg of a new crew change so that could have contributed to a lack of attention to detail or distraction. Complacency played a part as PDC are not amended frequently from filed routing. FO hadn't flown in a month and didn't notice how an amended clearance on a PDC looks and briefed what was loaded in the FMS.

Whoever loads the FMS should double check the clearance and verify the cleared route and have the other pilot verify the fixes more closely against the clearance as some have the same initial fixes.

Narrative: 2
On the climbout, the FMS was programmed for a departure procedure that led south then north east. The first fix on the departure flown and the correct one ATC wanted were the same. When initial contact with ATC was made, I mentioned we were climbing via the departure that was thought to be correct. After about 8 minutes or so, ATC notifies us that we were off course and queried which departure we were on. We notified ATC and they came back and said we were supposed to be, according to their paperwork on a different departure procedure. ATC cleared us to a fix about 50 miles away and we resumed the flight without incident and without request for contact from ATC.

The cause of this event may be contributed to a failure to cross check the programming of the FMS alongside the PDC as opposed to just the release.

Suggestion to prevent this include not programming the route in the FMS until after the
PDC/clearance has been received from ATC. Including climbing via the XXXXX departure in all initial contacts with departure control when applicable.

**Synopsis**
Air carrier flight crew reported a track heading deviation. ATC questioned their routing and the crew realized they had an amended clearance.
ACN: 1746792

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 7000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746792
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

After departure given heading of 360, climb to 7,000 feet. Approaching level off we received a TCAS RA due to crossing arrival traffic (right to left) at 8,000 feet. Traffic was in sight prior to event and throughout event. We leveled off at 7,000 feet. No separation was lost.

Aircraft was climbing rapidly to 7,000 due to light weight. The rate of approach triggered the TCAS RA.

As pilot flying I should have intervened and reduced our rate of climb upon seeing the traffic and potential conflict. This was my first leg back after two months not flying.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported due to light weight and high climb rate the aircraft received a Resolution Advisory.
**ACN: 1746781**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Fractional
- Make Model Name: Light Transport
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Climb

**Person: 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Fractional
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746781
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Person: 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Fractional
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746782
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
Assessments

- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Prior to departure off of Runway XX we briefed the ZZZZZ X departure. Upon departure we flew the assigned heading in the SID and met the crossing restriction. Approach then gave us a climb to FL190. In the climb the FD Mode Off annunciator came on. We then turned direct to ZZZZZ1. Within a few seconds ATC queried us and asked where we were going. He told us to turn back to our originally assigned heading from the SID. We continued on uneventfully.

I think several things came into play today. It was a swapped crew in the middle of my day. We haven't been flying very much in the past three months, I didn't sleep very well the night prior due to noisy rooms next door. And finally we were too hasty in responding to the FD mode annunciator, which should have been in HDG for this departure.

Narrative: 2

After having briefed the ZZZZZ X ZZZ1 departure on the ground, on departure we were given an amended climb unrestricted to 190. At about that time the FMS, upon reaching the end of the departure nav fixes, gave us the FD mode amber warning, I referenced my transcribed clearance from our paperwork and I mistakenly got us moving direct to the next fix ZZZZZ1 listed after ZZZ1 instead of maintaining the runway heading as we had briefed. ATC issued a lower level off of 120 and asked where we were going, we read back to the above fix and we were corrected and admonished to maintain the runway heading per the chart.

Suggestions: The usual, slow down, make sure everyone is on the same page, if in question inquire. There is some rust from the minimal frequency of flying, and my personal expectations of How fast we can move things along needs to be revisited.

Synopsis

Flight crew reported not flying the assigned heading on departure and being corrected by ATC. The crew referenced lack of flying as a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1746772**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2300

**Environment**
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746772
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While on a heading of 150 to intercept final, at 2,300 feet and inside of ZZZZZ. We were cleared for the visual for XXC. We were using the ILS/LOC XXC as back up. My intent was to stay in NAV mode, white needles to intercept and then hand fly the remainder of the approach. As we approached the final course, the white needles were not moving as I expected and while "heads down" to confirm that the automation was set correctly the Captain said to turn. I looked up and realized we flew through the final course. I believe I turned off the autopilot, but hesitated in turning because I was unfamiliar with the airport. The Captain took control and corrected, ATC advised us of the course deviation, I replied that we were correcting. Once the Captain got us re-established on final he gave me control back, we were above 1,000 feet AGL, and we landed uneventfully.

Scan breakdown, my failure to look outside when distracted by the automation. This was also my first time flying into ZZZ so when I looked up, it took a few seconds to orient myself. On our debrief, both the Captain and I realized neither one of us sequenced the FMS when ATC started to vector us for the approach. This caused the issue with the white needles not moving. This trip was to maintain landing currency, I have not flown since the early April. I was also ZZZ1 based [flying] the Aircraft Y type. This trip was on the Aircraft X type, which I have not flown in a while.

Basic airmanship: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. Good scan discipline. Follow SOP in regards to the automation. Anticipate problems when flying into unfamiliar airports.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing a course deviation and stated being away from flying was a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1746769**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace: Class B: ZZZ
- Airspace: Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1746769
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
- Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

While on the localizer course to XXL into ZZZ, the FO, acting as PF, placed the aircraft into heading mode and green needles approximately 35 NM from ZZZ to have the aircraft track the localizer to the runway. However, before arming the LOC mode on the aircraft FCP, the FO failed to realize that the selected course for the localizer NAVAID was set to approximately 347 degrees, instead of the appropriate 273 degree inbound course. When the aircraft began to turn to the north, the CA, acting as PM, commanded the FO to disengage the autopilot and hand fly the aircraft back on to the localizer, which the FO promptly did. ATC instructed that a 250 heading be flown to re-intercept. The FO then continued the remainder of the approach without incident.

This event can be attributed to a simple lack of proficiency on the part of the First Officer. The FO explained that he had been on prolonged time off, and had not flown the aircraft for approximately three months. This trip was assigned to prevent his takeoff and landing currency from lapsing. Unfortunately, due to the current COVID pandemic crisis, this extended leave period caused the FO’s instrument cross-check and automation management skills to decay slightly.

In the future, it is suggested that the aircraft not be placed into green needles to intercept localizer NAVAIDs at such a great distance from the runway. The aircrafts automation is likely to be very imprecise and unpredictable and should rather be switched to green needles much closer to the runway. It is also suggested that the FO make a habit of verifying that the correct inbound course is selected on the PFD before commanding the aircraft automation to use green needles. Finally, despite these highly irregular circumstances facing the company and the aviation industry at large, I would recommend that the First Officer try to pick up flying somewhat more often, in order to avoid this sort of skill decay.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing a track heading deviation due to FO entering the wrong heading on the PFD. Captain and ATC caught the mistake and corrected the heading.
ACN: 1746754

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 500

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746754
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746758
- Human Factors: Time Pressure

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : FLC Overrode Automation

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
The event occurred on the visual approach to XXR. We were turned in a bit tight to intercept the final and I was slow in getting a rate of descent established sufficient enough to capture the glide slope. We turned the flight directors off and autopilot off and continued. We were stable by 500 feet but exceeded 1,000 FPM below 1,000 feet AGL. I think I reached 1,300 FPM during the correction to capture the glide slope. The landing and taxi in was uneventful.

First leg of a three day trip after being off for a few days may have played a role. I haven't done a whole lot of flying since being off for 2 months.

My proficiency is coming back to pre-coronavirus time off slowly but surely.

Narrative: 2
We were on visual approach to XXR at ZZZ. PF was late starting down to catch the glide path. Configured and approximately one dot high and ten knots fast at 1,000 feet, unstable but correcting. Stable by 500 feet but had inadvertently reached a VVI of about 1,300 FPM for a short period below 1,000 feet in the process. Landing was uneventful.

Cause: A lapse in monitoring the descent rate by both pilots. An earlier recognition of developing circumstances that could lead to instability would have likely mitigated this occurrence.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach, disconnected the autopilot and stabilized at 500 feet and landed uneventfully.
ACN: 1746744

Time / Day

Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2

Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Check Pilot
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746744
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

After getting the ATIS, requested taxi clearance from hanger/ramp on taxiway Romeo 2 to Taxiway Alpha for a departure southeast. Tower replied, "Present position, cleared for takeoff" without acknowledging the request to taxi to Alpha. I told the pilot flying, that the Tower Controller didn't hear the request and to once again request taxi clearance to Alpha for the departure. He did so and Tower cleared us to Alpha for takeoff to the southeast. This is unusual, as they normally clear us to Alpha only, then once ready, we are to let them know we are ready for takeoff. They will then clear us for takeoff from Alpha. We taxied on out to Alpha and I told other pilot to get confirmation from the Tower that we were indeed actually cleared for takeoff. He did so and Controller confirmed that we were cleared for takeoff from Alpha. During this time, I noted that they were using both Runway X and Runway YY. We departed Alpha, parallel Runway X and flew straight out and started our turn southeast as we passed abeam the Tower as is customary. I heard the Tower Controller talking to an aircraft using Runway YY earlier and as we started our southeast turn, saw an aircraft climbing out from Runway YY on what would have been a collision course for us both. Other pilot saw a different aircraft he pointed out, but I pointed out the one that was the immediate threat which surprised him as he had not seen it. I told him to hold his altitude and turn hard right to pass behind the aircraft climbing out to the north from Runway YY. After we were obviously clear now, I contacted the Tower and asked about us being cleared for takeoff with another aircraft coming off of Runway YY at the same time? We had not been given any notification, advisory nor restriction concerning the Runway YY departure at any time. The Tower Controller replied that the aircraft that we avoided would be "coming back around" (assuming that meant staying in the pattern) and to maintain visual separation. I told the Controller that we were now behind and would stay below that aircraft until clear to the southeast. We passed well below him, now back southeast-bound, as he was establishing a downwind for Runway YY. As I remember, I repeated my query as to the conflict to the tower, but there was no further comment concerning any of this from them. We continued southeast for our transition training flight without issue, including working with the tower quite a bit later in the flight around Delta Taxiway, Runway YY and finally around the X area. There were no further issues or comments and the training flight continued smoothly.

The ZZZ Tower has been doing some controller training and it is my understanding that the Controller is a trainee. This was evident during the early days over the last couple of months since Controller arrived, i.e. getting tongue-tied, or occasionally being corrected by the experienced Controller in the cab, etc. This is to be expected and basically a non-issue as with any new person learning their job, while on the job. There have been some frustrating times in that my students and myself have made multiple radio calls to the Tower with various controllers and either had a long delay prior to an answer, (with little or no other traffic at the airport) no answer at all requiring a second call, or several times, a change of radio to find out if the problem was in our aircraft or them for some reason not hearing us, or worst case, not paying attention. During this same flight for the report today, we had requested an approach to and use of Taxiway Delta to do some ground
reference work. They cleared us on a right base for landing on Delta and other pilot answered their transmission as appropriate. About a minute later, the Tower called us back to see if we could hear them. Other pilot replied once again to their directions but neither of us can figure out if there was a radio issue in the aircraft, or why they did not hear the first reply? We heard both their calls loud and clear, and they apparently heard our reply loud and clear only on the second attempt. This report is being submitted, not due to a deviation on my (our) part, but due to the potential collision hazard that the Runway YY departure presented with our own departure at nearly the same time without notification or restriction by the ZZZ Tower. My general impression over the last couple of months, to include since the COVID-19 problem began, that there has often seems to be a lack of attention coming from the Tower as to communication and complete situational awareness. I am hoping that by bringing this incident up in this format can somehow improve the situation so that it is a safer environment for all of us.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported departing a runway and then observing an aircraft departing from a crossing runway causing an airborne conflict.
ACN: 1746738

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude, MSL, Single Value: 5150

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC/Advisory, TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace, Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function, Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function, Flight Crew: Check Pilot
Function, Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification, Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification, Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification, Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1746738
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function, Flight Crew: First Officer
Function, Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1747003
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly. Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
As a line check airman, I was teaching and providing operating experience to a First Officer (FO) transitioning back to the Aircraft X type, after flying another aircraft type. I was the pilot flying and the trainee FO was in the pilot monitoring role. During our arrival into ZZZ, we received a STAR change from the ZZZZZ arrival to the ZZZZZ1 arrival due to East flow in ZZZ. This clearance was initially given without a runway transition, so we followed company procedure and put in the ZZZZZ1 arrival with XR Transition per the approach notes. At this time, we both mentioned that XR was closed, but decided to follow company procedure with the intention of changing the runway later.

The FMS and Automation systems from the trainee's previous aircraft had an auto-throttle and VNAV system. The Aircraft X type does not have these systems, so the descent needs to be manually managed with the thrust levers and vertical speed. The difficulty was compounded because we were using a single FMS Aircraft X type which is physically located in the 4 o'clock position from the Captain, making it nearly impossible to monitor the flight instruments and FMS simultaneously. I was teaching some techniques to manage the altitude and speed adjustments during the RNAV star. When the PM checked in with approach control, we were assigned Runway Y as anticipated. We tuned in the localizer frequencies and briefed the changes for runway Y, but neglected to reprogram the FMS due to the high workload of managing the STAR restrictions.

During the downwind portion of the STAR, ZZZ Approach assigned us to descend to expedite descent to 5,000 MSL. I aggressively descended the aircraft, and when approaching 5,400 MSL ATC told us to climb and maintain 6,000 MSL. I climbed the aircraft back up using the autopilot, but was confused and distracted by this unusual
change of altitude.

ATC gave us a vector for the base to runway Y. I was verbally instructing the FO how to sequence the FMS for the approach and made a quick visual check to make sure it was done correctly (not realizing the waypoints were still programmed for runway XR). I also coached the FO to change the Navigation mode on the FO's Navigation display for greater situational awareness and in case the FMS is improperly programmed.

ATC gave us an intercept vector over the ZZZZZZ2 intersection and cleared us to intercept the Localizer. I intended to initially track inbound on the FMS and switch to the ILS when within 18 NM. I had a mental red flag and thought "That's not right" when I heard ZZZZZ2 but saw ZZZZZZ3 Intersection on my MFD. The localizer had already passed for the FO's Nav Display, but due to his lack of recent experience and FMS differences from the previous aircraft, he did not mention this to me. I realized we were overshooting and shutoff the autopilot, while turning back toward the south to re-intercept the Runway Y course. As I was doing this, ATC noticed our error and gave us a vector to re-intercept.

As I was intercepting and re-stabilizing the aircraft, I let the aircraft drift up and down about 150 feet. I was also initially slow to get the aircraft slowed to an ATC assigned 160 kts because they were querying us about what happened. I reengaged the autopilot, aggressively slowed the aircraft and we were re-established for a stabilized approach. We were very lucky that XR was closed this day, otherwise a serious traffic issue could have occurred.

Cause: Poorly positioned Single FMS on Aircraft X type, Loading Arrival and Runway Changes using RNAV STARs, ATC altitude change distraction, low and non-recent experience of FO in training environment, overall decreased currency and proficiency of all pilots due to COVID-19 effects on industry, high workload during RNAV STAR.

Neglected to reprogram FMS and verify waypoints for correct runway after ATC assignment, Untimely Teaching, FO not speaking up about localizer movement.

I will guard against untimely teaching and focus more on my primary responsibility of flying and monitoring the aircraft, especially close to the terminal area. When training pilots coming from another aircraft, I will start from an assumption that their situational awareness is nil and that they might not have the recency with procedures, Flight Guidance, and FMS to back me up. I will be extra careful to listen and put runway changes into my FMS soon after they are assigned by ATC.

Narrative: 2

Left seat pilot (PF) Right seat pilot (PM). There was a lack of communication between the check airman and trainee due to the check airman focusing primarily on training instead of flying the airplane. During the departure briefing, as a right seat pilot, I asked to load Runway Y instead of Runway XR although STARS was saying Runway XR. This was because Runway XR was closed according to ATIS. But the left seat pilot replied that we should load the FMS with the runway on STARS and he would correct it when we received our runway assignment. While cruising, left seat (PF) and right seat (PM) executed positive exchange of controls for the arrival briefing. Suddenly things changed by ATC; such as arrival and runway while trying to stay away from weather.

Meanwhile, left seat pilot asked for weather related deviation 15 degree to the right. I asked to make sure right or left because there were storm cells to the right. Left seat pilot affirmed and asked again to the right. I requested from ATC 15 degree to the right due to
weather. ATC was astounded and repeated the question "Are you asking for left or right?" I said right, ATC replied standby and 10 seconds after approved weather deviation to the left because of the weather to the right. We then established left deviation from current heading to avoid weather. After left seat pilot finished the arrival briefing, we executed a positive exchange of controls and right seat resumed PM duties. When the left seat then resumed PF duties, the high speed warning occurred 3 times. Both side frequencies and courses were set for Runway Y, but the FMS was still on Runway XR. ATC instructed us to descend and maintain 5,000 feet from 6,000 feet. While we were around 5,300 feet, ATC instructed us to climb and maintain 6,000 feet. PF did not change the altitude. I said again, ATC assigned 6,000 feet. He bugged 6,000 feet and verified but he did not start climbing. I reminded him again that we should climb to 6,000 feet and he finally started climbing. I then verified once more with ATC to ensure assigned 6,000 feet was correct. We got vectors to Runway Y ILS and as a PM, I switched to green needles to make sure all was OK.

While left seat was on FMS, I figured out we were going to deviate from Runway Y course and I pushed the TCS and started turning to the right. Simultaneously, left seat pilot kicked the auto pilot off and back to Runway Y course. ATC advised us of a 20 degree deviation while we were around 210 KIAS and asked to reduce speed to 170. I offered gear down, but left seat pilot did not respond. I offered gear down again and ATC then asked to reduce speed to 160 KIAS immediately. Finally, PF asked for gear down and flaps 22. I was almost going to ask to go around, but we corrected and were able to configure the airplane. We made it stable and landed without much hassle.

Cause: Lack of crew communication. Mutual errors. Lack of verification when FMS was set up due to changing STARS and runway and fast paced environment. Meanwhile, left seat pilot was talking about topics related to training purposes. As a result, the aircraft automation established us for Runway XR instead of Runway Y.

Always take your time. If behind the airplane, ask for help from ATC. If you cannot descend or climb immediately due to lack of crew communication, advise ATC unable. Make sure both pilots are on the same page regardless of their level of experience, seat or check airman status. We are human beings and we may make mistakes, therefore CRM and MCC plays a crucial role in the safety of flight instead of being single pilot. It is a gray area and a question between left seat and right seat pilots of what action would be better if STARS is saying a specific runway and that runway is closed. I learned from this event that the crew should be strict about the sterile cockpit rule regardless of it being a training event. Therefore, both crew members can then focus on flying the airplane in order to prevent staying behind the airplane. Finally, the most important thing I have learned from this event is regardless of the other pilot's position/status, do not assume they will do everything correct.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and setting up to land on a closed runway with anticipation of changing to landing runway later.
ACN: 1746726

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference
ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory
TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person
Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1746726
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person
Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1746731
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC  
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: Flight Crew

**Events**

- Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector. Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
- Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**

- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

After departing ZZZ we received an ATC clearance to proceed direct to ZZZZZ. After referencing the FMC I replied that ZZZZZ was not on our flight plan and that we where routed RZZZ after ZZZZZ1. ATC then asked to verify our routing after ZZZZZ1, this is where we discovered what we had loaded into the FMC, and our Jepp app was different than our ATC clearance. We worked out routing with ATC and proceeded to ZZZ1.

Waiting for the aircraft to arrive late in ZZZ the Captain called Dispatch to discuss a northerly routing they had us planned for that appeared to take us closer to some weather than our more normal routes. The Dispatcher agreed and it was decided to change the route. The amendment came through and reflected the new routing. Once on the aircraft the route that uplinked to the FMC was the new routing as well.

Relevant factors include first and foremost time compression from the late inbound aircraft exacerbated by slow deplaning and mechanics in the flight deck, a nonstandard gate that required a lengthy walk to and from ops for paperwork as well and 6 MELs one of which was added at the last minute. Additionally, it’s rare to get a PDC clearance furthermore the format has changed since it was the norm, this coupled with expectation bias resulted in misreading the PDC. The departure and first few fixes of the PDC were exactly the same as our "new" routing additionally a line under the route titled "REVISED SEGMENT" stated NONE. All combined with COVID and the fact we are not flying as much as we used to.

In this case it had been in excess of an hour and a half since the Captain had called Dispatch and discussed the route change to when we departed. Along with the time compression, multiple amendments and MELs I had forgotten about the route change until we were airborne talking to ATC. In the future whenever there is a route change initiated by the flight crew and or Dispatch, I will be sure to mention it as a threat during the departure briefing in an effort to promote a more rigorous scrutinizing of the clearance, flight plan and loaded route.

**Narrative: 2**

Late changes to filed oceanic route clearance led to confusion of clearance after takeoff. As these reports usually start, we were under abnormal time constraints with a late inbound aircraft. Dealing with 5 MELs to decipher, and another last minute MEL addition, coupled with amendments to both our route and our release.
Having called Dispatch while waiting for the inbound aircraft, I requested slightly different routing due to some forecast turbulence plots on our original route. The Dispatcher agreed and reran our flight plan. It turned out to be a minute shorter in flight time and seemed like it would be a smoother route.

Here’s where it went awry. I was led down the wrong path by two factors, (traps). First our "new" clearance, on the release, was similar to our old, and, as it turns out, only filed clearance. Secondly, the clearance printout from ATC, has two sections. The first reads **filed route** which was exactly the same for the first two positions but is an incomplete route. The second reads, ***revised segment*** which read, NONE. As I was confirming the route and there were no revisions according to the clearance, I used the master flight plan print out as my cross check. Climbing out of ZZZ, we were given direct to a point not loaded into our FMC. After some confusion we figured out that the "old" route was the one ATC got and subsequently had given us. It seems that while we had been given an amendment to our flight plan on our paperwork, ATC had not gotten the "new" route. While still in radar contact and talking to ZZZ departure, we re-filed in the air to the route we both, had paperwork (master flight plan) for and had loaded in the FMC. Clearance was given and we proceeded on the route without further ado.

Recommendation would be to allow a FULL route, meaning the entire route, to be printed off with the actual clearance. Instead, for some reason we only get the first few points and if, as in our case, there is nothing in the ***revised*** sections, we are to assume the rest of the route is the same as our paperwork. Obviously a trap in our case.

Lessons for myself, resist expectation bias, confirm route on both documents, (clearance and master flight plan), and most importantly, after having so much time off, be extra methodical, ESPECIALLY when hurried by outside influences.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported during climbout they received a route change that was not on the filed route.
ACN: 1746706

Time / Day
Date : 202006
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : TX
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6000

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Descent
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1746706
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Upon reaching ZZZZZ on the ZZZZZ1X arrival, approach control issued clearance to descend to 6,000 feet. As PF, I selected 6,000 on the MCP and pressed level change to initiate descent. However, as I was referencing the iPad I noticed the aircraft banking left and immediately checked the MCP and realized I had accidentally pressed the heading select switch next to level change, with the bug displaced to the left, causing the aircraft to initiate a left turn. I immediately adjusted the bug to correct heading and maintain course to the next waypoint, however approach already noticed the slight deviation and issued a corrective heading. The time between our initial turn and corrective action was less than 5 seconds and the deviation was minimal, however we were in terminal environment with approach coordinating multiple arrivals and departures so it was not surprising that they immediately noticed.

Proximity of heading and level change buttons require extra attention to ensure aircraft is correctly maneuvered.

Normally I verify the selection of the mode control panel and verbalize the type descent as I check the FMA. Not exactly sure why that didn't happen this time. Perhaps a little rusty with the decreased flying over the last three months. In retrospect, I think disengagement of the autopilot as soon as I noticed would made it a quicker course correction with less deviation.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation after accidentally pressing the heading select switch.
ACN: 1746571

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1746571
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Landing Without Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway XXR. Sometime around ZZZZZ, approach told us to maintain 160 KTS till ZZZZZ1 and contact Tower at ZZZZZ1. Upon arriving at ZZZZZ1 the First Officer/Flying Pilot asked for gear down, flaps 3 and landing check list. I got busy doing it and forgot to contact Tower at ZZZZZ1. Subsequently we landed on Runway XXR without a landing clearance. We contacted the Tower as we cleared the runway and they gave us taxi instructions to hold short of Runway XXC and never said anything about us landing without a clearance.

I got busy and missed it. I'm new on the plane and have not been flying much lately and not yet as comfortable as I would like.

Pay more attention.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported forgetting to get a landing clearance from Tower.
**ACN: 1746549**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ. Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude. AGL. Single Value: 200

**Environment**

Weather Elements / Visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace. Class D: ZZZ

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1746549
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**

Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather
Primary Problem: Weather

**Narrative: 1**

On short final below 200 feet with a reported 10 KT quartering tailwind the approach became unstable and the Captain executed a missed approach. On the way to the hold ATC informed the crew that the wind was gusting now to 18 kts. Due to the low ceiling the RNAV was not available and due to the high tailwind the ILS RWY was not available. Crew diverted to filed alternate.

Crew recognized unstable conditions and executed a missed approach. Both pilots were called on reserve near the end of their duty day. The weather report was not as bad as actual conditions. There was approximately a 30 KT tailwind on the approach until around 400-500 feet final when the tailwind began to fluctuate between 10 and 15 KTS. ATC reported the gust on final and the aircraft became unstable at low altitude. Crew executed a missed approach. Also of note, due to MEL XX-XX-X the EGPWS Windshear mode was inop. Also this was the Captain’s first flight in nearly 2 months.

Crew obtained the latest weather from ATC which confirmed the gusting tailwind and deteriorating conditions. Crew noted that while the weather was worse than forecast, it was not forecast to improve for several hours. Due to the deteriorating conditions, lack of available runways to land on, RCC 5, nighttime, and a lack of recent flight experience, the crew elected to divert.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported executing a go-around due to a quartering tailwind and then electing to divert to filed alternate.
ACN: 1746536

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 13300

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 1
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746536
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was working 2 sectors at the time of the event, XX and XY. We had previously moved around positions around the room several times before this actual configuration, but this configuration is how things were normally done before the COVID scheduling. The event is as follows: Aircraft X is going to ZZZ from the west and requests the RNAV
RWY X Approach into ZZZ airport. I glance at the NOTAMs and the procedure, and clear them to cross ZZZZZZ (the IF) at or above 150 to meet terrain (XXX) and the crossing restriction of ZZZZZZ (XXY). The pilot continues to descend the aircraft for the approach at ZZZZZ to XXY, but is now below the terrain on an unauthorized approach. The aircraft was cleared for the approach at [time] and canceled IFR moments later after going below the MEA or MIA at ZZZ Center.

I feel there were several factors leading to the event. Most notably would be the way ERIDS [En Route Information Display System] shows us our NOTAMs. Typically you read over the NOTAMs in a quick fashion when you're busy and discard the long NOTAMs that never say anything important. Any NOTAMs that come after these elongated NOTAMs are typically not applicable as well. In this particular instance, the very last NOTAM listed was very much applicable saying this approach to ZZZ airport (the RNAV to RWY X) is NA (not authorized) even though it's been published for several months.

The next factor is the complexity. Before these last 2 days of work, I had previously never worked a busy session since COVID scheduling began. I wanted to switch back to days to continue to hone my skills as a Controller and I believe I have, but that still doesn't take into account how busy things have picked back up and how available people are during a day shift for help if it's needed (which there is not).

The next factor was traffic volume. I was fairly busy dealing with multiple things all over the sectors and that probably didn't help when it came time to look at the NOTAMs for this specific airport. I probably glanced over something that should have in my opinion jumped out at me more.

The next is the way we are briefed for these things. Being briefed for this new approach probably happened prior to the COVID scheduling and with so much time in between now and then, it is just a lost thought. I never even knew we had an approach to RWY X at ZZZ airport in State X until this aircraft requested it. And that goes into my next point.

Typically pilots don't request something that is NOTAMed Not Authorized or closed, but I didn't just have 1 aircraft request that approach today, I had several. All about 15 mins-20 mins apart. This is the only instance in which I cleared them and they got below terrain before canceling IFR, but it was still an issue.

I would recommend a different way to show NOTAMs on our ERIDS at the facility. Too often we miss something as we read over them because the very elongated NOTAMs are never applicable and NOTAMs that come after them are almost never read.

The second thing I recommend is to be briefed better on items such as this. Maybe I was briefed on the approach earlier in the year, but to know that now the procedure is NOTAMed NA is a different thing entirely. Sheets should be posted on the position that controls those aircraft and briefed prior to taking the position every time, which it was not.

I also feel I could do a much better job at reading the NOTAMs entirely.

Synopsis

Center Controller reported clearing an aircraft for a NA (Not Authorized) Approach, and observing the aircraft descend below the MEA.
**ACN: 1746530**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: F11.TRACON
- State Reference: FL
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3000

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: F11
- Aircraft Operator: FBO
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Training
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace.Class C: SFB

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: F11
- Aircraft Operator: FBO
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace.Class C: SFB

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Facility: F11.TRACON
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function.Air Traffic Control: Departure
- Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
- Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 1
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746530
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Staffing

Narrative: 1

I was working mostly student pilots on practice approaches and practice holding. The weather was building off the departure end of SFB departure end of the 9L & 9R. Aircraft X came from Sector K or Sector D and should have come over at 040 as per the LOA, but came over at 030. I did notice that Aircraft X was not at the correct altitude, I knew it might be an issue, but I didn't feel a sense of urgency to climb the flight to 040 and had other things going on.

The majority of my attention was focused on the west side of SFB. Arrivals for ORL were entering my airspace from the north and I was flowing them southwest over the SFB final and to the D sector, which is responsible for working them into ORL. I identified Aircraft Y climbing off of SFB and turned the aircraft north and away from the precipitation which was building to the east. When I issued the 360 heading, I did not evaluate the proximity to Aircraft X.

Frankly, I had been working at a high level for a long period, but was waiting for the traffic to die down. More and more IFR releases were flashing from SFB and I was definitely getting the feeling of reaching the edge of my skill level. I did ask for the sector to be split, but by that time I had already had an error.

I was under the impression that the flight schools would not be operating at full capacity because of the Coronavirus epidemic, but they were out in full force. I should have asked for help sooner.

I should have asked for the sector to be split about 30 minutes sooner. Once the sector was split, traffic was easily manageable. Even in times of normal staffing, I feel there are never enough controllers to split sectors without running long position times.

Synopsis
F11 TRACON Controller reported a conflict after an aircraft came over at the incorrect altitude.
ACN: 1746513

Time / Day

Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 35000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC/Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use.STAR: ZZZZZ 2
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person: 1

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 8700
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 30
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 800
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746513
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2

Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 6000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 40
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1746518
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
The mission on this day was a little unusual and because of the recent COVID pandemic, our flying has diminished substantially. We had to fly from ZZZ to ZZZ1 then fly and empty leg to ZZZ2. We picked up passenger in ZZZ2 and went back to ZZZ1 to pick up additional passenger before returning to base in ZZZ. We had about a 1.5-2 hour break while in ZZZ2 for lunch.

To simplify operation we decided that I would be Pilot Monitoring for the first two legs, ZZZ to ZZZ1 and ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. I would be Pilot Flying for the last two legs. To help expedite our ground time I opted to load up our upcoming flight plans in the secondary flight plan so after we landed and received our clearance all we had to do was activate it and verify it.

I think this is where something went wrong. I loaded up the flight plan for ZZZ2 to ZZZ1 while we were flying to ZZZ2. I opened our flight plan and loaded it up the way we filed it; route. When we got to ZZZ2 attempting to land on Runway XX we experienced wind shear causing us to go-around. After a successful recovery we were able to come back and land without further incident. The reason I mention the wind shear event is because it changed our planning on departure runways.

After lunch we loaded up our passenger and called ZZZ2 clearance to change our runway from XYL to XX because we experienced wind shear on the way out. We thought it would be prudent to depart with more of a headwind component than a crosswind component. This caused a significant change in our flight plan. We would now depart Runway XX via the ZZZZZ to ZZZ3 [Jet route] thence ZZZZZ1 for the arrival. I believe this is where the error happened. I am not sure if it was a human factor error or a computer error.

We both looked at the FMS and noticed a few discontinuities. After discussing them together we cleared up the issues and launched. While in cruise the aircraft flew from ZZZZZ1 to ZZZZZ2 and somehow [6 additional intersections] were missed. A few miles abeam ZZZZZ3 Center requested a 20 degree turn to the right and asked us if we were on
an arrival. We responded affirmative. ATC then told us that we should have been flying over ZZZZZ3 at the time and said that it was ok, we would fly back into their airspace and then be cleared directly to ZZZZZ2. After that everything was normal all the way to our destination and to our home base.

We discussed this in detail and determined that we should have looked at each fix to verify instead of just looking at the flight plan page. Normally this is something we do but because of recent events we chocked it up to complacency due to lack of routine. Obviously this is no excuses for pilot error but I thought it important to share my experience because it is something that can easily happen with the way our flight plan is displayed in the FMS. You can verify your route easily a few different ways in a few different formats. I am thinking, hypothesizing, guessing what happened was in the secondary flight plan the routing was [route] ZZZZZ1.ZZZZZ2 but when we got our route change due to the runway we missed an important part. I think with the change the FMS read ZZZZZ. [route] ZZZZZ1 ZZZZZ2 (note the lack of the period, I think the route in the FMS was [route] ZZZZZ1 direct to ZZZZZ2). This cause the airplane to go from ZZZZZ1 direct to ZZZZZ2 and not actually on the arrival.

In the future it is important for any routing but especially complex departures and arrivals to verify each fix. Not just verify they are in the flight plan page.

**Narrative: 2**

The other pilot (PF) programmed the FMS from an earlier flight and stored it. The actual clearance we received was different then what was filed, SOP changes had to be made. It was done rapidly by him and I failed to check the change against the chart. For some reason when the change was made, it didn't load the entire arrival but just the initial fix was flown to (ZZZZZ1) then it went direct to ZZZZZ2 instead of flying the fixes in between. ATC called to query us (as we were off route). We immediately requested a heading, corrected and reloaded the approach and got back on course. We briefed after the flight and adopted a full review procedure when storing routes (especially when unfamiliar).

**Synopsis**

Pilots reported entering the incorrect routing in the FMS resulting in a track heading deviation.
ACN: 1746493

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ILG.Airport
State Reference: DE
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 2
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: PHL
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class D: ILG

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Airspace.Class D: ILG

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3420
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 34
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 325
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746493
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Departing Runway 1, given initial heading 330, climb to 2,000. Tower handed off to PHL Approach. Approach cleared me to 9,000. Approach then called Traffic Alert one o'clock turn immediately to 270 degrees. After I did not respond immediately, Approach said 'radio check' turn immediately to 270 degrees. I responded, turned and continued my climb. Traffic (I never saw) passed behind me. Several factors contributed:

1. Other aircraft was in ILG Class D airspace apparently not in contact with ILG Tower or Approach.
2. ILG Tower Controller may have been 'in training.'
3. PHL Approach Controller was incredibly busy, potentially missing the potential conflict until he received a traffic alert. As the country is 'opening up' post COVID, anticipated level of weekend air traffic appeared to be underestimated.
4. Controller called the traffic at 1 O'clock, turn left. Natural tendency to want to look for the traffic, which would be blocked by the engine/wing in the turn. This delayed my action. Suggestion: Controller state 'Traffic Alert' make immediate turn to XXX. Do not state the location of the traffic. If it's that urgent, it's too late to start looking.
5. My avionics unit was in flight plan mode (anticipating getting a 'cleared direct to' (which I received almost immediately after the incident)), not traffic mode. Even though I was in Class D airspace, overlayed by Class B, on an IFR clearance and given a Radar Vector, it was VMC. Having the avionics unit set to traffic would have potentially provided an additional traffic alert. Difficult to say as this all happened in the first 60-90 seconds after takeoff when workload is at the highest.

Synopsis
Pilot reported receiving a traffic alert shortly after takeoff requiring immediate evasive action. Pilot noted that the PHL TRACON Controller seemed incredibly busy, thereby potentially missing the conflict.
During cruise, we ended up circling for over 30 minutes due to a thunderstorm on the field in ZZZ. The airport was closed and we were holding. During this time, my C Flight Attendant and I started feeling dizzy. We both attributed this to the burden of wearing a mask the entire flight. Fortunately in descent, we both started to feel normal, but it was unsettling to think about what could have happened if 2 out of 3 of us became ill during the flight. On a side note, when working C it is impossible to properly brief the exit row passengers without taking a mask partially off one’s face. The customers cannot hear us, understand us, and as I previously reported, I had to remove a passenger from the exit
row because it was impossible to tell how old he was with his face covered up.

Masks cannot be feasibly worn for 7-10 hour duty days. Masks only need to be worn during boarding, deplaning and walk throughs. This is becoming a huge safety issue.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported feeling dizzy along with another Flight Attendant and attributed it to having to wear a protective mask.
**ACN: 1746444**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746444
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Taxiway
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

After clearing Runway XXR at Taxiway 1X high speed, Tower issued instructions to taxi on 1 to 2X. We had previously briefed a hard left turn on 1 to 2Y as the likely taxi route. Upon the left turn I noticed all the mothballed aircraft on 2Y, and Tower advised us we turned the wrong way on 1. We didn't have room to do a 180, so Tower had us taxi to 1Y, then take the runway to 1Z, for turn around and normal taxi to ramp from there.

A combination of things. Long duty day after X days on the road. Expectation bias for taxi. Missed NOTAM in a lengthy taxiway closure novel. Tower not being more explicit with instructions, i.e. "taxi north on 1," running an after landing checklist distracting the First Officer from actively listening to instructions. Airport authority allowing taxiway to be used for mothballed airplanes while many other taxiways closed for construction.

Minimize long duty days with an almost X hour "drool" in ZZZ before second leg, especially after a week on the road. Better depict NOTAMs, perhaps with a visual indication of closures rather than alphabet soup. I should have delayed after landing checklist until after confirming taxi route. Also, avoid expectation bias due to previous experience.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a taxiway incursion due to expectation bias.
After reaching top of climb, Operations notified myself and the Captain via ACARS that the flight release was not signed prior to departure. Earlier, during our crew brief, the Captain asked if I had reviewed the release. I answered in the affirmative. He said he would print it out via the iPad app due to our COVID-19 procedures. This is "our" usual work-flow due
to COVID procedures - we each review the release on our iPads individually and then discuss any concerns prior to the Captain signing and printing the release from his iPad.

Technology challenges that are being experienced due to COVID-19 procedures. [We] are used to reviewing the release on screen together and Captain's sign via a network computer. Using the iPad is not as reliable.

We should not be sent a final manifest unless the release has been signed. I'm not sure if the work-flow for the manifest being signed includes steps completed by operations/dispatchers, or if it is automated through the system ramp agents use, but add a "checklist" step that checks for a signed release would 100% prevent this from happening in the future.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported being notified that the flight release had not been signed prior to departure. The FO stated that technology challenges as a result of COVID-19 procedures contributed to the event.
ACN: 1746434

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Maintenance Status.Records Complete: N
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type: Unscheduled Maintenance
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Repair

Component
Aircraft Component: Escape Slide
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multimotor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746434
Human Factors: Troubleshooting

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746753
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
**Events**

- Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person : Flight Crew
- When Detected : Pre-flight
- Result.General : Maintenance Action

**Assessments**

- Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
- Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
- Primary Problem : Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

During my before start flow on the door/oxy page I found that the over-wing exits were not "ARMED" Maintenance was summoned and after much investigation it was discovered that the airplane was taken out of storage a few days prior. When the airplanes are "mothballed" a pin is installed in the blow bottle for the slide so that they are not inadvertently deployed. What I find disturbing is this airplane was being flown for a number of days with the over-wing exits unarmed! Very unsafe and illegal.

Nothing causal just our normal flows/procedures. In these trying times we have pay special attention to proper N numbers, logbook numbers match, databases are up to date etc.

Slow down! Look over the release, do a thorough preflight check. Make sure Maintenance has put the proper notations in the logbook i.e. gear pins removed, pitot static covers removed and Emergency Exit window bottle pins removed!

**Narrative: 2**

During before start flows we identified that the over-wing exit slides were not armed. We called Maintenance and they troubleshooting the problem. After multiple circuit breaker resets Maintenance appeared to open the exits and then the slides were armed and the exits doors reset. Maintenance documented the procedure in the AML and said that they "reset the system."

It's possible the aircraft flew several times without the over-wing exit slides being armed.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported that the over-wing doors were not armed and the aircraft had been flown for several days in this condition. The aircraft had recently come from storage and the escape slides had not been enabled for deployment by Maintenance.
ACN: 1746383

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZOB.ARTCC
State Reference: OH
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZOB
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class E: ZOB

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZOB
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class E: ZOB

Aircraft: 3
Reference: Z
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZOB
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan: VFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace.Class E: ZOB

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZOB.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 1
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746383
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
During a session, I had three aircraft inbound to BAX airport. Two were IFR and one VFR flight following. The two IFR aircraft flew instrument approaches to BAX. I forgot to ask all 3 aircraft if they had the weather and NOTAMs at BAX. I have been working 5 days on and 10 days off due to reduced staffing levels. Additionally, I have not had to give an aircraft an approach clearance in a long time. There were no BAX [NOTAMs] to issue aircraft, but I still did not confirm they had the weather for the airport.

I felt unsettled after the session, wondering if I may have missed something when providing approach control services to aircraft. I looked up the requirements in the 7110.65 after the fact. Thankfully, all aircraft were fine, but I failed to be prepared for the task at hand. Knowing my skills may have diminished due to long periods away from the job, I am more aware to anticipate situations that I may be lacking in knowledge. I will be aware of this and seek to refresh myself on procedures I may not normally see often before they occur.

Synopsis
ZOB Center Controller reported forgetting to ask 3 different aircraft if they had weather and NOTAMs for their landing airport.
ACN: 1746354

**Time / Day**

Date: 202006  
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**

Locale Reference: ATC Facility: SLC. Tower  
State Reference: UT  
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 5000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC  
Weather Elements / Visibility: Turbulence  
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10  
Light: Daylight  
Ceiling. Single Value: 20000

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
ATC / Advisory. Tower: SLC  
Aircraft Operator: Personal  
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer  
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91  
Flight Plan: None  
Mission: Personal  
Flight Phase: Initial Climb  
Airspace. Class E: ZLC

**Person**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Personal  
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying  
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot  
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified  
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine  
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument  
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Radar: 2  
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Non Radar: 4  
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 22  
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 366  
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1746354  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Human Factors: Time Pressure  
Human Factors: Workload  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew  
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types  
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence  
Detector. Person: Flight Crew  
When Detected: In-flight  
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification  
Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1

Upon the arrival leg into ZZZ the TRACON controller (very good), assisted us getting around the terribly laid out SLC Bravo airspace. The Controller informed us to contact the SLC Tower upon departure for a transition through the Bravo off ZZZ.

On departure, we contacted SLC ATCT. The Controller issued a beacon code. We did not receive a Bravo clearance however. We began to orbit. We experienced moderate turbulence, up/down drafts and high engine temps as we orbited and waited for clearance. It never came.

The Controller who was clearly working too many frequencies combined was issuing clearances to parked aircraft on Clearance Delivery. This is completely unacceptable. Either the priority of duties is incorrect at SLC Tower or this Controller needs a refresher as airborne aircraft shouldn't be in holding because you're playing catch up on CD.

After finishing a third orbit of getting my brain rattled by turbulence, I called on the frequency with just my tail number. The Controller, who'd clearly forgotten that he was also working airborne aircraft cleared me through the Bravo immediately.

The Tower needs to understand that there is very little reality in the small area where the Bravo doesn't start near ZZZ. This creates terrain alerts and terrible ride conditions, especially for lighter aircraft.

I understand that due to COVID-19 that Controllers are working more frequencies than usual. I get it. This can't happen though. The level of service shouldn't be sacrificed for anything and in this case, it clearly was. Please be better. Airlines not moving on the ground shouldn't have priority over general aviation in the air.

Synopsis
Pilot reported issues with the service provided by SLC Tower and cited Controller workload as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1746329

Time / Day
Date: 202006

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Phase: Parked
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Deferred: N
Maintenance Status.Records Complete: Y
Maintenance Status.Released For Service: Y
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Installation

Component
Aircraft Component: Nose Gear Door
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746329
Human Factors: Fatigue

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Maintenance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Maintenance Action
Result.Aircraft: Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
Installation of the RH Nose Landing Gear Door bumper on Aircraft X. After installing the bumper I went back to check that the bumper was secured to door stop. I moved the center control rod out several times checking the bumper security. After being informed on [date] that the aircraft had a returned flight due to the nose gear door problems, I am unsure at this time if the maintenance action I preformed was a factor in to the return to field event.

This incident happened during the COVID-19 crisis. After being off for several weeks on a normal sleep routine. We were asked to return to work on a limited and staggered work schedule. I was off work approximately 8 weeks prior. This situation caused me to be off work and on a normal sleep schedule and then returning to work for one day on a night shift schedule. I could tell that I was fatigued due to the abnormal interruption of my circadian rhythm. The task I was performing has very limited instructions in the maintenance manual. I recommend a specific task be written to install just the rubber bumper on the nose gear door stop. These rubber bumpers frequently fall off and it is a common occurrence to replace them. I also noticed that the door stop on the nose landing gear doors can cause the nose gear door to appear open and locked when in fact the over-center linkage of the door is not in its locked position. This could potentially cause a sequence issue during door operation. This situation can be easily missed.

**Synopsis**

Mechanic reported that after performing work on the nose gear door, the aircraft had nose gear problems in flight. Mechanic was concerned that fatigue due to changes in work schedule hours contributed to a possible error.
ACN: 1746320

Time / Day
Date : 202006
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Parked

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : General Seating Area
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1746320

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Illness
Detector.Person : Passenger
Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
When Detected : Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
ZZZ to ZZZ1 during boarding as Flight Attendant A was preparing cabin for departure. Passenger A seated in seat XXA (which was not her assigned seat) was informed by Passenger B in seat XXB that she wasn't feeling well. (Who should have been seated in seat XXA).

Passenger A asked FA A if she could be moved, felt uncomfortable sitting next to Passenger B. Passenger A was flying home to visit someone who had been in hospital and didn't want to take a chance by flying in to ZZZ seated next to the other passenger. FA A
informed FA B that a passenger was not feeling well and that the passenger seated next to her wanted to move. I moved Passenger A up one row where she should have been seated. And ask Passenger B why she wasn't feeling well finding out she had a sore throat and coughing and just felt bad. I ask if she thought she could fly or wanted medical assistance she said she thought she would be ok and wouldn't need any.

Per Medlink, guest was not approved to fly and was removed. Passenger count was correct and flight departed.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported a sick passenger boarded a flight, but was removed from the flight prior to departure.
ACN: 1746311

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746311

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Galley
Cabin Activity: Service
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746319
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Passenger in Seat XX I asked to put his seatbelt on and please put his mouth covering back on when doing compliance. When in the air the pilots took the seatbelt light off and made to PA. The passenger got up and went to the bathroom in the back of the plane FA-A went to check on first class and when I was up front the pilots called and asked if there was someone smoking in the bathroom. FA-B was on the phone and the passenger had just came out of the bathroom and FA-B ask if he was smoking and he said he was vaping. And there was not fire in the bathroom FA-B checked The bathroom thoroughly. FA-B is talked to the passenger. Pilots called and asked the FAs to tell the passengers to stay on the plane so the Captain can talk to him FA-B told the passengers and also to keep his mask on. Later the man sitting [in Seat XY] came to the back and told FAs that the passenger in XX was not wearing his mask so FA-B took one of the blue masks and gave it to him. The passenger in XX Remain seated when deplaning the captain went and spoke with him.

Recommend no vaping placards in the restrooms.

Narrative: 2

While in the air passenger in Seat XX went to the lavatory in the aft lavatory. While in the lavatory I was in the aft galley and heard the alarm go off. I was about to knock on the door when he stepped out of the lavatory where I stopped him. I asked him if he was smoking on the plane which he responded that he had, I had told him that it was a $XX,000 fine and a federal offense, I asked him if it was a vape and he replied that it was. When the Captain called and had asked what happened. I told him that the passenger had smoked/vaped and that he was being compliant and honest. The passenger went to his seat and I checked the bathroom to make sure there was no cigarette or anything in the trash and toilet. The bathroom didn't smell so I have reason to believe it was a vape. The Captain called again and told me that he wanted to speak to the passenger after the flight, so I went up to him to his seat and told him after the flight was done he needed to stay on board so the Captain could speak to him. I had to also remind him he needed to wear his mask while during flight. FA A had told him before he needed to wear his mask as well. During the flight after the situation a passenger came to me and FA A and told us that he wasn't wearing his mask so I got one of our masks and went up to him and politely asked that he wear his mask during the whole flight and if his kept falling down I will provide him with one and handed it to him. After all passengers deplaned he stayed on board and the CA talked to him.

Maybe in the lavatory have it say no smoking/vaping. And maybe add to safety card and the consequences of what could happen if you do.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight attendants reported that a passenger was vaping in the lavatory and was not wearing a personal protective mask during the flight.
Flight attendants experiencing fatigue from extended work hours and additional duties due to change in flight schedules and practices since the onset of COVID-19. On [date] at XA15 Zulu (Z) flight attendants reported for work. At XC15Z flight attendants worked first leg. At XH15Z flight attendants worked a second flight. While on the ground, flight attendants provided water services as well as any additional service requested by
passengers (beverages, coffee, snacks). At XK55Z flight attendants worked a third flight. During this flight, flight attendants confirmed with each other how such a long work day without breaks is causing them to have symptoms of fatigue. Flight attendants are currently unable to take breaks due to passengers staying onboard the aircraft on ground stops. Flight attendants are constantly going back and forth in the aisles serving various beverage requests throughout the ground time as there is no standard protocol for service on ground stops. This results in an increase of flight attendant time in the aisles during COVID-19. The flight to final destination arrived at XS20Z. Flight attendants worked over 18 hours and were given only one break at least 13 hours into their shift that was approximately 90 minutes long. Flight attendants confirmed the length of the day, along with the increased duties during ground stops, causes them to feel that toward the end of the shift they are not able to think clearly which could result in confusion or poor judgement if having to handle an emergency situation. Flight attendants agreed writing a report should be done to address our safety concerns over working such long shifts.

Flight attendants agreed providing a layover among one of the stops between the originating flight, and the last flight of the day, would decrease the work hours to a reasonable duty day. In this case, ZZZ might be a reasonable layover.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported experiencing fatigue from extended work hours and additional duties due to change in flight schedules in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
**ACN: 1746282**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746282
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Pre-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**
Arrived at ZZZ flight operations to find COVID-19 protocols being used and social distancing being encouraged. The same protocols are in place for boarding and riding the crew buses to our aircraft. We are also encouraged to wear masks in the presence of ramp and maintenance personnel when they board the aircraft. We even found a note saying the cockpit had been sanitized at some point. So, the COVID-19 safety protocol chain was intact until we reached the cockpit.

What we did not find however, were any alcohol-based wipes with which to clean our headsets or wipe down knobs, levers, seatbelts and other touch points in the cockpit. I know the cockpit was supposedly sanitized, but I am not sure that every touch point, especially the headset microphones, would be adequately cleaned by the cleaning crew. The only wipes on board the aircraft were Sanicoms and M-Zone Screen Wipes. Both of these wipes have been shown to be ineffective against the COVID-19 virus. My question and concern is why weren't there any Purell Hand Sanitizing Alcohol wipes, or something comparable on board our aircraft? When I called the Flight Safety Department to inquire about this issue, I was encourage to go ahead and submit a report to highlight this safety shortcoming.

Inadequate sanitary supplies effective against the COVID-19 virus on board the aircraft to wipe the touch point surfaces on the aircraft.
Replace the ineffective Sanicom wipes that are part of the cleaning crew's supplies with an adequate supply of Purell or other alcohol-based wipes that are effective against COVID-19.

**Synopsis**
Air carrier Captain reported having inadequate cleaning supplies to sanitize their cockpit equipment.
**ACN: 1746254**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Corporate
- Make Model Name: Medium Transport
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Corporate
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746254
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

Departing ZZZ and assigned the ZZZZZX departure. The departure was thoroughly briefed before flight. All waypoints checked. We went as far as setting up the engine out procedure in the secondary flight plan. After takeoff the PF began the departure. The aircraft was cleaned up, accelerated, and hand-flown. A busy time immediately after departure. Within one minute after departure and after completing the after takeoff checklist I looked at my primary display and noticed our flight path was roughly one mile west and one mile south of the left-hand initial curve of the ZZZZZ Departure. It was visual conditions and I believe the PF got distracted by maintaining visual with the terrain outside during the initial steep climbout and not focusing closely enough on the departure course line. I did not catch the deviation initially with the workload and all happening within a couple minutes. There was never any issue with terrain or traffic. ATC stated after this initial departure climb that we were off our course, and I acknowledged this.

Both myself the PNF, and the PF have flown very little in the last 3 months. I believe for the PF that this was his first leg in a few months. For myself, I've had 3 legs in the last 3.5 months. There is something to be said for a small lack of proficiency that this created, and not catching the error with a faster scan or recognition. Another factor was the PF wanting to get the feel of the plane again and to wanting to hand-fly a busy DP in mountainous terrain.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported a track heading deviation and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1746189

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 16
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Vectors
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1512
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 16
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 300
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746189
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party 1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party 2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was flying the following route under IFR: ZZZ [route] ZZZ1. I requested RNAV XX and after ZZZZ was instructed to fly heading 070 and later "Direct ZZZZZ" (intermediate fix). Another aircraft with similar callsign responded to the instruction "fly a 360" mistaking the instruction for them. The Approach Controller, who was extremely busy, repeated the instruction to me and due to the urgency in Controller's voice I also mistook the command also as a "360" (assuming imminent traffic conflict). Once the miscommunication issue was resolved I changed the autopilot mode from Heading to GPSS mode on the PFD. The approach was loaded but not activated and started to sequence to the next waypoint, ZZZ3. While I was troubleshooting I disabled the autopilot to roll the wings level and while selecting ZZZZZ Direct due to task saturation an altitude deviation occurred and the Approach Controller terminated the approach. Once composed I was instructed Direct ZZZZZ once more and cleared for the approach which was executed without further issue.

Contributing Factors: This was the first instrument approach conducted using new avionic equipment, which was installed a few days prior to this flight. I had familiarized myself with the unit on the ground and with the vendor's simulator app and pilot manual, but not in combination with the PFD and autopilot. I was not sufficiently familiar with the new unit. Flying practice approaches with an instructor would have been appropriate. While I have received recent instruction with an instructor (prior to equipment upgrade however) this activity is contrary to the CDC social distancing requirements and I have been limiting my training while the pandemic is ongoing as a consequence. In consideration to the above it would have been appropriate to conduct several practice approaches VFR on a less busy day to properly familiarize myself with the unit. The deviation would likely have been avoided had I configured the unit to fly direct ZZZZZ prior to changing autopilot mode from Heading to GPSS. Disabling the autopilot exacerbated task saturation. The Approach Controller was a little difficult to understand due to the intensity of communication and workload. ZZZZZ is phonetically similar to "Three Sixty". The ZZZZZ waypoint is located in City X north east practice area. Student pilots and non-instrument rated pilots using flight following mistaking the instruction and mistakenly responding to a call made to another aircraft may negatively impact Approach Controller workload.

Synopsis
Pilot reported a track heading deviation when executing a 360 turn resulting from confusing a fix name which sounds like the number 360.
ACN: 1746167

**Time / Day**

- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**

- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position: Distance: Nautical Miles: 5

**Environment**

- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling: Single Value: 35000

**Aircraft**

- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Airspace: Class D: ZZZ

**Person**

- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 5900
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 25
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 1040
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1746167
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Distraction
Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : CFTT / CFIT
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

The Captain was making his visual approach to the runway, which ATC assigned as the one coming over mountainous terrain. The Captain asked for flaps and gear early to aid the descent and slow our ground-speed. All but flaps 45 had been input. I noted the radar altimeter was 1,500 or 1,600 feet, at which time I notified the Captain we needed to get flaps 45 in before 1,000 HAT. He made the standard callout shortly thereafter, as I once again inquired whether we were okay to do so. He said we were. As we arrived at short final the glideslope alert sounded, followed by a brief "pull up" alert. The Captain flared and landed, to my memory, between the 1,000 and 1,500 foot markers. We stopped well short of the end of the runway, taxied clear, and proceeded to the gate.

Ultimately, I am uncertain on two fronts: 1) whether I input flaps 45 too late; and, 2) the significance of the "pull up" call given I remember getting it once in the sim and was told, as I recall, it happens at some airports.

This was my first time into this airport. The Captain has been there numerous times and was very familiar. Additionally, this was my first flight leg after almost three months of being off. Despite my studying to refresh myself prior to reengaging flight duties, I noted some rustiness was present. While the approach seemed high, I noted I was deferring quite substantially to the Captain's judgment with the surrounding terrain given his ongoing familiarity of the mountains and issues common to this airport. That combined with my regaining of my flight deck duty pace, my awareness and confidence being back in the airplane were surely suffering. Additionally, the runway had a significantly displaced threshold, adding to what I'm surmising might be some perception issues given the captain landed the aircraft near the thousand foot markers.

As I've had time the rest of today to contemplate the events, I've realized one bad habit I've made during my time in this job. When I noted the radar altimeter and thought we were too late for flaps 45 and the Captain remarked we were not late, I never actually noted our barometric altitude. And we were descending overhead mountainous terrain as I recall. So, the RA may very well have been misleading me and ultimately unnecessarily adding to my confusion and lack of confidence. Moving forward, I want to teach myself to have a barometric altitude number in mind prior to arrivals and not hone in on the RA to feed my awareness of the 1,000 HAT flaps in, stabilized threshold. For instance, at a given airport 1,800 feet MSL might be the 1,000 HAT number to be watching for on the barometric altimeter. Yet, if approaching over terrain, the barometric altimeter may be reading 2,500 feet MSL while the radar altimeter could be reading 1,000 feet. That was a big lesson learned for me today. Then, I do also wish I would have suggested to the
Captain to take the reverse runway given the light winds. I'm still at a loss as to why ATC assigned a terrain-tight runway when winds favored the runway with greater terrain separation.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported a CFTT incident citing unfamiliarity with the airport and issues relating to the surrounding terrain.
**Time / Day**

Date: 202006  
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference: US  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC  
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10  
Light: Daylight  
Ceiling.Single Value: 12000

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
CTAF: ZZZ  
Operator: Personal  
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91  
Flight Plan: None  
Mission: Personal  
Flight Phase: Taxi  
Route In Use: Direct

**Person**

Reference: 1  
Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Personal  
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying  
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot  
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private  
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument  
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1449  
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 3  
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 646  
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1746158  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness  
Human Factors: Training / Qualification  
Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Conflict, Less Severe  
Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Runway  
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This incident occurred while taxiing clear of the runway after landing at ZZZ. I was returning direct from ZZZ1 - a short flight - where I had briefly stopped while returning from a flight earlier in the day to ZZZ2 my first flying destination since the start of the COVID-19 related remaining-at-home.

As I approached ZZZ, I was speaking with Approach. The Tower at ZZZ was closed, due to shortened hours instituted during the pandemic, so that the airspace was Class E instead of the usual (towered) Class C; the Tower had closed for the day at XX00 local. (I landed just before XA00 local.) After receiving the automated weather at ZZZ, I informed ATC that I was proceeding on an extended right base to and landing on Runway XX, which based on the automated weather was appropriate. I then switched to the CTAF - the usual Tower frequency and now the CTAF - and self-announced my intentions.

I landed uneventfully on Runway XX, and as the aircraft slowed I reported on the CTAF that I would be leaving runway XX at Bravo Taxiway. I made the left turn onto Bravo and, after reporting on the CTAF that I was clear of Runway XX at Bravo and proceeding down Bravo taxiway, I continued ahead. Due to the pandemic and greatly reduced flying by GA pilots, there seemed to be very few aircraft moving on the ground or inbound to the ZZZ airport.

However, without realizing it, I had inadvertently turned off Runway XX not onto Bravo Taxiway, but onto Runway XYR, on which there were no other airplanes. Then, as I proceeded down what I thought to be Bravo Taxiway (but was actually Runway XYR), I observed a high-wing single-engine aircraft slowly enter the far end of the asphalt - i.e. the approach end of Runway YXL. I assumed that this aircraft was going to taxi along Bravo Taxiway (the pavement that I was on) in the opposite direction, and I moved over to the left side of the pavement to allow that aircraft plenty of room to pass by my moving aircraft on the right. I then observed that high-wing aircraft execute a slow 180 degree turn and taxi back off of the "taxiway" along which I was moving. It was not until I reached very close to that far end of the pavement - where I had expected to join Taxiway Sierra - that I realized that I was on Runway XYR and NOT on Taxiway Bravo. At the same time, the high-wing aircraft contacted me on the CTAF to inquire my intentions, and I explained that I thought I had turned onto Bravo Taxiway from Runway XX, apologized for my error and departed the runway via a right turn onto Bravo (at Bravo-4) and then a left turn onto Taxiway Sierra.

I believe that my error can be attributed to a combination of several factors.

First, although XXX is my "home" airport, my lack of flight time during the previous 3 months had a greater than expected impact on my flying readiness, a "dulling" effect on my aviation abilities; I was clearly not as "sharp" as I generally expect and require of
myself. To make such a "rookie" error of landing and then turning off the runway at the wrong intersection is inexcusable and unbelievably dangerous, and is something as to which I normally play *extremely* close attention; I know that runway incursions of any sort are dangerous, unacceptable and to be constantly guarded against.

Second, this is the first time, in the X years that I have been based at ZZZ, that the Tower has been closed when I was flying there. When I fly into (or out of) untowered fields, I make it my business to exhibit a focused, intentional effort to be on greatly heightened alert, both in the air and, apropos here, particularly on the ground, to correctly identify all taxiways, runways, and movement and non-movement areas, as well as all other aircraft in motion on the field. I believe that complacency arising from my close familiarity with ZZZ caused me to "relax" the degree of heightened attention that this situation - the lack of an operating Tower and Ground Control - demanded.

Third, in going over and over in my mind how I could possibly have turned onto Runway XYR instead of onto Bravo Taxiway in leaving Runway XX, I realize that an important causative factor resulted from a violation of one of my cardinal "rules" during the landing rollout, when I had a brief verbal exchange with my wife, who was riding in the right seat, just after we landed. I recognize a sterile cockpit during and after landing to be an essential safety measure, of which my wife (as my frequent flying companion) is quite aware. At ZZZ, the turnoffs after landing on Runway XX are, first, Runway XYL, then Runway XYR, then Taxiway Bravo, all in relatively quick succession. The Taxiway Bravo turnoff is perhaps only about 15 feet or so beyond Runway XYR. In retrospect, I recall that I self-announced on the CTAF that I would be exiting Runway XX at Bravo Taxiway as I was rolling out/slowing down between the intersections with Runways XYL and XYR, and then - likely somewhat distracted by the brief verbal exchange with my wife, and as I had sufficiently slowed by that point - I simply made the next turnoff, which put me not on Bravo Taxiway but onto Runway XYR. Despite my longstanding familiarity with ZZZ airport, its taxiways and runways, I failed to pay the proper attention and exercise sufficient care to confirm that I was turning off the runway at the intersection that I had intended.

Finally, as I turned onto and proceeded down Runway XYL (which I mistakenly thought to be Bravo Taxiway) I failed to notice the markings and signage that *should* have told me that I was not where I thought that I was. Again, I was engaged in conversation with my wife, and was quite clearly not paying the proper degree of attention to my surroundings as I taxied on an airport with which I complacently viewed myself as having sufficient familiarity to allow myself to "relax" my attention. My obvious lack of sufficient attention to the markings and signage, by reason of my longstanding familiarity with the airport, would (and should) have alerted me at multiple points that I was *not* on Bravo Taxiway but, instead, on a runway.

This error could have been easily avoided by just doing the things that I always try to do - and that I know I should do - each and every time that I fly. First, I allowed there to be a "conversation," albeit brief, with my wife during the landing and taxiing phases of the flight; there is simply no excuse for not maintaining a sterile cockpit from the time that the approach for landing begins until the aircraft is completely stopped. Second, I must continue to maintain heightened situational awareness on the ground while the aircraft is in motion - e.g. during landing, exiting the runway, and subsequent taxi operations - and, just as importantly, before restarting any movement on the ground after being stopped (e.g. after clearing the runway and stopping to retract flaps, etc.) Third, even when I am certain that I am in the right place, proceeding in the correct direction, on the correct surface area, I should constantly be questioning where I am and rechecking and
reconfirming where I am and where (and how) I'm headed and intending to proceed. Fourth, I must better recognize when I do not feel as "sharp" and confident as I normally do, and require, when flying and use that recognition to "turn up" still further my attention and alertness and thereby seek to compensate for any such difficulties that I'm experiencing. This goes doubly when operating in a non-towered environment. Extra care and attention in these situations is *always* required, but even more so when, for example, my flight and observational skills may have been "dulled" by a reduction or lack of recent flight time. It is my intention to never again allow complacency with my surroundings, e.g. at my "home" airport, to serve as or justify a short-cut or lack of focused attention that reduces my situational awareness and attentiveness to everything going on around me.

This experience has truly scared and shaken me. I was extremely lucky, and can only think about what might have happened had I not been so fortunate. My complacency based on close familiarity with my "home" airport could have proven deadly. I hope to *never* have such an experience again, and I intend to do everything that I can to prevent a re-occurrence. This is a lesson that I shall never forget.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported experiencing a runway incursion after landing.
I want to bring a safety issue regarding flight attendants wearing face masks while on board aircraft. One of our critical duties is to be on guard for the smell of smoke. Today on our flight I realized that the mask hinders my ability to pick up the minute traces of smoke. Shortly after I had this realization I did smell smoke very powerfully, I took down my mask to have a better idea of what the smell really was. This occurred shortly after takeoff, so I was hesitant to call my Lead, but decided it was strong enough I should. When I picked up the phone the FA in the back of the aircraft was already describing the issue, the Lead and the Captain were on the line listening.

The Captain speculated we had just pulled in the smoke from outside and we were told to stay vigilant. At this point I did not resume wearing my mask until I was confident the
smoke had subsided.

I feel wearing the masks at any time while on the aircraft hinders me from performing my duties to the best of my abilities thus putting the entire aircraft and everyone on it, including myself, lives at risk and exposes us to greater liability.

I am formally requesting we rethink and hopefully revoke the suggestion any flight attendant impair their abilities by wearing a face mask while on board an aircraft.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported wearing a COVID-19 mask hindered her ability to smell smoke in the cabin.
ACN: 1746089

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 10000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Indicating and Warning - APU
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1746089
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1746090
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
This was my first time flying the airplane in 75 days. I did have sim 30 days ago. The FO hadn't flown in a couple weeks I believe. The airplane was full to capacity of XX pax. There was an issue with being able to take everyone before we left. Also there was a maintenance issue that was signed off but needed clarifying. Overall it was a smooth on time departure. During climb out above 10,000 we were discussing COVID and the new procedures. The APU altitude exceed message came up. We ran the QRH it went away and continued the rest of the flight without incident.

Narrative: 2
Climbing through FL330 we got a caution chime and EICAS message. APU ceiling exceeded. We followed the QRH instructions and shut down the APU with no further incidences.
I cannot recall what distracted me during engine start, but I did not complete my after start flow. In addition I did not notice that the APU was still running when I completed the after takeoff checklist. I should always believe that something is wrong when my flow is interrupted and should repeat the checklist when this happens. That will be my behavior in the future.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported forgetting to turn off APU and later exceeding the APU ceiling.
**ACN: 1746006**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 7000

**Aircraft: 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Aircraft: 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Other
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function.Air Traffic Control: Departure
- Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 7
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746006
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was working Radar combined to the Tower. We are on COVID-19 schedules with reduced staffing. It was a VFR day and traffic was building. We had just made the decision to open radar off to the TRACON on the hour. Complexity was definitely increased due to working moderate to busy traffic in the Tower. Aircraft Y was an IFR practice approach, climbing off ZZZ. Aircraft X was a ZZZ airport departure level flying eastbound. Aircraft Y wasn't able to be handed off to ZZZ approach due to his round robin flight plan. I was assisting the Tower Controller with 6-7-10 work and other tricks to get a handoff accomplished on Aircraft Y. Aircraft X asked if he had traffic, when I noticed Aircraft Y and Aircraft X converging. I turned Aircraft X to a 360 heading and descended Aircraft Y, but I think I lost separation. I didn't notice the converging traffic on the aircraft I was actual busy with trying to accomplish a handoff with. Aircraft X coming faster from the west didn't stick out to me as traffic heading northeast bound. Honestly I also forgot that I had climbed Aircraft Y to 7,000, I thought I had stopped him at 5,000. That doesn't make up for missing the traffic and altitude in my scan.

Traffic picked up faster than expected and we probably should have split radar earlier. I should not have let myself get distracted with automation issues and should have stayed focused on the traffic. Also due to COVID-19 traffic has been much reduced, and honestly I got behind in ramping up with traffic that used to be normal but is now busy in the current situation.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation event and made reference to COVID-19 staffing levels as a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1746005**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ZLA.ARTCC
- State Reference: CA
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 8500

**Aircraft: 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZLA
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace.Class E: ZLA

**Aircraft: 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZLA
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class E: ZLA

**Aircraft: 3**
- Reference: Z
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZLA
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Airspace.Class E: ZLA

**Aircraft: 4**
- Reference: A
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZLA
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Airspace.Class E: ZLA

**Aircraft: 5**
Reference : B
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZLA
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace. Class A : ZLA

**Aircraft : 6**

Reference : C
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZLA
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace. Class A : ZLA

**Person**

Reference : 1
Location Of Person. Facility : ZLA.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function. Air Traffic Control : Departure
Function. Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification. Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 12
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number : 1746005
Human Factors : Workload

**Events**

Anomaly. ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly. Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector. Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result. Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result. Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Staffing
Narrative: 1

We had the area combined into two sectors, although we had the staffing to have three open. I had Sectors 09, 10, 12, and 31 combined, which was a normal configuration pre-midshift before COVID, and a normal combination on a daily basis during COVID schedules. This combination tends to get pretty busy, with VFR's, military traffic, plus the IFR's, but I've been working it a lot these last few months, so I'm pretty used to it by now. We also had an FLM present in the area, sitting at the Supervisor's desk doing something on the computer.

I started getting busy with aircraft after aircraft calling to pick up flight following and/or a pre-filed IFR clearance off an airport (IPL) for which we provide approach control services. First, Aircraft X called airborne off IPL, looking for his IFR clearance. I gave him his code to squawk and told him to standby and maintain VFR. Went to make sure I was caught up on all the other aircraft. Then Aircraft Z called requesting VFR flight following. I eventually got back to him after finishing up shipping other aircraft, issuing other necessary clearances, etc. Gave him his code and told him to maintain VFR and standby. Then Aircraft Y called airborne off IPL also looking for his IFR clearance. I gave him his code to squawk and told him to maintain VFR, it would be a minute, that I couldn't seem to catch up.

At this point I had 15 aircraft on two frequencies. Aircraft X was a small aircraft and Aircraft Y was a slightly bigger/faster aircraft, and I recognized that the Aircraft Y may overtake Aircraft X and they were close, enough so that I didn't want to give the front Aircraft X his IFR clearance yet, especially when I was so busy and couldn't watch the two closely. I did tell Aircraft Y that restricted area was cold, and that if he could maintain VFR and start heading toward JLI [VOR], that I would be able to give him his IFR clearance eventually direct JLI [VOR], but this would help speed it up (Because it provided separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y). During this time Aircraft A was also calling me for an IFR clearance, off an airport right near IPL. I told him I was too busy and to standby. I also was trying to coordinate the activation of a MOA with adjacent sectors/facilities. The other Controller in the area noticed I was busy and asked if he could help with the MOA coordination.

I gave Aircraft Y his IFR clearance direct JLI [VOR] then as filed, maintain 10,000. I had 4 data blocks (Aircraft Y, Aircraft B, Aircraft C, Aircraft X) within a 5.5NM area, working on a range where I'm watching more than 200 miles of airspace. I gave Aircraft X his IFR clearance, turning him to a heading of 285, in preparation for the required LOA handoff to the Approach Control, climbing to 100. I'm not sure why I didn't see Aircraft Y leaving 077 for 100 when I gave Aircraft X his turn (from about a 255 heading) to H285 and clearance leaving 081 for 100, other than I was getting frazzled from being so busy and not being able to catch up, and having the 4 data blocks right close to one another. Conflict alert went off and as soon as I saw it, I turned Aircraft Y to a H315 and Aircraft X to a H255.

I want to be very clear that I didn't directly ask the FLM for help, and I know I have a responsibility to do so. But I suspect that if close attention was being paid to what was going on in the area (there were two controllers in the area with two sectors open - there was nothing else happening that would have been drawing their attention away). I said multiple times out loud on frequency that I was busy, that I couldn't catch up, etc, which drew the other Controller in the area's attention to my workload, but the FLM never came over to see if I needed help or to act as an extra set of eyes to get me through this period. I believe if the FLM had noticed and either came over to at least watch over my shoulder as an extra set of eyes, this might have been prevented. It was too late to call another...
Controller back, I was too busy to separate the sectors. Or...they should have just had three sectors open since my sector(s) were busy and we had the staffing to do so.

**Synopsis**

ZLA Center Controller reported losing separation due to traffic volume, watching too large of an area and the COVID-19 configuration.
<table>
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<td>Date: 202006</td>
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<td>Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800</td>
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<td>Locale Reference: ATC Facility: SLC.Tower</td>
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<td>State Reference: UT</td>
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<td>Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 200</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weather Elements / Visibility: Windshear</td>
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<td>Light: Dusk</td>
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<td>Reference: X</td>
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<td>ATC / Advisory.Tower: SLC</td>
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<td>Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier</td>
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<td>Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing</td>
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<td>Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2</td>
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<td>Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121</td>
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<td>Flight Plan: IFR</td>
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<td>Flight Phase: Landing</td>
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<td>Location Of Person.Facility: SLC.Tower</td>
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<td>Reporter Organization: Government</td>
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<td>Function.Air Traffic Control: Flight Data / Clearance Delivery</td>
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<td>Function.Air Traffic Control: Local</td>
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<td>Function.Air Traffic Control: Ground</td>
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<td>Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified</td>
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<td>Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 9</td>
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<td>ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1746003</td>
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<td>Human Factors: Confusion</td>
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<td>Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence</td>
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<td>Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>When Detected: In-flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather  
Primary Problem: Weather

**Narrative: 1**

Aircraft X went around short final due to wind shear two times. Both were from the weather and created a potentially dangerous situation with the departure traffic at the time. At the time, I was combined with LCW/GCW/GCE/CD. There were several aircraft calling in on different frequencies and I was scanning both sides of the airport to verify compliance. On the east side, there is construction that is making every aircraft taxing a complex situation. When the aircraft went around the first time, I was talking to an east side aircraft so I was totally distracted. The facility had a runway incursion just last week over there so it is a point of focus and cannot be ignored. Even with busy traffic at the time.

Regional management has dictated how we are to divide the positions very specifically with the reduced staffing. The problem is that the CIC cannot adjust to the real time situations because we are being told specifically how to split positions from individuals outside the facility that don't understand our traffic. There has been zero input from the people actually working the positions on this. In this case, all the locals should have been combined and ground and clearance should have been combined. We should not have to be dealing with go-arounds on one side of the cab and complex taxiway/runway configurations on the other. Their knee-jerk reactions have created an unsafe environment because we can't work the traffic in a safe manner. Every Controller and Supervisor I have talked to has said this is not safe. We are all willing to have a conversation on how to improve workload in the Tower. But there has been no conversation. Just dictates from a bureaucracy that doesn't understand our operation. Collaboration is not telling us your decision after it has already been made.

**Synopsis**

SLC Tower Controller reported an aircraft went around twice due to windshear and also reported that the way the Tower cab positions are split up are not flexible and not safe.
**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZME.ARTCC
- State Reference: TN
- Altitude, MSL, Single Value: 28700

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory Center: ZME
- Make Model Name: Medium Transport
- Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace, Class A: ZME

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Function, Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification, Flight Crew: Flight Engineer
- Experience, Flight Crew, Total: 14600
- Experience, Flight Crew, Last 90 Days: 80
- Experience, Flight Crew, Type: 230
- ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1745982
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown, Party 1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown, Party 2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly, ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly, Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
- Anomaly, Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector, Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I had filed a flight plan for FL280. During the climb, a [ZME] Center Controller issued us a clearance to climb and maintain FL300. My FO responded accordingly. We were then handed off to the next sector, so we checked in. As we were climbing through FL287, then Controller said he thought we had filed for FL280, but was it our intention to climb to FL300? My FO responded that FL300 would be fine. So the Controller cleared us to continue climb to FL300. I don't believe we were ever anywhere close to other aircraft, so no conflicts ever arose. I'm not sure why the previous Controller cleared us to FL300 instead of our filed FL280, but it was fine for us so we just accepted it. I'm also not sure why the next sector Controller did not know that we had been cleared to FL300, but I think when we checked in we gave him our current altitude and that we were climbing to FL300, as that is our normal procedure in hind sight, I should have had the FO question the first clearance to FL300 to be sure that's what ATC wanted: perhaps that Controller gave us an altitude he was intending for someone else? At least it would have clarified things 100%. As I mentioned before, there were never any traffic conflicts or safety issues, but the potential was there. So when we were issued an altitude higher than what we had filed for, we should have questioned it: just to make sure everyone was on the same page. I have noticed in the last couple months, that Controllers seem to be working multiple sectors and are off-line more frequently than was common in the past. Checking in when changing sectors and trying to obtain IFR clearances at rural airports is slower and more cumbersome these days. I suspect this is due to reduced staffing at various facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic. This reduced staffing does increase the potential for reduced safety of flight, in my opinion.

Synopsis

Captain reported ATC issued a climb 2,000 feet above the filed altitude, crew took the altitude and did not question ATC. Another Center Sector Controller eventually asked crew why they were going to newly assigned altitude instead of filed altitude.
**ACN: 1745951**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 8500

**Environment**
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Ceiling: Single Value: 4500

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace: Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Private
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 265
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 25
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 15
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1745951
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly: Airspace Violation: All Types
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: Flight Crew: Exited Penetrated Airspace

**Assessments**
Narrative: 1

I planned a long cross country flight from State Y to State Z with the intention of flying just east of restricted airspace R-XXXX, near City X, State X, then toward the ZZZ VOR, near City Y, before turning north to fly west of ZZZ1. Cloud cover was forming low near City Z, so I climbed to 8,500 for smooth air and very clear flying. Unfortunately, I began to track to the ZZZ VOR too early and overflew the northwest corner of the restricted airspace. I should have paid closer attention to my GPS to ensure I was well clear to the east of the restricted area before tracking the VOR. Another contributing factor was slightly changing my route during the flight since I knew I wouldn't see ZZZ2 due to the clouds below. I truly didn't realize I had made this mistake until I landed in State Y and was directed to call ZZZ Control. Another contributing factor, and a mistake I will not make again, was my reluctance to call for flight following due to perceived reduced personnel at ATC facilities due to the COVID crisis.

Synopsis

Pilot reported flying into a restricted area and attributed it to weather and not receiving ATC flight following.
I am writing to object to the narrow forbearance provided to instrument pilots under the SFAR. By limiting the modifications of recent flight experience the way that you have, a significant group of IFR pilots are being denied the ability to exercise instrument privileges unless they are willing to fly with a qualified safety pilot or an instructor, any of whom could be carriers of the virus or an unintentional victim of an infected pilot.

I do not meet the present requirements for: flight hours accrued in the last 12 months, or number of instrument approaches in the last 3 months, nor do I qualify under the various types of flights the SFAR is restricted to. However, last year, I passed an IPC, a BFR, and was signed off for both a high performance endorsement and complex endorsement. Since that time I have accrued over 30 hours of solo flight time in the airplane, and flown probably 15 or more instrument approaches under VFR conditions. I feel competent to fly the airplane in instrument conditions.

The limitations imposed by the SFAR in this respect, while well intended, seem to essentially negate any significant applicability to the population of instrument pilots. More consideration needs to be given to other indexes of competency, with involvement perhaps of the Instructing community to use their judgment of pilot competency in providing a subjective element to the requirements.
Synopsis

Pilot reported concerns with the limitations imposed by the SFAR concerning the ability to exercise instrument privileges.
ACN: 1745872

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 7000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 12000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Medium Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Route In Use: Direct
Route In Use: Vectors

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 14000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 15
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 30
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745872
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were enroute to ZZZ on an IFR flight plan. I was the safety pilot on this flight. We were cleared to climb to 7,000 feet. As we approached the target altitude, our rate of climb was excessive, approximately 1,000 feet per minute. I called out a warning at 500 feet to go, 300 feet, 100 feet. I told the pilot flying our rate of closure was excessive at 300 feet to go. Pilot flying flew through our target altitude. I called out 100 feet high, 200 feet high, you're going to bust 300 feet. Pilot flying lowered the nose and descended to our assigned altitude.

I often fly with the pilot flying and had not seen this action before. The pilot flying asked me to fly with him. Due to the COVID situation, pilot flying had not flown for a while and wanted to brush up his skills. We flew 6 approaches, airway intercepts and holds.

Synopsis
Pilot reported an altitude deviation due to excessive climb rate.
ACN: 1745854

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked
Maintenance Status.Required / Correct Doc On Board: Y

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Other Documentation

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745854
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Maintenance
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

Aircraft were assigned to the crew. Work card XX-XX-XX was used for the type X Aircraft while performing the work two discrepancies were noted: Step X, verify battery switch on. No reason given or instructions to turn it off. The next was Item Y, instructed us to make sure no ECAM messages. The type X Aircraft does not have an ECAM system. Both items have been fixed with the revision to the work card.

Type Y Aircraft work card XX-XX-YY was assigned and while working this card it was noted in step Y you N/A the step if the airplane is parked less than XX days no action required for the water disinfectant. However step Z 1 tells us to reset circuit breakers with only one block to stamp. This causes a conflict between both actions if one was done and the other not. Step A, instructs us to make sure there is no ECAM messages. The type Y Aircraft does not have an ECAM system. With these minor errors the blocks were stamped off. The type Y Aircraft work card has not been corrected.

The reason the mechanics find it necessary to continue working after finding these minor errors is they're afraid to stop production of the aircraft. They will be labeled trouble makers and now more than ever their afraid to cause problems to give the company a reason to fire them. As to reduce manpower. The root cause is the inability of the company to publish a work card that can be used by the Mechanic without having to ensure others have done their job correctly. This problem is not new, we continue to encounter sloppy card production.

Develop a system when a problem is found or when there is a need for clarification it can be addressed right away without local management involvement. I found this to be the case for me yesterday and it led to a heated argument and I was told to do as your told. What a way to bring closure to an issue.

**Synopsis**

Technician reported work card discrepancies for two different types of aircraft and being pressured to continue working after finding these errors.
ACN: 1745850

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked
Maintenance Status.Records Complete: N

Component
Aircraft Component: Pitot-Static System
Aircraft Reference: X

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745850
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Maintenance
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected.Other
Result.General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
I was told that my manager needed to see me. My supervisor told me I missed extra verbiage, I needed to add "Installed Pitot and Static Port were covered" placards to the log page and Maintenance XXX-XX-00 was not enough and showed me where the sign off on
the Maintenance task was with. I thought "referencing the Maintenance XXX-XX-00 was enough to cover the procedure on the Log page. Then he told me to go install the placards on the Capt's yoke because of the audit.

Installed the 2 placards on the yoke.

My manager had my fact finding and told me the same infraction. I may have been a little distracted trying to figure out how to get all the tags to fit on the circuit breakers for the Pitot and Static port heat. They were too close together to fit all the tags. I must of thought I installed them on the yoke after tagging the circuit breaker for the Pitot and Static Heat.

I didn't mention it in the Fact Finding. The announcement of possible involuntary layoffs may happen. That has been weighing in the back of my mind. I would be embarrassed if I mentioned that, I know professionally [I'm] not supposed to let that cloud my judgement while doing the job.

**Synopsis**

Technician reported being distracted by possible lay-offs and did not complete a work order correctly.
**ACN: 1745712**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: A80.TRACON
- State Reference: GA

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.CTAF: PDK
- Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
- Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Airspace. Class D: PDK
- Airspace. Class E: A80

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function. Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1745712
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- Anomaly. Conflict: Ground Conflict, Less Severe
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector. Person: Flight Crew
- Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result. Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

**Assessments**
Narrative: 1

Landing PDK, VASI and PAPIs were all NOTAMed out. Wind favored 3R but we didn't have an approach and it was night with no verticals guidance so we requested ILS 22L with a 2kt tailwind. The Tower was closed and numerous small aircraft were in the pattern for 3L and 3R. On short final at 500 feet an aircraft called base for 3L. There were no Runway lights on 3L, so we confirmed he was on that runway. We weren't comfortable landing head on with an aircraft we couldn't see landing on a runway with no lights and thought he may be on the wrong runway. We went around and got vectored for another approach. Approach said we were in a Bee Hive trying to land against traffic. A plane on the ground held for us and we were able to get in on our 3rd attempt. In our 2nd attempt we never descended for the runway and boxed back to the east for a successful third attempt. PDK should be restricted after the Tower closes and the winds favors Runway 3R with the VASI INOP and numerous planes landing and doing touch and goes on an unlit runway.

We should restrict operations into PDK when the Tower is closed and we can’t land with the flow of traffic. The Tower closed at XA:00 pm local on our arrival day. Since we couldn’t land on Runway 3R without Vertical Guidance at night with no approach being available and the VASI NOTAMed out, we couldn’t land with the flow of traffic since the winds (310 @ 8 kts) were favoring 3R/L. Since the winds were light we requested vectors for the ILS 21L and took a 2 kt tailwind. The unnerving part was there were numerous aircraft in the traffic pattern landing on an unlit Runway (3L). We inquired about this on CTAF, but had questions if the aircraft knew which runway they were on and we didn’t want to fly head on into traffic we couldn’t see making call outs to an unlit runway we couldn’t even determine was available to use or being used. And the distraction of planes in the pattern trying to tell us what to do (how to work pilot the control lighting and the traffic pattern direction when we asked if the small Runway 3L was lit) and for us to try to explain to them why we couldn’t land 3R isn’t good at XY hours of duty, at night, when we were trying to talk on two different frequencies to coordinate (Approach & CTAF) and shooting an approach. A80 Approach also told us to be cautious landing the opposite direction and that we were in a "bee hive." This also put a lot of extra work on them. It’s unsafe and we were going to divert if there were any additional issues on our 3rd attempt, but another jet on the ground was keeping the runway clear for us and we descended to land. We also had to taxi across this unlit runway with aircraft landing on it and using very little lighting and only having Nav/Beacon lights illuminated. With towers operating at reduced hours during COVID, this could cause an issue at other airports as well.

Synopsis

Pilot reported attempting to land at an airport with a closed Control Tower and other aircraft landing on an unlit runway at night.
**ACN: 1745709**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: PIE.Airport
- State Reference: FL
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 12600

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: Marginal
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Thunderstorm

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: TPA
- Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Airspace.Class E: TPA

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745709
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
I was assigned SIC and performing PF duties. During Preflight activities I took care of customer service, greeted passengers, brought them to plane etc. The PIC was performing PNF duties, obtaining ATC Clearance and cockpit set up. After ensuring passengers were taken care of, I then went to the flight deck and sat down fastened my safety belt in the left seat. The PIC had already obtained the departure clearance and set up the cockpit for departure to include the flight instruments with an initial assigned altitude of 16,000 feet. I was not present on the flight deck when clearance was received, read back to ATC, and confirmation of correct read back from ATC. The PIC briefed the flight plan, we reviewed the FMS, and I was briefed 16,000 feet as our initial assigned altitude. We departed PIE normally, thunderstorms were in the vicinity. The PIC attempted to check in 3 times with ATC before successfully making contact on the 4th attempt. We were climbing through 12,600 feet to what we believed was our assigned altitude of 16,000 feet. ATC immediately told us to descend to 12,000. We complied with that instruction and descended to 12,000 feet. At no time did I observe on TCAS an aircraft within 5NM of our aircraft. We did not get a TA or RA event. ATC requested we contact them after we land at our destination. We called ATC. We discussed event with Controller. Controller had informed us that he had reviewed the event prior to us calling. Twice in the conversation he stated that we (Pilots of Aircraft X) did nothing wrong. He believed PIE Tower may have missed correct read back of Initial ATC clearance.

Suspect miscommunication of initial ATC clearance departing PIE. Without being present when clearance was obtained from ATC, I cannot confirm with 100% certainty. Other factors to be considered should take into consideration the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and how this has affected all aviation operations. Both the PIC and myself haven't flown in over two months. This was our first trip back in just less than 90 days. Controller from ATC also briefly addressed the affects COVID-19 was having on ATC personal in our conversation. I understood from Controller that many ATC personal were working in unfamiliar duty positions, new sectors etc., i.e. recognition that ATC personal, operations have been strained over the past few months due to COVID-19 issues.

Recognition that many ATC personnel and pilots are working in somewhat strained conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is important to maintain vigilance in regards to attention to detail, recognition of distractors that may degrade or impede performance. Keep focus on tasks at hand.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported a miscommunication problem with TPA TRACON resulting in an altitude deviation and attributed it partly due to not flying because of COVID-19.
ACN: 1745694

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Dawn

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 68
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 7500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745694

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 11
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2854
Narrative: 1

Upon completing my day in the hotel room, I received a phone call from the Chief Pilot at the Operations Control Center. He informed me that I had flown an aircraft three legs with open logbook discrepancies. During my preflight at the origination of the pairing, I did a logbook check, but failed to notice that the maintenance items written up had not been closed out. My attention was focused on the missing terminating fuel from the day prior and then the subsequent search to get that information so I could complete the morning fuel audit. I overlooked the fact that the writeup had not been closed out and signed off by a Mechanic.

In analyzing the chain of errors, I was the last safety gate. The terminating Crew from the previous night should normally have let Dispatch know that there were open writeups remaining in the logbook, and Maintenance on the overnight should have also made sure the logbook was clear after completing any open writeups. If I had done a complete logbook check, I would have caught that the entries were still open, but I did not catch it.

Narrative: 2

It was the first flight of the day. We departed with three open writeups in the Maintenance logbook that were not addressed overnight.

With extra time, I could have also reviewed the Maintenance logbook. Due to the COVID-19, I used the extra time outside my duties to disinfect my work area.

Synopsis

Pilots reported being advised that the aircraft was flown with open write ups on three legs.
ACN: 1745666

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: LAX.Airport
State Reference: CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4200

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: SCT
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Traffic Watch
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B: LAX

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: SCT
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B: LAX

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: SCT.TRACON
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745666

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight  
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**

- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Vectored Aircraft X for a Visual Approach to Runway 24R initially without a heading then later assigned a 230 heading to join final and issued traffic for south complex Runway 25L traffic. Aircraft X had traffic in sight. Aircraft X passed through the final approach course getting close to the south complex traffic. Aircraft Y, Aircraft Y was issued traffic but did not have them in sight. Aircraft X was given instructions to correct back to Runway 24R.

Right now we are getting a lot of unfamiliar and less experienced pilots coming out flying at LAX due to slow downs during COVID and it's my responsibility to be extra diligent in ensuring these types of aircraft are doing what they need to [in order to] operate safely.

**Synopsis**

SCT TRACON Controller reported experiencing an airborne conflict between an air carrier and a GA aircraft.
ACN: 1745614

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745614
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I failed to put the red strap in place after disarming R1. I was A for the first time in over 15 years, I was a bit nervous. I was concerned with donning a face mask prior to L1 being
opened.

Maybe a policy regarding when to put mask on as the A. Taking it on and off for the phone and PAs is an added task.

**Synopsis**

Lead Flight Attendant reported the red tag was not put in place after disarming the door.
ACN: 1745547

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 7000

Environment
Light: Dusk

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 14
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 25346
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745547
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience Flight Crew Last 90 Days : 130
Experience Flight Crew Type : 3492
ASRS Report Number Accession Number : 1745680
Human Factors : Distraction

Events
Anomaly Deviation - Altitude : Overshoot
Anomaly Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On the arrival into ZZZ, ATC commanded a descent, which I selected Level Change, frequency change and then cleared for the RNAV XXR Approach. After reprogramming the approach from the left to right and briefing, I failed to select VNAV before busting the 7,000 feet restriction at ZZZZZ. We Immediately disconnected the autopilot and returned to 7,000 feet. The remainder of the approach was uneventful.

Prioritizing the sequence of events. Basic piloting. Having flown little in the last 90 days, my proficiency level is not as it normally is. Be aware of this and that I am in the Yellow. Work harder at staying in the Green.

Narrative: 2
During the arrival to ZZZ, ATC requested a descent. PF selected Level Change to increase descent rate. A runway change from expected Runway XXL was to Runway XXR and the new approach was programmed. Approach clearance was received. I noted that we were still in Level Change and not in VNAV and that we were low. PF immediately corrected. Visual approach concluded the flight without further incident.

PF and PM mitigate LNAV/VNAV distractions of the busy approach, runway change, etc. I, as PM, should have verified the vertical mode.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an altitude deviation during approach. Lack of flying and proficiency were contributing factors.
ACN: 1745485

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 2 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 7200
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 75
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 120
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745485
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Taxiway
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was picking up my aircraft from ZZZ airport after an extensive annual. The annual was more drawn out due to the virus thing. I paid for the service, conducted an extensive pre-flight, started the aircraft and prepared to taxi. I noted an aircraft departing from the same area ahead of me received the same clearance I normally get as taxi Runway X via Romeo, Alpha. I continued with the engine warm-up and checked each item paying close attention to the aircraft's response, again due to the extensive annual inspection. I received my own taxi clearance that was for Taxiway Uniform, which is a parallel taxiway to Alpha. The first taxiway to turn right to the assigned runway is Alpha. There were no other aircraft anywhere on the airport taxiways or ramps except for the one ahead of me. That aircraft was now at the runway and was at the hold short line for Runway X. I then instinctively turned onto Alpha, not initially realizing that I had been instructed to take the next right at Uniform. I continued checking braking action, steering, monitoring the engines performance and then realized I was about 200 feet down Alpha not on the correct taxiway. The next taxiway was Victor, which connects Alpha and Uniform, so I turned onto Victor and right onto Uniform, the correct taxiway. I believe I caused this problem because I was preoccupied with the aircraft's condition and did not pay close enough attention to the taxi instructions. The fact that the airport was nearly deserted contributed to my complacency, as well as the fact that I had flown this complicated twin only once in the past 6 months. I did write down the taxi instruction and had a copy of the airport diagram in front of me. I was both surprised and disappointed that I had made this error.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported a taxiway incursion, citing distraction with aircraft condition and lack of recent flying as contributing factors.
ACN: 1745467

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745467
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
During flight preparation on the ground in ZZZ for a flight to ZZZ1, forgot to switch ON three of the four window heat switches. Reason being...the ON indication typically indicate "OFF" when the window temp exceeds a certain temperature threshold while sitting on the ground on a hot day in the sunlight. It would not be unusual for me to leave those switches off until we get to the before start checklist and turn them back on knowing full well that once we push and; hopefully, get out of the direct sunlight, they will cool down and we get the proper "Green" indication. Somehow I missed turning them back on even though I typically touch the switch when the checklist item is read. The left most switch that I touched was the only one that was in the ON position. I never told my FO that I had left them off momentarily for that reason due to other distractions in preparing to depart. Needless to say it was a shock for me when performing my shutdown flow at the gate in ZZZ1 and seeing 3 of the 4 switches already off. I intended to debrief the FO of the issue at the gate, but we had numerous distractions that I could not get to that point and subsequently encouraged him to go ahead and leave as I had some other write ups for maintenance to deal with.

The other distractions:
1) I was tired and this would be my Xth day of flying in a row after not having flown an airplane in over a month. I slept "Okay" that night before but not to a degree I would have liked.

2) After rotation during the ZZZ departure, we noticed the Antiskid Inop indicator illuminated for about 5 seconds during the after takeoff flow but subsequently and quickly disappeared. When we landed the speed brake did not auto deploy; although the landing was very gentle, I couldn't be sure if it was the touchdown or indeed the antiskid system failed. I had to manually deploy the speed brake and use gentle braking with taxiing off the runway as a precaution although braking felt normal. We did not use autobraking for the landing. I was busy running through my head that this needed to be written up.

3) We were assigned an unusual gate at ZZZ1.

4) Checklists and debrief were interrupted multiple times as the ground power establishment was inadequate and would fail multiple times after several tries and at one point all power was momentarily lost on the aircraft.

5) Multiple write ups for maintenance which took a while before I could leave the aircraft.

This is something I had done in the past a few times; holding off turning the window heat switch on and I always had some sort of reminder including the checklist to catch it before push. I think a combo of building fatigue and distractions had a hand in the matter. At the end of the day though; I owned this one. I never informed my FO of what my plan was. On a positive note; except for passing through a thin cloud layer descending into ZZZ1, we never encountered any real icing conditions. None. This is an easy fix. Just turn the darn switches on and leave them on as we should. The windows will cool down as the aircraft moves out of the direct sunlight and airflow begins outside the gate. Let your FO know; like I usually do what you are doing. I think lack of quality sleep; low flight time and building fatigue definitely played a roll. This can work against you when you employ "technique" under certain circumstances. Again it was my misjudgment and I own this. Thank you.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported forgetting to turn on three of the four window heat switches during pre-flight.
ACN: 1745422

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6000

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Medium Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry
Flight Phase: Climb

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745422
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745423
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were climbing out of ZZZ with vectors. Cleared from 3,000 to 6,000 feet. We both called out 5,000 for six thousand feet to go. I was head down turning on the radar, there was weather ahead. The 3rd crew member in the jump seat called out altitude. I looked up as we were climbing through 6,200 feet. Pilot flying recovered about 6,300, then quickly returned to 6,000. ATC asked us to confirm our altitude, which we did at 6,000 feet.

Pilot fling was hand flying the airplane, which caused the altitude deviation. His scan missed the altitude, even though we both confirmed 1,000 feet to go. My suggestion is to have the autopilot on in low altitude high congestion areas.

Narrative: 2
I was Pilot Flying. Weather build ups in the area. Several step climbs. Pilot Monitoring was working radar. I was visually looking at weather. We both called 5,000 for 6,000 feet in the climb. I got distracted and overshot the assigned altitude by about 300 feet and made an immediate correction back to assigned 6,000 feet. ATC asked us to confirm 6,000 feet. No further issues. Continued uneventfully to destination

Due to COVID-19, our flying has been down considerably. I was hand flying to try to keep up my scan and hands on skills. I got distracted in the climbing turn while looking at build ups. I should have engaged the autopilot instead.

Synopsis
Flight crew reported overshooting altitude and then returning to assigned altitude. The Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.
ACN: 1745410

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 21000

Environment
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Door
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1745410
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
During the preflight inspection, we noticed in the logbook a couple of maintenance items concerning a noise emanating from the main cabin door during flight. The door and its seal had been inspected by Maintenance and a leak check had been conducted, with "ops checked good" (or words to that effect) in the corrective action. If memory serves, the most recent write up described the above noise as a "hum." We departed and climbed away from ZZZ uneventfully. While climbing through FL210 at a cabin PSID of 7.5 we heard the noise from the cabin door. It was not a hum, rather a loud shout. The Flight Attendant later described it as sounding like a "chain saw." Indeed, when the forward Flight Attendant went to call us, he had to go to the back of the aircraft and use the aft interphone as it was virtually impossible to communicate with that racket going on. We asked ATC for a level off and then a decent to try to make the noise less with a lower PSID. A quick check of the cabin pressure and PSID revealed no issues there; the cabin pressure was working normally. Indeed, checking the cabin alt vs aircraft alt in the QRH's manual pressurization schedule revealed that everything was fine. I tried calling Maintenance in ZZZ as we should have still been within radio range, but I think that they may have gone home for the night. I also ACARSed Dispatch and then called Maintenance Control on ARINC. It took a while to get through to them due to COVID-19. When I appraised them of the situation, they told us to return to ZZZ. I talked to the flight attendants and talked the passengers to let them know what the situation was. It was a bit frustrating for the latter as the roar from the door was a soft hum aft of row X. To add insult to injury, a thunderstorm developed over ZZZ in our absence, so we had to hold...which was fine as Dispatch still had to round up operations agents, gate supervisors, ramp agents, fullers etc. To add insult to injury, after we landed, the ramp was closed due to lightning. After we blocked, I gave Maintenance a quick shout on the telephone and we offloaded the passengers and made our way over to the next aircraft for the flight to ZZZ1. Changing the subject, I would mention that the FO (PF) did a fine job flying the aircraft and dealing with ATC whilst I was talking to the Maintenance/Dispatch/flight attendants/passengers and to the FAs for taking care of the passengers.

Apparenty there is something afoot with the door seal on aircraft XYZ. I guess Maintenance's efforts as to try to rectify any hums/roars/squeals etc hadn't solved the problem.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported a loud hum during climbout emanating from the door and having to return to departure airport.
**ACN: 1745376**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position: Angle: Radial: 166
- Relative Position: Distance: Nautical Miles: 5
- Altitude: MSL: Single Value: 4000

**Environment**
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 20
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling: Single Value: 4500

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Climb
- Route In Use: SID: ZZZZZ
- Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 22500
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 0
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 3000
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1745376
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
ZZZ -- Departing XXL on the ZZZZZZ departure, we noticed the aircraft not turning right after crossing ZZZZZ1. I intervened to start the turn. At that time, ATC cleared us direct ZZZZZ2. The rest of the SID was flown normally. We talked about this later, and we determined that the airplane was still in RWY Track and had not switched to Managed Nav.

I was too slow recognizing that the aircraft wasn't turning. ZZZZZ2 waypoint is an overfly point and I should have been monitoring it closer. I also didn't notice that Managed Nav was not armed. Another contributing factor was that due to the current situation, I haven't flown very much in 2020. I definitely felt rusty. No excuse though. Just part of it.

Synopsis
Pilot reported experiencing a track heading deviation and cited rustiness and lack of flying as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1745365

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference:Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Parked
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 550
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 350
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745365
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Squawked VFR (1200) in the SFRA. Returned to work as flight instructor after being gone for about three months due to closures caused by the COVID-19 Virus. First day back at ZZZ. Flying with XX year old student who tends to skip around checklists (it was his first day back, too), I usually watch him like a hawk because of this tendency. Still, he managed to miss the "transponder" item and somehow it got past me. Even still, I normally double (sometimes triple) check the transponder as part of my pre-takeoff flow. Because of my extended absence and lack of proficiency in the SFRA, I forgot to double check and took off with 1200 on the transponder. In order to resolve this issue, I need to keep a closer watch on my students, as I am the PIC. Aircraft is based in ZZZ, so transponder should be set to 12XX as its default squawk code. I must be more adamant about checking my transponder before takeoff.

Synopsis
Instructor pilot reported taking off with incorrect transponder code and cited lack of flying due to the COVID-19 as a contributing factor.
Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4500

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745329
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Passing 4,500 feet I noticed the airspeed at 268 kts and that the speed was not set in managed speed, the flying pilot (Captain) reduced the speed to 250 kts and then set the speed to managed speed. This happened on climbout departing ZZZ on the ZZZZZ SID. The First Officer was the non-flying pilot.

Cause: 35 hours in seat and the second flight in two months.

Suggestions: Having more time in seat, before having an extended break from flying.

Synopsis
Pilot reported exceeding 250 knots below 10,000 feet.
ACN: 1745290

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 2000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Transport
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: VFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace. Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Developmental
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1745290
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown. Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X was doing pattern work, I believe for ZZZ1 airport. It was a late pointout from the X area and we were both extremely busy and should have split sectors, but with staffing due to COVID-19 it wasn't possible. Aircraft X ended up going into ZZZ Tower's Delta without any coordination.

I should have pointed out the aircraft to ZZZ Tower first and foremost. It would have helped to know Aircraft X was going to do work today. The volume of photo flights absolutely saturated both X and Y areas today, so I have to think that contributed. Overall X and Y sectors should have been split to accommodate the volume and complexity.

**Synopsis**

TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation occurred due to lack of coordination. Traffic volume was cited as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1745186

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Turbulence

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 2
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745186
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were flying to ZZZ. Neither I nor the Captain had been to ZZZ before. The Captain also had not flown in a couple of weeks he told me. ATC kept us high while arriving. As we came towards the airport I called it out but my Captain said that wasn't it. I wasn't familiar with the area or airport, so I thought he knew it wasn't it. We were going in and out of clouds when Center handed us off to Tower. As we flew almost over the airport my Captain then realized it was the airport. At the same time Tower asked us our plans for the visual approach. My Captain told me to tell them we wanted to join left downwind for the visual. At this time we were very high, fighting turbulence, and gusty winds. ATC cleared us for the approach. He turned the AP off to do the visual. We backed it up with the RNAV. I feel as though my Captain was too close to the airport to make a stable landing and I reminded him "We can always go around." The winds (I can't remember the exact direction) were almost a direct crosswind from the left. We were making a left pattern. This caused the plane to have a high airspeed on the base leg, causing him to overshoot final. Density altitude also did not help as we had a higher TAS and steeper angle to descend as well and decreased engine performance. He then decided to do a go-around. He hit TOGA but forgot to call for flaps which I then asked "Flaps 2?" He told me to put flaps 3 which I thought was odd. I then said positive rate and got the gear up. I also told tower that we are going around. They asked us our plans and he said he wanted to fly the pattern again but set up better. I told them that and requested a longer final. There was a small business jet landing and they said to follow behind them and to take as long of a final for whatever we needed. At this time he started turning but the airplane thought we were still doing the published missed. He was confused by this and overrode the AP. I was trying to help fix the automation because the AT kept wanting to go full power. He clicked on heading mode but the heading bug was set to the runway and the plane started to turn to the heading. I quickly centered the heading bug back up. I was like just fly the airplane and deal with the automation later. He turned everything off at this point. I then was able
to correct the automation and set the RNAV back up. By this time we were on downwind. He kept more distance and a longer final and we landed in very gusty winds and went back to the gate to debrief.

There were a few causes that led to a unstable approach and go around. 1. ATC put us right over the runway very high. 2. The weather was not smooth and there were high winds 3. It is a difficult airport to land at. 4. The Captain was rusty from not flying 5. I'm new and this was my first go around and the worst winds/turbulence I have experienced 6. Automation, in this case, hindered not helped us

I think pilots need to constantly review profiles like the go-around profile to remember the call outs. I should have told the Captain that flaps 3 was incorrect. More knowledge that when flying in the mountains ATC will keep you high all the way up to the airport, there aren't arrivals like in ZZZ that walk you down to keep a stable approach. More knowledge on high density altitude and the effects on flying. More knowledge of hand flying visual approaches, I don't think my Captain realized the effect of a tailwind on base and that caused us overshoot.

**Narrative: 2**

The event was a go-around after an unstable approach on a visual, backed up by RNAV, RWY ZZ at ZZZ, followed by a successful hand flown visual. As a Captain flying into ZZZ for the first time, I was pilot flying due to the FO being fairly new to the line. Approaching the ZZZ area, we went through a pretty thick cloud layer, with some light rime ice, which added ice speeds. Upon breaking out of the layer, we noticed another layer between us and the field. Around this time, Center started calling out the field, but between the cloud layer and my unfamiliarity with the area, we were unable to identify the field until we were very close. We had, however, begun slowing early in anticipation due to conversations I had with colleagues about this tendency to be left high by Center. The FO was first to spot the field, but by that time we were within several miles, if not virtually on top of the airport. Center cleared us visual and terminated radar services when we were at around 13,000 feet for a field with X,XXX feet elevation. Tower offered a pass over midfield, then a turn downwind to lose altitude and setup. Around this time, we picked up some gusty and shifty winds in the valley that comprises ZZZ. I felt that the automation was having difficulty keeping up with these wind shifts, and elected to hand fly with the auto throttles disengaged. However, I did not descend sufficiently before turning final inside ZZZZZ, which left us too high and without enough room to fully configure and be stable by 1,000 feet AGL for landing. The FO and I jointly called for go-around. We then proceeded to muddle through the go-around profile, but got cleaned up in time to coordinate with Tower for a second attempt. At about this time, I asked the FO to re-sequence the approach in the FMS, thinking that it would get us out of GA mode. This took some time, and while that was going on, I was confused as to why automation was still flying the go-around. I clicked off the autopilot and auto-throttles in time to assume a heading at tower's request for some other inbound traffic. About this time, the FO reminded me that maybe cycling VNAV to re-enter the "green world" might help exit GA, which it did, but I elected to keep hand flying. Wind conditions in the area introduced variances in speed and altitude that I compensated for. We then continued on a second visual approach, this time allowing more distance on final, and got fully configured and stable.

Winds had picked up more in the interim, introducing a fairly direct cross wind on [runway] XX, but the landing was successful. As soon as we got to the gate, I made sure to debrief the event with the FO, while our recollections were fresh, in order to ensure that we both got lessons learned, etc.
The primary cause was PF lack of situational awareness and over reliance on manual handling when automation might have been more appropriate. A further primary cause was accepting a short visual instead of asking Center for vectors farther out to allow for more maneuvering space for the approach. There are several secondary causes, the largest of which was unfamiliarity with the area compounded by insufficient backup descent references. As PF, I have flown infrequently in the last 5 weeks due to COVID-19 related schedule reductions and a return to reserve. (In fact, I had picked up this trip partly in order to get some flying time.) This led to degraded manual handling skills, a rusty go-around profile, and some confusion with automation at times. The PM was fairly new to the line, having been called off standby on short notice, and with about XX hours on the airplane. FO was also unfamiliar with mountain flying, and while I have operated into mountain airports such as ZZZ2 and ZZZ3, neither of us had been to ZZZ. There were also minor crew coordination issues, likely due to a combination of my lack of recent flying and an FO new to line flying.

Crews must be cognizant of the differences between flat land flying at major airports, and mountain flying, to include altitude, terrain, and weather effects. Multiple descent references might be prudent, instead of simply using "10,000 at 30" or a field elevation driven path, in order to increase situational awareness. While we slowed down early with the notion that we might be left high, crews should brief and act on descent planning that allows for extra margin in high altitude field operations. Do not be afraid to ask for vectors to allow for space to configure. Crews should also ensure that they stay sharp on all aspects of equipment and operations while they are not flying in this era of reduced schedules. Lastly, rely on joint coordination between CA and FO to mitigate the challenges of operating in airports outside of our norm.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around. Unfamiliarity with the airport and rustiness from lack of flying were cited as contributing factors.
ACN: 1745174

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.
Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.
Distance.
Nautical Miles: 2
Altitude.
MSL.
Single Value: 5000

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.
TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.
Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.
Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.
Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.
Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.
Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.
Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.
Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.
Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.
Flight Crew.
Last 90 Days: 35
Experience.
Flight Crew.
Type: 35
ASRS Report Number.
Accession Number: 1745174
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.
Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.
Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.
Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.
Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function: Flight Crew: Captain  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine  
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument  
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1745299  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**

Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types  
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude  
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance  
Detector. Person: Flight Crew  
When Detected: In-flight  
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

On the ZZZZZ Arrival we were at 6,000 feet and the radios were busy. There were numerous aircraft with similar call signs. We were given clearance off the STAR and cleared direct ZZZZZ1 for ILS XR. We both thought the Controller also cleared us to 4,000 feet. I asked the Capitan, PM, if we were cleared to 4,000 feet, and he said, "Yes." I also thought I heard the Controller clear us to 4,000 feet. I started down in Vertical Speed mode 1,000 FPM, and when we approached 5,000 feet, ATC queried why we were descending, and to just level off at 5,000 feet. The PM told ATC that we understood that we were given a descend clearance but ATC said, "NOPE."

**Narrative: 2**

I was the PM, and we were finishing a turn ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ. I hadn't flown in April, flew one turn in May, and was on my third turn in June. This turn was by far the longest, scheduled for X+10 block hours. Although I felt fully prepared for the duty day, I did feel slightly rusty, due to the lack of recent flying. The FO, as PF, also had not flown much recently. We had talked about being tired, the two long legs, and anticipating the end of the day.

The radios were busy with the departures and arrivals at ZZZ and ZZZZ, and other area airports. On the ZZZZZ Arrival, shortly after passing ZZZZZ at 6,000 feet, I checked in with Approach, instructed us to proceed to ZZZZZ1, for the XR Localizer. I read back that clearance. I think I expected a descent out of 6,000 feet, and the phrase "X-Right Localizer" became, in my mind, "cleared to 4,000 feet and intercept the localizer." When I turned to the FO, I told him the clearance was to proceed to ZZZZZ1, descend to 4,000 and intercept the localizer.

The FO set 4,000 feet on the MCP, selected VERT SPD, and dialed in about 1,000 FPM descent rate. He then put ZZZZZ1 on the top of the RTE Page 1, and I confirmed both the altitude change and mode, and the route adjustment. The FO executed in the MCDU, and we began a descent and turn to ZZZZZ1. The FO stated he would use LNAV to intercept and then select VOR/LOC afterwards.
Passing about 5,200 feet, Approach told us he had not cleared us to descend, and to level at 5,000 feet. I acknowledged that, and replied I thought he had cleared us to descend. Approach replied with a curt "Nope." The FO arrested the descent at 5,000 feet, while we attempted to recognize the error. I was convinced we had been cleared to descend, that I had read back a descent clearance, and Approach had not corrected an improper read back. At that point I was confused.

About two minutes later, Approach advised us to look for westbound traffic at 4,500 feet to the north. We did not acquire a visual on said traffic. Subsequently we were cleared for the ILS XR, at or above 4,000 feet and 250 knots. I do not recall being directed to contact ZZZ Tower. Five minutes after being cleared for the ILS XR, I called Approach Control in the blind of my intention to contact ZZZ Tower. We landed without further problems.

Having previously discussed our tiredness, I should have been on guard for the increased potential for errors. I should have verified the clearance with the FO, PF, before we changed our flight path, instead of telling him what I believed the clearance to be.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation during arrival. Captain stated rustiness due to lack of flying was a contributing factor.
ACN: 1745071

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 800

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 4000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 2527
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 55
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 434
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1745071
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I taxied out to Runway XXR. As I was taxiing, Ground called me and asked me to squawk the correct transponder code. I was annoyed with myself for not having put it in already - the transponder code that was in the box from the previous flight was close enough to the current one that I had failed to catch it in my preflight checks.

I was then cleared to take off on XXR. As I was climbing out, the Tower asked me to say altitude. I was climbing up to 1,000 MSL, which was also my final altitude for my VFR flight. I replied that I was passing through 1,000, then corrected myself and said that I was climbing to 1,000 which is what I would maintain. Neither response was correct - Tower had asked me for my then current altitude. Tower didn't query me further and I climbed up to 1,000 and soon left Class B airspace.

I had just returned from a 2 1/2 month COVID related leave of absence. I had completed a refresher flight with a company instructor, but this was my first day of operational flying after my return. The incidents with the transponder code and the altitude communication showed me that I was still a bit rusty and not quite up to the standards that I demand of myself as a professional pilot. I have resolved to take it slow and double check my preflights as well as my communications until I feel completely comfortable again.

Synopsis

Pilot reported being rusty after lack of flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic resulting in communication issues with ATC.
**ACN: 1745059**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position: Angle: Radial: 194
- Relative Position: Distance: Nautical Miles: 4
- Altitude: MSL: Single Value: 2500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace: Class D: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Commercial
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 5361
- Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 40
- Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 1482
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1745059
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC
**Events**

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types  
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR  
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control  
When Detected : In-flight  
Result.General : None Reported / Taken  

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing  
Primary Problem : Human Factors  

**Narrative: 1**

While in contact with ATC and cleared to descend at pilot's discretion I was told to contact ZZZ Tower. I was also told to avoid ZZZ1 airspace which I did. I was not told to avoid the ZZZ airspace. After numerous attempts to get through to ZZZ Tower contact was made. The Tower operator was extremely busy because the Tower was short on staff. This airport was doing a lot of training flights and was very busy. The Tower operator was handling both Ground Control and Tower operations. After finally making contact with the Tower, the Tower operator got upset because I entered his Class D airspace. I thought I was handed off by Approach Control to ZZZ Tower. I don't know if I was handed off by Approach to ZZZ Tower, or if the Tower operator was too busy to realize what was happening.

In the future I will make sure that before I enter controlled airspace I will be in contact with the person controlling that airspace and not depend on being handed off by another Controller. Even though I realize that I need to be more diligent about controlled airspace, I believe that because the Tower operator was so overworked is what really caused the problem. If the Tower operator was not doing Ground Control and Tower Control at the same time in an extremely busy facility radio contact could have been made much sooner and this would have never happened. I would suggest that in the future if the Tower is short on staff, the number of training operations be reduced so as to not overload the Tower operator.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported an alleged airspace violation while being under flight following and handed off to a Tower by Approach Control. Reportedly, Tower Controller was working numerous frequencies/positions and advised pilot that he had violated the Class Delta airspace.
ACN: 1745054

Time / Day
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

Aircraft
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: FBO
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Training
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Route In Use.Other
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: FBO
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1735
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 25
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1400
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745054
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function.Flight Crew: Trainee
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 139
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 139
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745091
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
This was a 14 CFR 141 instrument training flight with a student nearing the completion of the program. This was the first training flight for the instrument student after not having flown for approximately three months due to COVID-19 precautions. We were on an IFR flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ, returning to ZZZ on the same flight plan. The student filed ZZZ1 ZZZZX ZZZZZ ZZZ ZZZ2 ZZZ1. During the enroute phase, I requested from Approach the RNAV (GPS) Y RWY XX at ZZZ, with a touch and go on RWY XX, and a return to ZZZ with the ILS XYL to a full stop. Before we were cleared for the approach to ZZZ, Approach relayed the following missed approach instructions "On the go, fly Tower assigned heading, climb and maintain 3,000 feet." I read back the instructions because my student missed the transmission. Shortly after receiving the missed approach instructions, we received our approach clearance for the RNAV (GPS) Y RWY XX and transferred to ZZZ Tower. We decided to fly the approach using the autopilot, which the student was not familiar with. This required a significant amount of coaching, especially to manage the altitude step-downs. There was a single engine aircraft in the traffic pattern and we were instructed to report traffic in sight and that we were #2 for RWY XX behind the traffic. I was focused on coaching the student to use the autopilot and looking for the traffic in the pattern and did not hear the landing clearance transmission correctly. The traffic ahead executed a touch and go without incident. We followed suite and executed a touch and go. Several hundred feet in the air, tower asked us what we were doing. I explained that we were on the missed approach and climbing to 3,000 feet. The Tower Controller advised
that we had been issued a landing clearance, not a touch and go. In the same transmission, the controller asked if we were IFR or VFR and to state our intentions. I explained that we were IFR and given missed approach instructions to a fly tower assigned heading, climb and maintain 3,000 feet and were planning to return IFR to ZZZ. I also apologized profusely. Tower switched us over to Approach - I read back the instructions and apologized again for the error. I was mortified.

I believe that expectation bias played a crucial role in this error coupled with my inattentiveness to the landing instructions issued by Tower resulting from my focus on coaching my student through the use of the autopilot for the approach and looking out for traffic in the pattern. Without exception, in my prior experience as a CFII in northern State X, Tower has cleared my flights for a touch and go following an instrument approach when on an IFR flight plan that does not terminate at that airport. I believe this prior experience established a strong expectation bias. I also believe that I inappropriately focused my attention on coaching my student through the approach using the autopilot. This was his first flight back after an extended hiatus from flying, so we had to work through some fundamental refresher in addition to incorporating the autopilot. This was a high workload environment for my student. Finally, I was focused on visually acquiring the traffic ahead of us, which added to my workload.

I have learned several lessons because of this experience. Focus and listen to the clearance. Regardless of how advanced the student is, do not assume they will take the appropriate course of action. As an instructor I am there to make sure a crucial error does not occur. Prioritize workload. Teaching is important, but making sure we are aviating, navigating, and communicating comes before anything else - even teaching.

I truly am sorry for this error. While there was no evasive action taken by any aircraft (the preceding traffic was on a downwind leg by the time we executed the touch and go and no other traffic was in the airspace), I understand that was just luck.

I know better and will do better next time.

**Narrative: 2**

My instructor and I were on an IFR training flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 round robin back to ZZZ. We flew the RNAV GPS Y RWY XX approach into ZZZ1. On approach, we were talking to Approach which cleared us for the approach and to see them on the missed approach. We were instructed to fly Tower assigned heading on the missed up to 3,000. My expectation was to do a touch n go and return back to ZZZ for our round robin.

We switched to ZZZ1 that then cleared us to land. I became so fixated on doing a touch n go that we landed and did our touch n go. After we were airborne ZZZ1 tower told us that he had cleared us to land. We apologized.

This was my first IFR training flight since COVID-19 shut everything down. I think that I became so fixated and accustomed to doing a touch and go and flying the missed approach that I missed that the tower had cleared us to land and not a touch n go. Confirmation bias on my part that I assumed he had cleared us for a touch n go and misheard the tower instruction. I think there may also have been a communication error to the tower as he was under the impression that we wanted to land and not do a touch n go. He had asked us if were IFR, which we filed for so I think there may have been an issue with the plan as I filed it.

My takeaway is that I need to listen much closer to the instructions. During the approach I
became fixated on flying the approach and read back the instruction but did not catch that it was a landing clearance and not for a touch n go. I was expecting a cleared for touch n go and my confirmation bias interpreted the cleared to land as that.

Synopsis

Pilot instructor and student reported distraction in the cockpit resulted in executing a touch and go without ATC clearance and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1745052

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 4
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 650

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 5000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 6250
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 5
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 775
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745052
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While providing a sightseeing trip to a friend in order to see a specific home from the air I lost track of my altitude and was at one time 350 feet lower than I should have been. The Tower Controller had approved a descent from 1,500 feet to 1,000 feet in order for me to be able to take some photos. When I noticed my altitude, while trying to provide her a good photo, at 650 feet MSL over the water and at times I estimate 650 feet AGL over the land. I violated 91.119(b) in that, "Over congested areas, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet." To correct, I immediately applied power and climbed back to altitude over the water.

At no time was the aircraft in any danger of hitting the ground or do I believe I was "zooming." The aircraft never banked more than 15 degrees and only exceeded slightly more than 1G at approximately 90 knots IAS.

For me the worst part was not in the violation of FAR 91 regs, but as an experienced CFII and pilot of over XX years and XXXX hours, I lost situational awareness and lost 350 feet of altitude without realizing it. If a student of mine had done this, I would have immediately called his/her attention to it before a 100 feet deviation.

A contributing factor was not flying regularly due to the Coronavirus. I was not as proficient as I should have been. Three weeks earlier I had flown a solo warm up flight but obviously this was not enough. In the future I will give myself more proficiency flights and humble myself and fly with another CFI to keep my skill level where it needs to be.

Synopsis

Pilot reported while on a sightseeing trip they went too low, pilot eventually caught the mistake and climbed back to a normal altitude.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ACN:</strong> 1745049</th>
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**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1100

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Training
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 5200
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 25
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1000
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1745049
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Workload
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1

Air Traffic Controller using same frequency for Tower/Ground/Clearance Delivery. Due to minimum manning, when airport gets overwhelmed (4 aircraft) all radios garble together and confusion and landing clearances are unsure.

Synopsis

Pilot reported communications issues due to Tower Controller working multiple positions on same frequency due to facility staffing issues.
ACN: 1744987

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744987
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Taxiway
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: Taxi
Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

When taxing out we were told B R to XR. I joined B via A then AX or AY and not via G like I think they wanted me to. They asked us to side step over to B when we were on A.

This was my first day back after about a month and half off. Join taxiways using the most direct means or request clarification when unsure.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported a taxiway incursion and cited being off for a month and a half as a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1744964**

**Time / Day**
- **Date**: 202006
- **Local Time Of Day**: 1201-1800

**Place**
- **Locale Reference.Airport**: HPN.Airport
- **State Reference**: NY

**Environment**
- **Flight Conditions**: VMC
- **Light**: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- **Reference**: X
- **ATC / Advisory.TRACON**: N90
- **Make Model Name**: Small Transport
- **Crew Size.Number Of Crew**: 2
- **Operating Under FAR Part**: Part 91
- **Flight Plan**: IFR
- **Mission**: Passenger
- **Flight Phase**: Climb
- **Airspace.Class D**: HPN

**Person**
- **Reference**: 1
- **Location Of Person.Aircraft**: X
- **Location In Aircraft**: Flight Deck
- **Function.Flight Crew**: Captain
- **Function.Flight Crew**: Pilot Not Flying
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Instrument
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- **Qualification.Flight Crew**: Multiengine
- **ASRS Report Number.Accession Number**: 1744964
- **Human Factors**: Confusion
- **Human Factors**: Communication Breakdown
- **Communication Breakdown.Party1**: Flight Crew
- **Communication Breakdown.Party2**: ATC

**Events**
- **Anomaly.ATC Issue**: All Types
- **Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading**: All Types
- **Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural**: Clearance
- **Detector.Person**: Flight Crew
- **When Detected**: In-flight
- **Result.Flight Crew**: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
- **Result.Air Traffic Control**: Issued New Clearance

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Primary Problem : Staffing

Narrative: 1

SIC obtained a hold for release clearance, and loaded the FMS. Reviewed FMS programming per FOM/AOM verified all the points. SIC stated we were given a SID then as filed. While proceeding on our route, ATC cleared us to a fix that was not on our flight plan. Queried ATC as to our routing, and it did not match our as filed routing. (Filed ZZZZZ JXXX ZZZ1 ZZZ2 JXXY ZZZ4, believe ATC said clearance was ZZZZZ JXXX ZZZ3 direct ZZZ4). Asked ATC for a heading while we corrected our FMS programming. ATC cleared us to another fix, verified the routing to destination. We adjusted the routing and proceeded to our destination.

Re-opening the ATC facilities at HPN would be helpful, especially with the increasing amount of flights into and out of HPN.

Synopsis

Pilot reported clearance was different than what they had filed and would like to see HPN ATC Facilities re-open.
ACN: 1744945

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Taxi
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744945
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Taxiway
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: Taxi
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Upon Landing and clearing the runway XXL at ZZZ, I believed that tower stated "Next left, remain this frequency, taxi to park". Unfortunately tower actually said "Next left, contact ground point nine" as I played back from the avionics playback function after tower strangely issued me a taxi clearance while I was already taxiing. I read back the (what I thought was a re-issued clearance) and began to question if I heard the initial runway clearing call correctly. After utilizing the playback feature, I realized I taxied without a clearance.

With the reduced flight activity of the COVID-19 pandemic, I need to slow down, take more time, and be extra cautious. This is amplified by my expectation bias from the past few flights as tower has given me the "Monitor and taxi to park" clearance. Clearance, ground, and tower have all been combined lately due to reduced activity. In many cases, clearance has had us taxi with tower frequency, and such. All the more reason to be extra cautious. Take additional time, and listen carefully as we are all in very non-standard operations.

Synopsis

Pilot reported a taxiway incursion partially due to expectation bias.
ACN: 1744942

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude, MSL, Single Value: 34000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory, Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size, Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace, Class A: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function, Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification, Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification, Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1744942
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function, Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification, Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification, Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification, Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1744940
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly, Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly, Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector, Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
After departing ZZZ in cruise, I disengaged the autothrottles and autopilot to trim the aircraft. Autopilot was reconnected, but I inadvertently forgot to reconnect the autothrottles. We then encountered continuous light turbulence, I selected .76 in the speed window and manually pulled the throttles back, not realizing that the autothrottles were not on.

The speed dropped into the upper yellow band, we got a "buffet alert" in the FMC. Throttles were manually advanced to continue, but speed recovery was slow so we asked for a descent from FL340 to FL320. Speed recovery was rapid after we started down. In cruise we got a low speed buffet alert. Airspeed was in the lower yellow band. Power levers were manually advanced to continue power, but recovery was not adequate. We asked for a descent from FL340 to FL320. Speed recovered.

This was the second leg of my 1st trip back after X months off. I thought after an uneventful 1st leg I thought I was through the danger of being rusty, boy was I wrong. The major cause was my complacency after an uneventful first leg coming back from X months off. I wrongly figured I had knocked the rust off on when the first leg went so well. We don't disconnect the autopilot/autothrottles in cruise very often, this requires extra vigilance to make sure the aircraft is in the correct configuration.

Narrative: 2
Departed ZZZ, aircraft needed constant retrimming, which it did on flight ZZZ1- ZZZ day before (same aircraft). Levelled off at FL340. Smooth air, needed retrimming after level off. CA disconnected A/P and A/T to retrim ailerons, then reengaged A/P. I did not notice that A/T [had] not reengaged. Shortly after, entered area of constant light turbulence occasional moderate bump, slowed speed to .76 M. Speed not coming back, CA pulled throttles back to Maintain .76. Shortly after, got BUFFET ALERT, added power and started descent to FL 320. At that point, CA realized A/T not engaged. Engaged A/T, Normal after that. Always be extra vigilant, especially when disengaging A/P and A/T at altitude. Since retrimming not usually necessary, disengaging at altitude not done that much, and due to not flying as much, and a lot of deadheading, did not catch the A/T.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a low speed buffet alert during cruise due to having the aircraft in the incorrect configuration with autothrottles not engaged. Lack of flying was cited as a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1744800**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202005

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744800

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Maintenance
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

**Narrative: 1**

While wearing a mask it is often times extremely unsafe to work on ladders or lifts. It is also difficult to work in tight spaces while wearing a mask and safety glasses. The glasses fog up and we cannot see what we are doing (i.e. trying to place a nut on blindly while holding a screw, removing screws from elevator access panels, pinning cannon plugs, etc.) Readjust mask without thinking I could have just touched Skydrol or have other chemicals on my gloves.

[When I] put the mask on, breathe, glasses fog up depending on body position.

Not enough investigation into the ability to wear masks while doing our daily tasks within OSHA standards for safe work practices. Even if fog resistant safety glasses are available for someone with 20/20 vision, they are not for someone with corrective lens safety glasses.

Remove mask. Better to not be blinded and jeopardize safety when completing tasks.
Re-evaluate the safety aspect of wearing a mask. Is it Within OSHA standards? Consider readjusting the mask to prevent blinding while working around Skydrol.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Mechanic reported that wearing a mask and safety glasses causes the glasses to fog up, resulting in safety concerns when working on ladders, lifts, and in tight places. Mechanic also expressed concern that while working with chemicals, they could inadvertently be transferred to the mask.
ACN: 1744783

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference_ATC Facility: ZZZZ.Tower
State Reference: FO

Environment
Flight Conditions: Mixed

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory_Tower: ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size_Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Approach

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person_Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function_Flight Crew: Captain
Function_Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification_Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number_Accession Number: 1744783
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Workload

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person_Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function_Flight Crew: First Officer
Function_Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification_Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification_Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification_Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number_Accession Number: 1744784
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
I feel that because of the aviation industry dramatic operational reduction in flights there should be a way to raise awareness about the risk of not having our normal operational practice for pilots, ATC, dispatchers, and everybody that is involved in the operation during these unusual times. I had not flown for more than 2 months, I was flying with a first officer which was his first flight out of OE and had never been to ZZZZ, and ATC gave us short vectors to conduct another approach when there was barely any traffic.

While been vectored for a visual approach into Runway XXL into ZZZZ, we noticed that there were a few clouds right on the approach path (weather reported was VMC with SCT 1800). I was pilot flying. ATC asked us if we had the runway in sight, but we were already in IMC inside a cloud and could not accept the visual approach. We discontinued the approach and started getting vectors for Runway XYR for an RNAV APP. We got short
vectors, things were happening pretty fast, we set up the approach, got the landing performance numbers, performed the briefing, and started configuring to flaps 2. During the briefing we noticed the final APP course had an off set to the RWY. There was also terrain north of the approach and the communication barriers with ZZZZ increased our workload. We got fixated outside, continued configuring, but realized we were not going to be stable at 1,000 feet. For the safety of the flight and company procedures, we decided to go-around. During the go-around, there was a 2 second red warning which I believe was spurious as it went away immediately and we didn't have time to read the ECAM message. Got vectors again for the XXR RNAV and landed safely without any further issues.

**Narrative: 2**

Pilot read files could remind pilots of lack of experience combined with recent inactivity could lead to loss of situational awareness. Recommend pilots configure earlier on approaches and sacrifice minor fuel savings while proficiency is retained by pilots who have been absent from the line. We were initially given vectors for a visual approach to Runway XXL, but were IMC too long to accept a visual approach clearance. We executed a discontinued approach with vectors, then took vectors for the RNAV XYR Approach. Due to high workload, minimal preparation time, and language barrier/standard phraseology issues with ATC we became task saturated and overly fixated on the approach navigation. We realized we were not configured, were unstable on the approach, and executed a missed approach.

We then received vectors for another RNAV XYR approach, and landed safely without further incident.

Contributing factors: Captain long period without flying. FO: First leg off IOE, unfamiliar with ZZZZ airport ATC: Language barrier, non-standard and confusing phraseology. ATC's apparent preference for XXL visual when scattered layer at 1,800 made RNAV XYR a better choice.

**Narrative: 3**

During IOE, my international orientation to Continent Area X was waived per recent policy changes. I picked up a turn on [date] for ZZZ to ZZZZ and back in open time. No queries or restrictions were placed upon me via the scheduling system.

Per company procedures, it specifies that an international flight segment is no longer required for IOE completion per company document. I reviewed this on the evening of [date] prior to reporting the next day.

Upon reporting, the Captain asked about this specific concern. We reviewed the company procedures prior to pushback at ZZZ for our first leg, which was conducted as Flight ABC to ZZZZ. Satisfied that we were in regulatory compliance, we departed. In the interest of furthering our understanding, the matter was discussed en route to ZZZZ. Having thoroughly examined the matter, we arrived at ZZZZ. We then flew the return leg as Flight DEF under the belief that [we] were fully compliant.

Per a conversation with a knowledgeable person the following day, it was suggested that the company's position was that newly-qualified First Officers who did not do a Continent Area X turn during IOE were in fact not qualified to operate those flights without the supervision of a check airman.
Both flights were conducted with the highest regard for safety and were completed without incident.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew experienced a high work load during an approach which resulted in unstable approach and a missed approach. The crew cited lack of experience and recent flying as contributing.
ACN: 1744763

Time / Day

Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 30000

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise

Component

Aircraft Component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744763
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Maintenance Action
Result.Flight Crew: FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This concerns an airframe overspeed of approximately 5 KIAS for approximately 10 seconds that occurred at FL300 and .78 mach. We had experienced two issues on takeoff, the first of which required a low-speed RTO and the second involved no FLEX annunciation on the FMA. The FO and I were discussing these events on the climbout (above 10,000) and I was mentally focused on what had happened. Upon reaching our assigned cruise altitude of FL300 I checked that the aircraft had leveled out and I picked up my iPad to start reviewing reporting requirements, ARMS codes, etc. What I did not do was properly review the FMA indications. A few moments later we got a CRC, Master Warning, and aircraft overspeed annunciation. We were approximately 5 KIAS too fast. I immediately retarded the thrust levers (to an intermediate position, not idle) and deployed the speed brakes. As we slowed down I reset the thrust levers to Climb, retracted the speed brakes, and stabilized the aircraft at the desired speed. The FO and I discussed the situation and looked over the instruments. We both agreed that the engines had stayed at climb thrust after level-off and had not retarded to a lower cruise thrust setting, leading to our acceleration and overspeed. He observed that the autothrust was not engaged. We engaged the autothrust, confirmed proper cruise indications on the FMA, and resumed normal flight. We notified maintenance of the overspeed and made an AML entry.

It is likely that the autothrust never engaged during takeoff. We did not get a FLEX indication on the FMA during takeoff roll. We were prepared for this since the previous crew had reported the same thing. I advanced the thrust levers to TOGA, the FO called TOGA set, and we continued for a normal takeoff. At some point during the early climb I did notice that there was no TOGA indication on the FMA. Discussing this later with the FO, he stated that he had confirmed TOGA (and proper engine thrust) on the ECAM displacement, but not on the FMA. My subsequent failure to confirm the cruise indications on the FMA lead to me not seeing that the aircraft was accelerating into an undesired state. I also think that lack of proficiency was a contributing factor. This was my third flight (second as PF) after seven weeks off. This is the longest I have ever not flown without a simulator refresher before returning to the line.

Ensure that I confirm desired aircraft state on the FMA at every phase of flight.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported an airframe overspeed in cruise that likely resulted from the autothrust not being engaged during takeoff. Captain noted that the failure to see the FMA indications resulted from a lack of proficiency and recency of flying.
ACN: 1744694

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 1
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 700

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 7000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 22330
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 32
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 800
While on a routine FAR part 91 training flight, my student and I were conducting practice landings and remained in the traffic pattern as announced. We had discussed prior to takeoff the importance in non-tower controlled airspace and the importance of vigilance and that we'd make additional radio calls to announce both our position and intentions. In addition, given the student's prior training and holder of a private pilot license, student added the importance of situational awareness of other traffic. We also discussed the importance to observe both the 12 O'clock and final approach area during the base leg due to the close alignment of the parallel runways at our airport.

As we turned from downwind to base, I reiterated to observe the area ahead as well as the final approach area for traffic. Just prior to turning base to final I observed a plane that appeared to be at our 12 O'clock flight for the parallel runway somewhat higher than our altitude. I suddenly realized that the oncoming plane had overshot his turn and instead began a turn to final and aligned with our runway slightly above and ahead of use. I asked the student to execute a go-around so as not to [get] caught in the wake of the encroaching aircraft as at this time it was now ahead and descending for landing our intended runway. We executed the go-around, and re-entered the traffic pattern for a landing. While in the downwind I called the local FBO and asked that they get the tail number for the aircraft that had just landed and asked that the pilot remain at the FBO until my arrival. Upon landing I proceeded to the FBO where I met the pilot as he deplaned. I inquired whether he was aware of his action and he indicated he decided to use the longer of the two runways as he was high and fast, and that he never saw our aircraft. I then inquired at the frequency he was on and he indicated he had requested the UNICOM frequency from ATC and was given XYY.ZA. I indicated to him that the Tower closes at XA00 and the CTAF was the same as the Tower frequency XYB.C...he apologized, but I indicated that in light of the fact he never saw our aircraft that his actions had caused an unsafe near miss and that he should be aware that his actions were not only careless but placed safety and risk to others due to his carelessness. The take away from this event is that because of recent changes in ATC and Tower closures due to the recent cut-backs and pandemic has created unusual risk to safety due partly because of failure by
novice pilot's complacency and lack of experience and non-standard practices. I suggest as a benefit to others to be vigilant in their situational awareness and review basic operating procedures.

**Synopsis**

Instructor pilot reported an airborne conflict with an aircraft that was not on correct frequency.
ACN: 1744678

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744678
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
While performing the flow for the taxi checklist, I forgot to turn on the probe heats. I read the taxi checklist I stated "Anti-Ice - Set." The probe heats remained off for the duration of the flight and I didn't notice until we landed and were taxiing in. It was a clear VFR day and we flew at 13,000 feet for our short flight. Luckily, the probe heat was not critical for this flight, but nonetheless it was an unacceptable error.

This was my first flight in nearly 3 months. Due to COVID-19 I have taken leave and bid for reserve which has led to the long period of not flying. Because I had not flown in a few months I was rusty on my flows. I felt that my recollection was strong enough, but in reality I should have taken some time to review SOPs.

Everyone knows that flying skills and company policies/procedures are highly diminishable. In order to prepare for a flight following a period of inactivity I should have dedicated more time to review my duties. I placed too much confidence in assuming that it would all come back to me as "second nature." I pride myself in being highly standardized, but this time I was too lazy to put in the effort to review. My previous hard work and the excellent training programs within company allowed for a mostly successful flight despite being away from the plane for so long, however I know that more is expected of me and I will strive to be better and more professional.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported forgetting to turn on the probe heat and stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.
Upon boarding my flight I was approached by a Flight Attendant refusing to wear a mask. I inquired why and was informed COVID is fake and masks violate constitutional rights. I was afraid of confrontation to push back further, so I just asked Flight Attendant to stay
away from me. It created an uncomfortable work situation where I had to decide between feeling safe, and wanting to maintain peace. For the rest of the trip not only was my health put at risk, but others were as well. From other cabin to each and every passenger on board, our health was more at risk then it needs to be due to non-compliance of a requirement.

To avoid a lack of CRM and a situation where FAs might become hostile towards each other, as well as for everyone's health and safety, masks must be mandated unless strictly for medical reasons.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported that another Flight Attendant refused to wear a mask during boarding and throughout the flight. Reporter expressed concern that the health of passengers and other cabin crew were put at risk.
ACN: 1744482

Time / Day
Date: 202006
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 900

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 6
Light: Night
Ceiling.Single Value: 12000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use: Direct
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 193
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 0.8
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 174
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744482
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Exited Penetrated Airspace

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
The flight was to keep me current for both day and night flight. This COVID-19 thing has kept me from flying lately. Typically I do this with a general currency flight that starts during daylight and ends at night, so I can get my 3 landings in. I also go through flight maneuvers as a part of the currency. That day I did slow flight, Power on and power off stalls as well as steep turns. I was feeling a little disoriented so discretion being the better part of valor I decided to head back to ZZZ. My preparation for the flight was flawed: 1) I didn't protect my night vision 2) I didn't properly get the aircraft set up for night flying 3) I didn't have my firelight app set up [as it should] have been. When I headed back I flew through ZZZ Class D airspace without communicating. I usually fly around the space and I didn't realize I had entered it until I looked down at the airport. It is very close to ZZZ1 and I just wanted to get the plane on the ground at that point.

Synopsis
GA pilot experienced an airspace incursion while returning from a practice flight. Pilot reported not being fully prepared for the flight and had not flown lately due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1744433

Time / Day
Date: 202005

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Route In Use: Vectors
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Deferred: N
Maintenance Status.Records Complete: N
Maintenance Status.Released For Service: N
Maintenance Status.Required / Correct Doc On Board: N
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type: Scheduled Maintenance
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Work Cards
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Inspection
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Testing

Component
Aircraft Component: Lubrication Oil
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Lead Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744433
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Maintenance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Maintenance
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected.Other
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X was in a storage state during preservation maintenance when an engine run was accomplished on both #1 and #2 engines with their main oil tank empty and their respective main accessory gearbox drained of oil as well.

This is an event that is unprecedented, I am here to focus on how serious this is in regards to determining serviceability of the subject engine(s). As an experienced lead AMT, I am no stranger to engine overhaul, test cell duties, diagnostic test flights or on-wing engine taxi runs. I know how violent an engine reacts when it incurs an internal failure while in operation and to summarize the thought process, it's fortunate that many of these failures happen on the ground during maintenance but some unfortunately happen when an aircraft is in service and in flight.

Every engine manufacturer designed these engines to operate normally on different phases of flight under different conditions providing that the operator/consumer, observes, adheres to all or any operational instructions provided. In regards to engine oil quantity, our company pre-run checklist, before an engine is even operated, it must contain a minimum of 1X quarts of main oil quantity as displayed in the flight deck. I have no doubt that an engine will still operate normally with lesser quantity if oil pressure and oil temps remain normal and no other abnormal parameters are observed. If an anomaly does happen during an engine operation that's related to oil and or lubrication system, especially those observed readings that can indicate an impending failure or incursion beyond its operating limits, the engine in operation must be stopped immediately.

The company has ample resources available to address or troubleshoot these issues in the form of MMs, FIMs, TSMs, etc., and likewise, all modern aircrafts has built in systems known as recorder mediums such as PCM, DMU, and FLT RCDR that can be downloaded as necessary to provide insight and health assessment to many operating parameters including engines at real time or recorded. With the issue we have, none of the recording mediums downloaded has provided us with any source of readings and or indications that may shed light as to how we can possibly approach and deal with this problem.

Here's the issues that I have: These engines were run with no oil in tank and main accessory gearbox oil was drained as well. With the rate of speed that these engines operate even at idle, there are many parts within the scope of the lubrication systems that is dependent on proper oil pressure in order to maintain normal operating temp such as the huge thrust bearings, sideload bearings and other compartment bearings along with
the other critical parts like the scavenge and pressure pumps. Common sense will also dictate that with no oil to begin with, these bearings and critical seals have now been exposed to undetermined excessive heat that may have inflicted heat damage and reduce life cycle on other parts. I have thoroughly searched the MM and TSM in hopes to provide me some insight on how to troubleshoot or address this issue and found none.

In fact, due to my curiosity, I have checked all the other fleets troubleshooting manuals and was unsuccessful as well. The only fleet that came close to addressing an oil pressure issue involves the CFM engines and that’s whenever its engine oil pressure goes below minimum limits that exceeds 30 seconds, the engine is to be replaced. Engines are just not designed to operate with the oil system drained and it’s beyond my scope of knowledge and experience to determine serviceability. Unless an engine manufacturer can provide us insight, recommendations or have experienced a similar event and shares us the information and or make known to us what decision that had to be made, we and the Company is in a serious predicament.

What we are being asked as part of the maintenance process are these EG callouts that instructs to check MCDs and perform numerous engine runs as to ascertain and prove its serviceability. These engine runs are unfounded and lack merit and frankly speaking, they are very dangerous. They clearly appear experimental, based on assumptions and not ECRA supported. These proving engine runs are best authorized and done in a test cell environment where it is safe and properly managed.

In summation, these engines were not run with a low oil qty condition as many may have thought or have been misled to think. One would argue that it still had oil in the form of residuals in the lines and that would be enough to come to a conclusion that all the bearing compartments and other critical areas were not affected or heat damage is not a factor.
These types of arguments are foolish and obviously do not share the same mindset as I and that is to operate with a mindset that's geared towards safety, legality and have a high degree of confidence that the right decision is made, without any doubts or reservations.

The public views us as an airline of choice and as we transport them around, they expect guaranteed reliability, safety and comfort. In conclusion, the decisions to be made hinges on two different paths. One is to render the engine serviceable after maintenance proving runs that is unfounded, lack merit or support from many technicians and frankly speaking, the engine(s) are damaged goods! The other direction is to follow the only recourse that should have been in the first place. Stop these foolish maintenance practices that may prove dangerous downline and do what's right.

**Synopsis**

Lead Aircraft Technician reported an aircraft in storage had both engines run with no oil in either the main oil tank or accessory gearbox.
On Aircraft X, after the cleaner left the plane a small crew went on the plane and accomplished electrostatic cleaning. Afterwards I spoke to the crew about the cleaning. I then started choking and gagging. I am very concerned about the chemicals and the health of people like me as well as others who clean the plane and use this equipment with just a filtered mask. After I left them, my lungs started to clear up fast. But for a long time afterwards I still have some shortness of breath. I know the EPA has issues with this kind of cleaning, but I am very concerned for the health of our employees, vendors, cleaners as well as our passengers. As of today, I don't know what kind of chemicals are being used and the time to keep away from the plane.

I understand the cleaning issues, but it had effects upon me. I don't know the answer to this one.
Air carrier Maintenance employee reported adverse health symptoms after exposure to an aircraft just cleaned using electrostatic spraying.
Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type: Unscheduled Maintenance
Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved: Repair

Component: 1
Aircraft Component: Circuit Breaker / Fuse / Thermocouple
Problem: Improperly Operated

Component: 2
Aircraft Component: Indicating and Warning - Lighting Systems
Problem: Design
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 5685
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 91
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3653
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744335
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
I briefed the crew like I always do, but emphasized to both pilots and FAs the fact that we are making a lot of mistakes. I encouraged everyone to stick to SOP and work together as a crew.

We pre-flighted the aircraft and I made a point to be diligent. That said, you get interrupted and this was the case with my normal inspection of the circuit breaker panel. I normally do this as so as I go into the flight deck. In this case, the FO was not in their seat fully, so I accomplished some initial items, then stepped back. When I returned, I failed to inspect the C/B panels. If I had, I'd have noticed the collared C/Bs for every probe heater.

I went through my overhead flow although I checked the probe heat, I didn't notice that the lights never went out. I think this is possibly due to the fact that every probe heater was ions, so the whole light panel for these probes was lit, as opposed to noticing if only one light failed to extinguish. My error.

We continue with our procedures and briefly noticed before taxi that the panel anti-ice light was lit. The FO jiggles the button and it extinguished. We figured it was just the panel acting up, which it often does. This is a human factors issue. We have become so de-
sensitized to the panel not working that when we get an indication like this, we think nothing of jiggling the switch and continuing if the lights go out. I have the panel stick many times and often when we check it, it take numerous presses from both pilots to get the system to test. This is normalization of deviation, both from and SOP standpoint, but also from a design and system failure standpoint. We all know this system is poor.

When the anti-ice light went out, we continued to takeoff, checking the panel once again, and got no lights. We took the runway and at about 30 knots, the Master Caution light lit up and I took the aircraft and rejected the takeoff. We ran the checklist and cleared the runway to troubleshoot. We had gotten the Master Caution with no associated panel light illuminated. This is not right. We jiggled both panel lights and the anti-ice light in front of the FO came on steady. It should have been on, the entire time. I called Maintenance Control and after talking with the, I taxied back to the gate for maintenance.

They discovered that when the aircraft was pulled from storage, that all the C/Bs for the probe heaters were still collared.

Takeaways for me:
- Late night departure.
- Lack of recent experience, proficiency.
- Interrupted SOPs during preflight.
- Myopia to the illuminated probe heat lights because they were all on. This is not common and doesn't stick out. This may seem strange, but we both looked at the overhead panel numerous times, and even though all the probe heat lights were on, it didn't stick out. If only one had been on, it would have been salient.
- The panel system doesn't work right. We all know this and have learned to accept it. That said, I think we all believe this system needs fixing. It sticks and doesn't test very often.

**Narrative: 2**

Scheduled push of XA:55 local. 3rd flying leg in the previous 33 days. Due to various reasons both the Captain and I completely missed the CB check during our preflight flow. During the recall test for the after start flow, the MC light and Anti-ice annunciation on the panel illuminated. We checked the overhead panel, and the window heat looked normal (no overheat, all green). We then checked the probe heat panel and all of the amber lights were on, however our brains incorrectly registered it as "normal" since there wasn't a broken up pattern (expecting to see one or two lights not in the same state as the others). We then retested the recall check it did not illuminate the MC light or any panel annunciations, even during the recall checks of all subsequent flows. During the takeoff roll, before the engines even achieved T/O N1, the MC light illuminated but no panel annunciations illuminated. The Captain executed a low speed RTO and stopped on a taxi way to troubleshoot. We checked and cleared the recall test multiple times because the only light that kept illuminating was the MC. Only after several recall tests did the anti-ice annunciation on the panel illuminate again. After discussing the situation with Maintenance Control we ended up returning to the gate. Operations started asking us questions and troubleshooting the anti-ice systems. After a couple minutes, the Captain realized that we had completely forgotten to check the CBs and we started looking for any popped CBs. We then saw all the pitot heat CBs pulled and secured with big red collars and flags even though the maintenance release we had was valid. Operations re-secured the CBs and we were on our way.

**Synopsis**
Air carrier flight crew reported rejecting a takeoff in response to multiple warning lights. The aircraft had been in storage and anti-ice circuit breakers had been collared and not removed by Maintenance prior to flight.
**ACN: 1744314**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202005

**Place**
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744314
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

Bottom line - the re-qualification training courses are unsafe and unacceptable for the timelines a pilot has been off the fleet and position. To be straight, many of us are appalled that the union, the company, and the FAA would have ever signed off on this. The rest of the pilots just do not know what they are in for yet.

I have never needed any extra training time nor have I failed any checks in my XY-year career as a pilot. I made the mistake of trusting company judgement after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 when I was displaced off the X/Y fleet (FO) after only my second trip after IOE. I had less than XXX hrs on that fleet and position in those months. I then was able to bid back to it just under X years later. I was put through a 2-day sim refresher and a 3 day PC with 14 days of notice. It was totally inadequate and I had to put in a massive study effort with minimal sleep and still felt that it was all on my shoulders to spool up during that first few months after training. Now, years later, nothing has changed. I have now been surplussed from Captain's seat on the X/Y fleet. Even after X years as a Captain, I cannot hold any the left seat at any domicile on any equipment. I will be an FO once
again after having already done that for over XZ years. I have been off the type FO position for over X years, and off the Z fleet Captain position for over X years. I have been assigned a re-qualification X course, which has been deemed as "sufficient" training.

Apparently, we also have made the mistake of assuming the industry has learned from the type situation and the egregious assumptions made that a bulletin and a video would be enough training for pilots to handle all the differences.

Many of us are backsliding, taking double demotions in some cases, and some getting furloughed yet again. You are standing by the curriculum that pilots who have been off the jet for nearly five years, just need a quick refresher of a sim, then a PV, another sim, then an MV, and then a loft and an then an LOE. Just imagine doing that yourselves. Also, it is often the case that two FOs get assigned together, so we get even less training in those few days due to having to switch roles and seats.

Any pilot off the seat and fleet for more than two years should have a full qualification course. Pilots between 12-24 months should have re-qualification Y, 6-12 months re- qualification X, and 3-6 months re-qualification Z. The alternatives will be pilots needing extra sims, having poor training record marks, failing checks, and not having the knowledge and skill they need restored to fly the line safely. There must be an understanding of both normal ops as well as emergencies. And all training should be to 'proficiency,' not just to 'demonstrated.'

We cannot afford to have any incidents/accidents as we try to emerge from this horrible COVID-19 situation. We expect much more from the company, the union, and the FAA in helping to give us adequate training and the tools we need to do the best and safest flying we can, especially now with all of the distractions and pressures.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported concerns with re-qualification training courses after not flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Assigned a 5 day ZZZZ trip from reserve. On the deadhead leg, I observed non-compliance with the mask policy from one of my fellow crewmembers; simply no face covering worn at any time during the flight despite clear policy and announcements from the FAs. On the working legs, none of the 4 of us wore our masks once the door was closed until we arrived in ZZZZ. All of us wore masks in ZZZZ airport, but that relaxed in the van and at the hotel. On our return, 3 out of 4 of us wore masks through ZZZ. The one who did not was stopped for 30 minutes by the CDC, but not given a reason. As I walked through ZZZ1 after returning, I noticed less than half of uniformed pilots wearing a mask while more than 80% of customers did. My concern is not with any one crewmember, but with two general principles: 1. intentional non-compliance with company policy. 2. reducing customers security both physically and psychologically.
Air carrier First Officer reported inconsistent use of masks per guidelines by crewmembers.
ACN: 1744306

Time / Day
Date: 202005

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 68
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1170
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1744306
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Other / Unknown
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy
**Narrative: 1**

While conducting my crew briefing with my mask on this flight, I felt safety was compromised. I was unable to conduct the briefing in the same manner I had before. Instead of a collaboration of the crew I felt my brief was a mandate, just a lecture from the boss. I found it difficult to judge the facial expressions of the crew during my briefing items with their faces covered. I feel the crew thought the same about me with my mask on. Several minutes later the lead FA asked me several questions that I went over in that brief that validated my concern that my brief was subpar due to the face mask requirement. It was as if this crew member was not in attendance for the brief. I pride myself in my clear and concise briefings as a way to bring the crew together to lay the groundwork for a successful safe flight. My reflection of my brief after was I would have had just as much success not briefing at all. I feel the mask, in a briefing situation, degrades safety and why I submit this report. I am not commenting for or against on any other facet of the face mask policy except for the briefing.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported concerns with wearing masks during pre-flight crew briefings.
ACN: 1744199

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 14000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Light Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 8000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 150
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 250
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744199
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Enroute, we were cruising at 14,000 feet awaiting a climb (planned FL340). My FO and I heard us cleared to FL270 from Center. My FO read the climb clearance back without comment from ATC. We began a climb and sometime just above 16,000 feet, ATC came on frequency with instructions to descend; that we were not cleared to climb. We immediately began a descent. I apologized and explained what we heard and read back. ATC did not respond. Remainder of interaction with Controller was uneventful, as was the remainder of the flight.

With the pandemic, prior discussions with ATC informed me that less traffic volume has resulted in Controllers covering more simultaneous sectors. I'm wondering if the climb clearance was given to an aircraft on a different frequency (with a similar call sign) such that we heard no other aircraft read back the clearance, further reinforcing our belief that the clearance was for us. My FO and I discussed the event and still believed that our tail number received the clearance.

Synopsis
Pilot reported a communication issue resulted in an altitude deviation.
ACN: 1744193

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3490
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 2.5
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744193
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution
**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Primary Problem: Human Factors  

**Narrative: 1**

Aircraft X was on an IFR flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 at 4,000 feet. Was flying the GPS XXR approach into ZZZ1. Approach at XYZ.X cleared me for the approach into ZZZ1 and to contact Tower. Approach did not give me the Tower frequency and I looked up the frequency on the approach plate and mistook the UNICOM frequency of XYY.AB and broadcasted my position and intentions. I thought it was odd that I did not hear any response, but with COVID-19 conditions I was not sure and continued to broadcast to short final and landed. I taxied back for an IFR flight back to ZZZ2 when a pickup truck pulled up beside my plane. I used ground XYX.C to find out my deviation and followed the truck to park and call Tower. I realize now that the correct Tower frequency is XYD.X.

I picked up an IFR flight plan back to ZZZ2 without incident and flew the GPS XY approach into ZZZ2 to a full stop.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported being on the incorrect frequency and thinking it was odd that no other aircraft were heard while landing.
ACN: 1744138

Time / Day

Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1

Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1744138
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion

Person: 2

Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1744139
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Arriving at ZZZ, after approach check was completed, on a very light traffic day, I was cleared "ILS X, 2,000 till established." I stayed at 2,000 until intercepting the glide slope and did not meet the mandatory 1,500 at ZZZZZ. When I checked on with Tower they said, "I guess Controller gave you relief from ZZZZZ?" We were almost on top of ZZZZZ at this time and could not make the restriction. I don't know why, but I thought, "2,000 until established" gave me relief from the ZZZZZ crossing restriction.

1) I was lulled into a false sense of ease. Due to Coronavirus there was very little traffic in X airspace and it was a beautiful visual day. Usually I would have been hyper-alert in that airspace, but it was more like going into non busy area or something. 2) Expectation bias- I expected the clearance to say, "2,000 until established, ZZZZZ at 1,500, cleared for the ILS X." When Controller cleared me, I thought, "I don't have to cross ZZZZZ at 1,500, Controller gave me 2,000 until established." 3) Weak approach brief-my PNF mentioned afterward that he forgot about the mandatory 1,500 at ZZZZZ. Had I briefed more thoroughly, he may have caught my mistake, but since I didn't verbalize the ZZZZZ - 1,500 feet restriction, he was not in the loop. 4) I did not verbalize my intention when Controller gave me the clearance- I should have said something like, "2,000 until established, I don't have to make ZZZZZ at 1,500." My PNF might have then recognized my stupidity.

Narrative: 2
Arriving into ZZZ I was the pilot monitoring and was on approach control frequency. We were initially clear direct ZZZZZZ1 and later given a heading of 090 to intercept. We were then given "On heading 090 maintain 2,000 till established, cleared for the ILS X, contact ZZZ Tower." The PF armed the approach and neither of us took note of the mandatory altitude of 1,500 at ZZZZZ even though both of us have flown this approach many times in the past. When I contacted the Tower we were cleared to land. Tower then said "I guess you were given relief on the altitude at ZZZZZ." Without thinking I replied "Yes." I then looked at the approach chart and noted the altitude requirement. No further comment from Tower and no request for a phone call were made.

This error was caused by complacency due to the fact it was severe VMC and we had been on the approach many times. The approach briefing was "Visual approach backed up by the ILS". The briefing should have been more thorough but it was lax due to the conditions. My monitoring was lax in that I didn't look over the approach chart to note the mandatory crossing altitude.

In the future I will make sure we do a complete briefing of the approach chart even in VMC conditions.

Synopsis
Flight crew reported missing a crossing restriction during approach.
**ACN: 1744131**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202006
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Final Approach
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1744131
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Primary Problem : Human Factors  

**Narrative: 1**  
We were cleared for a visual approach Runway X into ZZZ. FO was flying he configured to gear down flaps 30 when the glideslope came alive at the FAF ZZZZZ. The fix is around 3.5 NM from the runway. As we were descending on glideslope I told the FO, that we were at 1,400 feet AFE and to continue slowing down since he was around 165 kts, in order for us to be stable by 1,000 feet, he continued slowing down, and asked for flaps 45 degrees. Unfortunately, by the time we reach 1,000 we were fully configured for landing but too fast, so I told him to go-around and try it again. We completed a go-around per the POH profile, I spoke with Approach and Tower and eventually we received vectors back around to Runway X where we landed without any further issues. They asked the reason for the go-around, I told them it was due to being unstable. Flight attendants and passengers were notified as we were being vectored back to Runway X and After landing and arriving at the gate, Dispatch was notified.

I detected our height from the field elevation around 1,400 AFE and noticed that we were still too fast around 165 kts judging our distance from the runway and a 3.0 degree angle glide path, I asked the FO to keep slowing down so we could be stable by 1,000 feet, he did by asking flaps 45 before landing checklist, but by the time we were at 1,000 feet we were too fast still. Therefore, unstable.

FO being fully configured by 1,000 feet but too fast. Therefore, not complying with all the criteria required for a stable approach.

FO reacted by slowing down and asking for flaps 45 degrees, unfortunately by the time we reached 1,000 feet we were too fast. Therefore, I asked him to go-around and try the approach again.

Before the flight, the FO introduced himself and told me he was a low time FO and hasn't flown much in the past 2 months, most likely due to the reduced flying situation the industry is experiencing at the time. He told me he was still low time. He did very well during the entire flight, unfortunately by the time we were executing the approach he started getting behind the airplane by the time he asked for gear down flaps 30, because he thought that he had enough distance to keep slowing down the airplane he took his time, without realizing that the ZZZZZ FAF fix is only 3.5 NM from the runway slightly closer than others standard FAF at different airports/approaches and therefore he should've kept slowing down. I pointed to the fact that we were approaching 1,000 feet around 1,400 feet that and he was too fast still too fast, he reacted by asking for flaps 45 degrees. However, by the time we reached 1,000 feet he was still too fast. He performed the go-around and his second approach was much better. I would say a suggestion for this issue would be to rotate new low time FO's to fly more often whenever is possible. I know it's hard due to the current flying demand, but after we talked after landing about why we went around, he said he hasn't flow much in the past 2 months and unfortunately he fell behind during the approach phase of the flight.

**Synopsis**  
Air carrier Captain reported an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around.
**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference Airport: ZZZ Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude AGL Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
- Crew Size Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Airspace Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function Flight Crew: Captain
- Function Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience Flight Crew Total: 21000
- ASRS Report Number Accession Number: 1744087
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Communication Breakdown Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown Party2: Ground Personnel

**Events**
- Anomaly Flight Deck Cabin Aircraft Event: Illness
- Anomaly Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector Person: Flight Attendant
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result General: Physical Injury / Incapacitation

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors
Narrative: 1

After forward entry door closed, I was advised by #1 FA that we had a sick passenger on board, and a CSM had okayed travel by the passenger. At the same time, I got a call from the #4 FA advising me that the passenger was acting sick/nauseous and disoriented and was causing a lot of concern with the other passengers, who were concerned about their safety and health. This was the first time I was informed of the passenger issue, CSM never consulted or briefed me. We had no way to isolate [the] ill passenger. Contacted operations to have CSM return to aircraft.

Was told that passenger had been denied boarding on a previous flight, and paramedics had attended to passenger and okayed the travel, but there was no record of this or witnesses, just what the passenger claimed. I asked CSM if the passenger's temperature had been taken, it had not. I asked that be done, but they had to get a thermometer from outside security.

While waiting for the thermometer, and after further consultation with the FA's concerning their interaction with the passenger, as well as increasing concern by other passengers about traveling with a passenger that was exhibiting obvious signs of illness of some type, I decided to have the passenger removed from the flight to ensure the safety of my crew and passengers because of the behavior and symptoms being exhibited by the passenger in question and the unknown cause of illness.

In my opinion, poor screening by gate and CSM personal, desire to not deal with an issue and try to push it off on the crew, hoping to let the problem be handled by the flight crew and not dealt with by the gate personnel.

In these times during a national health pandemic, we need to be more cautious and err on the side of safety for the majority of the passengers and crew rather than avoiding making a decision that affects just one passenger or crew. We, as an airline, including gate/CSM personnel, need to treat these situations as if the potentially ill passenger is going to go back and sit down next to one of our family or loved ones. Also, we need to consider the optics of allowing a visibly ill passenger onto an aircraft with a public that has a heightened awareness and concern about the health conditions of other passengers. Also, the CSM and agents need to get the Captain in the loop about things that are going on his/her aircraft. I am absolutely floored that the first I heard about this was by my flight attendants after the agent had given me the final check before closing the door. I hate to say it, but this was yet another example of the degradation of not only Captain’s authority, but also professional respect for the Captain and the entire flight crew.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported having to remove a passenger showing symptoms of illness.
ACN: 1744071

**Time / Day**
Date: 202005

**Environment**
Light: Night

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

**Component**
Aircraft Component: Data Transmission and Automatic Calling
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Dispatch: Dispatcher
Qualification: Dispatch: Dispatcher
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1744071
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Dispatch

**Events**
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly: Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector: Person: Dispatch

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Aircraft

**Narrative: 1**

The Captain operating Flight AB contacted flight control over SATCOM to request to speak with Dispatch and Maintenance regarding the malfunction of their CPDLC. Maintenance told the crew that if they preferred they could issue an MEL to defer the CPDLC, as long as the Captain and dispatch agreed it was deferrable. The Captain wanted to continue with the deferral and I stated that I would review the route, NOTAMs and Jepp to verify there were no restrictions. The first step I took was to review the enroute NOTAMs over waypoint ZZZ VOR because that is a known hotspot. There was a NOTAM for ZZZ1 VOR that stated "If" the aircraft was capable of logging onto CPDLC that it was preferred for that route. I interpreted the wording of the NOTAM to mean that it was preferred, but not required. To continue my investigation of the NOTAM over ZZZ1 I searched "CPDLC" in the state rules and procedures for Country X in the Jepp airway manual text. Under "Route 1234, Y1, Y2 procedures" it states "data link service, CPDLC/ADS-C, is applied to the Routes 1234 [ZZZZZ-ZZZZZ], Y1 and Y2." And then there is a table for "Country mainland data link routes operational conditions" and lists CPDLC requirement, again, only for 1234, Y1 and Y2. Then I searched CPDLC for the rest of the state rules and procedures for the countries along the rest of the route and referenced an email from the training department that confirms that our aircraft, can operate in Continent X with no FL restriction with CPDLC inop. Then I confirmed to the Captain that I could not find any restrictions preventing us from using the deferral and continuing the flight as planned. The CPDLC deferral does require the ATC strip to be modified to reflect the loss of CPDLC, so I attempted to rerun the flight plan, but LIDO was not able to rerun the flight plan and gave an error message that there were no available FL on airway X111. When I reviewed the enroute NOTAMs for X111, there was an airway restriction up to FL310, and I mistakenly assumed that LIDO was misinterpreting the NOTAM and restricting the entire airway then in perfect storm timing the enroute airway restriction NOTAM was canceled and I reran the flight plan (and assume that I mistakenly reran the flight plan without the MEL applied) and was able to run the flight plan on another OFP, confirming my belief that it was just a misinterpreted NOTAM by LIDO. Then I wanted to be certain that I did not mess with the planned fuel or planned altitudes by simply canceling and refiling the ATC strip on the filed OFP instead of sending a whole new flight plan with a new OFP this was to prevent accidentally changing any current info, due to the flight being ready to block for departure, and also to receive acknowledgment from all countries listed under the ATC filing, which I did receive acknowledgment and no reject from all of them. It was not until I came in the next day that I was informed by a Senior Dispatcher that there were two RNP4 airways that were on the route, X111 ZZZZ1 to ZZZZZ2, and Y999 ZZZZZ2 to ZZZZZ3. I quickly realized that I had been scanning for any restrictions to CPDLC and not also looking for restrictions to RNP4 (which would have led me straight to the RNP4 routes listed in the airway manual text).

My suggestions moving forward after reviewing this situation. I felt pressure due to time constraints because 1) The flight was nearing their ETD and the route for ZZZZ1 to ZZZZZ2 is notorious for airway closures and I did not want to risk possibly delaying into them, 2) The flight was ready to block and if it was possible to continue with the deferral then I did not want to cause a delay, 3) The Continent X desks (at least mine) are seemingly always setup with flights departing very close to the same time. I was also responsible for Flight AC ZZZZ3-ZZZZZ2 and XXX ZZZ-ZZZZZ2 which both departed within an hour of each other and I was already almost an hour and a half behind on planning due to the ZZZZ1 deferral and there are multiple NOTAMs to review for XX and XXX can be time consuming to find an efficient route to cross that is also approved by [foreign ATC]. In fact I had to notify the
Supervisor that it was possible that I would not have XXX paperwork submitted in time, but was able to barely make the 2 hour deadline.

The next issue was that due to coronavirus separations I was the only dispatcher in Continent X control in my building so I did not have anyone directly next to me to start the dispatch release process and failed to ask my fellow dispatchers on the ocean side for assistance. Lastly, guidelines for constant issues with CPDLC freezing state that if the CPDLC freezes before departure to contact maintenance and have them accomplish the circuit breaker reset procedure. So from now on I will insist that maintenance follow through with this procedure instead of defaulting to a deferral.

Synopsis

Dispatcher reported re-routing issues associated with the deferral of a flight's CPDLC system.
ACN: 1744067

Time / Day
Date: 202005

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Component
Aircraft Component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1744067
Human Factors: Confusion

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number : 1744068
Human Factors : Confusion

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result. Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Experienced Maintenance delay prior to departure which eventually resulted in an aircraft swap. New aircraft came from hangar and required an additional troubleshoot to clear avionics discrepancy. Asked to refile after cleared to taxi. This was the start of mild mental fatigue. After takeoff we experienced a high workload with multiple heading, altitude and frequency changes. The pilot flying called for the after takeoff checklist. I did the after takeoff flow and ran through the after takeoff checklist. I read the 'thrust rating climb checked' and looked at the climb button to verify that I had pressed it, but failed to specifically look on EICAS to verify that CLB was reflected. When we reached cruise altitude the PF called for the cruise checklist and upon running the cruise checklist we realized that we were still in TO-1 and pressing the cruise button would not change the thrust setting. It became apparent that during the takeoff run the thrust was inadvertently placed in the max power detent and was the reason CLB and CRZ power was not established during the climb. We established CRZ power and continued the flight. Upon arrival I called Operations and was told that because we did not receive any warning/caution/advisory message the aircraft did not require any further inspection.

Mild mental fatigue prior to departure due to maintenance delays and trouble shooting. Lack of experience/proficiency and recent experience in 'type.' Mental saturation during a high workload phase of flight. Failure to diligently cross-check while running a checklist.

Adhere to SOP and diligently cross-check during checklist execution. The Coronavirus has created an unprecedented situation for all of us. After receiving the minimum IOE, I had only flown four legs when everything shut down in ZZZ. I didn't fly for almost three months. The flight regarding this report was my third leg since the shutdown. I think that the company should be looking more closely at who (while still technically legal) may need refresher training/recurrent/more IOE etc. Currency/consolidation/proficiency isn't just a legality, it is also a factor in the safety of our employees and passengers.

Narrative: 2
I was pilot flying. Upon reaching cruise flight and calling for the cruise checklist (approximately 10 minutes after takeoff), the CA and I noticed that the thrust setting on the EICAS display was showing TO-1 rather than CLB. When we tried to select CRZ thrust setting, the EICAS still showed TO-1. It was then that we realized the thrust levers were still in the detent, thus preventing the setting of any other thrust settings besides TO-1. When we pulled the thrust levers out of the detent and re-selected CRZ, "CRZ" appeared
on the EICAS, and we continued the flight to ZZZ. After landing at ZZZ, the CA called maintenance to ask if we should write up that the thrust rating appeared to have been left in TO-1 until cruise. Maintenance said because no warning/caution/advisory messages showed up, we did not need to write it up.

I had inadvertantly pushed the thrust levers into the detent on takeoff. I have a habit of glancing at the thrust rating to back up the pilot monitoring after they say, "After Takeoff Checklist complete," but I was mildly distracted by the busy departure and did not do that this time.

When I am pilot flying, I plan to be careful to continue my habit of checking the thrust rating on the EICAS when the After Takeoff Checklist is complete.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported he had inadvertently pushed the thrust levers into detent setting on takeoff, which was not recognized until reaching cruise flight.
ACN: 1744042

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude MSL Single Value: 4000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace Class D: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace Class G: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization: Government
Function: Air Traffic Control: Departure
Function: Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Function: Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1744042

Events
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1

I was working the Satellite sector. I had several aircraft in my airspace on two frequencies and constant shout line communication. I was delivering aircraft to the adjacent sector at even altitudes (correct direction of flight). ZZZ Tower tagged and coordinated a VFR aircraft with an alternator issue as what I deemed could be a possible emergency, but I was not in communication with the aircraft. A separate target not tagged indicated 4,000 feet. To prevent a possible conflict I climbed the multiple aircraft I was delivering to 6,000. This altered the altitude we usually deliver aircraft in that sector. I received a arrival to ZZZ at 5,000, knowing I would have to separate my arrival from the aircraft with the alternator issue not on frequency I started the aircraft decent earlier than usual. I cleared the ZZZ arrival aircraft to ZZZZZ, the initial approach fix. I descended an arrival aircraft to Runway X based on the lateral course ZZZZZ offered. The aircraft made a very slow course to ZZZZZ. Realizing the conflict I issued heading to diverge the courses. Shoutline, multiple frequencies, workload and reduced staffing all played a role in this error.

With reduced staffing during this pandemic, we are working with less of the manpower we are normally afforded. While commercial traffic is down general aviation has remained solid. We need to staff based on the demand.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict and attributed it to staffing levels due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1744041

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 4
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1744041
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

ZZZ was using Runway X configuration due to the winds. Aircraft X flew into ZZZ Airspace on the Arrival and was told to report ZZZZZ, expect Runway X. When they reported ZZZZZ, I advised to fly a right downwind for Runway X. In the meantime, I had moved an aircraft on Ground Frequency and also cleared at least two other aircraft the use of Runway X. I cleared Aircraft X sequence and clearance to land Runway X. They read back Runway X. There was one aircraft in the Runway X local traffic pattern and I moved to sequence and clear him behind Aircraft X, but could not find Aircraft X out the window, until I saw him very short final, if not over the threshold for Runway Y. I immediately sent him around and advised I had cleared him for Runway X, told him on climbout to turn left, and fly a left downwind for Runway X. By this time the traffic pattern aircraft was well into the right downwind approaching right base turn. Aircraft X had turned left to join left downwind for Runway Y, conflicting with the traffic pattern aircraft. I told Aircraft X to immediately climb and turn westbound and issued traffic. Aircraft X reported the traffic insight. Thankfully the right base pattern traffic had already started their descent down in preparation for Runway X arrival, but I had not seen that at the time of the immediate climb clearance. I told them to extend out to the shoreline and enter right base Runway X, and asked if they understood that we are landing Runway X, the eastbound runway, and they said yes. I had to point them out to ZZZ1 Tower while they maneuvered back inbound to Runway X. They landed and taxied to park.

This could have been a major issue had my pattern traffic, or any other arrivals for that matter been on short final or approach. The pattern traffic aircraft (sorry I forget his call sign) was on the departure end of Runway X and was not affected by the Runway Y go-around.

I did not Brasher the pilot because I wasn’t 100% sure if I had misspoken and wanted to listen to the tapes.

Aircraft X is a student trainer aircraft. There could have been instruction going on and distraction, however the pilot in command read back Runway X several times. The flight school location on the field changed recently- and often for convenience in taxiing, they request to land Runway Y- so there could have been some expectation bias from the pilot going on. I did see two pilots exit the plane when they parked on their ramp.

At the time of the incident, I was the only Air Traffic Controller on the clock. The previous Controller’s shift was over and that is when Aircraft X initially called inbound. Coronavirus has us down two controllers, so we are operating summer traffic on winter hours, staying open only until XA pm instead of normal XC am. With daylight lasting later into the evenings, traffic is staying steady later into the evenings. Typically on summer hours, at the time of this occurrence, there would have still be 2 controllers on position and this had a better chance of getting caught sooner and alleviating the situation. To have more eyes in the Tower later in the evening and to accommodate safer operations for everyone, I would recommend some changes to scheduling. I would recommend a 1-9, 2-10, and 215-10:15 to help alleviate workload and increase safety.
Synopsis

Center Controller reported an aircraft attempting to land on the wrong runway resulting in another aircraft executing a go-around.
ACN: 1743932

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 5000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1743932
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1743943
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Rejected Takeoff
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

Taxiing out for takeoff in ZZZ, Ground Control cleared us to taxi to Runway XXL. One minute later, ATC then said to change runway to XXR. We, as the crew, accomplished the runway change checklist and got all set for takeoff. ZZZ Tower cleared us for takeoff on Runway XXR. As we lined up on the runway, the Captain gave me control of the aircraft. I advanced the thrust levers and called "Set Takeoff Thrust." Approaching what I believe was the 80 knot call, I heard a transmission from ZZZ Tower saying "Flight XX Cancel takeoff clearance if able." The Captain resumed control of the aircraft and rejected the takeoff. We stopped on the runway, and turned off and queried ATC as to why we were asked to cancel the takeoff. We were informed that ZZZ Center was having staffing issues and they didn't want us in the air quite yet. We as a crew felt that was not an appropriate reason to reject given the phase of flight, and because of this we incurred a 30 minute delay and put excessive wear on the tires and brakes on the airplane. In the future, I would recommend that staffing issues of an air traffic control facility are not justified causes for rejected a takeoff in a heavy jet airliner and once a takeoff clearance is issued, unless there is an imminent emergency, the takeoff is not rejected.

Narrative: 2

Approaching 80 kts during the takeoff, ATC said "Flight AB, if you can, cancel takeoff clearance." The 80 knot call was missed and the reject was initiated around 95 knots. We cleared the runway to the right on XX taxiway and then held on XY taxiway for 20 minutes for the brake temps to decrease from 320 degrees to less than 150 degrees with the fans ON. As we were waiting, I asked ATC what the reason for the cancellation of the takeoff clearance. He said ZZZ Center was getting saturated with the current staffing issue. Runway XXL was closed at our departure time. We were cleared to cross XXL and cleared for takeoff XXR. From that clearance to the reject was maybe 2 minutes or so. While hearing ATC ask us to reject, I didn't know if someone had crossed XXR downfield, were we on fire, was there smoke, was there a vehicle or person on the runway. Had I known it was for ZZZ Center saturation, I would have elected to continue the takeoff. Had we continued the takeoff, would we have continued on course, maybe hold or been given vectors, or stay at a lower altitude until ZZZ Center accepted us. I don't know, but any of those would be a better option than a reject. If ATC was saturated, whether ZZZ1 or ZZZ
Center, having us reject was not the best course of action. Had we been at a higher speed and still rejected this would have been a lot worse. Fuse plugs on the mains would have let go causing X flat tires, fire trucks rolled, we’d be unable to clear the runway, and the airport would have closed. In the future, if Center is busy and we are on the roll, ATC should not ask us to reject our takeoff.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported that Tower instructed them to abort the takeoff roll which was requested by the ARTCC facility due to traffic and staffing issues and could not yet accept the flight into their airspace.
ACN: 1743906

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 39000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Medium Transport
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 8100
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 30
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 700
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743906
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

On IFR cross-country ferry flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1, we were level at FL390 and ZZZ Center switched us to XYY.ZA crossing into State X. We checked on to the frequency, but heard no response. We decided to wait and check-in again in the event there was a Controller switch or other delay. We mistakenly waited too long to make contact with ARTCC via charted frequency or guard frequency, because several minutes later we realized we hadn't been called or heard other aircraft. Quiet ARTCC frequencies have become more prevalent during the COVID-19 travel restrictions and low air traffic volume. We attempted contact one more time on XYY.ZA and got no response, so then we looked up the ZZZ Center frequency for our location on the IFR chart and immediately reestablished contact with ZZZ Center. No unusual comments from the Controller. Flight was uneventful from that point.

We may have been transferred to an incorrect frequency, as both pilots remembered hearing XYY.ZA. I don't think we were monitoring XBX.A, as our VHF radio does not have a specific guard monitoring feature. We were monitoring BCY.Z on our UHF radio. We should have been more timely in establishing contact with previous center sector or charted frequency once our initial call was unanswered. No traffic conflicts were reported by ATC, and no questions or queries about the event by any ATC facility.

Synopsis

Pilot reported that after checking in on Center frequency, no response was received for some time. The pilot delayed locating an alternative frequency due to the quiet frequencies that have become prevalent during COVID-19 reduction in air traffic volume.
**ACN: 1743857**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Door Area
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743857
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Upon arrival, as the A FA, I made disarming announcement, disarmed door and cross checked my door (L1) and the R1 door. I then waited for jet bridge and CSA, gave thumbs up, waited for knock, then opened door. As I was opening I heard the interphone "ring." The D answered it. After I stepped away from door to let guests off, I asked the D what the back FAs needed. The D stated that they were relaying that the AFT doors were disarmed. I had forgotten to call them.

I take full responsibility. I rarely fly A, and due to COVID, I haven't been on an airplane in almost 2 months. I was trying to go slow and be cautious. But missed that important step.

**Synopsis**
Air carrier Flight Attendant reported forgetting to notify other FAs that the AFT doors were disarmed. Flight Attendant stated not having been in an airplane for an extended time due to the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the event.
**ACN: 1743853**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005

**Environment**
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Cabin Lighting: Off

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person, Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Service
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1743853

**Events**
- Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: In-flight

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was flying in A position. About 20 minutes into the flight a passenger began coughing violently in row X window seat Captain's side. I went over, passenger threw up in mask. I was about 2 feet away to help assist. I gave passenger napkins, a new mask, and several double bagged trash bags. I went to ask how passenger felt. Passenger said very nauseous and ate before flight andusually never eats before flight. Flies all the time. I said okay. I turned on air vent and put a cool towel on passenger's head and gave passenger water. I told passenger to ring me again for anything. Ten minutes later I heard
passenger wheezing and coughing again. Passenger’s mask was off and was puking in the bag. Again I was two feet away. Passenger was retching and coughing in my face. I told passenger to put a mask on in order for me to assist safely. Passenger did. I asked passenger to tell me what's going on again and if oxygen [was needed] or for me to call for medical personnel on board. Passenger declined both. Passenger can't breathe and feels hot. I call the Captain and tell him what is happening. Based on the coughing and hotness alone he and [I] both decided EMT's should meet the flight during this pandemic. Passenger doesn't throw up anymore. We land. EMT's are there upon arrival along with supervisors and gate agent. I tell the supervisors, gate agent and airport personnel what happened. The EMT's said passenger had airsickness and left. I called the base and spoke to Person A. I told her what happened and my concerns and that I wanted to take a test since passenger coughed directly in my face and the puke bag with bodily fluid was open. I was told by Person A and Person B, because I notified them of the incident if I test positive, I will not be pulled with pay, since I notified them. The supervisors need to have correct information if exposed to COVID-19 while on duty.

Synopsis

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported interacting with a sick passenger in flight who was possibly exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms.
**ACN: 1743844**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

**Component**
Aircraft Component: Transponder
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1743844
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

**Events**
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

During the second half of our flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 while in the cruise portion of the flight, the FO pointed out the transponder was still in ALT On and not TA/RA. We switched it to TA/RA and continued the flight. My mistake for not visually confirming during the "Before Takeoff" Flow and Checklist and my recommendation is to remind crews to really take their time and visually identify items are completed because a lot of us are going weeks or might go a month or longer without flying since COVID lessened our customers desire to travel. Best case I would recommend rotating people through scheduled trips to try to get people to fly at least every other week to maintain everyone's proficiency, but I understand that may be a tough wish.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported not recognizing until cruise that the transponder was set incorrectly. Captain recommended that crews visually confirm checklist items since many pilots are flying infrequently due to COVID-19 reductions in travel demands.
**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743828
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative:** 1
Had a lot of confusion and miss communication at the beginning of a passenger event. Originally I was told that there was a passenger at the gate who does not have a face mask isn't going to wear one. Also that that passenger was telling people at the gate of having had the virus already. On top of that I was told this passenger had a medical problem they were traveling to ZZZ to be worked on. I was also hearing that passenger was being disruptive.

One of my flight attendants had a concern of this passenger still being contagious and being a disruptive passenger. With the passenger still being at the gate I started to receive more information I was told to contact MedLink. Turns out that the gate had already been in touch with MedLink and the passenger had already been cleared by MedLink. As for the pre-existing medical condition, the passenger told the gate of not wearing a mask because it causes asthma attacks. I verified this to be a possibility with MedLink on my side.

As for the disruptive behavior I spoke with the station manager and he informed me that the passenger was being cooperative and only just understandably a little frustrated. I asked him if he thought passenger would be an issue in flight and he indicated that he did not believe that to be the case. After speaking with my flight attendant about her concerns we decided they had all been resolved and we allowed the passenger to board the flight. I think this is new to all of us and I don't think I could do anything different.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported a series of miscommunications regarding a boarding passenger who was possibly contagious with COVID-19. After the Captain spent time resolving the issue, it was determined that the passenger could be allowed to board.
ACN: 1743824

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743824
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Regained Aircraft Control
Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On departure out of ZZZ was given a heading after taking off and to level at 6,000 feet. I turned to the heading and let the nose [go] below the flight director to try and give an easier level off. At first I reduced the throttles manually, but as we were also looking for traffic ahead I let go of the throttles while looking outside and ended up speeding up to about 265 knots before realizing it. I immediately pulled the throttles back and added back pressure.

I believe I underestimated how rusty I might be from barely flying this month. Going forward I’m going to rely more on following the flight director much closer, especially because of how little I’m flying.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain had an airspeed deviation and cited being rusty due lack of flying as contributing.
The flight plan had us going straight across via ZZZZZ so minimum time to coast out. I logged us into CPDLC with ZZZZZ Oceanic ATC Operations and we did the circle and tick procedures. Then shortly before ZZZZZ ATC re-routed us over ZZZZZZ1 and then told us service terminated, squawk XXXX. We dialed up XYX.Z and XYA.Z on the radios. This was
my first flight in over 3 months due to COVID schedule reductions. In the process of all of this, we forgot to get a SELCAL Ck with ZZ Radio. I caught this later in the flight and we did the SELCAL check with ZZ Radio. Flight continued uneventfully.

We got busy with multiple tasks in a short period of time and overlooked the SELCAL check. I was using the ZZZ Reference Ck list on my iPAD but since you can't check off the items on the iPad it's not as effective as using the actual paper copy. Also, having not flown in so long creates another challenge as I had probably lost some of my regular flow that comes with flying more regularly. These are pilot not flying tasks but as the Captain, it is my responsibility to make sure they get done.

Lessons learned: Be sure to use the paper copy of the Reference Guide checklist. There is great value in being able to look and see if any check marks are missing on the checklist.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain forgot to do a SELCAL check and cited as contributing factors multiple tasks in a short period and having not flown in a long time.
I relieved my fellow Controller, they informed me during the briefing that ZZZ Approach (ZZZ) was open. I sat down and applied my mid configuration settings. My mid configuration settings default to ZZZ airspace not being depicted because typically when we work the Mid shift, ZZZ is closed. I forgot to show that the airspace was open on my scope. I had an IFR aircraft, Aircraft X, westbound and 080. I checked the routing on Aircraft X and it was good so I tried to initiate a handoff to ZZZ1 Approach which was still about 60 miles away. The handoff failed, I assumed it failed because the aircraft was too far from ZZZ1's boundary. I didn't look into it any further. Because I tried to initiate the
handoff to ZZZ1, the aircraft's auto handoff was inhibited and ended up flying about one mile into ZZZ airspace without a handoff until I received a call from ZZZ asking if I was talking with Aircraft X. I said yes, and proceeded to hand off the aircraft and ship them to ZZZ.

During this pandemic I should have changed my mid configuration settings to default to showing ZZZ open. We are on a mid configuration more often due to low volume and if I had been depicting ZZZ airspace I would not have forgotten that they were open and I would have sent the handoff to them before violating their airspace.

**Synopsis**

Controller reported using a configuration that did not show an airspace that was open. Controller thought airspace was closed and had an airspace violation.
**ACN: 1743749**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference
  - ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Night

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Initial Climb
- Route In Use.SID: ZZZ
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 11300
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 5
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 50
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743749
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors
Narrative: 1

Altitude deviation due to poor CRM while PIC was flying with auto pilot off. Contributing factor low recent flying due to COVID slow down. Deviation immediately reported to ATC and corrected.

Synopsis

Corporate pilot reported having an altitude deviation while hand-flying the aircraft and attributed it to lack of flying due to the COVID-19 slow down.
ACN: 1743722

Time / Day
Date: 202005

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743722
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Manuals
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Due to new FAA exemptions, concerns arise from the jumpseat alternative being away from the interphone and the cabin. Flight attendants sitting in passenger seats are not and have not been listening to the phone when it rings. If you're in a seat during a critical phase of flight issue, we are unable to receive the proper communication about the incident without making it known to the whole cabin in the area around the cabin seat allocated for the flight attendant. Social distancing has more negative issues than positive. Safety is being compromised as not being able to see outside the airplane and understand
any potential evacuation responsibilities. Window shades are asked to be raised and is not enforceable. Medical conditions exist that prevent people from wearing a mask, and it's not enforceable. Flight deck jumpseat has not [been] restricted with X people in the flight deck is severe social proximity and international flights with X to Y pilots in the flight deck also engage in safety of flight issues which is why social distancing policy is not mandated. By allowing flight attendants to sit outside of our jumpseats, it is a safety of flight issue and should not be allowed.

Also anytime sitting on a jumpseat, is a safety issue during safety of flight times aka sterile flight. Due to the need to have to be able to speak, yell, and command an evacuation at a moment's notice with instant communication from the flight deck, face covering policy should be exempted from times performing criticism functions. The current policy does not address this in specific form and needs to be addressed.

Flight Attendant Operations Manual announcement per aircraft is not updated regarding removal of masks during decompression and needs to be added to specific language of every live demo and updated in safety video. Adding announcement outside of the Flight Attendant Operations Manual announcement is not as effective.

Not properly demonstrating the oxygen mask and demo life vest is compromising safety due to distance measure of passengers not being able to see the demonstration. CDC now says that the virus does not have reasonable transmission from surfaces.

Mask policy face covering should also be considered revised as mandatory due to the time of useful consciousness at high altitudes. Due to the 6-10 seconds at high altitudes, we could have more severe issues with the time it takes to remove a face covering, mask, shield, etc., and endangering the lives of our crew and passengers. In addition, there has been no CDC testing that has proven people without symptoms have transmitted to another person. In addition, there is not documented test that has proven this to be effective. There are documented health concerns, however, regarding the mandatory face covering of the nose and mouth with high altitude limited oxygen for extended periods of time.

Face covering cannot be considered an essential safety of flight issue when it is determined that other safety concerns or duties would warrant its removal. It is not then an essential job function when the face covering would need to be removed for the most critical parts of our flight.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Flight Attendant expressed multiple concerns regarding company COVID-19 protocols, including alternative jumpseat locations, social distancing in the flight deck, safety equipment demonstrations, and the wearing of protective masks.
**ACN: 1743562**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 3
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: Mixed
- Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 8
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling.Single Value: 2500

**Aircraft: 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Initial Climb
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Aircraft: 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 11000
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 55
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3000
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1743562
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Automation: Aircraft RA
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
Miss Distance. Horizontal: 6000
Miss Distance. Vertical: 500
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Due to COVID-19, ZZZ Tower had reduced staffing resulting in 1 Controller working Tower, Ground Control and Clearance Frequencies. A relatively nice day and lifting of stay at home restrictions caused a very high amount of air traffic, with a mix of IFR and VFR, with a lot of training and pilots trying to get back to flying. On departure we leveled at 2,500 feet flying runway heading (departed XXL), once above traffic that was staying in the pattern for XXR, we were given a right turn to 230. In the right turn to 230, traffic was observed on TCAS at 12 o’clock, same altitude, opposite direction, just outside of a mile, increased rate of turn and initiated a climbed to 3,000 feet to ensure separation, returned to 2,500 feet when clear of traffic on 230 heading. Was handed off to ZZZ1 Departure with no further/other traffic conflicts and no apparent problems arising from our altitude deviation.

Synopsis
GA pilot reported experiencing an airborne conflict during departure having to take evasive action. Reporter cited an increase in traffic due to the lifting of stay at home restrictions as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1743554

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Parked
Route In Use: Direct

Component
Aircraft Component: Transponder
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1800
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 8
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1600
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743554
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Landing after the second flight of the day, during shutdown noticed that transponder had been left on the previous flight's code assigned for flight following instead of having been set to XXXX which would have been appropriate for this flight conducted without flight following. The transponder is ADS-B, so there was still a unique identifier. The flight originated at ZZZ shortly after XApm when the Tower had shut early due to COVID. I am used to getting a flight following code from ZZZ ground, but did not this time because of the closure. Had I been at a normally uncontrolled airport, I would have followed my checklist for electronics, but I am so used to getting codes at ZZZ that I did not pay proper attention to that portion of the preflight/runup. Compounding this is that the transponder is new and less familiar than the one I have flown with for years, which actually would indicate more attention is needed. Always run through full electronics checks on startup and shutdown!

Synopsis
GA pilot reported inadvertently leaving the transponder code set from the previous flight. The pilot was accustomed to getting a code from the Tower, however the Tower had closed early due to COVID-19 hours and the pilot did not check the transponder.
**ACN: 1743551**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling.Single Value: 20000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Takeoff
- Route In Use: None

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 650
- Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 2
- Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 400
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743551
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew

**Events**
- Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Conflict, Less Severe
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action  
Result: Flight Crew: Rejected Takeoff

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I received my IFR release with a 2 minute void time. Although I had heard the pattern traffic call "turning base" there were no subsequent calls. I checked final and saw no traffic. I announced my departure and entered Runway XX. As I started to roll, the other pilot radioed "hold position, hold position." He further stated that he was on short final and was initiating a go-around. On my climb out he asked if I was on frequency. I replied and he told me that I had essentially cut him off. Although I never saw him, or heard him call "turning final," I apologized and we each went our own way.

Contributing factors on my part include: about 2 hours experience in the last 90 days due to COVID; the 2 minute release window; my unconfirmed belief that I could depart without impacting the other aircraft.

Corrective actions include: Asking ATC for a longer release window; calling for a position report from the other aircraft prior to entering the runway; accepting the release voidance and rescheduling the release.

Human performance consideration: I believe that I experienced a form of "get-there-itis." It felt urgent to depart before reaching the 2 minute void time and that urgency affected my judgment. In truth, there was no rush and I could have taken one or more of the previously identified corrective actions. I will do so in the future.

Synopsis

Pilot reported calling on radio for traffic and attempting to depart in a 2 minute window, when an aircraft on final requested pilot to hold position, but ultimately had to go-around.
ACN: 1743473

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude: AGL: Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Maintenance Status: Maintenance Deferred: Y
Maintenance Status: Records Complete: N
Maintenance Status: Required / Correct Doc On Board: N

Component
Aircraft Component: Aircraft Logbook(s)
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1743473
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Maintenance

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Narrative: 1

After we had secured the aircraft at the gate in ZZZZ, I realized that maintenance stickers had not been written up in the logbook on the ground in ZZZZ1. This was a result of several disruptions that took place on the ground in ZZZZ1. Upon shutdown in ZZZZ1, very quickly the cockpit was swarmed by several people. Loadmaster, Maintenance and local quarantine authorities all congregated in the cockpit area. It was conveyed that before anything could take place on the aircraft until the entire flight crew had cleared the local inspection protocol. This entailed all flight crews leaving the aircraft for a temperature and document check on the outside aircraft steps. In order to get the process of unloading and loading going we all left the cockpit area. Before leaving the cockpit we briefed maintenance on the stickers and the required inspections needed. We were all under the impression that maintenance would complete the inspection and complete the logbook as required. After we had completed the quarantine inspection and reentered the cockpit, we observed the mechanics discussing the stickers. I incorrectly assumed that they had been entered into the logbook as we had received the maintenance release. As I was entering the stickers in the logbook in ZZZZ I realized that ZZZZ1 maintenance had not entered them in the logbook.

In the future I will not allow any external influences take priority before all my duties are complete. Also I will start enforcing the no cockpit entering until I have completed all my post flight duties. A suggestion would be to pass the responsibility of writing up the stickers to maintenance as it is a maintenance function. The flight crew is saddled with enough work.

Narrative: 2

Upon completing our second flight of the day into ZZZZ and completing the logbook we realized that we had failed to transfer two DMIs (Deferred Maintenance Item) from the first flight to the second. I believe there were several factors that allowed us to miss these items in ZZZZ1. As soon as we had pulled into the chocks in ZZZZ1 ground crew were immediately accessing the flight deck explaining their procedures and informing us that we needed to fill out COVID-19 paperwork, get our passports, and exit the aircraft to meet
local customs authorities who wanted to take our temperatures, and take our pictures while holding up our passports. We complied with this and exited the aircraft to follow their procedures. The local authorities then disappeared with our passports and we were sent back to the flight deck. The mechanics also took the logbook off the flight deck while they were doing their work. This created just enough of an interruption and out of the ordinary procedures to distract us from ensuring the logbook was completed properly.

I don't feel the flight crews have any business exiting the aircraft in Country X. Even if we have a fever, what are the authorities going to do, forcibly detain and quarantine us for a through flight? Regardless of the distraction, I should have done a better job of making sure all DMIs were transferred to the next flight. I had volunteered to complete the logbook for the Captain and should have ensured it was done correctly. In the future I will always ensure all deferred items are properly transferred.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported that deferred maintenance items were not properly documented due to multiple distractions in the flight deck, including international COVID-19 screening protocols.
ACN: 1743466

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Component
Aircraft Component: Nosewheel Steering
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743466
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Automation: Aircraft Other Automation
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Flight Crew: Rejected Takeoff
Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

We were cleared to line up and wait on Runway XXL at Taxiway XX in ZZZ. Shortly after we were cleared for takeoff. I was the Pilot Flying and I advanced the thrust levers. When taking the controls from the First Officer I accidentally bumped the tiller on the way to the yoke. As we were accelerating we got a Steering Inop Master Caution. We aborted the takeoff roll. We stopped and I knew that it was my error that caused the EICAS message, so I decided to reengage the steering to turn off the runway. We turned off and asked ATC to put us to the side so we could run some checklists. After running the checklists I informed the First Officer that I had bumped the tiller and caused the EICAS message. We decided to continue and had enough fuel to depart.

I recently upgraded to this aircraft type and this was my first aborted takeoff as a Captain. I haven't been flying much unfortunately, so I felt a little rusty going in. The first error was bumping the tiller on the takeoff roll. This caused the steer inop and caused the aborted takeoff. The next error was not calling maintenance to verify everything is working as intended. The message trigger was when we were accelerating with the Steering Inop.

I need to take my time and not rush. I felt as though I rushed myself getting off of the runway.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported aborting a takeoff roll when the tiller was accidentally bumped, causing the steering to disengage.
ACN: 1743435

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 2500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743435
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

We were completing the last leg of a three flight pattern with a non-revenue flight into ZZZ. There [were] no passengers or crew in the back of the airplane. Weather conditions were very good with unrestricted visibilities, light winds, and some light turbulence. ZZZ is very well known to both pilots having been home airport to both during their career. The pilots are both PIC’s, well acquainted and friendly with each other, and work very well together. I was PIC, flying the leg from the left seat, and it should be noted this was only my 4th approach and landing in over two months due to COVID-19 related Ops stand-downs and vacation. Approximately 25 miles south of the airport, we called the airport in sight and were cleared for a visual approach to Runway XL. The airplane was on profile, with appropriate speed and altitude and I began to configure and reduce speed and line up for final approach. The tuned ILS was on glide path and just left of centerline at about 10 miles out, at flaps 10deg and approximately 220 kts, and already cleared to land. Then, the other pilot asked me about a landmark near the Airport which was off our right wing. It was a clear violation of sterile cockpit and I allowed myself to be distracted during a critical phase of flight and pointed the landmark out to him. When I returned my attention to the airplane, it was quickly evident we were now high, fast, and not configured properly. I briefly considered deploying all drag possible and diving for the runway but quickly discarded that option. The other pilot suggested asking the Tower for a left 360 deg turn. Given that we were approximately 2,500 feet AGL and there was virtually no traffic at the time, I agreed with the suggestion. He made the request to the Tower, it was quickly approved, and I initiated the left 360 while continuing a gradual descent and continuing to configure. We rolled out of the turn at three miles, on speed, on glide path, fully configured and stable. We then continued the approach to a normal, uneventful landing.

To me this was a clear case of pilot distraction brought on by an egregious violation of sterile cockpit rules by both of us. Our familiarity with each other and a shared history of operating at this airport led us down the path of complacency. The surprising thing to me was how quickly the airplane departed from the correct descent profile despite such a brief distraction. I should have been much more vigilant in maintaining sterile cockpit, especially given my rustiness from a prolonged layoff from flying. I also believe that over-friendliness and familiarity in a cockpit with your flying partner has the potential to be more dangerous than a crew that doesn't like each other since they are more likely to only focus on the job. This incident was a wake up call for me to brief the absolute necessity of sterile cockpit especially with my friends.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported an unstable approach and requesting a 360 turn on final from Approach. Reporter cited lack of flying and distractions during the approach as contributing factors.
ACN: 1743200

Time / Day
Date: 202005

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Landing
Flight Phase: Taxi

Component
Aircraft Component: Brake System
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew: Total: 9140
Experience.Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 46
Experience.Flight Crew: Type: 3035
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743200
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Experience: Flight Crew: Total: 1158
Experience: Flight Crew: Last 90 Days: 27
Experience: Flight Crew: Type: 1158
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1743209
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
Result: General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
Had a BRAKES auto brake fault ECAM on landing. Taxi to gate was normal. Autoparked Gate X. Set parking brake and realized immediately that the aircraft was slowly moving. Applied normal brakes to stop aircraft. Reapplied parking brake. Ground crew gave us the chalks in signal. It pains me to write this because I am a brake pressure fanatic, but since this was my first trip in over 2 months, my scan was rusty, and I didn't verify the brake pressure, and this happens. Pressure was definitely normal with the second parking brake attempt. Sent report and called maintenance.

Narrative: 2
During the short taxi in from Runway XX in ZZZ to Gate X (less than 3 minutes) we parked the aircraft with both engines running since we were still within the 3 minutes cool down period. As the Captain set the brake, and before he can verbalize "Brake Set" the aircraft began to move forward. The Captain immediately stepped on the pedal brakes and stopped the aircraft. Prior to landing we received a ECAM message "AUTO BRAKE FAULT" which went away after a few seconds. After landing we had normal braking and steering. At the time we didn't think anything of it, but after we reset the brake after the movement at the gate we thought they might be connected. We reported it and called maintenance.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a brake issue on landing and re-occurring at the gate. Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.
ACN: 1743199

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Fuel Booster Pump
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 4209
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 13
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3627
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743199
Human Factors: Confusion

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
The aircraft right center fuel pump low pressure light would not go out with the switch on. The flight would not be legal to operate in ETOPS airspace (ZZZZ-ZZZ). Due to the COVID pandemic, deplaning passengers/crew at any of the stations was unavailable. Decision was made to operate the aircraft back to ZZZ1.

For FDPs originating in ZZZ1: "The second sequence will begin in either ZZZZ1 or ZZZ and have no more than one segment, ending in ZZZ." Due to the inability to continue the flight to ZZZ and the inability to deplane the aircraft, the decision was made to have "Crew B" operate the aircraft from ZZZZ2 back to ZZZ1.
We had a center tank (right) inop fuel pump on deck in ZZZZ2. We were thus unable to complete the future ETOPS portion of our assigned trip to ZZZZ1, ZZZZ and ZZZ. My copilot and I reached our time limit during the ensuing company machinations to determine the fate and future of our trip. When we timed out we were on the ramp in ZZZZ2. There are dramatic virus pandemic restrictions of personnel in ALL of the X locations encompassed by company. These were supposedly excepted/exempted for crews that got "stuck" in the various X locations due to maintenance issues, etc., but apparently were not, at least not in ZZZZ2. The company was aware of our plight, and the restrictions, and determined the best course of action was for the relief pilots to assume flight duties and fly the aircraft back to ZZZ1. The relief crew planned and flew the flight back to ZZZ1 without any known incident.

Narrative: 3

Aircraft had a malfunction of the R forward main boost pump on arrival into ZZZZ2. The amber associated and "low pressure light" was illuminated with the pump switch on and fuel in the main tank. It was written up by Crew A. Decision was made to MEL the inoperative boost pump. This MEL did not allow for the flight to operate in ETOPS airspace and therefore the flight from ZZZZ to ZZZ was not going to operate.

With the current COVID-19 restrictions, Country X was not allowing any passengers into their country. The decision was made, for the safety of passengers and crew, to have Crew B, who had been in rest up until this time, to fly the flight back to ZZZ1. The flight landed safely in ZZZ1 without any further incident.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported equipment problems and having to change destinations due to COVID-19 restrictions.
As we were cleared for departure I realized that I had forgotten to brief the over the wing passengers prior to pushback. At 10,000 feet I got up and briefed all four passengers individually. It has been nearly 3 weeks since I last worked, with so much new information, and procedures changing daily I got caught up and distracted from my original duties.
Flight Attendant reported forgetting to brief the over the wing passengers until at 10,000 feet.
**ACN: 1743084**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 34000

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
- Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 5
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1743084
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I cleared Aircraft X to cross ZZZZZ at FL340. I handed the aircraft off to adjacent center and subsequently noticed the aircraft descending through FL340. I called the other center to notify them of the unassigned descent, and the Controller investigated to learn the aircraft was going to FL240.
With COVID-19 lack of traffic and talking to a Supervisor about unrelated things, my focus was not 100%. I don't know if the aircraft read it back wrong to me or not. We've always got to be on guard.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller reported being distracted due to COVID-19 issues and did not hear a wrong read back from a crew, which resulted in an altitude deviation.
**ACN: 1743080**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position: Angle: Radial: 310
- Relative Position: Distance: Nautical Miles: 28

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Cruise
- Route In Use: None
- Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Private
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1743080
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly: Airspace Violation: All Types
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was on a VFR flight. I was following the ZZZ 310 radial inbound and approximately 28 miles from the ZZZ VOR. My plan was to turn southbound towards my home airport ZZZ1 before approaching the ZZZ area. I was watching the floors of the Class B as I approached ZZZ, but I inadvertently crossed into the floor airspace. Upon realization of this fact I immediately turned around and descended to clear this airspace. Not flying during the COVID-19 restrictions made me rusty and behind the airplane.

Synopsis

Pilot reported inadvertently flying into Class Bravo airspace and cited lack of flying during the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.
Guidelines impose a requirement for Flight Crews to wear face covering masks. It appears there is a diversity of opinion in the medical community about the efficacy of wearing non-surgical masks to stop the spread of disease, and there is also a diversity of opinion about the health risks associated with the routine wear of face masks by otherwise-healthy individuals. Some medical professionals and associations advise that the routine wearing of face masks may present the following health risks for individuals: 1. Increased chance of dizziness, hypoxia, hypercapnia, and headaches; 2. Increased risk of viral infection, due to increased touching of the face, as a result of the novelty and discomfort of wearing a mask; 3. Increased chance of infection, as a result of prolonged use of a contaminated, single-use mask; 4. Increased chance of infection, as a result of exhaled air being directed into the eyes, causing an uncontrolled response to touch or rub the eyes; 5. A decrease in the body's innate immune response, as a result of the increased viral load resulting from the creation of a moist habitat that sustains and encourages viral activity; 6. A decrease in the body's natural immune response, as a result of diminished exposure to the natural flora that create and maintain a robust immune system.

This leads to the following concerns:
1. An increased risk of hypoxia and hypercapnia is incompatible with safe flight operations. Although guidelines do not require the use of face covering masks inflight, it does require Crews to wear them immediately prior to flight, and makes their inflight use optional.
Before we mandate the use of these masks for Crews who are about to operate an aircraft—or permit their optional use for Crews in flight—we should first conduct a risk analysis. It appears guideline hints at FAA approval for this practice, but it appears that the FAA SAFO 20009 on this subject was simply reinforcing generalized CDC guidance about the wear of face masks in public, without specifically addressing the unique situation of Flight Crew Members who are about to operate (or are actually operating) an aircraft. It is not clear from SAFO 20009 that the FAA did an appropriate medical study to determine if it was safe for Flight Crews to be exposed to an increased hypoxia and hypercapnia risk immediately prior to or during flight. Furthermore, the SAFO does not require operators to analyze this risk, and instead only directs them to address complications surrounding the donning of oxygen masks. Unless the FAA or the Company has conducted a study to evaluate hypoxia and hypercapnia risks, in consultation with aviation medicine professionals, it seems premature to apply the generalized CDC guidance for members of the public to the special and unique work environment of Flight Crews who are operating or about to operate an aircraft.

2. Since Flight Crews lack the ability to adequately disinfect face masks during their extended travels, and since the Company is unable to adequately supply Flight Crews with an appropriate number of single-use face masks to permit regular replacement, it is possible that our flight crews may be more susceptible to self-induced contamination if they are required to wear masks.

3. There appears to be a risk that extended use of the face covering masks could actually result in a decline in the immune system of otherwise-healthy flight crews—something that would result in greater susceptibility to viral infection in the long term, including the COVID-19 virus that these measures are meant to defeat. While well-intentioned, it's very possible that we could be hurting the health of our Employees and creating the potential for increased sick calls with a mandatory wear policy—the opposite of what we hope to achieve with a mandatory wear policy.

If an appropriate medical study about hypoxia and hypercapnia risks associated with facial mask use by Flight Crews has been conducted and Flight Crews are simply unaware of it, then the study's findings should be made available to Flight Crews, so that they may be better educated on this subject. In the absence of a suitable medical review that addresses these potential health and safety concerns, it is suggested that the mandatory wear policy should be eliminated until such a study can be completed, to guarantee the safety of our Employees and Customers. Similarly, the possibility that a mandatory wear policy could inadvertently have an overall negative impact on Employee health, instead of a positive one, should be evaluated if it has not been, and weighed against the perceived advantages of such a policy.

Synopsis

Air carrier pilot described the potential negative aspects of wearing a face mask in the flight deck.
ACN: 1742952

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2500

**Environment**
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Turbulence
- Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling.Single Value: 2500

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Route In Use: Visual Approach
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Engineer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742952
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was on a vector with ZZZ approach for a visual to Runway XX and a descent clearance to 3,000 MSL. Passing through 3,000 the altitude alert flashed and I thought it was a 1,000 foot warning. At 2,600 MSL I realized my mistake and made an immediate climb back to 3,000 MSL. Approach made no mention of my deviation and a few minutes later cleared me for the visual to Runway XX.

There were a few factors involved. The attitude indicator and heading indicator had been recently replaced with two glass displays. Though I had flown plenty of glass in the past, these instruments are still somewhat new to me. I had also taken time off earlier in the year and combined with COVID-19 had not done any flying. I had planned on going out with an instructor before the flight, but the social distancing with COVID-19 made me decide against doing that. I made a few flights totaling 7 hours during a two week period before the date of the incident by myself doing basic and commercial air work, takeoffs and landings and just getting familiar with the plane again. In March I also did several approaches and holds in a flight simulator. The simulator was configured with a standard six pack.

No excuses on my part. I momentarily got behind the airplane and had some confusion with what one of my instruments was telling me.

Synopsis
GA pilot reported misinterpreting an altitude alert and descended from assigned altitude while on approach. Lack of familiarity with the instrument panel and lack of recent flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic were cited as contributing factors.
ACN: 1742870

Time / Day
Date: 202005

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Air/Ground Communication
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742870

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
As part of the preflight procedure, the cockpit was disinfected with the large isopropyl alcohol based wipes/ Lysol type wipes for the common touch points during preflight and
post flight. As part of this cleaning, the headsets are cleaned with the wipes and dwelling or the boom is wetted. This created a situation where when the pushback crew called for pushback, the boom mike on the headset did not work. The handset was used. After a period of time before takeoff, the boom was tested again, leading to the possibility that the alcohol solution may have entered inside the boom mike and not dried thoroughly as part of the dwelling process. The same hazard occurred on the previous leg to the FO, and normal operation was restored after a period of time.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported alcohol from cleaning products may be entering the boom mike causing the equipment to malfunction.
ACN: 1742867

Time / Day
Date: 202005

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742867
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Dispatch
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Flight took a delay due to issues loading cargo. Shortly after airborne, I received a call from Load Planning (LP) Supervisor informing that ZZZ Ramp incorrectly loaded the aircraft and that in its current status they were exceeding max tail limit by around 200 lbs. LP said that removing passengers from row XY would put the aircraft within limits. After discussion with crew over ACARS we agreed to confirm row XY was empty and to have LP send the correct weights en route.

Synopsis
Dispatcher reported being advised of an aircraft that took off with incorrect weights and the need to ensure a certain row in the aircraft was empty to be within limits.
ACN: 1742866

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742866
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Regained Aircraft Control
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Flying into ZZZ at 2,500 feet with VFR conditions ATC was vectoring us for the approach to XXL. It was XA:00pm and we were the only airplane in the sector due to the COVID flight reductions. We were on a downwind when we were asked if we had the airport in sight for a visual approach. I said that I did and the FO was comfortable with my decision. This is where all the mistakes started.

I failed to communicate my plan on how to fly this approach. I disconnected the autopilot. I proceeded to the FAF ZZZZZ and told the FO to select 1,500 feet the altitude for ZZZZZ and started to descend in FLCH. Since I haven't flown much since the flight reductions I'm embarrassed to admit my flying skills were very poor. I descended to 1,300 feet at ZZZZZ as I made the sharp turn to intercept. The FO was giving me good guidance but the long day, lack of currency and tunnel vision for the runway made me just not hear his excellent CRM prompting. Again, I'm embarrassed to say from ZZZZZ to below 1,000 feet I got below the glideslope twice. At 500 feet we were stable and landed.

I should have gone around, but like the many pilots before me that have written scenarios of unstable approaches, I didn't. Why not? Because it was VFR, because it was an easy approach, because I could do this. All the reasons that lead to unstable approaches. In all my years of flying, this is the worst decision and execution of my career. I am truly embarrassed to admit this. I am now one of those "How In the World Did They Do That" pilots. I only can hope you don't use this as your new teaching scenario.

So many lessons learned from this one. Visual approaches are one of the most difficult to perform. We don't do them on a regular basis. Fly it as a full ILS. Give yourself enough room outside the FAF to get set up. Don't rush it. Use the autopilot to get set up. Don't hand fly. Especially when it is late and you may be tired. Communicate all your intentions clearly to your flying partner. VVM. Hear and listen to your partner. They are 2 different things. Don't have a big ego and Go-Around. It's not a failure. I know all of these lessons, but failed to execute them. I'm sure the stress of current world events, our company's financial situation, the lack of flying and a lot of other outside influences are contributing factors to this but certainly no excuse.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing an unstabilized approach in which they should have executed a go-around but decided to continue and stabilized at 500 feet. Captain reported rustiness from lack of flying contributed to the event.
ACN: 1742861

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 10000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1742861
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1742853
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
Did not intercept the correct runway arrival transition in ZZZ due to a late change in clearance.

Flying into ZZZ on the cleared route ZZZZZ RNAV arrival the clearance was changed to the ZZZZZ1 ZZ1 transition Runway XX. During the descent ATC requested us to maintain 310 knots and then comply with speed restrictions at ZZZZZ. Selected speed intervene and reset crossing restrictions on MCP because we were now in VNAV SPD vs VNAV PATH. Aircraft was still in VNAV SPD passing the ZZZZZ intersection, so we were continuing to reset the altitudes causing a higher workload than usual. Approaching the ZZZZZ2 intersection we changed to the final Approach Controller and were given a change to intercept the Runway XYL transition for the ILS and descend to 7,000 feet. I did not enter the runway and transition in adequate time to prevent flying through the course. When ATC asked if we had intercepted I replied we had not and were given direct ZZZZZ3 for the ILS.

Many factors lead to this deviation. First, since the COVID flight reduction I have only flown 3 trips and am not as proficient as before. Second, I am not that familiar with ZZZ and am not accustomed to last minute changes since I fly into mostly continent X destinations. Third, the confidence of runway assignment due to our gate location on the side of the airport. And lastly, the knowledge that there were so few airplanes flying into ZZZ during the pandemic that the need for a last minute change was not anticipated.

Narrative: 2
Did not intercept the correct runway arrival transition in ZZZ due to a late change to clearance.

Flying into ZZZ on the cleared ZZZZZ ZZ1 RNAV arrival with Runway XX in the FMS. The clearance was changed to ZZZZZ1 transition a ways after ZZ1. During the descent ATC assigned 310 or greater on the descent, but might ZZZZZ1 speed restrictions. In VNAV/LNAV, opened window to set 310 knots and VNAV Path changed to VNAV SPD so Captain set next lowest altitude vice 8,000 feet. Still in VNAV spd next lowest altitude was set and Controller also had speed reduction to 280 knots.
Approaching ZZZZZ2, we switched to final Controller and he changed Runway to XYL. The FO was still adjusting speed and making sure the altitudes on the arrival were made, so not reading notes for XXL vice XY on the ZZZZZ1. The subsequent waypoint from ZZZZZ2 was not in the FMS, so we were late turning toward ZZZZZ3, more on a course toward ZZZZZ4. ATC asked if we still on the arrival, we said we were having trouble getting it in the box.

ATC then cleared us DCT ZZZZZ5 and descend to 7,000 feet. We intercepted final and flew an uneventful 30 flap landing to XYL.

Lack of flying in almost three months and unfamiliarity with ZZZ certainly didn't help situational awareness on the arrival. I haven't flown to ZZZ in at least X years. The late arrival/runway change reminded me of ZZZ2 RNAV/runway changes.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported multiple changes to the arrival and runway resulted in a track heading deviation. Flight crew stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1742856**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1742856
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result: Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem
- Result: Flight Crew: Rejected Takeoff

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was on short call. The crew desk called to assign a 1 day pairing. I woke up and got ready for my deadhead to ZZZ.

Once in ZZZ the Captain called operations to find out how we get to SPOT X. Operations mentioned the plane was in Maintenance and it might be a few hours until it was ready. After about :45 minutes Maintenance deferred the R FMC. We received a new release and were taken to the aircraft. Once onboard we both did our normal flows. I also used the FERRY Checklist.
We were slightly out of our normal flows and the right FMC was deferred. Once we completed our checklist Maintenance cleared us to start the engines. I started both engines per SOP. The L ENG was a no start. I followed the ECL and contacted Maintenance as instructed by the FM. Maintenance had us restart the L RNG and there were no issues. The Captain called for "Flaps 5, After Start Checklist. Somehow doing my flow after start flow I set Flaps 1 instead of Flaps 5.

We taxied from the Maintenance Hanger to Runway XXL. We completed all of the Checklist. A note: with the right FMC deferred the LWR CTR DU can be used via Display Select Panel (DSP) i.e. ENGCOMMCHKL displaying only one at one time.

Taxi was normal and all checklist completed. The Captain was PF and on the application of takeoff power the TO CONFIG Master Warning went off for Flaps. The Flaps were set to 1 not 5. We pulled off the runway and notified Tower. I ran the rejected TO checkout and we taxied back to XXL. The Captain and I discussed how could we have missed that?

I set the flaps to 5 and re-ran the Before Takeoff. We checked the brake temps and the FMC and briefed our departure again.

Once in cruise we debriefed how we missed such an important item. For my part it is not lack of proficiency, I just flew an trip as PF. Some factors that might have affected me were: the early call, the FMC deferral and the Engine no start. Also, with COVID-19 there are so few flights and we had a tight window to make the only ZZZ2 flight from ZZZ1 today. This self-induced time pressure might have subconsciously contributed.

**Synopsis**

First Officer reported setting the incorrect flaps resulting in an immediate rejected takeoff after receiving a configuration warning.
ACN: 1742825

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component: 1
Aircraft Component: Aircraft Logbook(s)
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Component: 2
Aircraft Component: Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742825
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: MEL
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Narrative: 1

We operated two flights with an incorrect MEL applied. Flights A and B were operated under the incorrect MEL. MEL XX-X-XX was applied to Aircraft. The correct MEL should have been XX-X-XY. Due to flight deck wipe down I did not review logbook and MEL closely enough nor did I make sure I communicated completely with FO for confirmation.

I need to remember to utilize CRM when it comes to MEL compliance.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported operating flights with an incorrect MEL applied. The flight deck sanitizing process was cited as a reason for not closely reviewing the logbook and MEL.
ACN: 1742814

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ. ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 29000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1742814
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Undershoot
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

**Narrative: 1**

Working ZZZ Center I believe, at FL380, was given instructions to cross ZZZZZ at FL290. Set 500 FPM descent in FMS, with intention of verifying and adjusting once stabilized in descent. Person A came from cabin and began conversation at cockpit, distracting me from my intended task, and I did not see that we were not going to make 29,000 at ZZZZZ until just before crossing; increased rate of descent in attempt to make [the] restriction. Estimate missing crossing by 500 feet or possibly more, as at approximately the same time, Center called and gave us descent to FL240, so we continued our descent. No mention was made by ATC of any conflict nor any questioning as to what our status for making the restriction was. This was our first trip in the aircraft in almost three months, due to COVID-19 pandemic issues, and also the first time we had worked as a crew in almost three months. Recent experience was certainly a factor, but not an excuse. I am extremely disappointed with myself for not staying better focused on my immediate task, and counseled the FO on duty to monitor when Pilot Not Flying.

Suggest all crews redouble efforts and vigilance in these trying times as we are all working in unfamiliar situations now with the pressures put on us by the pandemic. Fortunately at this early stage of things moving back toward some semblance of normal, there was probably not a great possibility of a traffic conflict. That will change in the coming days, and even though we may not personally make any more mistakes as these, there will be other crews coming back to flying from furloughs, etc. that still need to get their game back. Looking out for ourselves and the other guys and gals even more than we did before will be the new normal for some time.

**Synopsis**

Corporate Captain reported experiencing an undershoot of a crossing restriction and cited lack of recent flying experience due to the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1742780

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1600

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1742780
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

My home airport is a class D located just outside the ZZZ terminal Class B area. I always wanted to land at ZZZ and with air traffic quiet due to the COVID-19 situation, I thought this would be an opportunity to ask for permission to do so. The weather was clear and I climbed into Aircraft X and departed to the south. I got an early frequency change and got the weather at ZZZ, spoke to ZZZ Approach and asked if I could land at ZZZ. I told ATC I wanted a full stop and taxi back for immediate departure. ATC gave me a squawk code and instructed me to ident. Moments later ATC informed me he had radar contact and gave me a heading of 320 into Class B and to climb and maintain 1,600 feet for vectors to Runway XXL at ZZZ. I repeated the instructions and complied. I was vectored towards ZZZ Airport and then handed off to the Tower for landing. I switched to ZZZ Tower and was cleared to land. The landing was great and I was the only aircraft on the tarmac. I was given taxi instructions for departure on XXR, and asked if I could get vectors to ZZZ1 for a low approach. After departure I was given a heading and altitude for ZZZ1. I executed the low approach for Runway XY at ZZZ1 and then climbed for vectors to the north. I was told to fly to X location to maintain 1,500 feet. The X location was right in front of me with the beautiful city skyline to my left. As I passed over the X location and continued north, it occurred to me that I never heard "Cleared into the Class Bravo." I was given vectors to land at ZZZ, but ATC never said those magic words. I had forgotten to confirm with ATC prior to entering the Bravo if I was cleared, it was just assumed since I was given a discreet transponder code and vectors to land at ZZZ. It is important to avoid complacency during these unusual times where the airspace is eerily quiet. Air traffic has been significantly reduced and all of us, including air traffic controllers, must remain on top of our game so that when things get busy again, we are all ready to do our jobs effectively and remain safe up there. This much is clear.

Synopsis

GA pilot reported not being sure if he was cleared into Class B Airspace. Reportedly, the decision to fly into Class B airspace was based on the lack of traffic due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1742767

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 20000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Vectors

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742767
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Having not been airborne in a couple of months, I decided some instrument approach practice was a good idea in VMC. My initial plan was an RNAV approach at ZZZ. But a late airplane switch put me in an airplane with only ILS capability so I decided to do the ILS approach at ZZZ1. This put me in busy ZZZ2 airspace. While practicing an ILS approach to ZZZ1 under the hood, ZZZ2 Approach was very busy. I set up the radio for ZZZ1 Tower in the secondary and double checked it per the approach chart. When handed over to ZZZ1 Tower, I switched the frequency and called the Tower with my position. I then was very busy keeping the needles centered. The air was a bit bumpy and I had not been flying since the COVID-19 outbreak so was very busy and focused. I was doing an OK job with the navigation but didn't have much bandwidth for anything but the needles and pre-landing checks.

When I didn't hear from Tower I thought it was odd but I was busy so just called for a low approach. After the go-around, I came back up on Approach frequency and the Controller said I had not contacted the Tower. I said I called them. Then I checked the frequency again. I had set .0X instead of .X. I had even checked it 3 times before the switch and again at the switch and didn't catch the error. The second error was not confirming contact with the Tower and confirming landing clearance. Since the Approach Controller was very busy I cancelled approach practice and did some VFR landing practice. I need practice and will take an instructor with me next flight.

Synopsis
Pilot reported being switched from Approach to Tower, but dialed incorrect frequency resulting in a go-around.
ACN: 1742760

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 4800

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Navigation Light
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1650
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 2
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1400
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742760
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I forgot to turn on my ADS-B for this flight. Climb and descent phases were inside the ZZZ Class B veil, but not in Class B area. I was using my MODE C transponder.

I have an ADS-B that powers on with the nav lights. I forgot to turn on the nav lights. I'm still getting used to operating with ADS-B out. I was also down for 2 months for my annual inspection, partly due to unavailability of my IA because of virus concerns. As this flight was a post-maintenance flight and a windy day, I was concerned about the windy conditions and the best procedure for working with the Tower to climb overhead the airport for the initial climb and checkout. (Working with the Tower was a non-issue, they are great).

I need to revise my Pre-taxi, Runup, or Before Takeoff checklist to include ADS-B (the placard on my panel is apparently not adequate). My checklists are laminated to back of my flight clipboard, so not easy to revise and still on the to-do list.

Synopsis
GA pilot reported forgetting to turn on Navigation Lights so the ADS-B would activate.
During boarding, a passenger approached me to indicate his displeasure that another passenger was not wearing a mask. I offered to allow the passenger to move forward to the exit row to gain distance from the indicated passenger. Another passenger seated in
the exit row had removed his mask as he was eating. The original passenger, seated in seat X, opted to state that it was "[expletive]" that we wouldn't force everyone to wear masks. I did ask the passengers in question to put on a mask, but he refused. I brought the situation to both the other FA and the pilots. Passenger in seat X remained quiet once he returned to his seat.

Passengers are nervous about flying and rapidly changing requirements that vary from state to state as well as a general disregard for what flight attendants say on the part of the passengers.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger's displeasure with other passengers not wearing masks.
ACN: 1742698

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ. ARTCC
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Light Transport
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1742698
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1742699
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Fatigue

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
At approximately XA:15Z the pilot flying noticed we were about 500 feet above our assigned block altitude FLX50-X70 and climbing at 200 FPM. This was brought to my attention, pilot flying quickly corrected the error, and we resumed cruise flight at FLX70. No other aircraft were around us and nothing was said to us by the Center Controller. Flight continued uneventfully.

Ultimately both the pilot flying and I were distracted and tired. Both of us had reported in a tiredness the night before after several long tough days. Neither one of us got the amount of quality of sleep we wanted for that day. In addition, we were in an in depth discussion on current events and I believe that added to the distraction. We were in the block FLX50-FLX70 but level at FLX60 when the pilot flying communicated and decided to climb to FLX70. I acknowledged that, but failed to realize that the altitude selector was never reset from FLX60 to FLX70. Under normal circumstances I would have trapped that error, but I believe the aforementioned factors contributed to me missing this detail.

This was a breakdown of SOP. Both of us are to blame for letting our guard down and not remaining diligent despite the fact that we had now flown together enough to trust each other. Sometimes it creates more errors when you trust the other person too much, it makes it easier to deviate from SOP. I believe this error was caused by a multitude of factors which have been mentioned above and to prevent that in the future requires more diligence on my part and the part of the pilot flying.

Narrative: 2
While in the block FLX50-X70, we were level at FLX60. We had become light enough to climb to FLX70 so I notified the FO that I was doing so. For whatever reason, this time I selected the climb mode without resetting the Altitude Selector first. We'd had a couple challenging days with schedules and passengers and were also distracted by a sensitive conversation about COVID-19. We agreed afterward that we were more tired than we realized. I caught the error as we approached FLX75 doing 200 FPM. The last altitude I remember seeing in my scan was FLX68, when I made a subtle mental note that we should be level in a minute. The total deviation was 500 feet and ATC never said anything to us as I descended back down to FLX70. I checked the TCAS both Above and Below on the 50 nm scale and didn't see any aircraft anywhere on the map. Fortunately we were in relatively empty airspace controlled by Center. I don't know why I didn't set the altitude first. That is certainly not normal practice for me so I guess it was the cumulative effect of being tired and being distracted by a conversation about a sensitive subject.

Both crew members being more tired than we realized. Being distracted by a sensitive conversation about COVID-19. My deviation from SOP and the FO's failure to monitor the SOP.

If any one of the factors of SOP deviation, conversation distraction, or fatigue is removed, it wouldn't have happened. All we can do is try to minimize these threats. Most important is the adherence to SOP, but it’s the cumulative effect that got us in this case. Obviously my attention has been refocused on SOP adherence going forward.
Synopsis

Flight crew reported climbing 500 feet above assigned block altitudes and cited COVID-19 conversation distractions and fatigue as contributing factors.
ACN: 1742622

Time / Day
Date: 202005

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Transport
Crew Size. Number of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 6
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1742622
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Detector. Automation: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Separated Traffic

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I had just got a relief briefing shortly before the event. I was cleaning the equipment immediately after assuming the position. I would normally be scanning, but my attention was diverted to cleaning the equipment. Aircraft X was already climbing to FL350 and Aircraft Y was level at FL280 both on route. Most aircraft are climbing extremely well right now with the coronavirus traffic being low. I did not see during the briefing the possible conflict based on climb rate of Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. However, after conflict alert triggered I immediately turned Aircraft X 30 degrees left and expedited his climb. I then called a traffic alert to Aircraft X and told him to expedite again. I then called traffic to Aircraft Y. Then Aircraft Y said he had the traffic in sight. After regaining standard separation I cleared Aircraft X back on course. No other issues noted.

I should have done a better job scanning during the relief briefing. I normally would have and should have this time also turned Aircraft Y 30 degrees away [from] Aircraft X. For some reason (probably the change in environment of traffic) my instincts didn't turn both aircraft which would have probably kept separation or been very very close to it. I should have done a couple scans before cleaning the equipment or switching aircraft to the next frequency which took my eyes off a possible conflict.

Synopsis

Center Controller reported a loss of separation event due to being distracted while cleaning equipment.
Due to the unprecedented events of COVID-19, the FAA has made special exemptions to requirements of meeting 90-day currency for takeoffs and landings for Airmen and other rules in relation to currency of flight operations.

The aspect of the exemption in question is the exemption for Air Carrier Pilots that allows 2 additional calendar months before De-Qualification.

As a member of a flight crew for a 121 Operator, it has come to my attention that there has not been any guidance as to the scenario of two Air Carrier Pilots who have not flown within 90 days or greater to fly together. One concern of mine is a flight crew operating where a Captain was on Voluntary/Non-Voluntary Time Off for 90 days or greater and a First Officer was also on Voluntary/Non-Voluntary Time Off or not flying as a result of COVID affecting regular flights.
Keeping in the rules 'No Green on Green' always in mind, I believe that the issue of pilot proficiency vs currency should be addressed.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer requested guidance in a scenario where two air carrier pilots, neither of whom has flown within the prior 90 days due to the new 2-month FAA extension, are operating on the same flight. The First Officer expressed concern regarding the issue of pilot currency versus pilot proficiency.
ACN: 1742475

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742475
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

We had an extremely light passenger load. During the boarding process, the forward FA asked me if it was okay if a passenger moved from the aft of the aircraft to the front of the aircraft. I told her it was okay with me if she was comfortable with doing so, but that was the last communication that we had. After takeoff, I had a sudden realization that the passenger may have moved and that the passenger data/distribution from the auto-closeout may differ from our actual passenger distribution, therefore affecting the accuracy of our weight and balance and manifest. I had the FO call back to the FAs, who confirmed that the passenger did in fact move. After landing, the FA told me that she did not realize that we needed the updated passenger locations for our manifest/weight and balance numbers.

This event was caused by a lack of communication by both parties. By not closing the communication loop, there was information that was not conveyed correctly and therefore caused a breakdown. The lack of further information from the FA led me to the assumption that the passenger was not moved, whereas in her opinion I had given her the OK to do whatever she needed to do and there was no need to report back with any changes. Additionally, we are so used to flights being full and the auto-close out process being so automated, that moving passengers is a relatively new occurrence that none of us were necessarily expecting, but that we should be aware of and expect to occur more in the future.

During unprecedented times such as these where passenger loads are extremely light and the need to distance passengers may be necessary, and where the weight and balance process is now very streamlined and automated, it would be a great reminder for all crewmembers to be aware of the necessity to maintain accurate record of passenger location, and update the data in the MCDU to reflect where passengers are actually seated if it differs from the auto close-out data. Explaining to flight attendants the importance of this communication (having an accurate manifest and subsequently weight and balance data) may help all parties understand the importance of making these changes. I personally plan on briefing the crew during particularly empty flights, that they need to report any passenger seating changes to me prior to departure.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported that the aircraft departed with passenger distribution data different from the actual distribution due to one passenger changing seats. The Captain noted the aircraft was very lightly loaded and it was important to ensure an accurate record of passenger location, as this could affecting weight and balance data.
ACN: 1742319

**Time / Day**
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Angle.Radial: 070
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 10
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 500

**Environment**
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 10000

**Aircraft : 1**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 2**
Reference: Y
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: None
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1742319
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events

Anomaly: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
Miss Distance: Horizontal: 1000
Miss Distance: Vertical: 250
Result: Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Flying VFR with flight following from ZZZ Approach on local flight to maintain currency and run engine during COVID-19 inactivity. I was flying at 500 feet when my ADS-B/TIS traffic alert activated. I observed traffic head on at my altitude about a mile away, opposite direction that appeared to be a small aircraft as well. I immediately turned to the right, and descended to approximately 300 feet. The traffic passed off my left with adequate clearance. As I recovered from this maneuver I found myself around 300 feet over a group of people, possibly violating minimum altitude over persons. Once the traffic passed I climbed to a safe altitude consistent with minimum altitudes for the area.

Synopsis

Pilot reported having to descend to avoid a collision, then realized aircraft may have been too low over a group of people.
ACN: 1742312

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 6
Weather Elements / Visibility.Other
Ceiling.Single Value: 5000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: Visual Approach

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function.Flight Crew: Trainee
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742312
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather
Primary Problem: Weather

Narrative: 1

This was my first training flight in furtherance of a CFII rating. I received my CFI rating and have not flown as an instructor pilot since receiving my rating.

My CFI-I instructor pilot for today's flight was someone I met over the phone. This morning was my first in person meeting with him. Prior to today's flight, I have [XX] hours of CFII ground instruction with a different instructor.

Last evening, I prepared for the flight by organizing my instrument instructor materials and monitoring the weather. I used Foreflight to monitor the weather checking METAR, TAF and MOS for the morning. At the time, the weather was reporting morning calm winds, good visibility and winds increasing in intensity to over 20 knots by the afternoon. Our flight was scheduled for 2 hour flight time, so I believed we would be completed before the wind front moved through the area.

This morning, I checked Foreflight weather again - METAR, TAF, MOS and winds aloft prior to leaving the house. The current and forecast weather was not significantly changed from the evening prior. I did note the winds aloft at 6,000 was over 20 knots and at 3,000 was in the teens. I do not recall the exact winds. During my drive to ZZZ, I listened to local area forecast on the radio which confirmed what I already knew regarding the weather and wind.

Good night's sleep, no health issues, no alcohol consumption in probably 3 or 4 weeks. Hydrated and personally fueled. No home or work related stress. I am, however, driven by college course requirements to complete my overdue CFI-I training which - I had hoped - to do by the end of [month].

On arrival at ZZZ, the winds were calm. We met at XA:00, briefed our flight training for the morning with the intent to review avionics. We also reviewed CFII flight standards and best practices for instructors. I would be flying from the Right Seat for the lesson.

At approximately XA:45, we left for the hangar. I noted the winds had started to pick up. We conducted pre-flight inspection of the aircraft together and departed ZZZZ for the practice area without incident. ATIS reported winds 260@12 knots peak gust to 17.

Flight training was uneventful and as planned. I set up for the Approach to ZZZ, under view limiting device, and contacted Approach for the practice approach. ATIS report was unchanged from our departure, winds 260@12 peak gust to 17. I flew the approach and after passing the final approach fix at 2,000 feet, I added one notch of flaps and reduced power for the descent. At the time, I called out the approach speeds out-loud. Approximately 2 -3 miles from the threshold I added a second notch of flaps, I removed the view limiting device. I commented that I was keeping a bit more power in, at 1700 RPM, to compensate for the windy conditions and would not add additional flaps. I believed I was flying a stable approach and was on glidepath to land on the 1,000 feet runway markings. I reduced power upon crossing the threshold to about 1200 - 1300 RPM.

Approximately 200 feet before the 1,000 foot marker I was beginning the landing flare when we encountered a wind gust that caused the plane to balloon. I recovered and started a landing attempt when a second gust put us on the ground and the aircraft
porpoised twice. I continued moving down the runway and taxied to the hangar. As we were departing the runway, ATC reported a wind gust to 19 knots.

During post-flight inspection, we noticed about a small bend on the prop tip.

Chain of Events:

- New instructor to me
- Current but not proficient in the type aircraft since my last flight in almost a year.
- Current, but had not flown in over a month, rusty.
- Failed to give the surface winds the attention I should have. I was watching the weather, but was (a) eager to get back into the air; (b) I failed to recognize the hazard it created given my level of proficiency from lack of flying in the last 30 - 90 days; and, (c) failed to recognize that the cross wind component on landing was close my personal minimums given my flight recency.
- At the FAF, I called out the landing airspeeds and recognized the wind conditions required compensation which I also said, out loud, about 2-3 miles from the threshold. I still felt comfortable with the approach and noted - out loud - the position of the windsock almost down the runway.
- When at the flare near the touchdown point encountering the gust of wind - which in hindsight, was probably a wind shear - and aircraft ballooning, I failed to take immediate action. The chain of event culminating in the aircraft porpoising and the prop striking the runway.

LESSONS LEARNED -

- Given the weather forecast of increasing winds, I should have realized that my personal minimums would be near the limits at the time we would finishing the lesson. In fact, the winds performed exactly as forecast. At this point I should have postponed the lesson, but I was driven by a desire to get back in the plane from such a long period of time and start my CFII training.

- Since I had not flown in this type aircraft in almost a year and, again, given the wind forecast, I should have postponed the training flight for another day.

- During the approach, I took note of the increased winds and the need to compensate with pitch and power and flaps to mitigate against what eventually happened. My inexperience was overcompensated, however, by my belief that I was maneuvering the aircraft in a stable approach for landing and that "I could do it."

- At the flare, when the wind ballooned the aircraft I failed to immediately initiate a 'go around' by adding full power and flying the aircraft. Instead, I forced the landing by trying to salvage it when a second gust put us on the ground and porpoising twice. I believe this was caused by me not reducing enough power coming over the threshold and landing with too much speed. Again at the first indication of a bounce, and giving the windy conditions, I should have immediately applied power and initiated a go-around.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I SHOULD HAVE DONE:

- Immediately, and without hesitation, initiated a go-around. That is the safest thing to do.

- Postponed flight training due to the windy and gusty conditions, my limited flying during COVID-19 restrictions, and my lack of recent experience flying this type aircraft.
- Discussed during pre-flight with the flight instructor my lack of recency in this type aircraft and the winds reaching my personal minimums around the time our lesson would conclude.

Finally, I am glad no one was injured and the aircraft is repairable. This was a very hard lesson for me, but one that will resonate for the rest of my flying career and one that I can/will share with others.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported wind gust caused the aircraft to porpoise twice during landing causing minor propeller damage. Pilot cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1742311**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1100

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: FBO
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: None
- Mission: Training
- Flight Phase: Initial Climb
- Route In Use: None
- Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: FBO
- Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multimeter
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742311
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Training / Qualification
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was training a student in the local ZZZ area (ZZZ). After completing training maneuvers [XX] miles east of ZZZ we returned to ZZZ for touch and go landings. After the 2nd landing we climbed to [an] upwind leg. The Tower Controller was talking to me and another aircraft in the pattern. He gave an instruction to the other aircraft which was doing another touch and go. I heard the Controller say extend upwind he will call the crosswind turn. At the time I made a quick comment correcting my student on his climb speed. I believed the Controller was talking to the other aircraft. I proceeded to make a normal left crosswind turn and continue a normal traffic pattern. As I was on downwind the Controller advised me I should have been on crosswind. I apologized and informed him I didn't realize that instruction was for us. ZZZ has been working with minimum staffing due the pandemic. A single Controller handles three positions Clearance Delivery, Ground Control, and Tower. With this in mind I would've chosen to do touch and go landings at an airport with less traffic. I will be sure to be cautious about this fact until air traffic and controller staffing goes back to normal.

Synopsis

Instructor pilot reported thinking Tower instructions for them were for another aircraft resulting in a heading deviation. Reporter cited Tower staffing issues due the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.
Non-rev passenger cleaned her seat area with bleach. I smelled the chemical. Number three notified the Captain and the number one Flight Attendant. They called for the customer service. The customer service representative talked with the passenger and had
the bleach removed from the aircraft. Flight continued on to ZZZ without any further incident.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported a passenger cleaned the seat with bleach. Bleach was removed from aircraft and flight departed.
Narrative: 1

On this flight, my first flight worked since the introduction of mandatory masks I found it incredibly difficult to address the non-compliance of many passengers with the mandatory mask requirement based on the guidelines provided, even after reviewing them thoroughly several days before. Many passengers boarding the aircraft were not wearing masks and instead holding them in their hands, some of them stating that they didn’t know it is now a
mandatory requirement, though I was told announcements were made at the gate.

The verbiage in the guidelines need to be more clear on what, if anything, can be done for non-compliance of passengers wearing masks on board the aircraft. I think that there should be a clearer approach to dealing with this new mandatory mask requirement as well as the non-compliance that will follow. I feel that having a more cohesive approach from both Ground Personnel and flight attendants will reduce the non-compliance in a non-confrontational way.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported difficulty and confusion with guidelines when trying to enforce the mandatory mask requirement.
**ACN: 1742175**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 25
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 13000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ4
- Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Climb
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742175
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We departed ZZZ. We had received a short-range clearance via the ZZZZZ1 Departure Procedure to the ZZZ1 VOR with a climb to 9,000 and as part of the clearance, told to expect filed route and altitude within 10 minutes â€¦. The routing I had filed was ZZZ ZZZZZ1 ZZZ1 ZZZ2.

The copilot is a very experienced pilot, but new to both the aircraft and the older avionics in the aircraft. During the climb, we were given a heading of 340 degrees and cleared to climb to 12,000 feet MSL. Shortly afterwards, we were issued our "filed route" with the exception that ATC added ZZZ3 and ZZZ3 005/060 to the route prior to ZZZ4 and to climb to 14,000 feet and a new heading was issued to intercept the ZZZ3 005 radial. The aircraft is equipped with older EFIS and FMS. We were climbing very quickly and somehow we missed selecting the altitude preselect arm. We had briefed the need to always arm and altitude selector with each and every change in altitude and to also verify that it was armed 1000' prior to the preselected altitude.

I realized that we were probably close to intercepting the assigned radial and rather than ask my copilot to set things up in an FMS that he was still unfamiliar with, I put my head down to program the FMS with the new routing. The copilot called out the altitude deviation as we were going through 14,300 at a high rate of climb. It took another couple of hundred feet to arrest the rate of climb and work our way back to 14,000 feet.

I believe that there were several factors involved in this incident. First and foremost, as PIC, I simply failed to properly manage my inexperienced (in that aircraft) copilot. I failed to follow the principle of AVIATE, NAVIGATE and COMMUNICATE.

Contributing factors were that we were both rusty - our flying had been significantly reduced due to the COVID-19 quarantines. [X] days before the incident we had flown the aircraft [X] hours on a series of test flights. Prior to that, the last time we had flown the aircraft was over two months ago.

Additionally, the Tower personnel at ZZZ could have issued a more appropriate short-range clearance out of ZZZ. I have received the "ZZZ3 ZZZ3005/060..." routing many times in the past for northbound flights out of the ZZZ4 area when departing out of ZZZ5 which is north of ZZZ4. However, this was my first flight northbound out of ZZZ which is south of ZZZ2. In the past, on departures out of ZZZ to the South, East and West, the clearance received when contacting ZZZ4 Approach was actually the same as what I had filed. I know that this information is available to the ATC staff at the ZZZ Tower, or should be, because after the fact, I checked my email and discovered that [company] had sent me an email giving me the "Expected ATC Routing" for the flight that included the "ZZZ3 ZZZ3005/060" between ZZZ1 and ZZZ2. Having this information included in the "expect..." clearance issued prior to departure would allow flight crews to program their nav systems prior to takeoff. It is a very simple thing that reduces workload and would therefore enhance safety.
Finally, as a flight crew, we debriefed the event and discussed the appropriate techniques and safeguards that we need to strictly follow as we resume flying.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported experiencing an altitude deviation during departure. Reporter cited routing clearance issues and lack of flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic as contributing factors.
**ACN: 1742161**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
-Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
-State Reference: US
-Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
-Weather Elements / Visibility: Fog
-Visibility: 1
-Ceiling.Single Value: 300
-RVR.Single Value: 5000

**Aircraft**
-Reference: X
-ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
-Aircraft Operator: Air Taxi
-Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
-Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
-Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
-Flight Plan: IFR
-Flight Phase: Takeoff
-Route In Use: Direct
-Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
-Reference: 1
-Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
-Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
-Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
-Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
-Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
-Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
-Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
-Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
-Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
-ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742161
-Human Factors: Fatigue
-Human Factors: Distraction
-Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
-Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
-Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
-Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
-Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result-General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
During all this COVID restrictions fatigue is taking its toll. At ZZZ I called Center and picked up clearance and departed to ZZZ1 like usual. After departure I had doubts about being released or not. Every night it is pick up the clearance with a fast issuance concluded with void in 5. During all this I will correct any doubts about being released by making sure there is verbal confirmation or denial of "you are released" or "hold for release". It would be an improvement in safety to require a verbalization of release on every clearance at uncontrolled fields as this one was at the time.

**Synopsis**
Pilot reported being unsure if he had a release to get airborne on a flight. Fatigue from COVID-19 restrictions was cited as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1742159

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Landing
Route In Use: None

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742159
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Excursion: Runway
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Weather
Primary Problem: Weather

Narrative: 1
Was cleared to land on Runway XXR at ZZZ, airspeed was approximately 5 knots higher than usual on approach. Made a normal, smooth touchdown on XXR prior to Taxiway 1. Almost immediately on the initial rollout encountered a right crosswind and aircraft swerved hard to the left. The aircraft exited the runway pavement between Taxiways 1 and 2 and the remainder of the rollout was on the grass infield between Runways XXR and XXL until reaching Taxiway 2. Then taxied onto Taxiway 2 and, after receiving clearance, taxied the aircraft normally across Runway XXR to parking. The aircraft sustained minor cosmetic damage and there were no injuries. It was a solo flight. ZZZ Tower had inquired after the rollout as to whether any assistance was required to which I replied in the negative.

Factors which I believe contributed:
1. Due to Covid 19 pandemic and aircraft being in annual for a month did not have much recent flight experience.
2. Due to Covid 19 pandemic, had to order shoes online, instead of being fitted in a store, which were heavier than expected and worn for the first time during this flight, which resulted in less rudder sensitivity and probably decreased ability to control aircraft on rollout.
3. Crosswind force taking effect almost immediately upon initial rollout right after touchdown.
4. Airspeed 5K too high on touchdown.
5. Failure to react quickly enough due to lack of recent flight experience in regards to a go-around, though still not sure a go-around would have helped.
6. Had been very mentally focused on instrument procedures and flying holding pattern during the flight prior to landing and had "expectation bias" of a normal landing with no crosswind.

Synopsis
Pilot reported after landing a crosswind took control of the aircraft causing a runway excursion.
**ACN: 1742152**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Ambulance
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Route In Use: Vectors
- Route In Use: Visual Approach

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742152
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Landing Without Clearance
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Runway
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: Taxi
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was vectored for a visual approach to Runway X. When asked to contact Tower I switched frequencies, but forgot to contact the Tower and unfortunately landed without a clearance. During this time I was monitoring my medical crew in the back as we had a very sick passenger on board. This is not an excuse but with all the COVID-19 patients we've been flying the last few weeks I've just found myself a bit preoccupied with thoughts of bringing the virus home to my family and not knowing it. That being said, even with everything that is going on, as a professional we still need to pay attention to the task at hand and not get complacent. That truly is why this happened I feel. We get comfortable at our home environment, beautiful day and we forget the simple things that are a vital part of the operation. It's been fairly quiet at the airport except for a few passenger and air ambulance flights, so there was no infraction of airspace or anything that involved another aircraft but is still something that after years of flying I can't believe happened. Bottom line, we have to pay attention!

Synopsis

Pilot reported landing without clearance and cited the COVID-19 environment as a contributing factor.
**ACN: 1742122**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
- Cabin Activity: Boarding
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1742122
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
- Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
- When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
- Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
Before boarding I notified agent and 2 flight service personnel that passenger in seat XX needed to be moved away from my jumpseat for social distancing. The seat is directly facing the YY jumpseat. I have legitimate concerns of contracting COVID-19 when seated directly facing a passenger in such close proximity. I confirmed a 2nd time with the agent that I wanted the passenger moved. Flight service informed me that the passenger would be moved to a different seat. I was satisfied with the answer and boarding began. As we reached the end of boarding I observed that the passenger still seated in original seat, our legs would also be extremely close, was coughing, and was not wearing a mask. A different agent came aboard aircraft and I notified her that he was supposed to be moved. She responded that she had no idea what I was talking about. I requested flight service to return to the aircraft. Flight service stated that the flight was at complete [XX]% capacity and they couldn't move him because no other seats available. They informed me that if I was scared I will just be removed (without pay, missed trip, disciplinary action). I asked flight service for a few minutes to allow him to gather my options which now meant delaying the flight. I briefed Captain on what was transpiring. I was informed that I would be disciplined if I chose not to work the flight and the guidelines states it is sufficient enough if both passenger and I have on masks while facing each other. I asked flight service if they had extra masks to provide passenger, which they did not. I spoke with passenger regarding wearing a mask which, although disgruntled, he was able to produce from his carry on luggage. I returned to boarding door and informed flight service that I would work the flight. Boarding door was closed quickly and we rushed to push the flight. Through all of the confusion I did not brief my exit rows. After arming my doors and completing All Call, I went directly into the lav in an attempt to gather my composure, completely forgetting that X people in the exit row needed a manual safety demo as their monitors were stowed. The chaos and confusion while boarding, the lack of clear and concise communication from flight service, coupled with my fear of how to protect myself from contracting COVID-19 led to my lack of focus and poor performance of required duties.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported requesting a passenger be moved to accommodate for COVID-19 social distancing. Passenger was not moved and in the process Flight Attendant forgot to brief emergency row.
Narrative: 1
We were working the flight and were not informed of the X passengers with COVID-19 symptoms until already in flight. They were sitting in the aft near our crew rest seats. They didn't wear their masks for the entirety of the flight. Will we be informed if they receive positive tests for the Coronavirus?
Flight Attendant reported not being informed of passengers on the aircraft with COVID-19 symptoms until after airborne.
ACN: 1742058

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: Marginal
Light: Dusk

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742058
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person: Dispatch
When Detected: In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

I was notified by the safety department that the Dispatcher for our flight filed a report for that flight departing without an alternate. The TAF information that we looked at showed the weather legal to depart without an alternate. Once boarding was complete it came to our attention that the gate agent boarded before the plane was sprayed with disinfectant. We called the Operations Center and they wanted the plane to be deplaned and sprayed. We finally talked with operations and got them back out to reattach the jet bridge and send the sprayers out. After cleaning was complete we re-boarded, closed up and prepared to push back. When we were initially ready to push we would not have been very late. As we waited longer and longer for a push crew the weather got worse at our destination. We ended up landing XX minutes out of our window to file without an alternate.

Due to the aircraft cleaning being delayed and our focus being towards the cleaning of the aircraft and figuring out how to get everyone off and cleaners back on we became distracted. We took our attention away from the flight and did not catch that we were to arrive much later than expected and when we would need an alternate. The Dispatcher did not catch this either and we departed without an alternate.

The pilot's sole focus should be on the safe operation of the aircraft, there needs to be some sort of divide when it comes to who handles the cleaning and problems in the back of the aircraft. When our attention was away trying to make sure other people were doing their jobs, i.e., cleaning in the cabin, we became distracted and didn't catch the mistake made in filing an alternate.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported taking off without a required alternate. A delay due to spraying for COVID-19 was cited as a contributing factor.
Air Carrier X is not following SAFO20009 guidance in its operation. Air Carrier X is not providing to its passengers or flight crewmembers procedures on using oxygen masks while wearing required face masks on board aircraft. Alcohol based hand sanitizer is not being provided to flight crewmembers. Lack of facilities on aircraft or near aircraft to wash hands with soap and water. Cabin and flight decks are not being cleaned, disinfected, or sanitized after every flight or between crew changes. Lack of detailed cleaning process for flight crewmembers. Flight decks and cabins are dirty and stained. There is no assurance that you are using a clean, disinfected, and sanitized aircraft or workplace. No social distancing practices are being implemented in workplace. Crewmembers are having to share uncleaned surfaces with numerous coworkers and other company employees.

Provide employees with alcohol based hand sanitizer. Provide employees with proper PPE and training for disinfectant product usage and manufacturer's instructions for using product are adhered to IAW with Safety Data Sheets. Create a logbook for each aircraft
about its cleaning history with employee names, times, areas that were cleaned, and what products were used. Provide proper cleaning instructions and training. Provide passengers and flight crewmembers guidance on using oxygen masks while wearing face masks. Provide potable water so crewmembers can wash their hands with soap and water. Provide a socially distanced area for crewmembers to use a landline phone and computer to complete preflight briefings, through flight and post-flight paperwork.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported that airline is not following the SAFO2009 guidance during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1742024

Time / Day
 Date: 202005
 Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
 Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
 State Reference: US
 Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
 Reference: X
 ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZ
 Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
 Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
 Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
 Flight Plan: IFR
 Mission: Passenger
 Flight Phase: Taxi
 Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
 Reference: 1
 Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
 Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
 Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
 Function.Flight Crew: Captain
 Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
 Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
 Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
 Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
 ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742024
 Human Factors: Distraction
 Human Factors: Situational Awareness
 Human Factors: Confusion

Events
 Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
 Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
 Detector.Person: Flight Crew
 When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
 Result.General: Maintenance Action
 Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
 Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
 Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
 Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
 Primary Problem: Human Factors
Narrative: 1

We had to return to the gate and remove a passenger exhibiting the signs and symptoms of COVID-19. We had just finished de-icing the aircraft and when I called the FA to notify her, she informed me that we had a passenger in the back of the airplane that was visibly ill. She said he was coughing, sneezing, not wearing a mask, and he refused to wear a mask despite repeated attempts by her to give him one. A doctor who was sitting in front of him said he had also gotten up to use the lavatory about five times since they had boarded. She also said the other passengers were starting to panic and become upset with him. I told her to keep them calm and we were going to return to the gate as soon as I spoke to Dispatch so they could put the wheels in motion per airline protocol.

During a global pandemic, a visibly sick passenger was able to get through check-in, security, walk through the terminal, past a gate agent, and onto an airplane with [XX] other passengers and [X] crew members.

I got Person Y on the phone, told him I wanted to return to the gate, and asked him what I needed to do to adhere to Airline's current COVID-19 protocol. He said he needed to make some phone calls and would get right back to me. While I was waiting I called operations on the radio to tell them what was going on and find out which gate they wanted us to return to once got back to the ramp. Person Y called me back and said once we returned to the gate EMS was going to evaluate the passenger and we would go from there. I notified the FA and then notified the passengers as delicately as I could of the situation. Once we got back to the gate EMS came on board and went back to the passenger who was in seat X. They escorted him off of the airplane and into the ambulance at the bottom of the jet bridge where they evaluated him. While this was going on I called Person Z to inform him of the situation as well. A few minutes later the EMS came up and said he wanted to speak to me out on the jet bridge. He informed me that the passenger was "positive for every screening marker of COVID-19." While I was speaking to him the station manager was on the phone with another woman and said she wanted to speak to me. I told her what had just transpired and she said we could deplane to have the entire aircraft fully sanitized or we could continue to ZZZ1 as is and the decision was up to me. I told her we would deplane to have the aircraft cleaned. I got back on the aircraft and made another PA to the passengers explaining what we were going to do. Once they finished cleaning the aircraft I spoke to Person Y again, verified the fuel, weather, etc., from my release was still valid, boarded the [XX] passengers who still wanted to travel to ZZZ1, and we left.

Even though it's already 2+ months into this pandemic I think mandatory masks for all passengers and screening at security checkpoints by TSA or at the very least at the gate should be mandatory. Social distancing isn't an option in a closed environment with recirculating air - like that on an airplane.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was removed from flight due to exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms. Reporter suggested masks should be mandatory for all passengers and there should be screening for COVID-19 symptoms at security checkpoints.
ACN: 1742005

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZ
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Widebody, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1742005
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1742226

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector.Person : Ground Personnel
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Upon landing Runway XXL Ground said cross Runway XXR via [taxiway] join [other taxiway] to [intersection]. Ground Controller asked if we were going into Gate YY and we replied "Yes." Airport was completely quiet, no other aircraft taxiing and assumed cleared all the way to gate. Turned into intersection and saw guide in and continued to uneventful parking. After shutdown we were advised to call operations. We called and were told we needed to call Ramp Tower as they were still open and operating.

Narrative: 2
Neglected to call Ramp Tower after landing and during taxi to the gate. In past XXXX-ZZZ legs, the aircraft type would be parked on the end of the concourse at a gate that doesn't require a call to Ramp. With the gate assignment being YY, I neglected to notice that a call to Ramp would be necessary.

Contributing to the mistake, we were cleared to the ramp entrance by Tower as we were clearing XXL and that further contributed to me thinking we were good all of the way to the gate. It was very late relative to my home time zone, so I was tired. This was also my first flight in the FO seat in almost two months due to COVID-19 concerns.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported not calling Ramp before taxiing.
ACN: 1741998

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude: MSL Single Value: 21000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Fractional
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function: Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience: Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 10
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1741998
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Staffing

**Narrative: 1**

Working [3 sectors] combined. Had a brief period where volume/complexity exploded. This aircraft was a ZZZ arrival from the west. We pointed out the aircraft to ZZZ1 approach to get him away from ZZZ2, where all the conflicts were. I later observed the aircraft 5-10 miles inside ZZZ3 approach airspace without a handoff.

Aside from just the bump in traffic level, the frequency congestion was horrible. Center has been worse than normal during the pandemic in complying with the LOA. We are getting ZZZ4 area landers above FL300. Also, aircraft had been auto-flashing to ZZZ3 above FL240 all day because flight data (or whoever) didn't run the text file to turn off ZZZZZZ Intersection the last time it was active. We had no Supervisor and nobody was answering flight data. As a result I had dis-inhibited the auto-flash to ZZZ3.

I really wish we could use cross coupling where available to eliminate pilots stepping on each other.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller reported working 3 sectors combined during the COVID-19 pandemic and did not point out an aircraft resulting in an airspace violation.
ACN: 1741968

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 10000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Fuselage Tail Cone
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741968
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Maintenance Action
Result.Aircraft: Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
After having taken an X week break for Coronavirus, I was doing a currency flight with my student. Student had performed well on all other tasks. We came in for landing and did a few normal touch and goes before practicing short fields. During one of the short field landings, the student was holding the plane in the flare and we struck the tail on the ground. We noticed it after the flight due to the bent skid plate. The plane was immediately taken for a maintenance inspection.

Synopsis
Instructor pilot reported that while flying with a student they struck the ground with the tail of the aircraft during landing.
Had 2 issues of non-compliance of company policy on same flight:
1. None of our catering personnel were wearing a mask while catering our aircraft.
2. We had a non-revenue pilot board our flight with required mask on. Then as I observed...
him from back of aircraft, as soon as he got to his row he took off his mask and put it in his uniform jacket. I came forward and asked him if he needed another mask and he said, "No, I have one." I asked him to please put it on. He complied until I walked past him, then took it off again. I mentioned it to our Purser. As she was doing cabin compliance checks with me prior to closing main cabin door, Purser again had to ask him to, "Please put on mask again." He complied at that point.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported catering personnel were not wearing masks, and a non-revenue pilot was not complying with mask usage until pilot was asked twice to comply.
ACN: 1741926

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741926
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Blocked in ZZZZ1 and noticed that the ZZZZ ramp had left the ramp copy of the signed release on aircraft. I handed the release to the ramp agent in ZZZZ during pre-flight after signing.
We got to the jet which had just arrived. Due to health screening, we did not go into ZZZZ Operations as we normally would. The inbound crew was still onboard, and we had [X] jumpseaters. We then had to deplane while the disinfecting crew came onboard. It was very hectic. Once on board, and able to get to the cockpit to pre-flight, I had to call into ZZZZ Operations for the trip folder with the weather and flight plan release. After I signed the release, I placed it on the first observer seat until a ramp agent came to the cockpit. The ramp agent took the release from me, but must have placed it down on the 1st observer seat, and then forgotten it. The ZZZZ ramp is not used to taking the signed release as we normally review the release and sign it online in ZZZZ Operations. I did not have a chance to review the release via iPad prior to arriving at the aircraft due to the health screening, and the commotion at the jet with cleaners, jumpseaters, inbound crew hanging out, etc.

Just need to remember to assure it goes overboard with the ramp agents, the ramps agents need to be reminded to not forget the paperwork.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported they departed with the flight release form still in the aircraft. Reportedly, ramp personnel forgot the form in the aircraft after the crew had handed it to them.
ACN: 1741905

Time / Day
  Date: 202005
  Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
  Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
  State Reference: US
  Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
  Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
  Reference: X
  ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
  Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
  Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
  Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
  Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
  Flight Plan: IFR
  Mission: Passenger
  Flight Phase: Landing

Person: 1
  Reference: 1
  Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
  Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
  Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
  Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
  Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
  Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
  ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741905
  Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
  Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
  Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
  Reference: 2
  Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
  Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
  Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
  Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
  Function.Flight Crew: Captain
  Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
  Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
  Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Narrative: 1

Short turn on to final just inside ZZZZZ Intersection. One dot high. I was task saturated configuring from 210 to 170 knots and getting on glideslope. I tuned out ATC while configuring and didn't catch that we hadn't switched over to Tower for a landing clearance. Captain was busy as well assisting me in configuring and missed the frequency switch to Tower. After landing we noticed we were still on approach frequency.

Although I lost listening focus on ATC communications during configuring, from FAF to touchdown it was pretty quiet and mellow. If I had refocused on listening to ATC chatter, I would have easily noticed we were still on approach frequency.

Narrative: 2

Short approach to Runway XX, slightly high and slowing to 170. On glideslope by ZZZZZ Intersection. FO leg, he configured quickly and slowed from 170 assigned to approach speed as we approached ZZZZZ Intersection, then dropped the nose to get rid of the 1 dot high glideslope. On glideslope shortly after ZZZZZ1 Intersection, transitioned to normal descent rate and speed. Landed uneventfully. On rollout, not hearing any instructions from the Tower, I looked at the radios and saw that I had never switched over to Tower and gotten a landing clearance. Switched over as I turned off the high speed, called Tower, they replied "There you are Aircraft X, we've been looking for you," then gave me taxi instructions. Cross Runway XY, contact Ground and given instructions to taxi to our gate. No further contact from either Tower or Ground.

Both CA and FO have had extended periods of time off, the latest being about X weeks (FO flew yesterday after a [X] week break). Before that, with all the cancellations in [month], flying was spotty, CA flew [X] trips in the [X] weeks before the latest [X] week break. Both of us were aware of the situation, but we got caught short with a short approach, trying to configure, finish the checklist, and get back on the glideslope when the time came to flip the switch to talk to Tower and get a landing clearance.

Don't let obvious distractions at important points of the flight divert you from required frequency changes or procedures, especially if you know you haven't been in the game much lately.
Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance. The Captain made reference to lack of flying time in recent weeks as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1741873

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Descent
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Function.Air Traffic Control: Departure
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741873
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Time Pressure

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Supervisor / CIC
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 1
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741991
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Staffing

Narrative: 1
I was working 3 low altitude sectors combined plus ZZZ Approach Control. It is highly unusual for us to ever be working approach airspace outside of the normal midshift times, but we are during morning rush hours to reduce ZZZ Approach Control employee's exposure due to COVID-19. We are also working ZZZ1 Approach into the morning hours. The complexity of multiple approaches and unfamiliarity with operations at ZZZ airport inside ZZZ Approach airspace led to a missed readback error while we were formulating a plan how to deal with the situations.

I had a Aircraft X northwest bound at XX0 and an Aircraft Y southwest bound at FLXX0 who needed lower to also do multiple approaches at ZZZ with all the other aircraft doing the same. I descended the Aircraft Y to XY0 above the Aircraft X and missed that he read back ZZ0. The Aircraft Y read the clearance backward which was awkward and caused me to miss the altitude readback. Instead of the Aircraft Y saying Aircraft Y descending to ZZ0 altimeter 30XX, he said 0XX ZZ0 Aircraft Y. When I heard 0XX I looked for a data block with a 0XX in it not realizing it was the Aircraft Y clipping the altimeter and saying it first so I missed the ZZ0 part.

Center is working sectors combined with fewer people than normal which is fine, but now just this week they now have us doing ZZZ1 Approach and ZZZ Approach during hours we normally do not work Approach Control. The frequency congestion and lack of frequency coverage at the lower Approach Control altitudes adds an undue burden and complexity to Center normal operations which are fairly busy at times with the combined sectors and reduced staffing. We are also working those 2 approach controls earlier in the evening than normal. The approach controls need to work their normal hours and this incident would not have occurred.

Narrative: 2
Aircraft Y, NW bound, level at XX0. Aircraft X, SW bound at FLYY0 was given descent clearance to XY0. Pilot read back ZZ0. When the radar showed Aircraft Y at XX7 the Controller issued a climb clearance to Aircraft Y and a descent clearance to Aircraft X.
Numerous calls for coordination was being accomplished by the X-side around the time of the incident.

Due to COVID-19, 3 TRACONs are on reduced operating hours; ZZZ2 TRACON, ZZZ1 TRACON, and ZZZ TRACON. ZZZ ARTCC new specialty controllers are tasked with assuming the airspace for a longer time with a substantial increase in traffic in the morning hours. By the X o’clock hour ZZZ2 TRACON and ZZZ1 TRACON have assumed their airspace. The issue lies with the late opening of ZZZ TRACON. There is a major increase in traffic the hour before they open with arrivals, departures, overflights, military flights, and practice approaches. These are operations that increase the complexity and mental fatigue of the controllers that are unfamiliar with conflicting approaches, missed approach procedures and coordination with towers.

I recommend that ZZZ Approach still stay open for the total hours they feel will increase the safety of their workforce, however as soon as practicable shift the operating hours 1 hour earlier to control traffic their facility is accustomed to working on a daily basis. This will decrease ZZZ’s Center's workload to a greater level of safety and increase the level of safety in ZZZ TRACON's airspace during this morning traffic period.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller and Front Line Manager reported an airborne conflict event while working Center airspace along with three other Approach Control airspaces.
ACN: 1741854

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 16000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 12
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 3000
RVR.Single Value: 10000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted AircraftManufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 20000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 50
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 5000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741854
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
No radio communication. COVID-19 lack of traffic. Flew out of radio contact with the Controller. Pilot complacency due to the reduction in air traffic and radio communications.

Synopsis
Pilot reported flying out of radio contact with the Center due to complacency from the reduction of air traffic caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
**ACN: 1741839**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741839
- Human Factors: Time Pressure
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Confusion
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected : Taxi  
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors  
Primary Problem : Procedure

**Narrative: 1**

Some last minute passengers boarded the airplane. Due to new social distancing guidelines with passengers spreading out throughout the cabin I had a Flight Attendant perform a count. We received a paper CLR from ramp. We entered the information and received good numbers and departed on time. Approximately 5 minutes after departure we received the close out data while taxiing and approaching the end of the runway. I assumed the ZONE data would be wrong, but the total passenger count would be correct. Because I was actively taxiing I asked the FO to resend the data from the FA count. ATC gave us our takeoff clearance which I instructed the FO to reject the clearance and let them know we are working on an issue with our takeoff data. We held short of the runway were I was able to review the correct CLR date from the paper copy and correct ZONE data based on the FA count. We re-sent the data to make sure the data on file last sent was correct. We reviewed that nothing in the takeoff data had changed based on what we had sent prior to departure. The rest of the flight was normal. [X] days later I received notification from our company saying our passenger count was off by "X". They stated the auto close out numbers showed XX passengers but our manifest on file was showing YY; a difference of X. I sent my reply to our company stating the story I am telling here to explain the situation and apologize for any mistake on my, or my crews part. The next morning (X days after the flight) I received a reply from the company saying further investigation revealed airline updated there system showing YY passengers and apologizing to me stating our count was only off by "X" passengers. But based on the original and updated notification I received we had YY both times so we should be correct. I’m filling this out as a precaution if we were off of our count due to any error between the gate agent and FA, the FA count, or our pilot inputs to the manifest. I tried to create time to fix the problem prior to takeoff and double check the manifest for accuracy, as well as the takeoff data. The one thing I failed to do was double check the total count of the auto closeout compared to our [count]. Prior to door close and departure I am fairly positive I asked the FA if her total was verified with the agent prior to closing the door, as this is my normal habit with [passenger] counts, and she said yes. I had a great crew, so I had no reason to doubt the count. To sum up, I am not sure if our count was correct or off by one, but I am extremely sorry for any errors on my part.

The cause was the auto closeout data coming through the system after departure while taxiing and automatically sending new takeoff data. When this happens it frustrating trying to re-input all of the corrections and find any required changes. Based on prior flights if there is any change in CLR or passenger counts the closeout will knock out any inputs previously made, and verified by the crew. This can happen several times even if there is no change in closeout data. I’m not sure if the gate agents are clicking to close out the flight more than once or an error trying to transmit or receive the data from the system. This can cause a rushed and stressed environment if the closeout comes within a few minutes from departure. Particularly if the closeout gets sent multiple times with the same wrong data. This gets increasingly frustrating when the data comes in after departure and
pushback or while taxiing. Knowing this I tried to do my best to create more time to avoid rushing and give us both (CA and FO) together time to review all of the inputs and verify all of our takeoff data was correct and unchanged. We held short of the runway to accomplish this. A major contributing factor on my part was I failed to look at the takeoff data generated by the closeout to verify the total count. I assumed just the zones would be off. I should not have had that mindset. Because I was taxiing when the closeout data came in I did not have a chance to check the totals before the FO started changing them. Had I caught this we could have called Operations and resolved the issue prior to takeoff. This was also a failure on the FO not to double check the total count prior to making any changes. The FO was a sharp guy and had been performing great so I also trusted he looked at the data before making changes. I should not have trusted and assumed this would have taken place. Another factor could be a counting mistake by the FA or failure to verify the total with the gate agent. A possible issue could be the gate agent just agreeing with the total the FA said and not actually cross checking it with his computer total. But, I have a feeling the root cause, and what actually happened, was the gate agent did verify the correct total with the FA based on the count, but failed to close out the flight prior to pulling the jet bridge.

First and foremost require gate agents to close out the flight prior to coming down to pull the jet bridge. Prior to pulling the jet bridge verify we received the close out data. In our case we were operating off of a paper CLR and [passenger] count, no closeout was received until after departure and pushback and we were already taxiing. Require gate agents to split up passengers for social distancing guidelines and not move passenger forward to avoid any weight and balance issues and passengers moving from assigned seats. That way the closeout data will actually be correct and usable and we can mitigate error in the chain such as input error, count error, and verification errors.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported issues with the passenger count on board and social distance seating guidelines which delayed the flight.
I contacted Scheduling once I landed in ZZZZ. I wanted to return on the outbound flight that was completely empty. Scheduling informed me that I needed to [be] with crew and stay in ZZZZ. I expressed my concerns of staying with the crew. Then getting on 2 other aircraft and staying in 2 Hotels. Scheduling wanted to know the reason for my concern. I begin to explain that I received called before I left for my trip, that I have come in contact with a crew member that tested positive [for] COVID-19. Scheduling immediately turned me over to the Duty Manager on duty that evening back in ZZZ. I tried to explain the situation, and who was the person telling me the details of my interaction. And the
scheduler that told me that I had to either do the trip or remove myself from the trip.

I explained to Manager the person that called me to inform me of my contact with the crew member with COVID-19. And also explained what the Scheduler wanted me to do. Then I tried to explain the concern of the Captain of why I was on the trip in the first place. Manager explained he wanted me to continue on the trip. To stay at the hotel and continuing on with the crew on the rest of the trip. Manager informed me that someone from the COVID team would be calling me at the hotel within \([X]\) hours. None of which ever happened.

At this point of arriving in ZZZZ. The only thing I wanted to do is come home. I would like to know the reason why I could not do that. So would my crew and so would the flight deck. Please give me a reason why I had to stay in two hotels and try to self quarantine myself. After working the full flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZZ. Then staying at the hotel in ZZZZ. Then deadheading from ZZZZ to ZZZ2. Staying in a hotel in ZZZ2. And then continue on another flight from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1. No I’m not a doctor but listening to the experts, the scientist and the doctors. The best thing would have to turn me around and send me home. So please tell me why that was not done. And what was the purpose of keeping me there.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported being asked to continue flying after being notified of being in contact with a crew member who had tested positive for COVID-19.
ACN: 1741713

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling: Single Value: 5000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class G: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: FBO
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741713
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Landing Without Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Observer
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Narrative: 1

Myself and another CFI landed at a non-towered airport that was NOTAMed "CLSD TO TRANSIENT" aircraft.

During the COVID-19 slowdown, our flight school had ceased all student training and was only flying occasional proficiency flights with either a solo instructor or dual instructors. This was a dual instructor flight and the first such dual flight for either of us in over a month (it was solo ops only before this). We had just finished a simulator proficiency flight and headed to the airport. Our profile was local: depart ZZZ1, simulated XC to ZZZ2, diversion to ZZZ then simulated XC to ZZZ3, diversion to ZZZ4 and return to ZZZ1. Landings were planned at ZZZ, ZZZ4 and ZZZ1. We split up the pre-flight and introduced the new sanitizing procedures our school had implemented the day before. Our weather checks were brief, as it was clearly a "nice" day. METAR, TAF and local radar showed no concerns apart from some turbulent and gusty conditions. No SIGMETs or worrisome AIRMETs. Weight and balance was good and we were pretty familiar with the airports we were going to. I took the first leg to ZZZ. As I began the startup checklist, I remembered I forgot to check the NOTAMs. I asked my co-pilot (another instructor) if he had gotten a chance to check the NOTAMs and if not, could he check while I started up. He responded in the affirmative that he checked. I clarified, confirming that he checked for both airports we intend to land at. Again, he responded in the affirmative, stating we were good to go. With this, we continued on. Upon arriving at ZZZ, we observed and communicated with a local aircraft departing the airport towards the south, presumably doing flight training over the lake. This pilot made no attempt to inform us the airport was closed and his presence left little doubt that the airport was open. We continued inbound, making all the appropriate CTAF calls. When closer, we observed no signage was placed near or on the runway (such as an "X"). We began doing pattern work and prior to taking off to begin our third lap, a voice on CTAF informed us the airport was closed to transient aircraft (presumably someone in the FBO). Surprised, I apologized and advised we would depart the area after taking off. Upon returning to ZZZ1, I checked and sure enough, there was a NOTAM set to expire within 24 hours stating the airport was closed to transient aircraft. I asked my co-pilot/fellow instructor who had earlier confirmed there were no NOTAMs and he said he must have missed it.

- ZZZ was one of only a handful of airports approved for this week's proficiency flight by our flight school. Had it not been listed (or no list provided), it is unlikely we would have gone there.
- My fellow instructor confirming there were no NOTAMs.
- The current COVID-19 slowdown and new sanitizing procedures had changed our procedures just enough to potentially affect our normal flow of operations.
- Observing and communicating with an aircraft departing ZZZ immediately prior to our arrival certainly seemed to end any doubt (if there was any) about the airport's open/close status.
- No markings on or near the runway to indicate airport closure.

Ultimately there is no excuse. I regret not checking the NOTAMs myself, but I am also disappointed that another experienced instructor missed this vital NOTAM. However, we are all human and sometimes we might miss the handful of coded identifiers that mark an
airport closed. Thankfully, the airport was only closed to transient aircraft and there were never a safety risk.

Synopsis
Pilot reported doing pattern work, practice landings and takeoffs at an airport that had been NOTAMed closed.
**ACN: 1741701**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202005
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Personal
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Route In Use: Direct

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741701
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Runway
- Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
- When Detected.Other
- Result.Genera: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Human Factors
**Narrative: 1**

Flying on a VFR cross country from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. I checked NOTAMs for the airport the evening before my flight and early in the morning before my departure. I took off from ZZZ1 at XA:50 local time and I landed at ZZZ around XB:30 local. I saw a working crew on the ramp as I taxied in. The line person parked me and told me I had landed on a closed runway. There were no markings on the runway to indicate it being closed. I asked when the NOTAM was published and she said it was published this morning. I looked at my ForeFlight and a NOTAM was published after I had departed ZZZ1. Had I gotten to ZZZ just a little later there would have been markings on the runway indicating that it was closed and I wouldn't have landed. My assumption is with the coronavirus, the airport manager wasn't certain if or when work would begin and didn't issue the NOTAM until the work crew arrived.

**Synopsis**

GA pilot reported landing on a closed runway, that was NOTAMed closed after pilot had already checked NOTAMs and had departed.
I'm writing in my regards of a guest dissatisfied experience. I had a guest prior to takeoff ask me if it's possible if there was a vacant row available where her and her husband can sit next to one another. I responded once we are in the air and it's safe for me to get up I will see what's available because we have close to a book flight with X guests onboard. Every row in the main cabin had at least 1 person sitting in it but row XX. This is a scary
and worry time for a lot of our passengers with COVID and a lot of the passengers boarded this flight were not wearing mask. The passengers in the aft of the aircraft expressed their worry and asked "NOT to bring anyone back to sit in this empty row as worry to COVID."

I went back to the lady and deeply expressed that with COVID we are really doing our best to protect all of our guest with their health and well-being. That with this difficult time we ask guest to remain in their assigned seats.

I did what I felt was right for the safety and concern for all of the other passengers who are worried with COVID and how they really are wanting there social distancing. I really do understand where this guest is coming from and wouldn't have an issue with her wanting to sit next to her husband. But having guest express their concerns with COVID and asking please don't fill these seats here in the back. I was thinking more for the safety and well-being with social distancing.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger asked for a different seat, but Flight Attendant was unable to comply with the request due to social distancing concerns from other passengers.
Before boarding, the Y Flight Attendant noticed a cigarette butt found in Row XX. She picked it up and showed it to me. It looked like 3/4 of a smoked cigarette.

Also on this aircraft, there was no alcohol-based hand sanitizer present for the flight attendants. The only sanitizer that was stocked on the aircraft were the usual foam
sanitizers.

If there was someone actually smoking on the previous flight at their seat, that's a huge safety hazard. I also don't know how the cleaners (if there were any) missed this, as it was clearly visible if a flight attendant spotted it.

Also, it's my understanding that each flight is supposed to have alcohol-based sanitizers. Please make sure that they are available to flight attendants on every flight.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported they found a 3/4 used cigarette on the aircraft while doing initial inspections and wondered how the cleaning crew missed it. Also, there were no alcohol based cleaning/sanitation supplies on the aircraft.
ACN: 1741688

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Door Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741688
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Gate Agent / CSR
When Detected.Other
Result.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was the X FA and I disarmed my door, but forgot at first to move my door flag to the disarmed position, I gave the Gate agent a thumbs up, and when she didn't move, I realized my mistake, moved the flag to the correct position, gave a thumbs up and then we opened the L1 door. Triple check myself before giving a thumbs up! I was concerned about getting my face mask on for door opening and deplaning and I allowed this to interfere with my usual focus. In the future I will put this on after the door is opened since I can't wear the mask and use the intercom to call to the back.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported initially forgetting to move the door flag to the disarmed position due distraction from putting a mask on to avoid COVID-19 exposure.
ACN: 1741683

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741683
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I experienced an immediate burning sensation in my eyes/nose/throat/lungs and an immediate headache upon entering the aircraft to perform my safety checks. There was a strong residual odor from the cleaning product, which is being overused by both fleet and flight attendants in response to COVID. I experienced these symptoms on my ZZZ1 flight.
After flying to/from ZZZ1, I continued to experience the acute burning sensation in my eyes/nose/throat/lungs and headache on my drive home. I found the safety data sheet on this product which states "May cause irritation or damage to the eyes" and "May cause chronic nasal passage, throat, or lung irritation if breathed over a prolonged period of time in the form of mist." It also states on the bottle "hazardous to humans and domestic animals." Several flight attendants in ZZZ are getting very sick from this cleaning product which is being left onboard for flight attendant use. This is inappropriate and unacceptable and must be removed from the aircraft immediately. Perhaps the Sani-Com Wipes or similar wipes can be provided for the flight crew. Please see attached Irregularity Report. Remove X product from the aircraft for flight attendant use and replace with Sani-Com wipes or similar wipes.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported an immediate burning sensation in eyes/nose/throat/lungs and an immediate headache, from the cleaning products used to combat COVID-19.
ACN: 1741644

**Time / Day**

Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi

**Person**

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741644
Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter: Other / Unknown
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Taxi
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Aircraft: Aircraft Damaged

**Assessments**
Narrative: 1

Pushback from the gate commenced while the parking brake was set. The tow bar's shear pin broke.

I, the CA, failed to release the parking brake during my pushback flow. Typically, this oversight in a flow would be caused by rushing or by being interrupted. That was not the case here. Even though a mechanical had caused us to change planes and be delayed, I did not feel rushed. Especially since we had to wait 30 plus minutes to be fueled. Most flows have a cadence between the CA and the FO. The pushback flow also involves the gate agent, the lead FA, the Ramp Controller, and the pushback crew. The cadence of this pushback was different because everything had been completed except fueling the plane. The cargo door had been closed and the agents had been on the tug for 30 minutes. As soon as the fueling was finished, everyone was ready to go. The FA left the cockpit and we started our flows. This is where the normal cadence changed. Everyone was ahead of me. The first part of my flow ends with turning on the rotating beacon. Then I ask the FO for pushback clearance and I tell the pushback crew "brakes released, hold the push. I'll call you back." This time the FO called for the push before I finished the first part of my flow. The push back crew also called earlier than usual. Just as I turned the beacon on, my FO said: "cleared to push." Normally for me, the call to the pushback crew is three steps. The FO states "cleared to push," I release the brakes (a physical motion), and I state "brakes released, cleared to push." This time I received the "cleared to push," I turned on the beacon (a physical motion), and I gave the pushback command. That is the only reason I can figure as to why I skipped releasing the brakes. The FO did nothing wrong. Some call for pushback clearance as soon as the yellow hydraulic pump comes on indicating the cargo door is being shut. This time everyone was ready at the same time, which is not normally the case. I flew two legs the day before after having been off for two months. I had been reviewing my flows, etc. in preparation for returning to the line. I felt completely comfortable and satisfied with those two flights, which, by-the-way were completely "normal."

Our flows are interrupted regularly. Most of the time it is easy to just start over. I did not realize that I had deviated from my flow. I had been off for a while. My plan was to go to the training center and practice my flows in a procedure trainer before I returned to work, but was unable to due to our training center being closed due to the COVID-19 virus. My practice at home went well. I had flown two legs the day before and all went well. I suppose I was overconfident. I probably should have used our flow charts for a few flights.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported pushing back before brakes were release causing the tow bar shear pin to break.
I arrived at base for my shift and the aircraft and day crew were gone, out on their X flight of the day. I clocked on in and got my flight release. They returned to base an hour plus later. The day pilot went inside to enter his flight while I refueled the aircraft and
conducted a pre-flight inspection. I came inside, and began discussing the day's events with the off-going pilot. We were still talking 30 minutes later when another flight request came in. I accepted the flight, submitted my forms, quickly finished up a briefing with the crew, and walked out to the aircraft. The flight was uneventful and was completed without issue.

The passenger had required full COVID-19 precautionary measures, so we decontaminated the aircraft and ourselves prior to entering the base. I entered our flight info into the records, then began closing out our maintenance log book. I saw that the 10-15 hour re-torque inspection for the float step was overdue. I double-checked the numbers and the logbook to determine if it was actually overflown. Unfortunately, the latter was the case so I placed the aircraft and base out of service then notified the on-call mechanic, and the manager.

Going forward, the feeling of being hurried will be a cue to throttle back and be extra meticulous. Paying particular attention to things out of the ordinary will help against complacency. After a few months of slow flight volume, our base conducted [X] flights in [Y] days. That should be a cue to double-check the numbers.

One possible control that would also be helpful is to patch the software to highlight inspections that are due within 10 hours in the section of the flight release request. We currently have to enter a password to override inspections that show overdue to complete the flight release request, which is a great prompt. Highlighting inspections due in less than 10 flight hours in yellow may help prevent this kind of oversight in the future.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported flying aircraft with an overdue inspection.
ACN: 1741625

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Fire/Overheat Warning
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1741625
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

[At] cruise, smelled like wire burning, put masks on, then visible smoke [was] coming from pedestal. Flew barber pole until approximately 15 km, landed, shut down airplane no more visible smoke, but still bad smell in airplane. Kept masks on [and] opened windows. Opened door, smell dissipated, deplaned. Mechanic found fire/overheat system circuit breaker popped wires were burnt. He told me Maintenance Control advised him this [has happened to several] airplanes. They believe alcohol from wipes is shorting out wires.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported smelling a burning smell during cruise. Post-flight Maintenance briefing advised the pilots alcohol from wipes may be shorting out wires.
ACN: 1741536

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 30
Ceiling.Single Value: 12000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741536
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
My flight review expired at the end of month. I had been in State X for most of next month and then spent two weeks in place Y for yet the next month. When I returned the COVID-19 pandemic was starting to take over everyone's life. I had no time for flying in that period, until I was asked to fill in for an instructor who was leaving. For whatever reason, I never looked at my Flight Review date and missed it. I flew on that date and four subsequent dates before something made me look. I was out! Inattention to details has never been a problem till Coronavirus came along. Purely human error - mine. Sorry.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported being outside of flight currency requirements and cited distraction from the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1741533

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1600

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Descent
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1741533

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Altitude Excursion. I was operating with a company instructor pilot. We were on an IFR flight plan operating in the vicinity of ZZZ. We had requested a practice RNAV XX instrument approach into ZZZ and were cleared direct to ZZZZZ, maintain 2,000 feet until ZZZZZ, cleared for the RNAV XX into ZZZ.

We were descending out of altitude (above 2,000 feet) and I was wanting to practice cockpit automation. The minimums for the approach were already programmed in the FMS, so I requested we set the minimums in the altitude selector and got approval from the IP. I selected LPV minimums with the altitude selector and continued the descent. At 1,700 feet MSL, I realized that we did not capture 2,000 feet MSL and took appropriate action to return to 2,000 feet. I'm not absolutely sure, but I believe we may have descended to 1,600 feet before arresting the descent and climbed back to the assigned 2,000 feet. The approach was then completed normally.

Analysis and debrief revealed that an inadequate brief of the approach with the intended use of automation and a confirmation of correct programming of the automation had not taken place. The vertical descent mode of the AFCS had been left in VS as opposed to the required selection of the VNV function. The VNV function would have held us to 2,000 feet while VS only looks at the altitude selector for level off.

Supplemental factors:

Do to COVID-19, our flight schedule had been greatly reduced and this was my first day of flying in [X] weeks.

At the time of the altitude excursion, I had been on duty for [X] hours and had flown close to five of those hours.

**Synopsis**

Pilot reported experiencing an altitude deviation and cited lack of flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.


**ACN: 1741509**

**Time / Day**

*Date: 202004*

**Aircraft**

*Reference: X*
*Operator: Air Carrier*
*Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing*
*Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2*
*Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121*
*Flight Plan: IFR*
*Mission: Passenger*

**Person: 1**

*Reference: 1*
*Location Of Person.Aircraft: X*
*Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area*
*Reporter Organization: Air Carrier*
*Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)*
*Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current*
*ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1741509*
*Human Factors: Confusion*
*Human Factors: Situational Awareness*
*Human Factors: Communication Breakdown*
*Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant*
*Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other*

**Person: 2**

*Reference: 2*
*Location Of Person.Aircraft: X*
*Reporter Organization: Air Carrier*
*Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)*
*Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current*
*ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1741510*
*Human Factors: Confusion*
*Human Factors: Situational Awareness*
*Human Factors: Communication Breakdown*
*Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant*
*Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other*

**Events**

*Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness*
*Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Hazardous Material Violation*
*Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy*
*Detector.Person: Flight Attendant*
*When Detected: Pre-flight*
*Result.General: None Reported / Taken*

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

A passenger on a recent flight had tested positive for COVID-19. My crew and I were all notified of our certain exposure, but were informed that we would be expected to fly out a few days later. The company refused to give us alternate travel despite being potential carriers. We were not granted assurance of tests upon landing, or that we would be given leave to quarantine for the full recommended 14 days to allow for symptoms to manifest or not. The flight itself was booked with passengers who would not be informed that their working crew were potentially infected. Among our passengers were many who are considered high risk, and the crew that had worked the previously leg would also be on board, deadheading back to ZZZ. Along with mechanics and pilots who were also forced the deadhead home on our flight. Social distancing was not possible, with nearly every seat full, and with limited supply of masks (which were literally see-through material) it is very likely that entire plane is also now infected.

Company noted the passenger's positive test, informed the crew and took no further action to ensure the safety of the infected crew and the incoming passengers/crew. Our crew took it upon ourselves to organize and schedule for COVID testing once we were back in base, along with attaining doctors notes to back our need to self-isolate.

Company should have contingency plans in place to avoid a repeat of forcing an infected crew to interact with passengers and non-infected crew members. Better resources to get crews tested and given proper time to get results/isolate accordingly.

Narrative: 2

Cabin Crew was informed that a passenger on a previous flight had tested positive for COVID-19, which indicated to us that we had all been exposed. Company responded to our initial questions regarding our concerns about flying while exposed, but informed us that we were still expected to work the flight from ZZZZ to ZZZ. According to the a recent guidelines, a flight crew that has had a positive tested passenger/positive exposure are recommended to self-isolate 14 days and should be excluded from work. We were not given this option and instead asked to work a flight with numerous passengers who would be considered high risk for COVID-19. On the flight itself there were additional deadheading crew members who were also now at risk for exposure. The flight was basically fully occupied and social distancing measures were impossible to practice. I was initially scheduled to operate two more working flights a few days later as well, but was removed from those flights after I took the initiative to get tested and secure a physician's note grounding myself until the results came back.

Synopsis

Two flight attendants reported having to work a flight a few days later after being on a flight with a passenger who had tested positive for COVID-19.
ACN: 1741474

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Pitot-Static System
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741474
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Other Person
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was made aware several days ago that my flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1 on operated with vertical stabilizer probe covers on. I did the walk-around and did not notice the covers on the probes. In my years of flying this type aircraft, I have never had the probes covered. I entered a write-up after landing that the FEEL DIFF light came on several times in flight, but the aircraft operated normal. Yesterday I spoke to Maintenance in ZZZ and I asked what color are the probe covers normally. He said normally X color, however they were short on supplies and in many cases used other methods to cover the probes. Also, Maintenance mentioned this was a new procedure and did not have all the necessary standardization and procedures in place. In today's environment, we have all types of distractions going on, I don't believe I need to list them. This is a challenging time for all employee groups which can cause mistakes and errors. I'm sure Maintenance did not intentionally not remove the covers.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported being notified that he had operated a flight with the vertical stabilizer probe covers on during flight.
ACN: 1741452

Time / Day
Date: 202005
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741452
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741454
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Weight And Balance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
We were told we had 2 jumpseaters. We had two jumpseaters. We showed 2 jumpseaters on the final Weight and balance. We noticed at cruise that the release only listed one jumpseater. We notified company and got time and initials for adding jumpseater to release.

COVID-19 departure procedures distracted from normal departure flows.

Narrative: 2
My First Officer for entire trip was removed for this leg and included as a jumpseater. He was on the pairing, was alerted for show, and was on the W/B, but was not on the release. During alert call I was told that we had two jumpseaters yet only one was at the hotel with us (my normal FO) and only one on the preliminary release (who was not at the hotel.) At that point we figured they had gotten the name wrong or they would correct it on the actual release form. Due to a complete change in clearing COVID protocols in ZZZZ we did not go to Operations as usual and got to the plane late. The second jumpseater was already in the plane when we arrived. The paperwork showed up well into our preflight process and I didn't catch the omission on the final release form. I did notice shortly after we got airborne and contacted Operations to add him. They sent us time and initials for the addition.

Many different procedures, time shortage, information gap. Just missed one message I meant to send but got busy.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported mistakes in flight release documentation relating to the number of jumpseaters on board.
ACN: 1741398

Time / Day
Date: 202005

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741398
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Face masks may be used during flight as a preventative measure against the spread of COVID-19. This poses significant safety compromises.

The over/continued use of face masks has been linked to unconsciousness due to insufficient oxygen intake/excessive carbon dioxide intake.

Masks also cause communications barriers in already noisy flight decks. Should an explosive decompression occur, time of useful consciousness at typical flight levels is approximately 15-30 seconds. Time is critical. Modern airliners utilize quick-don pilot oxygen masks for a reason.

Has the FAA conducted extensive testing verifying face masks will not interfere with oxygen mask use? If not, face masks must be removed before oxygen mask use. A process that will take critical time at a critical time. Should the face mask be pulled down below the chin or should it be remove above the head? How will a tied face mask be quickly untied? Pilots have received zero training in these tasks. These questions pose serious risks until they are analyzed.
Because of the extreme risks to flight safety should oxygen masks be immediately required, the FAA must immediately intervene and prohibit face mask use during flight until they have specifically tested various face mask types and determine which, if any, are safe for use in flight.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported significant safety compromises with wearing face masks during the COVID-19 pandemic and associated problems with oxygen masks.
ACN: 1741389

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude: MSL. Single Value: 4500

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Cruise

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory: TRACON: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Cruise

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- Reporter Organization: Government
- Function: Air Traffic Control: Approach
- Qualification: Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
- Experience: Air Traffic Control: Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 1
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1741389
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness
- Human Factors: Workload
- Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
- Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
- Anomaly: Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This took place during the special staffing for COVID-19 and I was on position at a very busy sector, I was about 30-45 minutes into my shift. I split off this sector due to the large number of aircraft in the airspace at that time, there were about ten on the frequency with at least ten more on 1200 codes in about a 15-20 mile area of airspace. I was speaking as clearly and quickly as I could, and calling traffic and issuing VFR instructions and assigning altitudes and I was aware of just one IFR aircraft on the frequency. I completely missed that Aircraft X was IFR and when they checked in, I told them to advise the weather and maintain VFR at or above 045, due to all the other traffic, I gave him traffic calls and various assignments for VFR altitudes, all of which the pilot read back as VFR instructions. Normally, this aircraft operates VFR, especially when conditions are very good VFR, and I don't know if there was datablock overlap, but I did not realize that he was IFR until I turned him onto the final approach course, I normally give radar vectors for approaches to these flight school aircraft for practice approaches. When I moved the datablock, I realized it was IFR and I apologized to the pilot after asking whether he was IFR (since he answered all my VFR instructions), and I later found out that when he passed by the only IFR aircraft I was working (Aircraft Y) that they were separated by 2.92.

I feel badly that I missed the datablock, although I also feel that I was working very hard with high complexity and I ended up terminating flight following to a few aircraft due to the number of aircraft on frequency and in the airspace. I feel like the situation was controlled and I just missed that his datablock was IFR because I had so many aircraft on frequency and in the airspace.

I would just normally have had a handoff or extra set of eyes watching me if I was working this amount of traffic at this sector, but due to our staffing situation with COVID-19, we have just a few controllers per shift.

Synopsis

TRACON Controller working COVID-19 schedule reported a loss of separation between two IFR aircraft while accidentally providing VFR instructions to one of the aircraft.
ACN: 1741388

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use.Other

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 1
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741388
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This event occurred during special staffing circumstances, in which we are working on skeleton crews due to COVID-19, and I was working with one other person, and half of the airspace for our TRACON. Also, there have been a high amount of practice approaches during this time. Aircraft X was at 030 was cleared for an approach into ZZZ that has a one minute procedure turn at ZZZZZ [Intersection], and I had another aircraft I was vectoring into ZZZ1 at 040, which I waited until he was established to descend him, because the approaches come close to each other but don't overlap. I have never seen this type aircraft go as far out as Aircraft X did, especially doing less than 100 kts, and so I immediately got off the line I was coordinating on and asked him if he was commencing the turn inbound, I then called traffic to him and he said traffic in sight and I asked that he maintain visual separation. I did not realize at the time that I lost separation, but upon review, the Quality Control staff found that I lost separation before I obtained visual separation.

In the future, I would ask the pilot to report the turn inbound and wait to descend the other aircraft or I would wait until I visually observe this on the screen. I have worked many of these approaches in this type of scenario and I was anticipating the turn to be much smaller, but I realize I should protect for a larger turn, in case the pilot does something I am not anticipating. In general, these weeks have been hard because of the high amount of VFR traffic and the flight school operating out of ZZZ2, along with no D-side or Coordinators and more airspace, longer time on position with many days off in between, and it just makes it a little harder.

Synopsis
TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation due to an aircraft taking too long to turn inbound on the approach. Controller made reference to COVID-19 related issues contributing to the event.
ACN: 1741300

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Ground Personnel: Ramp
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1741300

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Ground Personnel
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
ABC County has mandated Corona Virus mask wearing. The team employees work in very close proximity of each other in our tugs (less than 3 feet apart). No one on the shift wears a mask, but me. I asked when this order came out if it was going to be enforced and it was said by management that we can't force them to wear them. If you can't force them to wear masks, then how can you force me to work with them.

Synopsis
Ground employee expressed concern over being the only employee who wears a face mask and works in close proximity with other team employees.
ACN: 1741275

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference: ATC Facility: ZZZ. Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value: 3000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Route In Use: Vectors

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Corporate
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741275
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
While taxiing out to XX at ZZZ, Tower gave us our takeoff clearance with a turn to heading 310. The instructor non-flying pilot I was with read back the clearance saying left turn to 310. After departure the non-flying pilot bugged a left turn to 310, and I began the left turn. When we checked in with departure they notified us it was supposed to be a right turn, and instructed us to stop the turn. I'm not aware of any traffic conflicts that resulted from the turn. The non-flying pilot is confident he heard left turn, I'm only confident I heard him read back left turn.
I'm new to the airplane and have not flown much in the past few months due to the COVID-19 virus pandemic. The left turn to 310 off of XX seemed odd at the time, but due to the decreased air traffic I did not question it, as I should have. I'm not sure if it was pilot or ATC error, but I felt a safety report was warranted.

Synopsis
Corporate pilot reported turning the wrong direction to a heading issued by ATC. The pilot stated they were new to the airplane and had not flown much recently due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1741266

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.Tower
State Reference: US

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility: Turbulence
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 30
Ceiling. Single Value: 12000

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace. Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1741266
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

I was landing in ZZZ after a personal/training flight in the local area. I called 13 miles out and was told to enter the left downwind for RWYXX. I reported midfield left downwind for RWYXX and was cleared to land RWYXX. I turned base and lined up on RWYXY. As I noticed my mistake, the Controller cleared me to land on RWYXY - which I did rather than maneuvering back to the final for the parallel RWYXX. There wasn't any traffic around on either final.

Contributions to my mistake were 1) really gusty strong winds - very bumpy. The wind blew me wide on my downwind/base to final turns 2) I was complacent in checking the runway environment picture as I made the base to final turn 3) After the COVID-19 shutdown and winter, I am rusty and need to practice to get better proficiency.

I'm going to improve my proficiency and work on complacency that has crept into my flying.

Synopsis

GA flight instructor reported lining up on final approach with a runway parallel to the assigned runway. Cited as contributing were weather conditions and a lack of recent proficiency flights due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1741227

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Aircraft Documentation
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741227
Human Factors: Time Pressure

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected.Other

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Aircraft

**Narrative: 1**

Due to a large amount of work loading medical supplies, got in a bit of a rush to block out on time, and read BOW (Basic Operating Weight) placard wrong as XX,XXX. Was really XY,XXX. Due to COVID cockpit procedures, placard [was] very distorted, blotchy and worn. Corrected using adjusted weight column on weight and balance form. Error did NOT affect speed cards used for takeoff or landing. However, error was caught after trip during post flight paperwork checking before turning in.

Do not rush, even if medical supplies. More vigilance on possible flight deck alterations or damage due to COVID cleaning. Did read and was aware of email regarding placards, just didn't stare at it long enough to discern the Number X instead of Number Y.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain misread the BOW (Basic Operating Weight) placard which resulted in a weight and balance miscalculation. The placard had become distorted and worn due to COVID-19 cockpit cleaning procedures.
ACN: 1741215

Time / Day
Date : 202004
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 3
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Parked

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1741215
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Illness
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1
On Day 0, I operated Flight ABC from ZZZZ - ZZZ. I was the Captain assisted by [the] First Officer and the IRO (International Relief Officer). We had additional deadheading flight crew. The flight was uneventful and we landed in ZZZ. On Day 4 I received a call from the company informing me that my crew and I had been exposed to someone who had tested positive for COVID-19. I inquired as to who the infected person was, but she would not give me any names and stated they could not discuss any details with me. I immediately called my first officers and they both reported that they had received the same notification call at approximately the same time. Next I called the jumpseaters. My first call was to Jumpseater A who informed me that he was pulled from his flight on Day 1 by the company. He specifically stated that he was told he was being removed from his flight on Day 2, "due to him being possibly exposed to a person who has been tested for COVID-19." His notification occurred before our departure back to ZZZZ so we are curious why we were not shown the same abundance of caution and removed from our flight assignment since we were in close contact with affected jumpseater. Instead we were only notified after we returned to ZZZ on Day 4 after having potentially exposed more jumpseaters and the good people of the neighborhood who we intermixed with during the ZZZZ layover. The FO in question did test positive for the virus and I am now showing secondary symptoms which I pray is not related to a COVID infection. In closing, I personally believe that if there was a possibility that a crew member was potentially COVID-19 positive, we should have been removed as operating crew and tested!

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported being notified by the company of a possible exposure to COVID-19 through another crew member. The Captain expressed concern that deadheading crew was notified before the on-duty crew and suggested that they should have been removed from duty sooner.
Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 41000

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility: Thunderstorm
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 50
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Taxi
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Flight Engineer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741192

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Narrative: 1

Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 in an overwater equipped aircraft with a co-pilot that hasn't completed overwater training. We were on a filed route that kept us close to the shoreline but had to deviate around area of heavy thunderstorms which got us farther off shore than authorized by our ops specs. I filed the flight [plan], but didn't take into account that any deviation further offshore would exceed acceptable distance from the shoreline. Due to COVID-19 my co-pilot's overwater training had been cancelled and that fact I hadn't considered when I filed the flight plan. I will definitely review everyone's quals in the future and be sure the filed route complies with all regulations.

Synopsis

Air taxi pilot reported that while deviating around thunderstorms, the track resulted in flying farther offshore than allowed by company Ops Specs. The pilot noted that due to COVID-19 the co-pilot's overwater training had been cancelled.
ACN: 1741165

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Landing
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741165
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Visual approach to Runway XXL. Vectored to a wide downwind by ATC. Was high and over-corrected and descended too low. Had the ILS XXL tuned in as a backup and by the time the aircraft turned final, was 1 dot low on the glidepath. Stopped the descent and re-established on glidepath to an uneventful landing. Lots to learn on this one as debriefed by both pilots after landing. As the pilot flying I over-corrected on the much wider downwind than I was used to and got low as a result. Would have worked for a normal downwind, but I should have held my descent. Have not been flying a lot lately, and neither had my FO and it showed as I think under normal flying I would have caught this prior to final and made an earlier correction. Definitely something to watch out for personally with the reductions in flying.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported an altitude overshoot during approach and cited reduced flying as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1741125

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility: Rain

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741125
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
This pairing was built as a deadhead out in Aircraft X with us flying the same aircraft back. C/S agent in ZZZ was fully compliant to COVID policies and asked that I pre-board in order to give her more space with other passengers. FAs on the aircraft did not all have masks on (was okay, we weren't boarding yet), but as the flight went on, I noticed that FAs often did not have masks on, and were seen by passengers handling the snacks without masks on. The passenger next to me, also no mask, slept most of the flight, but other passengers in First Class (I was assigned [first class seat]) did notice the FA behavior. Given the sensitive situation, I simply pointed at my own mask and nodded. The two attendants up front then seemed to keep the masks on. Note: When food and bottled water is handed out, people, including myself are forced to pull mask up/down in order to eat.

ZZZ2-ZZZ (Our leg):
We were unable to get paperwork prior to departure ZZZ. When I got release -- on taxi-in ZZZ1 -- I saw release-1 showing a different aircraft type. I accepted release and got off to walk to our new gate. C/S in ZZZ1 was not mask compliant (mask around neck but not on face). When I returned from walk-around, the aircraft was boarding normally: jetway full, line down aisle, etc. FAs again did not all have masks 'up'. I said something like, "I know it's hard, but the masks are important." Not sure she heard me, but she did put it up as she went to the middle to deal with a developing seat issue. I went to the flight deck and did my thing. Within a few minutes, the Purser returned to say, we have a belligerent passenger that just cussed me out because of a seat being occupied. "He used f-bombs and called me several expletives." Wanting to resolve the problem, I waited for the C/S agent (different guy, and this one had a mask and gloves on) to arrive and I followed him back. The man had a mask on his face. He told the gate agent that company was not complying with promises made on their booking. "I booked this seat and it showed no occupant here," he pointed at well-masked young man in [the seat]. "I can't have this man in this seat." The C/S agent explained that the booking said "If available" and that we had to accommodate additional passengers. "C/S agent said, "You are welcome to deplane and I'll book you on another flight." He said, "I'm staying, I have a connection in ZZZ." The C/S agent looked at me, and I said to the man, "Well, we have the issue of how you treated my Purser." He mentioned being scared, and that he'd not do that again. I said, "Okay, I'll want to hear what you say to her, as I'm leaving that decision up to her." I also offered him use of an N-95, if I could find one. He said pointing to his mask, "This covers better than the N-95, so no thanks, I don't need that." He apologized to the FA Purser and ensured he be calm going forward. The Purser could have said, "Okay, thank you," but of course, she didn't. She said loudly that, (paraphrase) "What you did is unacceptable, and if you repeat that behavior in any way, there will be security to meet you at the gate." The passenger nodded and said simply, (paraphrase) "I'm scared, I wasn't supposed to have a person next to me." There were many side conversations and other more minor passenger complaints such as requests for seat moves, and requests for passenger mask use, and reports of FA non-use of masks that I won't get into.

My FO was freaked out by the fact that he'd likely be furloughed. I spent a while addressing those concerns. I went over the governmental support, etc. He calmed down enough that I felt we'd be okay, but also told him this was my first flight in [XX]-days and that we'd both need to be on our A-game, as there were likely to be errors resulting from these many threats. Also talked about how each error itself would become a threat. FO made takeoff at his request and I made landing at ZZZ. There were many errors made due to rustiness, and we spent several minutes in the cockpit with the debrief card. There were no FAR deviations during the segment.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported various issues relating to the COVID-19 pandemic including FAs not properly using masks, passenger complaints regarding seating issues and lack of flying time.
ACN: 1741118

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 4000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1741118
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Overshoot
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

During IFR training flight, in VFR conditions, after the missed approach at ZZZ, I climbed to 3,500 feet and proceeded north. I contacted ZZZ Approach and requested 4,000 feet. The Controller was busy and said he would get back to me. A minute later the Controller cleared me to 4,000 feet and direct to ZZZ VOR.

The mistake was after I declared a missed approach at ZZZ, without further guidance from the Controller, I should have flown the published missed approach for the VOR Runway XX. Maximum altitude would have been 3,000 feet according to the published missed approach. Looking back, when the ZZZ Controller cleared me for the approach to VOR Runway XX, into ZZZ, he also instructed me to contact the airport advisor frequency. Due to COVID-19, the ZZZ Tower was closed and there was no advisory frequency published for the airport. In retrospect, I should have called the ZZZ Controller right back and informed them of this before I continued with the approach to ZZZ.

In my defense, the Controller could have instructed me to fly the missed approach or given me other missed approach instructions before he cleared me for the approach to ZZZ and instructed me to change frequencies. There were no other airplanes flying nearby and conditions were VFR. The Controller made no mention of the deviation.

Synopsis

Pilot reported executing the wrong missed approach procedure after not being issued missed approach instructions. ATC cleared the pilot for the approach and issued instructions to contact airport advisory frequency, however there was no such frequency published for the airport and the Tower was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1741074

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Flight Phase: Cruise

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1741074
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: Maintenance Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Customer boarded airplane and was coughing, etc. Flight Attendant provided face mask that he refused to wear. Customer vomited all over the back galley and bathroom and spread the vomit on carpet back to his seat. Captain had the airplane taken out of service upon arrival due to the stench and magnitude of vomit everywhere.

Flight Attendant [was] sent back to base with no pay or the option to get checked out for COVID-19.

Our system is flawed. We need to be proactive and make customers wear face masks and
get temperature checked. Flight attendants are first responders and need to be protected from the spread of this COVID-19.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported a passenger vomited throughout aircraft causing aircraft to be taken out of service after landing at destination. Flight Attendant suggested passengers should wear masks and have their temperature checked prior to boarding during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1741073

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Cabin Lighting: High

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741073

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Strong smell detected by passengers and crew. Noticed a passenger spraying walls, windows, armrests and seats. I immediately opened service door. Captain smelled it as well. [Passenger] made [the spray] from home with alcohol, etc. We notified Operations and a Customer Service Supervisor appeared. Crew was worried about it being flammable. Supervisor talked to passenger. No action was taken. Customer put spray bottle back in luggage. Supervisor took smelly wipes. Smell was so strong and crew wanted bottle removed from aircraft to ensure safety of passengers and crew, but Supervisor made the call. Smell finally disappeared during flight.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger brought on board a smelly spray container made with an alcohol base mixture. Passenger reportedly started spraying walls, windows, seats and armrests.
**ACN: 1741072**

**Time / Day**
   Date : 202004

**Place**
   Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
   State Reference : US
   Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

**Environment**
   Light : Daylight

**Aircraft**
   Reference : X
   Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
   Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
   Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
   Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
   Flight Plan : IFR
   Mission : Passenger
   Flight Phase : Parked
   Cabin Lighting : High

**Person**
   Reference : 1
   Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
   Location In Aircraft : General Seating Area
   Cabin Activity : Boarding
   Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
   Qualification.Flight Attendant : Current
   ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1741072

**Events**
   Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Passenger Misconduct
   Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event : Illness
   Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
   Detector.Person : Flight Attendant
   Were Passengers Involved In Event : Y
   When Detected : Pre-flight
   Result.General : None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
   Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
   Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
   Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
   Primary Problem : Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
During boarding, I noticed a passenger step on to the plane with a mask around his neck. I said hello and he said hello back. When he turned right to head down the aisle, he stopped almost as soon as he stepped on to the carpet. I stepped forward from the galley to see why he had stopped. I saw him turn his head completely to the left so that his face was now facing mine, with approximately 18" between us. He sneezed directly in my face, making no attempt to cover his mouth, pull up his mask or turn towards the row 1 window. I immediately stepped back, grabbed a C-fold and blotted my face. I politely asked him to cover his mouth and/or wear his mask if he needs to sneeze or cough. He said okay and proceeded to a seat. I don't believe his behavior was intentional, but I was still exposed to any germs he has. I was wearing a mask, but no eye glasses or goggles to cover my eyes. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this is an even greater safety concern than it normally would have been.

Not sure what else could have been done, as passengers should always cover their mouths when they sneeze. Perhaps Operations could add some basic hygiene tips to their boarding announcements, like washing hands, covering their mouths, etc.

**Synopsis**

Flight attendant reported passenger sneezed directly into Flight Attendant's face without attempting to cover the sneeze. Flight Attendant suggested passengers should be given hygiene tips during pre-boarding announcements.
ACN: 1741053

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1741053
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Flight Crew
Were Passengers Involved In Event: Y
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result. General: Work Refused

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy
**Narrative: 1**

Was scheduled to deadhead back to ZZZ from ZZZ1 after an overnight and deadhead from ZZZ2. I checked the load on the aircraft that morning and the aircraft was overbooked by X people it was an X type aircraft for XXX passengers. Several messages of maintaining social distancing were played throughout the airport as well as physical signs about maintaining at least 6 feet between you and other people. We had several announcements on the aircraft from ZZZ2 about spreading out and maintaining social distancing recommendations. Yet here we were scheduled on an aircraft where every seat was filled. I notified crew scheduling about the situation (they should have already known). I had found an aircraft going directly back to my home (ZZZ3) which was less than half full and asked to be released. I did notify my crew about the situation and told them what I was planning. However, the FO lives in ZZZ and had no other options, the FAs did not think they could get released and thought that they had no other options. With no N95 masks to protect themselves and with studies showing that over 50% of infected individuals are asymptomatic the company put their crews in a no win situation with the high possibility to be infected and unable to perform their duties within 2-14 days as well as possibly infecting other crews within that time not to mention their families.

Crew scheduling has the same software and better than crews do to check aircraft loads. Our partners know what their aircraft loads are. Just two weeks ago a similar situation presented itself and our partner replaced the same type aircraft with a much larger aircraft] in order to enable social distancing and passenger comfort as well as crew safety. We have multiple aircraft sitting unused and deteriorating on the runways and taxiways of all of our hubs. There is no excuse for allowing this situation. We were a valid and available crew, aircraft need to fly in order to avoid future maintenance issues and there are aircraft not being used. At a minimum someone should set up some crew only flights for transporting commuting and deadheading crews, so we can reduce our exposure. They could be shared between all airline companies. At the same time or in addition more aircraft should be utilized as passengers should not be forced to sit next to each other and violate CDC guidelines. Our partners could start enabling us to fly, but instead had canceled several flights (not for crew availability or aircraft) during the day. Just offering some suggestions as to how we can do this better and not put our aircrews nor our passengers in jeopardy. Fortunately, I had other options, most others do not.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported being scheduled a flight at full passenger capacity and was concerned about social distancing and exposure to COVID-19.
Narrative: 1

I was approached by [a] Supervisor and he told myself and the crew on gate that it is now mandatory for all crew members to wear the wireless headsets including the wing walkers. I communicated to Supervisor about the concerns of sharing equipment that touches my face, ear and mouth area due to the current crisis of the COVID-19 virus. It was communicated by him in the past to the work group that wearing the headsets by the wingwalkers was optional and only mandatory for the push back driver. The headsets come in sets of [X], they are all stored in the same box and can come in contact with the other users on the team. I voiced my concern of the sharing of equipment and was told there is enough time in-between flights to sanitize.

Synopsis

Ground employee reported concerns about having to wear commonly shared wireless headsets during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1741022

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Taxi

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

Component: 1
Aircraft Component: Winglet
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Component: 2
Aircraft Component: Horizontal Stabilizer
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Other / Unknown
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741022
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Other / Unknown
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741025
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 3
Reference: 3
Location In Aircraft: Other
Narrative: 1

[We were] asked to re-position an aircraft that was in storage. We moved it closer to Aircraft X that was already in storage. They then asked us to move it even closer to Aircraft X. While we were moving Aircraft Y struck Aircraft X. We felt comfortable with the first movement of Aircraft Y, we all felt uncomfortable when [we were] asked to move it even closer to Aircraft X.

Narrative: 2

[It was] requested [to] re-position aircraft(s) at storage area. Note: 4 aircraft were parked at the storage area. Requested that 2 aircraft to be parked closer together. Aircraft Y was re-position closer to Aircraft X. [It was] requested Aircraft Y to be moved even closer to Aircraft X.

Narrative: 3

They wanted two aircraft repositioned in the static parking area so that more aircraft could be fit in. We repositioned Aircraft Y and went to the second aircraft, but, were told that the first aircraft had to be repositioned again. We went back to Aircraft Y and started to reposition it a second time when the left winglet struck the right horizontal stabilizer of the aircraft next to it (Aircraft X). I was wing walking the left wing of Aircraft Y and more concerned with the winglet and a piece of equipment when the event occurred.

Narrative: 4

Towing aircraft in a remote location with no directional markings, no stop markings just a freeform area of tarmac and very vague direction from [Person A] that continuously is changing their decision on where exactly they would prefer aircraft placement to accommodate more aircraft in said space. During repositioning today we struck wingtips with adjacent aircraft during [the] requested reposition in remote location with above conditions and additional equipment in close proximity.
Synopsis

Air carrier ground crew reported that while repositioning an aircraft in a remote parking location, the wing struck an adjacent parked aircraft. The crew reported that the move was done to fit more aircraft into the parking location.
ACN: 1741018

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Other

Component
Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 3059.60
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 112.6
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 1541.73
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741018
Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 22800
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 152.98
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 8230
Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person : Other Person
Result. General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

It was brought to my attention that we may have departed from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with an expired FMC database. Arriving at the airport we proceeded to the company directed location and then proceeded to security and eventually arrived at our gate. I conducted a preflight briefing with my cabin crew and then begun my preflight duties. My First Officer conducted the initial cockpit set up and I began to disinfect switches and buttons wearing gloves and mask. I noted that the plane had arrived from ZZZ2 a few hours earlier. I performed my normal preflight duties to include verification of the navigation database. After we were both finished our preflight duties we conducted our briefings and departed for ZZZ1. We did not notice nor [were we] told of any navigation errors by ATC. There have been some added distractions lately with the numerous added cautions for cockpit cleanliness. I was not aware of nor did I intend to operate with an expired FMC database. Before and during the flight we verified and continuously monitored the departure, enroute, and arrival waypoints against the charted points. Again no navigation discrepancies were noted and we arrived at ZZZ1 uneventful. This report is submitted to help improve the safety and help identify why crews may inadvertently use old databases.

Narrative: 2

As pilot not flying I programmed the FMC for our flight to ZZZ and didn't notice the nav database being out of date. Between the still new process of cleaning the flight deck and numerous request for cleaning supplies from flight attendants I may have been distracted at some point but don't remember any specific time during the programming of the FMC. I do remember starting my cockpit setup only to stop to get [disinfectant] wipes to clean before resuming setup.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported inadvertently flying with an expired FMC database. The Captain noted that distractions due to numerous added cautions for cockpit cleanliness may have contributed.
ACN: 1741003

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1741003

Events
Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred: All Types
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
I don't feel it's safe for the FAA to extend pilot currency to six months (or 180 days) instead of the normal three months (90 days), whether or not there is a pandemic. No studies were conducted to support this policy change, and no comment period was allowed. I have flown with individuals who were off work for 30 days and it can be scary. I think whatever the FAA policy, our airline would be wise to adhere to our historic practices of three takeoffs and landings within 90 days, or you go do them in a simulator.

Synopsis
Air carrier pilot expressed concern about the safety aspect of the FAA's extension of the landing currency requirement from 90 to 180 days.
ACN: 1740938

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Oxygen System/Crew
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740938
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While completing the pre-departure safety demonstration, I had my face mask on. During the portion of the demonstration where I had to demonstrate the correct use and application of the demonstration oxygen mask, my own face mask was still on while I was demonstrating how to use the oxygen mask. I realize passengers wearing their own masks could think it would be alright to put the oxygen mask over their face mask based on my incorrect demonstration.

I went into my trip misinterpreting and misreading communication regarding face masks, which led me to think I would just need to wear my face mask throughout the flight without understanding that there are exceptions and appropriate situations during which to remove the face mask. While completing my safety demonstration, I do not think I realized I was wearing my face mask as I was demonstrating the use of the demonstration oxygen mask. I believe that I was also narrowly focused on keeping up with the demonstration rather than being situationally aware of the fact that I was still wearing a mask as I went into the oxygen mask demonstration.

Looking back on this event, I realize I could have been more aware of myself and my surroundings. Before I started the trip, I simply thought that I would just need to wear my mask for the duration of my flights without comprehending that in certain moments of the flight, such as demonstrating correct use of the oxygen mask, that it would be appropriate to remove my mask in order to safely and accurately show its proper use. I plan to be more situationally aware, realizing that I may need to remove my mask for certain tasks. I will now remove my mask for the pre-departure demonstration in order to show how to properly use and wear the oxygen mask.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported wearing a personal face mask while demonstrating oxygen mask use during the pre-departure safety briefing. The Flight Attendant was concerned that passengers would think it would be acceptable to place an oxygen mask over a personal mask.
ACN: 1740911

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740911

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
During preflight, flight attendants brought to our attention that there were no sani-wipes on board. We called Operations for some to be delivered and they said they had zero inventory to give us.
While the planes are cleaned, wipes need to be available so crews can ensure their workstation is wiped down after crew/plane swaps.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported no sani-wipes were on the aircraft, nor available from operations.
The use of wireless headsets exposes ramp employees to COVID-19 exposure. How can we be 100% certain the coronavirus has been completely wiped off of the wireless headset? The eyes and mouth are obvious routes to potential infection. The use of wireless headset without a policy to ensure the device has been completely and properly sanitized before use may inadvertently spread COVID-19.

Ground employee reported the use of shared headsets exposes ramp employees to COVID-19.
ACN: 1740829

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Ramp
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740829
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
2 team members that are separated for social distance in accordance with CDC guidance were paired to work together. Which brought them to be close to each other less than the 6 feet [not in accordance with] the government requirement.

Synopsis
Ground employee reported two team members were less than 6 feet apart and not in accordance with social distancing government guidelines.
ACN: 1740821

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Taxi
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740821
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740823

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Assessments
Narrative: 1

On taxi-out there was some confusion from Load Planning after sending our final weights. They then asked for First Class seating configuration. We complied and sent the information. The confusion may have stemmed from the fact that passengers were moved out of First Class to comply with passenger COVID-19 boarding. After waiting for them to sort out the seating configuration the Captain called Dispatch and he confirmed we were good to go as long as passengers were removed from rows X and Y. We received another message as we were starting our takeoff roll asking for more passenger seating configurations. After takeoff we later responded and told them we were airborne and then Load Planning told us we took off without final weights. This was frustrating as we had three copies of final weights sent to us. The Captain also called Dispatch to confirm that we were good to go as long as everyone was moved out of Row X and Y. The multiple messages and confusion from Load Planning created multiple unnecessary threats.

Narrative: 2

Load Planning was accusing us of taking off without final weights on a very empty flight. They were creating threats and distractions, it took them more than 1/2 an hour to tell us we were good to go after moving people out of Row X and Y. We had to call Dispatch on cell phone and they confirmed that if we removed passengers from rows X and Y we would be good to go. We finally did what we were asked and I have 3 final weights and after takeoff Load Planning tells us we took off without one. Someone was totally not knowing how to get accurate final weights to us at a critical phase of takeoff which created threats beyond belief, really more than 1/2 an hour in this environment where capacity has been reduced 90 percent?

Synopsis

Flight crew reported having to move passengers from two rows for weight and balance causing a delay, and then once airborne crew was told they took off with incorrect final weights.
ACN: 1740815

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740815
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
I am submitting this report to address two things - 1) My crew accepting a takeoff clearance, when ATC called us by the wrong callsign, and 2) A general lack of alertness that I am seeing on the line as a result of these extremely irregular times.

Regarding the takeoff clearance - we were Number 1 at the hold short for runway at ZZZ. We were the only aircraft out there. Nobody else in line or even within 300 yards of the runway. ATC issued a takeoff clearance for runway and the callsign was very similar to ours. My FO accepted the clearance (reading back the correct callsign) and off we went. In retrospect I believe that ATC referred to us as Company XXX (not YXX). This became clear to me when he said it again and corrected himself while switching us to departure. In truth there was no doubt in my mind that the clearance was intended for us because we were literally the only ones there, but I still should have clarified it. The takeoff was uneventful.

I believe that a factor in this event is the fact that all of us are becoming a little too complacent with [few] people on each flight and virtually no other traffic around us. Every flight is starting to feel like that delayed 2 AM departure where the usual tension of flying aircraft tends to go away with direct clearances that never happen and comms that are a bit too relaxed. We are letting our guard down at a time where we can ill afford it.

I should have stopped and asked the Controller to clarify. Even though I was 100% sure that the clearance was intended for us, I let my guard down. Verify that clearance was for Company YXX. He says oops sorry, we read it back, and off we go. If we weren't the only ones there or the field was more complicated or congested that could have bitten us. As a group we need to re-dedicate ourselves to being careful and methodical in our flying. Our airline and our industry are already hanging on by a thread. I can't imagine a worse time to add an accident to the mix. Nothing changes just because the aircraft or the airport or the sky are virtually empty. We need to do things the right way - the professional way. Anything less leaves our Company and our futures to chance.
The Captain told me the next day he filled out a report about ZZZ Tower using the wrong call sign for us to take the runway and depart. I am not sure if that happened, but I have no reason to doubt that it did. Our callsign was YXX and the Captain said he mixed up the numbers. I didn't catch it. I read back my callsign and we took the runway and departed. At the time we were the only aircraft at the runway ready for departure.

I could listen up a bit closer to catch those moments of dyslexia that we all have from time to time and query the controllers. Also, the other crew member could speak up when hearing something differently.

**Synopsis**

Flight crew reported a similar callsign issue resulting in a takeoff without clearance. The crew attributed this to a lack of alertness and complacency due to the irregular times.
ACN: 1740811

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Initial Approach
Route In Use.Other
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 4.5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740811
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance  
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We are working approach control airspace as part of a COVID-19 mitigation plan. Aircraft X was on approach to ZZZ, which is in Approach airspace, when Approach called and asked for a block for an approach in ZZZ1. I had previously told a Controller at [another facility] that I would not be able to approve that approach because I was blocking for the aircraft into ZZZ. When [other facility] called back and asked again for the block for ZZZ1 I again told them no. The other Controller began to question me. I explained the block that I needed and he still seemed confused. I then was trying to get off the line to get back to my traffic. I then said "If you can keep him clear" and that I couldn't authorize the approach with my rules. [Other facility] then said they could give him an alternate missed approach. While I don't believe I specifically approved the approach my language may have been interpreted as authorizing the approach. At the time I was thinking that the approach may have some procedure that I was not aware of that would allow the approach to run but upon rereading the Center SOP I do not believe that would be the case. While I don't believe that the aircraft lost separation with each other or specifically with protected airspace they may have been on approach at the same time which is not allowed by the Center SOP.

I do not believe that these approaches conflict as published and the restriction can be removed. However, we also need more concise rules about what approaches we can and cannot run. Our procedures were designed for the Midnight shift with low traffic and when we run the day shift we face a lot of delays because our rules are not as lenient as the approach controls that usually run the airspace. When I have tried actually determine if these approaches conflict I keep running into problems because I am not sure who to contact and can never get concrete answers. A central office that could evaluate the procedures, or someone in the center specifically trained in approaches who could determine whether or not they conflict would be helpful.

Synopsis

Center Controller also working Approach Control airspace due to the COVID-19 pandemic, reported communication issues with another Approach facility resulting in an airborne conflict.
ACN: 1740805

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5000

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Vectors
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Initial Climb
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class C: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Supervisory: 18.5
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740805
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

I was working all positions combined during the COVID reduced staffing period. Both ZZZ and ZZZ1 were in their north configuration. I had turned Aircraft X to a XXX heading for a vector to the Visual Approach. I had released Aircraft Y on an initial westbound departure heading. During the sequence of events, I had forgotten that Aircraft X was a ZZZ1 arrival, mistaking him as a ZZZ arrival. Both arrivals are vectored in a similar manner to the Visual Approach in this configuration from the north and the Aircraft X call sign made me think ZZZ arrival. The Aircraft Y departure had to build a little altitude before I could turn him north because the temperature was decreasing the climb rate today. I mistakenly cleared Aircraft X for a Visual Approach to Runway XX and then he corrected me with the "Runway XY" readback. I had planned to go right to Aircraft Y for his turn to the north, but I realized if I didn't correct Aircraft X first, he might turn early towards ZZZ1, so I corrected his heading and altitude first. The lost time, however, resulted in a loss of lateral separation after I turned Aircraft Y to the north.

This resulted as a loss of awareness about my aircraft and what they were doing. If I hadn't made the mistake of clearing Aircraft X to the wrong airport in the first place, the sequence would have worked out with enough time to turn Aircraft Y in a timely manner.

**Synopsis**

TRACON Controller reported that while working traffic at a combined position during COVID-19 reduced staffing period, they experienced a loss of separation.
ACN: 1740738

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Takeoff

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740738
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Fatigue
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740739
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Time Pressure
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Other / Unknown
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
During the flight preflight, I missed resetting the flap selector to 10 degrees, as is my normal practice. During taxi out and completing the before takeoff checklist, the challenge question was asked "Flaps 10," and due to expectation bias, and monitoring an aircraft back taxiing on the runway, I saw and confirmed 10 degrees of flaps, instead of the 15 degrees actually dialed in. When Tower cleared us for takeoff I advanced the throttles, and the aircraft horn sounded due to the incorrect flap setting, I pulled the throttles to idle at approximately 5 knots applied brakes, then we reset the flaps to 10 degrees, and after confirming the correct configuration continued the takeoff.

2nd leg of the day, a day after an oceanic crossing, followed by isolating in the hotel. This accompanied by the COVID-19 restrictions caused broken sleep periods. While I felt fine, the fact that I was only getting 3 1/2 to 4 hours of sleep in blocks, coupled with the circadian disruptions did not help.

Better attention to detail.

Narrative: 2
On initial power push for takeoff, received the flap warning horn. The Captain brought throttles back, I reset the flaps to 10 and we continued the takeoff roll. I failed to check the flap setting when we input the numbers and again when I we accomplished the before takeoff checklist. A recheck when I called "Configuration Checked" may have caught it; however the dark most likely would have prevented this from happening. Do not assume and be sure to verify settings called. I failed to do this and allowed myself to get in a hurry.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a flap setting warning horn during initial power push for takeoff. The Captain cited lack of sleep as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1740708

**Time / Day**
Date: 202004

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740708
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
During recurrent ground school, multiple pilots in the class had disregarded the updated company policy to wear protective face masks while on duty. Our instructor had stated that they were required, but about 40% of pilots had left their company-supplied masks on the desk rather than wear them. Even during the Chief Pilot's presentation, he had removed his at times in order to facilitate wearing his eyeglasses.

Since the goal is to stop the spread of COVID-19 while possibly being asymptomatic, it is vital to keep the mask on at all times unless you need to ingest water or food. On the second day of class, we were told one pilot, who did a fairly good job of keeping his mask on during the day, had symptoms similar to COVID-19 overnight. This is exactly why everyone should have their masks on while on duty.

Make sure everyone is following company policy. The three pilots sitting behind me did not put their masks on at all during our first day of ground school, which I found to be irritating and a safety risk to everyone else in class and in the building.

**Synopsis**
Air carrier Captain reported that during recurring ground training individuals did not always wear a mask to protect from COVID-19 exposure.
**ACN: 1740686**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202004

**Place**
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Flight Phase: Climb

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Other / Unknown
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740686
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**
About 15 minutes before departure flight went nose heavy. I blocked rows 7 and 8 and told the Zone Controller about it. Zone Controller told me he would tell the gate agents to move passengers from 7 and 8. When the flight was finalized it went nose heavy again.
Passengers were physically moved by agents, but not in the computer. The aircraft was showing OUT so I sent my nose heavy message to the Captain telling him to block rows 7 and 8. His reply to me was I moved passengers out of First Class can we go now? I said, Negative, I need to know how many passengers you moved and where did you seat them. By this time about 35 minutes have passed and he is at the end of the runway waiting. So now the agents are working on another report to reflect the correct passenger count. But there count won't be correct because they don't know the Captain moved people out of First Class. After all of this the gate agents re-finalized with a count of XX and YY passengers. Dispatch sends a message to the Captain telling him to move the passengers back to First Class and the new weights are coming. I sent the new weights. Right after I hit the send button the Dispatcher calls and says the Captain isn't moving the passengers back to First Class due to the new COVID seating guidelines. So I invalidated the weights again. I asked the Captain to now send me a report of where everyone was seated. I didn't get a response for a while until he showed airborne. Then he sent me a message stating, "Too many distractions and threats. We are airborne." So now we have a flight in the air without correct weights.

Synopsis

Ground employee reported a flight departed with incorrect weight and balance numbers. Reporter cited COVID-19 guidelines and social distancing issues as contributing to the event.
ACN: 1740684

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 40000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Center: ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace. Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1740684

Events
Anomaly. Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Dispatch
When Detected: In-flight
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
After departure, company informed us a family member of Passenger X had received a positive test result for COVID-19. Passenger was isolated, questioned and denied any knowledge of the test or its results. Flight Attendant took all Medlink instructions to task. We were told CDC would meet us in ZZZ, all to remain on board until released by them. We left cockpit closed until released by CDC. Have no information on outcome.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported being advised after departure that a passenger's family member had been exposed to COVID-19. The crew followed proper CDC protocol at destination.
ACN: 1740683

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude:AGL:Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1740683

Events
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Aircraft was not provisioned with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to clean cockpit (the bag with masks, gloves, cleaning wipes). This flight should have been provisioned for the round trip. Not sure where the cleaning provisions went, but clearly thorough provisioning is not working. Fortunately I had a few wipes I had brought from home.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported no Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) or sanitizing equipment were provided for a round trip flight.
ACN: 1740640

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Off Duty
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1740640

Events
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
New jumpseat relocation has a negative when it comes to safety and security concerns. Compromising our ability to communicate in an emergency and security situation by being away from the interphone and private conversations that occur on the jumpseat cause issues and does nothing to promote social distancing because we still work together and there is no way to avoid that aspect on the airplane.

What's [the] purpose when you have to sit next to people and the whole row is not blocked anyways. It doesn't change anything and I am concerned this is throwing safety out the window. Safety demo and oxygen and life vest should be demonstrated regardless. In addition, we need to address oxygen masks with personal masks on their faces. This needs to be addressed immediately.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported concerns about safety and security issues relating to new COVID-19 jumpseat arrangements and social distancing guidelines.
Purser brought a passenger along on her trip during the Coronavirus outbreak. She stated they are traveling together all month long during her work trips. She is potentially exposing other crew members with an extra person during this time. He joined us on a shuttle. Didn’t wear a mask. Poor decision as a safety professional.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported concerns with another Flight Attendant bringing a passenger on the shuttle bus and flight during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1740550

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740550

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Contrary to guidelines pertaining to cargo operations, no Lysol wipes or other virus killing cleaning wipes were provide to flight crew operating out of ZZZZ to help reduce spread of COVID-19. Sani Com wipes only provided.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported no sanitation equipment was available for use while at a foreign destination during the COVID-19 pandemic.
**ACN: 1740533**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202004  
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference: US  
Relative Position. Angle. Radial: 300  
Relative Position. Distance. Nautical Miles: 4  
Altitude. MSL. Single Value: 2600

**Environment**
Light: Night

**Aircraft**
Reference: X  
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ  
Aircraft Operator: Personal  
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft  
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 1  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91  
Flight Plan: None  
Mission: Personal  
Flight Phase: Initial Approach  
Route In Use: Direct  
Airspace. Class B: ZZZ

**Person**
Reference: 1  
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck  
Reporter Organization: Personal  
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying  
Function. Flight Crew: Single Pilot  
Qualification. Flight Crew: Private  
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1740533  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Communication Breakdown. Party1: Flight Crew  
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

**Events**
Anomaly. Airspace Violation: All Types  
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types  
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: FAR  
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control  
When Detected: In-flight  
Result. Flight Crew: FLC complied w/ Automation / Advisory  
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

While on a currency flight about 25 miles NW of ZZZ I called ZZZ Approach to ask if they had the time with the COVID-19 slowdown at ZZZ to allow a low approach. Approach cleared me direct ZZZ from my location, but asked me to divert west of the field to allow for landing IFR traffic. I complied, but shortly thereafter the Controller asked me to stay below the Bravo class airspace. I assumed since he directed me "direct to ZZZ, set up for [Runway] XXR" I was cleared to enter Bravo. Upon his request I immediately descended below class Bravo and was cleared for the option after being handed to Tower. No further discussion of Bravo took place.

Synopsis

GA pilot had a Class B airspace incursion after assuming they were cleared through the airspace by ATC.
ACN: 1740532

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Angle.Radial: 050
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 8

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Ceiling: CLR

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.UNICOM: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
Aircraft Operator: FBO
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740532
Human Factors : Other / Unknown
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

The objective for this particular flight was recurrent formation training for me, with the assistance of the pilot of a second aircraft (an occasional training partner, based at another nearby airport). Per our telephonic briefing on the ground, we agreed that we would rendezvous in a particular location and that he would fly lead and I would join off his wing there. We further agreed on a time, altitude, frequency and call signs.

As I approached the practice area I observed at my 12 o'clock position at approximately 3,500 MSL an [Aircraft Y type] heading in the same direction -- i.e. to the center of the practice area.

On the air-to-air frequency, I then made my first call to check in and to ask the flight lead if he was in position. He responded that he was approaching the practice area. I told him I thought I had him in sight.

He then asked me my position, and I said I was at his 6 o'clock, several miles in trail. I told him he could maintain his heading and I would close from the rear.

As I approached the [Aircraft Y type] in front of me, I suggested over the air-to-air frequency that my training partner make a shallow turn to help me close, and he acknowledged. A moment later, the [Aircraft Y type] in front of me began a gentle turn to the left.

Once I was established in the turn and began to close, my partner asked for my current position; I indicated that I was moving from trail to his right wing. During this time I moved into a loose fingertip off the lead aircraft. About this time my partner asked again for my position and said he could not see me. I replied that I was off his right wing, and thought for a moment that possibly I was partly blocked by the window/door framing. To help with his field of view, I moved slightly forward to a more visible bearing line, and then
radioed to ask if he had a clear visual. He responded that he still did not, and at that point it suddenly occurred to me that I might be flying formation off the wrong aircraft. Over the air-to-air frequency I read the N number of the [Aircraft Y type] in view, and asked if that was my training partner's aircraft (we had been using call signs, so I had not had any prior occasion to reference his N number). He replied that he was flying a different aircraft, and the mistaken identity suddenly was clear to us both.

At the point, I broke off formation with the [Aircraft Y type], and switched back to tower (whose airspace was fairly close -- some ~8NM away -- to explain the mistaken identity and to ask if he was talking with the other [Aircraft Y type]. The tower controller indicated that he was not talking with that aircraft but said he would relay the message if the [Aircraft Y type] should check in.

That was the end of the mistaken/unsafe condition and the rest of the flight proceeded normally.

Contributing factors to this confusion included:

1) The remarkable coincidence that the mistaken [Aircraft Y type] was in exactly the right place at the right time and the right altitude, and that it subsequently began a turn exactly when I requested my flight lead to do so
2) My failure to ask my training partner to utilize TCAS/ADS-B to firmly establish me on his PFD prior to my moving in on what I thought was the flight lead
3) My electing to join from a trail position, which denied my flight lead a chance at a visual until later in the process
4) My expectation bias that, because of Corona, there would be few if any other aircraft and that this must have been my training partner (as it happens, the mistaken [Aircraft Y type] and the intended [Aircraft Y type] were the only two aircraft I saw or heard in the sky all day).

**Synopsis**

GA pilot reported flying formation with the wrong aircraft. Reporter cited a number of contributing factors that led to this confusion.
ACN: 1740524

Time / Day

Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Angle.Radial: 000
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 4
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740524
Human Factors: Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure  
Primary Problem : Human Factors  

**Narrative: 1**

Due to COVID-19 I had not been home in over a month. I work in ZZZ but live in a different state. I'm at risk at work so did not come home. Finally got a long stretch of days off and needed to fly my airplane. I had not seen my family for a long time. With no body flying I thought it would be a good chance be able to fly over there house. So I told them I was flying over if I could. ZZZ1 said they had a 40 minute gap with no traffic and I could fly over. I found their house and they were out side. After that we flew to another city.

After we got back I got thinking about the flight and I realized I had probably exceeded the normal bank angle and I was not in a rural area. I did my normal planning but had not really thought about what it entailed once I got there. My ADM [Aeronautical Decision Making] was lacking in my preflight planning. I thought about the flight but not what was going to happen when I got there. Thought we will wave take a picture and leave. But there was more to it than that. I needed to think about the process once we got there other than we will just wave and take a picture. Just poor planning for that part of the flight.

**Synopsis**

GA pilot reported a flight over homes may have been too low.
Myself and partner were assigned to work Aircraft X that arrived with 2 open log pages that concerned me and my partner about our safety and health at risk. My partner was assured that the aircraft was going to be deep cleaned. We were assigned to do a tire change and 1 svc and had to enter the flight deck to do work. As I entered the aircraft I spoke to the lead cleaner and had asked if they were concerned about what happened. To my surprise they were not aware of the COVID-19 contamination and sick pilots in the flight deck and I also asked if there was a special cleaning group to sterilize the flight deck. I think that the cleaners were the only ones that did their regular cleaning job and were not informed of what happened. I was really surprised that there is not an organized process for this type of situation. I thought that entering this type of contaminated aircraft would be really strict.
Synopsis

Technician reported an aircraft was supposed to be deep cleaned after possible COVID-19 contamination, but when cleaners were questioned they had not been advised to deep clean the aircraft.
ACN: 1740471

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740471
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 20349
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 234.88
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 3164.56
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740474
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Other Person
When Detected.Other
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Received ACARS message asking us to remain in cockpit until jetway operator leaves jetway. When we got off the airplane met by Chief Pilot and other personnel and we were told that we were exposed to another crew member that tested positive in ZZZ1. We were released from duty for 14 days and self monitored.

Narrative: 2
Upon landing in ZZZ from a flight from a layover in ZZZ1, our crew was met by Chief pilot of ZZZ and the local ZZZ CDC in the jetway. We were informed our crew had been exposed from another ZZZ2 pilot (who was there on another flight) had ate breakfast that morning with Captain, who was on my flight. He later told me social distancing had been applied, but they ate at the same table about 5-6 feet apart. I guess my exposure should have been 3rd hand thru Captain. We were taken off the flying schedule for 14 days to self monitor. I took it upon myself after 6 days at home isolation to get a COVID-19 test which turned out negative. I have subsequently returned to work and never had any symptoms whatsoever! I’m submitting this report on behalf of company pilots to make sure the flight deck is disinfected after an event such as the one we were made aware of for the safety of our down line pilots entering a cockpit.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported being exposed to COVID-19 from another pilot and having to self quarantine after notification.
ACN: 1740411

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 25
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 12000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility. Visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Ceiling. Single Value: 25000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Climb
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience. Flight Crew. Total: 7500
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 30
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 700
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1740411
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result. Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were being vectored during the climb with a couple of different assigned headings. We were advised by ATC that we would be cleared to our destination in approximately 5 minutes. We were then cleared to our destination. I entered a direct in the GPS and selected NAV Mode. We turned towards our destination, but were not going direct to it. The Controller asked us if we were going direct to our destination right after we discovered we were not. We were already in a turn to the left heading direct to the destination. There were no conflicts or other aircraft that showed up on our TCAS.

The problem arose as my normal co-pilot was out sick in quarantine for potential Coronavirus and I had an inexperienced co-pilot. In addition to flying the aircraft, I was monitoring the new co-pilot as he was unsure of himself in this aircraft. We completed a 20 degree turn, so we were flying direct to our destination. The co-pilot's inexperience contributed to this event. Also contributing to the event was a 125 knot crosswind that made the track less intuitive.

Synopsis
Pilot reported experiencing a track/heading deviation. Pilot stated the deviation occurred in part due to flying with an inexperienced co-pilot.
**ACN: 1740402**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Maintenance: Technician
- Qualification: Maintenance: Airframe
- Qualification: Maintenance: Powerplant
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1740402
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Maintenance
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**
Employees in Terminal X are not being issued PPE, specifically masks, to avoid contracting the COVID-19 virus, from management. The tool rooms where gloves and other PPE products are stored have informed me that management will be handing out the N-95 or equivalent masks to maintain accountability and/or to prevent employees from "hoarding supplies."

**Synopsis**
Technician reported that employees are not being issued PPE, especially masks, which are needed to avoid contracting the COVID-19 virus.
Passenger was complaining and wanted passenger deadheading pilot in Seat XX to put on mask since he was coughing and sneezing! FA asked deadheading pilot to put mask on as requested from Passenger in Seat XC. We had not noticed any unusual alerting signs. Heard him cough two times throughout the entire flight! Passenger and deadheading pilot had a conversation exchange once passenger approached him. It ended up to passenger
moving seats as once he said she is welcome to move if she isn't comfortable sitting there. Pilot came out to talk to passenger and deadheading pilot. Passenger moved to exit row!

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger complained about a deadheading pilot who was coughing and requested deadheading pilot put on a mask. Passenger ended up moving to a different seat.
ACN: 1740396

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740396
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I was the X Flight Attendant on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. With only 2 passengers the operations Agent came down to ask if we were ready to board. I said no we don't need to board 30 minutes early with only 2 people. Agent was pressured by management to still board at the normal time of 30 minutes prior to departure time. Again I explained that we do not need to board this early. I even told the Agent that I had not confirmed that the safety checks were done yet and started walking to the back of the aircraft. Agent asked "How long is that going to take?" To which I replied "I don't know maybe 10 minutes." Even though I had not indeed confirmed the safety checks had been performed, I honestly was trying to hold Agent up from boarding with this as a stall tactic. As I walked towards the back Agent yelled out "Are you guys ready?" to the flight attendants in the back to bypass me. I can only assume Agent was actually feeling pressured to board this early when anybody clearly knows that boarding 2 people will take at most 5 minutes. I believe with the current pandemic going on we could better limit ourselves to exposure by relaxing our boarding times. It is in our best interest to board people as late as possible right now. As the X Flight Attendant I am required to stand in the front of the aircraft for boarding and this forces me to be in close proximity to somebody that sits in the front. And upon boarding, the one passenger did take the first available seat to him which was row X. Had this person been disabled and required the first row seats I am required to let that individual sit there and expose me to them as well as expose them to me. Even more so than I was with the gentleman on my flight. The longer people are on these planes the more chance there is for them to contaminate the planes or us and vice versa.

There needs to be less on time performance pressure from the company. We should be allowed to choose a boarding position that we feel is safe and appropriate.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported concerns with being pressured to board early with only a few passengers. Flight Attendant stated it would be best to avoid boarding unnecessarily early to minimize the time of possibly being exposed to COVID-19.
**ACN: 1740373**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004
- Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

**Place**
- Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 11000

**Environment**
- Light: Night

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
- Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
- Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Airspace. Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1740373
- Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
- Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
- Detector. Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result. Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
During our flight from ZZZ1-ZZZ we were cleared to descend via the ZZZZZ Arrival into ZZZ1. Due to the Coronavirus there was a logistical situation developing at our destination that ultimately resulted in our being stuck at the destination without transportation, and me and the Captain were actively engaged in conversation trying to solve that issue. The bottom of the descent on the ZZZZZ Arrival is 11,000 feet. The aircraft had leveled at 11,000 feet and then a short while later I noticed the vertical path indicator descending indicating we were passing through the descent point for the proper descent path. Due to being focused on the conversation at hand, I was confused as to the state of the aircraft on the arrival. I had lost situational awareness to the fact the aircraft had already leveled at the bottom of the arrival and assumed we still had more altitude to lose. I questioned the situation asking the PM what the deal was and why we were not descending. The PM was trying to determine the issue and at that point I initiated a descent. Almost immediately we both realized that the aircraft had been level at the correct and final altitude on the arrival and I immediately initiated a climb back to 11,000 feet, which was our clearance limit. Unfortunately, we had descended to 10,500 feet during the process.

After the fact we realized that the issue happened because the PM had put a crossing altitude at the airport for planning purposes and that was generating the vertical guidance that caught my attention and caused me to get confused. We had not discussed the altitude put in at the airport yet due to the discussion pertaining to the logistics developing at the destination. The issue was completely my fault. I should not have initiated a descent without first confirming the state of the aircraft on the arrival. In the attempt to keep from getting high, I caused us to actually get too low. This is also a good reminder to deal with ground issues on the ground or in downtime during cruise, and not during the arrival or later phases of flight. We were not in sterile cockpit but it was not the right time to be dealing with the logistic problems, at least not the PF!

Going forward, Coronavirus or not, I have to focus on the appropriate phase of flight and not get distracted by issues on the ground while in critical phases of flight, like the arrival.

**Synopsis**

Corporate First Officer reported descending prior to a crossing restriction during arrival. First Officer referenced being distracted talking about COVID-19 related logistical issues that may have contributed to the event.
2 cleaners came on to service the aircraft in ZZZ. I saw them take trash from the first class pocket and set it into the seat even though they had trash bags. They were doing other things which I hadn't paid much attention to, but as one of the cleaners came to change the first class side trash I told her to not worry about it because I didn't really use it. She said she thought there appeared to be trash in it. I said it was fine. She said "Really." I felt now pressured, so said ok, if you want to do it. I preferred they were not touching everything if I hadn't actually used anything after I had sanitized it. The other
cleaner comes into the galley and they are talking and I'm near row 1. I realize my coffee cup is up in the cubbie/sink area and want to remove it while they are up there cleaning. I say excuse me and reach past the man and grab my cup on the counter. She has a trash bag in her hand. I take a drink. It is not my coffee but a cup, trash that the cleaners had set there to dispose of as they were doing the trash. I immediately spit the tea into the front lav. Tried to sani-wipe my mouth. And gargle with water but all of this is clearly futile. I know no passengers set it there. I stood in the galley until everyone deplaned. I asked the pilots. I know this is new for the airline and these cleaners. However, to even drink from a strangers cup on a non-flu, non-Coronavirus season would in itself be disgusting. An error for a cleaner to not immediately take trash and immediately put it into the trash bag in their hands. Not onto clean seats or sanitized counters. The cleaner never stopped me to say "Stop, wait, that's trash." She kept chatting to her coworker. This was a very bad error.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported thinking she was drinking out of her own cup and realized cleaners had put a different used cup in place, and was concerned about possible COVID-19 exposure.
A company employee continued to come to work knowing a member of his family had tested positive for the COVID-19 or Coronavirus. By doing so has put the health and safety of employees at risk. I am also informed upper management had information on this. This was reckless and far from safe.

Ground employee reported a person came to work after a family member had allegedly tested positive for COVID-19.
**ACN: 1740283**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: IMC
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Rain

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Ferry
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Company
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740283
- Human Factors: Fatigue

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740472
- Human Factors: Fatigue

**Events**
- Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred: All Types
- Result.General: Work Refused
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Initial pairing was brought to my attention the night prior. After reviewing the assignment and forecast winter weather for the following day, an earlier commute was needed to deal with icing conditions. Having left my residence at XA00 for an XD00 hours show, I encountered winter weather driving condition along with a longer commute. Arriving at ZZZ by XD00 hours I noticed the first delay with the flight being pushed until XF00 hours. The Captain and I boarded the aircraft a little after XG00 hours. While entering the forward galley we observed a pool of liquid coming out of the right oven. Maintenance and catering were both notified and a fix was attempted. At approximately XH00 hours maintenance began a series of unusual activity. Running both engines at the gate as well as removing equipment from the cabin. This was our first indication that the aircraft was not ready for ferry. During this time we were in communication with dispatch and Maintenance Control trying to secure a Maintenance Ferry Document.

At approximately XI:40 we were advised the departure was being pushed until XN:30 hours for deep cleaning. The Captain and I walked over to the hotel for lunch and received a room at approximately XJ00 hours. Agreeing to meet in the lobby at XL:30 hours for our new departure, a nap was not taken as we continued to try and track down hotel accommodations for later that night, get information for a point of contact in ZZZ1 and confirm transportation for travel to ZZZ2.

At XL:45 hours we were advised of a new departure time of XO:30 as the plane was still not ready for ferry, due to maintenance sign off and Ferry Documentation.

By XO:45 the Captain was at his decision point as a disagreement between Dispatch and Maintenance Control had developed preventing the Ferry Documentation being provided for a legal departure. At approximately XP00 hours I reviewed my own fitness and determined I was still at least 2 hours from departure and dealing with winter weather and maintenance. I felt I would not be able to get suitable sleep until approximately XV00 hours and this was pushing the limits to my own fitness in dealing with the threats of flying late at night, icing/weather challenges and the threat of fearing and aircraft vs. normal line operations. It was then that I decided a fatigue call would be the safest course of action.

Narrative: 2

Everyone is stressed out by the Coronavirus Crisis. The Maintenance Controller was working from home and might not have been able to generate a maintenance ferry document from home. He finally generated one. The aircraft had been parked for over 3 weeks, probably without adequate prep for that length of time which probably caused the leaks under the ovens. ZZZ Maintenance is overworked and understaffed to properly prepare multiple aircraft (that had been parked for weeks) at short notice and with new aircraft disinfecting processes just established. Unfortunately, I won't let ZZZ Maintenance, Maintenance, Dispatch and the Operations Manager make decisions that result in an unsafe flight or an unsafe operation, especially when I've been up for over 14 hours and I've got another 4 hours to go and fly into my Window of Circadian Low (WOCL). The aircraft was successfully flown with that maintenance ferry document from ZZZ to ZZZ1 the next morning.
Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported many delays encountered to get a flight going that eventually departed the next day.
ACN: 1740275

Time / Day
Date : 202004

Aircraft
Reference : X
Make Model Name : No Aircraft

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Company
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1740275

Events
Anomaly.No Specific Anomaly Occurred : All Types
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
Thank you for all the work you're undoubtedly doing these days. A concern, which probably has been brought up, but I hope our safety guys are working on it actively. Well, two concerns, related.

1 - Masks. Judging from my last trip, most pilots and FAs are not wearing masks at all. I know that the official guidance has shifted, but it really seems that our Company could do a better job of promoting the idea that wearing masks isn't to protect yourself as much as it is to protect others, in case you're infected and don't know it. Unless we get better and clearer guidance and expectations, I don't expect pilots to all of the sudden decide it is time to wear masks. It goes against a lot of deeply ingrained western norms.

It seems that many have the idea that if you can't get 100% protection, why bother. We're in the cockpit so who cares about on the van or in the airport. I think this is exactly wrong, apparently the "viral load" is important and anything that reduces your "initial dose" could lessen the severity of any subsequent illness. Apparently this is one reason they suspect that lots of healthy/young doctors/nurses are getting pretty bad cases, because they have so much exposure. Which brings me to the related concern?

2 - Cockpit social distancing. It is obviously impossible to properly social distance while flying with another pilot in the cockpit. The problem [is], the furthest away we can possibly get is 2 feet. That's an issue, I'm not aware of any other work environment that is so close and wearing a mask is currently prohibited. We need Company and Union and
FAA Safety all to push and approve masks in the cockpit. Presumably someone could run a pretty quick experiment in a high altitude pressure chamber where they test various masks versus blood oxygenation using pulse oximeters. I'm pretty certain that surgical type masks wouldn't present a problem, the N95s or homemade ones might as they could interfere with the seal, but a surgical mask seems benign on that count.

Anyway, if Company and the FAA for that matter, really intend to keep the airlines flying, then they need to relax this mask in the cockpit rule and explicitly approve it. We can’t maintain 6 feet and most of us aren’t wearing a mask. So a Pilot who wears one is protecting the guy he's flying with, but if his Co-Pilot isn't wearing one, it sort of defeats the purpose.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier pilot reported concerns with the inability to maintain proper social distancing in the cockpit during the COVID-19 pandemic. Reporter suggested guidelines should allow for pilots to wear surgical masks in the cockpit during this time to minimize COVID-19 exposure.
ACN: 1740252

Time / Day

Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight

Aircraft

Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ground: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Personal
Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight Phase: Taxi

Component

Aircraft Component: Communication Systems
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person

Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Personal
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740252
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly: Ground Incursion : Taxiway
Detector: Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : Taxi
Result: Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result: Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance
Result: Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Taxied to incorrect runway while dealing with poor radio quality. Went to ZZZ to update databases in newly installed avionics and after recent completed annual. Had no intentions of flying and only slightly considered starting the engine to see that the engine monitor was working. Didn't want to go flying because: The winds were gusty, above my personal minimums. [The] new avionics were going to be a distraction as a single pilot. Didn't want to involve instructor to abide to social distancing. Recent flight time was low: have only had 1 hour of solo time in my aircraft. No hours in [a month] for avionics repair and annual. [I] had comms trouble before with a malfunctioning secondary EDM (Engine Data Management) - considered that perhaps comms interference was caused by bad EDM.

A young passenger was with me and was a distraction. Pulled the plane out of the hanger to get GPS signal. I wanted to also check if fuel flow information was being reported from the EDM to the IFD (Integrated Flight Deck) - that meant I needed to start the engine. So, on a whim decided that it would be good to run the airplane for a while and taxi around to break in new brakes and verify things are ok after the annual.

And so it began -- I called Ground on comm 1 and told my intentions to taxi up X, down Y, and then back up X to park again. In my head I expected to head east up X, cross [Runway] XY. Then down Y, cross [Runway] XY, then back up X. I did not hear a response on comm 1. I called for a radio check 2 more times on comm 1. After barely hearing a response on comm 1 decided to try comm 2 - my head now boiling with frustration over the newly installed malfunctioning radio.

I called Ground on comm 2 and was able to get a clearance. I wrote down and repeated the clearance... Taxi to Runway XY, via X, hold short X1. Note that this is opposite my expectations. Not realizing it, and grumbling about the radio failures, I proceeded east towards Runway XY. This is the pilot deviation. I did not hear a call that was made that I was heading the wrong way, and an offer to either turn around, or cross. I heard another call that sounded like further taxi instructions, but I didn't understand what was being said, except that I should use X6. I turned onto X6 and stopped at the hold short line as I wasn't sure I was cleared to cross. The Controller listed out some instructions, which I miss heard and asked that I would take it one step at a time. Next clearance I understood enough to cross the Runway to Y6 down Y. There was more, but I just repeated that part I understood that got me down Y.

When I got down to the run-up area on Y, near Y6, I stopped and called for further clearance to cross. I heard no responses. After listening to the recording at home, I heard the further clearance prior to my arrival to the run-up area, but actually did not hear
responses to my calls. I made several calls, both on comm 1 and comm 2. At this point, a little panic set in. How was I going to get back across the runway without comms? OK lost comms procedures; in the slight panic/frustration, did not even think about a checklist...I proceeded to squawk 7700; thinking I was squawking the lost comms code.

I eventually got a hold of him on the Tower frequency. I was cleared across and back to the hangar area. I made a few more radio checks on the way back, and things were still iffy - but I was done at this point. No one asked me to, but after putting the plane back in the hangar, I got the phone number to the Tower from the FBO. I called, to hear what they thought happened, but the crew had changed out while I was hangaring the plane. The current Controller said no big deal was made of it.

It wasn't until I got home, where I re-read my clearance notes that I realized I had taxied the wrong way.

Contributing problems [included] a lack of currency/experience. Radio problems caused frustration and distractions. Stress. Dismissive: this will just be a simple taxi - I'm not flying.

Corrective actions [would include to] consider that taxiing can be just as complicated as being airborne. IMSAFE applies to both on the ground or airborne.

I - illness, nope.
M - meds are good.
S - Stress - oh yeah I'm stressed. COVID shutdown, kids at home, work from home, couldn't fly for months because of bad avionics install. This is why I wasn't going to "fly."
A - alcohol - zip.
F - fatigue, well rested.
E - emotions - did I mention stress; also dismissed that taxiing could be just as challenging as flying.

Review lost comms procedures. I'm printing a label for the squawk codes to stick on my transponder. Pretty sure I don't remember the Tower light signals, either. I called my instructor for ideas and he also suggested that I could have used my cell phone to call the Tower (even though, at the time I didn't have the number.) Really listen to clearances. They may not be what you are expecting. Before rolling, physically point to the direction of clearance, and verify with some outside evidence that it is the correct direction.

**Synopsis**

GA pilot reported experiencing a taxiway incursion citing multiple distractions and other human factors as contributing to the event.
**ACN: 1740241**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger

**Component**
- Aircraft Component: Oxygen System/Pax
- Aircraft Reference: X
- Problem: Improperly Operated

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1740241
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector: Person: Flight Crew
- Result: General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
- Primary Problem: Procedure

**Narrative: 1**
Concerns regarding the use of onboard passenger oxygen masks in the event of a decompression. Due to high use of personal face shields, I have concerns its use during a decompression will not provide adequate or appropriate oxygen levels to the passenger or crew using it. The only way this is resolved is to not wear the mask. There should be directions provided that in this situation, personal mask shields need to be removed. It will also be a concern regarding the time it will take in a high altitude situation. Regardless this should be addressed as a potential critical situation.

**Synopsis**
Flight Attendant reported concerns with passenger use of masks during the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of instructions to remove them in order use the oxygen masks in case of a rapid decompression.
ACN: 1740238

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Cabin Lighting: High

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740238
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Other Person
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was informed that a passenger in the gate area was refusing to cover his/her coughs in the gate area and were making people in the gate area uncomfortable due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the non compliance with being asked to cover the coughs. A Supervisor was called and spoke with the passenger. [We were asked] if we were comfortable with the passenger flying and from the information [they] told to us, we were not.

I believe during the COVID-19 pandemic that passengers should be screened before boarding and if people are believed to be sick they should be denied boarding to prevent spreading the illness.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was coughing in the gate area making the crew and other passengers uncomfortable due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1740213

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Taxi
Airspace.Class D: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740213
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion: Taxiway
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: Taxi
Result.Flight Crew: Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Missed direction on company page to contact Ground for pushback. Due to similar ramp appearance to many other company-owned, uncontrolled, small, remote ramps, pushed back onto the adjacent taxiway without asking Ground. When taxi clearance was requested, Ground Control mentioned that what we thought was an uncontrolled part of the ramp, was actually a taxiway. They said there was no conflict, but to note it in the future. Apologized and continued.

I believe that several factors added to the cause: Similarity to many other small ramps, my unfamiliarity with this particular airport, and, truthfully, the disruption in my normal flows and habit patterns due to the change in operations during the Coronavirus pandemic. I normally don't use my iPad for things like checking in or reading and signing the flight planning requirements. I previously exclusively relied on printed paper flight planning requirements because of the ease, accuracy, and speed of access and unmatched ability to understand the entire plan when referencing them. I also have found it faster to exclusively use the touchpad in the airplane for all in-flight info, and consider taking out and attaching the iPad to be superfluous, time-consuming, and limits visibility. During COVID Operations, I have been trying to find the best way to alter my flows and vary from proven habit patterns to comply with changing sanitation requirements and necessary technological operational changes. I believe the combination of dealing with cleaning the flight deck, reduced communication while wearing a mask and distracting tactile limitations of gloves, changes in where and how quickly pertinent information is obtained (iPad vs paper, iPad vs. Touchpad), and changes as simple as where your eyes look to get info, lead to this mistake. Simply put, I looked at the ramp depiction on the company page on the iPad, had it sized incorrectly to see the parking space only as opposed to looking at the depiction on the airplane's touchpad where I would normally look and see the requirement to call Ground for pushback, and missed it based on experience-based expectation bias. I think the FO did pretty much the exact same thing, causing him to miss it too.

As always, slow down, communicate, and don't fall to the limitations of previous experience before confirming an action from more than one source.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported pushing without contacting ground, citing COVID-19 operations as the reason for disrupting flows and habits.
ACN: 1740159

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1740159

Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
The following pertains to COVID-19 clarification: Due to an observation and numerous questions, we would like to have some clarification regarding the procedures that affect technicians system wide regarding the spraying/fogging process.

Cabin Deep Cleaning Procedure: What is our process regarding normal clean and a suspected COVID-19 incident? Is it the Deep Clean Process outlined in the Cabin Processing Manual? If a COVID-19 case is confirmed on the aircraft, is there any other measure we are taking? Spraying/fogging process? Various departments have posted information and have briefed their crews.

The spraying/fogging process can accept various chemicals. What chemicals do we plan to use? We have been told at ZZZ, we will be using X chemical. We have concerns about aeration of this chemical with respect to the Safety Data Sheet (SDS). It is our understanding that our company needs to notify and train personnel before introduction to the workforce. This informs technicians about the health risks associated with those chemicals. If our company plans on changing the chemicals utilized in the spraying/fogging process, will an effort be made to inform the various work groups? Are
we currently utilizing the process at ZZZ?

Quarantined planes: What is the process? Charter flights (Recovery flights): What is the process? We recommend the most stringent cleaning process!

Gate Technicians: How are we going about to inform them of an inbound risk of COVID-19 infection aboard an aircraft? Any effort to discuss and train our workforce on expectations, health risks, and procedures would be helpful.

**Synopsis**

Maintenance Technician reported questions and concerns relating to cleaning techniques for aircraft during the COVID-19 pandemic.
**ACN: 1740092**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Relative Position: Angle: Radial: 156
- Relative Position: Distance: Nautical Miles: 30
- Altitude: MSL: Single Value: 7800

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: Mixed
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Cloudy
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Visibility: 10
- Light: Daylight
- Ceiling: Single Value: 7000

**Aircraft : 1**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 2 Eng, Retractable Gear
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
- Flight Plan: VFR
- Mission: Training
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Airspace: Class E: ZZZ

**Aircraft : 2**
- Reference: Y
- ATC / Advisory: Center: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Airspace: Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
I was flying VFR above a broken/scattered layer with tops at about 9,500 feet after having climbed above the layer. Though I get flight following on 95% of my flights, traffic was so light (due to the pandemic), that I chose not to speak with ATC this day. I knew I had to fly well south of my destination before I could descend in relatively clear conditions. As I was descending and turning to the NW, I was suddenly staring directly at a commercial jet crossing my path from right to left 3+ miles directly ahead and below less than one thousand feet. I initiated a hard turn to the right and shallow climb, and I noticed the jet banking to its right. I was surprised to see a jet in this location at this altitude, so far west of ZZZ. I fly this route often for training, but rarely above 6,000 feet, so later after landing I studied the ZZZ STARs and saw that this jet was right where it was supposed to be on the STAR. I had collected the weather soon after the traffic encounter and it was reporting 5,500 broken which equates to an MSL ceiling of 7,000, which is about where the jet was. I realize now, that the jet was descending through the cloud layer that I flew around and the jet speed was such that it must have emerged from the cloud layer during my momentary “heads down” to get the frequencies at my destination. The encounter was rattling, and I can imagine the pilots of the jet making a colorful comment or two about general aviators. There are many obvious lessons here. Talk to ATC, maintain a traffic scan and pay closer attention to any traffic information available on the MFD. Nevertheless, I realize now that I do not have a full understanding of the STARs in my area since they are generally used by turbojet aircraft capable of 250 knots and arriving from the flight levels. In particular, I note that there are 25 STARs published for the airports under the Class B airspace. I believe it would be helpful for all general aviation pilots in this crowded airspace if there was a chart showing all the routes that was color coded for altitude. A chart with high glance value would be worth checking when traversing the region VFR. Better yet, would be a layer on Fore Flight or other EFB showing all STAR routes with a selectable altitude, say, between 6,000 to 7,000, or between 7,000 and 9,000, etc.
Synopsis

General Aviation pilot flying VFR reported experiencing an airborne conflict with an airliner. Pilot stated that lighter traffic during the COVID-19 pandemic was a factor in the decision to not contact ATC, which may have contributed to the event.
At the present time we are faced with COVID-19. Here in the US and other parts of the world people are told to wear mask or PPE to protect themselves. While our passengers on [airline name] are wearing masks, bandanas and other items to cover their nose and mouths no where in our safety demonstrations or announcements do we tell them how or what to do in a decompression during COVID-19. Shouldn’t we change our announcement to say "If needed, oxygen masks will drop from an overhead compartment. Remain seated with your seat belt fastened and pull the mask down to start the flow of oxygen. Remove your personal mask or protective equipment from around your nose and mouth and place the yellow mask over your nose and mouth and put the elastic band over your head."

Flight Attendant suggested changing the safety announcement during the COVID-19 pandemic to include instructions for passengers to remove their personal protective masks before donning drop-down oxygen masks.
I requested PPE, a face mask, from operating manager on duty. Immediately he asked,"What for?" I explained I would like a face mask during the COVID-19 pandemic while working over 15+ aircraft for the day. He then asked me "what AMM task are you doing that requires a face mask?" I stated again, that I would like a face mask regarding my health and safety since I will be aboard so many aircraft. He then told me he needed to make phone call. That phone call ended and he made another phone call regarding my request. Once the second phone call was over he reluctantly gave me a mask from a stack of at best, 20 face masks. We do not have an adequate amount of PPE face masks during this COVID-19 pandemic and when requested PPE we are challenged.

Provide adequate PPE for all mechanics and do not challenge the technicians when requested. There are no masks readily available for us. We are not being supplied PPE during COVID-19 pandemic.
Technician reported a Supervisor made two calls before reluctantly providing him with a mask. Technician stated they are not adequately being supplied with PPE equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1739948

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202003
- Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: FO
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Parked

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739948
- Human Factors: Troubleshooting
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
- Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative:** 1
Upon arrival at the gate in ZZZZ, we were not provided with a dedicated bus to take us to the aircraft. We were told to get on the bus with the passengers. Given the dangers of the coronavirus we should've been afforded a separate bus to take the crew to the aircraft. When parked at a remote hard stand, the crew should be transported in a separate bus for our safety.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported that the crew was transported to the aircraft in the same bus as the passengers to a remote hard stand, and that a separate bus would lessen the risk of exposure to COVID-19.
ACN: 1739882

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 16000

Aircraft : 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Aircraft : 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Climb
Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 17
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739882
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Staffing
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
During COVID-19 operations, I was very busy with sectors combined and a lot of aircraft in the ZZZ area with a large map range. I just took the sectors over from the previous Controller and asked him to sit on my D Side to help me. Aircraft X was a departure [out] of ZZZ1 and was level at 15,000 north out of ZZZ Approach airspace and Aircraft Y was a departure out of ZZZ to the west of Aircraft X climbing to 10,000.

I originally climbed Aircraft Y to 14,000 under Aircraft X and I was very busy with sectors combined and a lot of aircraft in the ZZZ area with a large map range. I observed that Aircraft Y was out in front of Aircraft X and climbed Aircraft Y with a turn on course to ZZZ2 to 17,000 due to other crossing traffic from the west. Aircraft Y was faster and wouldn't be an issue to climb. I continued to work the sector and noticed that the turn to ZZZ2 was [going to] bring the Aircraft together. I turned Aircraft X to zzz2 to help parallel the Aircraft and requested to Aircraft Y to report leaving 16,000 for standard separation. I believe I had 5 miles and 1,000 feet at the closest point.

Smaller scale map would have helped viewing the traffic.

Synopsis
Center Controller reported that while working through COVID-19 Operations, they became very busy working combined sectors resulting in an airborne conflict.
**ACN: 1739830**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202004  
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Passenger  
Flight Phase: Cruise

**Person**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X  
Location In Aircraft: Galley  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739830  
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**

Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Passenger Misconduct  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Detector.Person: Flight Crew  
When Detected: In-flight  
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure  
Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**

Passenger came back to aft galley and violated [COVID-19] social distancing to ask for another beer. Discontinue all onboard service and adopt policies to prevent passengers from placing flight attendants at risk of getting ill.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported a passenger violated COVID-19 social distancing rules when approaching the galley mid-flight to ask for a beverage.
ACN: 1739795

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739795
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Dispatch

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: MEL
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
When Detected.Other
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Logbook Entry
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Arrived at the aircraft and completed preflight items for a maintenance ferry flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 for the purpose of parking Aircraft X in ZZZ1 for stowage due to COVID-19 economic downturn. During pre-flight I determined that there was not a current maintenance release form in the aircraft Logbook. I called maintenance on the radio and requested a new maintenance release. Maintenance said we did not need a maintenance release form because we were flying a maintenance ferry flight and we only needed a maintenance ferry document, which should be in the aircraft logbook. There was no maintenance ferry document in the aircraft logbook or in the flight plan paperwork.

I called Dispatch and requested a new maintenance release and was told all I needed was the maintenance ferry document. I told Dispatch that I did not have one anywhere on the aircraft and I needed him to send me one. The Dispatcher told me that he couldn't "cut & paste" the maintenance ferry document into ACARS, but that he could take a picture and send it to me on my phone. He sent me a picture of the maintenance ferry document and I looked it over.

I had never seen a maintenance ferry document and therefore had no idea if the Dispatcher had sent me the proper documentation. Per the flight plan, we were dispatched Part 91, and having been told by both the Maintenance and Dispatch that we had what we needed, we proceeded to operate the flight safely and on-time between ZZZ and ZZZ1.

It was only an hour after our arrival into ZZZ1 that we were contacted by the flight operations and were told that we had departed without the proper maintenance release form. I sent a picture of the maintenance ferry document from Dispatch and a copy of the flight plan and told her I would file a report. We were not the only flight to be dispatched improperly by Maintenance and Dispatch.

Later that evening we received a report, detailing what a correct maintenance ferry document should be. We performed due diligence in our attempt to obtain the proper maintenance release form. Maintenance and Dispatch let us down and company, by not having the correct and proper documentation available either in the cockpit or available on the ACARS printer.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported having to ferry a flight for storage due the COVID-19 pandemic without correct maintenance release documentation.
ACN: 1739663

Time / Day
Date : 202004

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft
Reference : X
Make Model Name : No Aircraft

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Company
Cabin Activity : Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity : Service
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1739663
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

We should not be compromising safety and security policy onboard regarding sitting next to someone when in reality we have to work together anyways in a close environment regardless. If we have a problem with it, we shouldn't be coming to work. I am not afraid. Jumpseat assignments are for safety and should not be compromised to any other location because of comfort. Safety and security are number 1 concerns.

They are allowing the company to over staff flights above the established staffing guidelines that is providing an over staffing for no reason when it is completely not needed and that's the kind of concern I have. In addition, they are not providing hand sanitizer. Sometimes I can find them in the base, but we don't have them. Lysol for the counters don't do anything when you have nothing to clean the hands with and the small cut wipes in the kit are not good enough.
The increase [in] the amount of standbys is also not needed for May as it increased the amount of people sitting around in the airport until this blows over. Forcing us to all be on reserve promotes more problems than it solves.

Let me know if there is anything else I could provide as we work towards a solution.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported they are not being provided with adequate cleaning supplies and sanitizers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Flight Attendant also expressed concern with the flight being overstaffed for no reason.
ACN: 1739613

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference: US
Altitude. AGL. Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements / Visibility: Rain
Weather Elements / Visibility: Cloudy

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Airspace. Class D: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Type: 161
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1739613
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience. Flight Crew. Last 90 Days: 19
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1739616
Human Factors: Training / Qualification
Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Result.Flight Crew : FLC Overrode Automation
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I am submitting this safety report to highlight a growing challenging environment with COVID-19 and related training and currency issues. On the flight I flew to ZZZ yesterday, I was paired with a new FO who is on an extension trying to consolidate and hasn't been flying as a reserve. He reportedly has been trying to get flying and has been unable. I also have not been flying much with reserve and "bunky" trips. My last "assignment" was a landing class in ZZZ1. For our trip yesterday, we were scheduled to fly ZZZ2-ZZZ-ZZZZ. Being new and having less than 100 hours, the FO couldn't takeoff or land in ZZZ2, so I decided that I'd fly to cruise, let the FO fly enroute and descent to ZZZ, and then reverse that returning so he could gather some experience. With ZZZ being a new airport for both of us, and with non-precision approaches in use, that wasn't my first choice (I had intended to fly into ZZZ), but I didn't want to take both legs and not give the FO an opportunity to fly. With the inexperience of the FO and both of our currency issues, my brief then included the request that we definitely watch one another and work together as a team. Our flight worked that way on departure and enroute, but then became somewhat challenging for both of us going into ZZZ. The weather was overcast in light rain and the RNAV approach to [Runway] XX was in use. Prior to descent, the FO conducted a thorough brief and reviewed/briefed the RNAV approach procedures from the Approach Briefing Guide. All then went well until we were vectored toward the final course just outside ZZZZZZ fix, told to maintain 5,000 until established, and cleared for the approach. We were then very careful setting up everything for the rarely conducted RNAV approach per SOP. The problem however was that our vector by ATC was poor and we didn't intercept until just slightly outside ZZZZZZ which is normally crossed at 4,300 feet. With a combination of being focused on the RNAV procedures, ATC communications (Controller realized at the last minute that his vector had been poor), and honestly some rustiness on my part, I didn't immediately recognize that we were high until we broke through the clouds just outside ZZZZZZ and I saw the runway. The FO then immediately disconnected the autopilot in visual conditions, added additional drag and was able to salvage the approach to a safe landing. It worked out, but the approach and descent was obviously not as well conducted as either of us would have preferred.

Narrative: 2
I was the Pilot Flying on an RNAV Approach to ZZZ Runway XX in IMC. While the approach and landing were successful, I am filing a report because of the general feeling of rustiness
and feeling more behind the jet than I was comfortable with. I am a reserve on this specific aircraft type fleet and have not flown much due to both my seniority/reserve status and the COVID-19 situation's impact on our operations.

For background, I...was able to pick up one trip in late last year, and then was on leave, which was not ideal, but unavoidable. Upon my return I was back to being a reserve when the COVID-19 pandemic began to reduce our flying.

Scheduling put me on another flight in order to extend my consolidation window by XX days. I had no warm up and had not flown since late last year. Although successful, I was not at the comfort level I would have liked in order to complete the flight.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier flight crew reported conducting an unstable approach to a landing into an unfamiliar airport. The crew cited flying frequency as the main cause attributed to a reduction of flights during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1739597

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function. Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification. Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience. Air Traffic Control. Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 8.5
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1739597
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown. Party1: ATC
Communication Breakdown. Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly. ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector. Person: Air Traffic Control
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
Because of the COVID-19 situation we are trying to social distance. It was briefed that Operation managers would stay out of the areas from controllers as much as possible and controllers would not cover the CIC desk in order to limit the possibility of spreading the virus. Yesterday and today our OM has been roaming around the Control Room as if there is no direction to remain clear of the workforce. OM is also requiring the FLM to open sectors based on staffing not traffic needs. Both of these things I do not believe are good practice in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19. I also am under the understanding that this goes against the guidance of the agency and CDC.
I think management should be reminded that the purpose of this schedule is to minimize exposure of the workforce to potential illness.

Synopsis
Center Controller reported management was not following COVID-19 related facility policy for social distancing.
ACN: 1739596

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US

Aircraft: 1
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Other
Route In Use: Vectors
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Aircraft: 2
Reference: Y
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Aircraft: 3
Reference: Z
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Cruise
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Weather over ZZZ and all of the arrivals were still coming in. ZZZ shut off the ZZZZZZ arrival and all aircraft were being routed over the ZZZZZ1 arrival. Area 1 was getting saturated with holding, so I began to hold several aircraft. TMU (Traffic Management Unit) came by and said it should be no more than 15 minutes, the aircraft kept coming and Area 3 offered to hold one. The aircraft were complaining about the location of the hold, even though it was clear of weather it was far away from the only arrival gate that would be opened. They kept wanting to move closer. I held all aircraft at ZZZ VOR since it was a central point. TMU then came down and said they will take the aircraft 20 MIT [Miles In Trail]. As I started to line them up they came and said they will take them on vectors through the SW corner. So I was rerouting the first 3 aircraft and they were getting confused since it was a rapid change of plan. As I was advising the next aircraft, they called back and shut me off after the first 3. All of the aircraft were at or near the EFC (Expect Further Clearance) time and were all stepping on each other wanting to get a game plan. Some were on vectors for sequence some were still in the hold. I missed several point-outs to adjacent sectors because I only PVD [Plan View Display] the aircraft, and didn't specify what they were doing. The lack of communication between sectors, between TMU and ZZZ with a rapidly changing game plan was hard to follow. Luckily there wasn't a loss. I am working mids because of the COVID-19 pandemic. I haven't done a mid with ZZZ arrivals, and holding and weather reroutes in several years. Because of social distancing I didn't want to call for a D-side, and felt that once they told me the first time they were accepting arrivals I was good to go, but once they changed the plan, I needed some help quickly. Thankfully Area 3 was holding an aircraft, and separated several conflicts for me.
No recommendations. Its an unusual time, with unusual flow, unusual crews working traffic they are not used to. Luckily it all worked out "safely."

Synopsis

Center Controller reported holding several aircraft due to weather at intended airport, interacting with TMU, lining aircraft up 20 MIT, then after the first three aircraft the Controller was told to hold remaining aircraft. Controller reported that due to the COVID-19 pandemic he did not call for D-Side help because of social distancing concerns.
ACN: 1739595

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
Experience.Flight Attendant.Total: 2
Experience.Flight Attendant.Airline Total: 2
Experience.Flight Attendant.Number Of Acft Qualified On: 3
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739595

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I'm attending recurrent [on date] with a huge group of people, I know it's too late for me, however why do they think it's appropriate to gather a mass of highly susceptible people into the same tiny room for several hours, against government advisement, during a worldwide pandemic? My family is terrified I'm going to give them COVID-19 and I think its highly irresponsible and dangerous to continue operations as normal as if nothing is going on. The last thing I wanted to do is be in a room surrounded with other flight attendants that are exposed to the same thing I am on a daily basis. It's completely irresponsible and does nothing, but help spread the virus. I know we are considered "essential" but with everything going on things like this need to be adapted to provide social distancing and help prevent spreading the virus to other crew members and our passengers.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant expressed concern that attending a scheduled recurrent training class with a group of flight attendants could increase the risk of spreading the COVID-19 virus to other crew members and passengers.
ACN: 1739577

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
Qualification.Maintenance: Powerplant
Qualification.Maintenance: Airframe
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739577
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Maintenance
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was working on an aircraft located on the pad, Supervisor boarded the aircraft and instructed me, while standing in the entry way, that it was "okay" to remove the quarantined sticker on the door of Aircraft X and to board as needed, that it was "okay." These instruction were given with no documentation saying that the aircraft had sat for the required [time], and then deep cleaned, putting myself and others at risk of catching the COVID-19 virus.

Careful detailed records, documentation and logs generated are necessary to keep track of the condition of the aircraft and the safety of employees.

Synopsis
Technician reported being told the aircraft was "okay" to board, but received no documentation stating the aircraft was properly sanitized.
ACN: 1739520

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: FO

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Autopilot
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739520

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Aircraft: Equipment Problem Dissipated

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Primary Problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1
After departure from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1 it was discovered that the lights in the Captain's autopilot button on the MCP (Mode Control Panel) may have initially been operating intermittently. The light may not have illuminated upon initial press of the button, but shortly afterward came on and remained on for the duration of that flight and the
subsequent leg to ZZZZ2. The autopilot along with copilot side MCP autopilot switch/lights were verified operational. In light of recent changes to health screenings for COVID-19 in ZZZZ1 the flight crew came to a unanimous decision that since the malfunction had rectified itself and posed no further issues the malfunction would not be written up as a discrepancy at that time unless the problem persisted. This decision/action was likely a direct result of at least 1 crewmember’s concerns about safety/security and the uncertainty of officials actions in ZZZZ1 during this COVID-19 pandemic.

The actions by the flight crew are a direct result of unprecedented times amidst the COVID-19 pandemic forcing crews to analyze safety in a new way and juggling decisions in an attempt to find a positive outcome.

Further actions could/should have been taken by the crew to at a minimum at least consult the DDG (Dispatch Deviations Guide) with regard to the lighting. After a post flight review of the DDG I am under the opinion that this item could be an MEL item allowed by flight crew deferral. Alternate actions could also have been an in flight phone conversations with Dispatch, Maintenance, etc., to work through any issues with regards to the aircraft and with regards to crewmember security concerns as a result of COVID-19. Safety should always remain paramount even during these unprecedented times.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported the flight crew decided not to write up a minor in-flight equipment malfunction as a discrepancy, which might not be deferrable. The decision was due, in part, to the crew's uncertainty around recent changes in COVID-19 screening procedures at the destination airport.
ACN: 1739456

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739456
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
The callsign conflict was missed -- in my opinion -- as the result of two circumstances. First, I am still working on developing a workflow. Although I do have significant Dispatch experience, my coming up to speed in systems familiarization still has me with a handicap in reviewing potential conflict.
Second, the workload for company employees as the result of significant cancellations, schedule adjustments, and non-scheduled flying as the direct result of the COVID-19 circumstances is requiring increased schedule activity. The resulting delays, reposition flights, extreme biohazard precautions within the offices and other company property...are all responsible for degrading the inherent stability otherwise found in well-established systems and in the best practice of dispatching. Communication -- while still required -- must be remote and minimized.

Corrective action: It is my opinion the only course of action which would have prevented this occurrence is tighter communication. I do believe that if the ATC coordinators, Dispatch coordinators, and dispatchers were free to openly and routinely communicate as enjoyed in the past (absent COVID-19), and the situation were moot, we likely would not have had a callsign conflict. When balanced against the risk of closer socialization and systems still in place with ATC as risk mitigation, I do not believe that corrective action is warranted at this time and the systems in place today consistent with best practices and in the good interest of public health, worked as best as they could have.

We were dispatching Flight ABC and received an ACARS from that aircraft notifying us that ATC had given them a new callsign -- Aircraft X "ABCE" -- as the result of a callsign conflict. An identically numbered flight, ABC, no additional E, which was being operated by different Dispatcher was late inbound due to equipment delays.

The callsign conflict was not apparent to us -- the dispatchers for this flight, nor was it recognized by the second flight's Dispatcher, ATC coordinators, or Dispatch coordinators. We acknowledged the new callsign, continued the flight as planned.

**Synopsis**

Dispatcher reported a similar callsign issue and cancellations attributed in part to COVID-19 pandemic related work environment.
ACN: 1739384

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ground: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Phase: Taxi

Person
Reference: 1
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance: Technician
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739384
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter: Object
Detector.Person: Maintenance
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
We were put in a rush situation to move 2 airplanes after lunch from ramp to hanger, per management for inspections. I was right seat for the taxi operation and called Ground Control confirming taxiway was active for us and was cleared to taxi on [taxiway]. After starting to taxi, we were stopped in a partial turn by ground and told to use [taxiway] to exit ramp instead of [taxiway] and needed to turn. We were already pulled out a little and turned to the opposite direction, so as we made a tight left turn to the correct direction and the right winglet impacted an object next to the taxiway in front of ramp.

Do to the extraordinary circumstances of the Coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent urgent grounding and parking of the majority of our airplanes, there was an urgent rush to evaluate and sanitize airplanes which involved relocating some airplanes after already parked on a cramped ramp in which we were given very limited information regarding the rules of the agreement made with FBO on movement of airplanes on their cramped ramp and taxiways. Also, game plan changes several times a day made it hard to stay focused on the current task when we were getting reassigned midway through tasks several times a day.

I would suggest to make higher up management do a briefing before starting on a complex task like we had because of the Coronavirus pandemic, don't ever get in a rush no matter the circumstances or management requests and always tow on and off of unfamiliar ramp areas.

**Synopsis**

Maintenance Technician reported a collision with an object while taxing aircraft for maintenance. The rush to ground planes due to the COVID-19 pandemic was referenced as a contributing factor.
ACN: 1739379

Time / Day
Date: 202004
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739379

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Some days prior to reporting to work, I had read a company communication regarding the current COVID-19 pandemic, which referred to concerns about shared jumpseats as they affected our ability to practice social distancing. The company communication informed staff that they were currently reviewing all possible options for us to remove ourselves from adjoined jumpseats for our health and safety. As I reported to work I reread all more recent communications regarding the matter and could not find an update on the current
shared jumpseat policy. We have received an abnormal amount of daily communications purveying constant policy changes throughout the COVID-19 outbreak and I thought it was possible I just missed an update, so I asked the lead Flight Attendant if she had read what the company had decided on. The Lead Flight Attendant told me I was supposed to sit in the first row, passenger seat closest to my aircraft door, as if the jumpseat had been written up as inoperative. Under the impression that this was correct information given to me by a fellow crew member, I did not occupy my shared jumpseat during takeoff and landing, but rather the nearest passenger seat. Upon arrival to our layover hotel I reread all recent company communications yet again and found no such information on the matter. The following morning I reached out to several company and union representatives seeking accurate information on the policy, and found that this action had in fact, not yet been approved by the FAA.

All of this being said, I implore the FAA to please, please expedite a review of shared jumpseat policies as it pertains to the COVID-19 outbreak and CDC recommendations for social distancing. Our health and safety is on the line.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported having difficulty clarifying the company’s current policy on the use of shared jumpseats and social distancing. The Flight Attendant occupied a passenger seat during takeoff and landing, rather than the assigned jumpseat. After the flight, the Flight Attendant found that jumpseat policy changes had not been put in place.
ACN: 1739319

Time / Day
Date: 202004

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739319

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
It has been nearly a month without any Initial Operating Experience flights. I understand there is no requirement which defines the amount of time between completion of simulator training/operating experience, check-ride and starting (or completing OE). However, I am very concerned about my diminishing level of proficiency starting IOE.

Over the course of the last month (due to the COVID-19 crisis) the flight schedule has become so restrictive that the OE schedulers have been unable to execute many plans they have constructed for my flights and those of my classmates. I suspect the significant delays also extend to other classes waiting to complete IOE, as well as transitioning pilots needing to complete OE. LCA (Line Check Airman) availability has likely been further affected by other factors.

Beyond completion of OE, I expect the schedule restrictions will delay consolidation as well. Although an FAA extension to the consolidation timeline will put an administrative fix on that particular issue, it does nothing to assist with the retention of skills and knowledge.

Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer expressed concern about the erosion of skills and knowledge while awaiting OE and consolidation flights. A restrictive flight schedule due to the COVID-19 pandemic was cited as contributing.
**ACN: 1739228**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004

**Place**
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Daylight

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- Aircraft Operator: Personal
- Make Model Name: Small Aircraft
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 1
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 137
- Flight Plan: None
- Flight Phase: Parked
- Flight Phase: Takeoff
- Route In Use: None

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Personal
- Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739228
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
- Detector.Person: Flight Crew
- When Detected.Other
- Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
Post flight self debrief, I did a log book check and realized that I had flown out of currency, last biennial flight review was more than 24 months. I immediately shut down my operational commitments until I was able to find a flight instructor to conduct a biennial
flight review. Due to current circumstances, I found it difficult to find an instructor willing to fly with me due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, after several attempts I was able to find an instructor willing to give me a biennial currency ground school and flight.

I know it was a bone headed mistake and one that could have been avoided had I kept a calendar for myself with reminders and most importantly, during my slow time (winter) made sure that all my requirements were fulfilled prior to busy season and potentially miss out on work and fail to meet customer needs.

**Synopsis**

GA pilot had difficulty finding a flight instructor during the COVID-19 pandemic to conduct a flight review.
**ACN: 1739176**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202004
- Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 100

**Environment**
- Weather Elements / Visibility: Cloudy

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Landing
- Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739176
- Human Factors: Distraction
- Human Factors: Human-Machine Interface

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Check Pilot
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1739182

**Events**
- Anomaly.Deviation - Speed: All Types
- Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Ground Event / Encounter : Other / Unknown
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
After getting the weather in ZZZ [we] decided to fly a CAT III to Runway XX thinking we might not see the runway on a CAT I. Weather was X00 overcast. We setup, briefed and flew the CAT III approach. The approach was uneventful. At about 100 feet the CA noted my sink rate was a bit high. I began to pull back on the yoke more at the same time adding some power which made the problem worse with such a light airplane. We made a bounced landing and I decided to make a go-around. As I added power we might have lightly touched again, but made a successful go-around and clean up. After clean up the CA decided to make the landing on XY.

Narrative: 2
Approaching ZZZ, weather was X00 OVC X miles Visibility and a slight tailwind. We did do a landing data assessment. Weather was good to accomplish a CAT III landing. Airplane was very light due to approximately XX souls on board. FO flew [a] good approach. In the last 100 feet developed a higher sink rate. I told him to start pulling back on the yoke to break the descent. FO elected to add power at about 20 feet to break descent. This was a surprise to me. He added too much power for the circumstances. Due to the light weight the airplane accelerated forward, but still the main gear hit the runway firmly then immediately went airborne again. He pushed forward still trying to land the airplane but quickly realized a go-around was the correct thing to do so he initiated a go-around. During the go-around I believe the main gear kissed the runway again. I was in the process of taking the airplane, but he ended up doing a good go-around and I took the jet when we leveled off at 2,000 feet and I flew the rest of the flight and the landing to XY. The go-around was from XX.

I should have emphasized to FO not [to] rely solely on the flare cue. My hesitation in saying that the visibility was not great and he may find the flare cue helpful. I had no idea that he would increase the power to break the descent rate and since the jet was so light it reacted much more aggressively than he expected.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported the aircraft had a bounced landing resulting in a go-around. The crew cited the handling and performance characteristics of the lightly loaded aircraft as a contributing factor.
Several personnel present in the break room with Supervisor. Supervisor brought to [our] attention the decline in headset usage. Supervisor stated it was SOP. It was then brought to Supervisor's attention that we are in a state of emergency with the COVID-19 virus pandemic. It was then brought to Supervisor's attention that the microphone area was not able to be cleaned by a wipe. We questioned the alcohol content, and what the wipes kill. It was brought up the hearing lesson states you can wear either ear plugs, or the over-the-ears with cups. The headset lesson states that you should not wear ear plugs with the wireless headsets. There is no volume control with the wireless headsets, only noise cancelling - to which it doesn't do a great job. The wireless headsets are required to be worn during arrival and dispatch. To which at some point a changeover would be necessary which gives a break in hearing protection when switching between PPE [Personal Protection Equipment]. It was brought up [company safety rule] due to the headsets giving you a lack of peripheral vision, situational awareness, and a loud
amplification of outside noise. Also, as a pushback driver I’ve had to ask the flight deck numerous times on numerous occasions what they said over the radio to me as I could not hear what they were saying over the 2 wingwalkers. It was brought up that we only do a straight pushback in ZZZ. To the point on outside noise Supervisor stated that headsets numbered [3 headsets] had some hearing feature, but Supervisor did not know how to use it. I then asked if Supervisor had ever worn these headsets, and Supervisor stated "No." Supervisor then proceeded to walk away from the conversation on the shop floor.

**Synopsis**

Ground employee reported problems associated with sharing headsets.
ACN: 1738713

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 90
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 9753
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1738713

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Pre-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
The passengers were directed to sit in the first 10 rows thereby making social distancing impossible on a mostly empty flight. The Operations Agent could have worked the weight and balance more carefully and allowed the passengers to spread out evenly to provide appropriate social distance.

Operations Agents need to be directed to distribute bags and cargo to allow social distancing. Passengers [were] forced into close contact by weight and balance.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported that due to weight and balance needs, the Operations Agent directed passengers on a nearly empty flight to sit close together, violating social distancing requirements. The Captain suggested that weight and balance be reworked to allow appropriate spacing between passengers.
ACN: 1738687

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Relative Position.Angle.Radial: 216
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles: 12
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Ceiling.Single Value: 5000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Corporate
Make Model Name: Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 1350
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 100
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 800
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1738687
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1738694
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Landing Without Clearance
Anomaly.Ground Incursion : Runway
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Air Traffic Control : Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

Roughly 10-12 miles from Runway X, ZZZ Approach directed us to switch to the tower frequency after clearing us for a visual approach. The Pilot not Flying, my Captain, switched the pre-dialed in frequency for the Tower and called. I do not remember hearing a response as we continued our pre-landing checklist.

As Pilot Flying I was focusing on hand-flying the precision approach and responding to this pre-landing checklist. Due to the recent slowdown in flying, I felt it prudent that I hand-fly this precision approach to keep my skills up. All of my attention was on the flying.

In the past month I have flown less than 15 hours and then only very sporadically. The last day of flying prior to today was over two weeks ago and was with the same Captain.

The landing was uneventful and as we were exiting the runway, the Pilot Not Flying called "Clear of Runway X at taxiway." We did not hear a response. Pilot Not Flying tried again, and it was at this moment I realized that we were not on the correct Tower frequency and dialed in the correct frequency.

Pilot Not Flying had mistakenly dialed in ZZZ1 Tower Frequency instead of ZZZ Frequency. We realized that we had landed without a landing clearance. We promptly contacted the tower and admitted our mistake.

I believe the contributing factors in this event were lack of recent flying + landing at night after a long day and a long flight.
Corrective actions for this would be to pay closer attention to radio calls by Pilot Not Flying while acting as Pilot Flying and to ensure that we are given proper landing clearance before commencing landing. It is especially important to be extra vigilant when you are not as current as you are normally.

**Narrative: 2**

We were switched over to ZZZ Tower, but I inadvertently switched to frequency, which is ZZZ1, one of our previous stops that day. I checked in, and did not immediately get a response, so I continued with the checklist.

We completed the checklist and did what we have done hundreds of times before landed. I called the tower to see if we could take Runway X for taxi, and of course, got no response. I called a second time, which was when my First Officer noticed that we were on the wrong frequency. We switched in, and the Tower asked us if we had heard them. We admitted our mistake and continued on.

The takeaway is you can't let even an important thing like the checklist distract you from completing all of the required tasks in front of you. A contributing factor is that this was my third flight in over a month because of a massive slowdown in activity due to the Coronavirus pandemic. Lesson 2 is you have to be especially vigilant when you aren't as current as you normally are.

**Synopsis**

Flight crew reported landing without clearance due to fatigue and lack of recent flying assignments due to COVID-19-related decrease in flights.
**ACN: 1738676**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202003

**Place**
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Other / Unknown
Function.Maintenance: Other / Unknown
ASRS Report Number, Accession Number: 1738676
Human Factors: Confusion

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Other Person
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**
There are no available safety masks for us to use. Respirators are unavailable as well. There are no cleaning products available. Our stock has been sent to other stations leaving us with none and at stores, window employees are wearing respirators in front of their computer. Why is our health and safety not a concern? Yet the group is quick to point out vest or seatbelt infractions. These items should be readily available at all times. This needs to be resolved immediately.

**Synopsis**
Reporter was concerned that there weren't safety masks or respirators available for use.
ACN: 1738653

Time / Day
Date: 202003

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Door Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1738653
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
During the boarding process we discovered that the Customer Service Bag containing gloves, masks and sanitary wipes was not boarded. Other gloves were not boarded elsewhere. We reported the item missing to the Captain who requested it, but approximately 6 minutes before door closing we were told that, per the inflight Supervisor on duty at the time we would have to go without these vitally important PPEs. We indicated that per the Captain, the door would not be closing until the items were received. After several more minutes, the bag arrived and after all was said and done, departed on time.

I am writing this report to bring this to the attention to all involved in the decision making process. This policy must be reviewed. Crews simply cannot be asked to depart without the essential PPE for a flight. Granted gloves can be found elsewhere in first aid kits, etc., but not enough for an entire crew for an entire flight. Given the extreme danger of COVID contamination, gloves must be changed frequently between delivery and pick up services.

**Synopsis**

Flight crew member reported the bag containing protective gear for COVID-19 was not boarded on the aircraft, and that the on duty in-flight Supervisor directed the crew to depart without the bag.
ACN: 1738644

Time / Day
Date: 202003

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Other / Unknown
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1738644
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1

We are taught to accept no unnecessary risk. This report will likely not make it through the report meeting for some time, because the FAA representative is following this rule, as the FAA left the Training Center when social distancing became a directive. Flight Operations seems to be in a different world. Now, we are sending thousands of pilots out on multi-day trips with no N95 masks, no industrial disinfectant and no way to social distance on vans or in the cockpit.

Hotel rooms are not in any way guaranteed to be safe. Just yesterday, there were many pilots that had to be contacted because they had been in proximity to a known positive crew member. Company is not following SAFO 20003 procedure, which [recommends] crews to take daily temperatures. Why not? No reason given, we just don't follow it. We
are not providing disinfectants. Why not? Because "Supply Chain" can't get them. What if our fuel truck couldn't get enough gas for our minimum fuel?

Would we still operate? Since Crews can't social distance, they certainly need N95 masks and training on how to effectively use them; but we aren't providing the masks. We are accepting unnecessary risk and I worry very much that this is going to lead to a death, or deaths that could have been prevented by following our own internal guidance.

**Synopsis**

Flight crew member reported the company was sending crews out during pandemic without proper safety equipment.
Narrative: 1

While working our flight outbound we were instructed to put the headsets on. First of all, we are in a pandemic situation across the world. Secondly these headsets are not being sanitized after all flights. Dirty and transferring germs to everyone wearing them. Why are we still wearing these headsets when we can be wearing our own personal headsets or hearing protection? It makes no sense why we are contaminating our own work group. I can see the pushback driver using the headset to communicate with the pilots but for wing walkers to be using this is unsafe. There are limited supplies for cleaning and yet we are being told to wear this. What happens when its hot? Still wear them during this pandemic?

Synopsis
Air carrier ramp agent reported being uncomfortable with a company procedure requiring wearing shared headsets amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1738454

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude: AGL. Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory: Ramp: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1738454
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: In-flight
Result: General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Flight Attendant told us as we entered plane that she was informed her best friend was COVID-19 positive and that they had been together recently. She then stated she was having some symptoms and was thinking of getting off flight on day 3. I performed my safety duties and sat in seat X for takeoff and landing so I was more than 2 inches away from her on the jumpseat. This was for my safety. We performed monitor and challenge on takeoff and landing. I felt the need for social distance to protect myself and my family from a virus that can cause fatalities.

We should all be tested. For this virus. At minimum our temperatures should be checked daily. There should be no penalty for calling off. Maybe on planes that require flight attendants to share a jumpseat it would be prudent to move one of them to a seat by the exit like I chose to do.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported that a crewmember had possibly been exposed to COVID-19. For social distancing purposes, Flight Attendant sat in a cabin seat for takeoff and landing.
ACN: 1738408

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Takeoff
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 2399
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 126
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 2399
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1738408
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 7841
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 7841
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1738413
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Scheduled flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Tower was closed for operations due to COVID-19. We both followed procedures for closed Tower, by making calls in the blind and contacting ZZZ TRACON for clearance and for departure time/permission. There were multiple scheduled pushbacks at XA:45. The Captain briefed pushing back a few minutes early if possible to help alleviate congestion in a non-tower environment. We pushed and taxied to the hold short and called TRACON we were ready for departure. TRACON released us. I asked TRACON to clarify we were cleared to takeoff and they replied yes we were. We took off and departed uneventful following noise abatement procedure. After airborne, we discussed that we had departed several minutes before XB:00. ZZZ 10-7 page states no departures XP:00-XB:00L. After obtaining release from TRACON and verifying we were cleared to takeoff from ZZZ we realized that we had taken off several minutes prior to XB:00 once we were airborne. Other aircraft from another airline also took off before XB:00.

Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported the ATC Tower changed hours of operation and was closed due to COVID-19, resulting in a takeoff before curfew ended.
**ACN: 1738292**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202003
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference: Airport: ZZZ.Airport
- State Reference: US

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC
- Light: Dusk

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory: Tower: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
- Crew Size: Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
- Nav In Use: GPS
- Flight Phase: Initial Approach
- Route In Use: Direct
- Airspace: Class B: ZZZ

**Person : 1**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: Captain
- Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Multiengine
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
- ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1738292
- Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
- Human Factors: Other / Unknown
- Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
- Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC

**Person : 2**
- Reference: 2
- Location Of Person: Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function: Flight Crew: First Officer
Function: Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification: Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification: Flight Crew: Multifilemge
Qualification: Flight Crew: Commercial
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1738293
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown: Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown: Party2: ATC
Communication Breakdown: Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly: ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading: All Types
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly: Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Result: Air Traffic Control: Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
With the COVID-19 threat, the airspace was very empty and we were being vectored to an ILS in ZZZ in VMC. I was the Captain Pilot Monitoring and we discussed the option of a visual approach while being vectored on final because of the extremely low flight density. In anticipation of the handoff to ZZZ Tower, I tuned the #1 radio to XXY.Z and accidentally set that as the active radio frequency prior to receiving a final vector and approach clearance from ATC. The radio chatter was so light that I never realized I had gotten ahead of myself by activating this frequency. We flew east over ZZZ1 and I began to feel it was strange we were not being vectored when ATC called us on XAX.B. I immediately switched back to XAY.BB (approach, and we received a vector and clearance to get back on the approach). We made a steeper than normal turn (about 40 degrees) to get back due to ATC's request we were expeditious. We became stabilized for the rest of the approach.

Loss of usual busy ATC talking cues due to COVID-19 event. Fixation on potential visual approach. Errors: Changed frequency to Tower prior to receiving vectors and clearance for approach. Missed ATC instructions which caused us to overshoot our turn to final.

Company procedure is sufficient. I personally need to maintain my vigilance, especially when in abnormal airspace situation such as that created by the COVID-19 outbreak.

Narrative: 2
I was pilot flying and the Captain was pilot monitoring. We were on approach and the Captain changed to Tower frequency too early and we missed our vector. We were given a new heading and landed without issue.

Captain changed frequency early.
Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported an erroneous frequency change that resulted in a track heading deviation.
Multiple employees are being notified by management that they have been exposed to a coworker(s) that have tested positive for COVID-19. They are not being recommended to self quarantine, and allowed to continue to work and potentially spread the virus. One known exposure incident, the employee was permitted to continue to work and then began to experience symptoms 2 days later.

Ground personnel reported that persons exposed to COVID-19 were allowed to continue to work.
ACN: 1738151

Time / Day
Date: 202003

Place
Locale Reference: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Ramp
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1738151
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure

Narrative: 1
We need antiseptic spray, wipes and gels so we can clean our work area and equipment. Also they are shutting down work areas in product sort and combining all of us together, how are we supposed to follow social distancing?

Synopsis
Ground employee reported concern over his employer's Coronavirus related procedures.
I arrived for work a few minutes before my shift began. I had been assigned a desk by someone from midnight shift. I'm not sure if the assignments were done by a Lead or Shift Manager. I was assigned [a] desk, which is next to [another] desk. I did not measure the distance between the Load Planner and my position. I expect it is about 6 feet, probably not any less. The Lead was assigned [a desk] with a similar separation of about 6 feet. The other 5 Load Planners working this morning had at least double the distance between them as the 2 Load Planner and the Lead at these 3 desks.

The 3 of us were not happy with this arrangement. After loud complaining by several load planners for several minutes and my demanding that someone be moved, the Lead decided I could move to [a] desk which is across the aisle in the middle of 5 desks that were planned to be empty. This gave ample separation between the Load Planner and me.

I don't know why this requires loud complaining. The midnight Shift Manager and/or Lead don't want to provide any flexibility in this matter, as this is at least the second day in a row with similar desk assignments with needlessly reduced social distancing. I understand
there may be problems with how the phone calls "roll" between the desks or how the teams are assigned. These issues don't seem that important at this time as our workload is very reduced due to the reduced flight schedule. These issues need to be fixed to provide a safer, cleaner work environment.

Synopsis

Load Planner expressed concern about Coronavirus related company procedures that resulted in personnel being seated too close to one another.
We are not provided with proper sanitary equipment. No sprays or wipes, they give us 2 sanitary wipes for tractor work area equipment and also they are talking about consolidating piers putting people closer to each other.

Ramp employee expressed concern about Coronavirus related company procedures.
First let me say that I'm proud and humbled to be a part of the [Company] flight training center family. I take pride in being the best I can be every day.

That being said, I am disappointed with how the COVID-19 crisis is being handled. As citizens, we are being told to maintain a minimum of six feet from others as a "social distancing" measure, to wash our hands frequently and to use hand sanitizer and bleach wipes. I have [been] in the simulator for six of the past 11 days, and have seen exactly one bottle of hand sanitizer in the building (which was gone last night) and one three-quarters empty bottle of bleach solution next to a nearly-empty box of paper towels. Each simulator (mostly) has a ZipLoc baggie with a few supposedly sanitizing wipes on the computer desk outside the sim. Oh, and a handful on the inside of each restroom door reminding us to wash our hands and not come to work if we are sick. That's it folks. We are better than this.
Meanwhile, we have pilots cycling through the building(s) who have traveled to all parts of the globe in the past days, weeks and months and who have a very high probability of potential exposure to COVID-19, who have not been tested or quarantined prior to entering the building. In addition to this, these pilots are now quarantined together in a tightly-enclosed simulator for 4 hours at a time. Last night I saw an instructor wearing latex gloves, because he is concerned. We have a perfect breeding ground for transmitting and spreading this deadly virus, yet the attitude I've seen as an operator for the past two weeks has been fairly cavalier.

I could go on, but I think you've got the picture.

I don't want to be an alarmist, or simply point out the problem without offering a potential solution. I'd like to suggest that as an airline, we petition the FAA to allow us to have a 3 month extension on all training events (12 months vs 9). This would allow us to close the [training center] for two weeks for a hospital-quality deep cleaning, and allow us to stock up on sanitizer and protective equipment before going back to work.

As a nation we are being told to quarantine at home and to limit social exposure, yet we at the [training center] are apparently so "essential" that we are exempt from this quarantine.

I'm blessed to be healthy at the moment, and I will continue to work as long as I am, but how long will it take for this virus to spread to me and my colleagues until we no longer have the staff to operate?

**Synopsis**

Air carrier First Officer reported the company training center and simulators could benefit from more sanitation and cleaning supplies for staff and trainees in order to support a safe training environment. The crew member suggested that the company pursue FAA approval to extend training events deadlines in order to have time to deep clean the training facility.
I realized I didn't have my apron, which contained my EFB, while on the van, heading to our overnight. Because of our service procedures changing on an almost daily basis, during this chaotic time, my routine was disrupted and I inadvertently left it on our previous airplane. I knew we weren't going to be serving on our flight so I didn't get my apron out and stow it like I normally would, therefore I didn't realize it was missing until I was getting my van tip out of my bag.
Flight Attendant stated preoccupation with COVID-19 concerns resulted in forgetting to bring the EFB to work.
ACN: 1738047

Time / Day
Date: 202003

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1738047
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Dispatch
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Dispatch
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.Air Traffic Control: Provided Assistance

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
At turn over Aircraft X had ZZZZ listed as their southern ETOPS alternate. Was advised that flight was released with ZZZ and ZZZZ as their ETOPS alternate and ZZZZ has a NOTAM that states ZZZZ is not available as an alternate.

[Dispatcher] called and spoke with the tower and was not given a clear answer if we can use ZZZZ as an emergency airport. After taking over the flight told crew not to depart until I was able to correct ETOPS alternate. Was able to send all weather and numbers to crew and changed ETOPS alternate to ZZZ. Flight departed 10 mins late.

During planning of flight, ZZZZ NOTAM said it was not to be used as an alternate due to covid-19. Since an ETOPS alternate is an emergency situation I felt it was appropriate to use. the other airport ZZZZ1 had it runway closed during the ETOPS window. And the other airport ZZZ1 I felt had erratic weather observations, so I felt ZZZZ was the best choice. I called the tower to discuss using them as an airport in case of an inflight emergency. The tower controller passed me on to the manager. When I talked to him I got a vague response that an IFE would be ok to use ZZZZ as an alternate. After the fact other Ground Operations Control personnel had phone conversations with ZZZZ, whereas ZZZZ could not be used as an ETOPS alternate. After shift turn over Dispatcher had to change the ETOPS alternate.

**Synopsis**

Dispatcher reported prior to flight departure, a required alternate airport was NOTAMed unavailable due to COVID-19.
**ACN: 1738026**

**Time / Day**
- Date: 202003
- Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**
- Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON
- State Reference: US
- Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 11000

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: VMC

**Aircraft**
- Reference: X
- ATC / Advisory.TRACON: ZZZ
- Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
- Make Model Name: Large Transport
- Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
- Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
- Flight Plan: IFR
- Mission: Passenger
- Flight Phase: Descent
- Airspace.Class E: ZZZ

**Person**
- Reference: 1
- Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
- Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
- Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
- Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
- Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 22300
- ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1738026
- Human Factors: Situational Awareness

**Events**
- Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Conflict
- Detector.Automation: Aircraft RA
- When Detected: In-flight
- Result.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

**Assessments**
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
- Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
- Primary Problem: Human Factors

**Narrative: 1**
About 7 miles prior to ZZZZZ Intersection on the RNAV arrival while level at 11,000 feet and slowing to 220 knots we were issued a traffic callout by Approach. They said we had company traffic at our 10 o'clock climbing out of 7,000 feet for 10,000 feet. We reported him in sight. We got one "Traffic" TA on TCAS, followed shortly by a "Climb" RA. My FO (First Officer) immediately disconnected the autopilot and initiated the climb. Passing through approximately 11,400 feet the TCAS reported clear of conflict. I advised ATC of the RA and our climb. (I don't believe that loss of separation occurred). Once clear, ATC gave us descent clearance, and a frequency change.

[This] was early enough in the Coronavirus days that we were still getting used to flying nearly empty airplanes. Open climb with 20 passengers in an empty Large Transport could well give a 4,000 FPM rate of climb approaching 10,000 feet. I myself have been using Vertical Speed in the last 2,000 prior to level off at 10,000 feet to avoid excessive rates of climb. Apparently, the pilot of the other aircraft did not use the same technique. TCAS had no idea he was still planning on leveling at 10,000 feet, and issued us an RA.

I've been briefing my FO's on using Vertical Speed to alleviate excessive closure rates. I think that other pilots must be figuring it out and doing the same. I think it was self correcting as I haven't heard of others having the same experience as we did.

**Synopsis**

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a TCAS RA related to an abnormally high climb rate associated with very lightly loaded aircraft because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1737991

Time / Day
Date: 202003

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Ramp
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1737991
Human Factors: Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Ground Personnel
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
Working to close, we are given 2 antiseptic wipes for equipment, no wipes for work areas, ready rooms. In product sort instead of spreading people out, they are putting everybody together in a section. If anyone contracts virus it's very possible to spread.

Synopsis
Ramp agent reported working too close to others and not having sufficient antiseptic wipes.
ACN: 1737824

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference: US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 11000

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Center: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC
Reporter Organization: Government
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 12
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1737824
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Workload
Human Factors: Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation: All Types
Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control: Issued New Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control: Separated Traffic

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Procedure
**Narrative: 1**

Aircraft X going to ZZZ was at 110 10 miles west of ZZZ1. We need to miss Area X sectors because they are closed because of coronavirus. ZZZ approach wants them at 110 and they will miss airspace. I had another aircraft 7 miles in front of Aircraft X they took down. I called them with handoff because they weren't taking it. Controller claims I was flashing at wrong sector but we only flash to X. I then asked for lower, Controller said unable and to switch the aircraft. Aircraft X came back after 30 seconds and I switched again but they violated Sector X because we aren't allowed to get lower. ZZZ approach idea that they will descend doesn't ensure anything. Dumb procedure for this unusual time.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller reported unusual traffic flows due to COVID-19 and its effect on the normal workload.
ACN: 1737774

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Door Area
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1737774
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Warning strap on R1 door still armed after L1 door opened. Girtbar was disarmed on R1.

We had a medical emergency during the flight, medics were meeting the plane. I will say there is an overwhelming sense of anxiety felt by all the flight crew due to the coronavirus and the danger of our jobs and being exposed. Along with as a reserve working a lot due to the absences of flight attendants so definitely a little fatigued. After disarming L1 and moving to look at the R1 door was disarmed I could see clearly that the R1 girtbar was disarmed thought I saw the warning strap up but thinking now my D Flight Attendant was tossing her gloves she used to disarm the girtbar and it must of blocked my view enough not to notice the other side of the warning strap.

Once it was noticed the D Flight Attendant moved the warning strap to the disarmed position.

Everyone is using gloves to disarm doors for fear of getting infected with the coronavirus so we need to keep gloves on and the D Flight Attendant should move clearly out of the way so the A Flight Attendant can see. Then toss gloves after.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendant reported not following procedures during the disarming of doors after the arrival and stated distraction and anxiety about COVID-19 contributed to the event.
I worked Flight ABC out of ZZZZ, and operated out of a remote gate. The flight was full, and I was forced to ride on a packed bus to the plane from the gate crammed in with all of the passengers on my flight. This made me extremely uncomfortable given that we are putting ourselves at a much higher risk of being exposed [to the Coronavirus] during a 4
day trip rather than staying at home. Crew should be given dedicated transport to airplanes at remote gates separated from passengers.

Synopsis
First Officer reported concerns with having to ride a bus full of crammed passengers from the gate to the aircraft increasing their risk of being exposed to Coronavirus.
Narrative: 1

Recently a decision was made to limit the number of employees on the bus to provide more space in order to contain the spread of COVID-19 virus to our employees. While this is helpful and proactive it falls short of CDC guidelines which limits crowds to no more than 10. Furthermore the 6 feet separation guideline for social distancing is impossible.

Synopsis

Ground employee reported the employee bus carries more than 10 passengers and 6 feet social distancing separation is impossible.
**ACN: 1737577**

**Time / Day**

Date: 202003  
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC  
State Reference: US

**Aircraft**

Reference: X  
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**

Reference: 1  
Location Of Person.Facility: ZNY.ARTCC  
Reporter Organization: Government  
Function.Air Traffic Control: Oceanic  
Function.Air Traffic Control: Enroute  
Qualification.Air Traffic Control: Fully Certified  
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs): 11  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1737577  
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown  
Human Factors: Other / Unknown  
Human Factors: Troubleshooting  
Communication Breakdown.Party1: ATC  
Communication Breakdown.Party2: ATC

**Events**

Anomaly.ATC Issue: All Types  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Detector.Person: Air Traffic Control  
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**

Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing  
Primary Problem: Staffing

**Narrative: 1**

I reported to work today for the swing shift. Before coming in, the facility had restarted oceanic traffic with the exception of ZZZ airspace. ZZZ airspace was only going to be staffed due to the Coronavirus situation "As Needed." This meant that any overflight traffic was restricted to flying around ZZZ radar volume as the airspace is not going to be staffed. As a result, aircraft would be inconvenienced and rerouted around a 360 NM diameter of airspace.

We regularly when there are radar outages at ZZZ, put the higher altitudes (Usually FL320
and above) into the ATOP system allowing the ATOP controller to work that airspace volume. This operation allows overflights to fly through ZZZ utilizing NON RADAR rules at the higher altitudes. This operation would allow the airspace to be used without inconveniencing the aircraft operating there. This was suggested but rejected by the union for unknown reasons. Then Sector X could be staffed as needed for the approach into ZZZ purposes only.

Synopsis

Center Controller reported that under-staffing due to COVID-19 has resulted in numerous aircraft reroutes.
ACN: 1737462

Time / Day
Date: 202003

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Aircraft Furnishing
Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1737462
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

When we did our safety checks on first flight out of ZZZ, we found no disinfectant wipes. I requested them immediately and none ever came. We had approximately 10 alcohol wipes for the whole flight to ZZZ1, [a] 3 hour 30 minute flight. When we arrived to ZZZ1, we were on same airplane back to ZZZ. When cleaners came on I asked them if they had any disinfectant wipes or alcohol wipes, they said no. I asked if they had disinfectant spray, they said no. The cleaners came on the airplane with a vacuum cleaner and garbage bags. They did not clean the bathrooms nor fill up the empty tissue boxes.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported lack of disinfectant wipes and cleaning agents on the round trip flight.
My concern follows the global pandemic that is currently at hand (Coronavirus) and the current cleaning processes that are taking place at the Operations Center that affects our health.

1) X floor has had no disinfectant wipes now for two consecutive midnight shifts.

2) Only one hand sanitizer has been placed on X floor near the elevators, none anywhere else once you enter the doors.

3) During midnight shifts on [date] and [date] I have seen the same building attendant use a rag on a stick to dust and clean all monitors, desks areas, and even the floors...without ever changing the rag. This cannot be sanitary or help impede the spread of the infectious virus.
Dispatcher reported a lack of personal protection equipment and improper cleaning and sanitizing of the dispatchers' office.
ACN: 1737116

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference. ATC Facility: ZZZ. Tower
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 1500

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC
Light: Night

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory. Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size. Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use. Localizer/Glideslope/ILS: Runway XX
Flight Phase: Final Approach

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person. Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function. Flight Crew: Captain
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1737116
Human Factors: Distraction

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
Function. Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification. Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number. Accession Number: 1737128
Human Factors: Distraction

Events
Anomaly. Deviation - Altitude: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly. Deviation - Procedural: Clearance
Anomaly. Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
During night visual conditions crew accepted vectoring for visual approach with ILS BACKUP which is second option to straight in ILS to Runway XX in ZZZ. Instead of long downwind vectoring ATC queried crew if Runway was in sight, then cleared for approach. Crew turned base, but dim runway lights initially contributed to crew not descending in a timely matter. After lights were turned up crew determined stabilized approach could not be achieved and performed a go-around. Tower cleared crew to enter downwind and crew kept runway in sight while climbing to 3,000 feet AGL. On descending base turn crew got momentary EGPWS terrain warning and started nighttime terrain procedure. Warning silenced within 2-3 seconds. Normal landing was made. Crew debriefed extraordinary threats to mental distraction due to Coronavirus events. Captain had flown 5 straight days and was further distracted by family situation involving extraordinary airline operations.

During night VMC the crew accepted controlled vectors to visual backed up by ILS which is second option to Runway XX in ZZZ. ATC asked if runway in sight and cleared us for the approach. The lights were very dim and we also had a momentary false capture of the GS. Immediately requested lights turned up by Tower, but crew determined we were unable to achieve a stable approach. Upon go-around Tower cleared us to the downwind and we climbed to 6,000 MSL. Upon initial descending turn to base we got momentary EGPWS terrain warning an immediately executed terrain procedure. Warning went away immediately. Normal landing achieved. Captain and I debriefed all threats and distractions especially due to Coronavirus and impact on our company, careers and families.

Air carrier flight crew received a momentary EGPWS terrain warning while turning base on a nighttime visual approach. The flight continued to a safe landing. The crew noted that distraction due to the COVID-19 pandemic, its impact on the company, and family concerns contributed to the event.
I came on duty at XA:00 local. I was assigned the CIC (Controller In Charge) position because the day Supervisor was at 10 hours and needed to be relieved. At the time, I observed sector XX and sector XY both alerted red and over their map values. At this time we were providing spacing to ZZZ and ZZZ1 airports. We were also spacing JXXX and VXXX route spacing going to the north. Those are our main 2 airways going to the north. 

The outgoing Supervisor asked the STMC (Supervisor Traffic Management Coordinator) for verification that it was for all aircraft. It was noted that we needed help from ZZZ1 ARTCC with this and the STMC agreed.

Along with all of this, we were rerouting ZZZ2, ZZZ3, and ZZZ4 traffic. All aircraft inbound
to our airspace needed to be rerouted. Again, the STMC was made aware that we needed help with this. In addition to all of this, we were required to tuck aircraft going to ZZZ5, ZZZ3, ZZZ6, ZZZ7, ZZZ8, ZZZ9, ZZZ10, ZZZ11, ZZZ12, ZZZ13, ZZZ4, ZZZ14, ZZZ15, ZZZ16, and ZZZ17. Again, we were getting no help with this from adjacent sectors and facilities. AGAIN, the STMC was made aware of this and agreed to help.

I advised surrounding area supervisors that we needed help and told them what we needed. The supervisors either didn't convey the information or the controllers were not complying, but no one around us was helping with these routes or altitude restrictions. I also advised the STMC that we needed this slowed down ASAP because the amount of work placed on us was unacceptable. While this was all going on, both sectors YY and XX were still alerted red and over their guideline numbers. The Controller at sector XX shut off ZZZ1 ARTCC ZZZZZ sector due to airspace saturation. The amount of work he had to do with the amount of airplanes was overwhelming and he made the right decision. At this point, I had a CPC (Certified Professional Controller) d-side along with another Controller to get the radar Controller out since he was up for break and the OM all standing over the sector.

Take note that we are supposed to be practicing social distancing due to the COVID-19 outbreak in which ZZZ ARTCC management is completely disregarding I had 4 people within 4 feet of one another looking at an overloaded sector. UNACCEPTABLE! I pulled the OM (Operations Manager) aside and expressed my concern with this completely unsafe situation our area was placed in and manager agreed. Again, I told the OM that this needs to stop and be slowed down. For our area to be placed under this much extra work along with overloading sectors is completely unacceptable and reckless. Completely unsafe!

How about Management and TMU (Traffic Management Unit) need to abide by the sector guideline numbers and stop overloading sectors. The more restrictions placed on a sector, the lower the guideline number needs to be. You can't overload sectors along with a page full of restrictions and expect it to remain safe. The fact that we had this many restrictions placed upon us with ZERO help is just reckless.

**Synopsis**

Center Controller In Charge reported an unacceptable workload was placed on the facility which resulted in controllers being unable to practice social distancing at the facility.
ACN: 1737008

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 800

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Final Approach
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1737008
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Distraction
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Unstabilized Approach
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: In-flight
Result.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

We were established on a long final for Runway X with gear down and flaps at 5 due to being brought in a bit high and fast earlier. We were told 180 kts to the bridge. At 1,200 feet above the field the Pilot Monitoring who was the First Officer said, "Do you want more flaps?" I realized at that moment that I was pondering the economics of this virus on our airline, and thinking about my fears of a furlough. Had the First Officer not said something I really don't know how long I would have remained distracted. We finished configuring and were stable and configured by 800 feet AGL.

I never imagined that I would be able to be distracted at such a vital time. I thought myself too focused and professional to allow that. Apparently this situation plays on my mind and concerns more than I realized. Just being aware of this threat is vital. I wish I could warn everyone that this can happen. There is so much nonstop doom and gloom and fear coming at us from all directions, I must be aware of the threat and stay focused.

Synopsis

Air Carrier Captain reported that concerns about COVID-19 and possible furlough resulted in an unstabilized approach.
ACN: 1736933

**Time / Day**
Date: 202003

**Place**
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

**Aircraft**
Reference: X
Make Model Name: No Aircraft

**Person**
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Gate / Ramp / Line
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Ground Personnel: Gate Agent / CSR
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1736933
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Gate Agent / CSR
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**
Every computer keyboard at every gate I have worked in Terminal X is filthy. What happened to being deep cleaned, as the government has recommended. We cannot clean between the keys, we only have wipes. Sprays and wipes are not enough, air cans will not work. We are touching them constantly, they need to be cleaned for employee safety.

**Synopsis**
Gate Agent reported computers at this company's terminal need a deep cleaning for employee safety. The only cleaning items currently available are wipes.
We have a world pandemic and for the last week of flying I have been unable to attain ANY Sani-Com cleaning towels, Purell or other cleaning wipes at ZZZ flight Ops or other
airports during my trips. We need these to continue to perform our jobs with confidence and safety. Please address the supplying of these as quickly as possible.

Synopsis

Air Carrier Captain reported being unable to obtain hand sanitizers at base and throughout other company locations.
With the spread of the COVID-19 virus still spreading throughout the world, we here at Company need to do our part to help stop the spread of the virus to each other, our families, friends and the communities we live in. After looking at all the time clock areas I noticed that there are no hand sanitizing stations there. We hourly employees have to use our hands to clock both in and out and that's just another potential point of contact for the spread of the virus and not just at our time clocks but also point of entry to the sterile work areas including the ramp. Today when I asked for a hand sanitizing wipe packet, the person behind the equipment counter said they were all out and they didn't have any alcohol wipes either.

Synopsis

Ground employee reported the lack of sanitizing agents especially in the clock in/out areas.
ACN: 1736437

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Dawn

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Function.Flight Crew: Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 544
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1736437
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Confusion
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Primary Problem : Company Policy

**Narrative: 1**

Due to the world pandemic, national health emergency, and concept of social distancing, I decided for the safety of our passengers and flight attendants not to do a cabin service during our flight. I had the same flight attendants the day before and we discussed how we could best, and safely, manage our long flight to ZZZ1. As I approached the ZZZ Operations Agent, I presented the idea to him and asked him if he was comfortable making an announcement to the passengers to encourage the purchase of drinks or snacks as needed for the long flight. He seemed to understand and was willing to make an announcement.

Once down the jetway, I was approached by two ZZZ station managers who expressed concerns with it not being company policy and that it might panic our passengers. I assured them that I understood and if they were not comfortable making the announcement, that was fine. One of them suggested that a modified announcement could be made to encourage getting something to eat for the long flight. I agreed and said it was their call on how to handle it. During my preflight preparations for the flight to ZZZ1, I received a call from the Chief Pilot on call. He asked if I had permission from someone at Company for what I was doing.

I shared with him the timeline of how over the last four days I had tried to get Company approval, and also discussed my reasoning. He did not agree and said it was not Company policy. I reminded him that this was a national emergency. My understanding of the conversation’s conclusion was that I have Captain’s authority to do what is safe for the flight, but need to be ready to explain what I did. I told him that I understood. The flight to ZZZ1 was uneventful and we passed out cans of water at the halfway point. The passengers seemed very appreciative of our efforts and approach to the pandemic upon deplaning.

**Synopsis**

Air Carrier Captain reported the crew made the decision to suspend in-flight service for COVID-19 social distancing reasons contrary to company policy.
Aircraft arrived to our facility. The aircraft was not out of service and there was no routine maintenance due. At some point we heard a call come across the radio and the Supervisor replied. We heard the flight crew say that they came off of the plane and wanted to make sure that it was known that the aircraft had a "Corona Issue" and that was the reason it was staying overnight. I heard the Supervisor ask the flight crew if they wrote anything in
the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log), and the crew replied that they have been instructed not to put items like this in the AML.

After hearing this I inquired with the Supervisor, and he told me that he knew nothing about it except that it would be staying here for a "deep clean." I made some phone calls to find out what our procedure is supposed to be for assigning guys on an aircraft with a known Corona issue, where management told us that it wasn't a Corona issue, but just someone that had a fever. I asked if they can say with 100% certainty that it was not Corona, and was told no. I spoke to our shift manager and asked if we could get the overnight maintenance deferred as I don't think there is a clear procedure in place on how to handle an aircraft like this. At this point we deferred the overnight maintenance.

I would suggest there being better communication about any issues that would even remotely suspect a Corona contamination, there are too many unknowns out there to just put crew members at risk of contracting this virus, and I also think there should be a written policy in place on what precautions we need to take while handling a situation such as this one, and I also think there should be a write up in the AML of any potential "Corona Issues," especially so there would be something in writing when an aircraft like this is going to affect more than one shift.

**Synopsis**

Maintenance Technician reported an aircraft arrived at the facility as a result of a "Corona issue" and needed deep cleaning. The Maintenance Technician reported that there are no policies in place for this issue.
ACN: 1736305

Time / Day
Date: 202003

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked
Cabin Lighting: High

Person: 1
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Deplaning
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant In Charge
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1736305
Human Factors: Distraction
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Flight Attendant

Person: 2
Reference: 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: General Seating Area
Cabin Activity: Deplaning
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1736314
Human Factors: Situational Awareness
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
After we arrived in ZZZ, we left XX passengers on the plane before the next crew was at the aircraft. We left for our next flight. We had a medical incident onboard during the flight. While our CRM was effective, there were many decisions to be made. While our country is currently in a national emergency, any serious medical event leads to uncertainty. All three flight attendants were in constant communication with the Captain. At first we were told no passengers could leave the aircraft when we landed. We had passengers who were aware of the situation and wanted to be involved. Of course our first priority was the safety of our passengers and crew, we also were aware of the effect any decision would have on the company. After discussion with Station Ops and Dispatch, the Captain was instructed to not hold the passengers, and that the aircraft would be cleaned upon arrival. We also spent the entire flight containing the incident so all passengers felt at ease about their safety. I felt we were successful. However, in this coronavirus environment, it was very stressful and we had to remain calm and in control. We were dealing with many different situations and important decisions during the flight.
After the deplaning of Flight XYZ from ZZZ to ZZZ1, the one of the crew members failed to stay with the XX through passengers. During this flight, we encountered many distractions including a passenger that vomited in the forward lav and we alerted the Captain due to the national concern over the scare of the coronavirus. The crew maintained excellent CRM skills when communicating with the flight deck. The flight deck notified medical service and Dispatch. I was also comforting a woman who was flying to see her gravely ill mother.

**Narrative: 3**

During the deplaning process on Aircraft X, the crew failed to stay with the aircraft with XX thru passengers on board. We had an incident on board where a passenger had vomited in the forward lav. We alerted the Captain because of the concern about the national emergency over the concerns of the spread of Coronavirus. He asked if we knew who it was that was sick, I was [not] sure. He said we may have to keep everyone on board until we know who it was. I informed the Captain that I didn't know who it was and as a precaution we took the forward lav out of service. We were very concerned about the Coronavirus and the possibility of contamination. The Captain called Station Ops and Dispatch to ask what action we should take. They advised us to have Ground Operations meet the aircraft to clean it. We also had an upset passenger on board who had just lost her mother.

**Synopsis**

Flight Attendants reported concerns about a sick passenger in their flight.
**ACN: 1736278**

**Time / Day**
Date: 202003  
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400  

**Aircraft**
Reference: X  
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ  
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier  
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing  
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2  
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91  
Flight Plan: IFR  
Mission: Ferry  
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ

**Person**
Reference: 1  
Location Of Person: Company  
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier  
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher  
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher  
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1736278  
Human Factors: Workload  
Human Factors: Distraction

**Events**
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Weight And Balance  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy  
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR  
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter: Fuel Issue  
Detector.Person: Dispatch  
When Detected: In-flight  
Result.Flight Crew: Diverted

**Assessments**
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part  
Contributing Factors / Situations: Staffing  
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

**Narrative: 1**
Due to the extremely high workload I overlooked a closed runway on this reposition flight that was put on my desk from a Dispatcher last second. With over 40 flights on my desk plus the 5 flights I accepted in the passdown there is an absolute need for more dispatchers. Our flight loads continue to grow each and every day with no extra help! With the COVID-19 outbreak I received over 20 zero fuel weight resets throughout the day because of the increasing number of "no show" passengers. I also received just as many if
not more calls from the stations of those flights telling me that there was "no shows." Phone calls and workload have tripled due to this and it has shown over the course of the past few days that we need more dispatchers to:
1: Reduce workload stress
2: Reduce pressure on dispatchers
3: Continue to comply with FARs/Safety regulations to give crews and guest our best service

Aircraft X was dispatched to a NOTAMed closed runway that was overlooked at scheduled ETA. This was a Part 91 Re-position flight for scheduled maintenance in ZZZ. Aircraft X diverted to ZZZ1 where crew waited until runway re-opened in ZZZ to depart ZZZ1.

Synopsis
Dispatcher reported a NOTAM runway closure was overlooked due to the increased workload created by the COVID-19 pandemic.
ACN: 1735831

Time / Day
Date: 202003

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Light: Daylight

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct
Airspace.Class A: ZZZ
Cabin Lighting: Off

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Door Area
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Qualification.Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1735831
Human Factors: Other / Unknown

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: FAR
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1

Past 3 days have been very trying. Passengers are able to board the planes ill. Coughing, sneezing, even having the appearance of being ill. I am at the end of my 3 Day and instead of looking forward to going home, I am reluctant in that I may be bringing the virus home to my family. Please see if the company can have CDC (Center for Disease Control) come out and have crew members tested in base. Crew members are around hundreds of people a day and could very well be transmitting the virus to others. Please let me know when and how this necessary procedure could be implemented to best serve our customers and each other. Thank you.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported ill passengers on the flight and was concerned regarding lack of COVID-19 testing for the crew.
ACN: 1734918

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Nav In Use: FMS Or FMC
Nav In Use: GPS
Flight Phase: Cruise
Route In Use: Direct

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person: Company
Location In Aircraft.Other
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Dispatch: Dispatcher
Qualification.Dispatch: Dispatcher
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1734918
Human Factors: Confusion
Human Factors: Time Pressure
Human Factors: Training / Qualification

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Illness
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: In-flight
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X had an escalation of cause and concern when an unidentified passenger of the flight was seen coughing and blowing mucus from the nose while at the gate area.

A flight attendant on Aircraft X noticed a passenger coughing and blowing mucus from the nose. This flight attendant working the flight has a friend in [Management] and decided to call them. While enroute the Sector Manager alerted me that there is a belief that a passenger onboard may have symptoms of COVID-19 and the flight may be met at the gate by CDC (Center for Disease Control) agents. This of course necessitated an immediate call to the Captain operating the flight to ensure he and the flight deck crew were in the loop that his flight was possibly under suspicion of carry a passenger with COVID-19. The Captain called the lead Purser of the flight attendants and asked for an update. They said the passenger seemed fine now. The Captain confirmed through ACARS messaging and SATCOM updates that no preventative action was required. The flight arrived safely into ZZZ as scheduled and no CDC agents met the flight.

We had a bit of a communication breakdown as misinformation caused misunderstandings. It was initially believed a flight attendant called Medlink or [Operations Control] expressing concern for passenger. This was not the case. The Sector Manager approached me with updates and informed me of CDC personnel can be expected to approach the aircraft once it reached the gate. Fortunately this did not materialize as it turned out to be a false alarm. We are going to need more information on what policies or procedures may be implemented and how can we protect a passenger if they are falsely accused of having COVID-19. And if a passenger does have it and it is known how will the passengers onboard be informed and how will suspected COVID-19 infected passenger be safely removed from the aircraft? Will the aircraft be subject to quarantine? Will the flight be isolated from terminal and remotely parked? A lot of unanswered questions. [Operations Control] is making serious efforts to address the issue with a newly dedicated support team however this information in [publication] came out the day this event actually transpired and I was unable to use that service as recommended. We can expect an escalation of these COVID-19 incidents, especially in the next two months.

Synopsis
Dispatcher reported there was concern and confusion regarding an ill passenger due to the lack of defined policy and procedures for situations involving COVID-19.
ACN: 1734850

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference: FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 3
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Cabin Furnishing
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total: 10346
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days: 150
Experience.Flight Crew.Type: 575
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1734850
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Troubleshooting

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Airport
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

We arrived at the airplane in ZZZZ and shortly afterwards the Purser informed me that the gloves were missing from the Customer Service Kit. We called the station and requested additional gloves to be brought out to the airplane. A few minutes later a representative from ZZZZ came out to personally apologize and she informed me that the station was not equipped with any extra gloves. I discussed this with my crew and the flight attendants who informed me that they still had gloves in their possession from the previous flight, so it was decided that they had enough gloves to get them back to ZZZ. With the outbreak of the COVID-19 and the precautions that all employees are taking, I was surprised at the lack of basic supplies to help everyone follow our current procedures. Please pass along my suggestions that would ask the company to ensure adequate supplies be available.

Enroute to ZZZ, the Customer Kit was written up so that the missing gloves could be provisioned.

Synopsis

Air Carrier Captain reported there were no protective gloves on the aircraft nor available at the station.
ACN: 1734659

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport
State Reference: US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Ramp: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Parked

Component
Aircraft Component: Aircraft Furnishing
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Flight Deck
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew: Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew: Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew: Multigengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number: 1734659
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance

Events
Anomaly.Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event: Other / Unknown
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Crew
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result.General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
On preflight of crew O2 masks the only available means of sanitizing the masks was SaniWipes. SaniWipes have been determined not to be effective against COVID-19 virus. CFR 135.89 requires use of O2 mask if one pilot leaves flight station above 25,000 feet MSL. Adequate means of sanitizing the masks is required.

Adequate means of sanitizing masks is required ASAP.

Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain reported the only available means to clean the crew O2 mask was to use SaniWipes, which are reportedly inadequate.
ACN: 1733973

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 0001-0600

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Other

Component
Aircraft Component: Drinkable/Waste Water Syst
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Lavatory
Cabin Activity: Service
Cabin Activity: Safety Related Duties
Cabin Activity: Deplaning
Cabin Activity: Boarding
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1733973
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Maintenance
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Other
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: Taxi
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result.General: None Reported / Taken
Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Procedure
Primary Problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

Walking down the jet bridge my crew and I were met by the inbound crew who informed us that the aircraft did not have running water in both main cabin bathrooms. They were informed by Maintenance that the aircraft was to be taken out of service when it reached ZZZ, so they were surprised to see the flight going immediately back out. In light of the recent spread of COVID-19, I was concerned and uncomfortable to be working on an aircraft in which main cabin passengers would not be able to wash their hands. I informed the Captain and the Gate Supervisor that we were uncomfortable with this situation. Supervisor informed me she was calling the Tower and also asked the cleaners to bring hand sanitizer. No one attempted to discuss the situation any further with me, and boarding began. We departed for ZZZ1 with one working sink.

While I understand on-time performance is very important, I think protecting customers and crewmembers should be of higher priority. We've been told repeatedly that the best thing to prevent the spread of COVID-19 is to wash your hands with soap and water. The water should have been fixed, or another aircraft should have been substituted.

Synopsis

Flight Attendant reported the aircraft departed with one working lavatory sink which impacted the ability of crew and passengers to wash their hands to help prevent the spread of COVID-19.
ACN: 1733947

Time / Day
Date: 202003
Local Time Of Day: 0601-1200

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft
Reference: X
ATC / Advisory.Tower: ZZZ
Aircraft Operator: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing
Crew Size.Number Of Crew: 2
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight Phase: Other
Airspace.Class B: ZZZ

Component
Aircraft Component: Drinkable/Waste Water Syst
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Failed
Problem: Malfunctioning

Person
Reference: 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft: X
Location In Aircraft: Lavatory
Cabin Activity: Service
Reporter Organization: Air Carrier
Function: Flight Attendant: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Qualification: Flight Attendant: Current
ASRS Report Number: Accession Number: 1733947
Human Factors: Communication Breakdown
Human Factors: Other / Unknown
Human Factors: Troubleshooting
Communication Breakdown.Party1: Flight Attendant
Communication Breakdown.Party2: Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural: Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person: Flight Attendant
When Detected: Pre-flight
When Detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
When Detected: Taxi
When Detected: In-flight
When Detected: Routine Inspection
Result. General: None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations: Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations: Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations: Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations: Human Factors
Primary Problem: Company Policy

Narrative: 1
I worked two flights on tail Aircraft X with one AFT LAV sink inoperable. Although the sink in the other AFT LAV worked, neither LAVs had soap for crew and/or passengers to wash their hands. When we asked for soap, I was only provided with one extra bottle of alcohol-free hand sanitizer and SANI-COM wipes. Given the current Coronavirus pandemic, being able to properly wash hands for both crew and passengers is imperative. Being we had a five hour rolling delay due to a mechanical issue, soap easily could have been provided.

Provide crew and passengers with soap and working LAVs to wash their hands.

Synopsis
Flight Attendant reported one lavatory sink inoperative and no hand soap available on multiple flights.
With the recent concerns regarding COVID-19, I see two areas where we can make some improvements to enhance the Safety of our Passengers and Crew.

1. Wash your hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds, especially after coughing or sneezing. If soap and water are not available, use hand sanitizer. This is very hard to do in an aircraft lav. I would suggest, effective immediately, we place hand sanitizer (with the WHO recommended alcohol content) in all aircraft lavs at all times.

2. It appeared that starting about six months ago, Ground Ops would often open the potable water servicing door upon arrival (as opposed to when service was about to take place). Before COVID-19 this was more of just an inconvenience to through Passengers (no lav water in the sink) - now it is more of a safety issue; I would recommend Ground Ops disable the potable water during servicing for only the minimum amount of time required to complete servicing. Many thanks for taking the time to read this report.

Synopsis
Air carrier pilot gave suggestions to improve passenger safety during the COVID-19 pandemic.