

## ASRS Database Report Set

# Air Carrier (FAR 121) Flight Crew Fatigue Reports

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Report Set Description .....	A sampling of reports referencing air carrier (FAR 121) flight crew fatigue issues and duty periods.
Update Number .....	6.0
Date of Update .....	October 9, 2003
Number of Records in Report Set .....	50
Number of New Records in Report Set .....	39
Type of Records in Report Set .....	For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

IHS: 262-7

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data**

**SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports**


The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information may or may not be correct in any or all respects. At best, it represents the perception of a specific individual who may or may not understand all of the factors involved in a given issue or event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Battelle Memorial Institute, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director  
Aviation Safety Reporting System

## CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999.

Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Intersection : ARIES  
State Reference : FO  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : RJTG.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : RJTG.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B747-400  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Holding

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 250  
ASRS Report : 546515

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

**Person / 4**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude  
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action  
Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolutory Action.Controller : Separated Traffic  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 500  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 15000

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE GIVEN A HOLD AS PUBLISHED AT AIRES INTXN 1000 FT ABOVE OUR COMPANY. HIS CALL SIGN WAS ACR Y HHB, OUR CALL SIGN WAS ACR X HAB. THE CTLR SOUNDED NEW AND UNSURE OF HERSELF. HER ANNUNCIATION WAS ALSO A FACTOR. WE BELIEVED SHE GAVE US A TURN AND DSCNT FOR VECTORS TO FINAL APCH. WE READ BACK THE CLRNC AND INITIATED THE TURN AND DSCNT. WE NOTICED OUR COMPANY TFC STILL BELOW US AT 11000 FT STILL IN THE HOLD. WE WERE DSCNTING OUT OF 12000 FT AND THE ASSIGNED HDG WOULD HAVE PUT US CLOSER TO THE TFC. WE STOPPED OUR DSCNT AT 11500 FT AND STOPPED OUR TURN. WE MADE 2 CALLS TO TOKYO APCH TO VERIFY OUR CLRNC. THE CTLR THEN GAVE ACR Y HHB (THE TFC BELOW US) THE SAME CLRNC WE BELIEVE TO BE FOR US. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CTLR GAVE US A HDG AND ALT TO AVOID ANY FURTHER CONFLICT. WE ARE NOT SURE IF THIS INCIDENT WAS A READBACK/HEARBACK PROB OR CTLR ERROR. FOREIGN ACCENTS AND FATIGUE (FLC) (14 HR FLT) ARE BOTH CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS INCIDENT. TCASII GAVE US AN ADDITIONAL TOOL IN MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS EVEN WITHOUT A TA/RA.

Synopsis :

POTENTIAL CONFLICT OCCURS WHEN A B777 FLC STARTS A DSCNT THROUGH ALT OCCUPIED BY A COMPANY B747 WHEN RESPONDING TO A SIMILAR SOUNDING CALL SIGN FROM APCH CTLR AT NARITA, FO.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : RFD.Airport  
State Reference : IL

**Environment**

Ceiling.Single Value : 3000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : RFD.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 750  
ASRS Report : 546635

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airport  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

AFTER BLOCKOUT, ACFT DEVELOPED MECHANICAL. WE POSITIONED OUR ACFT ON A TERMINAL RAMP WITH ENGS RUNNING WHILE WAITING FOR MAINT PERSONNEL, TO RESPOND TO RADIO CALLS. AFTER RESOLVING MAINT PROB, IT WAS DECIDED TO CONTINUE WITH FLT. WHILE STILL PARKED, CAPT WAS TALKING TO GND ON COM #1 ABOUT WX IN THE AREA WHILE FO WAS SENDING MESSAGE TO COMPANY VIA ACARS WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON COM #2 TALKING WITH LCL MAINT PERSONNEL. AT SOME POINT, CAPT ASKED GND TO CONTINUE TAXI TO RWY 25 (RFD) AND APPARENTLY DID NOT REALIZE FO WAS STILL ON COM #2 NOT LISTENING AND PREOCCUPIED WITH TYPING MESSAGE ON ACARS. WITH HEAD DOWN, FO DID NOT REALIZE ACFT WAS UNDER MOVEMENT TOWARDS ACTIVE RWY. CAPT TAXIED ACFT TOWARDS WHAT APPEARED TO BE TXWY F BUT ACTUALLY ENDED UP BEING AN ACTIVE RWY. FO LIFTED HEAD UP AND NOTICED RWY EDGE MARKINGS APCHING AND REQUESTED IMMEDIATE STOP. AT THIS POINT ACFT WAS PROTRUDING PAST THE HOLD LINE AND ENCROACHING ON RWY 25. WE NOTIFIED GND AND WAS GIVEN BACK TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AS THERE WERE NO ACFT USING THE RWY OR IN THE VICINITY. FACTORS INCLUDED: POOR TXWY MARKINGS, LIGHT RAIN, CREW NOT WORKING TOGETHER, FATIGUE (7 HR 30 MIN BLOCK FLYING NIGHT). CAPT THOUGHT THAT TAXI LIGHTS AHEAD WERE THE ENTRANCE TO TXWY F. IN FACT, IN THAT PORTION OF RAMP AREA THERE ARE NO LIGHTS SIGNIFYING OTHER EDGE OF TXWY F.

Synopsis :

B757 CAPT MISTAKENLY STARTED TAXIING ONTO ACTIVE RWY AFTER GND HOLDING WHEN FO LOOKED UP AND NOTICED MISTAKE AND CALLED FOR STOPPING THE ACFT BEFORE IT WENT ONTO THE RWY. AFTER NOTIFYING GND CTL OF THEIR ERROR, THEY WERE GIVEN BACK-TAXI INSTRUCTIONS ON THE RWY.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : BNA.Airport  
State Reference : TN  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : BNA.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11200  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 220  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2500  
ASRS Report : 546980

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

I WAS ACTING AS FO, CONDUCTING IOE ON A NEW CAPT. IT WAS MY LEG TO FLY FROM MCO TO BNA. IT WAS LATE AT NIGHT, LAST LEG OF THE DAY, AND WE WERE BOTH VERY TIRED. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO BNA RWY 31. I HAD WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE RWY IN SIGHT AND I WAS HIGH, SO ALL MY CONCENTRATION WAS OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT IN ORDER TO MAKE THE RWY. AS WE GOT CLOSE, THE CAPT REMARKED THAT THE RWY DID NOT MATCH WHAT THE FMS DEPICTION AND ILS WAS INDICATING. I GLANCED INSIDE AND HAD JUST DECIDED TO INITIATE A GAR WHEN NASHVILLE APCH TOLD US TO GO AROUND BECAUSE WE WERE HEADED FOR SMYRNA ARPT. WE CLBED BACK TO 2500 FT MSL, LINED UP ON THE BNA RWY 31 ILS AND LANDED AT BNA. THE BNA RWY 31 APCH PLATE CARRIES A WARNING ABOUT SMYRNA ARPT, BUT I DIDN'T NOTICE IT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL MAKE A CAREFUL STUDY OF EVERY APCH PLATE, EVEN WHEN IT IS 'JUST A VISUAL APCH!'

Synopsis :

CL65 FLC ATTEMPTS APCH TO MQY ARPT WHILE CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH TO BNA.

**ACN: 547882**

**Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 20

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1300

ASRS Report : 547882

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EXHAUST GAS TEMP INDICATOR

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

ON PUSHBACK FOR LAST FLT OF DAY WITH WX DELAYS WERE ABOUT 1 HR LATE. BOTH PLTS WERE FATIGUED. FO WAS STARTING ENGS. R ENG START OK. L ENG NO LIGHT OFF. ON SECOND ATTEMPT GOT HOT START. ON SHUTDOWN GOT 'POST SHUTDOWN TAILPIPE FIRE' - ACCOMPLISHED PROC TO PUT OUT FIRE. I WAS OCCUPIED WITH MONITORING PUSHBACK AND NOT WATCHING ENG START. I BELIEVE FO ACCOMPLISHED SHUTDOWN AFTER FIRST ATTEMPT INCORRECTLY. THIS LEFT RAW FUEL IN ENG. ON SECOND ATTEMPT GOT HOT START AND AGAIN FO DID SHUT DOWN IMPROPERLY (STARTER WAS DE-ENERGIZED INSTEAD OF FUEL SHUT-OFF AND IGNITION OFF). I SHUT THE FUEL OFF. THERE WAS A FIRE RPTED IN TAILPIPE OF ENG BY GND CREW. I ACCOMPLISHED THAT FIRE PROC. THE TAILPIPE FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED AND MAINT WAS CALLED. I BELIEVE THIS INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY A MALFUNCTION IN IGNITION CIRCUIT AND THEN AGGRAVATED BY IMPROPER SHUTDOWN TECHNIQUE BY FO. ALSO FATIGUE AND MY ATTN OUTSIDE AS DICTATED BY OUR STANDARD PROCS DELAYED MY RECOGNITION OF DEVELOPING PROB.

Synopsis :

A CANADAIR CL65 RPTS 2 ATTEMPTS TO START THE L ENG DURING PUSHBACK. BOTH RESULT IN HOT STARTS AND OVERTEMP OF ENG.

**ACN: 548057**

**Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B737-300

**Person / 1**

ASRS Report : 548057

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolutory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE PERFORMING AN OVERNIGHT MAINT CHK ON A 737-300 ACFT, I FOUND THE CREW OXYGEN REQUIRED SVCING. I PROPERLY SVCED THE OXYGEN BOTTLE WITH OXYGEN AND LEAK CHKED THE SYS. AFTER COMPLETING THE CHK ABOUT XA30, I MADE THE REQUIRED LOGBOOK ENTRY FOR SVCING CREW OXYGEN. I MISTAKENLY WROTE 'SVCED CREW O2 WITH NITROGEN,' WHICH IN FACT I HAD NOT! MY ONLY EXPLANATION IS I HAD A HEAD COLD FOR THE PAST 3 DAYS AND WAS FEELING TIRED. AT CREW CHANGE THAT SAME DAY, THE CREW DISCOVERED THE LOGBOOK ENTRY AND THE CREW OXYGEN BOTTLE WAS CHANGED.

Synopsis :

A B737-300 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH AN IMPROPER LOGBOOK OXYGEN SVC SIGNOFF. ENTRY READ SVCED OXYGEN SYS WITH NITROGEN.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference : US

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 140  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4500  
ASRS Report : 548973

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

THE FINAL DAY OF PAIRING IS CONSTRUCTED IN A WAY THAT LEAVES THE FLC NO ALTERNATIVE TO FLYING IN A SEVERELY FATIGUED STATE. BY BEING FORCED TO FLY IN THIS CONDITION, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ON FLT FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2 CANNOT HELP BUT BE COMPROMISED. THE FINAL DAY OF THE PAIRING IS LEGAL BY BOTH CONTRACTUAL AND FAA STANDARDS. HOWEVER, THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO ASK ARE: SHOULD IT BE? AND, IS THERE ANY COMPELLING REASON TO HAVE THE PAIRING BUILT IN THIS MANNER TO BEGIN WITH? IN MY OPINION, THE ANSWER TO BOTH QUESTIONS IS NO! BECAUSE THE PAIRING CHKS IN PRIOR TO XF00 ON THE FINAL DAY, THE CREW CAN BE SCHEDULED TO FLY 13 HRS 30 MINS AND ACTUALLY FLY 16 HRS. THIS PAIRING IS SCHEDULED FOR XA35. IF THIS PAIRING CHKD IN JUST 20 MINS LATER, THE CREW COULD ONLY BE SCHEDULED FOR 12 HRS AND THE PAIRING WOULD BE ILLEGAL. FROM A PRACTICAL STANDPOINT, MOST ANY CONSCIENTIOUS CREW WOULD ATTEMPT TO GET A LONG NAP IN THE AFTERNOON BEFORE CHK-IN. BECAUSE THEY HAVE TO CUT THEIR NAP 20 MINS SHORT, THEY CAN NOW BE SCHEDULED FOR AN ADDITIONAL 1 HR 30 MINS OF DUTY AND BE ON DUTY AN ADDITIONAL 2 HRS 30 MINS IN CASE OF WX OR DELAYS. NOTE ALSO THAT A COMPLETE BODY CLOCK SHIFT FROM DAYTIME TO NIGHTTIME FLYING OCCURS IN THIS 24 HR PERIOD MAKING ANY TYPE OF EFFECTIVE NAP NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE ANYWAY. ALSO, LOOK AT THE IMPLICATIONS UPON ARR IN ZZZ2. THE CREW IS TECHNICALLY LEGAL UNTIL XX40. OUR ACTUAL EXPERIENCE ON THIS FLT WAS AS BAD AS OR WORSE THAN YOU MIGHT EXPECT. UPON ARR IN ZZZ, OUR AIRPLANE IS CLEANED, CATERED AND TOWED TO A REMOTE PARKING AREA FOR THE OVERNIGHT. THIS MAKES IT UNSUITABLE FOR THE PLTS TO NAP ON DURING OUR 3 HR 29 MIN SIT TIME. ZZZ1 HAS NO CREW REST AREA WITH ANY TYPE OF COUCH OR RECLINER SO THERE IS NO OPPORTUNITY FOR ANY TYPE OF REST IN THIS SIT. IRONICALLY IF THE SIT WAS SLIGHTLY OVER 1 HR LONGER, THE COMPANY WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE A HOTEL ROOM WHERE WE COULD TAKE A QUICK NAP AND GRAB A SHOWER BEFORE THE REDEYE SEGMENT. OUR AIRPLANE WAS THEN 1 HR LATE INBOUND FROM ZZZ2. OPS TOLD US THIS IS THE NORM FOR THIS FLT AND I'M CONFIDENT AN AUDIT OF ITS ARR TIMES WOULD BEAR THAT OUT. OUR FORECAST FOR THE FLT SHOWED 2 POTENTIAL AREAS OF TSTMS TO CIRCUMNAV ENRTE. ARR FORECAST WAS IMC WITH EXTENSIVE FOG AND LCL TSTMS OVER MUCH OF THE NE REQUIRING US TO USE ZZZ3 AS OUR ALTERNATE. AN ADDITIONAL LINE OF TSTMS LAY BTWN ZZZ2 AND ZZZ3 COMPLICATING A DIVERT IF NECESSARY. OUR DISPATCHER HAD PUT ON LESS THAN 30 MINS OF EFFECTIVE HOLD FUEL AND WHEN I CALLED HIM TO REQUEST MORE, HE TOLD ME I COULD HAVE AS MUCH AS I WANTED BECAUSE HE WAS BUSY WITH A MEDICAL EMER AND DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO LOOK AT IT. AS YOU CAN SEE, NOT A PRETTY PICTURE FOR A CREW ALREADY OPERATING IN A BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK, SLEEP DEPRIVED STATE. FORTUNATELY, ALTHOUGH WE DID GET A MINOR RERTE FOR WX, THE FLT WAS, FOR THE MOST PART, UNEVENTFUL AND THE WX ON ARR WAS WELL ABOVE MINIMUMS. IT WAS INDEED FORTUNATE BECAUSE ON DSCNT AND APCH MY PERSONAL PERFORMANCE WAS MARGINAL AT BEST. I WAS THE MONITORING PLT AND MY FO WAS FLYING. I ONLY HAD 1 BRIEF EPISODE WHERE I CAUGHT MYSELF NEARLY FALLING ASLEEP BUT MY MONITORING SKILLS DETERIORATED TO NEARLY NOTHING. I FOUND MYSELF FIXATING REPEATEDLY AND HAD TO FORCE MYSELF REPEATEDLY TO TRY AND CONFIRM WHAT TASKS I HAD COMPLETED AND VERIFY THAT EVERYTHING WAS GETTING DONE. WORSE YET, ON APCH, DUE TO THE MARGINAL VISIBILITY AND AN IRREGULAR CLOUD DECK, I DEVELOPED A CASE OF VERTIGO AND HAD TO SPEND CONSIDERABLE TIME AND DISCIPLINE JUST SCANNING THE INSTS TO REASSURE MYSELF THAT WE WERE WINGS LEVEL AND RIGHT SIDE UP. I BELIEVE THE REASON WE WERE SAFELY ABLE TO COMPLETE THE FLT IS THAT WE WERE LUCKY THAT NOTHING WENT WRONG AND THE WX WAS BETTER THAN FORECAST. CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING, MISSING AN APCH AND THEN DIVERTING TO ZZZ3 AND THE SIT WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN WORSE. IRONICALLY THE COMPANY'S POS WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT WE WERE STILL LEGAL TO GAS UP AND RETURN TO ZZZ2. I WOULD HAVE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO SHUT THE TRIP DOWN IN ZZZ3 FOR FATIGUE BUT WOULD HAVE FACED POTENTIAL DISCIPLINARY ACTION FROM THE COMPANY BECAUSE OF IT. MOST FORTUNATE OF ALL WAS THAT I HAD ONE OF THE MORE CAPABLE AND CONSCIENTIOUS FO'S THAT I HAVE FLOWN WITH IN THE PAST YR. WE BOTH KNEW THAT WE WERE FLYING IMPAIRED AND WE TOOK IT SERIOUSLY AND TRIED TO COMPENSATE AS BEST WE COULD. LASTLY, DID THE PAIRING NEED TO BE BUILT THIS WAY? ZZZ1 HAS MULTIPLE DEPS TO BOTH ZZZ2 AND ZZZ4 DAILY. THIS HAS BEEN THE CASE FOR A LONG TIME AND IT HAS NEVER BEEN NECESSARY TO RESORT TO THIS UNACCEPTABLE SEQUENCE OF FLTS. THERE ARE A MYRIAD OF WAYS CREWS CAN FLY IN AND OUT IN A PRODUCTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVE MANNER. IT WOULD BE ONLY A GUESS ON MY PART BUT I THINK IT WAS PUT TOGETHER LIKE THIS BECAUSE ON PAPER IT LOOKS LIKE A PRODUCTIVE TRIP FOR COMMUTERS WITH ITS LATE CHK-IN AND EARLY RETURN. OBVIOUSLY NO REASON IS ACCEPTABLE FOR COMPROMISING THE SAFETY OF OUR PAX, ACFT AND CREW. EVEN IF THIS PAIRING WAS PUT TOGETHER BY THE COMPUTER THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SOME HUMAN OVERSIGHT TO CONSIDER THE REAL WORLD HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES WITH THIS PAIRING. THERE ALSO NEEDS TO BE A WAY OF CHANGING A PAIRING SUCH AS THIS AFTER THE BID PACKET IS PRINTED. IF A PAIRING IS DEEMED UNSAFE, IT CAN'T BE ALLOWED TO BE FLOWN FOR AN ENTIRE MONTH JUST BECAUSE IT'S ALREADY ON THE LINES OF TIME.

Synopsis :

FLC FATIGUE.

**ACN: 549161**

**Time**

Date : 200205

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B747-400

**Person / 1**

ASRS Report : 549161

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative :

DURING ROUTINE MAINT ON MAY/WED/02 AT ABOUT XC30, I WAS CARRYING OUT MY CHK. BEING AT DOOR 3L, TO CHK FOR SLIDE RAFT PRESSURE, I JUST CRACKED OPEN THE DOOR HANDLE WITH DISARM-ARM LEVEL IN DISARM POS AND THE SLIDE RAFT DEPLOYED. PRIOR TO ACCIDENTAL SLIDE RAFT DEPLOYMENT, I CHKED FOR ALL DOORS TO BE IN DISARM POS AND ALSO CARRIED OUT GIRT BAR OP AND MODE SELECT LEVER FOR ARM AND DISARM POS. SINCE I AM ALSO A RUNUP TAXI CREW, BEFORE PICKING UP THE ACFT AT THE GATE, I PERFORMED THE ALL DOOR MODE SELECT AND GIRT BAR OP AT GATE AND TAXIED THE ACFT TO HANGAR FOR ROUTINE MAINT BEFORE LUNCH BREAK AT XA30. AFTER LUNCH, CARRIED OUT OTHER DUTIES ON THE SAME ACFT. GUESS I WAS A LITTLE TIRED. DURING MY OVERWATER CHK, I COULD HAVE CHKED FOR GAUGE PRESSURE WITHOUT OPENING THE DOOR BY USING A MIRROR. I HAD ALREADY CONFIRMED ALL DOORS WERE IN GND MODE, OPENING THE DOOR MAKES IT EASIER FOR ME TO LOOK DIRECTLY AT THE GAUGE INSTEAD OF USING A MIRROR. I HAD DONE THIS CHK MANY, MANY TIMES TO DATE SINCE MY EMPLOYMENT AT COMPANY X. IMMEDIATELY AFTER ACCIDENTAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE SLIDE, I RPTD THE MATTER TO MY SUPVR ON DUTY. THEIR ACTION WAS TO TAKE ME TO COMPANY MEDICAL FOR ALCOHOL/DRUG TEST. I HAD TO WRITE AN ACCIDENT RPT. THIS SAME ACFT WAS SCHEDULED FOR SFO-SYD FLT LATER IN THE DAY. THE DEPLOYED SLIDE WAS REPLACED AND ALL MAINT COMPLETED. ACFT RELEASED BACK TO SVC AND MADE ITS SCHEDULED FLT TO XXX WITH NO DELAYS.

Synopsis :

ON A B747-400, DURING A ROUTINE OVERWATER CHK, DOOR 3L SLIDE WAS INADVERTENTLY DEPLOYED. DOOR WAS OPENED TO CHK DOOR ASSIST BOTTLE PRESSURE.

**Time**

Date : 200206  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CVG.Airport  
State Reference : KY

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : MD-88  
Mission : Passenger

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B757-200

**Aircraft / 3**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Light Transport  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 600  
ASRS Report : 549323

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Separated Traffic

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WHILE AWAITING TKOF AT CVG, TWR ADVISED US TO 'PULL UP BEHIND THAT B757.' THE B757 WAS TAKING THE RWY AND CLRED FOR TKOF. I KNEW WE WERE NEXT FOR TKOF, BUT DIDN'T REALIZE THAT TWR WAS PLANNING FOR A TURBOPROP COMMUTER ACFT TO LAND PRIOR TO OUR DEP. RIGHT AFTER WE BEGAN TAXIING PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE, THE FO LOOKED UP FROM THE CHKLIST HE WAS COMPLETING AND ASKED IF WE HAD BEEN CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD. AT THIS POINT I REALIZED THAT WE HAD NOT AND I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE ACFT AND WE ADVISED TWR THAT WE HAD STOPPED PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THE ACFT WAS STRADDLING THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I ESTIMATE THAT THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WAS 40 FT PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND 30 FT AWAY FROM THE WHITE RWY EDGE LINE. TWR DIRECTED THE TURBOPROP TO DISCONTINUE HIS APCH AND CLRED US FOR TKOF. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. 2 FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. THE FIRST WAS THE TWR CTLR'S FAILURE TO USE THE WORDS 'HOLD SHORT.' HAD THESE WORDS BEEN SPOKEN, I HAVE NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE TAXIED PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THE SECOND WAS FATIGUE. I HAD BEEN UP SINCE EARLY MORNING AND THE FO HAD BEEN UP SINCE EARLY MORNING HRS. THIS WAS OUR THIRD LEG OF THE DAY.

Synopsis :

MD88 CAPT MISTAKENLY STARTED TAXIING INTO POS FOR TKOF AFTER TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED HIM TO PULL UP BEHIND A B757 THAT WAS AHEAD TAKING THE RWY. TWR SENT ANOTHER ACFT AROUND AND CLRED RPTR FOR TKOF SINCE HE WAS OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE.

**Time**

Date : 200206  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

State Reference : KS  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 16000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed  
Ceiling.Single Value : 19000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZKC.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4200  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 40  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 980  
ASRS Report : 549457

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Alternate  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

UPON HIS RETURN TO THE ACFT, THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE TSTMS AT OUR DEST AND THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TERRIBLE BRIEFING FROM THE DISPATCHER THAT AMOUNTED TO 'TSTMS IN THE AREA...I GAVE YOU LOTS OF GAS...EXPECT TO HOLD.' WHILE ENRTE, RADAR STARTED PICKING UP A LARGE AREA OF TSTM ACTIVITY SWEEPING W TO E THROUGH THE DEST. SINCE ATIS MENTIONED THAT THE SBOUND RWYS WERE IN USE, I SUGGESTED THAT WE ENTER A HOLD TO THE N OF THE STORM AREA TO ASSESS THE SIT AND TO BE PREPARED FOR A SBOUND APCH. ALTHOUGH VERY SATURATED FROM THE CONTINUOUS STREAM OF DEVIATING TFC IN THE TERMINAL AREA, ATC APPROVED OUR REQUESTED HOLDING POINT AND I ENTERED HOLDING, USING EACH INBOUND LEG TO PAINT THE STORM ACTIVITY WITH OUR ONBOARD WX RADAR, WHILE THE CAPT CONTACTED OUR COMPANY DISPATCHER FOR A 'BIG PICTURE RPT' ON THE STORM ACTIVITY. THE AIRFIELD WAS INTERMITTENTLY CLOSED AND MICROBURSTS WERE PERIODICALLY BEING ANNOUNCED ON THE FIELD. WHENEVER TFC WAS ALLOWED TO ARRIVE, A TRICKLE WOULD GET IN AND SOME WOULD GO AROUND, THEN THE FIELD WOULD CLOSE AGAIN. THIS PROCESS CONTINUED AS WE HELD. AT THAT TIME, THE AIRFIELD SWITCHED RWYS AND COMMENCED LNDG THE MANY ACFT THAT WERE HOLDING TO THE NBOUND RWYS. IN ORDER TO LAND, WE THUS CONCLUDED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO FLY TO THE S OF THE AIRFIELD AND JOIN THE APCH FLOW. AFTER CONFERRING WITH ATC AND EXAMINING OUR RADAR, WE DECIDED TO FLY S THROUGH AN OPEN CORRIDOR BTWN CELLS, TO A STORM-FREE AREA ON THE S SIDE OF THE ARPT. WHILE PERFORMING THIS TRANSITION AND WHILE CLR OF ANY RADAR RETURNS, WE FLEW THROUGH WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BRIEF BUT INTENSE RAIN SHOWER IN MODERATE TURB FOR APPROX 5 SECONDS (WE NOW SUSPECT IT WAS HAIL). AS WE WERE COMPLETING OUR COURSE REVERSAL, THE ARPT SWITCHED ITS APCH FLOW ONCE AGAIN AND COMMENCED LNDG BACK TO THE S. WE WERE NOW POINTING TOWARDS THE AIRFIELD, APPROX 40-60 MI AWAY. AS WE WERE APCHING THE STORM LINE AND THE AIRFIELD, WE DEBATED HOW TO MOVE BACK TO THE N OF THE AIRFIELD WHEN, SUDDENLY, THE RADAR WENT HAYWIRE. WE KNEW THE RADAR WAS NOW WORTHLESS AND THAT WE WERE IN QUITE A PREDICAMENT, SINCE WE WERE FLYING IN AN AREA OF MANY STORMS AT NIGHT AND MOSTLY IN IMC. ALTHOUGH WE HAD SEEN 'OUTS' IN THE AREA, WE NOW HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHERE THOSE 'OUTS' WERE! WE EXPLAINED OUR PREDICAMENT TO ATC AND REQUESTED A VECTOR OUT OF THE ENTIRE AREA AND INTO CLR AIR ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE AREA OF STORMS. THE CTLR'S REPLY WAS NOT REASSURING. HE SAID, 'ALL I SEE ARE AREAS OF HVY PRECIP ALL AROUND YOU...I SUGGEST THAT YOU HOLD YOUR PRESENT HDG....' WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ISSUED A TA FOR TFC AHEAD AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS AND THOUGHT THAT, SINCE OUR HDG ORIGINALLY SEEMED THE SAFEST PRIOR TO OUR RADAR FAILURE, COMBINED WITH THE FACT THAT THE TFC AHEAD WAS PROBABLY IN A SAFE AREA, PLUS THE FACT THAT ATC RECOMMENDED OUR CURRENT COURSE, HOLDING OUR PRESENT HDG WAS THE BEST OPTION IN THE SCANT MOMENTS WE HAD AVAILABLE TO THINK. SURE ENOUGH, THE NEXT 10 MINS WERE ABSOLUTE MAYHEM AS WE BLINDLY FLEW OUR WAY THROUGH THE STORM SYS AND INTO CLR AIR ON THE OTHER SIDE. WE ENCOUNTERED CONTINUOUS MODERATE TURB AND A FEW 10 SECOND INTERVALS OF SEVERE TURB. DURING OUR FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH THE SEVERE TURB, THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES DISCONNECTED AND I COULD DO NO MORE THAN TO HOLD THE YOKE AND YELL BACK AND FORTH TO THE CAPT WHILE TRYING TO GET MY EYEBALLS TO READ THE INSTS IN FRONT OF ME. AFTER THE FIRST BATCH OF SEVERE TURB SUBSIDED, I RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOMATIC SYS AND SELECTED 'TURB MODE,' WHICH HOLDS A SET ATTITUDE AND PWR SETTING. THE NEXT FEW ENCOUNTERS OF SEVERE TURB HAD US DSND UP TO 400 FT AND I HAD TO TAKE BACK MANUAL CTL OF THE ACFT AND GENTLY PITCH UP, SINCE WE WERE UNAWARE IF WE HAD ALREADY CLRED THE PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TFC AHEAD OF US. WE WERE QUITE TOUCHY ABOUT HITTING OTHER ACFT SINCE WE HAD ACTED ON AN RA WHILE IN OUR HOLDING PATTERN. ONCE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SYS, WE ELECTED TO DIVERT TO OUR ALTERNATE AIRFIELD. DURING THIS DIVERSION, WE ENCOUNTERED SMOOTH AIR AND THE RADAR RETURNED TO NORMAL OP. AFTER LNDG, WE FOUND A COUPLE OF 1/2 INCH HOLES AND SCRATCHES TO OUR RADOME. WE NOW SUSPECT THAT HAIL CAUSED THE DAMAGE. IN RETROSPECT, I HAVE LEARNED A FEW VALUABLE INSIGHTS. I HAVE ALWAYS HEARD THAT WX RADAR IS A STORM AVOIDANCE TOOL AND NOT A PENETRATION TOOL. ALTHOUGH WE DIDN'T INTENTIONALLY ATTEMPT TO PENETRATE ANY STORM 'SOFT SPOTS,' WE DID PICK UP HAIL DAMAGE AND HORRIBLE TURB, ATTESTING TO OUR INADEQUATE DISTANCE FROM THE CELLS. IN THE FUTURE, UNLESS I HAVE A VERY AMPLE HOLE FOR SHOOTING AN APCH, I'LL JUST HOLD WELL CLR OF ANY STORM AREA UNTIL THE SIT AMELIORATES AND IF IT DOESN'T, I'LL JUST WAIT UNTIL BINGO FUEL AND DIVERT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS ACCOUNT ARE THE APATHY AND LACK OF INITIATIVE FROM OUR COMPANY DISPATCHER. HIS INITIAL BRIEFING WAS COMPLETELY INADEQUATE. THE TSTMS BLOSSOMED DURING OUR TIME ENRTE AND THE DISPATCHER MADE NO ATTEMPT TO CALL US, AS THEIR 'FLT FOLLOWING DUTIES' REQUIRE. FURTHERMORE, THE CTLRS WE DEALT WITH HAD 'WX-WORTHLESS' RADARS (AS WE ALL KNOW) AND WERE COMPLETELY TASK SATURATED WITH OTHER ACFT. FINALLY, THIS ALL HAPPENED AT THE END OF A LONG DAY AND AROUND XA00, FATIGUING BOTH THE CAPT AND ME.

Synopsis :

AN MD80 CREW, UPON ARR AT DEST, MCI, ENCOUNTERED SEVERE WX, SPAWNING A DIVERSION TO THEIR ALTERNATE.

**Time**

Date : 200206  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference : US

**Environment**

Ceiling.Single Value : 300

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : DC-10 10  
Mission : Freight

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000  
ASRS Report : 550110

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Second Officer

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

I FLY FOR AN OVERNIGHT EXPRESS CARGO COMPANY. DUE TO LACK OF MAINT, WE FLEW MULTIPLE CONSECUTIVE LEGS IN AN ACFT WITH NO INTERNAL NAV, NO TCASII, NO AUTOPLTS, AND NO APU. THE LACK OF AN APU AND ADEQUATE GND COOLING, CAUSED EXTREME DISCOMFORT WHEN SITTING IN AN OVEN-LIKE COCKPIT WHEN ON THE GND (IN HOT WX). HAVING TO THEN HAND-FLY, USING ONLY VOR NAV, IN WX, AT NIGHT, AFTER MINIMAL DAYTIME SLEEP, WAS EXTREMELY UNSAFE. THE VORS IN OUR ACFT ARE NOTORIOUSLY UNRELIABLE, WITH THE CDI CONSTANTLY SWINGING SLOWLY FROM SIDE-TO-SIDE. ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF FACTORS COULD HAVE HELPED ALLEVIATE THIS ACCIDENT-WAITING-TO-HAPPEN: 1) PROVIDE INS IN ALL ACFT. 2) PROVIDE TCASII. 3) REPAIR AUTOPLTS (AT LEAST 1 OF THE 2). 4) REPAIR THE APU FOR GND COOLING, OR DISPATCH ACFT TO COOLER CLIMATE. 5) REPAIR VOR RECEIVERS. 6) ROTATE ACFT OR CREWS TO ELIMINATE MULTIPLE DAYS OF INTENSE FATIGUE. 7) DISPATCH ACFT TO VFR CITIES ONLY.

Synopsis :

MULTIPLE ACFT FAILURES AND MALFUNCTIONS LEAD TO A DC10-10 CARGO CREW'S EXHAUSTION WHEN HAVING TO DEAL WITH MANY ACFT MAINT DISCREPANCIES DURING NIGHT OPS IN HEAT AND WX NEAR ZZZ, USA.

**Time**

Date : 200206  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CVG.Airport  
State Reference : KY

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : MD-88  
Mission : Passenger

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

**Aircraft / 3**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Do 328  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2200  
ASRS Report : 550282

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 6**

Function.Controller : Local

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

## Supplementary

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

TAXIING FOR TKOF ON RWY 18L IN CVG, GND CTLR TOLD US TO FOLLOW THE B757 AHEAD. I WAS TIRED, HAD NOT SLEPT WELL NIGHT BEFORE EARLY MORNING SIGN-IN AND WE WERE ON OUR THIRD LEG OF THE DAY. B757 AHEAD TAXIED ONTO RWY 18L AND DEPARTED. WE SWITCHED TO LCL FREQ. CAPT CALLED FOR BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, WHICH I INITIATED. AS I WAS ACCOMPLISHING BEFORE TKOF ITEMS, I LOOKED UP, NOTICED WE WERE BEYOND RWY HOLD SHORT LINES AND ASKED THE CAPT 'ARE WE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD?' (WE WERE NOT.) THE CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT. WE HAD TAXIED ABOUT 50-75 FT BEYOND THE HOLD SHORT LINE AT THE TKOF END OF RWY 18L. THIS PUT US ABOUT 50-60 FT FROM THE EDGE OF THE RWY AND ABOUT 125-135 FT FROM RWY CTR (150 FT WIDE RWY). A DORNIER 328 WAS ON A 2 MI FINAL, YET WAS NOT A FACTOR. CAPT TOLD ME TO RPT OUR ERROR TO TWR. WE DID. TWR SENT THE DORNIER AROUND, THEN CLRED US FOR TKOF. BOTH OF US WERE TIRED. I HAD MENTIONED THIS TO CAPT IN THE MORNING, AND I FLEW ONLY THE MIDDLE LEG AS A RESULT. CAPT WAS TIRED ALSO. GND CTLR TOLD US TO FOLLOW B757 AHEAD AND QUITE LITERALLY WE DID. CTLR NEITHER STATED HOLD SHORT OF RWY 18L NOR DID HE SWITCH US TO TWR FREQ. EVEN THOUGH IT IS OBVIOUS TO ANYONE THAT YOU DO NOT TAXI ONTO AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC, BUT A QUICK 'HOLD SHORT RWY 18L' FROM GND CTLR LIKELY WOULD HAVE LEFT QUITE A DIFFERENT IMPRESSION ON US AS OPPOSED TO 'FOLLOW THE B757.' STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CHKLIST WHILE MOVING CLOSE TO A RWY DISTR ME FROM BEING AS VIGILANT AS I MIGHT HAVE BEEN. MAINTAIN VIGILANCE, REDUCE DISTRS AT CRITICAL JUNCTURES. I FELT COMFORTABLE WITH MY CAPT. HE WAS COMPETENT, CONFIDENT, BUT HE IS HUMAN. TRUST -- BUT VERIFY. WE WENT OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE, BUT NOT ONTO THE RWY. HOWEVER, I CAN SEE HOW DISASTROUS THIS SIT CAN BE. I WILL BE MUCH MORE RELUCTANT TO ACCOMPLISH CHKLISTS WHEN APCHING ACTIVE RWYS FOR TKOF OR AFTER LNDG. IN FACT, MINIMUM ACTIVITY (EYES OUTSIDE) APCHING AN ACTIVE RWY SOUNDS LIKE THE BEST ALTERNATIVE TO ME.

Synopsis :

AN MD80 CREW, TAXIING FOR TKOF AT CVG, CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE, SPAWNING A TWR INITIATED GAR TO LNDG TFC.

**Time**

Date : 200206  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SABE.Airport  
State Reference : FO

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 400  
ASRS Report : 551538

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : TKOF WARNING  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ALL NIGHT FLT FROM MIA TO EZE. COPLT LANDED. I TOOK CTL AT 80 KTS. I LOWERED THE THRUST REVERSER LEVERS. I AM NOT SURE WHAT I DID, BUT I KNOW THAT I MOMENTARILY MOVED MY HAND FROM THE THROTTLES. THE FATIGUE CAME IN TO PLAY NEXT BECAUSE WHEN I PUT MY HAND BACK SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT, BUT I WAS NOT SURE WHAT IT WAS. MY HAND WAS HANGING THERE AND I FELT THAT IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE RESTING ON SOMETHING, SO I PUT MY HAND ON MY R ARMREST. ABOUT THEN, THE WARNING HORN STARTED AND THE FLAP CONFIG EICAS WARNING CAME ON. I STILL DID NOT REALIZE WHAT WAS GOING ON. THAT WAS WHEN I SENSED A SMALL ACCELERATION AND THE FATIGUE DID NOT MATTER BECAUSE INSTINCT TOOK OVER. MY HAND WENT FORWARD, GRABBED THE THROTTLES AND BROUGHT THEM TO IDLE. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHROTTLES. THIS IS MY BEST GUESS ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED. SOMEHOW I TOUCHED THE TOGA SWITCHES ON THE FRONT SIDE OF THE THROTTLES. ON THE B777 THESE WILL ONLY ENGAGE BELOW 50 KTS ON THE GND. MY FLT HOME WAS A SCHEDULED DEADHEAD ON A B767 SO I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO LOOK AT THE THROTTLE GEOMETRY SINCE THEN TO SEE HOW EASY IT WOULD BE TO CASUALLY TOUCH THESE SWITCHES. ALSO, I DO NOT KNOW IF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SWITCHES IS ADJUSTABLE AND I HAPPENED TO HAVE SOME SUPER-SENSITIVITY SWITCHES. IF I ENGAGED THE AUTOTHROTTLES WITHOUT KNOWING IT, I AM SURE THAT SOMEONE ELSE COULD DO IT TOO. ANYWAY, HAVING ENGS THAT COULD UNEXPECTEDLY GO TO 90000 LBS OF THRUST ON A TXWY OR IN THE RAMP AREA MIGHT AT LEAST REQUIRE A WARNING IN THE OPS MANUAL. THE OTHER THING ABOUT THE FATIGUE WAS THAT I REALLY DID NOT THINK CLRLY ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED UNTIL I HAD GONE TO THE HOTEL AND SLEPT FOR ABOUT 6 HRS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR HAS EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ACFT THAT HAS A DISSIMILAR TOGA ACTIVATION SWITCH. AFTER FURTHER THOUGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE POS OF THE SWITCH ON THE B777, HE STATED THAT HE PROBABLY ACTIVATED THE SWITCH INADVERTENTLY DUE TO HIS FATIGUED CONDITION COMBINED WITH HIS RELATIVE INEXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT.

Synopsis :

INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF TOGA DURING LNDG ROLL ON A B777 AT THE END OF A LONG INTL FLT.

**Time**

Date : 200207  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EWR.Airport  
State Reference : NJ

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : EWR.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B727-100  
Mission : Freight

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : EWR.Tower  
Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

**Aircraft / 3**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : EWR.Tower  
Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9000  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000  
ASRS Report : 554105

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1800  
ASRS Report : 554907

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Second Officer

**Person / 4**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 6**

Function.Controller : Combined Ground  
Function.Controller : Combined Local

**Person / 5**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 6

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

- Problem Areas : Airport
- Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
- Problem Areas : Company
- Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
- Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

OPERATING IN AND OUT OF EWR ALL WK. USING RWY 4L 80% OF THE TIME. WE WERE CLRED TXWY B, TXWY RB, TXWY V, TO RWY 4L. THE QUESTION IS: WAS 'DELTA' STATED IN THE CLRNC. NOT SURE. I ENCOUNTERED SEVERAL DISTRS AT THE INTXN OF TXWY RB AND TXWY V. FORTUNATELY, THE ARPT WAS NOT BUSY. IT WAS EARLY. THERE WERE ONLY 3 ACFT TAXIING AND NO TKOF OR LNDG TFC. WE WERE DIRECTED TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY RB WHILE ON TXWY B AND THEN CTLR CHANGED HIS MIND FOR OTHER TFC TO GIVE WAY TO US. HE WAS ON TXWY A NEAR TXWY N. ANOTHER ACFT ON TXWY B NEAR TXWY C WHICH WAS CONVERGING AND NO MENTION WAS MADE FROM CTLR ON WHO WAS TO GIVE WAY TO WHO. MY FO ADDRESSED STIFF CTLS ON THE ELEVATOR AND AILERONS, WHILE I PROCEEDED DOWN TXWY V TO RWY 4R AS I HAVE DONE FOR MANY YRS AND ALL THAT WK. I THEN REALIZED THE MISTAKE. FORTUNATELY, TWR WAS HANDLING GND AND ALL FREQS AND THERE WAS NO TFC IN THE AIR. I CROSSED RWY 4L AT TXWY V INSTEAD OF TXWY D, TXWY PD TO RWY 4L WHICH WAS NOT HEARD BY ANY CREW MEMBER. THE CTLR DID NOT MAKE A BIG DEAL OF IT. HE WAS VERY POLITE. I AM SURE WE WOULD. THE CTLR WOULD HAVE FELT DIFFERENT HAD THE ARPT BEEN BUSY. ALSO, I WOULD HAVE NOTICED ACFT TAKE OFF AND LAND ON RWY 4L. WE ALWAYS CLR BEFORE XING ANY RWY. THE BIGGEST FACTOR IS: I HAVE HAD A SUBSTANDARD FO WHO IS 56 YRS OLD, FAILED 2 CAPT UPGRADES AND HAS TO BE WATCHED THE ENTIRE TIME. THIS INCREASES MY WORKLOAD. THE COMPANY AND A MAJORITY OF THE CREW FORCE ARE AWARE OF THIS FO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 554907: PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS EVENT WAS THE FATIGUE CAUSED BY THE NATURE OF THE LIMIT OF FLYING. BY THAT NIGHT, BOTH THE CREW AND EWR FLT OPS WERE SO TIRED WE CALLED OUR FLT BY THE WRONG FLT NUMBER. UPON CHK-IN WITH GND/TWR (OUR FREQ) WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS 'BRAVO, HOLD SHORT ROMEO, BRAVO, RWY 4L.' I READ THAT BACK. THE CAPT (OF 12 YRS IN B727 AND MOST OF HIS FLYING IN THE NE) SAID 'I'VE GOT IT,' OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. IT WAS REASONABLE TO THINK THAT HE DID HAVE THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS DOWN, AND I THEN DID NOT LOOK AT THE TAXI RTE FURTHER, BUT INSTEAD PROCEEDED TO TUNE RADIOS (121.5) AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST ITEMS.

Synopsis :

RWY INCURSION WHEN THE PIC OF A NIGHT OP CARGO FLT CROSSES RWY 4L AFTER HAVING BEEN CLRED TO TAXI TO THAT SAME RWY AT EWR, NJ.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : RJAA.Airport  
State Reference : FO  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : RJAA.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : MD-11  
Mission : Freight  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000  
ASRS Report : 556276

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

CREW MISSED CHANGING FMS ARR WHILE ON DSCNT TO NARITA ARPT, TOKYO, JAPAN. AN FMS ARR WAS LOADED INTO FMS THAT CONTAINED IAF AND FLT PLAN FOR APPROPRIATE RWY. ATC ISSUED A NEW ARR WHILE 20 MI PRIOR TO IAF. CREW READ BACK NEW CLRNC, BUT DID NOT CHANGE FMS ARR. BOTH ARR'S START AT SAME IAF (VENUS INTXN) AND HAVE SAME SECOND FIX IN ARR (VERY SIMILAR RTES). AS FO NOTICED DIFFERENCE IN ROUTING, FO WENT TO CHANGE ARR. AT SAME MOMENT, ATC ISSUED A HDG CHANGE AND ISSUED VECTORS FOR REMAINDER OF ARR. ATC DID NOT MENTION THE 2-3 MI OFF COURSE ARR. THE ACFT HAD DEVIATED FROM ATC ARR. FACTORS THAT CAUSED EVENT WERE CREW FATIGUE AND ATC ARR CLRNC ISSUED CLOSE TO IAF WHILE ACFT WAS IN HIGH RATE OF DSCNT TO MAKE XING RESTR AT IAF. CAPT HAD INTERRUPTED SLEEP DUE TO JET LAG (APPROX 5 HRS OF SLEEP IN LAST 36 HRS). CREW HAD BEEN ON DUTY APPROX 9 HRS AT OCCURRENCE OF EVENT.

Synopsis :

AN MD11 CARGO FLT FLIES THE WRONG ARR AFTER ACKNOWLEDGING THE AMENDED CLRNC BUT FAIL TO CHANGE THE FMC APCH OVER VENUS INTXN, FO.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MCI.Airport  
State Reference : KS  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MCI.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000  
ASRS Report : 556336

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

INBOUND TO MCI ON THE TYGER 4 ARR. NOTICED THAT ATC KEPT US AT 12000 FT ALMOST TO THE DOWNWIND LEG FOR L TFC TO RWY 19L. I DIDN'T HEAR MUCH TFC ON THE RADIO SO I ASKED ATC WHY THEY KEPT US SO HIGH. ATC RESPONDED 'SAY SPD.' I RESPONDED '245 KTS.' CTLR SAID 'YOU MISSED YOUR SPD RESTR EARLIER.' I THEN LOOKED AGAIN AT THE STAR AND SAW THAT IT SAID 'TFC LNDG S CROSS MELOY INTXN AT 210 KTS.' HE THEN ISSUED DSCNT INSTRUCTIONS AND WE MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT MCI. I WAS THE PNF ON THIS LEG AND WAS OCCUPIED WITH PNF DUTIES RELATIVE TO THE APCH PROCESS. I KEPT AN EYE ON THE ROUTING WHICH WAS FLOWN CORRECTLY AND ON COURSE BUT BOTH OF US MISSED THE SPD RESTR AT MELOY INTXN. WE WERE BOTH A BIT FATIGUED AS WE HAD AN XA30 WAKE-UP. NO TFC CONFLICT WAS NOTED AND I DON'T THINK ATC WOULD HAVE SAID ANYTHING EXCEPT THAT I QUESTIONED THE HIGH DOWNWIND ALT. I EVEN HAD THE SPD RESTR HIGHLIGHTED WITH YELLOW MARKER ON THE PLATE AND STILL MISSED IT. HAVEN'T COME INTO MCI FROM THIS DIRECTION IN A LONG TIME. I WILL MORE THOROUGHLY REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF THE ARR PROC BEFORE FLYING IT AND STAY MORE IN THE LOOP BY REVIEWING WITH MY COPLT ALL RESTRS.

Synopsis :

DC9 CREW DID NOT SLOW TO THE SPD LISTED ON THE STAR INTO MCI.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IAH.Airport  
State Reference : TX

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : IAH.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2500  
ASRS Report : 556739

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1700  
ASRS Report : 556733

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence.Other : TKOF/CLRNC  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airport  
Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO TAXI FROM SPOT X VIA TXWY WB TO TXWY WC IN IAH. AFTER LOOKING AT THE CHART AND THE SIGNS MARKING THE TXWYS, I FOLLOWED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS TXWY WB ONLY TO FIND MYSELF ON TXWY WA. THE SIGNS IN IAH ARE NOT LABELED CLRLY AND THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME I HAVE TAKEN THE WRONG ROAD. WITH MY JOB I WILL FLY INTO IAH A COUPLE OF TIMES IN A MONTH AND THEN NOT AGAIN FOR ANOTHER YR, WHICH DOES NOT BREED FAMILIARITY. THE SIGNS NEED ADDITIONAL ARROWS AND BETTER IDENT FOR CLARIFICATION. ON THIS SAME TRIP, AS WE STARTED OUR TKOF ROLL IN IAH, THE CTLR CAME ON AND CLRED ACR X FOR TKOF ON RWY 15R. BOTH MYSELF AND MY FO UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD ALREADY BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. I QUERIED THE CTLR AND HE SAID THAT HE WAS PRETTY SURE THAT HE HAD ONLY CLRED US INTO POS AND HOLD. FORTUNATELY, THE TFC WAS LIGHT AND THERE WERE NO CONFLICTS. THE FO AND I WERE BOTH EXHAUSTED AFTER DEALING WITH WX AND MECHANICALS FOR 2 DAYS SO SEVERAL MISTAKES WERE MADE. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE THAT WE MISUNDERSTOOD, OR HEARD THE TKOF CLRNC WE WERE EXPECTING. WITH MY FO BEING TOTALLY UNFAMILIAR WITH IAH AND MYSELF BEING ONLY SLIGHTLY FAMILIAR, THE TXWY INCURSION COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE TXWYS WERE ADEQUATELY LABELED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 556733: UPON REACHING THE DEP RWY, TWR ISSUED US A 'CLRED FOR TKOF.' I READ BACK CLRED FOR TKOF AND COMPLETED THE CHKLIST. THE CAPT GAVE ME CTL OF THE ACFT AND WE BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL. BEFORE ROTATION, TWR AGAIN SAID CLRED FOR TKOF. WHILE CLBING OUT, WE ADVISED TWR OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF A PRIOR TKOF CLRNC, BUT THEY DID NOT COMMENT. NO CONFLICTS EXISTED AND NO MORE WAS SAID.

Synopsis :

CL65 FLC FOLLOWED THE WRONG TXWY OUT AND TOOK OFF WITHOUT CLRNC.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EWR.Airport  
State Reference : NJ

**Environment**

Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : EWR.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : EMB ERA 145 ER&LR  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
ASRS Report : 556775

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
ASRS Report : 556774

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Supervisor

**Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE CLRED INTO POS ON RWY 29 IN EWR AND COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST TO THE LINE. WE WERE EXPECTING TO FLY THE EWR RWY 7 SID (265 DEGS, 5000 FT). AS ANOTHER ACFT WAS LNDG ON RWY 22L, ATC SAID 'FLY RWY HEADING, MAINTAIN 2000 FT,' AND WE COMMENCED THE TKOF. A FEW HUNDRED FEET INTO THE AIR, ATC SAID THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF AND TO LOOK FOR A HELI AHEAD. WE SAW IT AND DID NOT NEED TO CHANGE OUR FLT PATH AND THERE WAS NO TA OR RA. I TOLD ATC WHAT I HAD HEARD AS THE TKOF CLRNC, BUT HE REPEATED THAT WE WEREN'T CLRED. BOTH THE FO AND I WERE STUNNED BY THIS. EVERYTHING WAS IN PLACE FOR OUR DEP. THE XING TFC LANDED, THE RWY WAS CLR AND ATC GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS CONSISTENT WITH A TKOF CLRNC. NORMALLY, IF ATC HAD ALTERNATE INSTRUCTIONS, BUT NOT A CLRNC, THEY ARE VERY CLR ABOUT CONTINUING TO HOLD. OUR INSTRUCTIONS WERE TYPICAL OF A CHANGE IN DEP PLANS THAT ARE FOLLOWED BY A TKOF CLRNC. UPON ARR AT DEST, WE BRIEFED OUR CHIEF PLT. I WAS ASKED TO CALL EWR TWR AND THE SUPVR ASKED ME FOR MY CONTACT INFO AND SAID THERE WAS GOING TO BE AN INVESTIGATION. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I RECEIVED A CALL, BUT LET IT GO TO VOICEMAIL AND IT WAS THE TWR CALLING ME. BEFORE I CALLED BACK, I ADVISED MY CHIEF PLT THAT I HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO TAKE A NAP DURING MY 2 HR BREAK, BUT SINCE I WAS TIED UP WITH THIS EVENT, I WOULD NEED TO BE RELIEVED OF MY LAST TURN DUE TO FATIGUE. I HAD A REDUCED REST 2 NIGHTS AGO (5.5 HRS OF SLEEP) AND AN XA30 AM WAKEUP CALL THIS MORNING (5-6 HRS OF SLEEP). I FIGURED I HAD ENOUGH FOR 1 DAY AND THAT IT WASN'T SAFE TO FLY THE LAST TURN GIVEN THE LACK OF SLEEP AND THE STRESS OF A POSSIBLE CERTIFICATE ACTION. WHILE I BELIEVE THE OVERWHELMING REASON WE COMMENCED THE TKOF WAS DUE TO THE TIMING AND NATURE OF ATC'S XMISSION, THE LACK OF SLEEP CERTAINLY DIMINISHED MY ALERTNESS, BUT NOT TO A DEGREE THAT I FELT AT RISK AS THE WX WAS CLR. I TAKE EXTRA DILIGENCE AND CARE WHEN LACKING A FULL NIGHT'S SLEEP. I RETURNED THE CALL TO THE EWR TWR ABOUT 1 HR AFTER RECEIVING THE VOICEMAIL. I WAS TOLD THAT AFTER REVIEW OF THE TAPE, THE AMBIGUITY WAS APPARENT AND THAT NO FURTHER ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN. I WAS ADVISED TO BE MORE ALERT TO THE SPECIFIC 'CLRED FOR TKOF' CLRNC AND THE CTLR THAT WORKED MY FLT WAS ADVISED TO REITERATE THE 'POS AND HOLD' INSTRUCTION NEXT TIME. WHEN A CREW TAKES THE RWY, THERE IS THE ANTICIPATION OF AN IMMINENT DEP. THE ISSUANCE OF ALTERNATE TKOF INSTRUCTIONS WITHOUT A TKOF CLRNC IS TO A DEGREE ABNORMAL AND UNEXPECTED AND I BELIEVE CTLRS SHOULD BE EXTRA CAUTIOUS BY REITERATING THE CURRENT 'POS AND HOLD' CLRNC. THIS EVENT CERTAINLY GOT MY ATTN, AND I'LL BE EVEN MORE DILIGENT IN THE FUTURE. ALSO, ATC AT EWR WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL DURING THE EVENT AND ON THE PHONE AS WELL.

Synopsis :

EMBRAER 145 JET FLC TOOK OFF WITHOUT CLRNC DUE TO A MISUNDERSTANDING OF TWR CLRNC WHILE IN POS AND HOLDING.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SEA.Airport  
State Reference : WA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : S46.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : DHC-8-300  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11150  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 168  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2300  
ASRS Report : 557205

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Headup Guidance Sys  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE CLRED TO 7000 FT, EXPECTING A VISUAL APCH INTO SEA ARPT. I WAS USING THE HEAD UP GUIDANCE SYS (HGS) FOR PRACTICE. WE HAD 7000 FT SELECTED IN THE ALT ALERTER, BUT I DID NOT HAVE 'ALT SEL SELECTED,' SO THE GUIDANCE CLUE DID NOT LEVEL ME AT 7000 FT. I NOTICED MY ALT BUST AT 6000 FT, 1000 FT BELOW OUR ASSIGNED ALT. I CLBED BACK TO 7000 FT AS SOON AS I REALIZED MY MISTAKE. A MAJOR FACTOR IN THIS SIT IS THAT THE HGS DOES NOT SHOW IF YOU HAVE 'ALT SEL' SELECTED OR NOT. YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT THE PANEL TO SEE THAT. I HAVE HEARD FROM OTHER PLTS THAT THIS IS A PROB. WHEN USING THE HGS, YOU TEND TO GET WRAPPED UP IN IT AND FORGET TO SCAN THE PANEL FOR INFO THAT THE HGS DOES NOT SHOW. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT BOTH MYSELF AND THE FO WERE FATIGUED FROM A 4 DAY TRIP AND ONLY HAVING A 1 HR REST PERIOD. A SOLUTION WOULD BE TO MODIFY THE HGS SYMBOLOGY AND MODIFY THE '1000 FT TO GO' CALLOUT TO INCLUDE '1000 FT TO GO, ALT SEL.'

Synopsis :

DHC8-200 CAPT OVERSHOT DSCNT INTERMEDIATE ALT DUE TO PROGRAMMING THE HEADS UP DISPLAY AND THE DISPLAY NOT SHOWING MODE SELECTED.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IAD.Airport  
State Reference : DC

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : IAD.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : SF 340a  
Mission : Passenger

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : IAD.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5600  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 150  
ASRS Report : 557267

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Ground  
Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Critical  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

MY SCHEDULE THAT DAY WAS TO FLY FROM PHL ARPT TO IAD ARPT, ARRIVE AT XA00. WE DEPARTED EARLY NEXT MORNING AT XH00. THE FLT WAS DELAYED DUE TO WX IN THE BOSTON AREA. I DID NOT DEPART PHL UNTIL XA30. THE FO FLYING WITH ME STATED THIS WAS HIS 4TH TIME DOING THIS TYPE OF OVERNIGHT. HE STATED TO ME THAT 2 NIGHTS BEFORE THAT, DISPATCH HAD HIM AND ANOTHER CAPT FLY UP TO ANOTHER ARPT TO GET ANOTHER AIRPLANE. HE STATED HE ONLY HAD 2 HRS OF SLEEP THAT NIGHT. HE ALSO STATED TO ME HE FELT LIKE HE WAS SUFFERING FROM EFFECTS OF LACK OF SLEEP. HE SAID HE CANNOT SLEEP DURING THE DAY. THE FLT TO IAD WAS UNEVENTFUL. I, AS CAPT, WAS FLYING. IT IS ACR POLICY THAT PNF HANDLES ALL RADIO TFC. WE LANDED ON RWY 19R AND ACR Y MD80 LANDED ON RWY 12. THE ARPT AT THAT TIME OF NIGHT HAS BOTH LCL CTL AND GND COVERED BY 1 PERSON. I WAS TOLD TO TAXI AND HOLD SHORT OF THE RAMP AND CONTACT RAMP CTL. MY FO THOUGHT HE WAS TALKING TO THE RAMP CTL -- INSTEAD HE WAS TALKING TO ACR Z OPS WHO DOES NOT CTL THE RAMP AREA. THE ACR Z OPS TOLD US TO TAXI INTO THE RAMP AREA. MY FO, THINKING IT WAS THE RAMP CTL, RESPONDED BACK TO HIM. MEANWHILE, THE ACR Y MD80 LOOKED LIKE HE WAS HOLDING FOR ME TO GET BY. I STARTED TO TAXI INTO THE RAMP AREA. THE ACR Y JET, WHO WAS AT MY 2 O'CLOCK POS, STARTED TO TAXI IN. WE BOTH SAW EACH OTHER AND I WAS ABLE TO GET AROUND HIM. AT NO TIME DID THE ACFT TOUCH EACH OTHER OR PUT THE PAX IN ANY DANGER. THE PROB AT IAD IS 1 CTLR DOING 2 JOBS. THE OTHER IS WITH THE FLT DELAYED AND MY FO TIRED FOR LACK OF SLEEP. OUR ACR DOES NOT UNDERSTAND HOW LACK OF PROPER REST EFFECTS THE FLC. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THIS HAS HAPPENED. THE ACR Z OPS SHOULD NOT CLR ACFT INTO THE RAMP AREA. IAD ARPT SHOULD HAVE MORE CTLRS WORKING THAT LATE AT NIGHT.

Synopsis :

SF34 CREW AND AN MD80 ALMOST COLLIDED ON TAXI IN AT IAD.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport  
State Reference : NV

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 12500

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : L30.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : LAS.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-500  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000  
ASRS Report : 557405

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4500  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 175  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1300  
ASRS Report : 557406

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 5  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Airspace Structure  
Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

DEPARTING LAS, WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE IDALE RNAV DEP AND EXPECT RWY 19. WE PROGRAMMED THE LNAV FOR THE DEP AND PUSHED OFF THE GATE. ON TAXI OUT, OUR DEP RWY CHANGED TO RWY 25R, WHICH WAS A SHORT TAXI. APCHING THE RWY, WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, AND AFTER UPDATING THE TKOF PERFORMANCE DATA FOR THE NEW RWY, ROLLED ONTO THE RWY AND DEPARTED. AT LNAV ENGAGEMENT, IT BECAME APPARENT THE PROGRAMMED DEP WAS STILL PREDICATED ON RWY 19, NOT RWY 25R, SO THE DEP RTE WAS NOW INCORRECT. I DISENGAGED LNAV AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED TWR, THEN THE APCH CTLR THAT WE HAD AN LNAV PROB AND NEEDED VECTORS TO THE DEP. THE CTLR COMPLIED AND THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE CTLR NOTED THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH ANY OTHER ACFT. THE PRIMARY CAUSE WAS THE CREW'S FAILURE TO UPDATE THE NEW RWY ASSIGNMENT IN THE LNAV RTE. CONTRIBUTING CAUSES WERE: LACK OF CREW FAMILIARITY TRAINING WITH THE RNAV APCH/DEP SYS -- SPECIFICALLY, THE PROPER WAY TO CORRECT A MISPROGRAMMED RTE BY CHANGING THE DEP RWY AFTER TKOF TO REGAIN TARGET FIXES (IF THIS IS EVEN POSSIBLE), AND A CLR 'ROUTINE' OF UPDATING THE DEP RWY WHEN IT IS CHANGED. THE SHORT TAXI DISTANCE/TIME FROM THE GATE TO THE NEW RWY. CREW FATIGUE AFTER THE PREVIOUS NIGHT'S VERY LATE ARR/SHORT LAYOVER. MULTIPLE LEGS (6 LEG DAY), AND AN ABNORMALLY HIGH NUMBER OF FLT MGMNT AND MAINT ISSUES THAT HAD ARISEN THROUGHOUT THE DAY (SECURITY SCREENING PROB, INOP AUTOPLT, IMPROPER DELAY CODE, ACFT HISTORY OF EGT OVERTEMPING TENDENCY ON CLBOUT, OTHER MINOR EVENTS THAT WERE DISTRACTING AND TIRING, AND THE TIME OF DAY AS IT AFFECTED CIRCADIAN RHYTHMS (THE INCIDENT OCCURRED AT XA30 ON OUR BODY CLOCKS)). ADDITIONALLY, TRACON COMMENTED THEY ARE DOCUMENTING NUMEROUS INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE IN LAS, HAVING HAD ABOUT 20 THAT PARTICULAR DAY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 557406: DURING THE IDALE 1 RNAV DEP FROM LAS, OUR FLT DEVIATED FROM THE STANDARD RTE BECAUSE I PROGRAMMED THE FMC WITH THE INCORRECT RWY. LAS WAS DEPARTING ON BOTH RWYS 19 AND 35. WE WERE EXPECTING RWY 19 AND PROGRAMMED THE BOX FOR THAT RWY. AT TAXI, LAS GND CTL TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY C RATHER THAN SENDING US TO A PARTICULAR RWY. GND SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED US TO RWY 25R. I RE-ENTERED THE TKOF DATA FOR RWY 25R AND ENSURED THE V-SPDS AND STOPPING MARGIN WERE CORRECT. NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I CAUGHT THE IMPROPER DEP RWY ERROR. UPON ENGAGING LNAV ON TKOF, WE DISCOVERED OUR ERROR AND REALIZED WE COULD NOT INSERT THE CORRECT RWY WITH ITS CORRESPONDING NAV POINTS ON THE DEP. WE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED LAS TWR AND ASKED FOR A VECTOR TO A POINT ON THE DEP. TWR SENT US TO DEP CTL AND WE AGAIN MADE THE REQUEST. LAS DEP CLRED US TO BOACH AND INFORMED US THAT WE HAD STARTED OUR TURN TO THE S TOO SOON. THE CAPT CALLED THE CTLR AT LAS ONCE WE LANDED IN BUR.

Synopsis :

B737-500 CREW WERE CHANGED TO RWY 25R ON TAXI OUT, BUT REMAINED SET UP FOR A RWY 19 DEP.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : GRR.Airport  
State Reference : MI

**Environment**

Ceiling.Single Value : 100

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : GRR.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : SF 340b  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2200  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 800  
ASRS Report : 557952

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Supervisor

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

OUR CREW WAITED FOR THE RVR TO REACH 1600 FT TO DEPART. WE RECEIVED A GOOD RVR RPT 1800 FT AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD. (A CARJ HAD JUST DEPARTED IN FRONT OF US.) AS WE TAXIED UP TO THE APCH END OF THE RWY, TWR ADVISED US THEY HAD BAD NEWS -- RVR HAD JUST DROPPED TO 1000 FT. ACCORDING TO OUR OPS SPECS, WE CAN DEPART WITH 600 FT RVR WITH APPROPRIATE MARKINGS, IE, CTRLINE LIGHTS. WE THOUGHT WE HAD THEM AND ACCEPTED THE DEP. DURING THE TKOF ROLL, I REALIZED WE, IN FACT, WERE LACKING THE REQUIRED CTRLINE LIGHTS, BUT WE COULD SEE THE END OF THE RWY (5000+ RVR). I CALLED THE TWR CTRLR LATER AND HE CONFIRMED THAT THE 1000 FT RVR RPT WASN'T ACCURATE, IN FACT, WE HAD 1800+ FT RVR. IN ESSENCE, ALTHOUGH WE WERE LEGAL TO DEPART, WE ACCEPTED AN ILLEGAL TKOF CLRNC BASED ON ASSUMED/RPTED RVR DUE TO FLAWED THINKING. OUR MISTAKE WAS ONE OF INTENT, NOT OF ACTUALITY. IN SUMMARY, ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY, NO FARs WERE BROKEN, WE NEEDED TO BE MORE FAMILIAR WITH REQUIRED MARKINGS/LIGHTS FOR LOW VISIBILITY DEPS. MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR: FATIGUE. WE HAD COMPLETED 2 PREVIOUS CONTINUOUS DUTY CYCLES.

Synopsis :

AN SF34 CREW, DEPARTING GRR, ACCEPTED A TKOF CLRNC WITH THE RVR RPTED BELOW THEIR LEGAL LIMITS.

**Time**

Date : 200205  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DCA.Airport  
State Reference : DC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DCA.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Fokker 100  
Mission : Passenger

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DCA.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
ASRS Report : 558142

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
ASRS Report : 558141

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

XING OF HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 4. WE WERE CLRED TO THE HOLDING PAD FOR RWY 4 AT DCA TO WAIT OUT A GND STOP FOR ORD. AFTER APPROX 2 HRS, WE WERE GIVEN A RERTE AND TOLD TO START ENGS AND TAXI TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4. I THOUGHT THE GND CTLR TOLD US TO TAXI UP TO AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1 (OUR DEP RWY). AS WE APCHED THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 4, THE GND CTLR TOLD US TO HOLD OUR POS, BUT I DID NOT HEAR HIM. AS WE CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 4, HE AGAIN TOLD US TO HOLD POS AND THE FO FIRMLY COMMANDED ME TO STOP. WE STOPPED APPROX 20 FT PAST THE RWY 4 HOLD SHORT LINE. DCA TWR ALLOWED A COMMUTER AIRPLANE TO CONTINUE ITS APCH AND LAND ON RWY 4. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO CROSS RWY 4 AND SUBSEQUENTLY DEPARTED AND FLEW UNEVENTFULLY TO OUR DEST. THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 4 LEG DAY. WE HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR OVER 14 HRS. THIS EVENT POINTS OUT TO ME THE IMPORTANCE OF STRICTLY ADHERING TO OUR PROCS FOR HOLDING SHORT AND XING RWYS, IE, BOTH PLTS VERBALLY AGREE ON HOLD SHORT OR XING INSTRUCTIONS. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY THOUGH IT POINTS OUT HOW INSIDIOUS THE EFFECTS OF FATIGUE CAN BE. DURING THE GND STOP, WE BOTH REMARKED HOW TIRED WE WERE BECOMING. THE FO AND I BOTH AWOKE THAT DAY AT ABOUT XA15. EVEN THOUGH I KNOW WE ARE LEGAL TO REMAIN ON DUTY FOR 16 HRS, I KNOW NOW THAT FOR ME THAT MAY NOT BE A SAFE DURATION. FINALLY, WE WERE HELD AT THE HOLDING PAD FOR RWY 4, AN AREA THAT WE DO NOT NORMALLY TAXI TO. FOR A RWY 1 DEP WE NORMALLY TAXI SBOUND ON THE TAXI PARALLEL TO RWY 1 AND THEN IF NECESSARY USE THE HOLDING PAD FOR RWY 1. FO SHOULD BE COMMENDED FOR HER EXCELLENT SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND ASSERTIVENESS. SHE ESSENTIALLY SINGLE-HANDEDLY PREVENTED A RWY INCURSION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 558141: AFTER SITTING FOR 1 HR 50 MINS, DCA GND INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI UP TO AND HOLD SHORT RWY 4. I READBACK. WE TAXIED PAST RWY 4 HOLD SHORT LINE. DCA GND SAID 'STOP.' WE STOPPED APPROX 20 FT PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. ACFT LANDED ON RWY 4 AND WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 4 AND HOLD SHORT RWY 1 AND MONITOR TWR. WE DEPARTED INCIDENT FREE. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF I HAD VERIFIED THE HOLD SHORT WITH THE CAPT. I WAS OPERATING ON AN EARLY WAKE-UP TIME. THIS EVENT MADE ME REALIZE THAT MY PERSONAL DUTY DAY LIMIT IS 14 HRS.

Synopsis :

F100 CREW HAD A RWY INCURSION AWAITING DEP AT DCA.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

State Reference : TX  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D10.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : EMB ERA 145 ER&LR  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5400  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 115  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 196  
ASRS Report : 558168

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE CLRED DIRECT UKW AND THE UKW ARR TO DFW. THERE'S A NOTE TO EXPECT TO CROSS THE FIRST FIX PAST UKN AT 11000 FT AND 250 KIAS. AS THE PF, I ENTERED THE EXPECTED XING RESTR INTO THE FMS WITH A 5 MI PAD FOR SLOWING DOWN TO 250 KIAS. ATC BEGAN ISSUING STEP-DOWN DSCNTS FROM FL370 AND TO MAINTAIN 300 KTS. AS WE REACHED, I THINK, THE THIRD STEP-DOWN AT 15000 FT, ATC STILL HADN'T ISSUED THE XING AND WE FLEW THROUGH THE FMS PSEUDO-GS FOR THE XING. GIVEN OUR ALT AND DISTANCE FROM THE FIX, I WONDERED IF ATC WAS GOING TO GIVE THE EXPECTED XING. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE WERE GIVEN THE XING AND TO COMPLY WITH SPDS ON THE STAR. AS I RECALL, I REACHED 11000 FT A COUPLE OF MI SHORT OF THE FIX, BUT ALTHOUGH I WAS AT IDLE THRUST, I CROSSED THE FIX ABOUT 280 KIAS VICE 250 KTS. JUST BEFORE REACHING 11000 FT, ATC ISSUED A DSCNT TO 7000 FT. I CONTINUED DOWN WHILE TRYING TO SLOW TO 250 KTS. I NOTICED I WAS ABOVE 250 KTS PASSING THROUGH 10000 FT. I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE DSCNT AT ABOUT 9700 FT MSL AND SLOWED TO 245 KIAS BEFORE CONTINUING TO 7000 FT. THIS WAS CLRLY A LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. IN ADDITION, DUE TO A LACK OF SELF-DISCIPLINE, I ONLY GOT ABOUT 5 HRS OF SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE. I THINK THE SELF-INDUCED FATIGUE WAS A CAUSAL FACTOR. RECOGNIZING I WAS TIRED, I SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED AN AMENDED CLRNC FROM ATC. I AM UNAWARE OF ANY TFC CONFLICT.

Synopsis :

E140 CREW ACCEPTED AN ALT XING RESTR THE ACFT WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH IN D10 CLASS E AIRSPACE.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport  
State Reference : NV

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC  
Controlling Facilities.TRACON : L30.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : A319  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 875  
ASRS Report : 558456

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10600  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 400  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 310  
ASRS Report : 558465

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met  
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airport  
Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

CLRED BY ZLA TO CROSS LYNSY INTXN AT 12000 FT, 250 KTS. APCHING LYNSY, CHANGED TO LAS APCH CTL. CLRED TO DSND VIA LYNSY 1, EXCEPT CROSS UTARE AT 8000 FT. I READ BACK CLRNC AND CHKED PUBLISHED ALT, ON STAR, AT LYNSY. STAR INDICATED UTARE AT 8000 FT, 210 KTS. FO AND I WERE BOTH UNSURE OF THIS CLRNC. THE STAR SHOWS FIX AFTER UTARE, DUSJO, AT 6500 FT. I ASKED IF CTLR MEANT, CROSS UTARE AT AND MAINTAIN 8000 FT. NEW CLRNC GIVEN, CROSS UTARE AT AND MAINTAIN 8000 FT. DURING THIS EXCHANGE, THE ACFT BEGAN TO CAPTURE 12000 FT AND SLOW TO 250 KTS. AFTER THE CLRNC WAS VERIFIED, FO SELECTED 8000 FT ON FCU AND WE VERIFIED CHANGE USING ALT AWARENESS PROCS. I CHKED STAR AGAIN TO BE SURE WE WERE SET UP CORRECTLY FOR THE ARR. DURING THIS TIME, I REALIZED THE ACFT WAS NOT IN MANAGED DSCNT MODE. WE WERE NOW IN VERT SPD APCHING 11000 FT. WE HAD NOT REACHED MIROK INTXN, WITH ITS RESTR OF AT OR ABOVE 11000 FT. I INSTRUCTED FO TO LEVEL UNTIL MIROK AND THEN RESUME A MANAGED DSCNT TO 8000 FT. IF THE ALT ALERTER IS CHANGED ON THIS ACFT WHILE IN THE CAPTURE MODE, IT REVERTS TO VERT SPD. THIS APPEARS TO BE WHAT OCCURRED. APCH INDICATED OUR ALT AT LYNSY WAS 11200 FT INSTEAD OF THE REQUIRED 12000 FT. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ERROR. THE WORDING OF THE ORIGINAL CLRNC CREATED CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT. APCH INDICATED THE ACFT AHEAD OF US HAD A SIMILAR PROB UNDERSTANDING WHAT THE CTLR WANTED. THIS OCCURRED AT XA00, BUT THE CREW WAS ON LAST LEG OF A LONG DAY WITH BODY CLOCKS ON XD00. I THINK FATIGUE SLOWED OUR RESPONSE TIME. THE REVERSIONS ON THIS ACFT ARE A KNOWN PROB AND WE HAVE BEEN WELL TRAINED TO BE VIGILANT FOR THEM. STILL WE FAILED TO CATCH IT PROMPTLY. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE SAFER NOT TO BE CLRED TO DSND VIA A STAR IF INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFFS ARE DESIRED BY ATC. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME EITHER OF US HAD FLOWN THIS STAR. WE HAD THOROUGHLY BRIEFED IT AND HAD WE BEEN TOLD TO DSND WITHOUT THE UNPUBLISHED RESTR, I DON'T THINK WE WOULD HAVE HAD THIS DEV. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME EITHER OF US COULD REMEMBER RECEIVING A CLRNC LIKE THIS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 558465: ABOUT THIS TIME, LAS APCH CLRED US TO LAS VIA THE LYNSY RNAV 1 ARR, EXCEPT TO CROSS UTARE WAYPOINT AT 8000 FT. I IMMEDIATELY PUT 8000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW IN THE FCU PANEL. I DID NOT NOTICE ON THE FMA THAT THE ALT CAPTURE HAD BEEN ARMED TO LEVELOFF AT 12000 FT. WHEN I SELECTED 8000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW, THE ALT CAPTURE WAS NO LONGER ARMED AND THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED TO DSND IN A VERT SPD MODE TO 8000 FT. WE DID NOT REALIZE WE HAD DSNDDED BELOW 12000 FT BEFORE WE CROSSED THE LYNSY INTXN. WHAT WE BOTH MISSED FROM THE ORIGINAL CLRNC WAS TO MAINTAIN 8000 FT TO UTARE. I THINK FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WERE OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE INITIAL CLRNC AND MY FAILURE TO MONITOR THE FMA ON THE PFD.

Synopsis :

AN A319 CREW, DSNDING INTO LAS, MISINTERPED ATC'S INSTRUCTIONS, OVERSHOOTING A PUBLISHED XING RESTR.

**ACN: 558459**

## **Time**

Date : 200208

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

State Reference : NY

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed

Ceiling.Single Value : 1600

## **Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ALB.TRACON

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ALB.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Freight

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

## **Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2500

ASRS Report : 558459

## **Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

## **Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Second Officer

## **Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

## **Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Local

## **Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : GPWS

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

THE PIC SEEMED TO HAVE DIFFICULTY OPERATING THE ACFT ON DEP FROM MEM BECAUSE HE WAS NOT FOLLOWING STANDARD PROCS. HE DID NOT OPERATE UNSAFELY, ONLY NONSTANDARD. I MADE A MENTAL NOTE TO PAY EXTREME ATTN DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. HE BEGAN DSCNT FROM FL240 AT 55 DME. FOR TFC SEPARATION, WE WERE VECTORED ACROSS THE LOC TO INTERCEPT A 340 DEG HDG FOR ILS 1. APCH CLRNC WAS TO MAINTAIN 2500 FT TILL ESTABLISHED ON LOC, CLRED ILS RWY 1 APCH. AT 10 DME AND 210 KTS, I PROMPTED FOR FLAPS AND/OR GEAR. WE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO CONFIGURE. THE AUTOPLT INTERCEPTED THE LOC. THE GS CAME ALIVE AND I MADE THE CALL 'GS ALIVE.' WE CONTINUED WITH CONFIGURING THE ACFT AND THE AUTOPLT SEEMED TO BE TRACKING CORRECTLY. I CONTINUED MY PNF DUTIES, CHKING IN WITH TWR, RUNNING CHKLISTS, CONFIGURING THE ACFT. ON XCHKING INSTRUMENTATION, I FOUND WE WERE FULL SCALE DEFLECTION, LOW ON THE GS AT 1600 FT MSL. WE IMMEDIATELY BROKE OUT AND I SAW RED/RED PAPI AND COMMANDED 'CHK GS, YOU'RE FULL SCALE LOW, FLY THE VASI, STOP DSCNT.' SOME RELUCTANCE FROM THE PIC ABOUT THIS PROMPTED ME TO REPEAT 'YOU'RE LOW, FLY UP TO THE PAPI, YOU'RE STILL RED OVER RED!' WHEREUPON HE FINALLY DID. THE GPWS THEN WENT OFF 'GS, GS.' BY 1000 FT AGL, THE ACFT WAS STABILIZED AS REQUIRED AND WE LANDED. ON SHORT FINAL, MY FLT DIRECTOR FLAGGED 'COMPUTER.' AFTER BLOCK-IN, THE PIC WAS ARGUMENTATIVE ABOUT THE DEV AND SAID WE WERE AT 2500 FT WHEN I BEGAN TO BECOME ALARMED. THE SO BACKED ME UP AND WE INFORMED HIM WE WERE AT 1600 FT AND FULL SCALE DEFLECTION WITH MATCHING INSTRUMENTATION. THAT EVENING, AFTER CREW REST AND PRIOR TO THE NEXT LEG WHICH I WOULD FLY, THE PIC INDICATED TO ME THAT HE FELT THAT HE HAD NEVER LEVELED THE ACFT OFF AT 2500 FT WHEN I CALLED GS ALIVE. HE STATED HE WAS VERY TIRED AND HAD NOT FLOWN IN 6 WKS. PERHAPS STANDARDIZED AUTOPLTS IN THE CARRIER'S FLEET COULD HAVE AVERTED THIS. I FEEL THAT HE SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THE LEG TO ME IF HE HAD ANY DOUBTS ABOUT HIS FATIGUE, ONCE ENRTE. HAVING NEVER FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO JUDGE HIS CAPABILITIES OBJECTIVELY. I DID NOT FEEL HE ERRED ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY, HOWEVER.

Synopsis :

A B727 CAPT, LACKING RECENT EXPERIENCE, DEMONSTRATED DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING UP WITH THE ACFT, CULMINATING IN A GPWS WARNING WHEN DSNDRG BELOW THE GS DURING AN ILS APCH.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SJC.Airport  
State Reference : CA

**Environment**

Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : O90.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 785  
ASRS Report : 558575

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 637  
ASRS Report : 558572

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : ALTIMETER/VOR IND  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON DEP FROM SJC, ON THE LOUPE 9, WITH THE CAPT AS PF, WE WERE LEVELING AT 5000 FT TO COMPLY WITH A XING RESTR OF 5000 FT OR BELOW UNTIL XING THE SJC 047 DEG RADIAL WHEN ATC TOLD US TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 15000 FT. WE WERE APPROX 2 MI FROM XING THE RADIAL, AND WE INITIATED THE CLB THINKING IT WAS A CLRNC TO CLB UNRESTR. AS WE PASSED ABOUT 5300 FT, THE CTLR BEGAN TO ISSUE US A CLRNC BUT THEN SAID DISREGARD, AND WE CONTINUED THE CLB. NOTHING FURTHER WAS SAID. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT, BUT WE REALIZED THE CLRNC DID NOT NEGATE THE XING RESTR. IN RETROSPECT, WE SHOULD HAVE BRIEFED THE 'MAGIC WORDS' ON SUCH A DEP TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ALL RESTRS. FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR AS WE WERE UP AT EARLY MORNING FOR THIS XA20 DEP. WE WERE PROBABLY SPRING LOADED TO EXPECT THE CLB TO BE UNRESTR DUE TO THE HR AND LACK OF MUCH TFC. IN ANY CASE, WE SHOULD HAVE CLARIFIED THE CLRNC BEFORE BEGINNING THE CLB.

Synopsis :

B767 CAPT MISTAKENLY STARTED CLBING ABOVE THE SJC LOUPE 9 DEP XING RESTR BELIEVING THAT THE RESTR HAD BEEN LIFTED WHEN CLRED TO A HIGHER ALT.

**Time**

Date : 200208  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport  
State Reference : GA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : A80.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : ATL.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Brasilia EMB-120 All Series  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : A80.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : ATL.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000  
ASRS Report : 558872

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Person / 6**

Function.Oversight : Supervisor  
Function.Controller : Supervisor

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : RADAR  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4  
Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON APCH TO ATL (RWY 9R), 160 KTS WAS THE ASSIGNED SPD TO THE BUMBY MARKER ON THE ILS RWY 9R. THE FO WAS PF. APPROX 7.5 MI OUT, THE FO BEGAN TO SLOW TO CONFIGURE FOR LNDG. HE SLOWED TO APPROX 120 KTS. THE CTLR ASKED WHAT OUR CURRENT SPD WAS, AND I REPLIED 120 KTS. THEY ASKED US TO SPD UP TO 180 KTS IMMEDIATELY DUE TO TFC BEHIND US. WE COMPLIED AND THEN APPROX 4 MI OUT, SLOWED TO FINAL APCH SPD AND LANDED. THE TWR REQUESTED THAT WE CALL THEM VIA THE RAMP TWR. WE CALLED AND THEY ASKED WHY WE SLOWED TOO SOON AND EXPLAINED WHY THIS IS SUCH A PROB AT ATL. I APOLOGIZED. I BLAME THIS INCIDENT ON FATIGUE (WAS A CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHT) AND NOT BEING ATTENTIVE TO THE SIT. IN ADDITION, THE NEWNESS OF THE FO AND HIS LACK OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE NECESSITY OF SPD CTL IN ATL WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS.

Synopsis :

AN E120 CREW, ON APCH TO ATL, REDUCED SPD BELOW THAT ASSIGNED, SPAWNING A QUERY FROM ATC.

**ACN: 559049**

**Time**

Date : 200209

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

State Reference : WV

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 25000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B757-200

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12630

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3330

ASRS Report : 559049

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : FLT DIRECTOR PITCH BARS

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON THE WESTMINSTER 3 ARR INTO BWI, WE HAD BEEN CLRED BY ZDC TO CROSS LIZIO INTXN AT FL250. WE WERE DSNDRG WITH THE CTR AUTOPLT ENGAGED IN THE FLT LEVEL CHANGE MODE, 290 KTS SPD SELECTED, IN CLOUD AND IN MODERATE CHOP. OUR DSCNT PROFILE WOULD HAVE US LEVEL AT FL250 SEVERAL MI W OF LIZIO. AS WE PASSED FL253 IN THE DSCNT, THE AUTOPLT STARTED A SMOOTH, RAPID PITCH DOWN, AND THE AMBER AUTOPLT LIGHT ON THE CTR PANEL ILLUMINATED. BOTH FLT DIRECTORS INITIALLY COMMANDED A SIGNIFICANT PITCH DOWN, WITH THE AUTOPLT DECREASING PITCH TOWARDS THE COMMAND BARS. THE AUTOPLT WAS IMMEDIATELY DISENGAGED THE COMMAND BARS THEN REVERSED TO SHOW A PITCH UP COMMAND AS WE PASSED THE TARGET ALT. PITCH ALT REACHED ABOUT 10 DEGS NOSE DOWN, AND VERT VELOCITY APCHED -5000 FPM AS A MANUAL PULL-UP WAS INITIATED. AN ESTIMATED 1.5 G PULL-UP WAS ACCOMPLISHED TO MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF ALTDEV. MINIMUM ALT DURING THE PULL-UP WAS FL245, AND MAX ALT DURING THE RECOVERY WAS FL252. I TOLD CTR THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN FL250 DUE TO AN AUTOPLT MALFUNCTION, AND THE CTLR CLRED US TO CONTINUE OUR DSCNT TO CROSS MUMSY INTXN AT 15000 FT. AFTER I READ BACK THE CLRNC, THE CTLR INQUIRED ABOUT OUR CLB, AND I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE RECOVERING FROM AN AUTOPLT MALFUNCTION. THE CTLR THEN CLRED US TO DSND AND MAINTAIN FL240 AND SWITCHED US TO A DIFFERENT SECTOR. THE DSCNT TO FL240 WAS HAND FLOWN WITH THE FLT DIRECTORS STILL ENGAGED, AND AT FL243 BOTH FLT DIRECTORS AGAIN COMMANDED A RAPID PITCH DOWN. BOTH FLT DIRECTORS WERE SELECTED OFF AND THEN BACK ON, AND THE R AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. ALL FLT DIRECTOR INDICATIONS AND AUTOPLT ACTIONS WERE NORMAL FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. AFTER THE PULL-UP, I CHKED WITH THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT TO DETERMINE IF ANYONE HAD BEEN STANDING OR INJURED, AND WAS TOLD THAT EVERYONE HAD BEEN SEATED AND THERE WERE NO PROBS. AS A PRECAUTION, I HAD ASKED THE CABIN CREW TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR LNDG AND REMAIN SEATED, STARTING JUST PRIOR TO TOP OF DSCNT AND CONTINUING FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. AS FAR AS I KNOW, NO FAULTS WERE FOUND IN THE FLT DIRECTORS. I WONDER HOW FAR THINGS WOULD HAVE DETERIORATED, AND HOW MUCH ALT WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST IF WE HADN'T PERCEIVED A PROB AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AS SOON AS WE DID. I THINK OUR REACTION TIME MAY HAVE BEEN SLOWER THAN OPTIMUM DUE TO FATIGUE (ON DUTY FOR 8+ HRS, DOMICILE TIME, TIME SINCE AWAKENING APPROX 18 HRS FOR ME). I THINK WE WERE BOTH TASK SATURATED DURING THE PULL-UP. I REMEMBER COACHING THE FO TO INCREASE THE PULL-UP RATE, BEING CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE TFC AT FL240, AND AT THE SAME TIME NOT WANTING TO HURT ANYONE IN THE CABIN WITH AN ABRUPT PULL-UP. I FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE A COHERENT READBACK OF ATC'S NEW CLRNC WHILE MONITORING THE INSTS, RESETTNG THE MCP, AND COMMUNICATING WITH THE FO, IN MODERATE CHOP AND IMC. IF I HAD THAT TO DO OVER, I WOULD NOT HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED A NEW ALT CLRNC OR TRIED TO SET IT IN THE MCP UNTIL WE WERE STABILIZED (AND CALMED DOWN) AT THE LAST ASSIGNED ALT. 'STANDBY,' WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE USEFUL RESPONSE FROM ME, AND PROBABLY WOULD HAVE UNLOADED BOTH US AND THE CTLR. I WAS VERY RELIEVED TO LEARN THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX HAD FOLLOWED MY EARLIER DIRECTIONS TO SIT DOWN AND BUCKLE UP FOR TURB. FROM A SYS STANDPOINT (IF I UNDERSTAND IT CORRECTLY, AND IF THE 'BOOK' DESCRIBES IT CORRECTLY) THIS COULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED, UNLESS ALL 3 FLT CTL COMPUTERS SIMULTANEOUSLY SENT AN INCORRECT COMMAND (TWICE!). APPARENTLY, THE L FLT DIRECTOR (SOURCE: L FCC), R FLT DIRECTOR (SOURCE: R FCC), AND CTR AUTOPLT (SOURCE: CTR FCC) ALL COMMANDED A PITCH DOWN AT THE TIME THEY SHOULD HAVE COMMANDED A PITCH UP (AT ALT CAPTURE). THE AMBER AUTOPLT LIGHT ILLUMINATING INDICATED 'A DEGRADED OPERATING CONDITION EXISTS IN ENGAGED AUTOPLT.' FURTHER, 'AUTOPLT ENGAGEMENT REQUIRES AT LEAST 2 OPERABLE FCC'S. COMMANDS FROM THE 2 FCC'S ARE COMPARED TO PREVENT 1 FCC FROM COMMANING AN AUTOPLT HARDOVER...DURING SINGLE AUTOPLT OP, FAILURES AFFECTING THE ENGAGED MODE ARE ANNUNCIATED ON THE ADI.' WE SAW NO SUCH ANNUNCIATION. AS WE WERE BOTH WATCHING THE FLT DIRECTOR INDICATIONS CLOSELY DURING THE SECOND LEVELOFF AT FL240, WE WERE QUITE INTERESTED TO SEE BOTH FLT DIRECTORS 'JUMP' TO A PITCH DOWN COMMAND, AT ABOUT THE TIME WE EXPECTED THEM TO COMMAND A PITCH UP FOR ALT CAPTURE. ONE HYPOTHESIS IS THAT THE FCC'S WERE EXPERIENCING INTERFERENCE FROM A PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICE IN USE ABOARD THE ACFT. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS DIDN'T OCCUR TO US AT THE TIME INFLT, OR DURING THE LOGBOOK WRITE-UP ACTIVITIES AFTERWARDS. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO LEARN IF THERE ARE ANY SIMILAR AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR MALFUNCTIONS IN THE ASRS DATABASE THAT HAVE BEEN LINKED TO ELECTRONIC INTERFERENCE.

Synopsis :

A B757-200 DEVIATED FROM ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO CTR AUTOPLT MALFUNCTION.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SAT.Airport  
State Reference : TX  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SAT.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SAT.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 17000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000  
ASRS Report : 559496

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1600  
ASRS Report : 559813

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Critical  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

APCH CTLR ASSIGNED DSCNT FROM 6000 FT TO 3000 FT, MAINTAIN 250 KTS, HEADING 290 DEGS. TOLD TO EXPECT A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 12R. APCH THEN CALLED OUR ATTN TO TFC ON CLBOUT. PNF CALLED TFC IN SIGHT APPROX 10 NM ON AN EBOUND COURSE, S OF OUR POS. APCH THEN CALLED A SECOND ACFT TO OUR ATTN. PNF CALLED IN SIGHT APPROX 7-8 NM AT OUR 10-11 O'CLOCK POS. PF DID NOT VERIFY IN SIGHT. APCH GAVE US CLRNC TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. PNF ACKNOWLEDGE CLRNC. DEPARTING ACFT WAS NOT ON SAME FREQ. PNF SAW DEPARTING ACFT START A L TURN TO THE E AND ASSUMED THEY WOULD FOLLOW THE SAME PATH AS THE FIRST TFC. AT THIS POINT WE WERE APPROX 3-4 MI FROM DEPARTING ACFT. DUE TO OUR CLOSE PROX TO THE ARPT AND ASSIGNED SPD WE WERE DSNDING AT 2000 FPM. PF AND PNF BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH DSCNT PLANNING AND PNF LOST SIGHT OF DEPARTING ACFT. AGAIN PF NEVER SAW TFC. AT APPROX 5000 FT WE RECEIVED A 'TFC, TFC' TA FOLLOWED IN RAPID SUCCESSION BY 'MONITOR VERT SPD' AND 'CLB, CLB,' RA'S. WE COMPLIED WITH THE RA'S AND RECEIVED 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' RA'S RECEIVED AT 4500 FT. VERT SEPARATION WAS ABOUT 500 FT. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 12R AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 12 HR DUTY DAY PRECEDED BY A 9 HR OVERNIGHT AND ANOTHER 12 HR DUTY DAY. WE WERE BOTH FATIGUED AND COM WAS POOR. COMBINED WITH THE LATE DSCNT AND HIGH AIRSPD AND THE OTHER ACFT ON A DIFFERENT FREQ, WERE ALL FACTORS IN THIS INCIDENT.

Synopsis :

CL65 FLC HAS TCASII RA DURING APCH INTO SAT.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Intersection : SKEBR  
State Reference : NV  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 13000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 18000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : L30.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 900  
ASRS Report : 561316

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 30000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7000  
ASRS Report : 561130

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON THE SKEBR 1 ARR, ATC REQUESTED 250 KTS FOR SPACING INTO LAS. WHILE ON THE DSCNT PROFILE, WE ENCOUNTERED WAKE TURB FROM THE PRECEDING ACFT. WHEN WE PASSED CLARR INTXN, THE ACFT WAS TRACKING THE ARR. WHEN WE CROSSED OVER THE SKEBR INTXN THE ACFT DID NOT FOLLOW THE TURN AND CONTINUED ON THE 031 DEG HDG. WE NOTIFIED ATC AND TOOK THE CORRECTIVE ACTION TO REINTERCEPT THE ARR. UPON ARR AT THE GATE, THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE PROB WITH MAINT AND CAME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION THAT THE LNAV HAD MALFUNCTIONED. IN RETROSPECT, FATIGUE FROM THE 7 LEGS AND 10+ HR DUTY DAY AND THE UNCOMMANDED ROLL FROM THE WAKE TURB MAY HAVE DISENGAGED THE LNAV WITHOUT EITHER THE CAPT OR I REALIZING IT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL INCORPORATE A XCHK WITH AFDS TO ENSURE THE AUTOPLT IS STILL FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AFTER ANY TYPE OF TURB THAT IS ENCOUNTERED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 561130: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: WAKE TURB/SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERY THE ACFT WAS HAVING FMS AND AUTOPLT PROBS SUBSEQUENT WRITE-UPS AND SAME PROB NEXT DAY WRITE-UP.

Synopsis :

AN UNDETECTED AUTOFLT MALFUNCTION ON THE SKEBR RNAV 1 ARR TO LAS, NV. RESULTS IN A TRACK DEV.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IAD.Airport  
State Reference : DC  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : IAD.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500  
ASRS Report : 561325

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : FUEL CONFIGURATION LIGHT  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON DSCNT NOTICED YOKE DISPLACEMENT. LOOKED AT FUEL AND SAW APPROX 6000 LBS IMBALANCE. REALIZED XFEED WAS ON AND HAD BEEN LEFT ON BY GND PERSONNEL AND NOT CAUGHT ON CHKLISTS. COMPANY PROCS ALLOW FOR FUEL CONFIGN LIGHT TO BE ON FOR B767. CONFUSION BTWN ACFT TYPES CONTRIBUTED TO IGNORING CAUTION ANNUNCIATION. COMPANY PROCS THAT ALLOW CAUTION ANNUNCIATION TO BE ON ARE SUSPECT. JUMPING BTWN B757 AND B767 SOMETIMES SEVERAL TIMES DAILY CAN BE CONFUSING AT BEST. CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE COMPANY HAD JUST ISSUED A NEW CHKLIST AND THE PROCS FOR FUEL MGMNT HAD CHANGED. THIS COUPLED WITH A LONG DAY (FATIGUE) AND THE FACT THAT THEY WERE FLYING A B757 VICE A B767, WHICH HAS A DIFFERENT FUEL MGMNT PROC, LED TO THE OVERSIGHT OF THE XFEED VALVE AND THE GROSS FUEL IMBALANCE.

Synopsis :

B757 FLC HAS FUEL IMBALANCE WHILE ENRTE.

**ACN: 561439**

**Time**

Date : 200210

Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DSM.Airport

State Reference : IA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DSM.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Freight

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000

ASRS Report : 561439

**Person / 2**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

DUE TO COM/MISUNDERSTANDING, WE INADVERTENTLY CROSSED THE 'HOLD SHORT' LINES FOR RWY 13/31 AT DSM. VISUAL CHKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED (NO CONFLICTS) PRIOR TO RWY XING. GND CTL ISSUED FURTHER TAXI CLRNC AS WE WERE APCHING, PERHAPS ON THE ACTIVE RWY. FACTORS: 1) NORMALLY ON THIS TAXI RTE, SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY. (VERY SHORT DISTANCE FROM OUR RAMP TO RWY.) THIS CLRNC WAS TO 'TAXI TO,' OMITTING HOLD SHORT VERBIAGE. 2) FATIGUE -- LITTLE SLEEP, LONG DAYS.

Synopsis :

B767 CREW HAD A RWY INCURSION AT DSM.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : VLD.Airport  
State Reference : GA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : VLD.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Brasilia EMB-120 All Series  
Mission : Passenger

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : VLD.Tower  
Make Model : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3800  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2200  
ASRS Report : 561622

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Person / 5**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

PREVIOUSLY HAD TO RETURN TO GATE DUE TO CARGO DOOR LIGHT ILLUMINATION. BEGAN TAXI TO RWY 35 FROM TERMINAL RAMP. I DON'T RECALL HEARING HOLD SHORT OF RWY 17 INSTRUCTIONS FROM GND CTL. AS SOON AS WE CROSSED RWY 17, FO STATED HE WAS SORRY, BUT WE WERE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 17. I STOPPED THE ACFT AND VALDOSTA GND STATED 'CONTINUE TAXI TO RWY 35.' NOTHING MORE WAS MENTIONED REGARDING THE SUBJECT. I ATTRIBUTE THIS TO FATIGUE AS WELL AS DISTR WITH THE CARGO DOOR INCIDENT AND TRYING TO REMAIN ON TIME/SCHEDULE. I ALSO DEVIATED FROM MY NORMAL PROC OF STATING, 'CLRED TO CROSS, CLR L' AND GETTING THE FO TO 'CLR R.' IF I HAD DONE THIS LIKE I NORMALLY DO, THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A VERBAL CUE TO REMIND ME TO HOLD SHORT. THERE WERE NO PROBS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS RWY INCURSION. THE CLOSEST ACFT WAS ON A 5 MI FINAL DOING A PRACTICE ILS RWY 35 WHICH WAS COMPLETED WITH A PLANNED MISSED APCH.

Synopsis :

RWY INCURSION BY THE FLC OF AN EMB120 AT VLD, GA.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ABE.Airport  
State Reference : PA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZNY.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Freight

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6700  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 70  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200  
ASRS Report : 561805

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1800  
ASRS Report : 561807

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Person / 5**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 5  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

DEPARTED ALLENTOWN ENRTE TO STEWART (NEWBURGH), NY. DEP CLRNC WAS TO FLY RWY HDG AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT. AFTER LEVELING OFF AT 3000 FT, THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. FOR SOME REASON, THE AUTOPLT STARTED A VERY GRADUAL R TURN. THIS WAS SO SLIGHT THAT IT DID NOT APPEAR ON THE ADI AS A TURN. THE FO WAS GETTING THE ATIS AND I WAS FLYING THE ACFT. I DID NOT NOTICE THE TURN UNTIL ASKED BY THE CTR CTLR WHY WE HAD TURNED OFF THE RWY HDG. I REPLIED TRUTHFULLY THAT I DID NOT KNOW WE HAD. THE CTLR THEN GAVE US A TURN BACK TOWARDS OUR ORIGINAL COURSE. A FURTHER PROB WITH THIS SIT IS THAT THE AIRSPD INDICATOR IS DIFFICULT TO SEE, AS IT IS PARTIALLY BLOCKED BY THE CTL YOKE. IF THE ATTITUDE DIRECTION INDICATOR DOES NOT SHOW THE TURN, AS IN THIS CASE, IT MIGHT NOT BE PICKED UP BY THE CREW. THIS WAS A NIGHT CARGO FLT THAT HAD BEEN DIVERTED TO ALLENTOWN AND WAS RUNNING BEHIND SCHEDULE. HAVING BEEN UP ALL NIGHT, FATIGUE CERTAINLY PLAYED A FACTOR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 561807: ASSIGNED A 060 DEG HDG BY THE TWR AND SWITCHED FROM APCH TO ZNY FREQ, WHO INFORMED US THAT WE COULD EXPECT HIGHER MOMENTARILY. THE CAPT, WHO WAS FLYING THE ACFT ON AUTOPLT, THEN DIRECTED ME TO OBTAIN THE ATIS INFO FROM OUR DEST (SWF, NY) AND ADVISED ME THAT HE WOULD MONITOR OUR PRIMARY RADIO FREQ WITH ZNY WHILE I OBTAINED THE ATIS. OUR ACFT BEGAN A SHALLOW R-HAND TURN/DRIFT FROM OUR PRIMARY HDG (STILL 060 DEGS), WHICH I ASSUMED TO BE A NEW HDG ASSIGNED BY ZNY. ZNY ASKED US WHY WE HAD DEVIATED FROM OUR PREVIOUS ASSIGNED HDG. MY COMPASS READ 085 DEGS. ZNY THEN ASSIGNED US A NEW HDG OF ABOUT 010 DEGS. THE CAPT, WHO WAS STILL FLYING ON AUTOPLT, THEN MADE AN ABRUPT TURN TO THE L TO COMPLY, AND APOLOGIZED TO ZNY CITING AN AUTOPLT DRIFT PROB. IN EFFECT, OUR AUTOPLT HAD MALFUNCTIONED AND STARTED A R-HAND DRIFT, EVEN THOUGH ALL CTLS WERE CTRED AND THE ACFT WAS RELATIVELY IN A TRIM CONDITION. I INCORRECTLY ASSUMED THAT THE CAPT WAS TURNING R TO COMPLY WITH A NEW ATC ASSIGNED HDG. OVERALL, I LEARNED THAT ONE HAS TO BE EXTREMELY VIGILANT WHEN ONE PLT IS FLYING THE ACFT AND COMPLYING WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS, WHEN THE OTHER PLT IS BUSY COPYING OTHER INFO (ATIS).

Synopsis :

HDG TRACK DEV BY A DC9 CARGO FLC WHEN THE CAPT FAILS TO NOTE A SLIGHT TURN TO THE R WHILE ON AUTOPLT DURING A RWY HDG DEP PROC FROM ABE, PA.

**Time**

Date : 200209  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SFO.Airport  
State Reference : CA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : O90.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : SFO.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Aircraft / 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : O90.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : SFO.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000  
ASRS Report : 561899

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

DURING APCH TO SFO, BAY APCH ASKED US TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FOR COMMUTER ACFT LNDG SFO RWY 28L. APCH ASKED US IF WE COULD SEE THE ARPT OR SAN MATEO BRIDGE. WE INDICATED 'BRIDGE IN SIGHT.' APCH CLRED US VISUAL APCH RWY 28R, MAINTAIN VISUAL WITH ACFT RWY 28L, WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED IN SIGHT. OVER THE SAN MATEO BRIDGE AND JUST OUTSIDE, IT WAS A LOCALIZED AREA OF CLOUD COVER. AT ABOUT 2500 FT, WE ENTERED THE CLOUD DECK AND LOST SIGHT OF PARALLEL TFC WHICH WAS APPROX 2 MI AHEAD OF US. BEING THE PF, I STAYED WELL R OF THE LOC AND WE MAINTAINED SEPARATION USING TCASII. WE WERE OUT OF VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE OTHER ACFT FOR MAYBE 45 SECONDS OR SO. HOWEVER, AT THE BRIDGE, 1500 FT AGL, WE BROKE OUT AND REACQUIRED THE OTHER ACFT. I THEN INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG. IN RETROSPECT, WE SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED ATC IMMEDIATELY OF LOSS OF VISUAL CONTACT. HOWEVER, THIS WAS THE END OF THE DAY AND GET HOMEITIS WAS TAKING OVER. THIS SCHEDULE STARTED WITH AN ALL NIGHTER THE NIGHT BEFORE FROM SFO-ORD AT XA00 AND THOUGH THERE IS ADEQUATE REST IN THE SCHEDULE, I USUALLY ONLY SLEEP FOR 5-6 HRS. (I'VE FOUND MOST PLTS AGREE THIS IS ABOUT ALL THE REST THEY CAN GET ON ONE OF THESE SCHEDULES.) THIS SCHEDULE WAS PRECEDED BY ANOTHER ALL NIGHTER WHICH MEANT I HAD 2 SHORT SLEEP CYCLES IN A ROW. SO FATIGUE WAS A MITIGATING FACTOR, AS WELL AS THE DESIRE TO GET HOME TO MY OWN BED!

Synopsis :

B757 FLC LOST VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE COMMUTER ACFT AHEAD ON PARALLEL RWY VISUAL APCH DUE TO FLYING THROUGH A CLOUD AREA WITHOUT NOTIFYING TWR.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : RJBB.Airport  
State Reference : FO  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B747-400  
Mission : Freight

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000  
ASRS Report : 561920

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Departure

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Airport  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

RJBB/KIX OSAKA, JAPAN MAIKO2. MIYAZU TRANSITION (SID), DEPARTED FROM RWY 24 ON SID. DURING SECOND TURN, ATC RPTED WE WERE 5 MI OFF COURSE. WE WERE WELL ABOVE MSA (CLRNC TO FL210). FACTORS: ACFT -- EMPTY, LIGHT WT, ACCELERATED VERY FAST. LNAV/VNAV WAS IN USE AND COULD NOT KEEP UP WITH FAST SPDS. SHOULD HAVE SPD INTERVENED. SID -- NEEDS SPD RESTRS FOR TIGHT TURNS. FATIGUE: A BIG FACTOR. THIS WAS A CHANGE TO MY PATTERN AND ALTHOUGH WAS GIVEN 24 HRS ON THE GND PRIOR TO FLT, I WAS NOT ABLE TO GET REAL SLEEP.

Synopsis :

A B747-400 CREW, DEPARTING RJBB, WERE UNABLE TO MANEUVER AS REQUIRED BY THE SID, SPAWNING AN ATC ALERT OF A 5 MI DEV.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport  
State Reference : GA

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ATL.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-800  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 90  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2500  
ASRS Report : 562035

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Less Severe  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented  
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued Advisory  
Resolutive Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted  
Resolutive Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

LANDED RWY 09R AT ATL HARTSFIELD ARPT. ROLLED TO THE VERY END TO TXWY K WITH INSTRUCTION FROM TWR TO, 'HOLD SHORT RWY 09L.' WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND PROCEEDED. THE FO ASKED A QUESTION ABOUT THE LANDING AND JUST THEN I REALIZED WE WERE ABOUT TO CROSS RWY 09L AS TWR ALSO SAW WHAT WAS ABOUT TO HAPPEN AND CALLED FOR US TO HOLD SHORT. OUR NOSE JUST OVER AND CROSSED ONTO THE HOLD SHORT LINE ON THE TXWY. ATC THEN CLRED THE OTHER ACFT TO TKOF AND AFTER LIFTOFF, ATC THEN CLRED US TO TAXI ACROSS RWY 09L. SEVERAL THINGS COME TO MIND ON THIS NEAR INCIDENT THAT TROUBLE ME. FIRST, I NOW REALIZE HOW INSIDIOUS THIS PROB REALLY IS. I CONSIDER MYSELF VERY CONSCIENTIOUS TO THE POINT OF BEING A GRANDMOTHER ABOUT RWY CROSSINGS. YET THE UNTHINKABLE ALMOST HAPPENED TO ME. I HAVE TOLD MYSELF THAT I WILL NEVER LET MYSELF DO THAT EVER AGAIN. HOWEVER, INTELLECTUALLY, I NOW REALIZE HOW EASY IT IS TO BLOW IT. I CAN CITE DISTRACTION, POSSIBLE HUNGER, FATIGUE OR ANY OTHER NUMBER OF EXCUSES AS TO WHY I ALMOST CROSSED THE LINE. BUT ULTIMATELY, IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO INSURE THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN. YES, THE SYSTEM WORKED. BOTH MYSELF AND ATC CAUGHT THE ALMOST ERR, BUT WHAT IF WE HADN'T? I HAVE VOWED TO REDOUBLE MY EFFORTS. I HAVE ALSO GIVEN SOME THOUGHT TO HOW WE AS AN INDUSTRY CAN COME UP WITH SOMETHING THAT REALLY WORKS WITH REGARD TO ACCIDENTAL RWY CROSSING. POSSIBLY INSTALLING WIRE XMITTERS AT ALL TXWY/RWY INTXNS THAT WOULD SIGNAL THE TCAS SIMILAR TO AN 'RA' TFC CALL AND UPON CROSSING THE WIRE WOULD ALERT CREWS OF AN IMPEDING RWY CROSSING. I KNOW I WOULD LOVE TO HAVE A 'WHACK OVER THE HEAD' PRIOR TO ANY RWY CROSSINGS. WELL, A LESSON LEARNED FOR ME. I HOPE OUR INDUSTRY, CAN COME UP WITH SOMETHING AS GOOD AS TCAS TO HELP WITH THIS PROB.

Synopsis :

B737 CREW CROSSED, THE HOLD SHORT LINE AT ATL RWY 09L. AFTER BEING INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport  
State Reference : US

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B767-300  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2200  
ASRS Report : 562649

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Ground

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

GND CTL CLRED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY. READ BACK HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. TAXIED ONTO DEP END OF RWY THINKING HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS WERE FOR XING RWY. TWR GAVE IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI OFF OF RWY. WE TAXIED IMMEDIATELY OFF RWY. CREW WAS FATIGUED FROM 6 DAY INTL TRIP. CAPT WAS DISTRACTED BY NEW CHKLIST TERMINOLOGY. RELIEF PLT WAS CALLING RAMP. TXWY AND RWY OVERRUN MARKINGS SEEMED SLIGHTLY CONFUSING.

Synopsis :

B767ER FLC MISTAKENLY TAXIED ONTO RWY BELIEVING THAT HOLDING SHORT WAS ONLY FOR XING ACFT. TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED CREW TO TAXI OFF RWY.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CVG.Airport  
State Reference : KY

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : CVG.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4558  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 166  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1368  
ASRS Report : 563436

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

THE LAST 2 NIGHTS I HAD BEEN RELEASED AFTER WORK AND GOT TO SLEEP LATE. THE NEXT ASSIGNMENT REQUIRED AN EARLY MORNING WAKE-UP. I WASN'T ABLE TO GET TO SLEEP EASILY BECAUSE OF THE PREVIOUS 2 NIGHTS LATE RELEASE. I FINALLY FELL ASLEEP, LEAVING ME WITH ONLY 5 HRS INBOUND TO CVG. WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC FROM 4000 FT TO 3000 FT. AT 3700 FT WE WERE TOLD TO LEVEL AT 3500 FT. BY THE TIME IT WAS SET ON THE ALERTER, THE AUTOPLT WAS UNABLE TO CAPTURE. WE WENT THROUGH 3500 FT BY ABOUT 300 FT AND CLBED BACK UP. ALSO, ON FINAL, THE FO WAS HAVING PROBS WITH THE CONFIGN AND I WAS DISTR TRYING TO FIX IT. I DON'T CLRLY REMEMBER BEING CLRED TO LAND. NOBODY SAID ANYTHING SUGGESTING WE WEREN'T. IT JUST SHOWS HOW DEBILITATING FATIGUE IS.

Synopsis :

A CL65 PIC'S RPT ON HOW FATIGUE ENTERED INTO AN ALT OVERSHOOT AND A POSSIBLE LWOC AT CVG, KY.

**Time**

Date : 200210  
Day : Thu  
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CVG.Airport  
State Reference : KY

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CVG.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Ferry

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4560  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 166  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1368

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

THE FO AND I RPTED AT XA30 FOR READY RESERVE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ASSIGNMENT IS TO COVER REGULAR FLT SCHEDULE PROBS. WE ARE SUPPOSED TO BE RELEASED BY XA00. AT XD00 WE WERE GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT TO TAKE A GOOD ACFT TO AN OUTSTATION AND BRING A BROKEN ACFT BACK ON A FERRY PERMIT. I ARGUED, TO NOT AVAIL, THAT A REGULAR RESCUE SHOULD DO THIS SINCE THEY WERE PROPERLY RESTED. WE DID THE ASSIGNMENT AND DID NOT RETURN TO CVG UNTIL XI00. WE WERE BOTH EXHAUSTED. ON APCH, THE FO, DUE TO FATIGUE, SOMEHOW MANAGED TO DESELECT ALL NAV INFO FROM HIS SCREEN JUST AS WE WERE ABOUT TO JOIN THE LOC. THE ACFT TURNED AWAY FROM THE COURSE. FORTUNATELY, I CAUGHT THE ERROR QUICKLY AND RE-ESTABLISHED THE ACFT QUICKLY INBOUND. FATIGUE IS VERY DANGEROUS AND UNDERRATED.

Synopsis :

IN A RPT THAT ALLEGES FLC FATIGUE DUE TO SCHEDULING AS BEING CAUSAL, A CL65 PIC RE-ESTABLISHES HIS ACFT ONTO THE LOC AFTER THE FO, PF, HAD ERASED HIS NAV INFO FROM HIS SCREEN DURING AN ILS APCH TO CVG, KY.

**ACN: 564662**

**Time**

Date : 200210

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

State Reference : IL

**Environment**

Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZAU.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : Flight Attendant In Charge

ASRS Report : 564662

**Person / 2**

ASRS Report : 565213

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events**

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 4

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative :

FLT ATTENDANT #4 AND I (FLT ATTENDANT #1) WERE TALKING AT FRONT OF ACFT WHEN OUR EARS STARTED TO BOTHER US. I WAS JUST PICKING UP THE INTERPHONE TO CALL THE PLTS WHEN THE OXYGEN MASKS DROPPED. WE STARTED OUR PROCS FOR A DECOMPRESSION. I MADE A PA INSTRUCTING PAX TO REMAIN SEATED AND ON THE USE OF THE MASK. THERE WAS A WOMAN PAX IN THE FRONT LAVATORY WE MADE SURE SHE WAS OK. FLT ATTENDANTS #2 AND #4 WENT FROM MASK TO MASK THROUGHOUT THE CABIN TO CHK ON PAX. I WAS GETTING CALLS FROM THE COCKPIT (AND CALLING THEM) SO I STAYED ON THE INTERPHONE. AFTER APPROX 5 MINS, THE CAPT ADVISED US IT WAS SAFE TO STOP USING THE OXYGEN AND THAT WE WERE DIVERTING TO BUF. SEVERAL PAX WERE COMPLAINING OF EAR DISCOMFORT. MEDICAL PERSONNEL MET THE FLT. #4 FLT ATTENDANT LATER SUFFERED FROM DIZZINESS AND ALMOST PASSED OUT. ALL OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS DID AN EXCELLENT JOB DURING (AND AFTER) THE DECOMPRESSION. WE HAD ALL JUST ATTENDED RECURRENT TRAINING RECENTLY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 565213: FLT ATTENDANT #1 AND I EXPERIENCED CHANGE OF PRESSURE IN ACFT AND HAD DIFFICULTY CLRING OUR EARS. FLT ATTENDANT #1 WAS MAKING CALL TO COCKPIT WHEN OXYGEN MASKS DROPPED. THE CABIN BECAME VERY LOUD WITH THE OXYGEN FLOWING AND CABIN SMELLED OF SMOKE, WHICH WE LATER FOUND OUT IS THE SMELL OF THE OXYGEN RUNNING. ELDERLY WOMAN IN FIRST CLASS LAVATORY NEEDED ASSISTANCE PUTTING ON HER MASK AND I TOLD HER TO STAY THERE. PAX IN FIRST ROW OF COACH WERE POINTING TO 7X&Y. WHEN I GOT TO THEM, THEIR OXYGEN COMPARTMENT HAD NOT DROPPED OPEN. BECAUSE ELDERLY WOMAN IN LAVATORY HAD BEEN IN 7Z, THERE WERE ONLY 2 PEOPLE IN THAT ROW SO MOVED 7X&Y OVER TO USE THE EXTRA MASKS IN ROW 700Z. THERE WERE 2 OR 3 PAX WHO WERE COMPLAINING OF SEVERE HEAD PAIN DURING OUR DSCNT TO LOWER ALT DURING DECOMPRESSION. I WENT FROM MASK TO MASK CHKING ON EVERYONE, MAKING SURE THEY WERE ALL USING THEIR OXYGEN, BECAUSE THE MASKS DO NOT INFLATE, THERE WERE QUITE A FEW PEOPLE THAT COMPLAINED OF THEIR OXYGEN MASK NOT WORKING, BUT OF COURSE THEY WERE. I TRIED TO EASE EVERYONE'S FEARS AND STAYED IN THE CABIN UNTIL TOLD BY CAPT TO PREPARE FOR LNDG. TIME OF DECOMPRESSION WAS PROBABLY ONLY 5-10 MINS. FLT ATTENDANT #1 SAID SHE REMOVED HER MASK AWAY TO GIVE PAX AND BECAUSE THE ROAR IN THE CABIN WAS SO LOUD, PAX WERE NOT HEARING ME THROUGH MY MASK, SO I WAS TAKING IT OFF LONG ENOUGH TO QUICKLY SAY SOMETHING. FELT TIRED AFTER LNDG AND GETTING EVERYONE TAKEN CARE OF BY PARAMEDICS. NO PHYSICAL INJURIES, JUST HEAD AND EAR PAIN. I HAD INNER EAR AND BAL PROBS GO AFTER INCIDENT.

Synopsis :

MD80 CREW HAD A CABIN DECOMPRESSION. SOME PAX OXYGEN MASK DOORS DID NOT OPEN.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CAK.Airport  
State Reference : OH

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : CAK.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3700  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 150  
ASRS Report : 565175

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met  
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : GLIDESLOPE INDICATOR  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolutory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

THIS WAS A CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHT ASSIGNMENT, THE THIRD IN A ROW. THE PREVIOUS NIGHT, I HAD NO SLEEP DUE TO NOISE IN THE HOTEL. I WAS UNABLE TO GET ANY SLEEP THE FOLLOWING DAY EITHER. I ESTIMATE I HAD BEEN WITHOUT SLEEP FOR ABOUT 42 HRS. DUE TO THE SHORT FLT (DTW-CAK) MY FO SUGGESTED, AND I AGREED, TO BRIEF THE ILS RWY 23 APCH TO CAK BEFORE DEPARTING DTW. THE APCH CALLS FOR INTERCEPTING THE GS AT OR ABOVE 3200 FT MSL. ONCE ACQUIRING THE ARPT VISUALLY, WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 23. I MANEUVERED THE ACFT TO INTERCEPT THE LOC OUTSIDE THE FAF AND SET THE GS INTERCEPT ALT TO 2300 FT INSTEAD OF 3200 FT AS I SHOULD HAVE. I THEN DSNDDED TO 2300 FT SINCE THE GS INDICATION SEEMED TO AGREE WE WERE SLIGHTLY 'HIGH.' ONCE ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC AT 2300 FT, THE GS INDICATION WAS CORRECTLY INDICATING 'LOW.' AT THIS POINT. I NOTICED THE VASI LIGHTS ALSO INDICATING BELOW GS AND THE FO NOTICED OUR ALT AND SAID WE SHOULD BE AT 3200 FT, NOT 2300 FT. WE CONTINUED UNTIL GS INTERCEPT AND COMPLETED THE APCH. I BELIEVE I TRANSPOSED THE ALT DIGITS DUE TO FATIGUE. ALSO, I WILL NO LONGER BRIEF AN APCH BEFORE TKOF. I WILL BRIEF IT SHORTLY BEFORE THE APCH SO THAT IT IS MORE EASILY RECALLED DURING THE APCH, EVEN IF CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH.

Synopsis :

CL65 FLC INTERCEPTS ILS GS 900 FT BELOW PUBLISHED HT.

**Time**

Date : 200211

Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CYYZ.Airport

State Reference : ON

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CYYZ.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 565322

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Local

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

CREW FATIGUE/CURFEW VIOLATION. BOTH RESERVE COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS WERE RELEASED FROM THEIR EARLY RESERVE ASSIGNMENT AND REASSIGNED TO THE LATE RESERVE ASSIGNMENT THE NIGHT PRIOR TO COVER A RED EYE SEQUENCE THE FOLLOWING NIGHT. I WAS PRO-OFFERED THIS TRIP AND FELT IN MY COMFORT ZONE ACCEPTING THIS REASSIGNMENT SINCE I HAD 24 HRS TO READJUST MY SCHEDULE IN ATTEMPT TO RECEIVE THE REQUIRED REST TO SAFELY FLY THIS TRIP. HAVING FLOWN THE SAME SEQUENCE THE MONTH PRIOR AS A REGULAR LINE HOLDER WITH ALMOST THE EXACT SAME PHYSICAL CONDITIONS, IE, STRONG JET STREAM, POOR WX AT DEST, AND EARLY ARR CURFEW TO DEAL WITH, I CAN SEE NOW STEPPING BACK FROM IT THAT MY DECISION TO FLY AND ALERTNESS WAS CLOUDED BY A LACK OF REST. THE NET RESULT IS THAT WE LANDED 3 MINS PRIOR TO CURFEW IN TORONTO BEHIND A HVY B777 AND IT DIDN'T DAWN ON EITHER CAPT OR FO UNTIL AFTER ROLLOUT AS WE WERE TAXIING IN THAT WE GOOFED. AFTER COMPLETING THE PARKING CHKLIST AND BEING REMINDED OF MY MISTAKE BY THE AGENT, I EVEN HAD DIFFICULTY ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT OPS WITH A SIMPLE PHONE CALL TO CLR THE AIR. NOT TO EMBARRASS MYSELF ANY FURTHER NOW, AS A WALKING ZOMBIE, I DECIDED NOT TO HOLD THE REST OF THE CREW UP ANY LONGER AND HEADED TO THE CREW VAN AND HOTEL FOR SOME MUCH NEEDED REST. I COULD VENT, RANT AND RAVE ABOUT SOME CASUAL FACTORS RELATING TO MY DECISION TO LAND THAT NIGHT, BUT AS PROFESSIONAL PLTS, WE'VE ALL BEEN THERE BEFORE AND SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE BETTER SERVED IN THE DEBRIEF AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

Synopsis :

B737-700 CREW LANDED 3 MINS BEFORE CURFEW RESTRS PERMITTED AT CYYZ.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Mon  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EGLL.Airport  
State Reference : FO

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Ceiling : CLR

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : EGLL.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3481  
ASRS Report : 565356

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4941  
ASRS Report : 565523

**Person / 3**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ON DSCNT INTO EGLL, CLRED OUT OF FLT LEVELS TO 4000 FT (LCL ALTIMETER SETTING 1001 MB). CREW FORGOT TO RESET ALTIMETERS AND LEVELED AT FL040 (1013 MB) WHICH WAS ACTUALLY 3700 FT -- 300 FT LOW. ERROR WAS FIRST NOTICED AND IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED WHEN ATC QUESTIONED OUR ALT, ASKED US TO CHK OUR ALTIMETER SETTING, AND SAID HE SHOWED US AT 3700 FT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 565523: THE SETTING OF QNE WAS UNINTENTIONALLY NOT SET AND THIS LACK OF ACTION WAS MISSED BY ALL 3 PLTS IN THE COCKPIT. ACTION WAS TAKEN TO CORRECT ALT, IE, SET ALTIMETER 1001 MB. APCH WAS CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENCE. ALL SOP'S WERE FOLLOWED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FREQ CONGESTION AND ALL NIGHTER FATIGUE.

Synopsis :

ATC NOTES AN ALT OVERSHOOT ULTIMATELY ATTRIBUTED TO INCORRECT SETTING OF THE ALTIMETER.

**Time**

Date : 200211

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

State Reference : FO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

ASRS Report : 565879

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

ASRS Report : 565880

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

OUR FLT WAS CLRED TO 2000 FT WITH AN ALTIMETER OF 998. THE CAPT AND FO BOTH MISTAKENLY SET 29.98 INCHES INSTEAD OF 998 MILLIBARS. I WAS THE RELIEF PLT AND DIDN'T CATCH THE ERROR. AS WE DSNDED TO 2000 FT, WE ACTUALLY WENT A LITTLE LOWER DUE TO THE INCORRECT ALTIMETER SETTING. ATC ADVISED US TO MAINTAIN 2000 FT. THIS CLUED US IN TO THE MISTAKEN ALTIMETER SETTING. THE CAPT AND FO SET 998 MILLIBARS AND SAW THAT WE WERE NOW BELOW 2000 FT. WE MADE AN IMMEDIATE CORRECTION BACK TO 2000 FT. THIS IS THE CLASSIC ALTIMETER ERROR THAT WE ARE TAUGHT TO BE AWARE OF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 565880: WE WERE OVER 350 FT LOW WHEN APCH QUERIED US AS TO OUR ALT. THIS EVENT OCCURRED ON A WX DIVERT AFTER FLYING ALL NIGHT. I, THE CAPT, HAD NOT FLOWN TO EUROPE SINCE APR/XX/02 AND IT HAD BEEN 4 YRS SINCE MY LAST EUROPEAN TRIP PRIOR TO THIS TRIP. IT WAS THE CLASSIC 998 VERSUS 29.98 ERROR. I FELT THAT THIS EVENT WAS CRITICAL AND SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE LONG LIST OF ALTIMETER SETTING ERRORS. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN A MUCH MORE SERIOUS/FATAL ERROR IN A DIFFERENT SCENARIO. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS WAS THE FACT THAT WE HAD DIVERTED TO BRU AND WE WERE ALL FATIGUED AFTER THE LONG FLT COUPLED WITH HOLDING AT LONDON -- FOLLOWED BY A DIVERT TO BRU.

Synopsis :

SETTING 29 POINT 98 INCHES INSTEAD OF 998 MILLIBARS RESULTS IN DSCNT 350 FT BELOW CLRED ALT AND BELOW THE MSA DEPICTED ON THE ARPT APCH CHARTS AT BRUSSELS.

**ACN: 565999**

### **Time**

Date : 200211

Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

### **Place**

State Reference : VA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 25000

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

### **Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model : B727-100

Mission : Ferry

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

### **Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9000

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700

ASRS Report : 565999

### **Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

### **Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Second Officer

### **Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Radar

### **Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overrode Automation

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

### **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative :

ON FLT FROM FLL TO ABE, WE WERE IN CRUISE FLT AT AROUND FL250. SUDDENLY, WE ENCOUNTERED CLR AIR TURB. IN 14 YRS OF FLYING, I HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED SUCH VIOLENT TURB. I CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT, SLOWED THE AIRPLANE DOWN WHILE THE CAPT TOLD ATC THAT WE WERE EXPERIENCING SEVERE TURB AND NEEDED TO DSND. 2 OTHER AIRLINERS ALSO RPTED SEVERE TURB AND WERE ASKING FOR LOWER. AT TIMES, I COULD NOT CTL THE ACFT OR EVEN READ THE INSTS BECAUSE THE JARRING WAS SO RAPID IN ALL DIRECTIONS. LUCKILY, WE WERE A CREW ONLY FERRY FLT AND EVERYONE IN THE BACK ALSO HAD ON THEIR SEATBELTS, FASTENED. I FINALLY GOT THE AIRPLANE DSNDDED BELOW 17000 FT AND IT FINALLY SMOOTHED OUT. WE WERE LITERALLY EXHAUSTED AND WERE NOT SURE WHICH DIRECTION WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE GOING. ATC TOLD US TO TURN TO A HDG NOW OR WE WOULD PENETRATE RESTR AIRSPACE. IN THE DSCNT, I DIDN'T HEAR ANY TCASII WARNINGS AND I DON'T THINK WE CONFLICTED WITH ANY OTHER ACFT OR PENETRATED ANY RESTR AIRSPACE. WE CONTINUED ON TO ABE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Synopsis :

B727-100 CREW ENCOUNTERED SEVERE CLR AIR TURB IN ZDC CLASS A AIRSPACE.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport  
State Reference : CO

**Aircraft / 1**

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B737-300  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
ASRS Report : 566497

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

BEGAN TKOF ROLL AT APPROX XA55. AT APPROX 100 KIAS, COCKPIT DOOR OPENED. THE DOOR WAS CLOSED BY THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT APPROX 2 MINS LATER AFTER AIRBORNE. THERE WERE NO SECURITY INCIDENTS OR KNOWN ADVERSE PAX REACTIONS TO INCIDENT. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) CREW BECAME DISTR JUST PRIOR TO PUSHBACK DUE TO A PAX DEPLANING ISSUE AND POSSIBLE IMPACT ON AN ON-TIME DEP. 2) PRIOR TO DSCNT, CREW HAD FLOWN 5 SUCCESSIVE LEGS OVER 2 DAYS ON ACFT WITH THE NEW FORTRESS DOOR AND NO SECURITY BAR. 3) CREW DUTY DAY HAD BEGUN IN MFR WITH INCIDENT AT DEN OCCURRING APPROX 9 HRS LATER. FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE. BOTTOM LINE: THE FACT THAT WE HAD AN UNMODIFIED DOOR WITH A SECURITY BAR FLEW UNDER OUR RADAR SCREEN DEN. CRM FACTORS MAY HAVE BEEN DISTR, CREW FATIGUE AND THE FACT THAT PREVIOUS LEGS ON THIS IDENT WERE FLOWN EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE NEW DOOR AND NO SECURITY BAR. BOTH CAPT AND FO AGREED THAT WITH 2 DIFFERENT DOOR SYS NOW ON THE COMPANY B737 FLEET, THAT WE BOTH NEEDED TO DEVELOP A HABIT PATTERN DURING PREDEP THAT INCLUDED A VISUAL CHK OF THE COCKPIT DOOR PRIOR TO PUSHBACK.

Synopsis :

A B737-300 CREW, ON TKOF, EXPERIENCED THE COCKPIT DOOR COMING OPEN.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Sun  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

**Place**

State Reference : IL  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 33000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZAU.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : A319  
Mission : Passenger  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level  
Flight Phase.Descent : Vacating Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250  
ASRS Report : 566549

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 548  
ASRS Report : 566548

**Person / 3**

Function.Controller : Radar

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Overspeed Warning  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

WE WERE INBOUND TO ORD ON THE BRD3. IRK TRANSITION STAR. CAPT WAS PF. FLT TIME FOR LEG WAS 1 HR 45 MINS ABOUT 1 HR PRIOR TO ARR, WE PLANNED TO CALL FOR THE FLT PAPERS FOR OUR NEXT LEG, AFTER RECEIPT OF NEW ORD ATIS, AS CALLING FOR FLT PAPERS TIES UP COMMERCIAL RADIO. THE NEW ATIS CAME OUT ABOUT 10 MINS LATE AT 10 MINS PAST THE HR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE CALLED FOR FLT PAPERS AND OUR PURSER BROUGHT US OUR BREAKFAST MEALS. WE HAD BEEN OFF THE GATE ABOUT 1 HR 20 MINS AND AIRBORNE 1 HR. OUR FLT PAPERS WERE DELIVERED PIECEMEAL AND SLOWER THAN NORMAL. THE RESULT WAS, I WAS EATING, FLT PLANNING, RUNNING THE RADIO, PLANNING OUR ARR AND MONITORING THE CAPT'S FLYING SIMULTANEOUSLY. WHILE MORE THAN 200 NM FROM ORD, WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO CROSS KEOKK INTXN AT FL330. CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND PROGRAMMED THE FMGC FOR IT. CAPT THEREAFTER MISSED BEGINNING THE DSCNT AT THE FMGC CALCULATED TOP-OF-DSCNT POINT BY LESS THAN 10 NM. THE CAPT FIRST PUSHED THE FCU ALT KNOB WISHING TO ENGAGE A VNAV DSCNT. HOWEVER, AIRBUS LOGIC PRESUMES A CRUISE DSCNT AT 1000 FPM FOR DSCNTS BEGUN MORE THAN 200 NM FROM THE DEST. BY THE TIME THE CAPT REALIZED THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT DSCNTING FAST ENOUGH IT WAS TOO LATE. CAPT DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHURST AND EMPLOYED FULL SPD BRAKES, BUT CROSSED KEOKK STILL ABOUT 800 FT HIGH. WE WERE GIVEN AN ATC FREQ CHANGE JUST PRIOR TO KEOKK, AND NEITHER CTLR MENTIONED OUR DEV OR ANY LOSS OF SEPARATION. LEVEL AT FL330, CAPT RE-ENGAGED AUTOPLT 1 AND MOVED THE THRUST LEVERS TO THE CLB DETENT, INTENDING TO RE-ENGAGE AUTOTHURST. HOWEVER, UNBEKNOWNST TO US, HE FAILED TO PUSH THE AUTOTHURST BUTTON ON THE FCU (THE SECOND STEP IN ENGAGING THE AUTOTHURST SYS). BECAUSE OF THIS, HE HAD IN REALITY MANUALLY SET CLB THRUST, WHICH HAD NO ADVERSE AFFECT FOR OUR SHORT SEGMENT AT FL330. SOON FOLLOWED CLRNC TO FL290. CAPT COMMANDED A VERT SPD DSCNT OF 1000 FPM. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE AUTOTHURST WAS NOT ENGAGED, THE THRUST DID NOT RETARD. THE COMBINATION OF 1000 FPM DSCNT AND CLB THRUST CAUSED A MOMENTARY OVERSPD OF 2-5 KTS. CAPT REDUCED THRUST MANUALLY AND DECREASED THE DSCNT RATE TO PREVENT MORE OVERSPD. THIS OVERSPD COULD HAVE BEEN EASILY PREVENTED HAD EITHER OF US READ THE FMA'S INDICATED ON OUR PRIMARY FLT DISPLAYS AS WE HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO DO OVER AND OVER AGAIN THROUGHOUT OUR CAREERS AS 'GLASS' ACFT PLTS. CAUSES, EITHER WHOLLY OR PARTLY: 1) TRYING TO DO TOO MANY THINGS AT ONE TIME. 2) FATIGUE: SHORT LAYOVER COUPLED WITH XA30 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING WAKE-UP AND A CHALLENGING/DEMANDING DEP OUT OF DEN WITH DEICING AND WINTER OPS. 3) LOW BLOOD SUGAR: 14 HRS SINCE MY LAST MEAL. 4) OVERCONFIDENCE ON MY PART REGARDING THIS CAPT'S FALLIBILITY, AS THIS WAS OUR 26TH LEG TOGETHER THIS MONTH THROUGHOUT WHICH HE SHOWED SUPERIOR AIRMANSHIP. AND 5) LATE FOOD, LATE ATIS, SLOW AND PIECEMEAL FLT PAPER DELIVERY.

Synopsis :

A320 FLC EXCEEDS THE ACFT MAX SPD (VMO) DURING DSCNT AND MISSES THE ASSIGNED XING RESTR.

**Time**

Date : 200211  
Day : Fri  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

**Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : BUF.Airport  
State Reference : NY

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : BUF.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Mission : Freight  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

**Person / 1**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7000  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1800  
ASRS Report : 567250

**Person / 2**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Person / 3**

Function.Flight Crew : Second Officer

**Person / 4**

Function.Controller : Approach

**Events**

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

I WAS ACTING AS THE PNF IN A 3 MAN CREW CARGO FLT. APPROX 100 MI FROM OUR DEST THE CAPT BEGAN THE DSCNT FROM OUR CRUISE ALT. A FEW MINS INTO OUR DSCNT WE PASSED THROUGH FL180 AND SET OUR ALTIMETERS TO 29.89 ACCORDING TO THE LNDG PERFORMANCE CARD THAT WAS FILLED OUT BY OUR FE AFTER HE LISTENED TO THE DEST ATIS. WE LEVELED OUT AT OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 10000 FT AT WHICH TIME THE CTLR INFORMED US THAT HE SHOWED US AT 9500 FT. HE TOLD US THE CORRECT ALTIMETER SETTING WAS 29.52 NOT 29.89. WE RESET OUR ALTIMETERS AND IMMEDIATELY ADJUSTED OUR ALT. NO CONFLICT OCCURRED, AND WE CONTINUED TO OUR DEST WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE FE LATER STATED THE ATIS WAS VERY WEAK AND HARD TO UNDERSTAND. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT FATIGUE WAS A PARTIAL FACTOR IN OUR SIT. WE WERE FLYING NIGHT CARGO AND HAD ALL BEEN UP IN EXCESS OF 16 HRS. THE CTR CTLR GAVE US A ALTIMETER WITH OUR DSCNT CLRNC FOR BUF. OUR DEST WAS ROC, SO I REMEMBER THINKING WE SHOULD USE THE ONE FROM THE ATIS IN ROC. NOT ONE OF US WAS ALERT ENOUGH TO CATCH THIS DISCREPANCY!

Synopsis :

AN INCORRECTLY SET ALTIMETER RESULTS IN AN ALT OVERSHOOT DURING DSCNT.

**Time**

Date : 200212  
Day : Wed  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

**Place**

Locale Reference.Intersection : Ditch  
State Reference : NJ  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 13000

**Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Ceiling.Single Value : 14000

**Aircraft / 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZNY.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model : EMB ERA 145 ER&LR  
Mission : Passenger

**Person / 1**

Function.Oversight : PIC  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5246.7  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 153.4  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 693.9  
ASRS Report : 568227

**Person / 2**

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative :

ACFT #1 WAS PARKED AT THE GATE. THE ACFT WAS DE-PWRED. I PROCEEDED TO PWR UP THE ACFT. A GND FUELER CAME OVER TO THE ACFT AND FUELED IT WITHOUT MY PROMPTING (HE ASSUMED IT WAS THE HPN AIRPLANE AS WELL). AS A RESULT OF BEING UNABLE TO QUICKLY FIND AND HAVING TO PWR UP THE ACFT, WE WERE DELAYED BEYOND THE NEWLY SCHEDULED XA30Z DEP OUT OF PHL. WITH THE WX BEING POOR IN PHL, I WAS FEELING A SENSE OF URGENCY TO 'MOVE THE FLT' OR RISK BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE 16 HR DUTY TIME REG. THE GATE AGENT CAME DOWN THE JETWAY WITH PAPERWORK AND A DISPATCH RELEASE FOR THE FLT TO HPN. I CONFIRMED THE FUEL LOAD ON BOARD MATCHED THAT OF MY RELEASE AND SIGNED THE STATION COPY. I HANDED THE RELEASE AND A LOAD MANIFEST BACK TO THE AGENT (WE HAD ZERO PAX). I BLOCKED OUT AT XA50Z. WHILE CLBING OUT OF PHL, I REVIEWED THE RELEASE AGAIN AND NOTICED THAT THE DISPATCH RELEASE INDICATED THAT THE ACFT SHOULD BE ACFT #2, WHICH HAS A COMPANY CODE OF YYY. THE ACFT I WAS IN HAD A COMPANY CODE OF XXX (ACFT #1). I INFORMED DISPATCH DURING THE CLB, VIA SELCAL, OF THE DISCREPANCY, AND THEY INFORMED ME TO CONTINUE ON TO HPN. I ARRIVED IN HPN AT XB50Z AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED DISPATCH CTL AND THE REGIONAL CHIEF PLT. I HAD A DUTY OFF TIME OF XC05Z. AS A RESULT OF THE WX, I HAD A LONG DAY. I WAS TIRED AND AS A RESULT, MY JUDGEMENT AND PERCEPTIONS WERE SLOWED. THE LAST MIN CHANGE OF SCHEDULE WAS UNFORESEEN, AND I FELT I WAS OBLIGATED, SINCE IT WAS LEGAL TO CREW SCHEDULING AND DISPATCH TO COMPLETE THE FLT TO HPN OR RISK POSSIBLE QUESTIONING OR DISCIPLINARY ACTION BY MY COMPANY'S CHIEF PLT. BEING UNABLE TO QUICKLY FIND THE ACFT COMPOUNDED THE PROB. EVERYONE AT THE PHILADELPHIA STATION, CUSTOMER SVC REPS, FUELER, GND CREW, AND FLT CREW WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS THE CORRECT ACFT (A NORMAL FLOW ROUTINE). THAT, ALONG WITH BEING TIRED, THE SENSE OF URGENCY TO MAINTAIN LEGALITY WITH THE 16 HR DUTY TIME LIMITATION AND SIMILARITY OF ACFT CODES XXX ACFT #1 VERSUS YYY ACFT #2 CONTRIBUTED TO MY FAILURE TO NOTICE THE DISCREPANCY ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE UNTIL AIRBORNE. POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: OUR COMPANY FREQUENTLY SCHEDULES 14 HR TRIPS WHICH, AS A RESULT OF DELAYS, MAY BUMP UP AGAINST THE 16 HR DUTY DAY LIMIT. BY PUSHING THE DUTY/REST AND FLT TIME REGS, THE PRESSURE TO PERFORM OR FACE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCREASES THE POSSIBILITY OF INADVERTENT MISTAKES. CUSTOMER SVC REPS AND OPS PERSONNEL DO NOT RELY ON ACFT TAIL N-NUMBERS. THEY RELY ON COMPANY RESERVATION COMPUTER CODES (IE, XXX, YYY, ZZZ, ETC) FOR OPS. PLTS RELY MORE ON N-NUMBERS FOR NORMALLY SCHEDULED ROUTINES, CREATING CONFUSION WITH ACFT IDENT. AT MY COMPANY AS A PLT, WE ARE NOT TRAINED ON USING THE COMPANY COMPUTER SYS. AFTER 14 HRS OF DUTY, ACFT SWAPS AND LAST MIN CHANGES TO A SCHEDULE SHOULD BE MINIMIZED IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE QUESTIONING OF LEGALITY. BECAUSE OF THE LAST MIN CHANGE, I HAD TO QUICKLY AND ACCURATELY FIND OUT THE BLOCK TIME TO ENSURE I WAS LEGAL, FIND AND PREFLT THE ACFT, FUEL THE ACFT, AND BLOCK OUT AND HOPE FOR NO OTHER DELAYS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN LEGALITY.

Synopsis :

E145 CREW FLEW THE WRONG ACFT TO THE DEST AFTER THE COMPANY HAD THE WRONG ACFT ON THE GATE.