
        Feeling 
          a bit heavy? Got weight in the wrong places? If it's a personal problem, 
          you can blame the holidays. But, if it's an aircraft issue, the culprit 
          is likely to be a weight and balance error. At best, overloaded or improperly 
          balanced aircraft experience degraded performance and handling. Large 
          errors can result in the loss of stability and control. 
        Running 
          the Numbers 
          
        This 
          B737-300 flight crew did not follow up on the first clue that the load 
          numbers were off. As the Captain reported, it took five more clues and 
          a firm landing to confirm their suspicions. 
          
        
          - The 
            load sheet was given to us for an on-time pushback and the First Officer 
            loaded the numbers in the Performance Computer and Control Display 
            Unit (CDU) per normal operations. No discrepancies were noted at this 
            time. However, I thought that the V-speeds seemed lower than what 
            they should have been (clue #1). The passenger count on the load sheet 
            and the flight attendant passenger count matched.... The takeoff...was 
            normal. We initially set the throttles at 90% and left them there. 
            This helped our takeoff performance but also probably helped hide 
            the weight discrepancy.... The First Officer informed me that the 
            aircraft seemed to fly as though it was heavier than we had calculated, 
            but he thought that the trim setting might have been a little off 
            (clue #2).... The descent was a little behind the profile required 
            to make the crossing altitudes (clue #3). We were having trouble slowing 
            the aircraft and getting it down on the approach with flaps 30-degrees 
            as briefed (clue #4). We elected to use flaps 40-degrees, but still 
            could not meet the stabilized approach criteria, so we asked for Runway 
            4. Tower was unable to give us Runway 4, so we elected to go around. 
            This probably helped our performance since the fuel used on the go-around 
            lowered our gross weight for the subsequent approach and landing.... 
            On the second approach we both noticed that the aircraft was unusually 
            nose high for flaps 30-degrees and that more power than normal was 
            required to maintain our calculated approach speed (clue #5). We actually 
            flew ten knots faster than our calculated approach speed in order 
            to have better control over our pitch attitude. At one point during 
            the approach I noticed the stall indicator appear at the top of the 
            Heads Up Display (HUD) and then go away (clue #6). At this point we 
            knew that something was wrong, but even with all the clues we did 
            not know what it was. The approach ended with a hard landing. It finally 
            dawned on me that perhaps our weights were wrong on the load sheet.... 
            When we checked the load sheet we realized that the agent had not 
            added the passenger and cargo weight to the OEW (Operational Empty 
            Weight) and had used the OEW as the Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW). This resulted 
            in a 22,000 lb. error in our performance calculations.
Heavy 
          Baggage 
        
Failure 
          to account for the additional weight of passenger's "heavy" 
          bags can have a significant effect on the performance and control of 
          smaller aircraft. In the first of two ASRS reports that address this 
          matter, a Jetstream 41 crew wisely delayed their departure because of 
          suspicious indications. 
        
          - The 
            baggage loading and count was delayed and the baggage form got to 
            the crew late. Wanting to make an on-time takeoff, we completed our 
            calculations as quickly as possible.... While taxiing out to the runway, 
            the stall lights on the CAP (Central Annunciator Panel) momentarily 
            flashed on and off. This occurred twice during taxi. We referred to 
            the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook ) and rechecked circuit breakers. 
            No other indications occurred at this time so I assumed it was a malfunctioning 
            stall system. We decided to return to the gate to investigate. While 
            taxiing back, I noticed that the nosewheel steering was becoming intermittent.... 
            When maintenance arrived, they indicated that the nosewheel was considerably 
            extended. I asked the flight attendant to move two passengers to empty 
            seats in the forward portion of the cabin. Maintenance indicated that 
            the strut had compressed some, so I decided to taxi back to the gate. 
            The nosewheel steering worked fine. At the gate...the First Officer 
            indicated that there was a 350 lb. error in his calculations of the 
            baggage.... Also, the ramp inspectors informed me that the baggage 
            count was correct, but some heavy bags were indeed "very heavy" 
            and were loaded in the aft end of the compartment.
This 
          ERJ 145 Captain's report on a heavy baggage incident was the subject 
          of a recent ASRS Alert Bulletin.  
        
          - The 
            baggage slip indicated that we had 2,204 lbs. of bags. At rotation 
            I noted that the trim setting was clearly incorrect and I had to push 
            the elevator to the forward limit to recover from the nose up pitch. 
            The aircraft seemed to be much heavier aft than calculated. After 
            arriving at [destination] the ramp personnel indicated that the baggage 
            seemed excessively heavy. The bags were weighed and the recalculated 
            figure put the cargo weight approximately 1,095 lbs. over the maximum 
            limit.
An 
          Alarming Takeoff 
        
After 
          making mistakes that almost led to an accident, this C172 pilot generously 
          shared the experience through ASRS. It would be a mistake not to heed 
          the lesson.  
        
          - [I] 
            proceeded with the departure on a grass strip approximately 2,200 
            feet long. At 60 kts. I rotated and started to climb. I had packed 
            the plane and messed up because I had an aft center of gravity. Without 
            enough runway left to put down, I climbed (with the stall warning 
            screaming) to avoid trees at the end of the runway. [I] just cleared 
            the trees. The contributing factors were too much baggage, not knowing 
            the density altitude, and complacency. Thank God I am still around 
            to share this lesson. 
        Holiday 
          Hints 
           
        
 Holiday 
          pressures can affect concentration and judgement. Three ASRS reports 
          offer some valuable lessons about this seasonal syndrome.
Holiday 
          pressures can affect concentration and judgement. Three ASRS reports 
          offer some valuable lessons about this seasonal syndrome.  
        
Just 
          after an airport "turnaround" (from south to north oriented 
          runway operations), this A310 flight crew was given clearance to cross 
          an active runway enroute to the assigned runway. The Captain picks up 
          the story as they approached the hold short line of the intermediate 
          runway. 
        
          - I 
            immediately saw a DC10 on short final for Runway 27 and slammed on 
            the brakes.... We did encroach slightly on the Taxiway B to Runway 
            27 hold short line.... The DC10 did not appear to take any evasive 
            action.... I strongly suspect that there were considerable distractions 
            for the controllers associated with turning the field around from 
            southerly to northerly operations. "Habit patterns for survival" 
            saved the day. That is: 1. There were no distractions (e.g. no Flight 
            Management Computer programming) prior to crossing the active runways, 
            and 2. Good aircraft alignment and lookout facilitated properly clearing 
            both left and right before crossing active runways and taxiways.  
            This 
              was quite a jolt, even for an experienced and proficient Captain 
              and reinforces why we do things the way we do. A piece of wisdom 
              (from a 40-year airline veteran) came to mind as I reviewed these 
              issues, "It's the holidays, and people don't concentrate like 
              they do at other times." 
Several 
          reports in the November 2003 Callback (#290) 
          addressed the problem of unplanned flight into Instrument Meteorological 
          Conditions (IMC). Another report on this dangerous practice offers a 
          timely lesson: Don't let the pressure to get home for the holidays cloud 
          your judgement.  
        
          -  
            I departed in VFR conditions with a weather 
            briefing from the Flight Service Station (FSS) forecasting VFR to 
            Marginal VFR along my route of flight. After climbing through scattered 
            clouds, I leveled at 8,500 feet MSL. Near my destination, the layer 
            below closed and I found myself on top of an overcast. By that time, 
            ASOS at my departure point was also reporting overcast (the flight 
            distance was only 80 NM). Weather was clearly building in all directions. 
            I proceeded to a point above terrain well known to me and descended 
            through clouds to approximately 1,000 feet AGL, where I broke out 
            [and landed] at a nearby airfield.  
            The 
              weather was forecast to worsen in the direction of flight. When 
              it became clear that I would be unable to proceed VFR under the 
              clouds with sufficient altitude above the ground, the appropriate 
              decision would have been to return to my departure point immediately. 
              I felt pressed to get my errands done and get home for the holidays, 
              and this affected my judgement when I decided to climb above and 
              continue the flight. I have instrument training, but have not yet 
              been rated. 
Holiday 
          fatigue and haste contributed to this private pilot's runway incursion. 
        
          - After 
            landing on Runway 36, I was instructed by Tower to make a right turn 
            on the next taxiway and hold short of Runway 6.... My attention was 
            not where it should have been. I was concentrating on the distant 
            taxiway and ramp lighting and on my desire to finish this flight and 
            return to my home base. As a result of my lack of attention, I proceeded 
            to cross Runway 6 without clearance and with an aircraft on final 
            for Runway 6. I was immediately advised and admonished for my error.... 
            I was tired due to the holidays and my personal workload... As the 
            saying goes, haste makes waste....
        From the Maintenance 
          Desk 
        
ASRS 
          continues to receive reports concerning B767 wheel spacers. (see Callback 
          #282, March 2003). The following two reports shed some light on possible 
          causes for spacer problems on the nose gear.  
        
          -  
            Even with the proper manuals and paperwork on hand, the spacer on 
            the B767 nose wheels seems to be a trap. It continually sticks to 
            the wheel bearing when the assembly is removed from the aircraft. 
            The 767 has the only nose wheel spacer of [my airline's] fleet types. 
            This and the fact that B767 tires are rarely changed at this station 
            contribute to the spacer being missed.
          -  
            I was notified by my supervisor that an axle spacer was found to be 
            missing on the right side nose tire during the walk-around inspection.... 
            On the B767-300 there are two different axle configurations. One is 
            internally threaded and the other is externally threaded. I did not 
            think the externally threaded axle required a spacer. 
According 
          to the air carrier's maintenance manual, wheel spacers are required 
          on both the internally and the externally threaded B767 nose gear axles.