

## ASRS Database Report Set

# Checklist Incidents

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Report Set Description.....	A sampling of reports from all aviation arenas referencing checklist issues (design, procedures, distraction, etc.).
Update Number.....	9.0
Date of Update .....	October 9, 2003
Number of Records in Report Set.....	50
Number of New Records in Report Set .....	50
Type of Records in Report Set.....	For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

IHS: 262-7

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data**

**SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports**


The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information may or may not be correct in any or all respects. At best, it represents the perception of a specific individual who may or may not understand all of the factors involved in a given issue or event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Battelle Memorial Institute, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director  
Aviation Safety Reporting System

## CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999.

Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

**ACN: 546487**

## **Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Intersection : COFAX

State Reference : PA

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

## **Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZOB.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : A319

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

## **Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7000

ASRS Report : 546487

## **Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

## **Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

## **Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

HIGH VELOCITY TAILWIND DSCNT INTO PHL RESULTING IN AN ALT ERROR. ATC CLRNC WAS TO CROSS COFAX AT FL240. I DISCUSSED THE PARAMETERS OF THE FMS BEING LIMITED WITH A HIGH TAILWIND (270 DEGS, 130 KTS) WHEN ENTERING XING ALT IN THE FMS AND DISCUSSED HOW I WOULD COMPENSATE FOR IT. THE FO DISAGREED WITH MY BRIEFED SOLUTION AND ITS LIMITS TO THIS FMS LIMIT. HE STATED IT WAS NOT A PROB. I ASKED HIM HOW HE WOULD COMPENSATE FOR THIS FMS LIMIT AND HE SAID WITH 'SPD ADJUSTMENT.' I AGREED THAT WOULD WORK AS WELL. DURING THE DSCNT, I WAS OFF COM #1 GETTING WX AND GATE INFO AND I NOTICED AND I INFORMED FO HE WAS HIGH AND INFORMED ATC, WHEREUPON ATC STATED 'DO YOUR BEST.' FO NEVER ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE HIS DSCNT PROFILE AS HE HAD BRIEFED PRIOR TO DSCNT BY COMPENSATING FOR TAILWIND WITH SPD AND HE MISSED XING RESTR BY 600 FT (AIR WAS SMOOTH WITHOUT ANY INFLT PIREPS OF TURB) AND STATED 'THAT IS HIS PROB, NOT MINE,' PRIOR TO THE XING FIX. WHEN INFORMED OF THE NEED FOR PAPERWORK, HE SHOUTED 'GOOD' AND HE PUT HIS FACE CLOSELY IN FRONT OF MINE. I WOULD DESCRIBE HIS BEHAVIOR AS RAGE. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND PERFORMED PF DUTIES SUCH AS ENTERING FMS DATA. HE DISAGREED WITH MY ENTRY AND CHANGED IT AND STATED IT IS NOT A CORRECT PROC. I DIRECTED FO TO ACCOMPLISH PNF TASKS, WHEREUPON 'TRANSITION,' '180 FOR 170' CALLOUTS WERE MISSED, WHICH MAY HAVE CAUSED AN ALT ERROR. I HAD TO DIRECT FO TO CONCENTRATE ON ASSISTING ME WHEN HE WAS CONCENTRATING ON TAKING NOTES. I TOLD HIM TO 'PUT AWAY THE NOTES.' BELOW 10000 FT (CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT) HE WAS READING THE QRH (I HAD NOT CALLED FOR NOR WAS I INFORMED OF QRH NEED) DUE TO A STATUS MESSAGE. I STATED 'PUT AWAY THE QRH.' MULTIPLE CALLOUTS WERE ABSENT AND/OR ERRONEOUS BY FO. I HAD TO REPEAT MY COMMANDS MULTIPLE TIMES TO HAVE THEM ACCOMPLISHED, SUCH AS 'FLAPS 2 DEGS' WITH THE ACFT SPD APPROPRIATE FOR THE COMMANDED FLAP SETTING AND NO CALLOUTS OF 'SPD.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR (SCHEDULING FLIP-FLOP). CURRENT COMPANY AND UNION EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (STATEMENTS BY CEO DURING A 'TOWN HALL' MEETING AND LACK OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, USING TAX MONEY TO 'BUST OUR UNION,' ETC, WAS DISCUSSED PRIOR TO DEP.) PREVENTION: MY SUGGESTION FOR THIS PROB IS ADDITIONAL CRM AND SIMULATOR TRAINING (CURRENTLY WORKING WITH 'PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS') FOR FO. FOR BETTER SCHEDULING POLICY TO REDUCE FATIGUE. ACARS WX WOULD HAVE ASSISTED ME IN IDENTING HIGH CONDITION EARLIER BY NOT BEING OFF COM #1 TO GET WX AND GATE INFO. UPDATING FMS MATH CO-PROCESSORS TO COMPENSATE FOR HIGH TAILWIND/HIGH GND SPD DSCNTS. I NOTICED A 'TEMPER' DISPLAY FROM FO AT THE GATE IN PHX (BEGINNING OF THE PAIRING) WHEN GATE AGENT WANTED TO PLACE A 'MUST RIDE' PLT ON THE FLT DECK JUMP SEAT TO MAKE MORE ROOM FOR ADDITIONAL 'MUST RIDE' PLTS (FULL ACFT). HE WAS SHOUTING 'NO WAY' AND WAS VERBALLY BASHING SCHEDULING. HE WAS DEMONSTRATING 'HIS AUTH' THAT HE WAS MAKING THE DECISION. WE DISCUSSED THE SIT AS WELL AS HAVING A 'SECRET SVC' MAN ON BOARD (ACCORDING TO FLT OPS BULLETIN) BEING ALLOWED TO OCCUPY THE JUMP SEAT WITHOUT AN AVAILABLE CABIN SEAT AND NOT REQUIRING EMPLOYEE VERIFICATION. BOTH OF US WERE GLAD TO HAVE HIM UP FRONT WITH US, CONSIDERING THE NATION IS AT WAR, AND CAME TO AN AGREEMENT. SECRET SVC AGENT STAYS UP FRONT WHILE ANOTHER DEADHEADING CAPT REMAINS UP FRONT IN THE COCKPIT AS WELL. I SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED HIS MENTAL STATE WHEN HE BEGAN SHOUTING IN PHX AND HAD HIM REPLACED AT THAT TIME IN PHX. THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS BTWN THE MGMNT AND PLTS IS BECOMING MORE OF AN ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP AND IS INCREASING STRESS LEVELS. I AM SUGGESTING AND WILL REQUEST A PRESIDENTIAL EMER BOARD RESOLVE THE DISPUTE.

Synopsis :

A319 CAPT AND FO DO NOT APPEAR TO BE GETTING ALONG AND ARE NOT ABLE TO WORK AS AN EFFECTIVE CREW.

**ACN: 546732**

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Wed

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference : US  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 30000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000  
ASRS Report : 546732

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : AUTOPLT TRIM CAUTION  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

CLBING THROUGH FL300, WE GOT AN 'AUTOPLT TRIM RWD' CAUTION MSG. AFTER RESETTING THE AUTOPLT, THE MSG RECURRED, WHEN I TRIED TO TURN THE ACFT BACK TO THE COURSE, I REALIZED THE AILERON CTL WAS JAMMED. THE CAPT'S SIDE WAS ALSO JAMMED. WE RAN THE QRH PROCEDURE FOR JAMMED AILERONS. AFTER DISCONNECTING THE 'ROLL', BOTH SIDES WERE STILL UNABLE TO MOVE. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED. UPON DSCNT THROUGH ABOUT 16000 FT, THE FLT CTLS BROKE FREE. SINCE WE STILL DID NOT KNOW THE NATURE OF THE PROB, WE RETAINED EMER STATUS AND REQUESTED EMER EQUIP AT ZZZ. THE APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS MAY HAVE BEEN VERY HEAVY RAIN AT OUR DEP ARPT. ONE MORE NOTE, ON LNDG AT ZZZ, THE EMER EQUIP WAS NOT ROLLED, THOUGH IT HAD BEEN REQUESTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE AIRPLANE WAS TAXIED FOR TKOF IN A HEAVY RAIN SHOWER. THE RPTR SAID PASSING THROUGH FL300 THE AUTOPLT TRIM RWD CAUTION MSG ILLUMINATED, RESET WAS NO HELP. THE RPTR STATED IN TRYING TO MOVE THE AILERONS IT WAS DISCOVERED NO AILERON CTL WAS POSSIBLE. THE RPTR SAID THE CTLS WERE SPLIT BUT THE AILERONS WERE STILL LOCKED. THE RPTR STATED AFTER DECLARING AN EMER AND DSNDING TO 16000 FT THE AILERONS BROKE FREE. THE RPTR SAID VARIOUS METHODS HAVE BEEN TRIED TO AVOID WATER SOAKING THE AILERON COMPONENTS IN THE MAIN WHEEL, ALL UNSUCCESSFUL.

Synopsis :

A CANADAIR CL65 IN CLB AT FL300 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO LOCKED AILERONS CAUSED BY AILERON UNITS IN MAIN GEAR WELL FROZEN.

**ACN: 546841**

**Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 31000

**Environment**

Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B737-300

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 546841

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 546693

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : APU FIRE BELL AND LIGHTS

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Narrative :

DURING FLT PLANNING, WE OBSERVED APU WAS DEFERRED INOP DUE TO NEGATIVE BLEED AIR. WE READ OPS PLACARD AND DISCUSSED COURSE OF ACTION FOR INOP APU. WE ARRIVED AT ACFT AT XA45 AND WERE MET BY A TECHNICIAN WHO BRIEFED US THAT APU WAS INOP, BUT DUE TO FAILURE OF FIRE TESTING SYS, NOT BLEED AIR. TECHNICIAN WAS VERY PLEASANT AND WE THANKED HIM FOR HIS EFFORTS. DISPATCH SENT A NEW FLT PLAN BASED ON NEW MEL ITEM AND MAINT GENERATED A NEW MAINT RELEASE DOCUMENT. WE READ OPS PLACARD. REMAINDER OF DEP SEQUENCE WAS NORMAL. AT APPROX XC10, AT FL310, ABEAM ZZZ ARPT, WE PREPARING TO DSND INTO ZZZ2, THE APU FIRE WARNING SYS ACTIVATED. WE ACCOMPLISHED EMER QRH CHKLIST AND FLT MANUAL REF ITEMS. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH ATC, DISPATCH NOTIFIED VIA ACARS, FLT ATTENDANTS BRIEFED ON CABIN ADVISORY AND A PA ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE TO PAX. WE BELIEVED THAT THE WARNING WAS FALSE DUE TO THE FACT THAT: 1) APU HAD NEVER BEEN OPERATED, AND 2) MAINT HAD WORKED ON SYS THE NIGHT BEFORE. HOWEVER, ALL APPROPRIATE SOP ITEMS WERE ACCOMPLISHED FOR APU INFLT FIRE. WE DETERMINED THAT ZZZ2 WAS NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG. WE ASKED ZZZ2 FIRE DEPT TO SCAN TAIL AREA AFTER LNDG FOR ANY EVIDENCE OF FIRE. THEY RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO FIRE. WE TAXIED TO GATE.

Synopsis :

A B737-300 IN CRUISE AT FL310 DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO APU FIRE WARNING. APU PREVIOUSLY DEFERRED INOP.

**ACN: 546952**

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DCA.Airport  
State Reference : DC

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 15000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : IAD.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-500  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7600  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 220  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3144  
ASRS Report : 546952

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 20000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000  
ASRS Report : 546945

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : T/E FLAP GUAGE L/E DEVISE LIGHT  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

THE FLAPS WOULD NOT RETRACT FROM 5 DEGS DURING TKOF PHASE OF OUR DCA TO CLE FLT. AS THE PF I MAINTAINED AND NEVER EXCEEDED 210 KTS WHILE THE CAPT SORTED THROUGH THE PROB. WE VERIFIED THAT IT WAS NOT A GAUGE PROB BY REF TO THE OVERHEAD LED DISPLAY. THE CAPT REVIEWED THE QRH AND ATTEMPTED TO GAIN INFO FROM MAINT THROUGH DCA'S OPS FREQ, AFTER THE AIR PHONE WAS FOUND TO BE INOP, HE RAN THE TEST PROC WITH THE CABIN CREW AND DISCUSSED BRIEFLY WITH ME THE PROBABILITY OF DECLARING AN EMER AND RUNNING THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST FOR A HIGH SPD APCH AND LNDG AT DULLES AIRPORT. 10 MINS INTO THE FLT, THE CAPT DID MANAGE TO RETRACT THE FLAPS TO 0 DEGS WITH THE NORMAL FLAP HANDLE. WE CONTINUED ON TO OUR DEST AND THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL, WITH NORMAL FLAP EXTENSION UPON ARR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 546945: APPROX 10 MINS AFTER DEP (RWY 33 DME FROM IAD) WE GOT THE FLAPS TO RETRACT NORMALLY AND, WITH ATC PERMISSION, PROCEEDED TO DEST. I DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. THE FLAPS LINKAGE IS THE PROB. RECOMMEND MORE NEUTRAL TERMS/DESCRIPTIONS OF ONBOARD PROBS WITH ATC/FAA UNTIL TIME TO ASSESS THE ABNORMALITY. IN HANDLING THIS EVENT, I WILL SPEND MORE TIME LISTENING TO AUTHS, FAA AND ATC AND CAREFULLY CHOOSE TERMS. A MAJOR PROB WAS THE 'GTE AIR PHONE' WAS INOP AND I COULDN'T TALK WITH MAINT.

Synopsis :

B733 CREW DEPARTING DCA WERE UNABLE, INITIALLY, TO FULLY RETRACT THE FLAPS. AFTER CHKLIST COMPLIANCE, THE FLAPS RETRACT NORMALLY.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : HKNA.Airport  
State Reference : FO

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 4000

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B747-400  
Mission : Freight

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 130  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1045  
ASRS Report : 547118

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

**Person / 4**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : STICK SHAKER  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

ALL TKOF PREPARATIONS WERE COMPLETED UP TO FINAL FLT DECK PROC. WE INPUTTED ZFW DATA AS PER FOM INTO THE FMS, THE ZERO FUEL WT WAS 270.2 TONS AND FUEL ON BOARD 108.2 TONS. COMPLETED PUSHBACK AND TAXI. ALL CHKLISTS COMPLETE. NORMAL MAX THRUST DEP ON THE NAROK B SID RWY 6 TO FL310. DEP SPDS AS COMPUTED BY THE CREW MEMBERS V1 150, VR 167, V2 177. THE FMC SPDS CONFIRMED AND ENTERED AT V1 151, VR 168, V2 179. CLRED FOR TKOF, THE ENG PARAMETER NORMAL AND TKOF NORMAL. ON CLBOUT, ACFT WAS STABLE AT V2 +15 KTS (+/-1 KT), THEN NOTED THAT TARGET COMMAND SPD BUG ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN ACCORD TO V2 +23 KTS AT 300 FT RA. REST OF CLBOUT NORMAL ON NAROK B SID UNTIL FLAP RETRACTION FROM POS '1' TO 'UP' AT APPROX 270 KIAS ON PFD. SPD INDICATED APPROX FLAPS UP SPD AND INCREASING, BEFORE CALLING FOR FLAPS RETRACTION. IMMEDIATELY UPON MOVEMENT OF FLAP TO 'UP,' STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED AS LOW AND HIGH SPD BUFFET MARGIN MERGED AT RAPID RATE. IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR MAX THRUST AND FLAPS EXTENSION BACK TO POS #1. STICK SHAKER CEASED, BUFFET SPD TAPES SEPARATED TO WITHIN SAFE MARGINS FOR FLAP POS. ACFT CLBING IN LIGHT TURB IN IMC, CUMULONIMBUS IN THE VICINITY. WHEN CLR OF THE WX APPROX 3 MINS, REPEATED FLAP RETRACTION WITH SAME RESULT. NO EICAS AND NO STATUS MESSAGE DISPLAYED. ACFT AT ABOUT FL180 CLBING INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFF REQUESTED AND APPROVED. AT FL200 CREW IN CONCERT RESEARCHED QRH, PERFORMANCE DATA AND ACFT FLT MANUAL. ENGINEER WAS SUMMONED TO ASSIST IN EVALUATION OF SIT. REQUESTED RETURN TO NBO, ENRTE ACFT STABLE AND AUTOPLT ON. LAST ATTEMPT TO RETRACT FLAPS WAS MADE, WITH THE SAME RESULT. ACFT WAS CLRED TO DSND TO 12000 FT. DUE TO TERRAIN, STOPPED DSCNT AT 15000 FT. SATCOM WAS ESTABLISHED WITH ACR DISPATCH AND MAINT. INFORMED OF SIT TO DUMP FUEL AND LAND AT NBO IN CONCURRENCE WITH DISPATCH. FLEW INITIALLY TOWARDS GG, DUE TO WX ELECTED TO HOLD AT NV AT 15000 FT, INITIATED FUEL DUMP PER QRH AND DECLARED EMER. DURING DUMPING, APPROX 40 MINS, MADE NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT ACR OPS ON SATCOM UNSUCCESSFULLY DUE TO PHONE NUMBER BEING 'NOT AUTH.' DUE TO ENCROACHING CUMULONIMBUS APCHING ARPT AND FUEL GRAVITY XFER VALVE PROB, RESULTING IN FUEL IMBAL, DUMPING WAS TERMINATED AND DECISION TO LAND OVERWT WAS MADE FOR TOUCHDOWN AT 305.1 TONS FMC WT WAS MADE. DURING DUMPING, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CAPT AND FO PFD INDICATED AIRSPD WERE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THEIR INFO WAS APPROX 15 KTS HIGHER THAN THE STANDBY AIRSPD INDICATOR. BASED ON THE ABOVE INFO AND CREW ASSUMPTION BY ALL AVAILABLE INFO, THAT WE WERE AT A HIGHER WT THAN PREDICTED OR HAD FLT COMPUTER SYS PROB, A VREF SPD WAS MANUALLY CALCULATED ON CURRENT CONDITION. LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT FLAPS 30 DEGS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT EVERY ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE FLAPS FROM POS #1 TO FULL 'UP' RESULTED IN STICK SHAKER ACTION. THE RPTR SAID ALL ACFT FLT PARAMETERS WERE IN NORMAL CONFIG. THE RPTR STATED THE AIRPLANE WAS MAINT FERRIED FROM NAIROBI BY A TEST FLC AND NO INFO WAS RELEASED BY MAINT ON ACTION TAKEN. THE RPTR SAID IT WAS SUSPECTED THE ANGLE OF ATTACK SENSORS MAY BE INVOLVED BUT THIS IS JUST SPECULATION AND ONLY BECAUSE A EUROPEAN B747-400F WAS INVOLVED IN THE SAME TYPE OF INCIDENT.

Synopsis :

A B747-400F IN CLB AT 16000 FT TO FL200 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO FLAP RETRACTION FROM POS '1' TO 'UP' THE STICK SHAKER. CAUSING REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES.

**Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

State Reference : FO

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC

Ceiling.Single Value : 4000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : HKNA.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B747-400

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5194

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 125

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 826

ASRS Report : 547120

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 185

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2700

ASRS Report : 547115

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

**Person / 4**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

**Person / 8**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : IAS, STICKSHAKER

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1-2

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

INCIDENT RPT AT NBO ARPT, RESULTING IN RETURN FOR LNDG MAY/FRI/02. CREW MEMBERS ON BOARD: CAPT WAS PF, FO IN R SEAT PNF. ONE FO WAS JUMP SEAT SUPPORT PLT, ANOTHER FO JUMP SEAT SUPPORT PLT. ALL TKOF PREPARATIONS WERE COMPLETED UP TO FINAL FLT DECK PROC. WE INPUTTED ZFW DATA AS PER FOM INTO THE FMS. THE ZERO FUEL WT WAS 270.2 TONS AND FUEL ON BOARD 108.2 TONS. COMPLETED PUSHBACK AND TAXI. ALL CHKLISTS COMPLETE. NORMAL MAX THRUST DEP ON THE NAROK B SID RWY 6 TO FL310. DEP SPDS AS COMPUTED BY THE CREW MEMBERS V1 150, VR167, V2 177. THE FMC SPDS CONFIRMED AND ENTERED AT V1 151, VR 168, V2 179. CLRED FOR TKOF, THE ENG PARAMETERS NORMAL AND TKOF NORMAL. ON CLBOUT, ACFT WAS STABLE AT V2 +15 KTS (+/- 1 KT), THEN NOTED THAT TARGET COMMAND SPD BUG ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN ACCORD TO V2 +23 KTS AT 300 FT RA. REST OF CLBOUT NORMAL ON NAROK B SID UNTIL FLAP RETRACTION FROM POS 1 TO 'UP' AT APPROX 270 KIAS ON PFD. SPD INDICATED APPROX FLAPS UP SPD AND INCREASING, BEFORE CALLING FOR FLAPS RETRACTION. IMMEDIATELY UPON MOVEMENT OF FLAP TO 'UP,' STICKSHAKER ACTIVATED AS LOW AND HIGH SPD BUFFET MARGIN MERGED AT RAPID RATE. IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR MAX THRUST AND FLAPS EXTENSION BACK TO POS 1. STICKSHAKER CEASED. BUFFET SPD TAPE SEPARATED TO WITHIN SAFE MARGINS FOR FLAP POS. ACFT CLBING IN LIGHT TURB IN IMC, CUMULONIMBUS IN THE VICINITY, WHEN CLR OF THE WX APPROX 3 MINS. REPEATED FLAP RETRACTION WITH SAME RESULT. NO EICAS AND NO STATUS MESSAGE DISPLAYED. ACFT AT ABOUT FL180 CLBING INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFF REQUESTED AND APPROVED. AT FL200 CREW IN CONCERN RESEARCHED QRH, PERFORMANCE DATA AND ACFT FLT MANUAL. ENGINEER WAS SUMMONED TO ASSIST IN EVALUATION OF SIT. REQUESTED RETURN TO NBO. ENRTE ACFT STABLE AND AUTOPLT ON. A LAST ATTEMPT TO RETRACT FLAPS WAS MADE WITH THE SAME RESULT. ACFT WAS CLRED TO DSND TO 12000 FT. DUE TO TERRAIN, STOPPED DSCNT AT 15000 FT. SATCOM WAS ESTABLISHED WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT. WE INFORMED THEM, OF OUR SIT TO DUMP FUEL AND LAND AT NBO IN CONCURRENCE WITH DISPATCH. FLEW INITIALLY TOWARDS GG. DUE TO WX, ELECTED TO HOLD AT NV AT 15000 FT. INITIATED FUEL DUMP PER QRH AND DECLARED EMER. DURING DUMPING, APPROX 40 MINS, MADE NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT OPS ON SATCOM UNSUCCESSFULLY DUE TO PHONE NUMBER BEING 'NOT AUTH.' DUE TO ENCROACHING CUMULONIMBUS APCHING ARPT AND FUEL GRAVITY XFER VALVE PROB, RESULTING IN FUEL IMBAL, DUMPING WAS TERMINATED AND DECISION TO LAND OVERWT WAS MADE FOR TOUCHDOWN AT 305.1 TONS PER FMC WT WAS MADE. DURING DUMPING, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CAPT'S AND FO'S PFD INDICATED AIRSPDS WERE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THEIR INFO WAS APPROX 15 KTS HIGHER THAN THE STANDBY AIRSPD INDICATOR. BASED ON THE ABOVE INFO AND CREW ASSUMPTION BY ALL AVAILABLE INFO THAT WE WERE AT A HIGHER WT THAN PREDICTED, WE HAD A FLT COMPUTER SYS PROB. A VREF SPD WAS MANUALLY CALCULATED BASED ON CURRENT CONDITION. LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT FLAPS 30 DEGS. ACFT RETURNED TO APRON, ALL CHKLIST PROCS ACCOMPLISHED. ACFT SECURED, THE CREW DEPARTED TO THE HOTEL.

Synopsis :

B747-400 CREW HAD CONTINUOUS STICKSHAKER AND AIRSPD IRREGULARITY ON DEP AT HKJK.

**ACN: 547288**

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Mon

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : BOS.Airport  
State Reference : MA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : A90.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
ASRS Report : 547288

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : WARNING SYSTEM  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Missed Approach  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

I WAS THE CAPT AND PF, AND MY FO WAS THE PNF. THE FLT WAS IN SOLID IMC AND IN DRIVING RAIN. ON THE ILS RWY 4 APCH TO BOS, APCHING THE GLIDE PATH, I CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN. PNF PLACED THE GEAR HANDLE DOWN AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT CAME ON, WITH THE HYD LIGHT ON. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED THE HYD PUMP SWITCH OFF AND CHKED THE EMER AND MAIN ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE. THE MAIN WAS AT ZERO AND EMR AT 3000. LNDG GEAR INDICATIONS WERE NOSE SAFE AND MAINS UNSAFE, AND LIGHT WAS ON IN GEAR HANDLE. THE AIRSPD WAS 170 KTS. THE FLAPS WERE LEFT WHERE THEY WERE, WHICH WAS UP. HAVING COMPLETED THE MEMORY ITEMS, I INITIATED A GAR. I DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. I TOLD PNF THAT I WOULD RETAIN CTL OF THE ACFT, AND ASSUME COM DUTIES, AND THAT HE WAS TO REVIEW THE EPC FOR HYD LIGHT ON. HE DID THIS WHILE I RE-ENGAGED AUTOPLT AND COMMUNICATED OUR PROB WITH ATC. AT THIS POINT, HE MISREAD THE EPC AND CALLED FOR THE EMER LNDG HANDLE TO BE PULLED, AND I AGREED TO THIS. THE HANDLE WAS PULLED AND WE GOT 3 GREEN LIGHTS AND LIGHT OUT IN THE HANDLE. I INFORMED ATC WE COULD ACCEPT ANOTHER APCH AND I CALLED FOR THE FULL HYD CHKLIST. PNF GOT THIS CHKLIST OUT AND READ IT OUT LOUD. THE EMER PRESSURE WAS NORMAL, BUT THE MAIN WAS LOW, SO HE CHKED THE HYD QUANTITY INDICATOR AND THE BRAKE ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE, WHICH WERE NORMAL. HE THEN HAD ME CHK CIRCUIT BREAKERS XA, XB. THESE WERE IN, BUT I PULLED AND RESET THEM. I TURNED THE HYD PUMP SWITCH FROM OFF TO OVERRIDE TO OFF, AND THIS ACTION RETURNED THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE TO NORMAL, AND REGAINED NORMAL OP OF PUMP. I INFORMED ATC THAT WE HAD NORMAL INDICATIONS IN COCKPIT AND THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG.

Synopsis :

AN ACR CREW WITH A LNDG GEAR AND HYD PROB MISREADS THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST BUT IS ABLE TO OVERCOME THE ERROR COMPLETING THE FLT WITH A NORMAL LNDG.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference : US  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 15000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 300

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PIT.TRACON  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Learjet 54  
Mission : Business

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300  
ASRS Report : 547318

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : RT ENG OVERHEAT WARNING  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

DURING CLBOUT IN IMC, WE RECEIVED RED WARNING LIGHTS, CAS, TRIPLE CHIME WARNING, INDICATING R ENG PYLON OVERHEAT. I, AS PF, RETARDED THE R ENG TO FLT IDLE, AND CALLED FOR THE QRH AND HAD THE COPLT RUN THE APPROPRIATE PROC. WHILE PROC IN PROGRESS, I INFORMED ATC OF INTENT TO RETURN TO DEP ARPT (ZZZ1). THE PROB WAS CLRED, AND ONCE AGAIN, WE TURNED S TO CONTINUE TO ORIGINAL DEST OF FLL. 2 OR 3 MINS LATER, PROB RECURRED. THEN I ASKED FOR WX AT COMPANY MAINT FACILITY LOCATED NEARBY AT ZZZ, AND WAS CLRED DIRECT. THE R ENG NACELLE HEAT HAD TO REMAIN OFF, BUT THE R ENG WORKED NORMALLY, WITH THE R PYLON OVERHEAT WARNING AGAIN EXTINGUISHED. WE MONITORED THE ENG PARAMETERS, WATCHED FOR SIGNS OF ICING, AND DIVERTED TO ZZZ WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE NACELLE OVERHEAT WARNING IS A RECURRING PROB ON THE LEAR 45 AND HAS HAPPENED 3 TIMES TO THE RPTR WITH 2 SEPARATE AIRPLANES. THE RPTR SAID A PICCOLO TUBE DISTRIBUTES THE HOT PNEUMATIC AIR INTO THE PYLON AND IT IS BELIEVED A COMBINATION OF OVERLY SENSITIVE HEAT SENSORS AND INADEQUATE INSULATION IS CAUSING THE PROB. THE RPTR STATED THIS IS JUST WHAT MAINT SUSPECTS AND IS JUST THEORY.

Synopsis :

LEAR 45 AT 15000 FT DIVERTED DUE TO REPEATED R ENG NACELLE OVERHEAT. RECURRING PROB CAUSED BY OVER SENSITIVE SENSORS AND INADEQUATE INSULATION.

**ACN: 547431**

**Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : PHX.Airport

State Reference : AZ

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B737-200

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 17000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 12000

ASRS Report : 547431

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : A press & Quality Indication

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

CLBING OUT OF FL230, I OBSERVED AN 'A' SYS LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATION ALONG WITH THE MASTER CAUTION. I REQUESTED TO LEVEL OFF AT FL250 AND IT WAS GRANTED. UPON LEVELOFF, THE AUTOPLT WAS DISENGAGED, AT WHICH TIME I CHKD THE QRH FOR THE 'A' SYS LOW PRESSURE ILLUMINATION. THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO TURN THE APPROPRIATE SWITCH OFF, WHICH WAS DONE. AFTER A SHORT TIME, THE 'A' SYS PRESSURE GAUGE NEEDLE BEGAN TO FLUCTUATE BACK AND FORTH. AT THIS TIME THE QRH WAS REVIEWED FOR AN 'A' SYS FAILURE AND THE APPROPRIATE ACTION WAS TAKEN. THE ACFT FLEW FINE AND THERE WERE NO OTHER PROBS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACFT. MAINT CTL WAS NOTIFIED AND THE SIT REVIEWED. THE WX WAS GOOD AND THERE WAS NO KNOWN TURB AND NONE FORECAST FOR THE RTE FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2. THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE WAS ALSO NOTIFIED THROUGH DISPATCH, AT MY REQUEST, TO MAKE SURE THEY AGREED WITH MY DECISION TO CONTINUE ON TO ZZZ1. THE ACFT WAS STABLE AND FELT SOLID ON THE CTLS. ACFT X WAS HAND FLOWN BACK TO ZZZ2 BY MYSELF AND LANDED WITH EMER PERSONNEL STANDING BY. THE FIRST WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED THAT WE WERE GOING TO TREAT THIS AS AN EMER AND THAT WE WOULD BE USING THE BRACE POS FOR LNDG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED WHEN ON THE GND HYD FLUID WAS ALL OVER THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT FROM THE MAIN WHEEL WELL AFT. THE RPTR SAID MAINT LATER ADVISED THE LOSS OF 'A' SYS WAS CAUSED BY A CHAFFED LINE IN THE L WING ROOT AFT SPAR, MIDWAY BTWN THE WHEEL WELL AND THE L ENG. THE RPTR STATED THIS AREA CANNOT BE INSPECTED ON A PREFLT CHK UNLESS THE FLAPS WERE DOWN AND THE SPOILERS EXTENDED AND LOCKED.

Synopsis :

A B737-200 IN CLB AT FL230 LOST 'A' SYS HYDS PRESSURE AND QUANTITY. CAUSED BY CHAFFED PRESSURE LINE IN L WING ROOT AFT SPAR.

**ACN: 547739**

**Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : AZO.Airport

State Reference : MI

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC

Ceiling.Single Value : 5000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : AZO.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3600

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000

ASRS Report : 547739

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : ENG INSTRUMENTS

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

AT APPROX 7500-8000 FT, WE WERE DSNDRG THROUGH A CUMULUS CLOUD LAYER. WE HAD BEEN CLRD TO INTERCEPT THE ILS RWY 35 LOC AND DSNDR TO 2800 FT MSL. ONCE IN THE CLOUDS WE GOT AN 'ICE' MESSAGE AND PUT WINGS AND COWLS ON. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THERE WAS A BRIGHT FLASH OF LIGHT ALONG WITH A LOUD BANG THAT SEEMED TO HIT THE ACFT DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF ME. WHILE SCANNING THE EFIS/EICAS FOR ANOMALIES, I IMMEDIATELY SAW (AND FELT) THE #1 ENG FAIL. N1 AND N2 WERE ALMOST BACK TO ZERO. HOWEVER, INTERSTAGE TURBINE TEMP REMAINED HIGH. WE GOT A MASTER WARNING DUE TO LOW OIL PRESSURE AND THE ACFT BEGAN TO YAW TO THE L. I IMMEDIATELY PUT IN THE APPROPRIATE CONNECTIONS AND NOTIFIED AZO APCH THAT WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER AND THAT WE WERE SINGLE ENG. I CALLED FOR THE APPROPRIATE EMER MEMORY ITEMS FOLLOWED BY THE CHKLISTS (QRH). I WAS THE PF AND REQUESTED FROM ATC TO LEVEL OFF AT 5000 FT AND GET VECTORS FOR A BOX PATTERN SO WE COULD COMPLETE OUR CHKLISTS AND SET UP FOR A SINGLE ENG APCH. I ELECTED NOT TO TRY A RESTART AS I SUSPECTED THAT THE ENG MAY BE SEVERELY DAMAGED. DUE TO OUR LOW ALT WE WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT OUR DISPATCH THROUGH ACR RADIO. NO ONE ON THE GND AT AZO OPS ANSWERED US EITHER. I TOLD AZO APCH TO PLEASE CONTACT OUR DISPATCH AND NOTIFY THEM OF OUR EMER STATUS. THE FO RAN THROUGH ALL THE NUMBERS AND WE DETERMINED THAT WE HAD PLENTY OF RWY AT AZO USING RWY 35. WE DID R TURNS BACK AROUND FOR THE ILS TO RWY 35. DURING THIS TIME I KEPT GETTING A 'RWD AUTOPLT' CAUTION MESSAGE, STATING THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT KEEPING UP WITH THE TRIM REQUIREMENTS. I KEPT HAVING TO MANUALLY RE-TRIM. THIS ADDED GREATLY TO MY WORKLOAD. FINALLY, ON SHORT FINAL, I TURNED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND HAND FLEW THE ACFT TO TOUCHDOWN. AZO ARPT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING FOLLOWED US AND CONFIRMED THERE WAS NO SMOKE OR FIRE OBSERVED. I DECIDED NOT TO EVAC BUT TO MAKE A SLOW TAXI TO THE GATE. WE SHUT DOWN AT THE GATE WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CONTRACT MAINT FOUND NO PROBS WITH THE ENG. IT WAS DIAGNOSED AS GAS PATH FAILURE BROUGHT ON BY THE SHOCK WAVE OF THE LIGHTNING STRIKE. SEVERAL HOLES WERE BURNED INTO THE SKIN OF THE ACFT. CONTINUOUS IGNITION WAS NOT ON AND WAS NOT REQUIRED TO BE ON IN THE STATED WX AND ICING CONDITIONS.

Synopsis :

A LIGHTNING STRIKE FOLLOWED BY AN ENG FLAMEOUT DURING APCH TO AZO, MI.

**ACN: 549170**

**Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Fri

**Place**

State Reference : TX

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35600

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZFW.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 549170

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Oversight : Coordinator

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

DIVERTED TO DFW DUE TO REDUCED PWR ON R ENG. DURING ENRTE CLB FROM FL350 TO FL390, THE ACFT STOPPED CLBING AT FL356 AND AIRSPD BEGAN DECAYING. AT THIS TIME, THE R ENG EPR WAS NOTED PEGGED AT MAX, WHILE ALL OTHER ENG INSTS WERE READING LOW. NO EICAS MESSAGES WERE EVER RECEIVED. WE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED FL350 WHERE WE COULD MAINTAIN APPROX .74 MACH. AFTER REVIEWING THE QRH AND FINDING NOTHING MATCHING OUR INDICATIONS, IT WAS SUGGESTED WE MIGHT RETARD THE R THROTTLE AND TURN OFF THE R ENG ELECTRONIC CTL TO SEE IF WE WOULD REGAIN FULL PWR. HOWEVER, PRIOR TO TROUBLESHOOTING THE PROB OURSELVES, THE CAPT ELECTED TO GET A PHONE PATCH VIA DISPATCH TO MAINT CTL. THE PATCH WAS INTERMITTENT SO ANOTHER PATCH WAS OBTAINED. AFTER PASSING ALL ENG READINGS TO MAINT CTL, THE REPLY WAS WE HAD A PRESSURE LEAK AND WOULD ONLY HAVE REDUCED PWR BUT OTHERWISE A GOOD ENG. THE CAPT DECIDED TO DIVERT AND RECONTACTED DISPATCH WITH THE RESULTS OF THE MAINT CTL COM. THE DECISION WAS TO DIVERT INTO DFW WHICH WAS ALONG OUR RTE OF FLT. ATC HANDLING WENT SMOOTHLY AND WE RECEIVED DIRECT AND OUR REQUEST FOR DSCNT TO FL240. APPROX 5 MINS AFTER LEVELING AT FL240, THE R ENG INDICATIONS RETURNED TO NORMAL AND REMAINED THERE FOR THE DURATION OF FLT. A NORMAL APCH/LNDG WAS MADE AT DFW.

Synopsis :

B757-200 CREW HAD AN ENG THAT WOULD NOT PRODUCE RATED THRUST INFLT AT FL350.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ1.Airport  
State Reference : US  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 27000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4300  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2800  
ASRS Report : 549504

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : RIGHT N2 INDICATOR  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

WE WERE AT FL270 AND JUST BEEN CLRED TO A LOWER ALTITUDE WHEN THE #2 ENG FAILED. WE BEGAN THE CHKLIST PROCEDURES, DECLARED AN EMER AND IDENTIFIED ZZZ1 AS THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT IN POINT OF TIME. AS WE PROCEEDED WITH THE QRH CHKLIST, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE N2 (CORE) SECTION OF THE ENG HAD SEIZED, SO A RELIGHT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. THE ENG WAS SECURED AND WE INFORMED THE PASSENGERS AND THE FA OF THE SIT AFTER WE VERIFIED WITH OUR DISPATCHER THAT ZZZ1 WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR LNDG. AN UNEVENTFUL SINGLE ENG LNDG WAS MADE, WITH CFR STANDING BY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE N2 ROTOR WAS ACTUALLY FROZEN DUE TO THE GEARBOX FAILURE. THE RPTR SAID THE SUDDEN STOPPAGE OF THE N2 ROTOR STRANGELY WAS NOT FELT IN THE AIRPLANE. THE RPTR STATED THE ENG WAS CHANGED AND THE SHOP RPTED GEARBOX INTERNAL DAMAGE WHICH CAUSED THE N2 ROTOR TO SEIZE.

Synopsis :

A CANADAIR CL-65 IN CRUISE AT FL270 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO R ENG FAILURE CAUSED BY ACCESSORY GEARBOX INTERNAL FAILURE.

**Time**

Date : 200206  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport  
State Reference : GA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 15000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZTL.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Brasilia EMB-120 All Series  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3200  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500  
ASRS Report : 549857

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EFIS  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

RECEIVED AN 'AURAL WARNING' ON THE MULTI ALARM PANEL, FOLLOWED BY 'DUCT LEAK' INDICATION L ENG. THE CREW PERFORMED ACTIONS CONTAINED IN 'QRH.' THE COMPANY AND ATC WERE NOTIFIED AND THE FLT RETURNED TO POINT OF DEP. THE L ENG WAS SHUT DOWN PER QRH. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL AND THE ENGINE WAS SECURED. PAX WERE TO CONTINUE TO DEST VIA SECONDARY ARRANGEMENTS.

Synopsis :

AN E120 CREW, DEPARTING ATL, EXPERIENCED A 'DUCT LEAK' INDICATION AT 15000 FT, SPAWNING A RETURN TO ATL.

**Time**

Date : 200206  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

State Reference : GA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZTL.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Brasilia EMB-120 All Series  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200  
ASRS Report : 550026

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : PNEUMATIC DUCT LEAK WARNING  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

RECEIVED AURAL WARNING INDICATION ON CLBOUT. WHILE CHKING FLT PROCS, RECEIVED DUCT LEAK WARNING. QRH STATED TO SHUT DOWN ENG AND LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. THESE PROCS WERE EXECUTED WITH UNEVENTFUL LNDG.

Synopsis :

EMB120 CREW RECEIVED A PNEUMATIC DUCT LEAK WARNING IN ZTL CLASS E AIRSPACE.

**Time**

Date : 200206

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B737-300

Mission : Training

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 25000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 20000

ASRS Report : 551051

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : FAA

Narrative :

CARGO FIRE WARNING/SUPPRESSION SYSTEM B737-300. THE EVENT HAPPENED IN A SIMULATOR, AND IS SUBMITTED TO HIGHLIGHT A PROB WITH A CRITICAL ACFT SYS PANEL LOCATION AND WARNING FUNCTION. DURING A RECENT PROFICIENCY TRAINING, WE WERE GIVEN A FIRE WARNING BELL/LIGHT SIT ON ROTATION. I WAS IN THE R SET AND SILENCED THE BELL. AS WE CONTINUED THE CLB, I COULD SEE NO LIGHTS ON THE FIRE/OVERHEAT PANEL, AND TESTED THE SYS. NOTHING CAME ON, AND WE ASSUMED IT WAS A FALSE WARNING TO GET US TO REJECT AT OR ABOVE V1. SHORTLY WE GOT A CALL FROM THE 'FA' SAYING THE FLOOR IN THE AFT CAB WAS HOT. IMMEDIATELY WE BOTH LOOKED TO THE UPPER LEFT CORNER OF THE FORWARD OVERHEAD PANEL AND SAW THE AFT CARGO FIRE LIGHT ON. FEELING STUPID, WE GOT OUT THE QRH AND FOLLOWED THE PROC. LATER, I ASKED SEVERAL INSTRUCTORS ABOUT THE MALFUNCTION, AND THEY INDICATED MOST PLTS LOOK DOWN, ASSUME IT WAS FALSE, AND PRESS ON. FOR YRS WE HAVE BEEN TRAINED AND CONDITIONED TO LOOK DOWN. THE CARGO FIRE DETECTION USES THE SAME BELL AND GLARE SHIELD LIGHT AS DOES THE ENG FIRE WARNING SYSTEM, AND THERE ARE NO OTHER LIGHTS DIRECTING ATTENTION TO THE UPPER LEFT CORNER OF THE OVERHEAD PANEL. ONCE SILENCED, THE BELL DOES NOT RING AGAIN. THIS IS AN 'AFTER MARKET' SYSTEM, AND I WONDER HOW MUCH HUMAN FACTORS STUDY WENT INTO THE LOCATION AND OP OF THE SYSTEM. THE 700 SYSTEM IS DOWN ON THE CENTER CONSOLE AND A WARNING LIGHT IS HARD TO MISS. RECOMMENDATIONS: A CONCENTRATED EDUCATION PROGRAM ON THE SYSTEM, TENDENCY TO SILENCE THE BELL AND THEN ASSUME IT IS A FALSE WARNING. ADD A QRH ITEM FOR 'APPARENT FALSE FIRE WARNINGS' THAT WOULD DIRECT THE PLTS TO LOOK AT THIS PANEL AND THEN GO TO THE APPROPRIATE QRH ITEM. THE BELL SHOULD RING AGAIN IN 10 SECS IF CREW ACTION HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE. A LONG TERM SOLUTION IS TO ADD A LIGHT THAT IS IN THE PLT'S FIELD OF VIEW THAT INDICATES A CARGO FIRE. COMPANY NEEDS TO ESTABLISH A PANEL OF PLTS/HUMAN FACTORS EXPERTS TO LOOK AT NEW EQUIP, ITS FUNCTION, LOCATION, AND INTEGRATION WITH EXISTING SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES.

Synopsis :

B737-300 CAPT POINTS OUT THE AFTER MARKET ADDITION OF A CARGO FIRE WARNING AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEM HAS THE FIRE WARNING LIGHT LOCATION NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRE WARNING PANEL. IT IS NOT EVEN IN THE FIELD OF VIEW OF THE PLTS.

**Time**

Date : 200207  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DTW.Airport  
State Reference : MI

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 24000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D21.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : DTW.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : SAAB-SCANIA Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 554288

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : GAGES  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

DURING THE INITIAL CLB PHASE OF FLT AFTER TKOF DURING LNDG GEAR RETRACTION, WE RECEIVED A 'MASTER CAUTION' HYDS ON THE CENTRAL WARNING PANEL. WE PERFORMED THE QRH MEMORY ITEMS AND NOTICED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ON THE HYD PANEL: THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR WAS READING ZERO PSI, THE EMER ACCUMULATOR WAS READING BTWN 2500-3000 PSI, THE INBOARD AND OUTBOARD ACCUMULATORS WERE ALSO READING BTWN 2500-3000 PSI WHILE THE HYD QUANTITY WAS READING BTWN 100-150 CUBIC INCHES. WE PERFORMED THE QRH MEMORY ITEMS WHICH LED US TO TURN THE HYD PUMP SWITCH FROM 'AUTO' TO 'OFF,' AND WE PROCEEDED WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE QRH CHKLST. BASED ON THE INFO WE WERE READING OFF THE HYD PANEL, THIS LED US TO THE PORTION OF THE QRH CHKLST WHICH READS 'IF EMER PRESSURE NORMAL AND MAIN PRESSURE LOW WITH HYD QUANTITY NORMAL.' WE COMPLETED THIS PORTION OF THE QRH WITH NO CHANGES. THE 'IF MAIN PRESSURE DOES NOT INCREASE, APPLY HYD FLUID LOSS PROC FOR LNDG GEAR, FLAPS AND BRAKE OP, PAGE 08.5' APPLIED TO US AND WE CONTINUED THE QRH CHKLST. AT THIS POINT, THE HYD QUANTITY GAUGE WAS READING APPROX ZERO. WE CONTINUED WITH THE QRH CHKLST ON PAGE 08.5 'HYD FLUID LOSS.' OUR SCENARIO WAS NOW THE FOLLOWING CONDITION: 'IF BOTH HYD QUANTITY AND HYD MAIN PRESSURE LOW OR HAND PUMP EXTENSION NOT SUCCESSFUL.' WE PERFORMED THE APPROPRIATE PROCS AND EXTENDED THE LNDG GEAR AS PER FOLLOWS: EMER HANDLE -- PULL, LNDG GEAR HANDLE -- DOWN, BRAKE PRESSURE -- CHK. THIS WAS ALL PROCEEDED BY SLOWING THE ACFT TO THE 200 KIAS AIRSPD LIMITATION AS PER THE QRH. AT THIS POINT, WE COMPLETED THE QRH AND CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND THEN DISPATCH. WE HAD ALREADY NOTIFIED ATC OF OUR DIFFICULTIES AND REQUESTED VECTORS TO RETURN TO DTW. WE ASKED MAINT CTL TO ALSO REVIEW OUR QRH PROCS TO SEE IF THEY HAD ANY ADDITIONAL INPUT FOR US. THE QRH STATEMENT 'IF BOTH HYD QUANTITY AND HYD MAIN PRESSURE LOW OR HAND PUMP EXTENSION NOT SUCCESSFUL' APPLIED TO US AND WE PERFORMED A ZERO FLAP LNDG. DISPATCH CALCULATED OUR LNDG DISTANCE FOR THE CURRENT CONDITIONS AT DTW. AFTER WE TALKED WITH OUR FLT ATTENDANT AND OUR PAX AND HAD COMPLETED OUR CHKLST ITEMS, WE DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED TO LAND ON RWY 22L AT DTW. WE ADVISED TWR THAT WE WERE PERFORMING A ZERO FLAP LNDG AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO NOSEWHEEL STEERING AFTER LNDG. AFTER COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP ON THE RWY AND LNDG WITHOUT INCIDENT, THE ARFF HAD THEIR EQUIP AROUND US WHICH SEEMS TO BE NORMAL PROC. WE WERE ON THE RWY CTRLINE OR EXTREMELY CLOSE TO IT. APPROX 30 SECONDS OR SO AFTER STOPPING, ACFT STARTED TO GENTLY ROLL TOWARD THE E SIDE OF THE RWY TOWARD THE SAFETY AREA. WE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED ARFF TO KINDLY MOVE OUT OF THE WAY ON THE 'COMMON FREQ' AND THEY DID. THE ENGS WERE IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT TO 'FUEL OFF' AND THE PAX WERE ADVISED THAT WE WERE ROLLING INTO THE GRASS AND TO PLEASE STAY SEATED. WE HAD NO NOSEWHEEL STEERING OR BRAKING AUTH AFTER THE ACFT STARTED ROLLING, AND THE ACFT ROLLED VERY SLOWLY AND GENTLY INTO THE GRASS, MAKING CONTACT WITH NO ARPT FEATURES EXCEPT SOME DIRT AND A FEW BLADES OF GRASS. WE BRIEFED THE PAX IN MORE DETAIL AS TO WHAT JUST HAPPENED. THE PAX WERE SOON DEPLANED ONTO A BUS AND TAKEN INTO THE TERMINAL. OUR MECHS THEN SHOWED US THAT THE DOWN LOCK ACTUATOR SWIVEL ON THE R MAIN GEAR HAD BROKEN WHEN THE GEAR WAS RETRACTED. THE ACFT WAS THEN TOWED TO OUR COMPANY FACILITIES.

Synopsis :

AN SF340 FLC HAS TO RETURN LAND WHEN THEIR ACFT'S HYD SYS IS LOST AFTER TKOF FROM DTW, MI.

**Time**

Date : 200207  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IND.Airport  
State Reference : IN  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 31000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZID.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-400  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Vacating Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 8000  
ASRS Report : 555311

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : CABIN DIFFERENTIAL PRESS INDICATOR  
RATE OF CLB INDICATOR  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

AT FL310 STARTING DOWN TO FL290, CABIN PRESSURE STARTED TO RISE RAPIDLY. CREW EXECUTED IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEMS AS PER QRH AND MOVED ON TO ACCOMPLISH CHKLIST. UNABLE TO REGAIN CABIN PRESSURE, DIVERTED FROM STL TO IND AND LANDED SAFELY WITH NO INJURY TO CREW OR PAX AND NO ADDITIONAL MECHANICAL FAILURES.

Synopsis :

B737-400 CREW LOST CTL OF PRESSURIZATION AFTER THE THROTTLES WERE CLOSED FOR DSCNT IN ZID CLASS A AIRSPACE.

**Time**

Date : 200207  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

State Reference : NM  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 31000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZAB.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 12000  
ASRS Report : 555998

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Person / 4**

Function.Oversight : Coordinator

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : DC VOLTMETER  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

AFTER 1.5 HR DELAY FOR STARTER AND THEN START VALVE CHANGE, WE HAD RECENTLY LEVELED OFF AT CRUISE, WHEN THE #1 IRU DC FAIL LIGHT ILLUMINATED, FOLLOWED SHORTLY BY THE R IRU (INERTIAL REF UNIT) DC FAIL. COMPLIED WITH QRH. DC SYS APPEARED NORMAL. AFTER 1 HR OR SO THE CLOCKS BOTH FAILED AND MORE CHKS REVEALED THE BATTERY WAS DOWN TO 6 VOLTS. MAINT WAS CONSULTED TWICE BY AIR PHONE DURING THIS EVENT. AFTER LNDG SEVERAL SYS WERE INOP, WE HAD NO PA AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN AND THE EXTERNAL PWR WAS NOT ACCEPTED. WE WERE NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BECAUSE EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE IRC 'DC FAIL' AND CLOCKS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY. HAD WE REMEMBERED THAT WE HAD NO FIRE PROTECTION, ONLY 1 REVERSER WOULD DEPLOY AFTER LNDG, THE AUTOPLT DISENGAGE LIGHT AND ALARM COULD NOT BE SILENCED UNTIL LNDG, GND PWR WOULD NOT CONNECT TO THE ACFT AND NO PA WAS AVAILABLE OR VHF RADIO AFTER SHUTDOWN WE'D HAVE BEEN A LITTLE BETTER PREPARED. A NOTE IN THE QRH TO THE EFFECT OF 'IF THESE LIGHTS COME ON YOUR BATTERY IS GOING DEAD -- HERE'S A LIST OF WHAT YOU DON'T HAVE AND WON'T HAVE AFTER LNDG' WOULD BE USEFUL. ALSO, I WOULD BE EXPECTING A LITTLE MORE EXPERTISE AND HELP FROM MAINT. I AM ALSO HOPING THAT THE MAINT TECHNICIAN DIDN'T KNOW THAT WE WERE WITHOUT FIRE PROTECTION OR DIDN'T MENTION IT FOR CONCERN THAT WE MIGHT DIVERT AND LAND SHORT OF OUR DEST.

Synopsis :

A B737-300 EXPERIENCED TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN SHIP'S BATTERY PWR.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IND.Airport  
State Reference : IN

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZID.ARTCC  
Controlling Facilities.TRACON : IND.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : IND.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-200  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4550  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 225  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2300  
ASRS Report : 556260

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

IN DENVER, AT THE GATE, DURING THE INITIAL BRIEF, I ASKED THE FO TO FLY THE LEG TO INDIANAPOLIS AS I WOULD NORMALLY ASK SO THAT I MAY OBSERVE THE PLT AND ALLOW ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS AS AN INFLT MGR, HAVING THIS BEEN THE FIRST LEG WITH A NEW CREW AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MONTH. THE CLB CHK WAS COMPLETED AND WE WERE ENRTE TO INDIANAPOLIS. ATC GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO CLB FL290 AND WE HELD THERE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME FOR XING TFC. AT ABOUT 180 MI OR SO FROM DENVER, I QUICKLY NOTICED WHILE LEVEL AT FL290 THAT THE #2 ENG THRUST REVERSER UNLOCK LIGHT CAME ON. I TOLD THE FO THAT HE HAD THE RADIOS AND TO CONTINUE TO FLY THE ACFT. AT THAT POINT, HE WAS ON AUTOPLT B AT ALT HOLD. HE COMPLIED AND I PULLED OUT THE QRH AND WENT TO THE CHKLIST FOR REVERSE UNLOCKED LIGHT (INFLT). I RAN THE ENTIRE CHKLIST WITH INTERACTIVE DISCUSSION WITH THE FO THAT THE THRUST LEVER WAS NOT RESTR AT ANY POINT AND THE OVERHEAD REVERSER ISOLATION VALVE LIGHT WAS NOT ON. I CALLED BACK TO THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT TO CHK IF HE NOTICED ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY ON THE #2 ENG AND HE STATED THAT ALL LOOKED NORMAL. ALL ENG INDICATIONS APPEARED NORMAL AND BASED ON THE FACT THAT NO OTHER INDICATIONS BUT REVERSER UNLOCK LIGHT WERE ON, I BELIEVE IT TO BE AS THE QRH STATES, 'THE LIGHT IS GIVING A FALSE INDICATION.' TO FURTHER MY PROB SOLVING, I ELECTED TO CALL BACK TO MAINT CTL AND DISPATCH AND TOLD THEM OF OUR DISPOSITION AND THAT I WAS CONTEMPLATING ON RETURNING TO DENVER FOR THIS CONDITION. DURING THE DISCUSSION WITH MAINT, I PULLED OUT THE MEL AND LOOKED AT THE REQUIREMENTS TO MEL A REVERSER UNLOCK LIGHT. THE BOOK STATED THAT MAINT WOULD LOCK OUT THE REVERSER ON THE GND AND ADD THE MEL TO THE RELEASE, WHICH IN THIS CASE WOULD BE THE NEXT FLT. MAINT CTL OPTED THAT I CONTINUE TO INDIANAPOLIS. AN ACR MAINT MECH WOULD MEET ME AT THE GATE AND LOCKOUT THE #2 ENG THRUST REVERSER. SOMEWHERE BTWN FL180 AND DSNDING TO 11000 FT, WE FELT A VIBRATION IN THE CTL COLUMN AND I IMMEDIATELY WENT INTO STERILE WITH THE PAX. THE RTING TO CHANGE THE PWR SETTING THAT SEEMED TO BE CREATING A VIBRATION THAT COULD BE FELT IN THE COCKPIT CTR CONSOLE. I TOLD THE FO HE HAD THE ACFT AND RADIOS AS I REACHED FOR THE QRH. AT FIRST I FELT THE THRUST REVERSER STARTING TO OPEN, SO I QUICKLY ANALYZED THE ENG GAUGES AND ALL INDICATED NORMAL. I REPEATED THIS FOR BOTH THE ENG AND HYDS SYS. I CONTINUED TO EVALUATE THE PROB. I PUSHED THE #2 ENG THROTTLE SLOWLY FORWARD AND FOUND THAT TO BE AT 60% N2. AN EXTREME VIBRATION NOW RATTLED THE ACFT MUCH MORE THAN PREVIOUSLY. I QUICKLY BROUGHT THE THRUST LEVER BACK TO IDLE AND NOTED THE ENG INSTS NORMAL. I FELT THE REVERSER AT THAT TIME COULD BE PARTLY OPEN OR THE ENG WAS FAILING. THE THRUST LEVER NEVER SHOWED SIGNS THAT IT WAS RESTR. I QUICKLY DISCUSSED WITH THE FO THE POSSIBILITY OF PREVENTIVE ENG SHUTDOWN AND TO CONFIGURE EARLY USING FLAP 15 DEGS. I THEN CALLED BACK FOR THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO BE SEATED. I LEFT THE #2 ENG THROTTLE AT IDLE AND ELECTED TO KEEP IT RUNNING AND CARRIED THE MEMORY ITEM OF ENG LIMIT. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL AND BOTH THRUST REVERSERS WERE USED. THE FO CALLED OUT DISTANCE REMAINING UNTIL WE CAME TO A STOP. THE ENG VIBRATION WAS FELT ON THE GND WHEN THE #2 ENG THRUST REVERSER WAS DEPLOYED, HOWEVER, THE INDICATIONS WERE ONCE AGAIN NORMAL. I THEN MET THE MECH WAITING AT THE JETWAY WHO WAS THERE TO LOCK OUT THE #2 ENG THRUST REVERSER AND TOLD HIM OF WHAT WE HAD JUST EXPERIENCED. HE WENT OUT TO LOOK AT THE ENG AS THE OUTBOUND CREW STARTED TO COME DOWN THE JETWAY. AFTER INSPECTION, THE MECH STATED THE ENG HAD METAL PIECES IN THE TAILPIPE AND THAT HE TRIED TO ROTATE THE FAN AND AFTER SEVERAL TRIES THE FAN FROZE UP. AT THAT POINT, HE RPTD THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT AIRWORTHY AND SUSPECTED ENG FAILURE. I THEN SPOKE TO MAINT CTL AFTER THE MECH TOLD THEM ABOUT THE ENG FAILING. I ALSO WROTE UP THE FO'S NAV RADIOS FOR THE LOSS OF HIS RADIO AT LOC CAPTURE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE CAUSE OF THE #2 ENG VIBRATION WAS THE FAILURE OF THE TURBINE SECTION. THE RPTR SAID TURBINE PARTS WERE PICKED OUT OF THE TAILPIPE AND IT DETERMINED AN ENG CHANGE WAS REQUIRED. THE RPTR STATED DURING THE PART OF THE FLT WHEN THE ENG WAS RUN AT IDLE ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL.

Synopsis :

A B737-200 ON DSCNT BTWN FL180 AND 11000 FT, A #2 ENG VIBRATION WAS FELT. ENG OPERATED AT IDLE FOR LNDG. MAINT FOUND TURBINE PARTS IN TAILPIPE.

**Time**

Date : 200207  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

State Reference : WV  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZTL.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7500  
ASRS Report : 556361

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3500  
ASRS Report : 556360

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : CABIN HIGH ALT WARNING O2 MASKS DEPLOYED.  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

SLOW DEPRESSURIZATION OF CABIN. DEPARTED RDU AND CLBED TO FL350. AFTER ABOUT 15 MINS AT FL350 THE ACFT BEGAN TO DEPRESSURIZE. THE CABIN ALT AURAL WARNING SOUNDED AT ABOUT 10000 FT CABIN ALT. IMMEDIATE CLRNC WAS RECEIVED TO DSND TO FL240. PASSING FL300, CLRNC WAS GIVEN TO 11000 FT. DSCNT WAS RAPID WITH SPD BRAKES UP BUT WAS NOT UNCOMFORTABLE. DSNDING THROUGH ABOUT 16000 FT, THE PAX OXYGEN MASKS DEPLOYED. PAX HAD BEEN BRIEFED AFTER DSCNT STABILIZED. ACFT LEVELED AT 11000 FT, PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL WAS APPROX 1.0 PSI GIVING A CABIN ALT OF ABOUT 8000 FT. COORDINATED WITH DISPATCH AND ATC AND PROCEEDED TO MDW AT 11000 FT. APCH AND LNDG AT MDW WAS UNEVENTFUL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 556360: FLT WAS OUR FIRST OF THE DAY FROM RDU-MDW. APPROX 15-20 MINS AFTER LEVELOFF AT FL350, THE CABIN ALT WARNING HORN SOUNDED. CAPT COORDINATED AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT AND STARTED DOWN. I PULLED OUT THE QRH AT THAT TIME. WE DSNDDED ALL THE WAY TO 11000 FT WHERE THE CABIN ALT STABILIZED AT 8000 FT. THE OXYGEN MASKS IN THE CABIN DEPLOYED AT SOME POINT IN THE DSCNT. THE DEPRESSURIZATION WAS NOT RAPID AT ALL. THE CAPT TALKED TO THE PAX AND COORDINATED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO MAKE SURE EVERYONE WAS OK. AFTER SOME DIFFICULTY CONTACTING DISPATCH, WE MADE THE DECISION (AT DISPATCH'S REQUEST) TO CONTINUE TO MDW. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. ON AUG/THU/02, I RECEIVED A CALL FROM CHIEF PT. HE TOLD ME THE FAA WANTED MY CERTIFICATE NUMBER AS A RESULT OF THE FLT. AFTER READING THE CAPT'S IRREGULARITY RPT, THE CHIEF SAID THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONCERN HE COULD SEE WAS THAT WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. HE SUGGESTED WE FILL OUT AN ASAP RPT BASED ON BEING NOTIFIED OF FAA ACTION ON AUG/THU/02. I BELIEVE WE HANDLED THE SIT PROPERLY AND A DECLARATION OF AN EMER WAS NOT WARRANTED. WE IMMEDIATELY ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED DSCNT CLRNC, THEN REQUIRED NO FURTHER ASSISTANCE. FOM GUIDANCE IS NOT CLR OR SPECIFIC ON WHETHER AN EMER SHOULD BE DECLARED IN A SIT LIKE WE ENCOUNTERED.

Synopsis :

B737-300 CREW LOST CTL OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION IN ZTL CLASS A AIRSPACE.

**ACN: 556386**

**Time**

Date : 200208

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : LGB.Airport

State Reference : CA

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : MD-80 Super 80

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 556386

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : PACK MIXING VALVE POSITION INDICATC  
PACK TEMP.

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

AFTER DEP FROM LGB, WE DISCOVERED THAT THE R TEMP CONTROLLER WAS STUCK IN THE FULL COLD POS AND WOULD NOT WORK IN EITHER AUTO OR MANUAL. AFTER LOOKING IN BOTH BOOKS AND FINDING NO PROC, WE CALLED MAINT TO TROUBLESHOOT. THEY RECOMMENDED PULLING AND RESETTING 3 CIRCUIT BREAKERS. WE TRIED THIS TO NO AVAIL, AND FOUND WITH OUR HVY PAX LOAD AND KEEPING THE L CONTROLLER HOTTER THAN NORMAL, IT WAS BEARABLE IN THE AFT PART OF THE JET. AFTER LEVELING AT CRUISE, I DECIDED TO TURN ON ALL THE WING AND ENG ANTI-ICE TO SEE IF THIS WOULD DO ANY GOOD. ALMOST AS SOON AS THE WING ANTI-ICE CAME ON, THE VALVE STARTED WORKING, LEADING ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRESSURE CHANGE UNSTUCK THE CTL VALVE. I THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO INCORPORATE THIS PROC WITH THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND ANTI-ICE INTO OUR QRH BOOK. SINCE IT WAS A BALMY MORNING IN LGB, THE VALVE, BEING IN THE FULL COLD, WORKED FOR OUR COOLING NEEDS ON THE GND, SO WE NEVER KNEW IT WASN'T WORKING PROPERLY. HAD IT BEEN A COLD/FROSTY MORNING IN WINTER WITH A VALVE STUCK IN THE 1/2 - 3/4 POS, WE MAY HAVE HAD TO DIVERT SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FOR AN UNCTLABLE CABIN TEMP.

Synopsis :

MD80 CREW FOUND THE R PACK MIXING VALVE WAS STUCK IN THE COLD POS.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Intersection : BLEUZ  
State Reference : MS  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 12500

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZME.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 22000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 20  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 13000  
ASRS Report : 556648

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 175  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500  
ASRS Report : 556501

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Anomaly.Non Adherence.Other : ACFT PACK TURNED OFF  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : CAB ALT WARNING HORN  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

CRUISING FROM BHM TO MSY AT FL350. THE FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED AND ASKED US TO WARM UP THE CABIN. THE FO WARMED UP THE CABIN AND TURNED OFF THE GASPER FAN. BEGAN A DSCNT TO FL240. AFTER A SHORT TIME, CABIN ALT WARNING HORN BEGAN TO SOUND. HORN WAS SILENCED, CABIN ALT WAS AT 10000 FT, AND DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WAS INDICATED. CABIN WAS IN A SLIGHT CLB. BEGAN EMER PROC FOR RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION. AS THE FO WAS GOING FOR THE QRH, 1 NOTICED THAT THE R-HAND AIR CONDITIONING PACK SWITCH WAS IN THE 'OFF' POS. IT WAS PLACED 'ON' AND THE CABIN IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO DSND. DURING THIS TIME WE HAD NOTIFIED ATC THAT WE WERE REQUESTING A LOWER ALT AS WE WERE EXPERIENCING A PRESSURIZATION PROB. THEY CLRED US FOR FURTHER DSCNT AND ASKED IF WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER. OUR INITIAL THOUGHT WAS TO GET THE AIRPLANE BELOW 14000 FT TO KEEP THE OXYGEN MASKS FROM DEPLOYING. ONCE THE CABIN WAS UNDER CTL THE DSCNT WAS SLOWED AND WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOT DECLARING AN EMER AND OUR SIT WAS UNDER CTL. AT NO TIME DID WE DSND BELOW A CLRED ALT OR DEV FROM OUR ASSIGNED RTE. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THIS BEGAN WHEN THE FO TURNED OFF THE R-HAND AIR CONDITIONING PACK SWITCH INSTEAD OF THE GASPER FAN DURING CRUISE BY MISTAKE. THE CABIN SLOWLY CLBED DURING CRUISE AND THEN SLIGHTLY MORE ONCE THE PWR WAS REDUCED TO BEGIN THE DSCNT ALLOWING IT TO FINALLY REACH 10000 FT SETTING OFF THE WARNING HORN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 556501: IN TRYING TO REGULATE THE CABIN, I TURNED OFF THE GASPER AND RECIRCULATION FAN SWITCHES AND EVIDENTLY BUMPED OR INADVERTENTLY PLACED THE R PACK SWITCH TO 'OFF.'

Synopsis :

A B737-300 CREW, IN CRUISE AT FL350, EXPERIENCED A CABIN PRESSURE LOSS WHEN ONE OF THE 2 AIR CONDITIONING PACKS WAS INADVERTENTLY TURNED OFF.

**ACN: 557680**

**Time**

Date : 200208

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : RDU.Airport

State Reference : NC

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 13000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : RDU.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : EMB ER 135 ER&LR

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 557680

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 557679

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

DURING CLBOUT OUT OF RDU AT APPROX 13000 FT, WE EXPERIENCED A L YAW. WE ALSO FELT AN ACCELERATION ON THE R ENG. WE CHKED THE EICAS FOR ANY ABNORMALITIES. WE THEN RECEIVED A CAUTION MESSAGE OF ENG #2 OUT. WE RAN OUR REQUIRED MEMORY ITEMS FOLLOWED BY CHKLISTS. WE IMMEDIATELY DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC AND TURNED AROUND FOR A LNDG ON RDU RWY 5L. THE LNDG WAS DONE IN AN OVERWT CONDITION WITH AN APPROX WT OF 43100 LBS. THE LNDG WAS VERY SMOOTH AND WE ROLLED OUT TO THE END OF THE RWY AND CLRED. WE HAD RDU CFR EXAMINE THE ACFT FOR ANY DAMAGE AND GOT THE GO AHEAD TO TAXI TO THE GATE. WE DEPLANED THE ACFT NORMALLY. THERE WERE NO INJURIES OR VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 557679: BEFORE THE R ENG QUIT IT SEEMED TO HAVE ACCELERATED BECAUSE WE EXPERIENCED A MOMENTARY YAW TO THE L FOLLOWED BY A YAW TO THE R WHICH WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE R ENG FAILING. THE AUTOPLT WAS ON AT THE TIME AND DID A FAIRLY NICE JOB FLYING THE ACFT. CAPT COMPLETED THE CHKLIST WHILE I FLEW THE ACFT. WE RECEIVED RADAR VECTORS FOR THE VISUAL APCH. THE ACFT WAS APPROX 2000 LBS OVER MAX LNDG WT. WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE WITH THE OVERWT LNDG.

Synopsis :

AN EMB135 FLC HAS TO RETURN LAND AFTER THEIR #2 ENG FAILS IN A DEP CLB FROM RDU, NC.

**ACN: 557828**

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MSP.Airport  
State Reference : MN  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 2000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : M98.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 112  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2200  
ASRS Report : 557828

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS INDICATION  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

ON DEP FROM MSP ARPT, A TRAILING EDGE FLAP ASYMMETRY CONDITION OCCURRED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RAISE THE FLAPS. THE QRH WAS USED TO IDENT THE NON NORMAL PROCS AND WORK THE PROB. THE PROC HAD US ACTUATE THE GND PROX FLAP OVERRIDE SWITCH AND ADJUST OUR XREF SPD TO COMPENSATE FOR THE FLAPS STUCK IN A SPLIT CONDITION. OUR COMPANY WAS CALLED TO VERIFY THE PROCS WITH THE MAINT COORDINATOR AND TO DETERMINE A SUITABLE DIVERT ARPT. ORD WAS DETERMINED TO BE THE MOST SUITABLE BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE PROX AND LONG RWY (13000 FT FOR RWY 14R). FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX WERE BRIEFED AND THE ACFT LANDED SAFELY AND UNEVENTFULLY ON RWY 14R. AN EMER WAS DECLARED FOR THESE REASONS: 1) THE FLAPS WERE SPLIT (ONE AT 8 DEGS AND THE OTHER AT 14 DEGS). 2) LNDG FLAPS COULD NOT BE USED. 3) THE ADDED HIGHER AIRSPD ON FINAL. 4) INCREASE LNDG ROLL DUE TO THE EXCESSIVE SPD.

Synopsis :

B757 FLC HAS FLAP ASYMMETRY, DECLARES EMER.

**Time**

Date : 200208

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : AUS.Airport

State Reference : TX

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : AUS.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B737-200

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 8500

ASRS Report : 558412

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

NORMAL TKOF FROM AUS UNTIL PF CALLED FOR FLAPS UP. THE #5 LEADING EDGE DEVICE WOULD NOT RETRACT. QRH WAS FOLLOWED, FLAP (LEADING EDGE #5) STILL WOULD NOT RETRACT. NOTIFIED COMPANY MAINT, DISPATCH, AUS OPS AND FLT ATTENDANTS. QRH FOLLOWED FOR RETURN TO LAND AT AUS. REQUESTED EMER EQUIP STANDING BY AND ADVISED CABIN CREW TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR PRECAUTIONARY LNDG. LANDED AT, 102000 LBS AND AFTER LNDG, HAD EMER EQUIP CHK BRAKES FOR FIRE OR SMOKE. NONE RPTED BY EMER EQUIP. TAXIED TO GATE. MAINT SHOWED UP AND CHKED LEADING EDGE DEVICES FOR BROKEN TRACKS, ETC -- NONE FOUND. MAINT RPTED LEADING EDGE DEVICE'S TRACKS VERY DRY WITH MINIMUM GREASE ON THEM. LEADING EDGE DEVICES GREASED AND CYCLED APPROX 10 TIMES. MAINT NOTIFIED US THAT LEADING EDGE DEVICES WORKING FINE AFTER GREASING THEM. LOG SIGNED OFF AND DEPARTED APPROX XA30 LATE. NORMAL TKOF, CLB WITH NORMAL FLT TO PHX.

Synopsis :

B737-200 FLC RETURN LAND AFTER THE LEADING EDGE WING SLATS WOULD NOT PROPERLY RETRACT.

**ACN: 558467**

**Time**

Date : 200208

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

State Reference : NC

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 14000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : CLT.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000

ASRS Report : 558467

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

FLT WAS FROM ATL TO CLT. WHILE DSNding ON THE UNARM ARR, THE MASTER CAUTION ILLUMINATED SHOWING A WINDOW OVERHEAT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE CABIN ALT WARNING SOUNDED THE CABIN PRESSURE WAS ABOVE 10000 FT. FO AND I DONNED OUR OXYGEN MASKS AND PERFORMED THE QRH CHKLIST. CLT APCH WAS VERY BUSY. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED 10000 FT. ON DSNding TO A LOWER ALT, THE MANUAL PRESSURIZATION WORKED SOMEWHAT. A NORMAL APCH WAS PERFORMED IN IMC TO CLT RWY 36L.

Synopsis :

B737 FLC DECLARED AN EMER DURING ARR DSCNT AFTER A LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION.

**ACN: 558827**

## **Time**

Date : 200209

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : BDL.Airport

State Reference : CT

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 17000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Ceiling.Single Value : 5500

## **Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : BDL.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Descent : Vacating Altitude

## **Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8200

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000

ASRS Report : 558827

## **Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 220

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 9000

ASRS Report : 558035

## **Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

## **Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : HYD. PRESS INDICATOR HYD QUANTITY  
RUDDER ATL MANUAL LIGHT

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

ENRTE TO BDL ABOUT 50 NM W AT 17000 FT WITH AUTOPLT ON AND A DSCNT JUST STARTED, ACFT MOMENTARILY YAWED WHILE RUDDER CTL MANUAL LIGHT ILLUMINATED. SHORTLY, R HYD PRESSURE INDICATOR INDICATED APPROX 1000 PSI AND R QUANTITY SHOWED JUST ABOVE ZERO. QRH LED US TO THE 'R HYD PRESSURE LOW' PROC. FOLLOWED QRH PROC AND INFORMED ATC OF THE SIT AND REQUESTED PRIORITY HANDLING WITH CFR VEHICLES STANDING BY FOR PRECAUTIONARY REASONS. THEN BRIEFED CABIN CREW, PAX, AND COMPANY AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

Synopsis :

DC9 CREW HAD R HYD SYS FAILURE ON DSCNT TO BDL.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CVG.Airport  
State Reference : KY  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : CVG.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Traffic Pattern

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4200  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 90  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1240  
ASRS Report : 558888

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : APU FAULT, FIRE WARNING  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON DOWNWIND FOR RWY 18L AT CVG, AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO START THE APU. WE WERE PASSING THROUGH 11000 FT MSL AND INDICATING 280 KIAS. ON THE ATTEMPT TO START THE APU, WE RECEIVED AN APU DOOR INHIBIT/CLOSED MESSAGE AND THE APU FAILED TO START. THIS WAS SHORTLY FOLLOWED BY AN APU FIRE MESSAGE, FIRE BELL, AND MASTER WARNING. I WAS THE PF AND TOLD THE FO THAT I HAD THE RADIOS AND TO RUN THE APU FIRE PROC. THE FIRE WARNINGS STAYED ON FOR 4-8 SECONDS. BY THE TIME WE WERE GOING TO RUN THE APU FIRE PROC, THE FIRE WARNINGS CEASED. THEY WERE FOLLOWED BY AN APU FAULT MESSAGE. WE RAN THE APU FAULT QRH PROC AND THE MESSAGE EXTINGUISHED. THE FLT LANDED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INCIDENT. UPON ARRIVING AT THE GATE, MAINT WAS CONTACTED. I EXPLAINED TO MAINT VIA RADIO THAT WE HAD AN APU DOOR INHIBIT MESSAGE AND THAT I WANTED TO SPEAK TO A MECH DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE. WHEN THE MECH ARRIVED, HE RESET THE APU ECU AND RESTARTED THE APU WITHOUT ANY PROBS AND THE APU RAN NORMALLY. UPON CONSULTATION WITH THE MECH, THE EVENT WAS WRITTEN UP AND ENTERED INTO THE MAINT LOG AS AN APU DOOR INHIBIT MESSAGE DURING FLT. ON REVIEW OF COMPANY OPS MANUAL, THE COMPANY REQUIRES ANY FALSE FIRE MESSAGE TO BE WRITTEN UP AND ENTERED INTO THE MAINT LOG. AN IRREGULAR OPS RPT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE COMPANY EXPLAINING THE SIT AND WRITE-UP.

Synopsis :

CL65 CREW HAD AN 'APU DOOR CLOSED' WARNING MESSAGE, AND THEN HAD AN APU FIRE WARNING THE CREW DID NOT ACT ON THE FIRE WARNING.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : JAX.Airport  
State Reference : FL  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 41000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 500

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZJX.ARTCC  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model : Citation 10  
Mission : Business  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 290  
ASRS Report : 559196

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN ALERT EICAS  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

IN CRUISE, VMC FL410, FO FLYING, BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN ALERT ILLUMINATED ON EICAS. VERY UNUSUAL, BAGGAGE DOOR WAS VERIFIED CLOSED AND LOCKED PRIOR TO ENG START. SUSPECTED BAD MICRO SWITCH. WHILE DISCUSSING PROB, PRIOR TO READING CHKLIST, BAGGAGE ALT LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND CABIN ALT CLBED RAPIDLY AT FULL SCALE ON GAUGE. WE DONNED OXYGEN MASKS, ESTABLISHED CREW COMS, DECLARED EMER AND PERFORMED EMER DSCNT PROC AND WERE VECTORED TO AND LANDED VISUALLY ON RWY 7 AT JAX. WE SUSPECT RUPTURED DOOR SEAL -- EMER DSCNT LOSS OF PRESSURE CHKLISTS NOT READ (NO TIME) BUT ALL ITEMS PERFORMED. WITH A 2 MAN CREW (NO PAX) THIS WAS A FERRY FLT TO GSO. THERE WAS NO TIME TO PERFORM THE PROC, TALK TO ATC, AND READ THE CHKLISTS. THEY ARE REQUIRED MEMORY ITEMS IN OUR FLEET. MOREOVER, AT NIGHT, WITH OXYGEN MASKS ON READING THE CHKLIST WOULD HAVE COMPROMISED SAFETY AND FLYING THE ACFT (COCKPIT LIGHTS ON AND TRYING TO SEE OUT). BELOW 10000 FT, WITH MASKS OFF, DSCNT, APCH, AND BEFORE LNDG CHKLISTS WERE PERFORMED AND LNDG WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE INITIAL FAULT (BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN) WITHOUT A BAGGAGE SEAL LIGHT WARNING WAS MISLEADING AND LED US TO TAKE TIME WONDERING ABOUT A MICRO SWITCH PROB (COMMON IN OTHER AREAS) BEFORE GETTING THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST OUT. THERE IS A BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN PROC THAT MIGHT HAVE ALLOWED US TO ISOLATE THAT COMPARTMENT AND NEGATE THE NEED FOR A RAPID DSCNT DUE TO A DEPRESSURIZATION IE, YOU DO NOT GET A REAL BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN AT MACH .90 AND FL410 WITH JUST A LIGHT ON THE PANEL. THE SEAL LIGHT SHOULD HAVE ILLUMINATED EITHER PRIOR TO OR CONCURRENT WITH THE DOOR OPEN LIGHT. THIS GIVES THE CREW FAIR WARNING. MAINT IS WORKING ON THIS AS I WRITE.

Synopsis :

A C750 CREW, IN CRUISE AT FL410, EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE DUE TO A LEAKING BAGGAGE DOOR, A LNDG WAS MADE AT NEARBY JAX.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

State Reference : FO  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 31000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : MMZT.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 18000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 13000  
ASRS Report : 559907

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Person / 7**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : FIRE WING SYSTEM  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Airport  
Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Narrative :

THE FLT HAD BEEN AT CRUISE ONLY A COUPLE OF MINS WHEN THE FIRE WARNING BELL SOUNDED AND THE 'WHEELWELL FIRE' WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED. WE ACCOMPLISHED THE QRC AND QRH PROCS, EXTENDED THE LNDG GEAR AFTER SLOWING THE ACFT, BUT THE FIRE WARNING LIGHT REMAINED ILLUMINATED. WE STARTED TO DSND TO A LOWER ALT, DECLARED AN EMER WITH MAZATLAN CTR, AND COORDINATED OUR DIVERSION WITH MAINT CTL AND COMPANY DISPATCH. MAZATLAN WAS THE CLOSEST SUITABLE ARPT 'IN POINT OF TIME.' WE COORDINATED A LOW ALT 'FLY-BY' OVER THE TWR, WHO RPTED THAT OUR LNDG GEAR APPEARED TO BE NORMAL AND UNDAMAGED. THE 'WHEELWELL FIRE' WARNING LIGHT FINALLY EXTINGUISHED AS WE APCHED MAZATLAN ARPT (APPROX 20 MINS AFTER ILLUMINATING). I BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS THAT WE WERE MAKING A 'PRECAUTIONARY LNDG,' AND A NORMAL FLAPS 40 DEG LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON RWY 26 WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE HAD REQUESTED THAT THE TWR HAVE EMER VEHICLES STANDING BY, BUT THEY WERE NOT THERE. A NORMAL TAXI TO THE GATE WAS ACCOMPLISHED. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED NO APPARENT DAMAGE OR APPARENT CAUSE FOR THE FIRE INDICATION.

Synopsis :

A B737-300 FLC DIVERTS BECAUSE OF AN INDICATION OF A WHEELWELL FIRE WARNING, ONLY TO FIND THAT IT WAS A FALSE WARNING AFTER LNDG AT MMMZ, FO.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CVG.Airport  
State Reference : KY  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 4800

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : CVG.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2800  
ASRS Report : 560323

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3700  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 650  
ASRS Report : 560324

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : ENG INSTRUMENTS  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

AT APPROX 2500 FT AFTER TKOF, A LOUD BOOM AND YAW CAME FROM THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT. THE ITT ON THE #1 ENG WAS APPROX 980 DEGS C. DECLARING AN EMER, WE INFORMED ATC WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND WE WANTED TO RETURN TO CVG. AFTER COMPLETING THE QRH PROCS TO SHUT THE ENG DOWN, WE CONTACTED DISPATCH TO INFORM THEM OF OUR SIT. WE ALSO CONTACTED THE FLT ATTENDANT AND PAX AS TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING. WE INFORMED THEM WE HAD SHUT THE #1 ENG DOWN AND WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO CVG FOR AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. WE STATED CFR WOULD BE MEETING THE FLT FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AND WE WERE NOT PLANNING TO EVAC THE ACFT UNLESS I TOLD THEM OTHERWISE. ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED AND AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE. CFR MET THE FLT.

Synopsis :

CL65 CREW HAD #1 ENG FAILURE IN CVG CLASS B AIRSPACE.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : TYS.Airport  
State Reference : TN  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : TYS.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3541  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 113  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2186  
ASRS Report : 560519

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : GEAR DISAGREE (EFIS)  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

TO HELP FACILITATE A STABILIZED APCH INTO TYS, AFTER A LATE DSCNT BY ATC, WE SELECTED THE GEAR DOWN BELOW 250 KTS (APPROX 225 KTS) AND RECEIVED A GEAR DISAGREEMENT WARNING MESSAGE. WE ELECTED TO GO AROUND. THE QRH WAS CONSULTED AND FOLLOWED, RESULTING IN 3 GREEN DOWN AND LOCKED GEAR INDICATIONS. MAINT WAS CONSULTED AND CONCURRED A SAFE LNDG COULD BE MADE AND WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. ATC SENT OUT THE FIRE TRUCKS BUT THEY RETURNED AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG.

Synopsis :

A CARJ CREW, ON APCH TO TYS, EXPERIENCED A 'GEAR DISAGREEMENT WARNING' WHEN EXTENDING THE GEAR, SPAWNING A GAR.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport  
State Reference : NV  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 25000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 225  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 9000  
ASRS Report : 560561

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4300  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 220  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 800  
ASRS Report : 560560

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : ENG OVERHEAT WARNING  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Company

Narrative :

DEPARTED AT XA00, OFF AT XA12 CST. APPROX 75 NM FROM ORIGINAL CITY DURING DEP WITH CLB PWR. AT FL250, #2 ENG OVERHEAT LIGHT FLICKERED ON 3-4 TIMES, SEVERAL TIMES MORE DURING REFS TO QRH. QRH ENG OVERHEAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN WITH OVERHEAT LIGHT EXTINGUISHED, NEVER TO ILLUMINATE AGAIN EXCEPT DURING SYS TESTS. AFTER SUCCESSFUL AND NORMAL OVERHEAT/FIRE SYS TEST BEING PERFORMED, SELECTIVELY PLACED #2 FIRE LOOP SWITCH FROM NORMAL LOOP A AND B. FAULT LIGHT CAME ON WITH LOOP A ONLY SELECTED WITH ADDITIONAL REFS TO QRH. CONTACTED MAINT FOR ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS OF SYS CHKS AND ANY RECOMMENDATIONS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. NO ASSISTANCE GIVEN EXCEPT ADHERE TO QRH FAULT LIGHT. FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX ADVISED OF TURN BACK DUE TO 'PROB WITH ENG MAINT MONITORING SYS AND NOT BEING REPAIRABLE IN DEST CITY.' CONTACTED ATC FOR TURN BACK AND RECOVERY WITH IMMEDIATE DSCNT AND ARR CONDITION WITH CTR AND ARR. NO EMER DECLARED WITH ATC. ADVISED OF RETURNING FOR MAINT ITEMS ONLY. DUE TO TIME COMPRESSION, EXPLANATION TO FLT ATTENDANTS, EXTENSIVE ATC COORD, AND ROUTING, AND ADVISING 3 DIFFERENT CTLRS OF NATURE OF PROBS, DISPATCH WAS NOT ADVISED. RETURN WAS UNEVENTFUL WITH REDUCED THRUST AS REQUIRED ON #2 ENG FOR NORMAL FLAP 30 DEG APCH. LNDG RWY 25L WITH ARR AT GATE AT XA55 CST. CONTACT WAS MADE WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL IMMEDIATELY UPON ARR AT GATE. APOLOGIES AND EXPLANATIONS WERE MADE TO DISPATCH FOR NON-CONTACT. ACFT HAD HISTORY OF SIMILAR PROB WITH LAST EVENT ON SEP/THUR/02, WHICH WAS 2 DAYS PRIOR TO FIRST PAGE IN LOGBOOK. MAINT CTL AGREED WITH CREW ACTIONS, CHKING OF TEST SYS FOR FAULT LIGHT, AND TURN BACK FOR CORRECTIVE REPAIRS. ASSISTANT CHIEF WAS CONTACTED WITHIN 15 MINS OF ARR WITH FULL EXPLANATIONS OF EVENTS. UPON ADVICE FROM CHIEF PLT, ASAP ACTIONS WERE INITIATED WITH WRITTEN RPTS TO FOLLOW. CREW AND PAX WERE XFERRED TO SECOND ACFT WITHIN 1 1/2 HRS OF ARR FOR UNEVENTFUL FLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 560560: FLT DEPARTED. I WAS PF. DURING CLBOUT, PASSING APPROX 25000 FT, WE EXPERIENCED AN INTERMITTENT #2 ENG OVERHEAT LIGHT. WE RETARDED THE THRUST LEVER WITHOUT RESULT. THE OVERHEAT LIGHT CONTINUED TO FLICKER BUT NEVER ILLUMINATED STEADILY. THE CAPT ATTEMPTING TO TROUBLESHOOT SELECTED 'A' LOOP AND GOT A 'FAULT' LIGHT, FLICKERING CEASED. HE THEN SELECTED 'B' LOOP, AND GOT AN INTERMITTENT OVERHEAT ONCE AGAIN. AFTER A VERY BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH MAINT, HE ELECTED TO RETURN TO ORIGINAL CITY. THE SUBSEQUENT APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL, NO FURTHER PROBS NOTED. I FEEL WE HANDLED THE SIT WELL. THE CAPT RAN THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO FIX THE PROB. HE LET THE QRH DO ITS JOB IN TROUBLESHOOTING AND THEN MADE THE DECISION TO RETURN. I WAS FLYING AND CONTINUED TO DO SO WHILE HE SORTED THINGS OUT. WE EACH FULFILLED OUR ROLES AND BROUGHT THE SIT TO A SUCCESSFUL END.

Synopsis :

B737-300 CREW HAD ENG OVERHEAT WARNINGS FROM BOTH A AND B LOOP SENSORS.

**ACN: 560667**

**Time**

Date : 200209

Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : PHL.Airport

State Reference : PA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PHL.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 23450

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 185

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2950

ASRS Report : 560667

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS INDICATION

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

ON TAKE OFF, AFTER GEAR RETRACTION THE GEAR DISAGREE GEAR DOORS CAUTION MESSAGES APPEARED ON THE EICAS. ALSO, THE AMBER DOORS AND GEAR LIGHTS ADJACENT TO THE GEAR LEVER HANDLE. WE RECYCLED THE GEAR DOWN TO A NORMAL 3 GREEN INDICATION. WE CYCLED THE GEAR UP AND HAD THE SAME INDICATIONS AS BEFORE...EICAS MESSAGES GEAR DISAGREE GEAR DOORS. ALSO, AMBER LIGHTS DOORS GEAR ADJACENT TO THE GEAR HANDLE. WE CONFERRED WITH MAINT FOREMAN AND ELECTED TO RETURN. WE HAD A NORMAL ILS APCH (VFR) AND HAD A OVERWT LNDG WHICH WE DISCUSSED WITH MAINT AND FOLLOWED THE PROCS OUTLINED IN THE QRH-FOM. I MADE A SMOOTH UNEVENTFUL LNDG. GEAR INDICATION WAS A NORMAL 3 GREEN (DOWN).

Synopsis :

B757 FLC HAS LNDG GEAR FAULT INDICATION ON DEP FROM PHL.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

State Reference : ON  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 25000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : CZYZ.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 270  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 600  
ASRS Report : 561209

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS TRIM MSG  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

DURING DSCNT FROM FL250, AUTOPLT MAX WING DOWN TRIM CAUTION MESSAGES WERE ILLUMINATED. FOLLOWING QRH PROCS, AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED. CREW DISCOVERED R ROLL CTL WAS VERY POOR AND L ROLL CTL WAS WORSE. CREW DISCUSSED POSSIBILITY OF ICE BUILD-UP IN CTLS DUE TO HVY PRECIP AT DEP AND DURING CLB. AS DSCNT CONTINUED TO WARMER AIR (APPROX 0 DEGS C) FULL AND NORMAL CTL OF ROLL WAS EXPERIENCED! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATES THAT THE ACFT HAS CABLE CTLS THAT RUN THROUGH THE WHEEL WELL AREA. THE HYD CTL UNITS ARE IN THE WING, DOWNSTREAM OF THE CABLES. WATER IS ABLE TO ENTER THE WHEEL WELL AREA AND THE CABLES BIND OR LOCK UP WHEN THE CABLES ARE FROZEN BY WATER. THE CAPT INDICATES THAT PREVIOUSLY ISSUED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE NOTES REQUIRE THE INSTALLATION OF A SEAL IN A GAP AREA IN THE WHEEL WELL, AND GREASING THE CTL CABLES TO PREVENT ICE FROM STICKING TO THE CABLES. THE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE ALSO REQUIRES THE AUTOPLT BE DISCONNECTED EVERY 5000 FT, DURING CLB, TO EXERCISE THE LATERAL CTL, AS THE PROB STILL EXISTS. THE CAPT KNOWS OF ANOTHER CREW THAT EXPERIENCED LOCKED LATERAL CTLS WHICH WOULD NOT RELEASE UNTIL THE ICE LOCKING THE CTLS MELTED.

Synopsis :

CARJ CREW FOUND 'VERY POOR' ROLL CTL TO THE R AND EVEN WORSE CTL TO THE L. PROB DISSIPATED WHEN DSNING BELOW THE FREEZING LEVEL. THERE WAS HVY RAIN AT THE DEP STATION.

**ACN: 561233**

**Time**

Date : 200209

Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CRW.Airport

State Reference : WV

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CRW.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : SF 340a

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2007

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 232

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 900

ASRS Report : 561233

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : MAIN HYDRAULIC INDICATORS

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING THE TAXI, I PERFORMED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST THROUGH 'FLT INSTRUMENTS AND AVIONICS.' OUR SEQUENCE FOR TKOF WAS #3 FOR RWY 23. WITH THIS SEQUENCE, THE CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT JUST SHORT OF INTXN A1 ON TXWY A DUE TO 2 ACFT IN POSITION AHEAD. AS THE ACFT WAS SLOWING WE RECEIVED A MASTER CAUTION, HYDRAULIC LOOKDOWN LIGHT ON THE CENTRAL WARNING PANEL (CWP). THE CAPT RESPONDED 'IDENTIFY CANCEL' (POM 4.1.0). I RESPONDED TO THE CAUTION PER POM 4.1.0. THE CAPT PERFORMED THE MEMORY ITEMS, WHICH WERE TO TURN THE HYDRAULIC PUMP OFF. THE CAPT AND I EXAMINED THE HYDRAULICS PANEL TO ASSESS OUR SIT. WE OBSERVED THE FOLLOWING: EMER ACCUMULATOR, APPROX 2500-2900 PSI, MAIN ACCUMULATOR, LESS THAN 2100 PSI AND DECREASING, INBOARD BRAKE ACCUMULATOR, LESS THAN 2100 PSI AND DECREASING, OUTBOARD ACCUMULATOR, LESS THAN 2100 PSI AND DECREASING, QUANTITY, APPROX 200-250 CUBIC/IN (NORMAL). AT THIS TIME THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE QRH HYDRAULICS. I ADVISED THE CAPT I WOULD LET THE ATC TWR KNOW WE WOULD NEED SOME TIME TO RESOLVE A MECHANICAL ISSUE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE CAPT BEGAN TO TRY AND REPLENISH HYDRAULIC PRESS BY SELECTING 'OVERRIDE' ON THE HYDRAULIC PUMP OP PANEL. THE CAPTS DECISION TO DO THIS WAS DUE TO OUR CURRENT GEOGRAPHICAL AND MECHANICAL STATUS. THE ACFT WAS POSITIONED ON A DOWN SLOPING TXWY WITH NO RUN-OFF AT THE END, AN IMMEDIATE DROP OFF TO THE RIGHT OF THE ACFT AND DECREASING HYDRAULIC PRESS. THE CAPT STATED THAT THE HYDRAULIC PUMP WAS NOT OPERATING. THIS WAS DETERMINED BY THE ABSENCE OF VISUAL AND AUDIBLE INDICATIONS. I STATED TO CHK CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON THE HYDRAULIC CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL AND THEN COMMENCED THE QRH CHKLIST (8.3). THE CAPT CYCLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR THE HYDRAULIC PUMP 'AUTO' AND 'OVERRIDE' MODES. THE HYDRAULIC PUMP DID NOT OPERATE. AS THE CAPT BEGAN TO FEATHER ENG NUMBER 1, THE ACFT BROKE FREE OF STATIC POSITION. I LOOKED OUTSIDE BRIEFLY AND NOTICED THE ACFT BEGAN TO ROLL. I BROUGHT THIS TO THE CAPT'S ATTENTION BY STATING 'WE'RE ROLLING.' I CHKED THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE PANEL AND OBSERVED 0 PSI IN THE MAIN, INBOARD, AND OUTBOARD ACCUMULATORS WITH THE EMER ACCUMULATOR STILL INDICATING NORMAL PRESS AND HYDRAULIC QUANTITY INDICATING NORMAL. THE CAPT STATED THAT HE COULD NOT STEER THE ACFT. THE ACFT WAS ROLLING FORWARD AND SLIGHTLY RIGHT ON TXWY A. THE CAPT ADVANCED NUMBER TWO POWER LEVER TO USE ASYMMETRIC THRUST TO STEER THE ACFT AWAY FROM THE IMPENDING DROP OFF AND BACK THROUGH THE CENTERLINE AND TO THE LEFT EDGE OF TXWY A. AS WE EXITED TXWY A, I STARTED TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. THE CAPT SHUTDOWN NUMBER 1 AND 2 ENGS AS WE EXITED THE TXWY. AFTER THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP WE MADE AN ASSESSMENT OF OUR CURRENT POS. I NOTIFIED ATC THAT WE HAD EXITED THE TXWY AND WERE STOPPED IN BTWN THE TXWY AND RWY. THE CAPT NOTIFIED COMPANY OPERATIONS, DISPATCH, CHIEF PLT AND INSTRUCTED ME TO ADDRESS THE PASSENGERS AND FIND OUT IF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE WAS NEEDED. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE WAS NOT NEEDED. THE CAPT INSTRUCTED THAT ALL PASSENGERS REMAIN ON THE ACFT. APPROX 1 HR HAD PASSED BEFORE WE WERE ABLE TO LOCATE A TOW BAR THAT WOULD SUFFICE. THIS WAS ACR Y TOW BAR. THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD USED THEIR TUG ALONG WITH ACR Y TOW BAR TO TOW THE ACFT BACK TO THE RAMP. PRECAUTIONS WERE TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFE TOWING. THE ACFT WAS TOWED SOUTHWEST ON RWY 23 TO B TXWY. THE ACFT WAS PARKED AND SECURED ON THE COMPANY RAMP. THE CAPT NOTIFIED DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL TO ADVISE THEM OF THE STATUS OF THE SIT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE AIRPLANE HAS ONLY ONE SOURCE OF MAIN HYDRAULICS AN ELECTRIC MOTOR PUMP OPERATING IN TWO MODES, 'AUTO' AND 'OVERRIDE'. THE RPTR SAID THE HYDRAULIC PUMP MOTOR SHORTED OUT OPENING THE 800 AMP CURRENT LIMITER AND CAUSING THE LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESS. THE RPTR STATED THE ONLY HYDRAULIC BACKUP IS A HAND OPERATED PUMP WITH LIMITED CAPACITY. THE RPTR SAID THE MOTOR PUMP WAS REPLACED AND THE MAIN HYDRAULIC SYS CHKED BY OK.

Synopsis :

A SAAB 340A HOLDING ON A TXWY #3 FOR TKOF HAS THE MAIN HYDRAULIC PUMP FAIL AND ACFT ROLL FORWARD. USED ASYMMETRIC THRUST TO STEER OFF TXWY.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : PBI.Airport  
State Reference : FL

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : PBI.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : PBI.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 562219

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 260  
ASRS Report : 562221

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : ENG VIBRATION IND  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

PASSED HOLD SHORT LINE OF ACTIVE RWY. I CONTACTED TWR FOR TAXI CLRNC SINCE TWR WAS WORKING BOTH GND AND TWR. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO RWY 9L AND 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 13 AT TXWY A.' WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND I MADE A NOTE OF THE INSTRUCTIONS. AS WE BEGAN THE TAXI, WE HAD SOME LARGE FLUCTUATIONS OF THE #2 ENG VIBRATION GAUGE. THE QRH WAS REFERRED TO AND AS I WAS REVIEWING THE QRH WITH THE CAPT, WE TAXIED PAST THE RWY 13 HOLD SHORT LINE AT TXWY A. AT THIS TIME, BEFORE OUR ACFT ENTERED THE RWY SURFACE, THE CTLR NOTICED OUR POS AND ADVISED US TO IMMEDIATELY CROSS THE RWY. WE THEN LOOKED TO THE R AND SAW A DASH 8 (I BELIEVE) ON FINAL APCH. THE CAPT DECIDED THE SAFER COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO REMAIN STOPPED SHORT OF THE RWY SURFACE AND I CONCURRED. I ADVISED TWR WE WOULD HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY SURFACE. THE CTLR ISSUED A GAR TO THE ACFT ON FINAL. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE TAXI TO RWY 9L. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE ATC WORKING BOTH TWR AND GND, A SUNNY DAY VFR WHICH MAY HAVE LED TO SOME COMPLACENCY, NOT BEING ADVISED THERE WAS LNDG TFC ON RWY 13 AS PART OF THE CLRNC, AND FOCUSING TOO MUCH ATTN ON THE DISTR OF THE ENG VIBRATION GAUGE. EVEN THOUGH I HAD THE RWY DIAGRAM OUT AND WROTE DOWN THE CLRNC, I REMOVED MYSELF FROM THE NORMAL DISCIPLINE OF CHKING TXWYS AND RWYS BEFORE XING. I FELL INTO THE TRAP OF LOSING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WHILE WORKING WITH THE QRH AND NOT REALIZING HOW CLOSE WE WERE FROM THE START OF TAXI TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE OF RWY 13. (IT ALL HAPPENED QUICKLY.) IN HINDSIGHT, A PROC OF STOPPING THE ACFT FOR ANY CHKLIST, INCLUDING THE QRH, WOULD HAVE BEEN A BENEFICIAL PROC TO FOLLOW.

Synopsis :

B737 CAPT BECAME DISTR BY POSSIBLE ENG INDICATION PROB AND OVERSHOT RWY HOLD SHORT LINE, BUT DID NOT ENTER THE RWY.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Sat

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IAD.Airport  
State Reference : DC  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 14000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2600  
ASRS Report : 562405

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : CARGO DOOR MSG CABIN ALT INDICATO  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON CLBOUT, ABOUT 14000 FT, CARGO DOOR MESSAGE. THE CARGO DOOR INDICATOR WAS DEFERRED PER THE MEL. QRH CONSULTED. NO PRESSURIZATION WAS NOTED. CTLED BY MANUAL MODE. QRH DIRECTED TO DIVERT. MAINT CONSULTED WITHOUT ANY ASSISTANCE. WE DIVERTED INTO CRW. DESPITE THE MANUAL PRESSURE CTL WORKING, QRH RECOMMENDED DIVERSION. IN THE PROCESS, WE FLEW PAST CHO AND THEN ENDED UP NEAR CRW WHEN EVERYTHING WAS COMPLETED. CLARIFICATION ON QRH PROC FOR NO OR IF YES/NO FOR CTL CABIN PRESSURE WITH MANUAL CTL, IN ORDER TO PREVENT CONFUSION ON DIVERTING WHEN EVERYTHING WAS UNDER CTL.

Synopsis :

A CARJ CREW, CLBING THROUGH 14000 FT, EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE DUE TO A CARGO DOOR LEAK.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CVG.Airport  
State Reference : KY  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 7500

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6700  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 220  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2800  
ASRS Report : 562842

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF, FLT ATTENDANT CALLED THE COCKPIT AND RPTED DENSE SMOKE IN THE CABIN. THE ACFT HAD A DEFERRED APU. THE CAPT THOUGHT THAT, DUE TO THE SMOKE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF, THAT AIR CONDITIONING SMOKE WAS A POSSIBILITY. WITH NO SMOKE PRESENT IN THE COCKPIT, WE TURNED OFF THE #2 PACK. THE FO (PNF) WAS THEN ASKED FOR THE CABIN SMOKE QRH. MOMENTS LATER, A 'TOILET SMOKE' CAUTION WAS RECEIVED. FO WAS REDIRECTED TO THAT QRH PROC. CAPT (PF) DECLARED AN EMER AND ADVISED ATC AS TO THE NATURE OF THE EMER AND OF OUR INTENTIONS TO EVAC THE ACFT. THE FLT WAS CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH AND LNDG AT THE DEP ARPT. CAPT FLEW A CLOSE-IN VISUAL APCH WHILE THE FO RAN THE QRH. FO HAD TROUBLE LOCATING CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN THE PROC. SHORTLY AFTER, THE TOILET SMOKE MESSAGE CLRED. AT THIS POINT, THE ACFT WAS APPROX A R BASE FOR LNDG AND THE CAPT REALIZED THE CONTINUING NEED TO GET THE ACFT ON THE GND AND INSTRUCTED THE FO TO PUT THE QRH AWAY. ACFT WAS CONFIGURED GEAR DOWN AND FLAPS 30 DEGS. NORMAL CHKLIST PROTOCOL WAS USED FOR SELECTING FLAPS 45 DEGS AND THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. CAPT LANDED THE ACFT AND CLRED THE RWY. CAPT REALIZED IN THE HURRY TO LAND ACFT, THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF OUR INTENT TO EVAC PAX THROUGH THE MAIN CABIN DOOR (SMOKE APPEARED TO BE DISSIPATING). CFR RPTED A LARGE AMOUNT OF SMOKE COMING FROM THE AFT PORTION OF THE ACFT AFTER LNDG. CAPT WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT AND, WITH NO SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT, AND FO DOING THE QRH, NEVER DONNED HIS OXYGEN MASK. I SHOULD HAVE ABSOLUTELY DONE THIS AS SMOKE SHOULD ALWAYS BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. I ALSO FEEL A QUICK CALL TO FLT ATTENDANT TO NOTIFY HER OF OUR INTENTIONS WOULD HAVE HELPED A GREAT DEAL IN MAKING AN UNEVENTFUL EVAC GO EVEN SMOOTHER. TOTAL TIME FROM TKOF TO LNDG WAS APPROX 4-5 MINS. THOUGH INITIAL FINDINGS BY MAINT INDICATED THE #2 PACK DID COMPLETELY FAIL, I WAS MISLED BY SMOKE BAD ENOUGH TO SET OFF THE TOILET SMOKE CAUTION MESSAGE. WITH ONLY A FEW MINS IN THE AIR, I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO COMPLETELY FINISH THE QRH PROCS.

Synopsis :

REGIONAL JET CREW RPTED DENSE CABIN SMOKE JUST AFTER TKOF AT CVG.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

State Reference : LA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 37000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZFW.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 562847

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13300  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 10000  
ASRS Report : 562843

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : FUEL PUMP LOW PRESS LIGHTS  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE CRUISING AT FL370 WHEN THE CAPT LOOKED UP AT THE FUEL PANEL AND NOTICED THE #1 FORWARD AND #2 AFT FUEL PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED, FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT. WE CHKD THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND FOUND THAT THE #1 CIRCUIT BREAKER FORWARD AND #2 AFT, AND CTR R WERE POPPED. WE CONSULTED THE QRH AND, AFTER A FEW MINS, RESET THE CIRCUIT BREAKER. THE CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED BACK OUT. IT WAS ABOUT 1 MIN LATER THAT THE CAPT REMEMBERED SOMETHING ABOUT FUEL CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN THE LIMITATION SECTION OF THE FOM AND OPENED IT UP. WE THEN REALIZED WHAT WE DID WENT AGAINST WHAT WAS WRITTEN THERE. WE SHOULD HAVE NOT RESET THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. I BELIEVE 3 FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO US SCREWING THIS UP. THE FIRST AND FOREMOST, WE WERE NOT AS FAMILIAR WITH THE LIMITATION SECTION OF THE FOM AS WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN. IT IS A MEMORY RECALL LIMITATION. SECOND, IT IS A HABIT PATTERN, AT LEAST FOR ME, TO LOOK FOR TRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND RESET THEM ONCE. THIRD, SINCE WE CONSULTED THE QRH FIRST AND FOLLOWED ALL ITS GUIDANCE (DSND TO FL300 OR LOWER, BOOST PUMP, ETC) IT WOULD HAVE BEEN OF GREAT VALUE TO HAVE THAT RESTR LISTED THERE.

Synopsis :

B737-300 CREW RESET A POPPED FUEL PUMP CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTRARY TO FOM PROC.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CVG.Airport  
State Reference : OH

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 400  
ASRS Report : 563372

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EFIS  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF FROM RWY 27, THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED THE COCKPIT AND NOTIFIED US THAT SMOKE WAS FILLING THE CABIN. I TOLD THE CAPT AND HE SAID WE WERE GOING TO RETURN TO THE ARPT. I NOTIFIED THE TWR AND THEY TOLD US TO STOP OUR CLB AT 3000 FT MSL. AT THAT TIME, THE CAPT ADVISED ME TO RUN THE QRH CHKLIST FOR 'SMOKE IN THE CABIN.' IMMEDIATELY AFTER, THE EICAS DISPLAYED THE CAUTION MESSAGE, 'SMOKE IN TOILET.' HE ADVISED ME HE 'HAD THE AIRPLANE AND THE RADIOS' AND DECLARED AN EMER. WHILE I WAS RUNNING THE CHKLIST, HE ADVISED THE FLT ATTENDANTS THAT WE WERE INDICATING SMOKE IN THE TOILET AND ASKED HER TO VERIFY. SHE SAID THAT IT WAS COMING OUT OF ALL OF THE OVERHEAD VENTS AND THAT THE SMOKE WAS NOT ORIGINATING FROM THE TOILET. THE QRH DIRECTED ME TO OPEN SEVERAL CIRCUIT BREAKERS. AS I SEARCHED FOR THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS, THE CAPT ADVISED ME THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND AND THAT I SHOULD DISCONTINUE THE QRH CHKLIST AND PREPARE TO LAND. WHILE I WAS PUTTING THE CHKLIST DOWN, I NOTICED THE SMOKE HAD BEGUN ENTERING THE COCKPIT. I PUT ON MY OXYGEN MASK AND VERIFIED THAT THE CAPT COULD HEAR ME. SINCE WE WERE LNDG, I IMMEDIATELY XCHKED ALTIMETER SETTINGS AND TUNED IN THE RWY 18R ILS FREQ. AT THIS TIME, WE WERE ALREADY ON FINAL WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND FLAPS AT 30 DEGS. I BUGGED THE AIRSPD FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS AND INFORMED HIM WE WERE SLIGHTLY LOW. AS HE ADJUSTED ONTO THE GS, I ASKED IF HE WANTED FLAPS 45 DEGS. SOON AFTER HE CALLED FOR FLAPS 45 DEGS BEFORE LNDG CHK. I COMPLETED THE LNDG CHK AND WE LANDED APPROX 30 SECONDS LATER. WE THEN TURNED OFF THE RWY, I CONTACTED THE FIRE UNITS AND INFORMED THEM WE WERE EVACING. WE THEN OPENED THE DOOR AND EVACED THE ACFT THROUGH THE MAIN CABIN DOOR. AFTER A BRIEF INSPECTION BY FIRE PERSONNEL AND MAINT, THE CAUSE WAS STILL UNDETERMINED. MAINT SPECULATED THE SMOKE TOILET MESSAGE WAS GENERATED BECAUSE OF THE SMOKE BEING MORE DENSE TOWARDS THE AFT, BUT WAS PROBABLY NOT THE CAUSE OF THE SMOKE. I FEEL I BECAME TOO FOCUSED ON FINDING CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND THAT COM BTWN ME AND CAPT BROKE DOWN. I FOUND MYSELF UNAWARE OF OUR LOCATION AND WHEN I REALIZED WHERE WE WERE, WE WERE ALREADY ON SHORT FINAL. I SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THE IMPORTANCE, AT THAT TIME, OF SIMPLY LNDG THE PLANE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ENTIRE EVENT LASTED NO MORE THAN 5 MINS FROM THE RPT OF SMOKE IN THE CABIN TO LNDG AND EVAC. THE RPTR SAID THE CHIEF PLT HAS RELEASED NO INFO ON THE CAUSE OF THE SMOKE IN THE CABIN. THE RPTR STATED AFTER MAINT, THE AIRPLANE WAS RELEASED FOR SVC AND AGAIN HAD A 'SMOKE IN THE CABIN' EVENT. THE RPTR SAID WHEN THE AIRPLANE WAS OPERATED ON THE DAY'S FIRST FLT, THE APU WAS DEFERRED AS INOP AND AN AIR BOTTLE START WAS MADE. THE RPTR STATED THE REASON FOR THE APU BEING INOP IS ALSO UNKNOWN.

Synopsis :

A CANADAIR CL65, AFTER TKOF AT 1000 FT, DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND COCKPIT. CAUSE UNKNOWN.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CRW.Airport  
State Reference : WV

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CRW.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : SF 340a  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3250  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 45  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2200  
ASRS Report : 563681

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Critical  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : ACCUM PRESSURE  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Airport  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

DEPARTED THE GATE AREA WITH THE R ENG IN FEATHER AND R HIGH PRESSURE BLEED IN AUTO FOR MAX CABIN COOLING. USED DIFFERENTIAL THRUST AND NOSEWHEEL STEERING TO MAKE THE SHARP TURN OUT OF THE GATE AREA. AT THAT TIME, I TEMPORARILY SELECTED THE HYD PUMP TO OVERRIDE TO ENSURE ADEQUATE HYD PRESSURE IN THE ACCUMALATORS FOR MAKING THE SHARP R-HAND TURN. EVERYTHING APPEARED TO BE WORKING NORMALLY AT THIS POINT. GND CTL INSTRUCTED US TO FOLLOW A REGIONAL JET TO RWY 23 VIA TXWY A. DURING THE TAXI, THE FO COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHK UP TO THE CONDITION LEVERS AND I THEN PROCEEDED TO TURN OFF THE HIGH PRESSURE BLEED ON THE R ENG AND MOVE THE R CONDITION LEVER INTO THE MINIMUM/MAXIMUM RANGE. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE APCHING THE APCH END OF RWY 23 BEHIND THE REGIONAL JET AND THE GA ACFT. WHILE SLOWING THE ACFT, WE RECEIVED A MASTER CAUTION 'HYDS' ON THE CENTRAL WARNING PANEL. PER PROC, I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO 'IDENT AND CANCEL' WHICH HE COMPLETED. I SELECTED THE HYD PUMP TO OFF. WE OBSERVED THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR APCHING THE RED LINE. ADDITIONALLY, THE HYD QUANTITY WAS NORMAL, THE EMER ACCUMULATOR WAS NORMAL, AND THE INBOARD AND OUTBOARD BRAKE ACCUMULATORS WERE DECREASING. I CALLED FOR THE 'QRH HYDS' FROM THE FO. AFTER ANALYZING THE SIT, WE HAD HYD FLUID AND PRESSURE IN THE EMER ACCUMULATOR. I PLACED THE HYD PUMP SWITCH TO OVERRIDE IN AN ATTEMPT TO REPRESSURIZE THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR. THE FO INFORMED ATC WE NEEDED SOME TIME TO RESOLVE A MECHANICAL ISSUE AND STARTED RUNNING THE QRH. ATC WANTED US TO 'TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD' BECAUSE OF TFC BEHIND US. I INFORMED ATC THAT WE HAD A HYD PROB AND WOULD NOT BE MOVING THE ACFT AND SUGGESTED THE TFC BEHIND US GO AROUND VIA BACK TAXI ON RWY 23. AT THIS TIME, I CYCLED THE HYD PUMP SWITCH AGAIN (OFF/OVERRIDE) AND CONCLUDED THE PUMP WAS NOT WORKING DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF PRESSURE IN THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR AND THE FACT WE COULD NOT HEAR THE PUMP TURN ON WHEN SELECTED TO OVERRIDE. THE FO SUGGESTED CHKING THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS AT WHICH TIME I LOCATED THE 'AUTO' AND 'OVERRIDE' BREAKERS ON MY SIDE AND RECYCLED THEM ACCORDINGLY. AGAIN, I ATTEMPTED TO RECYCLE THE SWITCH FROM (OFF/OVERRIDE) AND IT WAS OBVIOUS THE PUMP HAD FAILED. THE FO WAS WORKING IN THE QRH DURING THIS TIME PERIOD. IN LOOKING AT THE MAIN AND THE BRAKE ACCUMULATORS, TO OUR SURPRISE, THEY WERE APCHING 0 PSI VERY RAPIDLY (IF NOT ALREADY AT 0 PSI). AWARENESS: AT THIS POINT, THE ACFT WAS POSITIONED ON THE DOWNWIND SLOPING ALPHA TXWY (ABOUT A1 INTXN) WITH A SEVERE DROP OFF IN TERRAIN TO OUR IMMEDIATE FRONT AND R. I MUST EMPHASIZE THE SEVERITY OF THIS SIT WAS QUITE APPARENT SINCE THERE WAS NO OVERRUN TO OUR FRONT OR TO THE R, AND THE VERY STEEP DROP OFF I CAN ONLY ESTIMATE TO BE ANYWHERE FROM 200-300 FT OF WOODED TERRAIN. I BECAME IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED THAT WE WOULD LOSE OUR ABILITY TO TURN AND STOP THE ACFT AT ANY MOMENT AND DID NOT WANT TO AGGRAVATE THE SIT WITH 'THRUST PRODUCING' PROPS. THAT IS, WHILE AT GND IDLE WITH THE CONDITION LEVERS IN MINIMUM/MAXIMUM RANGE WE WERE PRODUCING THRUST. I WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT ONCE BRAKE PRESSURE WAS LOST COMPLETELY, WE WOULD BEGIN ROLLING ON THE DOWNSLOPING TXWY WITH NO ABILITY TO TURN OR STOP. WE WERE PRESENTLY IN A STOPPED CONDITION AND I BELIEVED THAT BY FEATHERING THE ENGS WE COULD MAINTAIN STATUS QUO UNTIL WE COULD MANUALLY PUMP THE BREAK ACCUMULATORS (PER THE QRH) AND HAVE THE ACFT CHOCKED. I KNEW THAT BY FEATHERING THE L ENG WE WOULD HAVE THE ABILITY TO USE ASYMMETRICAL THRUST WITH PWR ON THE R ENG TO GET US OVER IN THE GRASS ON OUR L SIDE BTWN THE TXWY AND THE RWY (THE ONLY SAFE OPTION). CONSEQUENTLY, I BEGAN TO BRING THE L CONDITION LEVER INTO FEATHER. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE BRAKING WE PREVIOUSLY HAD WAS LOST AND THE ACFT BEGAN TO MOVE TO THE R. WHILE ROLLING, I MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO TURN THE ACFT WITH THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING AS WELL AS BRAKING WITH NO SUCCESS. BECAUSE I COULD NEITHER STOP NOR STEER THE ACFT, THE ACFT WAS GAINING MOMENTUM, AND BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS APCHING THE R SIDE OF THE TXWY, WE DID NOT COMPLETE THE QRH. I ELECTED TO APPLY PWR TO THE R ENG AND ARRESTED THE TREND TO THE R, AND WE WERE SUCCESSFULLY ABLE TO THEN ESTABLISH A TREND TO THE L AS WE CONTINUED TO ROLL. WHILE APCHING THE L SIDE OF THE TXWY, IT WAS APPARENT THE L PROP WAS GOING TO STRIKE THE TXWY/RWY SIGN. I MOVED THE L CONDITION LEVER TO FUEL OFF 2-3 SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT AND THE PROP STRUCK THE SIGN WHILE THE ENG WAS SPOOLING DOWN. AS WE LEFT THE TXWY, WE ELECTED TO SHUT THE R ENG DOWN AS WELL. WE ROLLED TO A STOP IN THE GRASS BTWN TXWY A AND THE APCH END OF RWY 23.

Synopsis :

TXWY EXCURSION AFTER A NEAR DROP OFF INTO A CANYON WHEN AN SF340 PIC LOSES CTL OF HIS ACFT ON THE TXWY WHEN UNDER PWR ON #1 ENG ONLY AND LOSES HIS HYD SYS DUE TO A PUMP FAILURE AT CRW, WV.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CVG.Airport  
State Reference : KY

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 6000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : CVG.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 563737

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS ANTISKID FAIL MSG  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around  
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolutive Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE ON APCH TO RWY 36R AT CVG AND SHORTLY AFTER LNDG GEAR EXTENSION, BOTH ANTISKID INBOARD AND OUTBOARD CAUTION MESSAGES APPEARED. AT THIS TIME THE FO WAS AT THE CTLS. WE PERFORMED A MISSED APCH AND UPON GEAR RETRACTION THE MESSAGES DISAPPEARED. WE RE-ENTERED THE PATTERN FOR ANOTHER APCH, THIS TIME DROPPING THE GEAR EARLIER AND RECEIVED THE SAME 2 MESSAGES. WE INFORMED ATC THAT WE HAD THE SAME PROB RECUR, DECLARED AN EMER AND ASKED TO BE REMOVED FROM THE PATTERN TO PERFORM THE APPROPRIATE QRH PROC. AFTER THE QRH PROC WAS COMPLETE, DISPATCH, THE FLT ATTENDANT AND THE PAX WERE NOTIFIED. IT WAS THEN DECIDED THAT THE CAPT WOULD PERFORM THE LNDG AND THE CTLS WERE XFERRED. WE RE-ENTERED THE PATTERN AND LANDED THE AIRPLANE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Synopsis :

CL65 CREW HAD EICAS, ANTISKID FAIL MESSAGES AT CVG.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference : US

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

ASRS Report : 563778

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
ASRS Report : 563780

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
ASRS Report : 563781

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS RT BLEED OFF LIGHT  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

I PLACARDED THE #2 ENG HPSOV (HIGH PRESSURE PNEUMATIC SHUTOFF VALVE) PER MEL 36-02B. I ACCOMPLISHED MPM 36-02B. HOWEVER, I INADVERTENTLY USED FIGURE 202 INSTEAD OF FIGURE 203. CONSEQUENTLY I DEACTIVATED THE WRONG VALVE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 563780: ON THE GND I INITIALLY QUESTIONED APPROX 5 DIFFERENT MECHS REGARDING R ENG HPSOV (HIGH PRESSURE PNEUMATIC SHUTOFF VALVE) AND 3602B MPM 36-2 FOR B767. ADDITIONALLY, I QUESTIONED MAINT REGARDING AN EICAS MESSAGE, 'R ENG BLEED OFF,' THAT SHOULD NOT BE DISPLAYED. MAINT REPLIED IT WAS A NUISANCE MESSAGE THAT WOULD GO AWAY AFTER CRUISE AND HIGH PWR SETTINGS. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED MY CONCERN REGARDING MAINT AND AS A PRECAUTION, WE OPERATED APU FOR TKOF TO PROTECT THE ADP. ON CLBOUT, WE SHUT DOWN THE APU AND RECEIVED 'R ENG BLEED OFF' EICAS MESSAGE. AT THIS POINT, I MADE CONTACT WITH DISPATCH AND 3-WAY ZZZ2 MAINT. I RELAYED TO DISPATCH THE MAINT ACTION TAKEN HAD REDUCED US TO A 1 PACK OP AND WE DISCUSSED MY REF TO QRH REGARDING THE 'R ENG BLEED OFF' EICAS MESSAGE. DISPATCH IN ZZZ2 CONFIRMED WRONG MAINT PROC APPLIED. DISPATCH CONCURRED THAT WE WERE FLT PLANNED AT FL350 AND WOULD REMAIN WITHIN 60 MINS OF AN ARPT ALONG OUR PLANNED RTE OF FLT. HOWEVER, ULTIMATELY DUE TO TSTMS, POSSIBLE ICING CONDITIONS, AND NIGHT IMC, I ELECTED TO DIVERT TO ZZZ3 TO HAVE PROPER MAINT PROC APPLIED. AS PRECAUTION FOR ADP PROTECTION APU WAS OPERATED FOR LNDG.

Synopsis :

A B767-300 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE INCORRECT #2 ENG PNEUMATIC BLEED VALVE RENDERED INOP PER THE MEL.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference : US

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-800  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 22500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7500  
ASRS Report : 564361

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2700  
ASRS Report : 564360

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : LEFT ENG START FAILURE  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE PUSHING BACK FROM THE SE GATE AREA AT ZZZ, WE ATTEMPTED TO START THE #1 ENG. WITH NO EGT RISE, WE ABORTED THE START, LOWERED THE START LEVER TO CUT-OFF, MOTORED THE ENG FOR 60 SECONDS AND COMPLETED THE QRH ITEMS. THE FO AND I AGREED THE PROB WAS THE FAILURE OF THE L ENG, R IGNITER AND REFERRED THEN TO THE MEL SECTION 74-01-04. WE CALLED FOR MAINT VIA FREQ X TO MEET US BACK AT THE GATE. THEY REPLIED BY REQUESTING US NOT TO RETURN TO THE GATE YET TO BE PUSHED TO THE AREA S OF GATE X, SO THEY COULD ADDRESS THE PROB THERE. WHILE WAITING FOR MAINT WE COMPLIED WITH THE MEL ITEMS OF OP (O) INSURING THE L IGNITION FUNCTIONED PROPERLY AS PER THE MEL BY STARTING THE L ENG AGAIN ON THE L IGNITER. RESIDUAL FUEL FROM THE PREVIOUS FAILED START CAUSED SIGNIFICANT SMOKE DURING START. WE SHUT DOWN THE ENG AND RPTED THAT EVENT ALSO TO MAINT. A LINE MAINT SUPVR TALKED TO US VIA INTERPHONE WHILE WE REVIEWED THE MEL WITH HIM. HE AND 2 OTHER MAINT PERSONNEL WORKED ON THE PROB. LATER HE REQUESTED US TO THEN START THE L ENG AGAIN. (NOTE: THE IGNITER NOW WAS IN THE 'BOTH' POS AS PER MEL 'O'). ONCE WE AGAIN STARTED THE L ENG, MAINT ASKED US TO START THE R ENG TO 'COMPARE SMOKE LEVELS FOR BOTH ENGS.' THE MAINT SUPVR LATER (XA18 LCL) ANNOUNCED 'YOU ARE GOOD TO GO.' I ASKED HIM SPECIFICALLY TO NOTIFY MAINT CTL TO LET ZZZ1 CONTRACT MAINT KNOW OF OUR WRITE-UP TO BE ADDRESSED. (NOTE: MAINT LOGS REFLECT ALL REFS TO R IGNITION FAILURE AND TO SMOKE REFS I MADE.) I WROTE UP THE R IGNITER AS BEING INOP AND THAT THE MAINT ADDRESSED THE ISSUES (PROCS). UPON ARR AT ZZZ1, I REMINDED THE AGENT OF THE WRITE-UP THINKING MAINT CTL HAD NOTIFIED THE CONTRACT MAINT IN ZZZ1 AS PER MY REQUEST WITH THE ZZZ LINE MAINT SUPVR. I WAS ADVISED BY ZZZ CPO THE FOLLOWING WK (OCT/TUE/02 XA25 LCL) THAT THE REQUIRED MAINT MEL PROC AND REQUIRED MAINT NOTIFICATIONS TO DOWN-LINE MAINT WERE NOT MADE BY MAINT ZZZ.

Synopsis :

A B737-800 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE L ENG R IGNITION SYS INOP. 'NO GO' ITEM SINCE IT IS PWRED FROM STANDBY BUS.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CSG.Airport  
State Reference : GA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 300

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZTL.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : ATR 72  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 165  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1205  
ASRS Report : 564517

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : LOW OIL WARN/LOW PITCH LIGHT  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON CLBOUT OF CSG, HAD AN ENG #1 LOW OIL WARNING, AND INTERMITTENT FLASHING OF LOW PITCH LIGHT ON ENG #1 PROP. FOLLOWED COMPANY QRH AND SHUT DOWN ENG #1. FLEW ON TO ATL BECAUSE WX AT CSG WAS JUST BELOW MINIMUMS FOR THE ILS RWY 6. THIS APCH WAS THE ONLY APCH WITH MINIMUMS CLOSE TO THE RPTED BASE, AND WOULD HAVE GIVEN ME AN APPROX 8 KT TAILWIND. FLT LANDED IN ATL WITHOUT ANY OTHER PROBS. ONCE AT THE GATE, ALONG WITH MAINT PERSONNEL, THE ENG APPEARED TO HAVE SHED ABOUT 6 OF THE TURBINE BLADES, AS VIEWED FROM THE TAIL PIPE. NO SIGNS OF ANY OBJECT ENTERING THE ENG THROUGH THE INTAKE WAS NOTED.

Synopsis :

AN AT72 CREW, DEPARTING CSG, EXPERIENCED AN 'ENG LOW OIL WARNING LIGHT,' SPAWNING ENG SHUTDOWN.

**ACN: 565061**

**Time**

Date : 200211

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SFO.Airport

State Reference : CA

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 565061

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS CARGO FIRE

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company

Narrative :

QRH OMISSION. HAVING JUST COMPLETED MY SIMULATOR TRAINING, I DISCOVERED THAT THE QRH DOES NOT HAVE ANY REF TO A CARGO FIRE EICAS MESSAGE IN THE INDEX. THE FRONT TAB REFERS TO A GENERIC CARGO FIRE SIT, BUT I MISSED THAT IN GOING TO THE INDEX. WITHOUT THIS EICAS MESSAGE IN THE QRH INDEX, VALUABLE TIME IS LOST LOOKING FOR THE CHKLIST OF A POTENTIALLY CRITICAL MALFUNCTION. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND A CHANGE TO INCLUDE THIS IN THE INDEX AND A MESSAGE TO ALL B767 CREWS IN THE MEANTIME.

Synopsis :

B767 CAPT NOTES HIS COMPANY'S QRH DOES NOT HAVE A PROC FOR THE EICAS MESSAGE 'CARGO FIRE.'

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : BWI.Airport  
State Reference : MD  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 24000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Do 328  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5200  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 2200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000  
ASRS Report : 565310

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : Flight Attendant In Charge

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Eicas  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ALL ASPECTS OF THIS FLT WERE UNEVENTFUL THROUGH CRUISE CHKS ON OUR WAY FROM PHL TO CAE. WE LEVELED AT FL240 AND WITHIN 10 MINS AT LEVEL FLT WE RECEIVED A CAS MESSAGE 'EP BRAKE ACCU PRESSURE LOW.' AS PNF, I GOT THE QRH OUT FOR THIS AS FO CALLED FOR 'QRH EP BRAKE ACCU PRESSURE LOW.' WE FOLLOWED PROCS AND WERE UNABLE TO ADEQUATELY RESOLVE THIS PROB AND WE WERE DIRECTED BY THE QRH TO LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. FROM OUR TRAINING, WE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD TO ASSUME A HYD LEAK AND POSSIBLE IMPENDING HYD FAILURE. WE BOTH AGREED THAT BWI WAS NOT ONLY SUITABLE, BUT WAS OUR NEAREST ARPT. WE BOTH AGREED AT THIS POINT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR ANY OTHER ASSISTANCE OTHER THAN A DIVERSION TO BWI. I CONTACTED DISPATCH AND EXPLAINED OUR SIT. THEY ADVISED US TO GO TO PHL. I STATED THAT BWI WAS NEAREST SUITABLE AND THAT WE WERE LNDG IN BWI. AT THIS POINT, OUR EICAS LIT UP WITH NUMEROUS CAS MESSAGES REFLECTING MULTIPLE SYS FAILURES. I LOST CONNECTION WITH DISPATCH AND SAID TO FO 'IT APPEARS WE HAVE MULTIPLE SYS FAILED, LET'S DECLARE AN EMER AND GET ON THE GND.' HE AGREED AND WE BEGAN TO CHK THE QRH FOR SYS FAILURES ACCORDING TO CAS AND TO COMMUNICATE WITH OUR FLT ATTENDANT. 10 MIN HYD PROB. NO BRAKES. THERE WILL BE EMER EQUIP. NO EVAC UNLESS I SAY SO. SHE UNDERSTOOD. WE RAN ALL APCH CHKLISTS, BUT WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER THAT HAD POPPED AND WE HAD DETERMINED THAT IT WAS NOT CRITICAL TO OUR MORE SERIOUS PROB OF A POSSIBLE HYD ANOMALY. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL ON RWY 28 AND I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT JUST BEFORE EXITING THE RWY. WE PAUSED ON THE TXWY TO ASSESS WHAT CAS MESSAGES WERE STILL ILLUMINATED OR IF ANY NEW CAS HAD OCCURRED. ALL HYDS WERE FUNCTIONING AND WE ASKED TO BE FOLLOWED BY 1 EMER VEHICLE IN THE EVENT THAT OUR HYDS FAILED DURING OUR TAXI IN. WE PARKED AT THE GATE AND DEPLANED ALL PAX WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE FAA SHOWED UP WITHIN 20 MINS AND TOOK DOWN ALL PERTINENT INFO AND WE WROTE THE ACFT UP FOR NUMEROUS FAILURES. WE DEADHEADED TO CAE AND LEFT THE ACFT IN BWI. IN ALL, MY FO DEALT WITH THIS DILEMMA IN A COMPETENT AND CALM MANNER. HE IS TO BE COMMENDED FOR HIS ACTIONS AS WELL AS FLT ATTENDANT FOR KEEPING OUR PAX INFORMED AND CALM.

Synopsis :

THE POSSIBILITY OF A HYD FAILURE INDICATED BY A LOW PRESSURE WARNING FOR THE HYD SYS ACCUMULATOR ON A D328 CAUSES AN EMER DIVERSION TO BWI, MD.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EWR.Airport  
State Reference : NJ  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 700

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 211  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2400  
ASRS Report : 566063

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Throttle Position Engine Indication  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport  
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition  
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

ACFT WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE AUTOTHROTTLES INOP. DURING PREFLT, FLC DISCUSSED MANUAL THROTTLE USAGE. WHEN CLRED FOR TKOF, INITIAL THRUST LEVER MOVEMENT AND PWR SETTING WAS NORMAL. AFTER TKOF AND AT 1000 FT, WHEN I (AS PF) WENT TO REDUCE PWR TO CLB PWR, THE THRUST LEVERS WOULDN'T MOVE. I THEN PUSHED THE AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECT SWITCH AND REGAINED CTL OF THE L ENG THRUST LEVER (WITH 20/20 HINDSIGHT, I DON'T THINK WE EVER HAD A PROB WITH THE L ENG). HOWEVER, THE R THRUST LEVER STILL WOULD NOT MOVE AND THE ENG REMAINED AT 98% N1 PWR. CONTINUED WITH DEP CTL RECEIVING HDG AND ALT CHANGES AS WE BEGAN TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB. AFTER WE GOT THE ACFT SOMEWHAT STABILIZED, I HAD THE FO CHK THE QRH FOR ANY APPLICABLE GUIDANCE REALIZING THERE PROBABLY WASN'T ANY, AND THERE WASN'T. I THEN HAD HIM CALL COMPANY MAINT CTL TO SEE IF THEY COULD HELP US. WE HAD NOW LEVELED AT 10000 FT AND I ADVISED ATC THAT WE WANTED TO STAY AT THAT ALT AND RECEIVED VECTORS WHILE WE WORKED THROUGH AN OPERATIONAL PROB. AIRSPD CTL BECAME FACTOR BECAUSE OF THE HIGH PWR SETTING AND WE QUICKLY REALIZED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO SHUT DOWN THE R ENG TO AVOID OVERSPDING THE AIRFRAME. FOLLOWING QRH PROC, WE SHUT DOWN THE R ENG, DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC, AND COORDINATED WITH ATC, OPS, MAINT, THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THE PAX FOR SINGLE ENG RETURN TO ZZZ. AN UNEVENTFUL SINGLE ENG ILS APCH TO RWY 4R WAS ACCOMPLISHED, AND AFTER HAVING THE ACFT CHKED BY THE ON-SCENE ARPT EMER CFR PERSONNEL, ONLY MINOR AIRSPD AND ALTDEVS OCCURRED AS WE TRIED TO REGAIN CTL OF THE R ENG. NO ERRORS OCCURRED THAT I KNOW OF. ACFT HAD A PREVIOUS WRITE-UP ON THE R ENG AND R THRUST LEVER AND THAT IS WHY THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE MEL'ED. IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY AN ISOLATED INCIDENT THAT JUST HAPPENS BECAUSE WE ARE OPERATING SOMEWHAT COMPLICATED MACHINERY.

Synopsis :

B757-200 CREW FOUND THE #2 ENG STUCK AT TKOF THRUST WITH A FROZEN THROTTLE. THE ENG HAD TO BE SHUT DOWN.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

State Reference : CO  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 21000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDV.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Beech 1900  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3370  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 270  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3052  
ASRS Report : 566113

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3370  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 270  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3052

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : "Cabin Alt High" Annun Cabin Alt Indicator  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency  
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON A CLB TO FL240, ON A FLT FROM COS TO ABQ, A 'CABIN ALT HIGH' ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED AT APPROX FL210. APPROPRIATE MEMORY ITEMS AND 'CABIN ALT HIGH' EMER CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED, WHICH REQUIRED THE USE OF CREW AND PAX OXYGEN. THE CREW VERIFIED THAT THE PRESSURIZATION HELD CABIN ALT AT 9800 FT AND THERE WAS NO SUDDEN OR RAPID DECOMPRESSION. DSCNT TO FL180 WAS CLRED BY ATC. DURING DSCNT, CABIN ALT INDICATOR SHOWED INCREASING PRESSURIZATION AND 'CABIN ALT HIGH' ANNUNCIATOR EXTINGUISHED. FURTHER DSCNTS WERE APPROVED AS TERRAIN PERMITTED. MASKS REMAINED DONNED FOR PAX AND CREW AS A PRECAUTION UNTIL ACFT DSNDND THROUGH 10000 FT. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT IN ABQ. EVEN THOUGH THE 'CABIN ALT HIGH' ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED, THE CABIN ALT INDICATOR WAS READING 9800 FT. CREW DID NOT KNOW IF IT WAS A MIS-RIGGED ANNUNCIATOR OR FAULTY GAUGE, SO WE OPTED FOR SAFETY AND USED OXYGEN. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS WAS THAT THE ACFT WE USE IS OLD AND CAN NO LONGER HOLD ADEQUATE ACFT PRESSURIZATION, AND THE ANNUNCIATORS ARE SOMETIMES SET TO ILLUMINATE TOO LOW A CABIN ALT. THE CABIN WAS NOT DEPRESSURIZING, BUT THE 'CABIN ALT HIGH' ANNUNCIATOR HAS ASSOCIATED MEMORY ITEMS AND EMER CHKLISTS THAT REQUIRE THE CREW TO DEPLOY OXYGEN MASKS, REGARDLESS OF THE SIT. INSTEAD, THE CREW SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONFIRM CABIN ALT BELOW 10000 FT BEFORE EXECUTING THE EMER CHKLIST. THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE WHOLE INCIDENT AND EASED PAX TENSIONS BY NOT HAVING TO DEPLOY THE OXYGEN MASKS. WE DEFERRED THE MALFUNCTION, WITH THE ACFT LIMITED TO FL180 OR BELOW AS PER OUT MEL, AND CONTINUED OPS.

Synopsis :

A B190 CREW. DURING CLB THROUGH FL210, EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE, SPAWNING AN INITIAL DSCNT TO FL180.