

**ASRS Database Report Set**

**Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) Issues**

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Report Set Description.....Crew Resource Management (CRM) inflight situations  
(conflicts, NMACs, and emergencies).

Update Number.....9.0

Date of Update .....October 9, 2003

Number of Records in Report Set.....50

Number of New Records in Report Set .....25

Type of Records in Report Set.....For each update, new records received at ASRS will  
displace a like number of the oldest records in the  
Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty  
most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records  
within this Report Set have been screened to assure  
their relevance to the topic.

IHS: 262-7

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data**

**SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports**


The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information may or may not be correct in any or all respects. At best, it represents the perception of a specific individual who may or may not understand all of the factors involved in a given issue or event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Battelle Memorial Institute, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director  
Aviation Safety Reporting System

## CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999.

Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

**ACN: 539311**

**Time**

Date : 200202

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

State Reference : CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : COS.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : A320

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 539311

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 540262

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

RECEIVED AMENDED CLRNC FOR RADAR VECTORS TO THE BRK 110 DEG RADIAL, 45 DME DIRECT HGO AS FILED. I PUT THIS FIX IN THE FMGC AS PBD01. AFTER TKOF, DEP CTL GAVE US A 080 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT THE 110 DEG RADIAL OUT OF BRK. I HAD THE FO SEQUENCE THE FMGC SO PBD01 WAS THE 'FROM' WAYPOINT AND I SELECTED LNAV. THE FMGC SHOWED AN INTERCEPT JUST BEYOND PBD01. JUST AS WE NEARED THIS POINT, ATC ADVISED US WE HAD OVERSHOT THE 110 DEG RADIAL AND CLRED US DIRECT TO GLD. I HAD NEGLECTED TO HAVE THE FO ENTER BRK AS A FIX SO THE RADIAL COULD BE PROPERLY INTERCEPTED, AND I THINK I ASSUMED THE 110 DEG RADIAL WAS OUT OF PBD01. CRM FACTORS INCLUDED: APU FAILURE AT THE GATE AND A FLAP PROB BEFORE TKOF MADE ME RUSH TO GET AIRBORNE. ALSO, AT THIS TIME I HAD THE FLT ATTENDANTS REMAIN SEATED DUE TO THE ROUGH RIDE. ATC DID NOT SEEM TOO CONCERNED AND THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT THAT I COULD TELL. IN DISCUSSING THIS WITH MY FO, WE DID NOT PUT BRK AND THE RADIAL IN RAW DATA BECAUSE WE THOUGHT WE WERE CLOSE TO THE INT POINT. THIS WAS A MISTAKE. ALSO, I DISCOVERED THERE WAS SOME DISCREPANCY IN THE CLRNC WE BOTH COPIED. I HEARD RADAR VECTORS TO THE BRK 110 DEG RADIAL, 45 DME AND HE HEARD RADAR VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE 110 DEG RADIAL TO THE 45D FIX.

Synopsis :

HDG TRACK DEV OCCURS WHEN THE PIC HAS THE FO ENTER THE WRONG DATA INTO THE FMC DURING A RADAR VECTOR PROC FROM COS, CO.

**Time**

Date : 200202  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : TPA.Airport  
State Reference : FL

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : TPA.TRACON  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Learjet 25  
Mission : Ambulance  
Flight Phase.Descent : Vacating Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7700  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500  
ASRS Report : 539358

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2500  
ASRS Report : 539481

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE DSNding FOR LNDG, WE HAD AN ALT INCURSION. I WAS THE FO AND THE PF WHILE THE CAPT WAS HANDLING THE RADIOS AND CHKLISTS. WE HAD RECEIVED SEVERAL STEP-DOWNS AND DURING THESE THE CAPT WAS OCCUPIED TALKING TO THE MEDICAL CREW IN THE CABIN, RUNNING CHKLISTS, FINISHING FINAL PAPERWORK, AND COMMUNICATING WITH ATC. DURING THE COURSE OF THE DSCNT WE ALTERNATED IN SETTING THE ALT ALERter BECAUSE THE CAPT'S HANDS WERE LITERALLY FULL AT TIMES AND ALSO BECAUSE IT WAS ON THE R SIDE OF THE COCKPIT. WHILE DSNding TO 13000 FT WE GOT A CLRNC TO 12000 FT, THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED ATC, AND NO ONE SET THE ALERter TO THE NEW ALT (PRESUMABLY EACH ASSUMING THE OTHER WOULD SET IT). I THOUGHT I HEARD 11000 FT AND CONTINUED DOWN TO THAT ALT WHEN SIMULTANEOUSLY THE CAPT AND ATC INFORMED ME OF THE 12000 FT CLRNC. ATC INFORMED US THAT NO CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NECESSARY AND WE CONTINUED THE DSCNT TO A NORMAL LNDG. THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY MY FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND AND VERIFY THE CORRECT ALT. I BELIEVE STANDARDIZED ALT ALERter PROCS SHOULD BE USED IN ANY MULTI-MEMBER CREWED ACFT. THE PNF SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE CLRNC TO ATC, SET THE ALERter, POINT TO THE ALERter AND VERBALIZE THE NEW ALT TO THE PF, AND THE PF SHOULD POINT TO THE ALERter AND REPEAT ALOUD THE NEW ALT. THIS WAS A FAILURE OF BASIC CRM. I THINK PART 135 OPERATORS NEED TO EMPHASIZE BASIC CRM AND DEFINED DUTIES FOR FLYING AND PNF'S MORE. I ALSO THINK A STANDARDIZED LOCATION OF THE ALERter IN THE CTR OF THE COCKPIT MIGHT ELIMINATE SOME OF THE INCLINATION OF THE CLOSER PLT TO 'HELP' THE OTHER GUY BY SETTING IT.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 539481: WE WERE VERY SOON THEREAFTER CLRED TO 12000 FT. I AM NOT SURE WHO ANSWERED THIS CALL AS I HAD PREOCCUPIED MYSELF WITH OTHER THINGS. WHEN I LOOKED FORWARD WE WERE LEVELING AT 11000 FT AND ALT PRESELECT WAS SET AT 13000 FT. ABOUT THE SAME TIME I QUERIED THE FO, TAMPA QUERIED US ABOUT OUR ALT. I TOLD TAMPA WE WERE AT 11000 FT. THEN ANOTHER ACFT CALLED US IN SIGHT. TAMPA TOLD US WE SHOULD BE AT 12000 FT. I APOLOGIZED AND HE ANSWERED NOT TO WORRY, THAT IT DIDN'T CAUSE A PROB. I DISTRACTED MYSELF FROM MY DUTIES BY TAKING A PICTURE AND IN THE PROCESS DISTRACTED THE REST OF THE CREW ALSO.

Synopsis :

AN LJ25 CREW, DSNding INTO TPA, OVERSHOT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT.

**Time**

Date : 200202  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Intersection : wobun  
State Reference : FO

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 4500

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : EGTT.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B767-300  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000  
ASRS Report : 539755

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 16800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75  
ASRS Report : 539620

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 230  
ASRS Report : 539622

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Airspace Structure  
Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

THIS IS A NARRATIVE OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO AN ALTDEV ON FEB/TUE/02, LHR-JFK. THE ALTDEV STEMMED FROM AN INADVERTENT DEV FROM SOP. OUR FLT DEPARTED EGLL ON RWY 27R, WOBUN 2F DEP. AFTER FLYING AT 6000 FT FOR APPROX 10 MINS, WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY LHR CTL TO TURN R, CLB 8000 FT. I WAS HAND FLYING AS WE INITIATED A VNAV CLB AS WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED PRIOR TO DEP. AS THE ACFT WAS CLBING TO 8000 FT, LONDON CTL REQUESTED FLT LEVEL LEAVING. AT THIS POINT, BOTH PLTS RESET THEIR ALTIMETERS FROM 0093 MILLIBARS TO 1013.2 MILLIBARS. THE INDICATED ALT CLBED TO APPROX 8450 FT. LONDON THEN INSTRUCTED US TO DSND AND TURN L TO APPROX 360 DEG HDG. NO TCASII ACTIVATIONS OCCURRED. ALTHOUGH THE TRANSITION LEVEL WAS BRIEFED NUMEROUS TIMES BEFORE TKOF, BECAUSE OF WORKLOAD AND TASK PRIORITIZATION PROBS, ALL OF US HAD LET OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DETERIORATE. IN RETROSPECT, SEVERAL CRM/SOP DEVS CAN BE DETECTED AND ANALYZED. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: FAILURE TO RESET 1013.2 MILLIBARS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CTLR GAVE THE TURN/CLB INSTRUCTION TO 8000 FT. WORKLOAD MGMNT: AS THE PF, IT WOULD HAVE IMPROVED MY CREW'S PERFORMANCE IF I HAD BEEN USING THE AUTOPLT. THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS WORKLOAD ON THE PNF AND I COULD HAVE DIVERTED MORE ATTN TO THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ASPECTS OF THE FLT. AT THE TIME I WAS TRYING TO KEEP MY PROFICIENCY CURRENT ON HAND FLYING. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL MORE CAREFULLY EVALUATE MY AUTOPLT/HAND FLYING OPTIONS. HUMAN FACTORS: 1) HIGH WORKLOAD FROM LHR CTL IN RESPECT TO HDG CHANGES AND TA'S. 2) MANEUVERING -- SLOWING ATC INITIATED TURN TO AVOID CUMULUS CLOUDS. 3) LOW PRESSURE OF 0093 MILLIBARS MAGNIFIED THE TRANSITION ERROR. 4) NONSTANDARD TRANSITION LEVELS, DEPENDING ON COUNTRY, ON CLB, AND ON DSCNT. 5) FAST CTLR INSTRUCTIONS. WHEN NOT ACCUSTOMED TO FOREIGN ACCENT, THE FAST PACE OF INSTRUCTIONS SOMETIMES REQUIRES A MOMENT TO PROCESS. MANY TIMES, ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS WILL CONFER AND DISCUSS WHAT WE THINK WE HEARD, BEFORE READBACK. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 539620: AFTER SEVERAL HDG CHANGES, THE THIRD PLT ASKED TO RANK THE IRU'S. PRIOR TO SELECTING THE FMC PAGE, WE RECEIVED A CLRNC FOR A R TURN AND A CLB TO 8000 FT. I SET 8000 FT INTO THE ALT WINDOW AND POINTED TO THE ALT, AND THE FO POINTED AS WELL. I WENT DOWN TO THE FMC CLB PAGE AND SELECTED CLB DIRECT AS BRIEFED. I THEN SELECTED THE FMC PAGE TO RANK IRU'S. DURING THIS PROCESS, THE CTLR ASKED FOR OUR ALT. WE THEN NOTICED WE HAD FAILED TO SET 1013 MILLIBARS OUT OF 6000 FT. WORKLOAD MGMNT. CAPT DID NOT PRIORITIZE HIS WORKLOAD AND WAS USING THE FMC LEAVING THE TRANSITION ALT. HIGH WORKLOAD FROM ATC WAS A FACTOR. HUMAN FACTORS INVOLVED: HIGH WORKLOAD FROM ATC, HIGH RADIO TFC FROM LONDON. A DIFFERENT TRANSITION ALT THAN NORMAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 539622: CAPT WAS SELECTING CLB DIRECT IN THE FMC SO THAT FO COULD USE VNAV. I ASKED CAPT TO PULL UP THE POS REF PAGE SO I COULD BEGIN THE CLASS II CHKLIST PRIOR TO COAST OUT. AFTER A FEW MOMENTS IN THE CLB, ATC QUERIED OUR ALT.

Synopsis :

AN ALTDEV OVERSHOOT OCCURS WHEN A B767-300 FLC FAILS TO RESET THEIR ALTIMETERS TO QNE WHEN LEAVING 6000 FT FOR 8000 FT ON THE DEP PROC FROM EGLL, FO.

**ACN: 540061**

**Time**

Date : 200202

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

State Reference : RI

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : A90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation : Corporate

Make Model : Medium Transport

Mission : Ferry

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 29000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000

ASRS Report : 540061

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken : Unable

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

FLYING AS FO, FLYING ACFT FROM R SEAT, ATP RATED, WITH CHIEF PLT. SOME SHINING EXAMPLES OF THE CHIEF PLT'S PROFESSIONALISM AND AIRMANSHIP: 1) ARGUING IN THE COCKPIT, AT ALL PHASES OF FLT OVER ANYTHING -- OFTEN NOT EVEN RELATED TO THE TASK AT HAND. 2) ON THE ACTIVE RWY, AWAITING TKOF CLRNC, CLRED, I CALLED FOR 'FINAL ITEMS' AND SET PWR, SIMULTANEOUSLY NOTICING HE DID NOT ANSWER TWR. I HIT FINAL ITEM SWITCHES, LOOKED OVER TO SEE WHY HE WAS 'OUT OF THE LOOP' AND FOUND, TO MY DISMAY, HE WAS TALKING TO HIS SISTER ON HIS CELL PHONE! MANY SMALL FLT DEPTS HAVE SIMILAR PROBS. PIC (CHIEF PLT) COULDN'T FIGURE OUT HOW TO ENTER THAT CLRNC IN THE FMS. HE IS VERY EXPERIENCED IN THIS ACFT, BUT HAS LET HIS PROFESSIONALISM SLIDE TO THE POINT WHERE HE NO LONGER BELIEVES IN CHARTS WITH OUR 'ELECTRONIC GEE WHIZ CAPABILITY.' CHIEF PLT WAS GETTING VERY IMPATIENT, AND TALKING ABOUT CANCELING IFR AND GOING VFR. I TOLD HIM, JUST ENTER DIRECT PVD AND WE CAN TAKE OFF AND WILL HAVE ALL THE TIME IN THE WORLD ENRTE TO PVD TO ENTER THE NEXT LEG AS IT WAS LATE. HE SAID OK AND SO WE DEPARTED. I CALLED FOR GEAR UP AND HE BOLTS OUT OF HIS SEAT SAYING 'YOU GOT IT, I'M GOING TO TIDY UP THE CABIN' AND LEAVES BEFORE I COULD STOP HIM. I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED FOR THE CHART ONLY TO FIND I HAD NO IDEA WHERE HE PUT THE ONE I GAVE HIM! I SUMMONED HIM TO THE COCKPIT ON THE PA WITH THE REMARK THAT IF HE DID NOT RETURN, I WAS GOING TO REQUEST A CLRNC TO LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT DUE TO PLT INCAPACITATION AS THIS WAS A 2 PLT ACFT. HE RETURNED TO BERATE ME FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO HANDLE THE SIT. HE FOUND THE CHART, HE HAD DROPPED IT ON THE FAR SIDE OF HIS SEAT. HE PICKED IT UP AND THROUGH IT AT ME AND LEFT AGAIN. THE PERMANENT FO AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS CHIEF PLT AT LENGTH. SHORT OF QUITTING, OURSELVES, THIS CHIEF PLT IS SO ENTRENCHED IN HIS JOB WITH OUR BOSS/OWNER THAT COMPLAINING ABOUT HIM TO ANYONE ELSE WILL ONLY CAUSE OUR EARLY TERMINATION. I HAVE RECOMMENDED HEALTHY EXTENSIVE DOSES OF CRM, BUT HE REFUSES. ACCORDING TO HIM, 'SERVES NO PURPOSE AS IT IS A WASTE OF TIME AND MONEY AS HE KNOWS HOW TO 'CTL' A CREW.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS IS NOT, AN AGING PLT, BUT ONE IN HIS MID FORTIES SO THAT HIS TRAINING OCCURRED SINCE THE ADVENT OF CRM.

Synopsis :

CPR FO RPTS LACK OF CRM SKILLS AND UNPROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF HIS CHIEF PLT.

**ACN: 540860**

## **Time**

Date : 200203

Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SLC.Airport

State Reference : UT

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

## **Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : S56.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation : Corporate

Make Model : Citation Excel

Mission : Business

## **Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : S56.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : Brasilia EMB-120 All Series

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

## **Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 95

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 639

ASRS Report : 540860

## **Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3709

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 66

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 108

ASRS Report : 540256

## **Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

## **Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Departure

## **Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action

Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Miss Distance.Vertical : 750

Miss Distance.Horizontal : 6000

## **Supplementary**

## Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

### Narrative :

THE FLT WAS PROGRESSING NORMALLY THROUGH TAXI AND INITIAL DEP OFF SLC RWY 17. THE FO WAS AT THE CTLS IN THE R SEAT. WE WERE ASSIGNED A 280 DEG HDG AND A CLB TO 10000 FT. IT WAS A COOL MORNING AND WE WERE LIGHT, THUS HAD A GOOD CLB GOING. THROUGH 7000 FT OR 8000 FT, WE GOT A TA. I LOOKED AT THE TCASII DISPLAY AND SAW THE TFC INDICATED AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS, LEVEL AT 11000 FT. I LOOKED OUT MY WINDOW PAUSING TO LOOK AT MY PFD NOTING A CLB RATE OF AROUND 3000 FPM, THUS GIVING ME AN EXPLANATION FOR THE TA. I THEN SAW THE BRASILIA WHERE THE TCASII HAD INDICATED. WE WERE NOW GOING THROUGH 9000 FT AND I TOLD THE FO TO 'GET THE NOSE DOWN.' I CONTINUED TO KEEP THE TFC IN SIGHT. GETTING AT OR NEAR 10000 FT, I PUSHED FORWARD ON THE YOKE TO ARREST OUR RATE OF CLB, THEN LOOKED BACK OUT THE WINDOW TO KEEP THE TFC IN SIGHT. THE TCASII THEN ISSUED AN RA 'MONITOR VERT CLB!' LOOKING BACK INSIDE, I NOTICED WE WERE STILL IN A SLOW CLB, SO I TOLD THE FO TO 'GET THE PLANE BACK DOWN TO 'TEN',' AND RAN THE MANUAL TRIM WHEEL FORWARD TO FACILITATE THE DSCNT. AT THIS POINT THE ACFT FINALLY STARTED TO DSND. THE MAX ALT THE ACFT REACHED WAS APPROX 10250 FT, BUT AT NO TIME DID WE REACH OR GO ABOVE 10300 FT. AFTER CONFIRMING THE ACFT WAS IN A DSCNT, I LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW TO SEE THE BRASILIA APPEAR TO PITCH UP SLIGHTLY AND BANK TO THE L AS IT PASSED OVERHEAD. WE AGAIN REACHED 10000 FT, AND THE FLT CONTINUED NORMALLY. IN 5 YRS OF FLYING WITH COMPANY X, THIS IS ONLY THE SECOND PERSON I'VE HAD TO 'PUSH FORWARD ON THE YOKE,' TO INDUCE LEVELOFF, AND THE ONLY TIME AN FO 'FROZE UP' AND WOULDN'T FLY THE ACFT. I WILL NEED TO BE MORE ASSERTIVE IN THE FUTURE IF I SEE THIS SIT RECURRING. HAVING THAT ACFT SO CLOSE AND WANTING TO MAKE SURE SOMETHING MORE SERIOUS WASN'T ABOUT TO HAPPEN KEPT ME LOOKING OUT THE WINDOW AND TRYING TO MONITOR ALL THAT WAS GOING ON. I WILL BE MORE AGGRESSIVE IN PREVENTION OF THIS SORT OF SIT IN THE FUTURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 540256: UNFORTUNATELY, IN STRIVING TO STAY BELOW 250 KTS WHILE EXECUTING A SMOOTH LEVELOFF, I DID NOT APPLY AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE YOKE OR REDUCE THE PWR ENOUGH TO ARREST OUR RATE OF CLB BEFORE WE HAD EXCEEDED OUR ASSIGNED ALT. THIS PROB WAS CAUSED BY MY FAILURE TO CORRECTLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE HIGH RATE OF CLB WE HAD AND APPLY AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH CTL FORCES AND PWR ADJUSTMENTS TO AVOID EXCEEDING OUR ASSIGNED ALT. FURTHER TRAINING IN PROCS TO FOLLOW IN THE CITATION EXCEL WHEN YOU HAVE SHORT CLBS OR DSCNTS COMBINED WITH SPD LIMITS WOULD BE HELPFUL. IN PARTICULAR, THE CITATION EXCEL HAS SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER CLB CAPABILITY THAN THE JETS I HAVE FLOWN PREVIOUSLY AND I HAVE BEEN SLOWER THAN I EXPECTED IN DEVELOPING THE PROCEDURAL HABITS FOR DEALING WELL WITH THIS SIT. IN ADDITION, I WAS SOMEWHAT DISTR BY LOOKING FOR THE TFC. I NEED TO LEARN TO RELY MORE ON THE OTHER PLT FOR THIS WHEN I AM FLYING THE PLANE, IE, BETTER CRM WOULD ALSO HELP.

### Synopsis :

C560 CITATION FO OVERSHOT INTERMEDIATE CLB ALT DURING CLBOUT RESULTING IN THE CAPT TAKING CTL TO HELP LEVEL OFF AND RETURN TO ASSIGNED ALT, AND AN EMB120 TAKING EVASIVE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA. DEP CTLR HAD ISSUED TA TO THE CITATION.

**Time**

Date : 200203  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DCA.Airport  
State Reference : DC

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 500

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DCA.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-800  
Mission : Passenger

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DCA.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 95  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200  
ASRS Report : 540909

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500  
ASRS Report : 541056

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airport

## Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

### Narrative :

NORMAL TAXI OUT FROM RAMP TO RUN-UP AREA FOR RWY 1. AN ACR Y B737 WAS FIRST IN THE RUN-UP AREA AND WE PARKED NEXT TO HIM. TWR ADVISED THAT WE WOULD BE NEXT AND TAXI UP TO BUT HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1. I READ BACK THE CLRNC AND BEGAN MY BEFORE TKOF FLOWS. CAPT, WHILE TAXIING, INADVERTENTLY PARTIALLY CROSSED THE RWY 1 HOLD SHORT LINE. I FEEL THIS MAY HAVE HAPPENED AS CAPT WAS ENSURING CLRNC OF OUR ACFT AND THE B737 IN THE RUN-UP AREA AND MY ATTN TO MATTERS INSIDE THE COCKPIT (IE, PA, XPONDER, BEFORE TKOF FLOW, ETC). UPON REALIZING WE HAD JUST SLIGHTLY CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE, I REITERATED TO CAPT TO 'HOLD SHORT, HOLD SHORT.' HE STOPPED THE ACFT AND ABOUT THAT SAME TIME THE TWR ALSO ADVISED 'HOLD SHORT.' BEYOND THAT, THE FLT CONTINUED TO IAH UNEVENTFULLY. POOR CRM BY ALLOWING THE ACFT TO SLIGHTLY CROSS A RWY HOLD SHORT LINE.

### Synopsis :

A B737 CREW, TAXIING FOR TKOF AT DCA, TAXIED PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE.

**Time**

Date : 200203  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : TYS.Airport  
State Reference : TN

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : DC-8 70  
Mission : Freight

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : TYS.Tower  
Make Model : DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6600  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000  
ASRS Report : 540959

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Second Officer

**Person / 4**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 5  
Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory  
Resolutory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE GIVEN A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 23R AT TYS. AFTER THE FO MADE THE LNDG, THE TWR/GND CTLR TOLD US TO TURN L AT THE END OF THE RWY, TAXI BACK ON TXWY B, AND HOLD SHORT OF THE APCH END OF RWY 23R AT B8. AN AIRBORNE DC9 WAS LNDG ON RWY 23R WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A 180 DEG TURN ON THE RWY AND BACK TAXI. AS WE TAXIED ON TXWY B AND COMPLETED THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST, THE DC9 LANDED AND BEGAN TAXIING AS INSTRUCTED. WE REACHED THE APCH END OF RWY 23R AND CROSSED THE RWY AT B8 WHILE SEEING THE DC9 TURN OFF THE RWY AT G7. THE CTLR INFORMED US WE WERE NOT CLRED TO CROSS RWY 23R AND TOLD US TO CONTINUE TO THE RAMP. WITH THE UNDERSTANDING OF WHY WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT, WE EXPECTED TO GET THE CLRNC TO CROSS AND IN MY MIND I THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED. FATIGUE PLAYED A LARGE ROLE IN THIS INCIDENT. WE HAD XA30 PICK-UP TIME AT THE HOTEL. THEN THE FIRST LEG FROM KNOXVILLE TO LOUISVILLE FOLLOWED BY A 4 1/2+ HR WAIT WITHOUT PROPER REST FACILITIES (RECLINERS) IN SDF BEFORE THE RETURN TRIP TO TYS. EVEN THOSE WHO FLY THIS ALL THE TIME OR BELIEVE THEY ARE USED TO THIS 'BACK-SIDE-OF-THE-CLOCK' SCHEDULE, ARE NOT IMMUNE TO THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF FATIGUE. BEING CONDITIONED FOR CERTAIN EVENTS, OR CLRNCs IN THIS CASE, TO OCCUR WAS ALSO A FACTOR. I REMEMBER HEARING ABOUT THIS DURING CRM TRAINING, BUT CAN'T RECALL THE TERM FOR IT. THIS IS A CASE OF WHERE FATIGUE COMBINED WITH ACTING UPON AN EXPECTED RESPONSE FROM ATC COULD HAVE RESULTED IN DISASTER.

Synopsis :

RWY INCURSION IN A CARGO DC8 DURING A NIGHT OP AT TYS, TN.

**Time**

Date : 200203  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ORF.Airport  
State Reference : VA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4700

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Falcon 2000  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Citation 10  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5600  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1700  
ASRS Report : 541434

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 75  
ASRS Report : 541597

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 2000  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 12000

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

OVER APPROX ORF TALKING WITH ZDC, WE WERE CONTINUING TO CLB IN AN EFFORT TO FIND SMOOTH AIR. I WAS THE CAPT, BUT FOR THIS LEG I WAS THE PNF. THE PF WAS A COMPANY INSTRUCTOR WITH MORE EXPERIENCE AND COMPANY SENIORITY, HOWEVER, DUE TO OUR COMPANY POLICY, HAD NOT BEEN 'RELEASED' IN THE ACFT SINCE HE HAD ONLY BEEN IN THE FALCON FOR A FEW MONTHS. THE ACFT WAS HANDLING VERY WELL AT FL450 AND HAD SEEMED TO CLB THERE WITH LITTLE OR NO EFFORT. BOTH OF US WERE COMMENTING ON HOW MUCH WE WERE IMPRESSED WITH THE HANDLING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FALCON AS HE WAS STILL HAND FLYING AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME. OUR ONLY PROB WAS NAGGING POCKETS OF LIGHT TO MODERATE CHOP AT FL450. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT THE FO ASKED ME FOR FL470 (THE AIRPLANE'S MAX ALT). I REMEMBER BEING A LITTLE HESITANT ABOUT THAT, BUT AT THE SAME TIME DIDN'T WANT TO CONTINUE FLYING IN THE CHOP WE HAD EITHER. I ASKED ZDC FOR THE ALT, AND WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC AT THAT TIME. THE FO INITIATED A SLOW CLB AND BEFORE TOO LONG WE WERE IN SMOOTH AIR -- FINALLY! HOWEVER, AS WE CLBED THROUGH FL460 THE ACFT PERFORMANCE AND AIRSPD WERE DECREASING AT A STEADY RATE, BUT WE HAD SOON LEVELED OFF AND WATCHED AS OUR AIRSPD LEVELED OFF, AS EXPECTED. TO OUR SURPRISE, CTR CALLED COMPANY TFC FOR US AT FL450 (WHO ELSE WOULD BE UP THIS HIGH!). BUT WOULDN'T YOU KNOW IT, JUST LIKE TURB TO REAR ITS UGLY HEAD, WE HIT A COUPLE OF POCKETS OF LIGHT TO MODERATE AGAIN, BUT THIS TIME OUR ACFT PERFORMANCE WAS UNABLE TO KEEP UP WITH THE BUMPS AS WE WATCHED OUR AIRSPD FLUCTUATE TO LEVELS BEYOND OUR PERSONAL COMFORT. WE HAD THE COMPANY ACFT IN SIGHT AND ASKED CTR FOR A DSCNT TO FL450 FOR TURB. THEY WERE UNABLE AT THE TIME, BUT SAID IN 5 MI. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR ACFT CONTINUED TO DECELERATE WITH THE ONCOMING BUMPS AND WE TOLD CTR WE WERE ON OUR WAY DOWN SLOWLY. CTR GAVE US A 30 DEG TURN TO THE R WITH A DSCNT TO FL450. ALL WAS FINE, AND WE DECIDED TO PUT UP WITH THE CHOP AT FL450 INSTEAD OF DSNding FURTHER. CTR ADVISED US THAT WE HAD SET OFF THEIR ALT ALERTER WITHIN THE 5 MI THEY NEEDED FOR CLRNC, BUT SAID ALL WAS FINE DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD THE ACFT IN SIGHT AND NEEDED TO DSNd FOR TURB. CORRECT! HOWEVER, IN THE BACK OF MY MIND I WISH I HAD BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING ABOUT THE FO'S DECISION TO CONTINUE TO CLB AND ALSO THAT I HAD CONSULTED THE ACFT MANUAL BEFORE ATTEMPTING THE CLB. THINGS COULD HAVE ENDED UP MUCH WORSE THAN THEY DID ALL BECAUSE WE HAD A BREAKDOWN IN CRM, AND THAT WE WERE RELYING ON THE FEELING OF THE ACFT OVER THE FACTS OF ITS KNOWN PERFORMANCE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 541597: AFTER LEVELING AT OUR INITIAL CRUISE ALT OF FL430, WE WERE GETTING A ROUGH RIDE FROM FL410 AND AGAIN AT FL450, SO WE REQUESTED FL470. DURING THE CLB, THE AIR SEEMED TO BE SMOOTHING OUT. HOWEVER, AFTER REACHING FL470 THE RIDE WORSENER TO MODERATE OCCASIONALLY SEVERE. THIS WAS CAUSING ME GREAT CONCERN AS THE AIRSPD WAS VARYING GREATLY AND AT THE TOP OF CLB FL470 WE CANNOT AFFORD TO GET SLOW OR LOSE AIRSPD. WE ASKED FOR LOWER. ATC HAD A COMPANY CITATION 10 CLOSING HEAD-ON. I HAD THAT ACFT BOTH VISUALLY AND ON TCASII. AS SOON AS WE PASSED, WE IMMEDIATELY DSNDED. ALT SEPARATION MAY WELL HAVE BEEN LOST. HOWEVER, WE WERE PAST THE ACFT AND NOTIFIED ATC ASAP. THE GREATEST DANGER WAS LOSING AIRSPD AND ALT AT FL470. I FELT A BUFFET, STALL OR BOTH WERE A VERY REAL POSSIBILITIES, AND EXERCISED A PIC DECISION TO DSNd AND GAIN AIRSPD IMMEDIATELY AS WELL AS TO LEAVE THE WORSENER TURB.

Synopsis :

F-2TH CREW CLBED ACFT TOO HIGH FOR THE ACFT GROSS WT AND CONDITIONS.

**Time**

Date : 200203  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SFO.Airport  
State Reference : CA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SFO.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Gulfstream II  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 17000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500  
ASRS Report : 541736

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Undershoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Separated Traffic

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ACFT WAS CLRED FOR TIPTOE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28L. I READ BACK CLRNC. CAPT (PF) THOUGHT HE WAS CLRED FOR VISUAL AND BEGAN TURN DIRECTLY TOWARD RWY. I TOLD HIM 'NO, YOU WERE CLRED FOR TIPTOE VISUAL.' HE CONTINUED INBOUND AFTER A SECOND REMINDER. I THEN GAVE HIM A HDG TO COMPLY WITH CLRNC. HE CONTINUED DIRECTLY TO ARPT. HE WAS HIGH AND CLOSE TO TFC HE WAS SUPPOSED TO FOLLOW. EVENTUALLY WE WERE TOLD TO GO AROUND. I BELIEVE THAT COMPANY NEEDS TO REVISIT CRM WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL.

Synopsis :

HDG TRACK AND SPD DEV DURING THE PIC'S HIGH, UNSTABILIZED APCH FRUSTRATES THE FO OF A GII ON THE TIPTOE VISUAL TO RWY 28 AT SFO, CA.

**Time**

Date : 200203  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : TNCM.Airport  
State Reference : FO

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : A320  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 18000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000  
ASRS Report : 541846

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : OXYGEN PRESSURE ECAM DISPLAY  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING PREFLT WE NOTED THAT CREW OXYGEN WAS 400 PSI. WE BOTH CHKED OUR MASKS AND REGULATORS AND THE CAPT SAID HE THOUGHT HIS WAS STUCK OPEN. WE DETERMINED THAT WE WERE BELOW THE MINIMUM REQUIRED PRESSURE AFTER CHKING THE ACFT FLT MANUAL. WE THEN DISCUSSED WHAT OUR OPTIONS MIGHT BE, WHEREUPON THE CAPT LEFT THE ACFT TO CONSULT BY PHONE WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT. THE CAPT RETURNED AND SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT WE WOULD FLY TO SJU WHERE BOTH OXYGEN AND MAINT WERE AVAILABLE. HE ASKED FOR MY OPINION AND I SAID THAT I FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE DECISION SINCE IT WAS A VERY SHORT FLT AT LOW ALT AND PASSED RIGHT BY SAINT THOMAS ARPT. WE WERE DISPATCHED FROM SXM TO SJU AND COMPLETED THE FLT UNEVENTFULLY. AT SJU, CONTRACT MAINT REPLACED THE CREW OXYGEN BOTTLE AND INSPECTED THE OXYGEN SYS. WE THEN CONTINUED OUR FLT TO PHL. AFTER REVIEWING OUR SIT WITH SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES, I NOW BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT HAVE DEPARTED SXM WITH LOW OXYGEN. THE ONE THING THE CAPT AND I HAD FAILED TO CONSIDER WAS AN EMER (SUCH AS SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT) WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED OUR USE OF OXYGEN MASKS. IN RETROSPECT, I THINK OUR DISCUSSIONS HAD NARROWLY FOCUSED ON THE NEED FOR OXYGEN TO BREATHE AT ALT AND OVERLOOKED THE CONSIDERATION OF SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. APPARENTLY, THIS WAS ALSO OVERLOOKED BY DISPATCH AND MAINT. I FEEL THAT WE USED GOOD CRM IN THAT THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE SIT AT LENGTH AND THEN CONSULTED BOTH DISPATCH AND MAINT. MAYBE, IF THE FLT MANUAL HAD A WARNING OR CAUTION NOTE NEXT TO THE OXYGEN TABLE IT WOULD HAVE HELPED.

Synopsis :

A320 CREW OPERATED A FLT WITH ALMOST NO CREW OXYGEN.

**Time**

Date : 200203  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport  
State Reference : GA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ATL.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-700  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000  
ASRS Report : 541946

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 126  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 126  
ASRS Report : 542457

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

HAD AN EDCT OF XA07, BLOCKED OUT AT XA58, AT APPROX XA10 ATLANTA GND CTL TOLD US TO FOLLOW A TURBOPROP TO RWY 27R. APCHING 'RUN-UP AREA,' FO ASKED ME IF IT WAS OK TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ. I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS, BUT I DID NOT WANT TO MICRO-MANAGE THE FO WHO WAS NEW ON THE AIRPLANE, AND HAD RECEIVED A FAIR AMOUNT OF TUTORING FROM ME DURING THIS 4-DAY TRIP (I NORMALLY LIKE GND CTL TO HAND ME OFF TO TWR WHEN AN EDCT IS PRESENT, AND THE COMMERCIAL CHART SHOWS 2 POSSIBLE TWR FREQS FOR THE S SIDE OF THE ARPT). SO I LET THE FO SWITCH TO A TWR FREQ...SHE CHOSE 123.85. I THOUGHT THAT IF THAT FREQ WAS NO GOOD, WE WOULD REALIZE IT BY SILENCE ON THE FREQ AND THEN CHANGE TO THE OTHER ONE. HOWEVER, I NOTICED THAT WE COULD HEAR THE CTL TWR WORKING OUR RWY, BUT NOT HEAR READBACKS FROM AIRPLANES. I TOLD THE FO THIS, AND ASKED HER IF THERE WERE ANY OTHER FREQS FOR THE TWR. IN MY MIND, THIS IS A PRETTY BIG HINT THAT WE SHOULD BE ON ANOTHER FREQ. I BELIEVE THAT, IN THE BIG PICTURE OF CRM, SOMETIMES A HINT IS BETTER THAN A STRAIGHT-OUT COMMAND, IN A NON-CRITICAL SIT, THUS KEEPING LINES OF COM AND GOOD CRM GOING, AND NOT DETERRING THE FO FROM FUTURE INPUT TO FUTURE SITS. BUT SHE DID NOT TAKE THE HINT, AND MISREAD THE (POORLY-DESIGNED) CHART, AND TOLD ME WE WERE ON THE CORRECT FREQ. SHE DID NOT NOTICE THE POSSIBILITY OF 119.1. AT THIS TIME THE TWR SPOKE TO US (ON 123.85) AND CLRED US INTO POS. WE READ BACK THE CLRNC, AND BECAUSE TWR DID NOT HAVE TO REPEAT THIS, IT THEN SEEMED TO ME THAT HE WAS ALSO LISTENING ON 123.85. THEN WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. WE READ BACK THAT CLRNC. APPARENTLY, AT THAT TIME THE TWR CTLR SEEMED TO REALIZE THAT HE WAS NOT HEARING ANYTHING FROM US AND ASKED US WHAT FREQ WE WERE ON, AND HE TOLD US THAT GND CTL HAD ASSIGNED US 119.1. HE WAS XMITTING BUT NOT RECEIVING ON 123.85. TURNED AWAY FROM GND CTL BEFORE BEING XFERRED. MISREAD (POORLY DESIGNED) CHART, TUNED IN WRONG TWR FREQ. CAPT KNEW THE SIT, BUT DID NOT WANT TO MICRO-MANAGE FO. CAPT MADE STRONG HINTS THAT WERE NOT PICKED UP ON. PUBLISH GUIDANCE AS TO WHEN TO CHANGE FREQ TO TWR FROM GND. TWR FREQ SECTION OF CHART SHOULD SAY 'S SIDE' OR 'N SIDE' INSTEAD OF RWYS 9L/R, 27L/R, AND 8L/R, 26L/R. TWR SHOULD LISTEN ON FREQS THAT HE XMITS ON, AND SHOULD BE ALERT TO THE LACK OF READBACKS BEFORE HE CLRS AN ACFT FOR TKOF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 542457: WHILE #3 FOR TKOF (1 AIRPLANE IN POS ON THE RWY) I ASKED THE CAPT IF WE SHOULD SWITCH TO TWR FREQ. WE WERE NOT GIVEN A TWR FREQ FROM GND CTL. I CONSULTED THE ATC PAGE OF MY APCH CHARTS AND FOUND 123.85 TO BE THE FREQ FOR RWY 27R. WE WERE UNABLE TO HEAR OTHER TFC ANSWER THE TWR, AND WE DISCUSSED THIS CONCERN WITH EACH OTHER. AT THIS TIME THE TWR CLRED US IN OPS ON RWY 27R, AND I ACKNOWLEDGED THE XMISSION WITH 'FLT NUMBER...CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 27R.' WE SHOULD HAVE CHKED WITH GND CTL FOR A TWR FREQ BEFORE TUNING IN THE FREQ LISTED ON THE CHART PAGE. WE SHOULD HAVE DOUBLE-CHKED THE FREQ WHEN WE HEARD ONLY THE TWR ON FREQ. THE GND CTLR SHOULD ISSUE A TWR FREQ WITHIN A TIMELY FASHION. IF THE TWR CTLR BELIEVES A CREW IS ON AN INCORRECT FREQ, HE SHOULD ALERT THE CREW IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ISSUING NEW CLRNCs. THE CREW SHOULD BE ALERT TO ALL CONVERSATIONS BTWN ALL ACFT AND ATC. CREWS SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE FEELING THAT 'SOMETHING MAY NOT BE QUITE RIGHT.'

Synopsis :

LOSS OF COM FREQ WHEN A B737-700 FLC SELECTS THE WRONG TWR FREQ, RECEIVING TWR BUT TWR NOT RECEIVING THEIR READBACKS ON 123 PT 85 AT ATL, GA.

**Time**

Date : 200203  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : PIA.Airport  
State Reference : IL

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 2000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PIA.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi  
Make Model : King Air 100 A/B  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 21000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 50  
ASRS Report : 542420

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4100  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 10  
ASRS Report : 541663

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

THE ACFT WAS AT 2400 FT MSL BEING VECTORED TO AN ILS RWY 31 AT PEORIA, IL. I, THE PF, DIVERTED MY ATTN TO THE PNF. HE WAS TUNING MY NAV FROM THE ILS FREQ TO A VOR FOR RANGE AWARENESS IN THE EVENT OF A MISSED APCH. I WENT BACK TO SCANNING THE FLT INSTS. THE AIRSPD WAS AT 115-118 KIAS WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. I ADDED PWR JUST AS THE AIRFRAME STALLED, I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT. THE ACFT ROLLED L APPROX INTO A 30 DEG BANK AND PITCH DOWN 30 DEG ALT -- LOST FROM 2300 FT MSL, APPROX 500 FT LOSS OF ALT, TO 1700 FT MSL BEFORE I HAD COMPLETED THE COMPLETE RECOVERY OF THE STALL. FLT RESUMED NORMALLY TO A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. THE PRIMARY JOB I WAS ENGAGED IN WAS TO FLY THE AIRPLANE. THE OTHER PLT WAS TUNING THE RADIOS. MY CRM USAGE WAS POORLY MANAGED BY MYSELF. I WAS MICROMANAGING THE RADIO TUNING INSTEAD OF FLYING THE AIRPLANE. I NEEDED TO REVIEW MY ACTIONS AND HOW I SHOULD UTILIZE THE PNF IN RELATION TO CRM. MY FUTURE FLTS WILL INCLUDE UTILIZING ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES FROM THE PNF AND NOT MICROMANAGE HIS JOB. PAY ALL MY ATTN TO FLYING THE ACFT. I INITIALLY THOUGHT MY ADDITION OF PWR AND DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT AGGRAVATED THE ROLL AND PITCH THE ACFT DOWN. THE ANSWER TO THE PROB WAS MY INATTN TO BASIC FLYING SKILLS -- NOT FLYING THE ACFT. I WILL IN THE FUTURE DIRECT ALL MY ATTN TO FLYING MY ACFT FIRST, AND IMPROVE MY CRM APPLICATION TO MANAGE MY PNF OR NOT MICROMANAGE HIS JOB AND MINE.

Synopsis :

B100 CAPT LOST CTL OF THE ACFT WHEN IT STALLED DURING APCH TRANSITION DUE TO DISTR OF OBSERVING THE FO SET THE MISSED APCH PROC IN THE NAVAIDS.

**Time**

Date : 200203  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport  
State Reference : GA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-800  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 150  
ASRS Report : 542927

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : FLAP POSITION INDICATOR  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

FLAP HANDLE SET TO 5 DEGS, FLAPS (TRAILING EDGE) SPLIT AND LOCKED BTWN 1-2 DEGS. QRH PROCS ACCOMPLISHED DELAYED LNDG UNTIL RAIN SHOWERS HAD PASSED. DECLARED AN EMER TO REQUEST LONGEST RWY. 170 KT APCH SPD. NO PROBS LNDG OR STOPPING. GOOD HUMAN FACTORS AND CRM. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE CAUSE OF THE FLAP FAILURE IS UNKNOWN AS MAINT MADE NO RPT OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. THE RPTR SAID THE EMER WAS DECLARED TO SECURE THE LONGEST RWY AS THE LNDG SPD WAS 170 KTS WITH NO FLARE.

Synopsis :

A B737-800 AT 4000 FT DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO LOSS OF TRAILING EDGE FLAP CTL. CAUSE UNKNOWN.

**Time**

Date : 200203  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EWR.Airport  
State Reference : NJ  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 14000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Jetstream 41  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2900  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 132  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 250  
ASRS Report : 543287

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2250  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 245  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1050  
ASRS Report : 543792

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : FUEL GAUGES  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ON THE CLBOUT, WE DETERMINED THAT WE HAD INSUFFICIENT FUEL TO PROCEED TO IAD. WE ASSESSED THE SIT, NOTIFIED ATC THAT WE HAD MINIMUM FUEL ON BOARD AND REQUESTED A DIVERSION TO EWR. ATC GRANTED US CLRNC TO EWR, WHICH WAS VFR AT THE TIME, AND WE PROCEEDED TO LAND WITH A CLRNC FOR A VISUAL APCH. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE TAXIED TO THE GATE, NOTIFIED DISPATCH AND WERE RERELEASED TO IAD. THE FLT FROM EWR TO IAD WAS NORMAL. THE FO AND I HAD FLOWN 1 ROUND TRIP TOGETHER PRIOR TO THIS FLT. WE RPTED FOR DUTY AT XA00 AND A SUFFICIENT REST PERIOD. THE FIRST TRIP WAS ALSO A ROUND TRIP. DURING THE TURNAROUND, OPS PROCEEDED NORMALLY. WE ASKED FOR RAMP SVC, CONDUCTED A POSTFLT INSPECTION, PICKED UP AND REVIEWED THE DISPATCH RELEASE, THEN TOOK A BATHROOM BREAK. AFTER WE RETURNED TO THE ACFT, WE COMPLETED THE TURNAROUND CHKLIST AND PROCEEDED TO WAIT FOR THE PAX TO BOARD. WE HAD NOT RECEIVED A FUEL SLIP ON THE EARLIER TRIP AND WE WEREN'T TOO CONCERNED THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED ONE ON THIS TRIP. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TIME FROM WHEN I LEFT THE ACFT, WENT INSIDE, AND RETURNED TO THE ACFT FOR A FUEL TRUCK TO HAVE COME OUT TO THE PLANE AND COMPLETE REFUELING. AFTER BOARDING WAS COMPLETED, WE HAD 3 MINS LEFT TO MAKE AN ON-TIME-DEP. THE FLT ATTENDANT INTERRUPTED OUR BEFORE START CHKS TO POINT OUT THAT THE AGENT LEFT THE BOARDING ROPE ATTACHED TO THE ACFT. THE RAMP MECH UNTIED IT AND WE STARTED OUR CHKLIST AGAIN, ONLY THIS TIME WE RUSHED TO ENSURE THE ON-TIME DEP. THE FUEL GAUGES WERE COVERED BY THE RELEASE PAPERWORK. AT THIS POINT, I FEEL THAT THE CURRENT ACR CHKLIST FAILS IN ITS PURPOSE. THERE IS NO VERIFICATION BY BOTH CREW MEMBERS CONCERNING FUEL, ONLY A RESPONSE FROM THE FO. WHILE I WAS CLRING THE PORT SIDE OF THE ACFT FOR ENG START, THE FO WAS LOCKING THE DOOR. WHEN HE STATED THE FUEL LEVEL, THE FO USED THE PLANNED FUEL FROM THE RELEASE. I HAD ASSUMED HE READ THE FUEL FROM THE GAUGES. FROM THIS POINT ON, THERE IS NO FURTHER REF TO THE FUEL IN ANY CHKLIST. ONLY WHEN WE LEVELED OFF AT 14000 FT DID EITHER OF US NOTICE THE FUEL LEVEL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT I CAN IDENT INCLUDE A LEVEL OF COMPLACENCY WHEN BOTH CREW MEMBERS HAVE A HIGH LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE OTHER CREW MEMBER TO BE ABLE TO PERFORM THEIR REQUIRED DUTIES, A SERIES OF EVENTS THAT INCLUDE AN INTERRUPTED CHKLIST THAT DISTRACTS BOTH CREW MEMBERS FROM THE TASKS AT HAND, A SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE IN THE CHKLIST, IE, NO REQUIRED RESPONSE FROM PERSONNEL CONCERNING THE FUEL ONBOARD, AND A SENSE OF URGENCY OVER ENSURING AN ON-TIME DEP. THE SINGLE MOST EFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION I COULD RECOMMEND IS A REVISION TO THE CHKLISTS CURRENTLY IN USE TO INCLUDE A DUEL VERIFICATION OF THE FUEL ON BOARD AT LEAST TWICE BEFORE TKOF, ONCE BEFORE START, AND ONCE DURING THE TAXI OUT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 543792: THE CAPT AND I HAVE MET WITH THE COMPANY AND WE SUGGEST DIRECTIONS, RUSHING, AND A WEAK CHKLIST, ALONG WITH COMPLACENCY ON OUR PART, ARE TO BLAME FOR THE MINIMUM FUEL SIT. OUR COMPANY IS IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGING OUR CHKLIST FROM THE FO STATING FUEL ON BOARD TO BOTH CREW MEMBERS STATING FUEL ON BOARD. THE CAPT AND I HAVE ALSO RECEIVED CRM AND CHKLIST TRAINING. DUE TO THE UNPLEASANT SIT WE PUT OURSELVES IN, ALONG WITH CRM TRAINING, WE ARE CONFIDENT THIS WILL NOT BE A REPEAT OCCURRENCE.

Synopsis :

JETSTREAM 4100 FLC DIVERTED TO ANOTHER ARPT ENRTE AFTER DISCOVERING INFLT THAT THEY HAD INSUFFICIENT FUEL TO MAKE THEIR SCHEDULED DEST.

**Time**

Date : 200204  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

State Reference : TX  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3500

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 4800

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model : Experimental Aircraft  
Mission : Pleasure  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 30  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500  
ASRS Report : 544029

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

AN EMER OFF-FIELD LNDG WAS CONDUCTED DUE TO ENG FAILURE. ENG FAILURE WAS DUE TO A BROKEN CRANKSHAFT. A LOW ALT VMC CRUISE WAS BEING CONDUCTED TO AVOID IFR VECTORS AWAY FROM GREAT CIRCLE RTE. NEAREST ARPT WAS LOCATED USING GPS DATABASE. AT 15 NM AND 2500 FT MSL, A DECISION WAS MADE TO LAND IN OPEN FIELD. TIME DID NOT ALLOW FOR COMPLETE EMER CHKLST TO BE USED. I THINK THAT THE STUDENT PLT (PAX) COULD HAVE HELPED ME USE THE CHKLST, HAD I THOUGHT ABOUT IT. ADDITIONALLY, CRM TRAINING WOULD HAVE HELPED ME. I COULD HAVE HAD HIM RADIO 121.5, SQUAWK 7700, ACTIVATE ELT, BUT NEVER GOT TO IT. TIME FROM ENG FAILURE TO LAND WAS APPROX 2 MINS. NO INJURIES AND MINOR DAMAGE TO AIRFRAME, LNDG GEAR.

Synopsis :

SMA EXPERIMENTAL PLT MADE AN OFF ARPT FORCED LNDG AFTER THE ENG CRANKSHAFT BROKE.

**Time**

Date : 200204  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MSP.Airport  
State Reference : MN  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : M98.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : MSP.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : DC-9 30  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 140  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 544427

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : GEAR LIGHTS  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 12R AT MSP, GEAR SELECTED DOWN, L MAIN GEAR RED UNSAFE LIGHT ILLUMINATED. AFTER GOING THROUGH ALL COMPANY PROCS WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL, WE STILL HAD AN UNSAFE GEAR LIGHT. I THEN DECLARED AN EMER, HAD THE FIRE TRUCKS STANDING BY, BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX AS TO THE PROB. I HAD THE FLT ATTENDANTS PREPARE THE CABIN FOR A CRASH LNDG. AFTER LNG, THE ACFT REMAINED ON ITS GEAR AND I HAD MAINT PIN THE GEAR, THEN TOW US OFF THE RWY TO THE GATE. I ASSURED THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS EVERYTHING WAS OK. MY CREW WORKED VERY WELL TOGETHER AND WITH EVERYONE UTILIZING CRM, THERE WAS NO DOUBT OR QUESTIONS AS TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH. EXCELLENT JOB WAS DONE BY EVERYONE FROM ATC TO DISPATCH, MAINT CTL, AND MY CREW. THIS TURNED OUT TO BE A NON EVENT, BUT JUST AS EASILY COULD HAVE BEEN THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

Synopsis :

EMER LNDG IN A DC9-30 WHEN THE L LNDG GEAR INDICATED UNSAFE CONDITION ON FINAL APCH TO MSP, MN.

**ACN: 544444**

## **Time**

Date : 200204

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Intersection : QUAIL

State Reference : CO

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

## **Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D01.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : Challenger C1600

Mission : Business

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6300

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 225

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2400

ASRS Report : 544444

## **Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

## **Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

## **Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE INBOUND ON THE QUAIL 3 ARR TO APA. WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS QUAIL AT 16000 FT MSL AND 250 KTS. AFTER LEVELING AT 16000 FT MSL, CREW EXPERIENCED MODERATE TO SEVERE CHOP AND MOUNTAIN WAVE ACTIVITY. THE AUTOPLT WAS ON TURB MODE TO DAMPEN THE CORRECTION FOR COMFORT. WHILE CLBING THROUGH 16200 FT MSL, CREW REALIZED THAT THE WX CONDITIONS EXCEEDED THE AUTOPLT LIMITATIONS AND BEGAN CORRECTION INPUTS. CLBING THROUGH 16500 FT MSL, I REALIZED THAT MY SENIOR CO-CAPT'S INPUTS WOULD NOT RESOLVE THE PROB AND SELECTED 'OFF' OF THE AUTOPLT. I THEN ORDERED HE GAIN CTL OF THE ACFT AT 16700 FT MSL. (I WOULD HAVE TAKEN CTL AT THIS POINT.) HE OBTAINED CTL AND IMMEDIATELY STARTED A DSCNT TO 16000 FT MSL. I THEN EXPLAINED TO DENVER OUR SIT. STRATUS AND TINY CUMULUS CLOUDS WERE ENRTE. NO SIGNS OF VENTRICULAR CLOUDS. SIGMET 'V2' FOR OCCASIONAL SEVERE TURB BELOW FL220, STANDING UP- AND DOWNDRAFTS VICINITY MOUNTAINS WAS ISSUED, SO WE WERE PREWARNED. WE WERE FLYING CO-CAPTS ON OUR FIRST TRIP TOGETHER. NOT KNOWING EACH OTHER'S EXPERIENCE AND I BEING THE JUNIOR CAPT, MADE THIS A TOUCHY ISSUE. I WOULD HAVE TAKEN CTL AT 16300 FT MS. WITH ANY OF MY FO'S. I ASSUME THIS CAPT'S EXPERIENCE WAS LOW. CRM ISSUES EXIST WITH 2 CAPTS, AS YOU CAN CLRLY SEE. THE ONLY WAY TO CORRECT THIS PROB WOULD HAVE BEEN: IMMEDIATE DISENGAGEMENT OF AUTOPLT AND PWR LEVERS TO IDLE. FORTUNATELY NO OTHER PLANES WERE AFFECTED BY OUR WX INDUCED ALT ERROR.

Synopsis :

FLC HAD ALT EXCURSION IN A LR-60 WHEN ENCOUNTERING MOUNTAIN WAVE ACTIVITY AND TURB NEAR DEN, CO.

**Time**

Date : 200204  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

State Reference : CA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 15000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC  
Operator.General Aviation : Instructional  
Make Model : PA-44 Seminole Turbo Seminole  
Mission : Training  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Enroute Altitude Change  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC  
Make Model : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 350  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 60  
ASRS Report : 544711

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

THE MISSION WAS A XCOUNTRY DUAL CREW TRAINING FLT TO ONTARIO, CA. THE PURPOSE WAS TO BUILD MULTI-ENG FLT TIME AND GAIN EXPERIENCE IN A CRM RELATED ENVIRONMENT. I HAD THE DUTY OF FLYING THE ACFT. MY PARTNER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMUNICATING WITH ATC. THE WX AHEAD DID NOT APPEAR TO BE SAFE TO PROCEED ON COURSE, SO WE REQUESTED IFR BACK. ATC TURNED US AROUND AND GAVE US AN ALT CHANGE. MY PARTNER READ BACK THE INFO. MY HANDS WERE TIED WITH FLYING THE ACFT AND MAKING NAV CHANGES. TO VERIFY THE ALT ASSIGNED, I ASKED MY PARTNER. I HEARD 'ELEVEN THOUSAND.' I BEGAN CLBING AND CTL CAME ON AND SAID 'EXPEDITE SEVEN THOUSAND.' BY THIS TIME I WAS AT 9000 FT. ANOTHER ACFT WAS PROCEEDING TOWARD US AND WE INTERRUPTED IFR SEPARATION. I TOOK RESPONSIBILITY BECAUSE I AM A CFII/MEI STUDENT AND MY PARTNER IS ONLY A PVT MULTI STUDENT. PRIOR TO FLT, I WAS A LITTLE CONCERNED ABOUT NOT KNOWING HIS PLTING SKILLS. WE WERE PAIRED TOGETHER TO SIMULATE AN AIRLINE MISSION. THE PROB IS THE DIFFERENCE BTWN THE EXPERIENCE LEVELS. I HAVE NO EXCUSES. IT IS MY JOB TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO CTL AT ALL TIMES. UNFORTUNATELY, I HAD TO VERIFY WITH MY PARTNER, AND RECEIVED A FALSE ASSIGNMENT. THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING BTWN US.

Synopsis :

PA44 PLTS DID NOT INSURE THEY KNEW THE ALT CHANGE GIVEN THEM BY THE ARTCC RADAR CTLR IN ZLA CLASS E.

**Time**

Date : 200204  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : TWF.Airport  
State Reference : ID

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : TWF.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Brasilia EMB-120 All Series  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1713  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 143  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 206  
ASRS Report : 544909

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence.Other : TKOF CLRNC REQUIRED  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

IT WAS THE START OF A 6 LEG DAY. AND IT WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAD FLOWN WITH THE CAPT. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT I WOULD FLY THE FIRST 2 LEGS TO TWIN FALLS, ID, AND THE RETURN LEG TO SALT LAKE CITY. FOR REASONS I COULD NOT DETERMINE, THE CAPT SEEMED RUSHED AND MISSED MULTIPLE RADIO CALLS. AFTER LNDG AT TWIN FALLS, THE CTLs WERE XFERRED TO THE CAPT AND HE ASKED FOR THE AFTER LNDG CHK. I NO SOONER LOOKED DOWN TO PERFORM THE CHK WHEN THE CAPT REALIZED WE WERE ABOUT TO GO OFF THE TXWY AND APPLIED FULL R TILLER STEERING TO AVOID GOING OFF. ONCE I REALIZED WHAT WAS HAPPENING, I COULD TELL THE CAPT HAD BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH THE FUEL GAUGES RATHER THAN LOOKING OUTSIDE. THIS CERTAINLY FLUSTERED ME, AND SHOULD HAVE ACTED AS A RED FLAG. HOWEVER, THE REASON FOR THIS RPT OCCURRED DURING TKOF FROM TWIN FALLS. THE WIND WAS CALM AND THE CAPT WANTED TO DEPART RWY 7. USING THIS RWY REQUIRES A BACK TAXI FOR FULL LENGTH. THE TAXI OUT WAS NORMAL WITH ALL THE APPROPRIATE CHKS COMPLETED. BACK TAXIING ON THE RWY, THE CAPT ASKED ME TO PERFORM THE BEFORE TKOF CHK WHICH ENTAILS USING THE COCKPIT TO CABIN INTERPHONE TO TALK TO THE FLT ATTENDANT TO SEE IF THEY ARE READY. JUST BEFORE LEAVING COM #1 TO TALK TO THE FLT ATTENDANT, I HEARD THE CAPT TELL TWR WE WERE READY TO GO. I THEN HEARD TWR CLR US FOR TKOF AT THE END. AFTER TALKING WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT, SHE TOLD ME SHE WAS NOT READY, WHICH I THEN TOLD THE CAPT. I TOLD TWR WE WOULD PULL OFF AT THE END IN THE TURN-AROUND AREA. TWR THEN CLRED US TO REMAIN IN POS AND HOLD ON THE RWY AND ADVISE WHEN READY TO GO. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE TWR'S INSTRUCTIONS AND THE CAPT AGAIN ASKED ME TO CALL THE FLT ATTENDANT, WHICH I DID, TO FIND HER READY TO GO. I TOLD THE CAPT SHE WAS READY AND HE SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'LET'S GET GOING, YOU HAVE THE FLT CTLs.' I ADVANCED THE PWR AND DEPARTED. ONCE AIRBORNE, TWR INFORMED US WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. I ATTRIBUTE THIS BREAKDOWN IN CRM TO BEING RUSHED AND ASSUMING THE CAPT HAD RECEIVED A TKOF CLRNC WHEN HE SAID 'LET'S GET GOING, YOU HAVE THE FLT CTLs.' THE CAPT TOLD ME HE TOOK FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SIT. HOWEVER, I FEEL I SHARE THE BLAME, SINCE I KNEW I WAS OFF FREQ AT A CRUCIAL TIME AND COULD HAVE SIMPLY HAVE ASKED 'ARE WE CLRED FOR TKOF?'

Synopsis :

UNAUTH TKOF BY AN EMB120 FLC AT TWF, ID.

**Time**

Date : 200204  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : PKB.Airport  
State Reference : WV

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZID.ARTCC  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Citation V  
Mission : Test Flight  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 30  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 545488

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING A SIC FAR 135.293 FLT CHK AND CHK AIRMAN INITIAL EVALUATION WITH AN FAA INSPECTOR ON BOARD, ACFT WAS GIVEN A BLOCK ALT OF 11000-12000 FT AND AN ASSIGNED HDG FOR SOME AIR WORK. STALLS WERE ACCOMPLISHED ON A CONSTANT HDG (AS ASSIGNED) THEN THE CHK AIRMAN CONDUCTED AN UNUSUAL ATTITUDE DEMONSTRATION. DURING THE ONSET OF THE UNUSUAL ATTITUDE THE CHK AIRMAN MANEUVERED THE ACFT TO A 90 DEG L HDG CHANGE. WHEN THE SIC (THE RPTR) INITIATED RECOVERY, THE RECOVERY MANEUVERED THE ACFT INTO ANOTHER ATC SECTOR'S AIRSPACE. THE CTR (ZID) CTLR CAUTIONED THE ACFT THAT IT HAD ENTERED ANOTHER SECTOR WITHOUT PERMISSION AND INSTRUCTED THE ACFT TO RETURN TO THE ASSIGNED AREA WITH A HDG CHANGE. THE CITATION 560 WAS EQUIPPED WITH TCASII AND WAS OPERATING IN THE RA/TA MODE. WE HAD A 30 MI RADIUS SELECTED ON THE FMD AND NO OTHER ACFT WERE VISIBLE WITHIN THE 30 MI RADIUS. THE CHK AIRMAN ASKED FOR A BLOCK ALT TO PERFORM 'AIR WORK' AND WAS ASSIGNED AN ALT BLOCK, BUT WITH A HDG INSTEAD OF THE NORMAL CLRNC OF A BLOCK OF AIRSPACE. CAUTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO APPRISE THE CTLRS THAT HDG AS WELL AS ALT CHANGES ARE NECESSARY DURING THE CONDUCT OF AN FAA FLT CHK -- THIS SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CHK AIRMAN. IN THIS CASE, THE CHK AIRMAN WAS UNDERGOING AN INITIAL EVALUATION FOR CHK AIRMAN AUTH AND I BELIEVE LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON. UNFORTUNATELY, THE APPLICANT (THE RPTR), BECAUSE OF THE CHK AIRMAN'S LAPSE, EARNED AN UNSATISFACTORY IN JUDGEMENT AND CRM.

Synopsis :

FLC ON TRAINING FLT MANEUVERED ACFT INTO ANOTHER SECTOR'S AIRSPACE.

**Time**

Date : 200204  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MDW.Airport  
State Reference : IL

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000  
ASRS Report : 546048

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : Flight Attendant In Charge

**Person / 7**

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Company

Narrative :

CRM COM BREAKDOWN. I WAS UNAWARE OF ANY PROBS ON THE NIGHT OF THE OCCURRENCE. UPON RETURNING HOME, I RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE CHIEF PLT INFORMING ME THAT I POSSIBLY COULD HAVE FLOWN THE LAST LEG WITH ONLY 2 FLT ATTENDANTS. SIT BACKGROUND: (I RECALLED) #2 FLT ATTENDANT HAD BEEN WONDERING ALL DAY IF THERE MIGHT BE A COMMUTING FLT ATTENDANT TO MDW, SO HE COULD COMMUTE HOME. FAST FORWARD TO MDW TERMINATING THE ACFT. A DRUG TEST REPRESENTATIVE CAME TO THE COCKPIT ASKING WHERE 3RD FLT ATTENDANT WAS. THE FO AND MYSELF AFFIRMED HE WAS PROBABLY STILL IN THE BACK. WITHIN MINS, ALL PAX WERE OFF AND I DEPLANED THE ACFT AND LEFT. AFTER CHIEF'S CALL, I CALLED MDW INFLT AND REQUESTED 1 OR BOTH OF THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS CALL ME AT HOME. I RECEIVED A CALL AROUND XA00 FROM #3 FLT ATTENDANT WHO INFORMED ME THAT #2 HAD PERFORMED A JETWAY TRADE AND HAD GONE HOME. PERSPECTIVE: WHETHER COMPLETED APPROPRIATELY OR WHETHER LEGAL, A JETWAY TRADE WAS PERFORMED. NEITHER THE ON-COMING, OFF GOING, #1 OR #3 FLT ATTENDANTS NOTIFIED ME OF THE CHANGE. CONSEQUENTLY, NO VERIFICATION PROCS WERE FOLLOWED. ADDITIONALLY, IF I WOULD HAVE KNOWN, THE DRUG TEST REPRESENTATIVE COULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED DIFFERENTLY. END RESULT: THE FLT WAS FLOWN WITH 3 FLT ATTENDANTS, BUT I WAS UNAWARE OF THE CHANGE. JETWAY TRADES NEED TO HAVE AN ADDITIONAL STEP OF NOTIFYING THE CAPT (THROUGH SCHEDULING) IF THE CREWMEMBERS THEMSELVES CANNOT PERFORM THIS FUNCTION.

Synopsis :

B737-300 CREW DEP ON THEIR FINAL LEG OF THE DAY 1 SHORT OF FLT ATTENDANTS.

**ACN: 546487**

## **Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Intersection : COFAX

State Reference : PA

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

## **Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZOB.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : A319

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

## **Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7000

ASRS Report : 546487

## **Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

## **Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

## **Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

HIGH VELOCITY TAILWIND DSCNT INTO PHL RESULTING IN AN ALT ERROR. ATC CLRNC WAS TO CROSS COFAX AT FL240. I DISCUSSED THE PARAMETERS OF THE FMS BEING LIMITED WITH A HIGH TAILWIND (270 DEGS, 130 KTS) WHEN ENTERING XING ALT IN THE FMS AND DISCUSSED HOW I WOULD COMPENSATE FOR IT. THE FO DISAGREED WITH MY BRIEFED SOLUTION AND ITS LIMITS TO THIS FMS LIMIT. HE STATED IT WAS NOT A PROB. I ASKED HIM HOW HE WOULD COMPENSATE FOR THIS FMS LIMIT AND HE SAID WITH 'SPD ADJUSTMENT.' I AGREED THAT WOULD WORK AS WELL. DURING THE DSCNT, I WAS OFF COM #1 GETTING WX AND GATE INFO AND I NOTICED AND I INFORMED FO HE WAS HIGH AND INFORMED ATC, WHEREUPON ATC STATED 'DO YOUR BEST.' FO NEVER ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE HIS DSCNT PROFILE AS HE HAD BRIEFED PRIOR TO DSCNT BY COMPENSATING FOR TAILWIND WITH SPD AND HE MISSED XING RESTR BY 600 FT (AIR WAS SMOOTH WITHOUT ANY INFLT PIREPS OF TURB) AND STATED 'THAT IS HIS PROB, NOT MINE,' PRIOR TO THE XING FIX. WHEN INFORMED OF THE NEED FOR PAPERWORK, HE SHOUTED 'GOOD' AND HE PUT HIS FACE CLOSELY IN FRONT OF MINE. I WOULD DESCRIBE HIS BEHAVIOR AS RAGE. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND PERFORMED PF DUTIES SUCH AS ENTERING FMS DATA. HE DISAGREED WITH MY ENTRY AND CHANGED IT AND STATED IT IS NOT A CORRECT PROC. I DIRECTED FO TO ACCOMPLISH PNF TASKS, WHEREUPON 'TRANSITION,' '180 FOR 170' CALLOUTS WERE MISSED, WHICH MAY HAVE CAUSED AN ALT ERROR. I HAD TO DIRECT FO TO CONCENTRATE ON ASSISTING ME WHEN HE WAS CONCENTRATING ON TAKING NOTES. I TOLD HIM TO 'PUT AWAY THE NOTES.' BELOW 10000 FT (CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT) HE WAS READING THE QRH (I HAD NOT CALLED FOR NOR WAS I INFORMED OF QRH NEED) DUE TO A STATUS MESSAGE. I STATED 'PUT AWAY THE QRH.' MULTIPLE CALLOUTS WERE ABSENT AND/OR ERRONEOUS BY FO. I HAD TO REPEAT MY COMMANDS MULTIPLE TIMES TO HAVE THEM ACCOMPLISHED, SUCH AS 'FLAPS 2 DEGS' WITH THE ACFT SPD APPROPRIATE FOR THE COMMANDED FLAP SETTING AND NO CALLOUTS OF 'SPD.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR (SCHEDULING FLIP-FLOP). CURRENT COMPANY AND UNION EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (STATEMENTS BY CEO DURING A 'TOWN HALL' MEETING AND LACK OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, USING TAX MONEY TO 'BUST OUR UNION,' ETC, WAS DISCUSSED PRIOR TO DEP.) PREVENTION: MY SUGGESTION FOR THIS PROB IS ADDITIONAL CRM AND SIMULATOR TRAINING (CURRENTLY WORKING WITH 'PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS') FOR FO. FOR BETTER SCHEDULING POLICY TO REDUCE FATIGUE. ACARS WX WOULD HAVE ASSISTED ME IN IDENTING HIGH CONDITION EARLIER BY NOT BEING OFF COM #1 TO GET WX AND GATE INFO. UPDATING FMS MATH CO-PROCESSORS TO COMPENSATE FOR HIGH TAILWIND/HIGH GND SPD DSCNTS. I NOTICED A 'TEMPER' DISPLAY FROM FO AT THE GATE IN PHX (BEGINNING OF THE PAIRING) WHEN GATE AGENT WANTED TO PLACE A 'MUST RIDE' PLT ON THE FLT DECK JUMP SEAT TO MAKE MORE ROOM FOR ADDITIONAL 'MUST RIDE' PLTS (FULL ACFT). HE WAS SHOUTING 'NO WAY' AND WAS VERBALLY BASHING SCHEDULING. HE WAS DEMONSTRATING 'HIS AUTH' THAT HE WAS MAKING THE DECISION. WE DISCUSSED THE SIT AS WELL AS HAVING A 'SECRET SVC' MAN ON BOARD (ACCORDING TO FLT OPS BULLETIN) BEING ALLOWED TO OCCUPY THE JUMP SEAT WITHOUT AN AVAILABLE CABIN SEAT AND NOT REQUIRING EMPLOYEE VERIFICATION. BOTH OF US WERE GLAD TO HAVE HIM UP FRONT WITH US, CONSIDERING THE NATION IS AT WAR, AND CAME TO AN AGREEMENT. SECRET SVC AGENT STAYS UP FRONT WHILE ANOTHER DEADHEADING CAPT REMAINS UP FRONT IN THE COCKPIT AS WELL. I SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED HIS MENTAL STATE WHEN HE BEGAN SHOUTING IN PHX AND HAD HIM REPLACED AT THAT TIME IN PHX. THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS BTWN THE MGMNT AND PLTS IS BECOMING MORE OF AN ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP AND IS INCREASING STRESS LEVELS. I AM SUGGESTING AND WILL REQUEST A PRESIDENTIAL EMER BOARD RESOLVE THE DISPUTE.

Synopsis :

A319 CAPT AND FO DO NOT APPEAR TO BE GETTING ALONG AND ARE NOT ABLE TO WORK AS AN EFFECTIVE CREW.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IAD.Airport  
State Reference : VA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : IAD.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Fokker 100  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : IAD.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
ASRS Report : 546902

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Person / 4**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : AIRSPEED INDICATOR  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE W ABEAM THE ARPT AT 6000 FT, 210 KTS AND HDG 190 DEGS. I WAS THE PF. APCH CTL INDICATED THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT A SHORT APCH. WE RECEIVED A DSCNT CLRNC TO 3000 FT. I SELECTED 180 KTS, ACTIVATED THE SPD BRAKES MOMENTARILY AND REQUESTED FLAPS 8 DEGS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER I REQUESTED FLAPS 15 DEGS. I ASKED THE FO TO ADVISE APCH CTL THAT THE RWY WAS IN SIGHT. THE FO COMPLIED. APCH CTL STATED THAT A REGIONAL JET WAS AT OUR 9 O'CLOCK POS. I COULD NOT FIND THE TFC. APCH CTL STATED THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT A L TURN. THIS WAS FOLLOWED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY ANOTHER XMISSION DIRECTING US TO TURN L TO 90 DEGS ALONG WITH A VISUAL APCH CLRNC. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AS WERE, I BELIEVED, THE AUTO THROTTLES. I TURNED MY ATTN TO THE FLT MODE PANEL AND DIALED A L TURN TO 90 DEGS. AS I SCANNED THE PRIMARY FLT DISPLAY, I SAW A LONG DECREASING AIRSPD TREND LINE. THE INDICATED AIRSPD WAS AT OR SLIGHTLY BELOW VMA. I CORRECTED BY SWIFTLY AND SMOOTHLY ADDING PWR. SAFE AIRSPD WAS ACHIEVED SWIFTLY. I BELIEVE THAT ALPHA MODE PROTECTION HAD ENGAGED. THE REST OF THE FLT CONTINUED SAFELY AND NORMALLY. IN MY OWN REVIEW OF WHAT CAUSED THIS EVENT, SEVERAL FAILURES ON MY BEHALF BECAME EVIDENT. I HAD DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHROTTLES IN ORDER TO EFFECT A SMOOTH AIRSPD REDUCTION FROM APPROX 300 KTS BACK TO 210 KTS. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT DSCNT TO 3000 FT, I SELECTED THE AUTOTHROTTLES BACK ON BY ARMING THE AUTOTHROTTLES SWITCH ON THE FLT MODE PANEL. I FAILED TO ENSURE THAT THE GREEN SELECT LIGHT UNDER THE INDICATED AIRSPD KNOB WAS ILLUMINATED. BECAUSE OF THIS, I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SURE THAT THE SELECT MODE WAS ACTIVE. I WAS NO LONGER FLYING THE ACFT. I FAILED TO ADEQUATELY COMMUNICATE WITH THE FO THAT THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE OFF WHEN I INTENDED THEM TO BE OFF. LIKEWISE, I DID NOT EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATE WHEN I INTENDED FOR THEM TO BE BACK ON. I DID NOT SEEK A CONFIRMATION FROM THE FO ON EITHER OCCASION. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE DISTRACTED. I FAILED TO SET PRIORITIES. I WAS OVERLY INDULGED IN SPOTTING TFC. THE TFC POSED NO THREAT TO OUR SAFETY. HOWEVER, IN A MISPLACED EFFORT TO GET THE JOB DONE I ALLOWED MY ATTN TO DIGRESS FROM THE REAL JOB OF FLYING THE ACFT. I PLACED AN OVER-RELIANCE ON AUTOMATION. I FAILED TO CONFIRM MODE SELECTION OF THE AUTOTHROTTLES. I FAILED TO KEEP SCANNING. IN ANALYZING THE FAILURES THAT LED TO THIS EVENT, IT HAS GIVEN ME A GREATER AWARENESS OF THE FOLLOWING: 1) PRIORITIZATION OF TASKS. 2) CRM. EFFECTIVE COM IS SPEAKING AND RECEIVING A RESPONSE. 3) AUTOMATION. ALWAYS CONFIRM THAT THE COMMANDED MODE IS ACTIVE. CONTINUE TO SCAN INSTRUMENTATION.

Synopsis :

PLT BECOMES DISTR DURING APCH AND FAILS TO NOTICE AUTOTHROTTLES ARE NOT ENGAGED. ACFT SLOWS BELOW MINIMUM APCH SPD.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SHV.Airport  
State Reference : LA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SHV.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : EMB ERA 145 ER&LR  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1400  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300  
ASRS Report : 547664

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : GPWS  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON MAY/SAT/02, I WAS THE FO ON A FLT FROM IAH TO SHV. AS WE APCHED THE SHV AREA I TOLD THE CAPT (THE PF) THAT I THOUGHT I HAD THE FIELD. AFTER TALKING ABOUT IT WE DECIDED THAT WE DID NOT THINK THAT WAS THE FIELD AND THAT THERE WAS NUMEROUS ARPTS IN THE AREA. ATC THEN INFORMED US OF THE FIELD LOCATION WHICH MATCHED THE LOCATION OF THE FIELD WE WERE LOOKING AT. AT THAT POINT ATC ASKED IF WE WANTED A VECTOR/TURN TO LOSE ALT. I ASKED THE CAPT/PF AND HE SAID TO TELL THEM WE HAD THE FIELD. UPON INFORMING ATC WE HAD THE FIELD, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. AT THAT POINT, I DO NOT RECALL OUR ALT HOWEVER, IT LOOKED HIGH. THE CAPT COMMANDED FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN. AS WE WERE WITHIN THE SPD LIMITATION. I SELECTED FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN. THE CAPT THEN BEGAN WHAT I WOULD CONSIDER AN AGGRESSIVE DSCNT. I DO NOT RECALL THE RATE OF DSCNT AS I WAS WORKING ON THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. AS WE REACHED 2000 FT MSL THE CAPT SLOWED THE RATE OF DSCNT AND BEGAN TURNING TOWARDS THE FIELD. AROUND 4.5 MI DME ON RWY 14 LOC I CALLED SHV TWR AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO LAND ON RWY 14. AS I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE INITIAL HIGH DSCNT RATE I TOLD THE CAPT I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE APCH AND THAT 'I DID NOT LIKE THIS.' AS THE CAPT DID NOT WANT TO EXCEED 30 DEGS OF BANK WE OVERSHOT FINAL A LITTLE AND THEN HE CORRECTED BACK TO FINAL. AROUND THIS POINT BOTH THE CAPT'S PFD AND MFD WENT BLANK AND THE AURAL WARNING UNIT BEGAN TO SAY 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN, BANK ANGLE, WINDSHEAR.' AS IT WAS VFR AND THE APCH WAS ON LOC/GS AT THE TIME, WE CONTINUED. THE AURAL WARNING UNIT CONTINUED TO SAY BANK ANGLE ALL THE WAY TO THE GATE DURING THE TAXI IN. WE LANDED ON SPD IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE WITHOUT INCIDENT. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE INITIAL HIGH RATE OF DSCNT AND GOING THROUGH THE LOC, I AS THE FO FELT THE APCH TO BE UNSTABLE. I ALSO FELT WE COULD HAVE USED BETTER CRM AS THE CAPT DID NOT TELL ME WHAT WE WERE DOING AND DID NOT RESPOND TO MY QUESTIONING HIS APCH. BETTER PLANNING SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXECUTED AND WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN A TURN TO LOSE ALT.

Synopsis :

UNSTABILIZED APCH.

**ACN: 556097**

**Time**

Date : 200208

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EGLL.Airport

State Reference : FO

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 556097

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : Flight Attendant In Charge

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : FAA

Narrative :

REQUESTED THAT I BE INFORMED OF THE CURRENT INFLT POLICY REGARDING FLT ATTENDANTS WHO HAVE SECURITY CONCERNS PRIOR TO DEP TIME AND WISH TO DEPLANE EVEN THOUGH THE CAPT/GSC ARE COMFORTABLE WITH THE SECURITY SIT. TO DATE, I HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE, SO I CONDUCTED MY OWN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MATTER TO DETERMINE THE CURRENT POLICY. AFTER DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH INFLT SUPVR'S FROM LHR, EWR, JFK AND THE DUTY FLT MGR WAS STARTLED AND DISMAYED TO DISCOVER THE STIFFLING AND THREATENING COMPANY POLICY THAT MUZZLES MY ONLY EYES AND EARS IN THE CABIN AND FEEL THE POLICY IS A SEVERE THREAT TO ACFT SECURITY AND IS DIAMETRICALLY IN OPPOSITION TO EVERY ASPECT OF COM AND ADVOCACY ENDORSE BY THE CRM CONCEPTS OF CREW COORDINATION AND COOPERATION. AS I UNDERSTAND THE POLICY, IF THE CAPT AND GSC ARE COMFORTABLE WITH A SECURITY CONCERN OF A FLT ATTENDANT AND THE RPTING FLT ATTENDANT STILL DESIRES TO DEPLANE, THEN, AFTER CONSULTING WITH INFLT SUPVR'S, THE INFLT SUPVR WILL GIVE THE CONCERNED FLT ATTENDANT A DIRECT ORDER TO WORK THE FLT, IF THE FLT ATTENDANT REFUSED, SHE/HE WILL BE TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT. I HAVE BEEN BRIEFING FLT ATTENDANTS ON EVERY FLT SINCE 09/TUE/01 AND I TELL THEM THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A TRIVIAL SECURITY CONCERN; THAT I WILL NOT TRIVIALIZE ANYTHING THEY INTUITIVELY FEEL IS UNCOMFORTABLE SECURITY WISE. I ALSO TELL THEM THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A DISRUPTIVE PAX ON BOARD ACFT EVER AGAIN. TERRORIST WILL NOT MAKE BLATANT ERRORS; IT'S THE SUBTLE, TRIVIAL BLUNDER THAT COULD GO UNDETECTED THAT WE SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH. I FEEL THE CURRENT RESTRICTIVE AND INTIMIDATING, POLICY IS DIVISIVE AND FORCES THE FLT ATTENDANT TO THINK TWICE ABOUT RPTING THE TRIVIAL INCIDENT. IF HE/SHE DOES AND NO ONE AGREES, THE ONLY RECOURSE IS TO WORK THE TRIP OR BE FIRED. AN ATTRACTIVE SURE-FIRE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO 'GET ILL' ON PREFLT AND DEPLANE WITHOUT INFORMING ANYONE, THEREBY POSSIBLY SEALING THE FATE OF THE CREW/PAX. THIS PRACTICE TOTALLY COUNTERS THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF CRM. I FEEL, IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY THREAT TO AIR CREW MEMBERS, WE SHOULD ALL BE WORKING, TOGETHER FOR THE SECURITY OF OUR PAX, AIRCREW AND ACFT.

Synopsis :

A CONCERNED B777 CAPT EXPRESSES HOW, 'HEAR SAY,' COMPANY POLICY IS A DETRIMENT TO THE FREE FLOW OF INFO INVOLVING SECURITY MATTERS.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EHAM.Airport  
State Reference : FO

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 3000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : EHAM.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B767-200  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 556147

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EFIS  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

JUST AFTER LIFTOFF, WITH CAPT FLYING, L UPPER AND LOWER CRT'S FAILED (LOSS OF PRIMARY ATTITUDE AND MAP INFO FOR CAPT). CTL OF ACFT WAS PASSED TO FO. CAPT SELECTED 'ALT,' WHICH USED ANOTHER SOURCE TO PROVIDE ATTITUDE AND MAP INFO. ACFT WAS RETURNED TO AMS USING OVERWT LNDG TECHNIQUES. WE HAD R IRU MEL'ED PRIOR. HAD WE NOT HAD A REAL WORLD THOROUGH PRE TKOF BRIEFING WITH ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS (CAPT, FO AND IRO) ADDING IMPORTANT DISCUSSION ITEMS, THE FIRST 60 SECONDS AFTER THE ATTITUDE, ETC, LOSS WOULD HAVE BEEN BUSIER THAN IT ALREADY WAS. AS CAPT, I MUST SAY WHAT A PLEASURE IT IS TO FLY WITH EXPERIENCED 'CRM-WISE,' CONFIDENT FELLOW AVIATORS (ESPECIALLY WHEN A PROB ARISES).

Synopsis :

A B767-200 FLC HAS TO PERFORM A RETURN LAND WHEN THE CAPT'S EFIS PANEL LOSES THE DISPLAYS OF PRIMARY ATTITUDE AND MAP DISPLAY AFTER TKOF FROM EHAM, FO.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

State Reference : GA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 33000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZJX.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : MD-11  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 18000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 0.5  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000  
ASRS Report : 557025

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 557647

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

SMOKE OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN WHILE IN CRUISE. EMER LNDG IN ATL, RWY 11, VFR. NO DAMAGE, NO INJURIES. SIT WELL HANDLED BY BOTH FLC AND CABIN CREW ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED PROCS. WHEN ASKED BY THE FO WHAT TO ENTER ON THE FMS FUEL DUMP PAGE, I RESPONDED WITH THE DEFAULT WT OF 430K, POUNDS (NO CHANGE). HOWEVER, I ADDED THAT THIS WOULD GIVE US 80K POUNDS OF FUEL REMAINING. WE WERE BOTH ON OXYGEN AND MY MIKE PICK-UP WAS WEAK UNLESS I HELD IT CLOSE TO MY LIPS. ALL THE FO HEARD WAS THE END OF MY STATEMENT, SO HE SET 48000 POUNDS IN THE DUMP WINDOW. I MISSED IT! WE LANDED 45000 POUNDS OVERWT, BUT WELL WITHIN RWY ALLOWABLE, THANKS TO RELIEF PLT, WHO CAUGHT ERROR. LESSON: ANSWER THE QUESTION AND KEEP IT SIMPLE WHEN IN THIS TYPE OF SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 556647: AS IN A LOT OF SCENARIOS SUCH AS THIS, COM WAS A KEY FACTOR IN THE OUTCOME. CONTINUED PRACTICE DURING SIMULATOR TRAINING WORKING VARIOUS ABNORMAL SITS WITH THE OXYGEN MASKS ON WOULD BE HELPFUL. A MISCOM OCCURRED DURING OUR SCENARIO ABOUT HOW MUCH FUEL WE WOULD DUMP AND HOW MUCH WE WOULD WEIGH UPON LNDG WHICH RESULTED IN AN OVERWT LNDG BY 45K LBS. ALL PARTS OF THE INCIDENT WERE EXECUTED WITH GOOD CRM AND THE CAPT FACILITATED THE SAFE OUTCOME WITH HIS LEADERSHIP AND SKILLS.

Synopsis :

MD11 FLC HAS SMOKE IN COCKPIT. DECLARES EMER.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : PIE.Airport  
State Reference : FL

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : PIE.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter  
Make Model : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng  
Mission : Passenger

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : PIE.Tower  
Make Model : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4600  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1600  
ASRS Report : 558101

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 35R VIA RWY 35L/17R, WHICH BECOMES TXWY A, AND TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9/27. WE TAXIED OUT AND WERE RUNNING THE TAXI CHKS WHEN AN ALERT GND CTLR REMINDED US WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9/27 AND CLRED US FOR AN IMMEDIATE XING. COMPANY SOP'S ARE TO VISUALLY AND ORALLY CLR BOTH DIRECTIONS WHEN XING ANY RWY. THE NOSE OF THE ACFT HAD CROSSED OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 9/27 WHEN THE CTLR HAD REMINDED US ABOUT THE PREVIOUS CLRNC. AT THIS MOMENT, I IMMEDIATELY APPLIED THE BRAKES. WE WERE NOT ON THE RWY, BUT THERE WAS A SINGLE ENG AIRPLANE ON ABOUT A 1 1/2 MI FINAL FOR RWY 9. THE CTLR HAD CLRED US FOR AN IMMEDIATE XING. WE COMPLIED WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE SHOULD HAVE SLOWED THINGS DOWN AND BEEN MORE ALERT TO THE INTXN. MY ROLE AS CAPT WAS COMPROMISED BY FAILING TO REMEMBER THE HOLD SHORT CLRNC. FROM NOW ON I WILL SLOW DOWN MY TAXI SPD WHEN APCHING INTXNS AND USE BETTER CRM WHEN XING.

Synopsis :

FLC HAS RWY INCURSION AT PIE.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MIA.Airport  
State Reference : FO

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MIA.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MIA.Tower  
Make Model : Helicopter  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Aircraft / 3**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MIA.Tower  
Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
ASRS Report : 558609

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 6**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 7**

Function.Controller : Local

**Person / 5**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

MIA TWR WAS OPERATING BOTH RWY 27L&R TKOFS AND LNDGS WHILE WE WERE SITTING ON THE ACTIVE RWY, 27R WAITING TO TAKE OFF, IN POS AND HOLD. THERE WERE 4 PEOPLE IN THE COCKPIT -- FO, FAA INSPECTOR, NON REVENUE PLT FOR ACR X, AND MYSELF. WE WERE TOLD BY MIA TWR THAT WE WOULD BE ON THE RWY FOR ABOUT 2 MINS WAITING FOR A HELI TO LAND OPPOSITE DIRECTION ON RWY 9L. AS USUAL, THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE MIA TWR WORKING BOTH RWYS. THE FO, FAA INSPECTOR AND MYSELF HEARD THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 27R, ONCE THE HELI CLRED THE RWY. I READ BACK TO THE CTLR, 'ACR X CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 27R, TURN R TO HDG 290 DEGS.' THE NON REVENUE PLT QUESTIONED WHETHER WE WERE CLRED, OR ACFT Y ON RWY 27L, WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. I QUESTIONED THE CLRNC WITH MIA TWR AND THE NON REVENUE PLT WAS RIGHT -- THE TKOF CLRNC WAS FOR ACFT Y. THE TWR CTLR NEVER SAID ANYTHING ABOUT SIMILAR SOUNDING CALL SIGNS AND GAVE THE EXACT SAME CLRNC TO ACFT Y. WE DID NOT TAKE OFF, BUT IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE THE NON REVENUE PLT QUESTIONED THE TKOF CLRNC. AS I ALREADY MENTIONED, EVEN THE FAA INSPECTOR THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. THE ONLY REASON THE NON REVENUE PLT HAD ANY QUESTION WAS BECAUSE HE HEARD ACFT Y GET A CLRNC TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 27L, JUST PRIOR TO THE CONFUSING TKOF CLRNC. THE FAA INSPECTOR FROM NYC SAID WE DID AN EXCELLENT JOB WITH GREAT CRM. HE SAID HE WOULD PURSUE THIS FURTHER WITH MIA TWR FOLKS.

Synopsis :

A B757 CREW, HOLDING IN POS AT MIA, ACCEPTED A CLRNC THEY THOUGHT WAS INTENDED FOR THEM. HOWEVER, AN ALERT COMPANY JUMP SEATER ADVISED THE CLRNC WAS FOR ANOTHER ACFT.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SJC.Airport  
State Reference : CA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : Marginal  
Ceiling.Single Value : 1300

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : O90.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : SJC.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter  
Make Model : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer  
Mission : Ambulance  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : O90.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : SJC.Tower  
Make Model : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 22000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 90  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 115  
ASRS Report : 558879

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 400  
ASRS Report : 558312

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

AN INTERMITTENTLY INOP VHF XMITTER MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO CONFUSION THAT RESULTED IN DSCNT BELOW MSA WHILE BEING RADAR VECTORED TO FINAL FOR THE VOR DME RWY 30R APCH AT SJC. I WAS THE PF IN VMC ON TOP OF SCATTERED TO BROKEN CLOUDS. BOTH OF US NOTED THE PROX TO TERRAIN, BUT BEING WELL CLR ABOVE IT, WE DID NOT IMMEDIATELY QUESTION OUR CLRNC. WE HAD JUST NOTICED THAT SOMEHOW THE ACTIVE COM HAD BEEN SWITCHED PREMATURELY TO TWR. WHETHER THAT WAS A RESULT OF SETTING OVER THE ACTIVE FREQ OR ACCEPTING ANOTHER ACFT'S FREQ, I'M NOT SURE, BUT BAY APCH FIGURED WHAT HAPPENED AND SOON SJC TWR ASKED US TO CLB TO 5000 FT. NEXT WE WERE GIVEN SEVERAL VECTORS, ONE OF WHICH WE RESPONDED TO WAS FOR AN ACFT WITH A SIMILAR CALL SIGN. THIS FACT COUPLED WITH AN INOP XMITTER MAY HAVE PREVENTED APCH CTL FROM HEARING OUR RESPONSE, THUS ELIMINATING THE FAIL SAFE FEATURE OF PRECISE READBACKS. THE APCH CONTINUED NORMALLY UNTIL WE WERE GIVEN A LOW ALT ALERT BY TWR. I HAD PREMATURELY TRANSITIONED TO VISUAL GUIDANCE AND FAILED TO MAINTAIN THE RECOMMENDED ALT AFTER ACQUIRING THE RWY. EQUIP FAILURE ASIDE, I BELIEVE COMPLACENCY PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS POORLY EXECUTED FLT. RECOGNITION OF THIS, PLUS IMPROVED CRM AND ADHERENCE TO NON PRECISION APCH PROCS, SHOULD HELP PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THESE MISTAKES.

Synopsis :

THE FLC WHILE ON VECTORS FOR AN APCH DSND BELOW MSA FOR THE AREA.

**Time**

Date : 200209

Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : TOL.Airport

State Reference : OH

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

Ceiling.Single Value : 7000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : TOL.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 559622

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Rejected Takeoff

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

THIS COMMENTARY CONCERNS THE EVENTS OF A FLT UPON WHICH I ACTED AS A FO DURING MY FIRST TRIP ON IOE. ONCE WE HAD ARRIVED ON OUR INBOUND FLT, I PERFORMED THE WALKAROUND (POSTFLT/PREFLT) AND NOTED NO ABNORMALITIES. I COPIED OUR ATIS, RECEIVED OUR CLRNC, SET THE V-SPDS, DETERMINED OUR THRUST SETTINGS AND MAX TKOF WT BASED ON THE PROJECTED AND CURRENT RWY IN USE (OVER 10000 FT LONG). ONCE ALL PAPERWORK WAS DONE, CLRNC WAS RECEIVED TO TAXI TO THE LONGER RWY UPON WHICH THE CAPT REQUESTED A NEARER AND SHORTER RWY (5600 FT). I QUESTIONED THE USE OF THE RWY DUE TO HIGH TEMP (OUTSIDE AIR TEMP), ACFT LOADING, AND THE FACT THAT PERFORMANCE NUMBERS HAD NOT BEEN CALCULATED FOR THE SHORTER RWY. THE CAPT FORGED AHEAD IN SPITE OF MY CONTINUED OBJECTIONS AND PROCEEDED TO ATTEMPT A TKOF ON THE SHORTER RWY. AS WE ACCELERATED DOWN THE RWY, AND I CALLED OUT THE AIRSPD, THE CAPT WISELY DECIDED TO ABORT. HE SUCCESSFULLY REJECTED THE TKOF AND TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY. AS A RESULT OF THE REJECTED TKOF THE BRAKE TEMPS WERE HOT AND I NOTIFIED THE CAPT THAT WE WOULD NEED TO HOLD IN POS ON THE RAMP TO ALLOW THE BRAKES TO COOL BEFORE A SECOND TKOF COULD BE MADE. ABOUT 30 SECONDS LATER, I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WOULD LIKE ME TO CONTACT GND TO REQUEST A PLACE TO HOLD. HE SAID 'NO' AND THAT WE WOULD TAKE OFF IMMEDIATELY. I OBJECTED 3-4 TIMES STATING THAT I DID NOT THINK WE SHOULD ATTEMPT THE TKOF DUE TO HIGH BRAKE TEMPS, LACK OF COOLING, EFFECT ON THE TIRES, AND WHAT THE EFFECT WOULD BE ON A SECOND REJECTED TKOF. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT CHOSE TO IGNORE MY OBJECTIONS. HE TOOK OFF AND THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY TO OUR DEST. IN SUMMARY, THE CAPT USED POOR JUDGEMENT AND IN SPITE OF REPEATED OBJECTIONS BY MYSELF, ATTEMPTED A TKOF ON A RWY WHICH WAS TOO SHORT FOR THE CURRENT CONDITIONS. HE THEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED A REJECTED TKOF AND THEN TOOK OFF ON THE LONGER AND APPROPRIATE RWY WITH HIGH BRAKE TEMPS WITHOUT THE MANDATORY COOLING TIMES AS STATED IN THE FLT MANUAL. THE CAPT IGNORED MY INPUT AND SEEMED INTENT ON USING BAD JUDGEMENT IN SPITE OF OBVIOUS SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS. I AND MY STRONG OBJECTIONS. IT SEEMED THAT THE CAPT BECAME A 1-MAN CREW AND PROPER CRM STOPPED.

Synopsis :

A CANADAIR CL65 REJECTED TKOF ON A SHORT RWY WITH A HIGH ENERGY STOP. MADE SECOND TKOF FROM LONGER RWY WITHOUT BRAKE COOLING.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference : US

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 5000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LCH.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : A300  
Mission : Test Flight

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200  
ASRS Report : 559801

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

CONDUCTING A FUNCTIONAL TEST OF THE AUTO GAR FEATURE OF AUTOPLT #2 DURING A POST 'C' CHK ACCEPTANCE FLT. INITIAL PITCH AND AIRSPD NORMAL AT 15 DEGS ANU AND V3 (150 KTS). AT 1000 FT CTL COLUMN NOSE DOWN INPUTS INITIATED, HOWEVER ACFT PITCH INCREASED. AT 3000 FT PITCH EXCEEDED 20 DEGS ANU AND SPD DECREASED BELOW 120 KTS. MAX THRUST WAS APPLIED. TRIM WAS NOT MOVING AT 4.5 DEGS ANU AND ELEVATOR EFFECTIVENESS WAS DIMINISHING. PITCH INCREASED TO 29 DEGS (FROM DIGITAL FLT DATA RECORDER) AT 4000 FT. MANUAL TRIM WHEEL WAS MOVED NOSE DOWN, DISCONNECTING PITCH TRIM AND AUTOPLT. RECOVERY WAS MADE. THRUST WAS REDUCED AFTER 10-15 SECONDS OF OVERTEMP ON CF6-50-C2 ENGS. DECLARED AN EMER AND RETURNED WITHOUT FURTHER EVENT TO ZZZ. INFREQUENCY OF TRAINING IN AUTO GAR CAUSED BREAKDOWN IN SOP. COMPLACENT APCH TO POOR ACFT PERFORMANCE DUE TO ON-GOING MULTIPLE MECHANICAL FAULTS/FAILURES IN TEST FLT. FAILURE TO DISCONNECT AUTOPLT. PF DID NOT QUICKLY AND DEFINITELY ANNOUNCE PITCH CTL PROB ALLOWING ENTIRE CREW TO FOCUS ON RESOLUTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE FLC WAS NOT PREPARED FOR THE AUTOTRIM AND AUTOPLT TO MALFUNCTION DURING THE GAR. THIS MALFUNCTION IS A RARE OCCURRENCE AND THE HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK OF THE ACFT WAS VERY UNUSUAL. HE STATED THAT HIS LACK OF COMMUNICATING TO THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS (CRM) WHEN THE MALFUNCTION WAS REALIZED CAUSED FOR A SLOW REACTION TO THE SIT. THE FACT THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT DISCONNECTED IMMEDIATELY WAS A FACTOR. AS THE ACFT ACHIEVED A DANGEROUSLY HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK THE SIT DETERIORATED AND THE FLC BECAME FIXATED AND DID NOT PERFORM THE SOPS AS PER THE OPERATING MANUAL.

Synopsis :

A300 AIRBUS FLC, DURING A GAR, HAS A MALFUNCTION OF THE AUTOPLT AND THE ACFT PITCHES INTO AN UNSAFE NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MSP.Airport  
State Reference : MN

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MSP.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : DC-9 30  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8700  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 135  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 8000  
ASRS Report : 560664

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Passenger Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE TAXIING OUT FOR TKOF AT MSP, WE HAD A R MAIN GEAR COLLAPSE ON A TXWY. THE GEAR COLLAPSE REALLY ISN'T THE STORY HERE. THE STORY HERE IS ABOUT THE CAPT AND MYSELF REACTING TO THE SIT IN DIFFERENT WAYS, AND THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF CREW COORD. AFTER THE COLLAPSE, THE CAPT WAFFLED ON HOW TO TREAT OUR SIT. I BELIEVED THE ACFT STRUCTURE WAS COMPROMISED AND SO COULD CAUSE A SIT THAT WOULD ENDANGER US. OUR INITIAL REACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RUN A CHKLIST IN THE CREW MANUALS. THERE IS NO SUCH CHKLIST FOR A GEAR COLLAPSE, SO WE HAD TO IMPROVISE. SINCE HE AND I VIEWED THE SIT IN DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, WE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY DRIFTED APART AS WE ANALYZED AND REACTED TO THE PROB. HE DIDN'T DIRECT ME OR ASK MY OPINION AS WE BEGAN TO WORK ON PROBS. AS WE DEALT WITH THE PROB IT BECAME EVIDENT WE WEREN'T ON THE SAME PAGE WHEN I ELECTED TO SHUT DOWN ALL PWR TO THE ACFT EXCEPT THE #1 COMRDO AND PA SYS. THE CAPT WAS SURPRISED BY MY ACTIONS, WHILE I THOUGHT THIS WAS WHAT HE WANTED. I ASSUMED HE WAS LOOKING AT THE SIT THE SAME WAY I WAS. HE GAVE ME NO GUIDANCE OR ORDERS THAT MIGHT HAVE CHANGED MY MIND. IN THE END, WE GOT THE PAX OFF THROUGH THE MAIN CABIN DOOR USING PORTABLE STAIRS. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE ACFT SUSTAINED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE DUE TO THE GEAR COLLAPSE. IN THESE TYPES OF SITS, AIR CREWS ARE CALLED TO ACT WITH NO GUIDANCE FROM ACFT MANUALS. WHEN NO GUIDANCE EXISTS, CREWS ARE ON THEIR OWN. I BELIEVE THIS SIT POINTS OUT WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN THE CAPT'S GUIDANCE IS ABSENT. CREW MEMBERS, WHEN LACKING GUIDANCE, WILL BEGIN TO ACT ON THEIR OWN AND PERHAPS AGAINST THE CAPT'S UNSTATED WISHES. CRM DOCTRINE ALSO PLACES SOME RESPONSIBILITY ON SUBORDINATE'S SHOULDERS. THE CAPT SHOULD BE ADVISED OF CONCERNS DURING AN EMER SO A WELL THOUGHT OUT PLAN OF ACTION MAY BE MADE.

Synopsis :

THE PIC AND FO FAIL TO AGREE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE COLLAPSED R GEAR IN THEIR DC9-30 AT MSP, MN.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SNY.Airport  
State Reference : NE

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 15000

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model : PA-44 Seminole Turbo Seminole  
Mission : Pleasure  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Aircraft / 2**

Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 75  
ASRS Report : 561095

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence.Other : CIRC BKR POLICY  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

GEAR FAILED TO EXTEND DURING DSCNT INTO SNY, GEAR PUMP CTL CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPPED. ATTEMPTED RESET 3 TIMES BUT CIRCUIT BREAKER WOULD NOT STAY SET. GEAR WOULD NOT EXTEND. OTHER AIRPLANE NEARBY AT SNY OBSERVED GEAR UP. RETURNED VFR TO APA. EXECUTED EMER GEAR EXTENSION CHKLIST. GEAR EXTENDED BUT NO GEAR SAFE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. LANDED SAFELY AT APA. GEAR BREAKER HAD BEEN SQUAWKED ON SEP/TUE/02 BUT SHOP COULD NOT DUPLICATE. PREVIOUS CRM TRAINING PLAYED KEY ROLE IN POSITIVE OUTCOME.

Synopsis :

THE PLT OF A PA44 SEMINOLE HAS TO RESORT TO HIS EMER EXTENSION SYS WHEN THE LNDG GEAR MAIN SYS MOTOR KEEPS POPPING THE CIRCUIT BREAKER WHILE IN DSCNT FOR AN APCH TO SNY, NE. RETURN LAND TO APA, CO.

**ACN: 561369**

**Time**

Date : 200209

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : JFK.Airport

State Reference : NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : A300

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 561369

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : Flight Attendant In Charge

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : SLAT SYSTEM 1,2 FAULT

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

SLAT PROB, UNABLE TO DEPLOY. DID 0 DEG SLAT, 40 DEG FLAP LNDG. ARRIVING JFK AROUND XA45Z, ABOUT 30 MI OUT SLOWING TO 235 KIAS, WE STARTED TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR THE APCH TO ILS RWY 31R AT JFK. WHEN WE DEPLOYED THE SLATS, WE GOT A SLAT SYS 1/2 FAULT. WE WENT TO THE A300 CHKLIST TO WORK THE PROB. WE ENDED UP LNDG WITH 0 DEG SLATS, 40 DEG FLAP SET-UP FOR LNDG. WE DECLARED AN EMER WITH NEW YORK APCH CTL. TOLD THEM WE HAD 91 PAX AND A CREW OF 9 ON BOARD WITH 14500 LBS OF FUEL ONBOARD. WE CHANGED OUR RWY TO THE ILS TO RWY 31L FOR THE LNDG. I MADE A PA TO THE PAX AND INFORMED THEM WHAT THE PROB WAS AND THAT WE HAD EVERYTHING UNDER CTL AND WOULD BE LNDG SOON. I ALSO TALKED WITH OUR #1 FLT ATTENDANT AND TOLD HIM WHAT WAS GOING ON. I BRIEFED HIM AND TOLD HIM TO BRIEF ALL THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS AND TO MOVE PEOPLE IF NEEDED. MY FO AND I COMPLETED ALL CHKLISTS IN REGARD TO THE SLAT PROB AND THE APCH CHK AND LNDG CHKLIST. WE HAD CFR WAITING FOR US AT JFK. OUR APCH SPD WAS AROUND 150 KIAS. WE TOUCHED DOWN WITHIN THE FIRST 1500 FT OF RWY 31L AND WENT TO THE END OF THE RWY WHERE CFR MET US ALONG WITH MAINT. WE ASKED MAINT TO MAKE SURE OUR BRAKES AND TIRES WERE OK AND THAT THE SLAT AND FLAPS WERE OK TOO. MAINT SAID EVERYTHING WAS FINE AND WE TAXIED IN, LEAVING OUR FLAPS DOWN FOR MAINT TO WORK ON. WE PARKED AT THE GATE AT JFK AND LEFT THE ACFT. I FELT THE CREW DID AN EXCELLENT JOB AND THAT CRM BTWN THE PLTS AND THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS EXCELLENT. THE PAX WERE VERY RELAXED AND DID WHAT THEY WERE TOLD. ALL IN ALL, A VERY NICE ENDING TO A LONG DAY.

Synopsis :

A300 CREW WAS NOT ABLE TO DEPLOY THE LEADING EDGE SLATS NORMALLY FOR LNDG.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport  
State Reference : NJ

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : TEB.Tower  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Gulfstream IV  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000  
ASRS Report : 561947

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met  
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

THE FLT WAS FROM RJAA TO PANC TO TEB. IT WAS AN EXTREMELY LONG FLT WITH AN EXTREMELY LONG DUTY DAY. THIS WAS NOT HELPED BY THE FACT THAT I HAD LITTLE SLEEP IN THE 24 HR PERIOD BEFORE TKOF, DUE TO THE TELEPHONE GOING OFF AND OTHER DUTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FLT. TKOF WAS SCHEDULED AT XA00 FROM NARITA, WHICH MEANT OUR FLT WOULD TAKE OFF AT NIGHT AND LAND AT NIGHT WITH SOME DAYLIGHT IN BTWN. IN ADDITION TO LITTLE SLEEP, THE COPLT WAS BRAND NEW TO THE COMPANY AND TO THE AIRPLANE. HE HAD NEVER FLOWN AN INTL, OVERWATER FLT. IN PANC, WE TOOK A SHORT MAINT DELAY WHILE I TRIED TO GET THE WATER SYS WORKING IN THE AIRPLANE SO THE PAX COULD HAVE RUNNING WATER. WE TOOK OFF FROM PANC FOR AN XA00 ARR IN TEB. BY THE TIME WE GOT TO TEB, I WAS EXHAUSTED. WE WERE RADAR VECTORED TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE TO RWY 6 FOR A STRAIGHT-IN LNDG. I BRIEFLY LOOKED OVER THE APCH PLATE EXPECTING TO FOLLOW THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR RWY 6 AND ASKING TO BREAK OFF THE APCH AND CIRCLE VISUALLY TO LAND ON RWY 1, MUCH MORE INTO THE WIND. AFTER HAVING BEEN CLRED FOR THE APCH, THE BREAKOFF WAS APPROVED AFTER PASSING TORBY, THE OM. I HAD TROUBLE PICKING UP THE ARPT AND IDENTING RWY 1. THE STADIUMS WE USE AS A POINT OF VISUAL REF FOR RWY 1 COULD NOT BE IDENTED BECAUSE ALL ASSOCIATED LIGHTING FOR THESE STADIUMS WERE NOT ON. WE WERE AT 2000 FT (ASSIGNED) WHEN CLRED FOR THE ILS 6 APCH. THINGS BEGAN TO HAPPEN FAST. I BECAME DISORIENTED ON THE ILS TO RWY 6. I STARTED A DSCNT FROM 2000 FT ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE WHEN GS INTERCEPTION ALT WAS REACHED. AT THIS POINT, I WAS STILL TRYING TO FIND RWY 1 SO I COULD ENTER A DOWNWIND/BASE FOR RWY 1. CONCENTRATING TOO MUCH ON THE CIRCLE FOR RWY 1, I MISSED THE XING ALT OF 1500 FT AT DANDY INTXN BEFORE THE OM. WITH RWY 6 NOW IN GOOD VISUAL SIGHT, I WAS DSNDRG. I FELT I WAS HIGH AND THEN I FELT I WAS LOW, TOO LOW FOR A CIRCLE TO RWY 1. I STARTED OUT AT 2000 FT AT GS INTERCEPT DOWN TO 1600 FT (BELOW GS) AND THEN BACK TO 2000 FT TO WAIT FOR THE GS INTERCEPT. IT WAS AT THIS POINT WHERE I DIDN'T REALLY KNOW WHAT ALT I SHOULD BE AT AND WHAT ALT I SHOULD CIRCLE TO RWY 1 AT. I SAW BIG, FAT TXWY 5 RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME. I DID NOT WANT TO TURN OFF OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE. I HAD NO OTHER REFS RIGHT AT THIS TIME OTHER THAN THE ILS AND RWY 6 AND I CERTAINLY DIDN'T WANT TO ADD TO THE PROB BY LEAVING THESE REFS IN SEARCH OF A RWY THAT I WAS NOT ALL THAT FAMILIAR WITH. I TOLD THE COPLT TO ASK TEB TWR FOR A STRAIGHT-IN LNDG TO RWY 6. THIS WAS APPROVED. I THOUGHT THAT GETTING THE AIRPLANE ON THE GND NOW ON RWY 6 WAS THE BEST OPTION, AFTER ALL WIND AT 360 DEGS AT 9 KTS GUSTING TO 15 KTS IS NOT THAT MUCH OF A XWIND WHEN LNDG ON RWY 5. SEVERAL FACTORS LED ME TO VARY THE ALT/DSCNT RATE (AND CLB), WHICH THEN LED ME TO NOT FOLLOW THE ALT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FINAL APCH TO RWY 5. THESE ARE: 1) MY PERSONAL RESERVES WERE GONE. I WAS EXHAUSTED. 2) MOMENTARY DISORIENTATION IN RESPECT TO RWY 5, WHICH LED TO INDECISION ABOUT THE BEST ALT TO CIRCLE TO RWY 1. I WANTED TO KEEP AS MUCH ALT AS POSSIBLE FOR THE CIRCLE. AT THIS MOMENT, I WAS ACTUALLY STILL TRYING TO DECIDE WHICH RWY I WANTED TO USE FOR THE LNDG. MY DECISION MAKING PROCESS WAS HAMPERED. I HAD NO REAL 'PLAN OF ATTACK' FOR THIS APCH: CIRCLE/NOT CIRCLE, STRAIGHT IN/NOT STRAIGHT IN RWY 1/RWY 6. 3) WE DIDN'T BRIEF THE APCH COMPLETELY. 4) NEW COPLT. MUCH OF THE FLT WAS TAKEN UP TALKING ABOUT AIRPLANE OPS AND INTL OPS. BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED IN TEB IN ADDITION TO BEING TIRED I WAS GETTING HOARSE. THE COPLT CRM WAS VIRTUALLY NON EXISTENT. 5) EXCELLENT WX. THIS GAVE ME SEVERAL OPTIONS FOR APCHING THE ARPT (IFR, VFR, STRAIGHT IN, CIRCLING) AND I DIDN'T FOCUS ON ANY ONE OPTION AND DID NOT CONCENTRATE OF ANY ONE APCH. IN THE FUTURE, I NEED TO BE MORE ATTENTIVE TO LONG DISTANCE/LONG DUTY DAY FLTS. I CAN REQUEST A THIRD PLT FOR THESE FLTS BUT IN THE PAST I HAVE SHIED AWAY FROM DOING SO BECAUSE CREW TRANSPORTATION IS EXPENSIVE. 3 PLTS IN THE COCKPIT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE, IS BETTER BECAUSE 3 HEADS ARE BETTER THAN 2, ESPECIALLY DURING HIGH WORKLOAD PERIODS, TKOF, APCH, LNDG. FIRST FLT FOR A COPLT IN THE AIRPLANE AND FIRST TIME INTL OPS FOR THE COPLT. THESE 2 FACTORS SHOULD NOT BE MIXED. SO THE COMPANY NEEDS TO LOOK AT MORE EXPERIENCED COPLTS. WORKING AS WE WERE THIS FLT, WE WERE BOTH STRESSED OUT.

Synopsis :

GLF4 CREW HAD ALT EXCURSION AND TRACK DEV ON APCH TO TEB AFTER EXCESSIVE FLT TIME, DUTY TIME, AND NO RELIEF PLT OR CREW CHANGE FROM RJAA TO PANC, AND ON TO TEB.

**ACN: 562370**

## **Time**

Date : 200210

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ANC.Airport

State Reference : AK

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

## **Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZAN.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B747-400

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

## **Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 16000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 20

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 620

ASRS Report : 562370

## **Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 18000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 160

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1300

ASRS Report : 562362

## **Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

## **Person / 4**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

## **Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Radar

## **Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : LOWER YAW DAMP FAIL LIGHT

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

HARD-OVER LOWER RUDDER ON B747-400. IN CRUISE, SMOOTH AIR, STRAIGHT AND LEVEL, ACFT SUDDENLY VEERED TO L AND ENTERED SHARP BANK WITHOUT WARNING. 2ND CAPT WAS FLYING. HE IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND USED FULL R RUDDER TO REGAIN CTL. HE DECLARED EMER AND HEADED FOR ANC. THEY SUMMONED ME AND OTHER FO BACK FROM BREAK, AND WE ALL BEGAN TO TROUBLESHOOT. I RELIEVED 2ND CAPT AND ASSUMED PF DUTIES. WE SOON DISCOVERED THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE CREW OPERATING MANUAL TO COVER THIS, SO WE GOT DISPATCH, MAINT CTL, AND OUR FLEET TRAINING CAPT ON A CONFERENCE CALL ON HF. WE DECIDED TO HEAD FOR ANC AND GO TO A LOWER ALT OVER COOK INLET AND GRADUALLY, CAREFULLY CONFIGURE TO LNDG CONFIGN A STEP AT A TIME, CHKING CONTROLLABILITY AND STABILITY AT EACH STEP. ONCE WE WERE CONVINCED ACFT WAS ACCEPTABLY CONTROLLABLE, WE HEADED FOR ANC. LANDED WITH NORMAL FLAPS BUT 'ABNORMAL FLAP' SPDS DUE TO CTL ISSUES. ALSO, DIFFERENTIAL PWR HELPED ON FINAL. OF COURSE, MUCH COORD DONE WITH ATC, FLT ATTENDANTS, COMPANY, AND MANY PA'S MADE TO PAX. LNDG WAS CHALLENGING, BUT SUCCESSFUL. WHAT WAS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE FAVORABLE CONCLUSION TO THIS 'NOTHING-IN-THE-BOOK' CRITICAL SIT? CRM! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE SUDDEN VEER TO THE L WAS CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF THE LOWER RUDDER PWR UNIT CASTING, CRACKING OUT AT A PLUG BOSS. THE RPTR SAID THE RUDDER WENT TO 17 DEGS L AND AS SPD WAS REDUCED AT LOWER ALTS THE RUDDER DEFLECTED TO 31 DEGS AT 180 KTS. THE RPTR STATED AT THIS TIME THE ONLY WARNING RECEIVED WAS A 'LOWER YAW DAMPER FAIL' WARNING. THE RPTR SAID IT TOOK 66 DEGS OF AILERON YOKE INPUT TO LEVEL THE ACFT AND ON LNDG APCH DIFFERENTIAL PWR WAS APPLIED AND HELPED ON FINAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ON ACN 562362 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED HE WAS THE CAPT FLYING THE AIRPLANE WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. THE RPTR SAID THE AIRPLANE WENT INTO A QUICK ROLL WITH A 35 DEG BANK, NOT A VIOLENT MANEUVER, BUT QUICK. THE RPTR STATED THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND DID NOT DISCONNECT WHEN THE BANK EXCEEDED 30 DEGS. THE RPTR SAID THE FLT DATA RECORDER HAD REGISTERED A 34 DEG BANK AND THE ACFT REQUIRED 65% OF R AILERON. WITH THIS MUCH AILERON DEFLECTION, THE FLT SPOILERS WERE DEPLOYED. THE RPTR STATED THE RUDDER DEFLECTION WAS 17 DEGS IN 1 SECOND. HE RECALLED THAT THE SVC BULLETIN STATED THE VERT FIN WAS NOT DESIGNED FOR QUICK L AND R MOTION, SO HE AVOIDED THE APPLICATION OF QUICK R RUDDER. THE RPTR STATED THE ONLY WARNING RECEIVED IN THE COCKPIT WAS 'LOWER YAW DAMPER FAIL.' THE RPTR SAID THE CAUSE OF THE RUDDER DEFLECTION WAS FAILURE OF THE LOWER RUDDER PWR UNIT CASTING WHICH BROKE OUT AT A PLUG BOSS, ODDLY ENOUGH, WITH NO LOSS OF #2 HYD SYS FLUID OR PRESSURE. THE RPTR STATED THAT, ON THE GND, THE RUDDER DISPLACED THE FULL 31 DEGS.

Synopsis :

A B747-400 IN CRUISE AT FL350 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO A HARD OVER LOWER RUDDER STUCK AT 17 DEGS L. CAUSED BY FAILED PWR CTL UNIT CASTING.

**ACN: 562543**

**Time**

Date : 200210

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DFW.Airport

State Reference : TX

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DFW.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 562543

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : #2 EGT INDICATOR

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Rejected Takeoff

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

**Narrative :**

TKOF ON RWY 36R AT DFW IN OUR B757 JET R CLOSE TO V1 AND BANG, BANG, BANG. HUGELY LOUD NOISES AND VIBRATIONS SHATTERED THE PLAN TO GO FLYING. THE CAPT AND I THREW A SCHOOL-HOUSE PERFECT ABORT. CRM RULES AS WE TEAMED WITH THE CABIN CREW AND RETURNED TO THE GATE WITH NO INJURY OR FURTHER INCIDENT. THE LEAD MECH RPTED THAT ONE OF OUR #2 ENGS HAD A COMPRESSOR STALL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE CAUSE OF THE ENG STALLING AND THE HIGH EGT HAS NOT BEEN RPTED BY MAINT. THE RPTR SAID THE ENG WAS CHANGED BUT NO OTHER DETAILS ON COMPONENT FAILURE ARE KNOWN.

**Synopsis :**

A B757-200 ON TKOF ROLL JUST BELOW V1 REJECTED THE TKOF DUE TO #2 ENG COMPRESSOR STALLING AND HIGH EGT.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : L18.Airport  
State Reference : CA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 4000

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model : M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Training

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 100  
ASRS Report : 563116

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

PIC (CFI R SEAT -- PNF) WAS GIVING ACFT CHKOUT/DIFFERENCES TRAINING TO CFI (L SEAT -- PF). AFTER AIRWORK, STALLS, STEEP TURNS, GLIDE AND SLOW FLT, PROCEEDED TO NON TWRED FIELD FOR LNDGS AND TKOFS. PNF BRIEFED PF TO ACFT'S TENDENCY TO FLOAT ON LNDGS AND THE NEED TO RETRACT FLAPS FOR BRAKING AND WT ON WHEELS EFFECTIVENESS. AFTER A NORMAL 45 DEG ENTRY AND PATTERN, A 3 DEG GLIDE (PAPI) APCH AND NORMAL TOUCHDOWN, THE PNF CALLED FOR 'GEAR UP' INADVERTENTLY. THE APPROPRIATE CALL BEING 'FLAPS UP.' AS THE PF REACHED AND ACTUATED THE GEAR, THE PNF FOLLOWED THE PF'S ARM AND RETURNED THE GEAR HANDLE TO 'GEAR DOWN.' THE WARNING HORN SOUNDED AT THIS TIME. THE ACTUATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED, GEAR COLLAPSED AND ACFT SKIDDED OFF CTRLINE, STOPPING ON RWY EDGE APPROX 1800 FT DOWN ALONG THE R EDGE. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: THE PF AND PNF WERE IN THE COMMAND/RESPONSE (NOT RESPOND) MODE OF CRM, IE, TELL/DO PNF WAS ON DAY 5 OF 12-14 HR DUTY DAYS AND RECEIVED 7 HRS SLEEP NIGHT BEFORE. THE PF HAD NOT BEEN TOLD THE LNDG WOULD BE TO FULL STOP BY PNF AND PF STATED AFTER OCCURRENCE HE THOUGHT PNF WAS CALLING FOR GAR. PF STATED HE WAS NERVOUS BECAUSE OF THE ACFT'S TENDENCY TO DIP AND ENTER A SPIN DURING PWR ON STALLS. PF STATED HE SHOULD HAVE FAMILIARIZED HIMSELF WITH COCKPIT LAYOUT PRIOR TO FLT TO A HIGHER DEGREE. PNF STATED (MYSELF) THAT AS SOON AS COMMAND WAS GIVEN, IT WAS RECOGNIZED AS INCORRECT AND CORRECTED. PNF WAS NOT 100% MENTALLY AND STATED THIS AFTER THE FACT. I ALSO FEEL THAT INCONSISTENCIES IN CFI CALLOUTS/PROCS HAS A PARTIAL ROLE HERE.

Synopsis :

MOONEY 201 FLC INADVERTENTLY RETRACTS GEAR DURING TOUCH-AND-GO LNDG.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IAD.Airport  
State Reference : VA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : IAD.Tower  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Learjet 60  
Mission : Business

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : IAD.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2450  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 600  
ASRS Report : 563193

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON OCT/TUE/02 AT APPROX XA00-XA30, I WAS ACTING AS FO/SIC AND PNF OF AN LJ60. WE WERE #2 TO TAKE OFF ON RWY 19L AT IAD. THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US WAS CLRED TO TAKE OFF. THE CTLR THEN TOLD US TO BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF AFTER THE NEXT ACFT. THE CAPT AND PF THEN BEGAN TO MOVE TOWARD THE RWY. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE CAPT THAT 'WE WERE NOT CLRED FOR THE RWY.' HE RESPONDED BACK 'YES WE WERE, HE CLRED US TO GO IMMEDIATELY BEHIND THIS GUY.' BEFORE I COULD THINK OR DO ANYTHING ELSE, HE HAD OUR AIRPLANE ON THE RWY, AND LCL WAS INSTRUCTING A COMMERCIAL ACFT TO GO AROUND. THE LCL CTLR CALLED US ON FREQ AND TOLD US WE WERE NOT CLRED FOR THE RWY. LATER, THE CAPT RECEIVED A MESSAGE TO CONTACT DULLES APCH AT WHICH TIME HE GAVE THEM HIS NAME AND ADDRESS. WE WERE NOT CLRED 'INTO POS' OR CLRED FOR TKOF BY THE LCL CTLR, AND I TOLD THE CAPT THIS. HE CHOSE TO DISMISS MY APPEAL TO STOP. WHAT COULD CORRECT THIS SIT? OPTIONS: IF CAPT DECIDES TO UTILIZE THE SECOND CREW MEMBER (CRM), IF CAPT HAS CERTIFICATE REVOKED, IF CAPT RETIRES.

Synopsis :

LEARJET 60 CAPT TAXIED INTO POS WHEN NOT CLRED CAUSING ANOTHER ACFT TO BE SENT AROUND.

**Time**

Date : 200210

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON

Make Model : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 563976

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Fuel Gauges

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

EXCEEDED ACFT FUEL IMBALANCE LIMITATIONS. DESCRIPTION: AT 5000 FT WE EXPERIENCED A WAKE TURB ENCOUNTER, WHICH PROMPTED THE CAPT (WHO WAS ACTING AS THE PF) TO DISCONNECT THE AUTOPLT. FOLLOWING RECOVERY, THE CAPT BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT WE HAD A FUEL IMBALANCE DUE TO AN OVER CORRECTIVE XFEED PROC. I HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY UNAWARE OF THE XFEED CONDITION, AND DID NOT CATCH THE FUEL IMBALANCE AS IT DEVELOPED IN THE DSCNT. POST FLT DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT THE CAPT HAD SELECTED XFEED WHILE I WAS 'OUT OF THE LOOP' TALKING TO OPS JUST PRIOR TO DSCNT. THE XFEED PROC WAS TERMINATED AND WE DISCUSSED OUR OPTIONS. THE DECISION TO CONTINUE WAS MADE AND APCH AND LNDG WAS NORMAL WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ADDITIONAL AILERON TRIM USED TO NEUTRALIZE FLT CTLS. A MAINT LOG ENTRY WAS MADE NOTING THE EXCEEDANCE OF FUEL IMBALANCE LIMITATIONS. 1) CRM! I SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN 'BACK IN THE LOOP' WITH THE CAPT PRIOR TO INITIATION OF THE DSCNT CHKLIST AND KNOWN ABOUT THE XFEED. 2) MONITOR THE AIRPLANE 'INSIDE' WHEN ACTING AS THE PNF EVEN BELOW 10000 FT WHERE MUCH OF OUR ATTN IS FOCUSED OUTSIDE. 3) SOME TYPE OF MEMORY AID FOR THE FUEL XFEED PROC COULD BE STANDARDIZED. (FLT DIRECTOR SWITCH BOTH ON 1, OR A CARD SIMILAR TO THE 'LOGBOOK REMOVED,' WHICH IS CONSPICUOUSLY PLACED DURING FUEL XFEEDING.

Synopsis :

MD-80 CREW INADVERTENTLY EXCEEDED THE FUEL BAL LIMITATIONS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO BAL FUEL.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

State Reference : FL

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 600

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZJX.ARTCC  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Regional Jet C165  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4150  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS STAB CHCD  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

ON THE START OF OUR TRIP, THE FO WAS GETTING THE COCKPIT SET UP AND I NOTICED THE 'V' NUMBERS ON MY PDF WERE A MAGENTA COLOR, WHICH MEANS THAT YOU HAVE INVALID DATA COMING FROM THE FMS. I SPOKE WITH MAINT CTL AND THEY THOUGHT THAT IF WE PWRED DOWN THE ACFT AND BROUGHT EVERYTHING BACK UP, IT WOULD HELP. I TRIED THAT AND THE 'V' NUMBERS CORRECTLY TURNED TO BLUE. THERE WAS HVY RAIN ALL DURING THIS PERIOD. WE DEPARTED CVG ON A REPOS LEG TO SRQ. THERE WAS RAIN/ICE ALL THE WAY UP TO FL220. WE DEPARTED SRQ WITH 2 PAX AND AFTER PASSING 5500 FT, WE LOST STABILIZER 'CHCD.' AFTER PASSING FL260 WE LOST MACH TRIM. I TRIED TO USE THE STABILIZER TRIM AND FOUND THEY WERE BOTH INOP -- EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS ONLY THE INDICATION OF STABILIZER 'CHCD' FAILURE. WE NOTIFIED ATC THAT WE NEEDED TO DIVERT INTO SAV AND SET UP THE FMS FOR RWY 9 ILS. WX WAS 7 MI AND OVCST AT 600 FT. THE TRIM SYS FAILED AT 0 DEGS FLAPS AND 320 KTS, SO WHEN WE STARTED TO SLOW DOWN, THERE WAS A LOT OF BACK PRESSURE NEEDED TO KEEP THE NOSE UP. WE PUT IN FLAPS 20 DEGS AND THEN PUT DOWN THE GEAR AND FLAPS 30 DEGS. THE BACK PRESSURE TO KEEP THE ACFT ON GS WAS TOO INTENSE EVEN FOR THE 2 OF US, SO I ELECTED TO GO BACK TO FLAPS 20 DEGS VREF +14 KTS. AS THE ACFT SLOWED ON APCH, MORE BACK PRESSURE WAS NEEDED, SO I ADDED MORE SPD TO GIVE OUR ARMS A REST. WE BROKE OUT AND SAW THE RWY AT 600 FT. WE WERE COMING IN PRETTY FAST, SO I PULLED PWR AT 100 FT. WE HAD 9300 FT X 150 FT RWY, SO SLOWING DOWN WASN'T A PROB. IN 20/20 HINDSIGHT, I SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER TO ATC. THEY KNEW I HAD A SIT AND HANDLED ME GREAT -- GIVING ME A STRAIGHT-IN TO RWY 9 ILS. I ALSO SHOULD HAVE TAKEN MORE TIME TO FIGURE OUT WHAT PROB I ACTUALLY HAD. THE EICAS SYS FAILED TO INFORM THAT 'BOTH' STABILIZER TRIM CHANNELS HAD FAILED -- NOT JUST ONE. SO WE HAD NO TRIMS, THE TRIM WAS FROZEN AT A 1.6 DEG NOSE DOWN TRIM (MAINT CONFIRMED AFTER PULLING THE COMPUTER BOX THAT BOTH CHANNELS HAD INDEED FAILED), NO MACH TRIM. NO AUTOPLT. I HAD THE CEO OF A FORTUNE 100 COMPANY IN THE CABIN ALSO. OVERALL GREAT CRM RULED THE DAY, AND WE MADE IT TO THE CHOCKS.

Synopsis :

CL60 CREW LOST STABILIZER TRIM CTL WITH THE STABILIZER TRIMMED FOR HIGH SPD FLT.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

State Reference : CA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Super King Air 200 Hdc  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500  
ASRS Report : 565131

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather



Narrative :

BE20 AT 16000 FT IN LIGHT TO MODERATE ICING CONDITIONS, 15 MI E OF EHF ON THE 105 DEG RADIAL, HDG 265 DEGS, 285 GND TRACK. ACFT COMMANDED PF. FIRST PLT WAS PNF. PIC WAS TALKING ABOUT ICING MEMOS AND THE ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT. I WAS HANDLING THE RADIOS, WATCHING THE WINGS AND XCHKING INSTS. I SAW THE AIRSPD DECAYING FROM 180 KIAS TO 160 KIAS THEN 150 KIAS OVER APPROX 2 MINS. I CHKED THE WINGS AGAIN. ICE WAS BUILDING SLOWLY. I LOOKED AT THE AIRSPD AND IT WAS HOVERING AROUND 143 KTS WITH A SLIGHT GROWING BUFFET/VIBRATION AND I THOUGHT I SHOULD INTERRUPT. I SAW THE TRIM WHEEL TRIMMING UP, LOOKED AT THE FLT DIRECTOR AND SAW THE COMMAND BARS ABOVE THE REF BAR AND I SAID TO ACFT, 'YOU SHOULD WATCH OUT, THE AUTOPLT IS GOING TO DISCONNECT.' HE MOVED HIS HANDS TO THE YOKE AND THE ACFT BUFFETING/VIBRATION INCREASED. I SAID 'BLOW THE BOOTS' AND I SAW HIM LOOK DOWN AND PUSH THE SWITCH UP. I LOOKED TO THE WINGS, BUT THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH ICE TO GET A GOOD RELEASE. I SAW THE ACFT YAW AND L WING DROP 10 DEGS. PIC ROLLED THE R WING DOWN AND WAS FIGHTING THE ACFT. I LOOKED AT THE WINGS AND DECIDED THAT MUCH ICE SHOULD NOT CAUSE THIS MUCH DRAG OR A STALL. AS I WAS LOOKING, I NOTICED HIS FEET WERE FLAT ON THE FLOOR AND WAS CAUSING A CROSS CTL STALL. I SAID, 'HAVE YOU GOT IT? YOU'RE CROSS CTING IT!' SOMETHING ON THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT WAS DRAGGING THE L WING BACK. I REALIZED IT MUST BE THAT THE PROPS WERE ICED UP AND CALLED OUT 'PROPS ARE ICED, UP PUSH THEM FORWARD!' I SAW HIS HANDS GRAB THE PROP LEVERS AND START TO MOVE THEM. ATC CALLED AND ASKED IF WE WANTED LOWER AS THE ACFT WAS PASSING THROUGH 15000 FT. PIC SAID 'YES.' AND I RESPONDED 'YES' TO ATC. ATC CAME BACK WITH 'MAINTAIN 14000 FT.' I RESPONDED '14 THOUSAND, WE ARE HAVING PROBS HERE.' I LOOKED AT THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR AND SAW THE ACFT 20 DEGS NOSE DOWN AND NOW R WING 30 DEGS LOW. PIC LOOKED PANICKED. I SAID 'EASY!' HIS FEET WERE STILL NOT ON THE RUDDERS. THE WHOLE TIME THE ACFT WAS BUFFETING AND AERODYNAMIC NOISE WAS RASPY. HE SAID 'PROPS FORWARD!' I SAW THAT THEY WEREN'T FORWARD AND PUSHED THEM UP TO MAX. AS THEY REACHED 2000 RPM, THE SOUND OF THE AIR SMOOTHED AND THE ACFT STOPPED BUFFETING. THE YAW TO THE L STOPPED AND THE WINGS WENT LEVEL. I RELAXED A LITTLE AND WATCHED TO SEE IF HE WAS NOW GAINING CTL. ALT WAS STABILIZING AT 14000 FT, BUT PIC WAS STILL FIGHTING THE ACFT. I CHKED THE WINGS AND THEY LOOKED THE SAME. I LOOKED FOR SOME KIND OF DRAG. THE GEAR HANDLE WAS UP AND LIGHTS OUT, NO HYD PUMP LIGHT, FLAPS POS INDICATED FLAPS UP. HE CALLED 'TRIM!' I TURNED THE ELECTRIC TRIM SWITCH TO THE 'OFF' POS AND LOOKED AT THE TRIM WHEEL. I SAW THAT IT WAS FULL NOSE UP. I ROLLED THE TRIM WHEEL FORWARD AND SAW THAT PIC WAS ABLE TO RELAX A LITTLE. I SAID 'YOU GOT IT?' HE SAID 'YES.' I SCANNED THE INSTS AND SAW THAT WE WERE HDG ALMOST S. I CALLED 'GET BACK ON HDG.' (HIS HDG BUG WAS SET TO 265 DEGS.) HE BEGAN TO TURN TO THE R AND WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN CTL OF THE ACFT. ATC ASKED IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE. I WAITED FOR A RESPONSE FROM PIC -- NO RESPONSE. I SAID, 'WE'RE OK NOW,' AND ATC REPLIED, 'DSND AND MAINTAIN 10000 FT, CONTACT BAKERSFIELD APCH.' WE HAD A NORMAL DSCNT AND BROKE OUT AT 11000 FT. ALL ICE WAS GONE AND PIC SAID 'I GUESS WE CAN PULL THE PROPS BACK.' I BROUGHT THE PROPS BACK TO 1700 RPM. IT WAS QUITE SILENT IN THE COCKPIT FOR A WHILE. FROM MY INITIAL CALLOUT TO CTL OF ACFT MAY HAVE BEEN 30-45 SECONDS. THE ACTUAL TIME UNKNOWN. MY CONCLUSION: I BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE LOSS OF CTL OF THE ACFT AND RESULTED IN A 2000 FT LOSS OF ALT AND AROUND 90 DEGS LOSS OF HDG. I BELIEVE THAT ALLOWING THE LOWER AIRSPDS CAUSED THE PROP BLADES TO ICE UP MORE THAN BEFORE REDUCING THRUST THAT LED TO EVEN LOWER AIRSPD. THE L PROP MAY HAVE STALLED AND CAUSED THE ACFT TO YAW L, CAUSING THE L WING TO DROP. NOT USING THE RUDDER TO COUNTERACT THE YAW AND BY ONLY USING AILERON TO COUNTER ROLL INCREASED DRAG. WITH THE TRIM FULL NOSE UP, ACFT COULD NOT RELEASE THE YOKE WITH 1 HAND TO ROLL THE TRIM WHEEL FORWARD, HE WAS UNABLE TO USE ELECTRIC TRIM OR DID NOT THINK OF IT AT THE TIME. FLC. EGO, A 'WE ALWAYS GO ATTITUDE' IN FRONT OF OTHERS, DURING THIS FLT CONVERSATION INDICATED THAT A PLT QUESTIONED THE AFTERNOON FLT IN ICE. PAST DISCUSSIONS FROM SENIOR PLT INDICATED THAT 'PROFESSIONALISM' MEANT THAT PIC DOES NOT ASK FOR PROGRESSION, HELP, OR SOUND IN ANY WAY THAT WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE WE ARE GOING OR WHAT WE ARE DOING. OPEN CHARTS AND POSTING OF APCH PLATES ARE DISCOURAGED. A NEGATIVE AND CYNICAL ATTITUDE DISCOURAGE OPEN DISCUSSION. POOR CRM. I FELT FROM HIS BEHAVIOR THAT HE DIDN'T WANT ANY INFO OR DECISIONS FROM ME. PIC SHOULD HAVE PAID MORE ATTN TO FLYING THE ACFT, ATTENTIVE TO ACFT INSTS, FEET ON THE RUDDERS AND HANDS ON THE CTLS IN POOR WX, AND A SAFE ATTITUDE. PROPS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CYCLED TO MAX RPM TO ENSURE ICE WAS NOT BUILDING ON THE BLADES. PF SHOULD HAVE USED RUDDER TO CTL YAW, NOT AILERONS. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE. I SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER AND SIT TO ATC WHEN LOSS OF CTL OF ACFT WAS EVIDENT. I SHOULD HAVE CALLED FOR MAX PWR AND ENSURED THAT THE PROPS WERE COMPLETELY FORWARD BY FOLLOWING UP BEHIND HIS HANDS ON THE PROP CTL LEVERS. TRIMMING AND VERIFYING MAX PWR ON ENG INSTS. I ASKED QUESTIONS IN THE PAST ABOUT MISSION MGMNT PROCS ON GO/NO-GO DECISIONS OR ICE LIMITATIONS. I WAS GIVEN AN ANGRY LOOK AND A RESPONSE OF 'WHAT DO YOU MEAN?' I SAID THAT THE LAST PLACE I WORKED WE COULD NOT FLY IN ANYTHING MORE THAN RPTED LIGHT ICING. I WAS TOLD THAT WE DON'T HAVE ANY LIMITATIONS. PROP DEICE BOOTS. AN AIR GAP BTWN ELEMENT AND ALUMINUM BLADE MAY RESULT I NO HEAT XFER TO THE ALUMINUM ALLOWING THE ICE TO FORM SOONER ON THE BLADE. I THINK THE SQUAT SWITCH/STALL VANE HEAT WORKS ON GND, BUT THE SECOND ELEMENT OR INCREASE HEAT DOESN'T WORK INFLT. THE INDG GEAR SQUAT SWITCH MUST BE RAISED TO CHK FOR INCREASED HEAT

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EWR.Airport  
State Reference : NJ  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 2500

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : EWR.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi  
Make Model : Hs 125 Series 700  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude  
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 130  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4300  
ASRS Report : 565399

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2150  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 112  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 854  
ASRS Report : 565191

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Person / 6**

Function.Oversight : Supervisor  
Function.Controller : Supervisor

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 5  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Separated Traffic  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 350  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 0

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Narrative :

AN INST FLT PLAN WAS FILED FROM HPN TO EWR. APCH CHARTS FOR NEWARK RWY 22L WERE CREW BRIEFED. WE DSNDED TO 2000 FT AND WERE ASSIGNED HDG FOR LOC INTERCEPT. NEW YORK APCH XMITTED A CLRNC FOR RWY 19, WHICH DOES NOT EXIST AT NEWARK, BUT DOES AT TEB. AFTER INTERCEPTING THE EWR RWY 22L LOC, FO SWITCHED TO NEWARK TWR AND RPTED INBOUND ON ILS. NEWARK TWR WAS SURPRISED BY THE CALL AND ASKED IF WE TOOK OFF FROM TEB. AFTER NEWARK TWR REALIZED THAT WE WERE LNDG AT NEWARK, WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A R TURN TO A HDG OF 280 DEGS. THIS IS THE MISSED APCH HDG FOR EXECUTION OF A MISSED APCH AT TEB. BEFORE MAKING THE ASSIGNED TURN, I SAW AN AIRLINER ABOVE OUR ACFT APPROX 200-500 FT ABOVE OUR ALT. I THEN TURNED SLIGHTLY TO THE L, REDUCED SPD TO FALL INTRAIL OF THAT ACFT, DSNDED TO 1800 FT, AND THEN TURNED TO MY ASSIGNED HDG OF 280 DEGS. AFTER SEVERAL VECTORS, WE RETURNED TO NEWARK FOR A LNDG ON RWY 29. AFTER LNDG, GND CTL ASKED IF I WOULD CALL THE TWR. WE DISCUSSED THE SIT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN DETERMINING WHY IT ALL OCCURRED IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND WAS INTERESTED IN LEARNING HOW THESE TYPES OF CONDITIONS COULD BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE. APPARENTLY DURING THE ATC FUNCTION OF HANDLING OUR FLT, A MISTAKE WAS MADE BY ATC. THE WRONG INFO WAS COMMUNICATED BTWN CTLRS AND WE WERE ASSUMED TO BE WHERE WE WEREN'T (MAKING AN ILS APCH TO RWY 19 AT TEB). THE FLC PREVENTED A MIDAIR COLLISION BY BEING ABLE TO RECOGNIZE THE MISCUE CAUSED BY ATC. WE RECOGNIZED THAT 2 ACFT WERE MAKING THE SAME ILS APCH TO THE SAME RWY AND TOOK THE NECESSARY CORRECTIVE ACTION. VMC CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL RECOGNITION AND EVASIVE ACTIONS THAT PREVENTED A POSSIBLE MIDAIR COLLISION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN #565191: MULTIPLE LEGS. WITHIN 135 DUTY REGS. NAVIGATION SYS FOR ACFT IS LOW FUNCTIONING AND LIMITED. INTERMITTENTLY WOULD NOT ACCEPT FIXES ON AIRWAYS AND APCHS. CAPT DID NOT WEAR A HEADSET AND LISTENED THROUGH SPEAKER SYS. FO DID WEAR HEADSET. FIRST TIME THIS CREW HAD FLOWN TOGETHER AND CRM WAS DIFFERENT WITH CAPT. UPON SEARCHING FOR THE APCH PLATES FOR RWY 19 AT EWR, I DISCOVERED THAT NONE EXISTED. I ALERTED THE CAPT. CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO CALL THE EWR TWR. TWR QUERIED AS TO WHAT ARPT WE INTENDED TO LAND. I REPLIED, 'NEWARK.' EWR TWR GAVE US A TURN TO THE R AND SENT US TO DEP.

Synopsis :

ATX H25B ON IFR FLT TO EWR INVOLVED IN ACR NMAC WHEN APPARENTLY THEIR FLT PLAN PROCESSED FOR TEB.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

State Reference : IN  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model : Super Skywagon/Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6  
Mission : Pleasure  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 26000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 30  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700  
ASRS Report : 565528

**Person / 2**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

I EXPERIENCED ELECTRICAL OUTPUT FAILURE OF THE ALTERNATOR AT 11000 FT ON TOP OF ALL CLOUDS AND IN THE CLEAR SOME 150 MI FROM DEST, WITH 4+ HRS FUEL ON BOARD. LIGHT ICING CONDITIONS EXISTED IN THE CLOUDS WITH LOW IFR EXISTING BELOW AND WITHIN A 100 MI RADIUS OF MY POSITION. I ADVISED THE ATC CTLR AT ZID, DECLARED AN EMER AND PRESENTED MY PLAN OF ACTION: 1) I REQUESTED OF ZID TO LOOK FOR VFR WX WITHIN RANGE OF MY 4+ HRS FUEL RANGE. 2) I ADVISED OF MY FLT CONDITIONS AND ANNOUNCED THAT I WOULD MAINTAIN PRESENT HDG AT 11000 FT AND GO OFF THE AIR FOR 20 MINS IN ORDER TO CONSERVE BATTERY PWR FOR COM. THIS TIME OFF THE AIR ALSO ENABLED ATC TO COORDINATE THEIR RESOURCES AND ENABLED ME TO SET THE COCKPIT UP FOR NO-ELECTRIC PARTIAL PANEL FLT WITH VACUUM DRIVEN ATTITUDE INDICATOR, MAGNETIC COMPASS, WRIST WATCH FASTENED TO THE CONTROL YOKE, 2 GOOD FLASHLIGHTS (1 2-BATTERY PEN LIGHT AND 1 'D' CELL LIGHT). 20 MINS LATER, WITH COMS BACK UP, ZID HAD INDEED LOCATED MVFR AT HUNTINGTON (HTS) AND SPECIAL WX VFR 4000 OVCST AT CHARLESTON, (CRW). BOTH STATIONS ADVISED IND BY TELEPHONE THAT THEY COULD PROVIDE ARPT SURVEILLANCE RADAR ASSISTANCE FOR DSCNT. I ELECTED CRW AND REQUESTED TO REMAIN AT ALT UNTIL OVER CRW'S AIRSPACE TO PLAN AN ELLIPTICAL DSCNT PATTERN IF NECESSARY AT CRW SO AS TO MAKE SURE OF THE VFR SUITABILITY OF THE CRW WX IN THE EVENT OF COMPLETE ELECTRICAL FAILURE AND LOSS OF COMS. ZID AGREED AND HANDED ME OFF EARLY TO CRW APCH SOME 60 MI OUT. CRW WAS ABLE TO LET ME GO OFF THE AIR AND CONSERVE 8 MORE MINS OF BATTERY PWR. COMS BACK UP WITH THE 1 COM RADIO ONLY 20 MI OUT, CRW APCH WAS ABLE TO GIVE ME RAPID DSCNT INTO THEIR AIRSPACE -- MAKING 2 ASR HDG CORRECTIONS TO HAVE ME BREAK FREE OF ALL CLOUDS ON A WIDE DOWNWIND LEG FOR CRW RWY 23 WELL CLR OF NORMAL TFC FLOW. THE ASR CTLR THERE AT CRW APCH ACCOMPLISHED THIS WITH ONLY THE PRIMARY TARGET OF MY AIRPLANE. ONCE ON TWR FREQ AND CLRED TO LAND, I WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE TFC WITH NAV AND ROTATING BEACON LIGHTS. LNDG WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT! EXCEPT THAT THE BATTERY PWR FAILED COMPLETELY ON CLRING THE RWY AND FOR TAXI TO THE RAMP. THIS RPT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AS PROOF POSITIVE THAT CRM WORKS, AND CURRENT SAFETY TRAINING INITIATIVES IN CRM ARE PAYING OFF.

Synopsis :

C206 PLT ENCOUNTERED AN ELECTRICAL FAILURE WHILE FLYING IFR FROM ONA TO I43 ON TOP OF A CLOUD DECK AT 11000 FT.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MIA.Airport  
State Reference : FL

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 25000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MIA.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1200  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 135  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1643  
ASRS Report : 565893

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 943  
ASRS Report : 565894

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

**Narrative :**

AFTER LNDG RWY 9L AT MIA, EXITED AT TXWY T5 TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 12. NOSE OF ACFT INADVERTENTLY OVER HOLD LINE OF RWY 12 AT TXWY T5. APCH AND RWY EXIT PLAN FULLY DISCUSSED DURING APCH BRIEFING. CAPT HAD RWY 12 IN SIGHT AND WAS STOPPING, BUT WAS MOMENTARILY DISTR IN MAKING SURE THAT ACFT SUFFICIENTLY CLR OF RWY 9L AFTER EXITING. GOOD CRM BY FO TO BRING TO CAPT'S ATTN THE HOLD LINE AND STOP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 565894: WHILE PERFORMING MY AFTER LNDG FLOW, I NOTICED THE CAPT APCHING THE HOLD LINE AND APPEARED NOT TO BE STOPPING. EXERCISING GOOD CRM, TOLD HIM TO STOP, WHICH HE DID. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR MOMENTUM CARRIED THE NOSE OF THE ACFT JUST OVER THE HOLD LINE.

**Synopsis :**

B737-300 CREW HAD A RWY INCURSION OF RWY 12 AT MIA.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport  
State Reference : NV  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 13000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : L30.TRACON  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Bae 125 Series 800  
Mission : Business

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : L30.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent.Other : Unknown

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 75  
ASRS Report : 566136

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

DEPARTING OUT OF LAS VEGAS, WE FILED THE VEGAS 1 SID. DURING THE RADIO SET-UP, THE VEGAS 1 WAS ENTERED INTO THE FMS. WE TRIED GETTING OUR CLRNC VIA PDC AND WERE UNABLE. THE PNF PICKED IT UP VIA THE RADIO. WE WERE ISSUED THE ACCES DEP, ACCES TRANSITION. BOTH OF US COMPLETELY MISSED THE 'DEP' PORTION OF THE CLRNC AND FOCUSED ON THE ACCES TRANSITION, WHICH ONE DID APPEAR ON THE VEGAS 1 SID. I HAD BEEN INADVERTENTLY LOOKING AT THE VEGAS 1 DEP STILL. I THOUGHT I HAD THE CORRECT SID, AND SO DID THE OTHER PLT. UPON DEP, I FLEW THE VEGAS 1, WHICH IS RWY HDG, 7000 FT, EXPECT RADAR VECTORS. WE RECEIVED FURTHER CLRNC DURING THE CLB WHILE ON RWY HDG TO 15000 FT. AROUND 13000 FT, ATC ASKED US IF WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT. WE RESPONDED YES. ATC THEN ASKED IF WE WERE TURNING OR ON THE SID. OUR RESPONSE WAS 'WE'RE ON RWY HDG.' HE COMMENTED THAT HE NEVER GAVE US THAT, AND TO TURN L DIRECT TO ONE OF THE INTXNS ON THE SID. WE ASKED FOR A HDG UNTIL WE GOT IT SET UP. WE BOTH FULLY REALIZED OUR ERROR AT THIS POINT. WE GUESS THAT WE WERE ABOUT 20 DEGS OFF WHERE THE SID INTXN WAS. THERE WERE NO TFC DEVS OR EVASIVE ACTIONS TAKEN. I THINK A VARIETY OF FACTORS ALLOWED THIS TO HAPPEN. I JUST RECENTLY CHANGED FLYING ENVIRONMENTS AFTER 10 YRS FROM IZI TO CPR. THE FMS IS STILL RELATIVELY NEW TO ME. I WAS COMFORTABLE WITH MY FLYING PARTNER AND HIS FAMILIARIZATION OF THE VEGAS AREA AND DIDN'T QUESTION THE DEP PROC. ALTHOUGH I DID WATCH HIM LOOK AT THE FMS SCREEN WITH A PERPLEXED LOOK, HE DIDN'T VOICE HIS DOUBTS OR QUESTIONS OUT LOUD. TO COMPOUND THE ISSUE, THIS WAS ONLY OUR SECOND LEG TOGETHER. I DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO INTERP WHAT I THOUGHT I SAW ON HIS FACE. I ALSO HAD A NAGGING FEELING AS WE CLBED OUT THAT WE SHOULD QUERY ATC ABOUT OUR HDG, BUT DIDN'T FOLLOW THROUGH. TO PREVENT THIS FROM OCCURRING AGAIN, I WILL CHK AND DOUBLECHK WHAT DEP IS GIVEN. CHKING TO BE SURE THE DEP CLRNC TITLE MATCHES WHAT WE HAVE IN OUR BOX/HAND, NOT JUST THE NAME OF AN INTXN OR TRANSITION. I WILL USE BETTER CRM AS WELL. ASKING, 'WHY THE LOOK ON YOUR FACE?' HAVING A BETTER BRIEF OVER THE SID, AND ASKING IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR DOUBTS ABOUT WHAT AND WHERE WE'RE GOING, CHKING THE FMS TO BE SURE THAT IT AGREES WITH OUR CLRNC, AND IF THERE WAS THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT ABOUT ANYTHING, EITHER CLARIFY WITH CLRNC OR ASK ATC IF IN THE AIR!

Synopsis :

THE PLANNED DEP WAS FLOWN FROM LAS VEGAS, NV, INSTEAD OF THE ONE ASSIGNED WHEN THE CLRNC WAS RECEIVED.

**Time**

Date : 200211

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport

State Reference : CO

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B737-300

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 566497

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

BEGAN TKOF ROLL AT APPROX XA55. AT APPROX 100 KIAS, COCKPIT DOOR OPENED. THE DOOR WAS CLOSED BY THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT APPROX 2 MINS LATER AFTER AIRBORNE. THERE WERE NO SECURITY INCIDENTS OR KNOWN ADVERSE PAX REACTIONS TO INCIDENT. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) CREW BECAME DISTR JUST PRIOR TO PUSHBACK DUE TO A PAX DEPLANING ISSUE AND POSSIBLE IMPACT ON AN ON-TIME DEP. 2) PRIOR TO DSCNT, CREW HAD FLOWN 5 SUCCESSIVE LEGS OVER 2 DAYS ON ACFT WITH THE NEW FORTRESS DOOR AND NO SECURITY BAR. 3) CREW DUTY DAY HAD BEGUN IN MFR WITH INCIDENT AT DEN OCCURRING APPROX 9 HRS LATER. FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE. BOTTOM LINE: THE FACT THAT WE HAD AN UNMODIFIED DOOR WITH A SECURITY BAR FLEW UNDER OUR RADAR SCREEN DEN. CRM FACTORS MAY HAVE BEEN DISTR, CREW FATIGUE AND THE FACT THAT PREVIOUS LEGS ON THIS IDENT WERE FLOWN EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE NEW DOOR AND NO SECURITY BAR. BOTH CAPT AND FO AGREED THAT WITH 2 DIFFERENT DOOR SYS NOW ON THE COMPANY B737 FLEET, THAT WE BOTH NEEDED TO DEVELOP A HABIT PATTERN DURING PREDEP THAT INCLUDED A VISUAL CHK OF THE COCKPIT DOOR PRIOR TO PUSHBACK.

Synopsis :

A B737-300 CREW, ON TKOF, EXPERIENCED THE COCKPIT DOOR COMING OPEN.

**Time**

Date : 200212  
Day : Mon

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport  
State Reference : NJ  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 5000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Hs 125 Series 700  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Non Precision

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 15  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000  
ASRS Report : 567321

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met  
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Undershoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

THE FO DID NOT HEAR THAT VOR DME APCHS WERE IN USE WHEN HE CHKED THE ATIS, SO WE WERE UNPREPARED FOR THE APCH. FROM THE APCH CLRNC TO TOUCHDOWN, WE WERE PLAYING CATCH UP. IN THE CONFUSION WE GOT OFF COURSE TO THE N AND WERE 500 FT HIGH FOR A MANDATORY XING POINT. DURING THE CIRCLE WE LINED UP ON THE WRONG RWY AT TEB, BUT DUE TO AN ALERT CTLR, WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON THE RWY WE WERE LINED UP ON. THIS SERIES OF MISTAKES MADE BY ME AND THE FO WERE COMPOUNDED BY LACK OF BASIC CRM AND DIVISION OF PF AND PNF DUTIES. WE BOTH TRIED TO DO EACH OTHER'S JOB, AND AT ONE POINT, WE WERE BOTH HEADS DOWN WITHIN 5 MI OF THE ARPT.

Synopsis :

H-25B CREW HAD TRACK AND ALTDEV ON THE VOR DME-A APCH TO TEB.

**Time**

Date : 200301  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MCO.Airport  
State Reference : FL

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MCO.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : A320  
Mission : Passenger  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10200  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 95  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200  
ASRS Report : 571223

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 18000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 175  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 571238

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Insufficient Time

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airport  
Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ATC VECTORED US TO A CLOSE-IN L HAND VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36R. TWR CLRED US TO LAND. UPON TURNING FINAL, WE WERE SLIGHTLY HIGH ON VASI, BUT THE DESCENT APPEARED TO BE CONVERGING TO THE CORRECT GLIDEPATH. CAPT CALLED FOR FLT DIRECTORS OFF AND BRING UP THE 'BIRD' AND TO SET THE INBOUND COURSE. AFTER REVIEWING THE APCH CHART, I LOOKED UP TO NOTICE A LIGHT ACFT DEPARTING OFF THE RWY AND WAS CLR. AS WE PASSED THROUGH APPROX 100 FT AGL, IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT THE RWY WAS FARTHER FROM THE TERMINAL THAN THE 10-9 CHART DEPICTED. AT APPROX 50 FT AGL, I BECAME AWARE THAT WE MAY ACTUALLY BE LNDG ON RWY 36L INSTEAD OF RWY 36R. AS WE BEGAN TO FLARE, I COULDN'T DECIDE WHICH WAS THE SAFER COURSE OF ACTION, TO STARTLE THE CAPT WITH A GAR COMMAND OR ALLOW HIM TO CONTINUE TO LAND ON A RWY WITHOUT CONFLICTING TFC. WE TOUCHED DOWN AND I TOLD THE CAPT WE HAD LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY. TWR CLRED US TO CROSS RWY 36R AND CONTACT GND. THERE WAS NO MENTION MADE OF THIS BY ANY CTLR AND THE ACFT CONTINUED TO THE GATE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 571238: WAS BEING VECTORED BY KMCO APCH CTL, FOR AN APCH TO RWY 36R. WHILE ON BASE TO FINAL, WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. ACFT WAS SLIGHTLY HIGH ON PROFILE, BUT WAS GOING TO BE IN PROPER LNDG CONFIGURATION AT 1000 AGL. I CALLED FOR 'FD'S OFF, BRING UP THE BIRD, SET INBOUND TRACK.' CONTINUED APCH AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG. ON ROLL OUT, TWR CLRED US TO 'CROSS THE RIGHT, CONTACT GND.' WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY (RWY 36L). NO COMMENT WAS MADE FROM ATC. IN TRYING TO ANALYZE WHY THIS HAPPENED, IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT MOST OF THE LANDINGS I DO TO PARALLEL RWYS ARE DONE TO THE OUTSIDE RWY AND SWITCHING OFF THE FD'S FOR A VISUAL APCH ARE TWO THINGS THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ERROR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE FLT CTL UNIT (FCU) WAS SELECTED TO FLT NAV VECTOR MODE WHEN THE FLT WAS CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH AS PER COMPANY POLICY, BUT BOTH HE AND THE CAPT WERE 'HEADS OUT OF COCKPIT' CONCENTRATING ON THE VISUAL APCH SINCE THEY WERE HIGH AND IN CLOSE AND THEY WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH GETTING THE ACFT DOWN. RPTR STATED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE PARALLEL TXWY TO THE LEFT OF 36L WAS A CONFUSION FACTOR, BUT THE LEFT BASE TO THE RIGHT RWY WAS A FACTOR BECAUSE IT SEEMED MORE NORMAL FOR A LEFT BASE TO BE FOR THE LEFT PARALLEL. RPTR ADVISED THAT HE DID NOT RECALL ANY COCKPIT BRIEFING PARTICULARLY RELATED TO THE LNDG. RPTR STATED THAT THERE WERE NO COMS FROM THE TWR AFTER THEY WERE CLRED TO LAND WHILE ON THE BASE LEG. RPTR STATED THAT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND READ BACK, RWY '36R.' RPTR STATED THAT HE HEARD AN ACFT BEING CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 36L AND THAT REINFORCED HIS IMPRESSION THAT RWY 36L WAS THE RWY IN USE. RPTR STATED THAT HE AND THE CAPT HAD A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP, THAT CRM WAS GOOD, AND THAT THERE WERE NO SCHEDULE PRESSURE, DUTY TIME, OR FATIGUE FACTORS INVOLVED. RPTR STATED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY. RPTR ADVISED THAT THE ARPT TFC WAS VERY LIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT RPTR STATED THAT HE HAS FLOWN INTO THIS ARPT ON THREE OTHER OCCASIONS, BUT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE APCH WAS FROM THE S, LNDG N. RPTR STATED THAT AFTER HE REALIZED THEY WERE LNDG ON RWY 36L, HE FELT IT WOULD BE SAFER TO LAND THAN GO AROUND FROM THE FLARE. RPTR STATED THE RWY WAS CLEAR AND THAT AFTER ROLLOUT TWR ADVISED THEM TO CROSS RWY 36R AND CONTACT GND. RPTR STATED THAT THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE INCIDENT BY ANY CTLR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 571328 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE HE AHD THE FCU SET TO FLT PATH VECTOR MODE AS PER COMPANY POLICY ON VISUAL APCHES AND HAD THE FO SET THE INBOUND COURSE WITH A THREE DEG GLIDE SLOPE. RPTR STATED THAT THIS CAUSES THE FLT DIRECTOR BARS TO BE REPLACED BY THE FLT PATH DIRECTOR/FLT PATH VECTOR SYMBOLS. RPTR STATED HE GLANCED AT THE INSTRUMENTS A COUPLE OF TIMES ON THE VISUAL APCH, BUT DID NOT LOOK AT THE LOC RAW DATA. RPTR STATED THAT THE PARALLEL TXWY TO THE LEFT OF RWY 36L MAY HAVE BEEN A SUBCONSCIOUS CONFUSION FACTOR. RPTR ALSO STATED THAT A LEFT BASE TO THE RIGHT PARALLEL WAS CONFUSING. RPTR STATED THAT THE APCH VECTOR LED TO A SLIGHTLY TIGHT APCH TO THE RWY. RPTR STATED THAT HE HEARD THE FO MUMBLING SOMETHING STARTING AT ABOUT 100 FT ABOVE THE RWY.

Synopsis :

A320 FLC LANDS ON THE WRONG RWY AT MCO.