Fuel exhaustion and fuel
mismanagement are common causes of engine failures and forced landings.
A General Aviation (GA) pilot describes how he and his instructor had
to make a forced landing, even after they obtained what they thought
was the necessary fuel for their final leg home.
- My helicopter
CFII and I preflighted the helicopter before...a training flight of
about 1.5 hours. We "dip-sticked" the tanks and determined
that we had approximately 28 gallons aboard. We expected to burn about
12.5 gallons per flight hour. I monitored our fuel state during the
flight. The fuel gauge indicated we had about [5-7 gallons] of fuel
for our return flight. The fuel gauge indicated a drop to almost zero
while we were enroute. We made a precautionary landing at a private
airfield just a few miles from our destination. We persuaded an airfield
resident to turn on their fuel pump...There was no decimal on the
gauge, no obvious 1/10-gallon indicator numerals. My CFII pumped fuel
into...one tank until the fuel pump indictor read "6" and
into the second tank until the indicator read "12."
While preflighting the helicopter again, we noticed that the fuel
gauge still indicated zero. Because the gauge had historically intermittently
indicated zero instead of the actual fuel state and because we thought
we had just on-loaded 12 gallons of fuel, we disbelieved the fuel
gauge, took off, and flew on to our destination. I was hover-taxiing
back to the ramp when the engine sputtered and quit, requiring an
unplanned emergency landing from a three-foot hover.
The fuel tanks were found to be completely dry, after a flight of
only a few miles. Postflight checking of the tanks, fuel boost pumps,
and lines revealed no leaks. I believe that we on-loaded only 1.2
gallons of fuel–not 12 gallons as we had thought. We should have
taken the time to "dip-stick" the fuel tanks to be completely
certain about the amount of fuel on-loaded.
The reporter paid the airfield
resident $20, making that a very expensive gallon of fuel. Still, as
the reporter concludes, That was one of the best buys I’ve ever
made, since it allowed us to fly back to our airport before the engine
quit on the ramp—rather than in the air, requiring a real autorotation
to the ground.
Another GA pilot also made
a precautionary landing when the fuel gauge did not jibe with the planned
fuel burn.
- I gave the
FBO instructions to fill both fuel tanks to 1/2 inch below the filler
neck. I returned four days later, preflighted the aircraft, and looked
in both Color fuel tanks–the level seemed lower than I had requested
but not so low that I was suspicious. I departed...and noticed the
fuel consumption was more than normal. The right tank ran dry soon
after I changed over to it. I advised Center I was going to divert...but
I became concerned that I might run out of fuel, so I chose a good
looking pasture and made a precautionary landing. I called a [nearby
FBO] for fuel. A farmer mowed a strip for me, and I took off and flew
the 5 miles to [my diversion airport]. I have a billing account at
the departure airport, so no fuel receipt was given to me, and my
visual inspection did not clue me in to the fact that I had not been
fueled. I should have used a measuring stick in the tanks.
Visual inspection of tanks,
dipstick measurements, fueling receipts (when available), and fuel gauge
readings should all concur. If any one is out of synch with the others,
the situation warrants a manual fuel check to verify actual fuel status.
Next,
an air cargo crew missed multiple preflight cues that their fuel state
was not as it should be. In portions of the report not cited here, the
Captain lists schedule pressure, crew fatigue, and lack of currency as
causes of this incident:
- During takeoff,
the airplane began to yaw and dip to the left. The takeo Color ff
was rejected. While taxiing back, we discovered that the main fuel
tank was virtually empty, thus starving the #1 engine of fuel. Apparently
the engine flamed out during takeoff, then relit during the rejected
takeoff. Further investigation found a fuel valve open which had allowed
the main tank to pump itself empty into another tank. Both the Captain
and Second Officer missed seeing the low fuel tank quantity, the fuel
transfer light, the low fuel tank warning light, and the fuel fill
valve switch in the wrong position.
As the reporter of another
fuel mismanagement incident summed up: Any fuel situation is potentially
dangerous, no matter how benign it may appear. As I learned many years
ago, fuel in the fuel truck is of little use to a pilot in the air.
In
the past, we have shared reports about insect nests found in fuel tank
vents and pitot tubes. Here is a report of a new location for those pesky
and persistent little wasps known as mud daubers, or dirt daubers. The
First Officer of a B-727 cargo flight tells the tale:
- Preflight,
start, and taxi were normal. Setting pow Color er for takeoff, the
Captain announced that the #1 and #3 throttles felt misaligned with
#2. The decision was made to continue takeoff. Takeoff roll was longer
than normal for this weight. Airborne, the Captain and Flight Engineer
analyzed the engines and determined that the EPR’s [Engine Pressure
Ratios] were extremely high on the #1 and #3 engines for the corresponding
[engine instrument] readings. The decision was made to return to the
airport. Maintenance found the PT2 [Pressure/Temperature terminal
2] probes on engines #1 and #3 to be fouled with dirt dauber nests.
Improper carriage of hazardous
materials (hazmat) can pose a serious threat to air safety. A private
pilot, traveling as a passenger on a commercial flight, reports on an
incident involving a common item that some people might not recognize
as a hazardous material.
- This event
was the ignition of a box of wooden kitchen matches contained in my
duffel bag. Also containe Color d in my bag was a box of fire starter
[sawdust and paraffin, shaped like a candle] which did not ignite.
The matchbox fire went out on its own, and was discovered by smell
by someone loading the baggage. I was informed that both of these
products are illegal to pack in baggage.
I was traveling with a group for a fishing trip, and packed a duffel
bag containing community food and camping gear. I made arrangements
to have fuel and stove oil waiting at our destination, as it is common
knowledge that these are hazardous materials and cannot be transported
safely on a commercial airline. I have spoken with at least 20 people,
including many pilots and several flight instructors, and not one
was aware that matches were a prohibited material.
The reporter notes that the
posted hazmat warning at the airline check-in counter referred to "flammable
liquids and solids," but matches were not included in the list
of examples. He adds that, later, At
the ticket counter...they took out from behind the counter a flier stating
that matches are prohibited. However, it was not posted where the public
could read it, and I would not have thought to ask for the flier if
this event had not occurred.
In another incident, a knowledgeable
First Officer recognized the danger of carrying two hazardous materials
together:
- The ramp
agent came to the cockpit and handed the Captain a Hazmat form for
one container of oil. The Captain rejected the Hazmat form because
it listed only one container and we were asked to carry two. The agent
returned with new copies of the paperwork.
The agent then handed the Captain a new Hazmat form for a canister
of oxygen [which] would go in Bin 4 alongside the oil. I asked the
agent if it was a good idea to put oxygen and oil containers together,
since oil and oxygen can combine if we hit turbulence. The agent didn’t
know. Both the agent and the Captain were satisfied with the oxygen
and oil packed together in the same bin. I told the Captain that I
was not comfortable with this combination, and did not want to fly
with it unless they were separated into different bins.
After discussing several
notable aircraft accidents attributed to improper handling of hazardous
materials, the crew agreed to have the items loaded into separate cargo
areas. The First Officer was wise to insist on the safe course of action.
Some
of the most interesting incidents we hear about at ASRS come to us as
brief reports from modest crew members. For example, the following report
from an L-1011 Captain did not reveal the gravity of the emergency:
- The [overwater]
flight was uneventful until just west of our destination, when an
electrical fire occurred behind one of the circuit breaker panels
in the cockpit. The Second Officer [SO] had to discharge a fire extinguisher
through a narrow seam crack in the panel. The bright white electrical
arcing left the SO visually challenged. An emergency was declared,
and we made an uneventful, but challenging, approach and landing.
Reports from the First and
Second Officers and a callback conversation between the Captain and
an ASRS analyst told a much more harrowing story. From the First Officer
[FO]:
- The Captain’s
autopilot dropped off with several warning flags on his flight instruments.
He transferred control of the aircraft to me. During descent, various
warning lights illuminated, which were reset several times. We ended
up with one pitch trim working.
The Captain was surrounded
by inop flags on his instrument panel, so was unsure of which instruments
were still operating. Random electrical warnings erroneously indicated
that the aircraft was simultaneously on the ground and in the air.
The FO continues:
- The Captain
and I had donned oxygen masks as soon as we detected smoke. The Captain
had a partial com failure with his oxygen mask, then with his headset/boom
mike. Cabin pressurization was climbing.
Cabin pressurization
control was switched to standby mode. The SO found a second fire extinguisher
and discharged it into the continuing red glow in the circuit breaker
panel.
And finally:
- During the
approach, we encountered... failure of both direct lift control auto
spoilers. At touchdown, spoilers were manually extended. I selected
reverse thrust, but no thrust reversers worked. On taxi in, all three
engines were in flight idle. At the gate...the aircraft was still
pressurized–Flight Attendants could not open the door. The SO
tried to shut down all packs and engine bleeds, but could not. The
Captain attempted to shut down the engines with fuel and ignition
switches, but engines kept running. Engine fire [fuel shutoff] handles
were pulled, and engines shut down. The door was opened from the outside,
and the passengers exited.
The final diagnosis from
maintenance personnel: an improperly installed wiring clamp had worn
through the insulation and shorted out. Kudos to the flight crew for
great crew coordination and superb handling of this aircraft emergency.
